Oral Answers to Questions

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Thursday 10th February 2022 Commons Chamber

[Nigel Huddleston]

The hon. Lady makes very important points. As we discussed earlier, sport should be for all, on and off the pitch. We need to make sure that there are opportunities right across sport. I believe that progress is being made—diversity and inclusivity are at the top of the agenda for many sportspeople I talk to—but she is right that we need more action, not just warm words.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

I welcome greater efforts by the Government to improve internet access, but I met the families federations of the Navy, Army and the RAF, and they are concerned about access to the internet across the military estate. May I invite the Department to do a study on internet access on bases for our armed forces, and to report back to Parliament?

[Julia Lopez]

I thank my right hon. Friend for raising that issue in the Chamber; it has not been raised with me before. I would be happy to look into improving access to the internet for our military.

Telecommunications Infrastructure (Leasehold Property) Bill

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Consideration of Lords amendments & Ping Pong & Ping Pong: House of Commons
Wednesday 24th February 2021 Commons Chamber

In closing, let me say that Labour has consistently welcomed this Bill throughout its stages, but it will play a very small part in improving our digital infrastructure. There is so much more to be done, and we feel this could be done more quickly. This Government have no idea how they will achieve their broadband roll-out targets. Given their track record, we do not even know whether the targets will still be the same in a year’s time. This is why we need a clear strategy that provides direction and focus to businesses, healthy competition and lower prices for consumers.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

It is good to see the Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, my hon. Friend the Member for Boston and Skegness (Matt Warman), in his place, discussing telecommunication matters again—it does not seem a long time ago that we were debating the whys and wherefores of Huawei. I am pleased to support him in encouraging us to ensure the completion of this Bill, albeit of course with due scrutiny, because it is well overdue. It seeks to establish a new security framework for the UK telecoms sector, and to ensure that telecommunications providers operate secure and resilient networks and services and manage their supply chains.

The Minister mentioned just how fundamentally this will change all our lives—how we live, work, socialise, travel and manufacture things. He is right to focus on how these difficult times of the pandemic have illustrated the importance of connectivity. It is all the more important that we are able to get Britain connected.

The Bretton Woods agreement after the second world war saw trading links—roads, ports and airports—deemed a priority so that we could get trade and the economy moving. As we come out of this pandemic and endure the recession, our digital economy will mean so much to our ability to advance and get back on our feet. I very much welcome the energy the Government are putting in here today.

I mentioned Huawei, but there is a wider dimension to this. Britain is in competition with other parts of the world, not least China, in making sure we have the high-tech digital capabilities to meet our future needs. The Bill is about not only putting in place protections against a country we are obviously in challenge with—China—but making sure we protect ourselves. The digital sphere provides not just opportunities but vulnerability to cyber-attacks; disinformation campaigns; interference, even in elections; manipulations on social media; data theft; and so on. The importance of security in communication links is paramount, and the longer we delay the Government’s being able to get on with this, the longer we have to lean on the older systems, which are very vulnerable indeed.

The Government’s target is to deliver nationwide gigabit-capable broadband by 2025. When he winds up the debate, will the Minister update the House on the ambitions for gaining full access to dwellings? I note with interest that gigabit availability is at only 16% in Bournemouth, so we would be delighted if the south-west, which, at 18.6%, is again below the national average, could receive support.

With your indulgence, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will digress from the main theme of the amendments and pose what I call the Rockefeller question, which is related to data. Rockefeller, of course, was the multibillionaire who formed Standard Oil. It took a US President, more powerful than Rockefeller, to stand up and break that monopoly. Arguably, today’s tech giants are replacing those monopolies of the 1900s, and that poses some awkward questions for all of us—for Government and society. The likes of Google and Facebook dominate the digital world. They now own 80% of the advertising market alone here in the UK. That poses big questions about how data is harvested, about the levels of tax paid, and about the stifling of fair competition. Those difficult questions must be answered. I appreciate that they are beyond the scope of the Bill, but it is important to get them on the record.

[Ronnie Cowan (Inverclyde) (SNP) [V]]

It is always a pleasure to speak in the House on behalf of the Scottish National party. Telecommunications is a reserved matter, and we have continued to engage constructively in refining the Bill from our part of the Opposition Benches. As I have previously highlighted in the Chamber, it is for the UK Government to ensure that our digital infrastructure is appropriately protected and managed as a key component of Scotland’s future economic success and of our position as a global leader in technology. Never has the importance of digital connectivity been more sharply brought into relief than during the ongoing pandemic. The fact that I am delivering a parliamentary speech from my home is evidence of this necessity.

On that note, I reiterate that the SNP supports the general aims of the Bill and wants to see it successfully implemented, with the appropriate amendments. I read with interest the recent debates on amendments proposed to the Bill in the Lords. Although the first amendment, in the name of Lord Alton, was withdrawn, I do not want to pass over it without making a quick comment. The purpose of the amendment was to prevent companies using UK telecommunications infrastructure to facilitate human rights abuses. The amendment was obviously not an accusation against Virgin Media, BT or others of having nefarious motives in allowing us to watch Netflix at home. Rather, it touched on a recurring theme in the Bill: our concern about the expanding tech influence of the Chinese Government.

I will not go over the debate on that amendment in detail, as Members can read it in Hansard. However, although the amendment was withdrawn, let us keep the spirit of it in mind. As the world becomes interconnected to an unprecedented degree, we must be vigilant about how our technology can inadvertently support abuses taking place elsewhere. Let us also take Lord Alton’s amendment as a worthy attempt to draw more attention to the increasingly disturbing evidence emerging from China regarding human rights abuses.

Not wishing to digress too far, I turn my attention to Baroness Barran’s amendment, relating to uncompetitive behaviour and a review of the Bill’s impact on the electronic communications code. The Scottish National party broadly welcomes this principled amendment, which would introduce sufficient measures to ensure that residents in multi-dwelling accommodation could access connectivity from the provider of their choice. Infrastructure provided by one supplier should not prevent a subsequent provider from installing their own service within the same building. Concerns were raised in the Lords about whether the amendment was necessary. Given that 10 million people could be affected by this legislation, there is no harm in taking a comprehensive approach. Some 76% of multi-dwelling units missed out on the initial efforts to deploy fibre because of problems in gaining access, so it should be self-evident to everyone in the Chamber that we must improve access and consumer choice.

Let us not pretend that previous amendments have created a perfect Bill. Industry experts have raised concerns that the legislation does not go far enough in providing flexibility for network operators. BT in particular is concerned that the bar set for a landlord to be classified as engaging with the network builder, and therefore not be subject to the Bill’s provisions, is far too low. Likewise, Virgin Media is seeking further clarity on the definition of “meaningful response” in relation to landlords’ communications with operators.

Questions have also been raised by operators on the balance the Government are seeking to create between the rights of landowners and the rights of telecoms operators. What does this mean in practice? Why would affording an operator the right to ask a court to grant access, independent of a tenant request, be against the public interest, especially if it ensures that tenants are given access to digital connectivity that may not have existed previously?

As the Minister will be aware, many utilities already have the right, with appropriate safeguards, to enter a property in order to maintain infrastructure. Do the Government agree with the future telecoms infrastructure review’s recommendation that telecoms operators’ right of entry should be brought in line with that of other utilities?

Of course, the process should be reviewed as per Lords amendment 3. If we are to achieve continual, irreversible improvement, the process must remain open to review. The Bill is now at such a late stage that I suspect some operators have effectively given up on seeing it reformed further, and they are merely accepting legislation that does not meet its full potential. Clearly, operators welcome this progress, but the industry is asking for greater clarity and engagement. It is unfortunate that the operators are still asking the Government to confirm basic definitions in legislation that is on the brink of becoming law.

Looking ahead, undoubtedly the consultation on changes to the electronic communications code is a primary way to build on the improvements that will come from this Bill. As the Government move ahead with the legislation and the review, it is vital that they consult more closely with relevant actors in the sector. After all, the telecoms operators are the only ones with the practical knowledge to make a success of the Government’s long-term ambitions for digital connectivity.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons & Carry-over motion & Carry-over motion: House of Commons & Money resolution & Money resolution: House of Commons & Programme motion & Programme motion: House of Commons & Ways and Means resolution & Ways and Means resolution: House of Commons
Monday 30th November 2020 Commons Chamber

[The Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Oliver Dowden)]

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.

Cutting-edge technology such as 5G and gigabit broadband have the potential to transform our lives and this Government are investing billions of pounds in their roll-out nationwide, but we can only have confidence in that technology if we know it is secure, and this Bill will create one of the toughest telecoms security regimes in the world, one that will protect our networks even as technologies grow and evolve, shielding our critical national infrastructure both now and for the future.

This Bill acts on the recommendations of the United Kingdom telecoms supply chain review, which in turn was informed by the expert technical advice at the National Cyber Security Centre in GCHQ. First, it establishes a tough new security framework for all the UK’s public telecoms providers. This will be overseen by Ofcom and the Government, and they will have a legal duty to design and manage their networks securely. Rigorous new security requirements will be set out in secondary legislation, and codes of practice will set technical guidance on how providers should meet the law, and where providers are found wanting, Ofcom will have the power to impose steep fines. For example, under the current regime fines for failing to protect security are limited to just £2 million or £20,000 per day, while under the new regime they will rise significantly, to up to 10% of turnover or £100,000 per day. Under the current regime Ofcom has limited monitoring and enforcement powers. Under the new regime it will have the power to enter premises of telecoms providers, to interview staff and to require technical systems tests.

If we pass this Bill, few other countries in the world will have a tougher enforcement regime, and the point of this Bill is not just to tackle one high-risk vendor; it raises the security bar across the board and protects us against a whole range of threats. According to the NCSC, the past two years have seen malicious cyber-activity from Russia and China as well as North Korea and Iranian actors. While I know that telecoms providers are working hard to protect our networks against this hostile activity, the Government have lacked the power to ensure they do so. This Bill puts a robust security framework in place, guaranteeing the protection of our networks.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

It feels like a long time since we had debates about Huawei at, I think, the beginning of the year, which perhaps started this national conversation about our critical national infrastructure. My right hon. Friend speaks about threats: what is the biggest long-term geostrategic threat facing the UK now?

--- Later in debate ---

[Oliver Dowden]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his intervention. The interventions are tempting me to jump around points that I intend to make, but he is right about the importance of diversification. We have published the diversification strategy, which is available for Members to examine, and I will come on to it in a moment.

It is this Bill and this Bill alone that gives Members the assurances they seek for the security of our networks both now and in the future. Further to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), operators are already taking our approach seriously—they are working now to meet the Government’s requirements. For example, BT has signed a deal with Ericsson for 5G equipment to enable it to phase out Huawei and is already in the process of using Ericsson products to replace Huawei in its core. Where operators can go further and faster without jeopardising the stability of our network, we will of course encourage them to do so, but it would be a big risk to force them to go even further. BT and others have warned that moving faster could put our networks under considerable strain, creating significant risk of blackouts, and it would take longer for 5G to reach the parts of the country where it would make the most difference.

[Mr Ellwood]

O2, Three and BT had concerns that they would have to cancel their contracts with Huawei but still pay for them, because the equipment was on its way. Could my right hon. Friend clarify what happens to contracts that are in the pipeline, which could see these companies go bust if they have to pay for them?

[Oliver Dowden]

My Department is in close contact with mobile network operators. I do not think that the sort of risk my right hon. Friend describes of companies going bust is remotely the case. Furthermore, we have given clear advance notice of this. For example, we made the first statements in January this year. We updated the guidance in July, and we also consulted extensively with the mobile network operators on the requirements in relation to installation that I am announcing today.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Ellwood]

The hon. Lady is setting out a long list of concerns with which many in the House would absolutely agree. Does she agree that for the reasons she is outlining it is perhaps now time for us to review the overseas aid that we give to China?

[Jo Stevens]

I do not want to step beyond my brief and interfere in that of my shadow Cabinet colleague, but we certainly should not be doing business with any companies that breach both human rights and workers’ rights. We have international labour standards in place and these are not companies with which to do business.

Turning now to broadband and 5G roll-out, and the delays and the costs layering on top of them, we have already seen delays in the roll-out of second and third generation fixed broadband, and we are now at the bottom of the OECD tables. In fact, only last week the Government sneaked out in the Chancellor’s spending review plans to water down their broadband promises. Instead of keeping to their manifesto promise to roll out gigabit-speed broadband to every home in Britain by 2025, the Chancellor revealed that the Government are now aiming to have a minimum of 85% coverage by that date. The budget for that plan remains the same, but now only £1.2 billion of the £5 billion will be made available up until 2024, so this will impact on the so-called levelling-up agenda.

The Government’s delay in dealing with the issue of high-risk vendors until now has also meant that there will be added delays and costs to the roll-out of 5G. The Secretary of State accepted that in July, when he said that the cumulative delay would be two to three years. However, the Government’s impact assessment for the Bill does not establish the effect of removing Huawei from the core network on the timescale for the 5G roll-out, so has the Secretary of State’s position, set out in July, of a two to three-year delay changed at all, and why does the impact assessment fail to address that issue? Also in July, the Secretary of State predicted that removing Huawei would cost operators up to £2 billion, but that could be a huge underestimate, because BT alone is saying that it will cost it £500 million, and the costs could be far greater, including the knock-on effects in terms of lost revenue and wider economic benefits.

As well as those economic consequences, there is another impact, because the provision of 5G for most of the UK will increase the digital divide without significant measures to tackle it. The three central problems at the heart of this divide are lack of internet connection, lack of technological devices, and lack of the skills to use new technology in a meaningful way. The Government have promised, and so far failed, to solve the lack of connection, which is a particular problem for under-served communities. There is nothing about 5G that will make it a better option for those communities, who are already lacking affordable access to fast internet. In addition, there is the distinct possibility that in order to access mobile 5G internet, users will need newer and more expensive devices built for those increased speeds. The pandemic has highlighted these divides and thrown into stark relief the need for help and support for those whose lack of connection, skills and equipment is a real barrier both in terms of employment and other meaningful connections.

There is one other significant consequence to the Government’s delay, and that is the new 4G-based emergency services network. That is now unlikely to completely take over from the existing platform until 2024-25. This delay is costing taxpayers millions. If the Government are forced to keep airwaves going beyond 2022, every year of delay adds an extra cost of about £550 million. The core of the ESM network does feature Huawei equipment, but EE has said that it is already working to strip this out and hopes to complete that by 2023. However, can the Secretary of State reassure the House that the presence of Huawei kit in the 4G ESM network will not have any impact on its lifespan, financial implications or security status and safety concerns?

I turn now to the removal of high-risk vendors’ equipment from the 5G networks. For the purposes of this debate, it is probably easier to refer to it as the removal of Huawei equipment, because that is where everybody’s current focus is. This must all be removed from networks by 2027. There is the “no new purchasing” rule from the end of this month, and the Secretary of State has announced today that existing stocks cannot be used after September 2021. However, there are questions for the Government around the implementation of this that I hope the Minister will be able to answer.

I have five specific questions. First, given that the Bill is based on a distinction between the core and the edge of the networks, how confident are the Government of the durability of the barrier between the core and the edge? Secondly, what steps are the Government taking to prioritise the removal of any existing Huawei equipment from the more sensitive core part of the network, and how much equipment does Huawei have in it? Thirdly, are the Government proposing to provide help to businesses who have invested in Huawei equipment ahead of this decision, and will there be legal support, as many operators may have to honour contracts that they cannot actually use or possibly afford? Fourthly, what steps will the Government be taking to work with local authorities and others to minimise disruption to businesses and individuals when removing the equipment? Fifthly and finally, what steps are being taken to minimise the costs to business?

I have one other point, from a different policy angle. When Australia banned Huawei from participating in its 5G network in 2018, China imposed retaliatory measures on Australian goods. The Government’s impact assessment does not address the economic consequences of potential retaliatory measures, so can they explain what steps are being taken to plan for that possibility?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker—does that mean that I get 16 minutes to speak? That is fantastic. [Interruption.] That is my first intervention, so it is now 17 minutes. It is good to catch your eye in this important debate, Madam Deputy Speaker, and to see present so many colleagues who were there at the start of the journey—I referred to this in the first intervention I made—when we first discussed Huawei in the Chamber.

The Defence Committee looked at this subject because the security of 5G is now critical, given our ever-growing reliance on data movement. To establish a new security framework for the UK telecoms sector and to ensure that telecoms providers operate a secure network and resilient services and manage their supply chains is absolutely fundamental to our new way of life. The completion of 5G over the next decade will be nothing short of revolutionary. Every aspect of our lives as we know them, including how we communicate, socialise, work, travel and manufacture things, will become increasingly dependent on lightning movements of wireless data. The advantages of such scope and scale in our growing online world have very much been appreciated during this pandemic, but, equally, we must recognise how our reliance leaves us very much exposed to those who might choose to cause us harm.

The backdrop of this was of course the lively debate, which I have referred to, over Huawei. Perhaps that was a wake-up call on just how powerful and tech savvy China has become. The Minister and the Secretary of State have made it very clear that this is not just about China—other non-state and state actors are now developing capabilities to interfere with our online world—but I make it very clear indeed that what we are discussing today exposes the wider uncomfortable reality of the gradual geopolitical shift in global power from west to east.

In our lifetimes, China is on course to become more powerful economically, technologically and militarily than the United States of America, and how we handle this so-called Thucydides trap is yet to be reckoned with. This is a usually disruptive transition of influence from one ruling power base to a rising power with eventually more dominance—a transition that history suggests is rarely peaceful. The only example of a peaceful transition is that from the British empire to the American superpower. If we are honest, this Bill is about exactly that. This is the starting point of a bigger conversation about how we manage such a transition. We are placing protections on our country against China, which we privately no longer trust, but I have to say that, publicly, we may be in denial about what we need to discuss.

We should finally come to terms with the fact that China has not matured into the responsible global citizen that, a decade ago, we hoped it would be. Instead, China offers a competing authoritarian ideology, leveraging its colossal economic growth to undercut western competition and ensnare dozens of countries into infrastructure projects and high-tech plans on terms that they can ill afford. Our growing dependence on the online world has created a new virtual theatre of war. The actual character of conflict has been changing in front of us: it is less about terrain, and now more about data. We are becoming increasingly vulnerable, with cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns, interference in elections, manipulation of social media, data theft, online espionage and sabotage. These are the new battlegrounds that we must prepare for and defend against. Our international rules-based order was crafted in the pre-digital age. A major cyber-attack, for example, could cause more damage than a dirty bomb, but would not technically trip a NATO article 5 response. International law must catch up, and this legislation is a small line of defence in a far wider geopolitical battle that we need to embrace.

Britain is rightly seeking to remain on the cutting edge of this fast-developing digital world, but this can only be achieved with greater protection and, indeed, investment in our critical national infrastructure. Our 5G capability must leave no virtual backdoors left open. Consequently, phasing out high-risk vendors, such as Huawei, from our 5G programme is the right call. However, we have to ask the question: why is it that a decade ago there were 12 vendors that can provide this support, yet today there are only six? There are two in Europe, with Ericsson and Nokia, two in the far east, with NEC and Samsung, and then of course two in China—Huawei and ZTE—and there the question lies. What we need to do about it is to make sure we have that capability to move forward in a secure environment.

We must accept that Huawei has grafted its way into our telecoms network partly because the UK vendor market is not diverse enough. Regaining the secure technological capability on which our new digital world will depend requires more than just legislation to block high-risk vendors from entry; it needs the advancement of our own technological capabilities. Open RAN has been mentioned, but it is still a long way off. OneWeb has been purchased as a possible capability for communications. We have yet to hear what the Government plan to do with that.

Ultimately, we must recognise that Huawei, ZTE and others are so powerful because they are state funded. Perhaps it is time for an Apollo moment: when the United States knew it was losing the space race, a combination of state aid and the commercial sector allowed it not only to catch up with but to overtake the Soviet Union. We need the same penny to drop here and to recognise what China is all about.

It is good to hear growing talk of the D5 trusted alliance of nations. It has been mentioned as an advancement of the Five Eyes community and I very much welcome that. We need to provide an alternative to the cheap solutions that the Chinese are rolling out, which continue to be peddled across the road. They are high-tech versions of the one belt, one road programme. Only with greater western resolve can we design and build the secure foundations for the profound new technological world we are about to experience.

I will underline the elephant in the room: what do we do about China? Unless we in the UK and collectively in the west address China’s conduct, there will be a geopolitical clash. That is inevitable and will slide us towards another cold war.

We should make it clear that the UK has huge respect for the Chinese people. Our histories are intertwined, perhaps more than many of us appreciate. The opium wars, the ceding of Hong Kong, the Boxer rebellion, the century of humiliation—perhaps Britain glosses over many of those historical footnotes, but for those in China, they influence their thinking and their attitude towards the west today.

However, today, the west is recalibrating its view of China. China’s conduct in the pandemic, from its initial efforts to hide the outbreak to rejecting any independent investigation, has exposed a dangerous agenda that we can no longer ignore. During China’s incredible economic ascent, western policy focused on deepening engagement in the hope that China would evolve into a responsible global citizen that embraced hard-fought principles of liberty, democracy and open trade. It is clear that the Chinese Communist party has something very different in mind. As it has increased its economic power, Beijing has deliberately shunned international accountability and rules. It may be gaining superpower status, but it avoids any sense of duty to uphold core values of freedom and the rule of law. Knowing that its conduct repudiates those values, it now pursues a geopolitical authoritarian agenda, as illustrated in the crackdown in Hong Kong, the terrible treatment of the Uyghur minority and its manipulation of the digital world, which mimics its one belt, one road initiative.

With countries becoming locked into long-term commitments with reduced autonomy and little prospect of withdrawal, more and more countries are becoming ensnared in China’s authoritarian sphere of influence. The US now publicly confirms that China is a strategic and geopolitical threat to the west, while here in the UK we have yet to say so, though I am pleased that the Secretary of State pointed out concerns about China.

I hope that the full publication of the Government’s integrated review will confirm that China now is a geopolitical threat. We require a turning point—another Sputnik moment, where we no longer pretend and we do not just legislate on high-risk vendors, but hold the regime behind the state-owned companies to account.

I hope that, with the changing of the guard in Washington, there will be a rejuvenation of the west’s collective resolve about what we stand for, what we believe in and what we are willing to defend. The next decade will be very bumpy indeed. If we are to avoid another cold war, protecting our telecoms infrastructure must be the first step of many.

UK Telecommunications

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Tuesday 14th July 2020 Commons Chamber

[Oliver Dowden]

As ever, the hon. Gentleman is very good at false indignation and theatrics, but in reality it is this Government, unlike the last Labour Government, who have, for the first time, set out a clear date, which will be enshrined in statute, to remove Huawei equipment, and we are stopping the flow into the networks. To do all that, we have to bring forward the telecoms security Bill, which I have said will happen in the autumn. I believe that autumn falls in the months of September, October and November.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

May I ask humbly that we distinguish between the people of China and the Communist regime?  It is the latter that for years we have tried to appease in the hope that it would mature into a global citizen, and that clearly has not happened. President Xi seeks superpower status, but now with a competing vision of world order. I therefore very much welcome the announcement today. Has the Secretary of State shared it with the Five Eyes community and, indeed, our US friends?

However, we should also expect repercussions from China, and to that end I strongly believe that this must be the start of a wider strategic foreign policy reset. Tactical announcements about sending carriers to the South China sea are all very well, but they must form part of a wider international collective western resolve to defend our values and our standards, in which China is very much welcome to participate and I hope the UK will play a leading role.

[Oliver Dowden]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his question. He is absolutely right to distinguish between the people of China and the Chinese Government. China is a wonderful country; I have very much enjoyed visiting it on occasions in the past, and there are some very warm people there. The difference is the Government of China and some of the abuses, particularly of the rule of law and human rights, that we have seen there. In the context of telecommunications security, we have an opportunity to work with our allies. If we can develop this open RAN technology of the future, it will provide an opportunity not just to benefit us but to benefit them, and indeed to further secure our infrastructure and make it more resilient.

Telecommunications Infrastructure (Leasehold Property) Bill

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Report stage & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Tuesday 10th March 2020 Commons Chamber

[Chi Onwurah]

The right hon. Gentleman anticipates the point that I was about to make in my speech, and I will clarify the differences.

Despite the lack of ambition in this Bill, we will not be opposing it. The Government are taking baby steps when it comes to digital infrastructure, but we will not stand in their way. Indeed, we will help them. We will be pushing a set of practical amendments in line with the Government’s stated intentions on tenants’ rights, competition and excluding high-risk vendors from UK telecommunications networks in the absence of the management and mitigation plans that we have been promised. There is also an important amendment on cyber-security education.

Amendment 2 expands the definition of persons who can request an operator to provide an electronic communications service to include rental tenants and other legal occupants who may not own the lease to the property that they occupy. Although the Bill’s explanatory notes and comments from the Minister suggest that tenants can make the request, the Bill itself does not make that clear, referring to them as lessees. Many tenants are desperate for gigabit broadband to enable them to work from home or grow their business. What if the landlord is difficult to reach or indifferent to their situation? Should not the person who actually lives in the building have some rights?

I will not try your patience, Mr Speaker, by expounding at length on the dire state of both home ownership and leasehold—or fleecehold as it is more properly known. The Government could end the misery of millions if they took on the large landowners and followed Labour’s commitment to end leasehold altogether. The system is broken, and that is one reason home ownership rates among young people are a third lower than they were in the early noughties. There are 4.5 million households in the private rented sector. We know also that tenants can easily find themselves in precarious and insecure circumstances through no fault of their own, or even with nowhere to live as a result of a section 21 notice. We therefore have a large proportion of our population condemned to renting for life, but with few rights and less certainty. Although the Government seem unwilling to address the housing crisis, they could, at the very least, ensure that tenants benefit from this legislation, and that is what our amendment seeks to do.

Much of the publicity around today’s debate relates to amendments 1 and 4, which seek to limit or prevent operators with high-risk vendors in their networks from taking advantages of the provisions of this Bill. Mr Speaker, as this is an issue of national security, I do hope that you will forgive me if I take quite some time to discuss these amendments.

My first job when I left Imperial College was with Nortel, a Canadian world leader in the then emerging telecommunications sector. If someone had said to me that a couple of decades later we would be incapable of building a European telecoms network without a Chinese vendor, I would have been astonished. Essentially, though, that was the Government’s position when they confirmed that Huawei would be allowed to participate in the UK’s 5G network, despite national security concerns. Huawei is bound by China’s National Intelligence Law 2017 to

“support, co-operate and collaborate in national intelligence work.”

We are not Sinophobes or Chinese conspiracy theorists. We do not believe that trade and cultural exchange with China are a bad thing, as some have suggested. There are also many great people working for Huawei in this country dedicated to improving our national infrastructure.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

We are going to venture into this subject in depth, but I just wonder whether the hon. Lady agrees with me on the following. When we are developing a relationship with China—yes, perhaps we want China to do business on level terms with us—is it right that Huawei, as she has described, is able to be used by its intelligence services, but western companies such as Apple, Amazon and eBay are not even allowed to operate in China under the terms and conditions that they are freely able to operate in the west?

[Chi Onwurah]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention. He raises two important points: one of reciprocity between how Huawei acts and how vendors from Europe and the US are able to act in China; and also one of the risks associated with that potential relationship with the Chinese security services. It is a risk that has been examined by the National Cyber Security Centre.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Mark Hendrick]

As the shadow Minister will be aware, the Government made an announcement on 28 January that they were going to give a very limited role to Huawei in the development of the infrastructure. They have also taken advice from GCHQ and the NCSC about the level of involvement that Huawei should have. Why does she disagree with that? [Interruption.]

[Mr Ellwood]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. Colleagues in a sedentary position have reminded me that there is a declaration of interest to be made, so I humbly ask the hon. Gentleman if he would state his relationship with Huawei.

[Sir Mark Hendrick]

rose—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

Order. A point of order should go through the Chair. It is either an intervention or a point of order; it cannot be both.

[Mr Ellwood]

I was trying to be courteous to the situation, Madam Deputy Speaker, but the message has now been given.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his point of order. I hope that Members will not interrupt the debate with too many points of order. I am sure that the hon. Member for Preston (Sir Mark Hendrick) is clear that if there were any need to make a declaration, I would expect him to do so.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

I rise to speak to the amendment standing in my name and in those of my colleagues.

The reason we have tabled this amendment is that we are genuinely concerned, like the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah), that this country has got itself far too bound into a process in which we are reliant on untrusted vendors—in this particular case, Huawei. We recently heard a Government Minister express the view that Huawei is a private company. Let us be absolutely clear at the outset: this company is not a private company. Ultimately, it is essentially almost completely owned by Chinese trade unions, and they, of course, are completely locked into the Chinese Government. This an organisation wholly owned by China.

It is often bandied around, including by some of the security guys the other day, that this is somehow all to do with market failure, as if out of nowhere companies from the west in the free markets—the free world—no longer wanted to get involved in this process. That is completely and utterly without foundation. The single biggest problem we have faced is that, nearly two decades ago, the Chinese Government set out to ensure that they dominated the market. As this organisation has access to nigh-on unlimited funds, it has spent that period underbidding every single time in these processes, from 2G through to 4G and now, as we understand it, 5G.

[Mr Ellwood]

I commend my right hon. Friend and the others who have put their name to amendment 1 for raising the profile of this difficult and complex issue. I think the Government should be on warning that while the amendment may not be pressed to a Division because of what the Minister says later, this House believes that we need to wean ourselves off Huawei. Does my right hon. Friend agree that there is an easy way out of this? There are six global vendors when it comes to 5G: ZTE, Huawei, Ericsson, Nokia, NEC and, of course, Samsung. The last two are not allowed to operate outside Japan and Korea. If they were invited to do so, that would enable us to push away Huawei and ensure that our national infrastructure is protected.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I agree with my right hon. Friend, and I was going to come to those points.

As I saying, if we look at this strategy, we see that when this all began, there were something like 12 companies in this marketplace. One by one, they have disappeared. Why have they disappeared? They simply cannot compete with Huawei’s pricing. These telecoms companies—telcos, as we call them—have bit by bit found themselves going to the cheapest bidder, providing the technology is as good as the others. By the way, it is certainly not an argument that Huawei has better technology; there is no evidence of that whatsoever. In fact, I think Dr Ian Levy said a year ago that he thought Huawei’s security issues were a shambles, and that is correct. Huawei does not somehow have extra brilliant technology. What it does have, however, is money, which allows it to bid down.

The hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central said that she is a believer in free markets. She will know that the free market relies on companies being able, when they sell their goods, to make enough money to reinvest and improve the quality of their goods. That is how a proper rules-based market works, but not with a company like this, which is able to strip that away. One by one, these companies have gone, not because of market failure but because it has been a policy position of the Chinese Government using Huawei to dominate this market over nearly two decades.

Online Harms Legislation

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Thursday 13th February 2020 Commons Chamber

[Matt Warman]

The work that the Cabinet Office is doing on protecting democracy is a hugely important, albeit complementary, part of the process, rather than something that is covered by online harms. Our intention is that the regulations and the codes of practice that Ofcom will draw up will be as future-proofed as possible, because we do not want to be coming back time and again having this debate in a whole series of forums. We need to get on with this.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull (Julian Knight) on tabling this urgent question, and the Government on their response. Today’s focus has very much been on online content and protecting children, but will the Minister comment on how the internet continues to be used by jihadi extremists to recruit future terrorists? The Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Bill went through yesterday, so there is more money for counter-terrorism, policing, probation and rehabilitation. But ultimately, until we are able to remove harmful online content that is being used for recruitment, further terrorist attacks, I am afraid, will take place.

[Matt Warman]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. It is important to say that the online harms Bill is being drawn up jointly with my colleagues in the Home Office to tackle exactly the areas that he suggests. The Bill also has a hugely important component on tackling disinformation, which is related to what he is talking about, albeit, I appreciate, not the same thing. It is important that we mount what we might call a full-spectrum response when it comes to these threats.

5G Network and Huawei

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Monday 27th January 2020 Commons Chamber

[Matt Warman]

In a sense, I think the hon. Gentleman is asking me about an unknown unknown, so I hesitate to get into the detail. However, the principle point he is making about the extent to which we can be confident about our future abilities to mitigate potential problems is at the core of the decision that will have to be made tomorrow.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

We are in a period of constant conflict. The character of war is changing, with terrain being replaced by the digital as the prize. This question is not about today; it is about long-term security and where China is going. In our lifetimes, it will become more militarily, technologically and economically powerful than any other country in the world. It is already causing the splintering of the internet. Does not the issue of Huawei raise bigger questions about where China is going and about the need for greater transparency on the international stage?

[Matt Warman]

My right hon. Friend is very experienced in these matters and gets right to the heart of the issue. The issue of this country’s relationship with other countries of varying friendliness around the world will only become more pressing. We have to make the right decision now.