National Security Bill (Sixth sitting)

Sally-Ann Hart Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 14th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman, who is a member of the ISC, for clarifying that. For that reason, I am not dead set in my opposition to the clause by any stretch of the imagination—I am open to persuasion. However, we need evidence through the ISC that there is a problem and that clause 23 is the best way to solve it. As matters stand, I cannot say that I have been persuaded of either of those things.

First and foremost, it remains difficult to see how officers of the services in question can commit an offence under the 2007 Act unless they intend an offence to be committed, or, secondly, unless they have a belief that their action will assist an offence. That is a high threshold, even before defences kick in.

We have heard already that the section 50 defence of acting reasonably applies. Given the “purpose” and “authority” under which any action of information sharing would take place, it surely seems very likely that that defence could easily be made out. That point has already been made by a member of the ISC this afternoon. It almost looks like that defence, in section 50(3) of the 2007 Act, was designed with employees of the agencies in mind. The Minister has asserted that the defence is vague, but they seem to be a perfect fit for some of the circumstances that we are considering.

Even if the Minister is correct, perhaps the better response would be to amend the defence, rather than disapplying schedule 4 altogether. It is not clear why it can be argued that the reasonable defence is any more vague than the concept in this clause of

“the proper exercise of any function”.

It is not clear to me what conduct that concept is and is not supposed to cover. We need clear explanations and I do not think we have been given them.

Will the Minister give an example of conduct that is a proper exercise of any function of the services, but that is currently subject to the chilling effect of the 2007 Act and would therefore be saved by the Bill? Why is such conduct not able to get over the threshold of the reasonable defence already? Why, as has been asked, is such conduct not able to be authorised under section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994? What type of data sharing is subject to this chilling effect and what causes that effect? Is it the remote possibility of data being used for a very serious crime or the significant chance it could be used for a less serious crime? Is it both? Is it neither? It is very hard to get a handle on what precisely the provisions are aimed at.

The Minister knows that concerns were raised on Second Reading about the potential for the clause to have a much more significant effect on actions that could, for example, support rendition or torture. He has set out today and in correspondence that domestic and international law means that such action would not be protected by clause 23. We will give that further consideration, but, in my view, the Government have much more to do to persuade us that there is a real problem here, and one that requires legislative intervention.

Even if a problem does have to be addressed, I am still to be convinced that this is the right response. Are there other options we could look at? Of course there are. For example, in last week’s evidence there appeared to be the suggestion that it was not so much the risk of conviction that was feared, but the risk of an investigation and being dragged to the courts and having to establish a defence of reasonableness. That was one of the problems.

Different things could be done. The clause could be moved around so that it is not a defence, where the burden lies on the person accused. We could make it an intrinsic part of the offence in the first place, so that nobody is dragged to court and has to establish the defence. There are other things that could be done—for example, requiring certain authorisations for prosecutions and so on.

Let us have that discussion, assuming that we can be persuaded that there is a problem here. Are there different ways to address it? For the moment, we remain a little bit in the dark on what precisely the nature of the problem is, and are unconvinced that the provisions in the clause are the best way to resolve any problem that does exist.

[Sally-Ann Hart (Hastings and Rye) (Con)]

Our intelligence and security services are this country’s frontline of defence, and we need to ensure that they remain the best and most professional in the world. To do that, they need to know that if an individual makes a decision in good faith and in accordance with all relevant procedures, to keep us safe, that individual should not be at risk of criminal liability. That responsibility must lie with the organisation.

[Maria Eagle]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Sally-Ann Hart]

In a moment.

Last week, Sir Alex Younger, former chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, said the issue was a point of principle. Contrary to some alarmist news reports and those opposed to clause 23, Ministers and spies will not be given immunity from committing crimes overseas. Clause 23 does not have any effect on any other criminal offences that might apply to an individual’s actions.

[Maria Eagle]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Sally-Ann Hart]

I have finished, thank you.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen McPartland]

What I am trying to say is that we want our UK intelligence services to be focused on keeping us safe and not to worry about whether or not they will be able to deal with a long court case on their actions. As things currently stand, the UK is—

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Let me give an illustration of the issue. If my hon. Friend saw someone in need of cardiopulmonary resuscitation on the floor, would he give them mouth-to-mouth and pump their chest? Is that something he would do? Would he do it if he thought he could be prosecuted for causing grievous bodily harm if he broke a rib? That would be his defence. That is a simplistic example to illustrate the issue.

[Stephen McPartland]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her intervention. I do not think I would be any good at giving anybody CPR. However, I understand the spirit in which she made the intervention and am grateful for that.

National Security Bill (Fourth sitting)

Sally-Ann Hart Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 12th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Clause 15 criminalises conduct that is preparatory to some of the offences we have debated. It is fair to say that this is another amendment that I might have approached slightly differently had I been able to draft it in the light of the evidence session on Thursday, rather than in advance of it. Obviously, this clause was widely welcomed at that evidence session, and I accept that evidence.

I thought Sir Alex Younger made an interesting observation when he said:

“The bottom line is that we have to get in front of this stuff…We need to solve it before it has happened, and that raises a set of ethical and legal dilemmas where it is important to be striking the right balance”.––[Official Report, National Security Public Bill Committee, 7 July 2022; c. 19, Q38.]

While he welcomed how the issue was treated in the Bill, he recognised that there are ethical and legal dilemmas.

I am another one of those lawyers who seem to overrun this place. [Laughter.] Thanks very much. Punishing preparatory conduct is not something I can recall from my dim and distant past as a law student, although that is probably as much to do with my memory as anything else. However, the serious point is that various crimes are set out and designed to punish certain acts; after that, other inchoate crimes such as attempts or conspiracy attach themselves to those basic criminal laws.

I absolutely appreciate that criminalising preparation allows enforcement and prosecution at an even earlier stage than an attempt, but the sort of legal and ethical questions raised by it come sharply into focus when we realise that the maximum sentence for such preparatory conduct is life imprisonment. What is particularly striking is that some of the completed offences do not attract that sentence. That seems pretty odd. If somebody guilty of completing the actual offence faces a maximum sentence that is lighter than the maximum sentence for somebody who is simply convicted of preparing for that offence, that seems a bit of an inconsistency.

Preparatory conduct offences also attach themselves, of course, to offences that I have already argued might be worded quite broadly. When we debated clauses 1 and 4, I made various points about the foreign power condition, national interest and so forth. For example, on clause 4, I expressed concerns about protesters operating in the vicinity of a naval base. The idea of life imprisonment for preparing for a blockade at Faslane naval base seems quite extreme. I appreciate that, for various reasons that we discussed, clause 4 does not attach in that way, but that is why we should take adding a preparatory offence to arguably already wide offences very seriously and be very cautious about it.

Indeed, in the clause the notion of preparatory conduct is pretty vaguely defined, I would say. It refers to

“any conduct in preparation for”.

Not to be flippant—particularly in relation to jackets, which everyone has taken off—but if someone puts their jacket on before heading along to a peaceful protest, is that preparatory conduct? I accept that that will not lead to life imprisonment—we hope—but what exactly do we mean by preparatory conduct? The amendment suggests that it must materially contribute to the offence.

The ethical point is that we need to leave people able to change their mind and not end up incentivising them just to carry on and complete the act. If they will already get life imprisonment for preparing, they might arguably say, “Well, I’ve gone this far. I might as well just carry on and complete the act.” Where is the incentive of saying, “Well, okay, you’re going to get punished for your preparatory conduct, but the consequences will be much less severe if you stop now rather than carry on and complete the act”?

If someone sits for three days with a confidential document on their desk in an envelope addressed to a Russian agent, does not the threat of life imprisonment for having stuck the document in an addressed envelope and put a stamp on it effectively encourage them to go through with that act?

[Sally-Ann Hart (Hastings and Rye) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman is talking about acts in preparation for an offence. A person engaged in preparing for an act of this type, even if they fail, could still be prosecuted, because they have been preparing for something. Who assesses material assistance? It could be a very small thing, but small things can be very incremental and lead to something bigger. Perhaps he could highlight that a little.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

That is a perfectly legitimate question and I suppose that ultimately it would be down to the judge to decide what is meant by a material contribution. As I say, putting a jacket on—again, I do not want to be flippant—could be about anything. Does it bring whatever is planned closer to fruition? I do not know. It could be more readily argued that purchasing equipment materially takes forward what was in contemplation, for example. However, as I say, that is a perfectly legitimate question.

The point that I was coming to was that the amendment seeks to put us in a place where we encourage people to change their mind, essentially, and not to put people away for life even if they are on the verge of engaging in conduct that would thoroughly merit that sentence. It would give them an out that will still attract punishment—possibly—but will give them that choice, basically.

We have not have very much in the way of written evidence, but we did receive some interesting written evidence from Dr Kendall at the University of Queensland. She makes the argument, as I have tried to, that the sentence is too harsh. She also argues that the Bill could be better worded. Furthermore, she makes the point that we should probably put in the Bill that someone cannot be convicted of an inchoate preparatory conduct offence. Basically, she is worried that someone might be found guilty of attempting to prepare, which takes us a step further back and complicates the picture even further. In her written evidence, she suggests that it should be made clear that someone cannot be charged with an attempt to prepare, which will take us too far through the looking glass.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen McPartland]

I understand what the hon. Lady is saying—

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Clause 13 on foreign interference refers to a person committing an offence

“if…the person engages in conduct intending that the conduct, or a course of conduct of which it forms part”

so that would include preparatory conduct, because it is a course, so the conduct goes from beginning to end. There will be preparatory conduct. Does my hon. Friend agree that that might scoop up the relevant particular point?

[Stephen McPartland]

My hon. Friend makes a very good point. At the end of the day, my understanding is that the offences are designed differently, which is why we were unable to capture the relevant preparatory activity as part of the offences themselves. I am not a lawyer, but effectively those offences are designed differently, and that is where we are.

Amendment 52 seeks to raise the threshold of that which be proven to show the preparatory nature of the clause. Those who intentionally engage in preparatory conduct, as specified under clause 15, pose a significant risk to national security, and that will be true regardless of whether or not their actions materially assist the ultimate outcome. For example, if a security guard in the employment of a foreign power leaves a door open to facilitate access into a prohibited place by a hostile actor, that would constitute a preparatory act. If the hostile actor then used an alternative route to access the site, for example, cutting through a fence, the guard’s act would not have materially assisted them and his acts would go unpunished. I am sure that the Committee would agree that that would be an unacceptable outcome.

Furthermore, the offence enables disruptive action to be commenced at an early stage, to provide the greatest chance of avoiding the harmful activity occurring. It will not always be possible to determine the end goal of a person’s conduct, and thus whether their preparations are of material assistance. Indeed, in some cases, an individual may not even have decided the precise harmful acts that will result from their conduct, but rather will have the intent that their preparatory conduct will bring out harmful activity in general. However, in order to be caught by this offence the individual must have the intent that their conduct will bring about one of the relevant harmful outcomes. I hope that reassures the Committee that the offence cannot be used to prosecute those who undertake actions without any awareness or intent that it could support the commission of a relevant act.

The amendment would undermine the utility of what is otherwise a key preventive tool. Therefore, I do not support it, and I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw it.

National Security Bill (Third sitting)

Sally-Ann Hart Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 12th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Stephen McPartland]

I may dwell on this clause slightly longer than others, because it is the first of a number of clauses regarding a regime to protect sensitive sites in the UK. There has been a range of examples and questions. To the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood, the simple answer is yes.

With regards to the Pokémon examples of the hon. Member for Halifax, the answers again are about—this very much determines the whole scope of the clause—prejudicial interest and people doing something accidentally. To fall foul of the clause, someone needs to have prejudicial interest against the UK. In the examples, people have wandered in and done something accidentally; they would not be prosecuted under the clause.

The right hon. Member for North Durham gave the example of strapping a camera to an eagle; if that is something that someone can do, fair play to them. However, if that camera strapped to the eagle were then to record activity in the place, and that was prejudicial to the UK, the person would be prosecuted. If they just wanted to strap a camera to an eagle to see what happened, the intelligence services have the opportunity not to prosecute someone, because, given the protections throughout the Bill, the Attorney General would have to sign off on whether to prosecute, and the Crown Prosecution Service on whether that was in the public interest.

I understand the point made by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East on ability to have lawful protest, and for lawful protest not to be restricted. It has been reflected by other Members and I raised it with the Department last week.

[Sally-Ann Hart (Hastings and Rye) (Con)]

It is absolutely right that people have the right to protest, but the attention of the Minister and that of the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East to the recent cases in which, for example, Extinction Rebellion protestors were found not guilty of criminal damage, despite the judge directing jurors that there was no defence in law. Likewise, the protestors who toppled the Colston statue were found not guilty. We have to be careful: jurors might find people not guilty, but we have to protect the ambitions of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

The Bill is specific about procuring “photographs, videos or other”. I understand why they are included: they are modern. If we pass the Bill, will sketches still be covered? Would it not be better to repeat that bit of the 1911 Act?

[Sally-Ann Hart]

rose—

[Stephen McPartland]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention and am happy to give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Hastings and Rye.

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Does my hon. Friend not agree that “other recordings” would include a sketch?

[Stephen McPartland]

Sketches are included, because a sketch would have to be inspected. The question was: are sketches included? The answer is yes.

National Security Bill (First sitting)

Sally-Ann Hart Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 7th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Holly Lynch]

Q You said in response to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley that you had a point to make about part 1. I want to give you the opportunity to make that point.

Jonathan Hall: I am slightly uncertain and concerned about the scope of clause 3(2), the foreign intelligence services offence. On the face of it, an offence could be committed inadvertently, and it does appear to cover quite a lot of lawful conduct. The example that I have been debating with officials is the example of someone who sells miniature cameras, which is undoubtedly conduct of a kind that could assist a foreign intelligence service. My concern with clause 3(2) is that it does not seem to have a sufficient mental element, either that the individual who commits the offence is deliberately acting prejudicially to the UK interest, or knows or ought to suspect that there is some foreign intelligence service involvement, so I have a concern about that particular clause.

[Sally-Ann Hart (Hastings and Rye) (Con)]

Q You mentioned that restrictions to legal aid could be counterproductive and could harm rehabilitation efforts. Can you please expand on that?

Jonathan Hall: Not all terrorists are cold, calculating, ruthless killers who will go and commit terrorist acts whatever their circumstances. They may exist, but there are also quite chaotic terrorist-risk offenders. I have certainly come across cases where the terrorist risk from the individual—the chance of their stabbing someone, for example—goes up if they are not taking their medication or if they are homeless.

My concern about the legal aid is that it will make it harder, for example, for a terrorist offender, maybe 10 years after they have been released and who is facing eviction, to get legal aid. That means that you might have less good decisions made and a sense of injustice or grievance on behalf of the terrorist offender, who will perhaps say to themselves, “Why can’t I get legal aid when everyone else in my situation can?” My real concern is people becoming homeless or falling into debt when they might otherwise be able to get legal assistance.

[The Chair]

I am afraid that brings us to the end of the time allocated to the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank Mr Jonathan Hall QC for giving evidence in this session.

--- Later in debate ---

[Damian Hinds]

Q How do you see information operations working? How might foreign states seek to interfere in our democratic processes and public life?

Professor Sir David Omand: If you recall the statement made almost exactly two years ago in the House by Dominic Raab, he said that the Government had concluded that it was “almost certain” that “Russian actors” had “sought to interfere” in our election in 2019; and we had the evidence from the American elections and the French presidential election in 2017. All the techniques were deployed. I do not know whether any members of the Committee have been watching the TV series showing on Channel 4, which is as good a primer as any on how such techniques can be used to pervert our political discourse as well as actually harm individuals. This is the world we are in, these are the harms we face and I think that this Bill is a good start in helping the agencies to address some of those harms.

Sir Alex Younger: On this issue, you are right to focus on the possibility of interference in our democratic process and the potential unintended consequences of what we are talking about here. Of course, one person’s interference is another person’s legitimate intervention. Perish the thought that it should be the Government’s responsibility to say what is true and what is not. That is the difference between us and our opponents.

I can understand the scale of the problem; I have seen it. I had a long chat with the Government about this, and the thing that convinced me that this was an appropriate response was, first, the foreign powers condition—to be clear, that is about people acting on behalf of a foreign power—and, secondly, essentially the use of deception to achieve your aim. It seems to me that if someone is working on behalf of a foreign power, using deception, to distort our political process, we have a pretty clear basis for taking action. That, I think, is as it should be.

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Q I want to pick up on the foreign interference point in clause 13 of the Bill:

“A person commits an offence if…the person engages in conduct intending that the conduct, or a course of conduct…will have”

a negative “effect” on the UK for or on behalf of the foreign power in question. In other areas of law, in particular the criminal law, we have intent and recklessness. Do you think that clause 13 should be expanded to include recklessness?

Professor Sir David Omand: I looked at clause 24, “The foreign power condition”, and there is quite a lot of scope in it for a successful prosecution to demonstrate that the individual who as, as you say, acted recklessly, could reasonably have been expected to know that their act would benefit a foreign power, for example, so I was not so concerned about that particular question.

[Sally-Ann Hart]

So you do not think that it should be included in clause 13?

Professor Sir David Omand: No, I had not concluded that.

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Sir Alex?

Sir Alex Younger: I do not have anything to add to that.

[Stewart Hosie]

Q I just want to press further on clause 23. You said that the absence of a carve-out to protect officers could have a chilling effect. Given that we have substantial data sharing, particularly with our closest partners, that the internal safeguards are very robust, and that there is already the defence of acting reasonably—you made the point that this would be on an order to do so—I am not clear yet why the carve-out in clause 23 is as necessary as you suggest it is.

Sir Alex Younger: First of all, “carve-out” means different things to different people, but there is a wild idea that this is a granting of immunity that means we can behave willy-nilly. You will know from your Committee experience that this is not true. I want to make that really clear. The reality at the end of all this—we have had the theoretical versus practical conversation already—is that there exists a risk that individual UK IC officers will face criminal sanction for doing their job. I do not think that risk should exist. That is fundamentally where I am. You can decide as politicians that it is better than what is being proposed by the Government, but I am saying that I do not think it is compatible with a healthy sharing regime of the sort that produces the security benefits I have outlined.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I bring in Sally-Ann Hart.

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Q We heard from the previous witnesses about the challenges of online harm—sabotage and dis, mis and malinformation—and the Bill seeks to modernise the espionage regime to meet the challenge of the digital age. Do you think it will achieve that aim and where are the gaps, if any?

Paddy McGuinness: I would expect it to be a dynamic process. I think you will be looking at further legislation; let us hope you have a long life as an MP, but in your time as an MP I would expect you to have to look at this again.

To Sir David’s point, I do not think we should delay for a moment fixing the things that the Bill fixes because of the fact that technologies develop dynamically. There is a lag. I can remember—I think I was actually working at GCHQ at the time—us thinking about what was happening with Facebook as it emerged as a widely used platform. Here we are with the Online Safety Bill, about 13 years later. There is a natural and quite proper lag between rapid technology innovation and slow and considered regulation and legislation, and we are going to have to live with that. I think this is good. It provides a basis, and I think the extraterritoriality is particularly important, as is the way in which sabotage is broadly defined to allow you to deal with the kind of range of things that I have been talking about, given that the opponent will move through those spaces.

[Antony Higginbotham (Burnley) (Con)]

Q The other day the director-general of MI5 and the director of the FBI said that most of what is at risk by quantity is not what the state does, but the technology, research and development and commercial advantage developed by our businesses and academic institutions. Does the Bill do enough—I am thinking mainly about the offences part of it—to protect against that risk?

Paddy McGuinness: I think it does a very significant thing in the way in which it criminalises specifically the trade secrets aspect, which covers a very broad range. Again, we may have to return to this. This kind of legislation and the type of work that Sir Alex and his successors in MI5, MI6 and GCHQ are doing has Darwinian effect, so I have no doubt that as companies have got better at certain kinds of protection advised by the interaction with the CPNI and the National Cyber Security Centre, so the opponents have got better at it. And we will have to go on doing it.

It does not feel as though we have quite the same volume of opencast mining of our intellectual property and economic value that we had, as was described previously by General Keith Alexander, the head of the National Security Agency in the US. He described the enormous volume—trillions of value—taken out of our economies. There still is a very high level, though, so there is more work to do on this, and it is a significant challenge to the corporate sector to do the right thing in this space, because of the difficulty that it represents. The Bill provides a really solid basis for that discussion, because of the criminalisation of the trades secrets aspect.

National Security Bill (Second sitting)

Sally-Ann Hart Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 7th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Maria Eagle]

Q That is fine. Finally, Mr Armstrong, is there a foreign influence registration scheme out there that you think would be particularly helpful to import into this legislation? What is the best example?

Sam Armstrong: The Australian scheme is by far and away the best example—in my view, the US FARA system is not a good comparator—and it is a shame that we have not taken the opportunity to bring it in sooner. The Australian high commissioner in London was George Brandis, who was the Attorney General who wrote that very Bill, and I know he was keen wherever possible to impress on the Government that he was there and ready to help. I am sure that offer has not dissipated.

[Sally-Ann Hart (Hastings and Rye) (Con)]

Q I have two questions, if there is time. First, Mr Miller, you mentioned people who are employed online and you said that you do not think those people have any idea who is employing them. Clauses 13 and 24 state that

“a person commits an offence if…the person engages in conduct intending that the conduct, or a course of conduct”

and

“the foreign power condition is met…if… the person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that”

it is a foreign power. Do you think that should be widened to include an element of recklessness or recklessness?

Carl Miller: I think doing anything that might compel any of the services involved to do any kind of due diligence on the people who are employing them can only be a good thing, although the general point I am making is that I don’t think criminalising activity within domestic legislation has been a particularly effective way of changing what people do on the internet, especially when those people are largely concentrated in jurisdictions that do not have any co-operative relationship with British law enforcement.

I remember I spent time with a number of cyber-crime teams across the UK and, in the words of one cyber-crime police officer, “If you are in Russia, the cost or penalty of doing cyber-crimes against British citizens is basically nil.” This is not going to be an effective way of reaching beyond our borders and addressing where we believe a large number of actors doing this kind of thing are; they are not doing this from the UK.

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Q On that point and the concerns you mentioned earlier about enforcement and deployment, and that the Bill is not enough alone, what would you propose? Will you expand on that point?

Carl Miller: Sure. First, we need to change the intelligence picture slightly. We should integrate SOCMINT—social media intelligence—within the national strategic intelligence picture. We overlooked open-source intelligence—

[Sally-Ann Hart]

But that is not to do with this Bill, is it?

Carl Miller: Sorry, I thought you asked me— Would you like to hear what I think?

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Yes, carry on.

Carl Miller: Partly it is to do with changing our national knowledge of where these threats are and who is doing them, so the integration of intelligence. Then, as I said, there should be a national risk register and possibly the creation of powers for parts of the intelligence establishment to undertake direct activity against some of the technical architectures that allow this to happen.

Sorry to delve into the technicalities for a second, but for instance residential proxy IP addresses are a very important way in which this stuff happens. Residential proxy IPs are toasters and fridges and stuff. Basically, they each have an IP address and many of them are hijacked. They are the kind of things you that you use if you want to fool a social media platform into thinking that you are 10,000 people from around the planet when you are not—you are one operator sitting in a particular country. These are criminal architectures that have been amassed and rented out and sold to people, and I am sure they are rented out by some of the actors who seek to do influence operations. These are the kinds of things that we need to target. Putting pressure on that kind of asset is the kind of thing that will probably not get rid of them, but will meaningfully increase the costs of this kind of activity.

[Gary Sambrook (Birmingham, Northfield) (Con)]

Q The Government tabled an amendment to the Bill to make “foreign interference” a priority offence in the Online Safety Bill. Do you think that will go some way towards addressing the concerns you have raised today?

Sam Armstrong: Yes, I think so. Imposing a duty on the social media companies is one of the only immediate tools and levers we can pull. I take Carl’s point; I do not think it is going to be sufficient to deal with the hordes of people overseas who are, frankly, conducting quasi-military-type activities against the UK through cyber means here, because criminal law is not the tool for that. Should they exist and are they necessary? Yes. Are they sufficient? Probably not.

Carl Miller: It is just massively insufficient. The reason why is that the platforms, however rich, clever or large they are, cannot reach beyond the platforms themselves. That is the problem. The way we have tried to respond to this problem so far is to have Facebook take down accounts, but take-down is a very weak response. That is essentially being priced in to those kinds of activities. They have developed methodologies for setting up or acquiring new accounts as they go. In principle, I am not hostile to platform regulation across a range of online threats, but for those problems where we are dealing with a set number of actors who have specific capabilities and tap into a specific and constantly evolving tradecraft, I do not think it is going to be the tool to make much difference.

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[Antony Higginbotham]

Q Given your role in academia now, do you think the sector would welcome the Bill providing more clarity on the legal position?

Professor Ciaran Martin: I do not mean to be flippant, but obviously there could be as many different opinions as there are academics. I think that Government providing clear frameworks, laws and guidance to universities without infringing on academic freedom is where I would want to be. I do not think that it is fair to rely on universities to police this activity. It is extremely difficult in open and collaborative research environments like universities to be able to identify what is malevolent activity. If they do, it is extremely difficult to know where to go, what the relevant laws are, and so forth. The combination of a clear legal framework and clear guidance to universities is something that I personally would welcome. I imagine quite a few people, particularly in sensitive areas like technological research, would absolutely welcome that.

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Q You said earlier, looking at the increasing concerns about China and cyber-espionage, that the Bill will be useful against the threat from China, but do you think that the Bill will make the UK safer from the cyber-espionage threat from China, or will we require enhanced offensive capabilities?

Professor Ciaran Martin: They are not mutually exclusive. The thing about offensive capabilities is that they are sometimes seen as almost symmetrical—cyber is a sort of enclosed boxing ring, where you have offence versus defence—but offensive cyber can be used for anything. Our own British Government’s one declared offensive cyber-operation was against so-called Islamic State, not against the cyber-capabilities of another state.

I need to be reasonably careful about what I say here, but if you think that the US’s offensive cyber-capabilities are largely in the Cyber Command and the UK’s in the National Cyber Force, the GCHQ-MI6-Ministry of Defence partnership, one would expect that the operational security of those capabilities to be pretty good and therefore make quite hard targets for other actors. Similarly, some of China and Russia’s offensive cyber-capabilities against us will have quite good operational security, which will make them hard targets. We cannot rely on offensive cyber-capabilities to stop other people, particularly at the top end of the spectrum, at the elite nation- state level.

There is no magic panacea in the Bill, because no magic panacea is available. Even in the areas we were talking about, such as completely remote activity, one of the things that we saw anecdotally—there is some emerging research to support this—was that when the US in particular had a legal framework, where it can prosecute and indict people in absentia, in China and to some extent Iran, that did have some impact for some time. It did not solve everything, but it did affect the behaviour of some actors—they could not travel to the west, most practically, because they were under indictment by the US and therefore all the US’s allies. It meant that the associates of these people, because digital infrastructure is global, could get arrested.

Some people working with Russian groups have been arrested in eastern European countries with which we can co-operate in law enforcement terms. Strengthening that sort of legal framework gives you something. It is probably more incremental than transformative, but it is still something.

[The Chair]

Damian Hinds, very briefly.

--- Later in debate ---

[Damian Hinds]

Q So you are not saying that you think that lawyers should be exempted from registering? Your objection is specifically about disclosure of documentation.

Rich Owen: Yes. Well, we are looking for something similar to the Australian scheme. The Australian legislation specifically exempts legal professional privilege, as well as seeking legal advice and assistance. That sort of model, which expressly exempts legal professional privilege, would be a suitable way forward for the scheme.

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Q I just want to look at the provisions relating to arrests without warrant, which is in clause 21 and schedule 3. The provisions relating to that include the ability to delay access to a solicitor and delay notifying a person’s family of their detention. Based on similar provisions for terrorism suspects, do you regard that as proportionate and necessary? Can I go to Dr Hoggard first?

Dr Nicholas Hoggard: You can, although I am afraid I will have to be very boring. Speaking with my Law Commission hat on, we are limited in what we can say with respect to those things that did not form part of the scope, regarding the protection of Government data. I am very sorry; I do not mean to be deliberately unhelpful, but we do not really—

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Q Can anyone answer that?

Rich Owen: Well, those provisions are modelled on terrorism legislation, when they concern a serious risk to the public, and there are suitable safeguards attached to them as well, so the position of the Law Society is to regard that provision as proportionate.

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Q Okay, thank you. I would just pick up, Mr Owen, on something that Mr Hinds mentioned about the FIR scheme and legal professional privilege. I was a bit confused; can you clarify if the FIR scheme would help prevent abuse of legal professional privilege, or are you saying that lawyers would be exempt from that?

Rich Owen: I was saying that an exemption on grounds of legal professional privilege, or seeking legal advice and assistance, could not be used for espionage, because you are outwith legal professional privilege. You are seeking to advance a crime, so that does not come within the ambit of legal professional privilege.

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Q I only ask that because I know that with the sanctions against Russian oligarchs there was a bit of confusion over that generally.

Rich Owen: Yes. There has to be access to justice for everyone, including rich people. They can communicate with their lawyer, and if they need advice on the law, that should be privileged. However, if they are seeking, through their communication with lawyers, to advance a criminal offence, then that is outwith legal professional privilege.

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Thank you for the clarification.

[The Chair]

We have a little more time if anyone has any further questions?

--- Later in debate ---

[Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)]

Q I want to touch on the whistleblower issue you raised. There have been some concerns that the Bill might not sufficiently target those with malicious intent. Is there a risk that it potentially criminalises whistleblowers?

Poppy Wood: The role of whistleblowers in society is really important. I know the Government understand that. There are some good recommendations from the ISC about whistleblowers that I do not think have been adopted in this version of the Bill. That is about at least giving some clarity to where the thresholds lie, and giving a disclosure offence and a public interest defence to whistleblowers so they can say, “These are the reasons why.” My understanding is that at the moment it sits with juries and it is on a case-by-case basis. I would certainly commend to you the recommendations from the ISC.

I would also say—this was a recommendation from the Law Commission and also, I think, from the ISC—that lots of people have to blow the whistle because they feel that they do not have anywhere else to go. There could be formal procedures—an independent person or body or office to go to when you are in intelligence agencies, or government in general or anywhere. One of the reasons why Frances Haugen came forward—she has been public about this—is that she did not really know where else to go. There were no placards saying, “Call the Information Commissioner in the UK if you have concerns about data.” People do not know where to go.

Getting touchpoints earlier down the chain so that people do not respond in desperation in the way we have seen in the past would be a good recommendation to take forward. Whistleblowers play an important part in our society and in societies all round the world. Those tests on a public interest defence would give some clarity, which would be really welcome. Building a system around them—I know the US intelligence services do that; they have a kind of whistleblower programme within the CIA and the Department of Defence that allows people to go to someone, somewhere, earlier on, to raise concerns—is the sort of thing you might be looking at. I think a whistleblower programme is an ISC recommendation, but it is certainly a Law Commission recommendation.

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Q On malign activity, is there a risk that through clauses 13 and 14 on foreign interference, the Bill could affect free speech, including political speech and journalism? If you think it could, what additional safeguards can be put in place to ensure that only malign activity is captured?

Poppy Wood: I have certainly read and heard concerns about journalism, about the “foreign power” test on civil society and about having Government money being quite a blunt measure for whether or not you might fall foul of these offences. On journalism, I think that is why you should never try to define disinformation: because those kinds of shape-shifting forms are very hard to pin down, particularly with questions like “What is journalism?”, “What is a mistruth?”, “What is a mis-speak?” and so on. We need to be careful about that.

On your specific question, I refer you to Article 19 and others who have really thought through the impact on journalism and free speech. I am sure it would be an unintended consequence but, again, we are seeing Russia using its co-ordinated armies on Telegram and other channels to target Ukrainian journalists. They are saying, “Complain to the platforms that the journalist is not who they say they are or is saying something false, so they are breaking the terms of service. Bombard the platforms so that that journalist gets taken down and cannot post live from Ukraine for a handful of days.”

That is just another example of how these systems are weaponised. This is where you can go much further on systems through the Online Safety Bill and the National Security Bill without worrying too much about speech. But I refer the Committee to other experts, such as Article 19, that have looked really deeply at the journalism issue. I think Index on Censorship may have done some work as well.

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Q You have mentioned disinformation. In this Bill, the Online Safety Bill, and perhaps the review that Ms Lynch mentioned, which you thought was a good idea, what more do you want to see the Government do to address dis, mis or malinformation and malign foreign influence online?

Poppy Wood: I think that where we are now is much better than where we were last year, but my concern is whether this will all be law when we have an election. If not, what are the backstops that the Government have in place to focus on this stuff? It will get tested only when we have an election, really. If that is before March next year or whenever these laws get Royal Assent, there will be a genuine question of crisis management: if this is not law, what are we doing? I would ask that question of the Government and the civil service.

As I said, the disinformation committee in the Online Safety Bill is years down the line. Bring that forward—there is no need not to bring it forward—and please make sure that it is not chaired by someone from a tech platform. I would write that into the Bill, because otherwise there is a risk that that will happen.

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Q Why?

Poppy Wood: Why should the committee on disinformation not be chaired by someone from a tech platform? They have a vested interest in this stuff, so I would get an academic or someone from civil society—someone at arm’s length who can take a holistic view. These platforms will want to protect their interests on this stuff, so I would warn against that.

I would like to see the transparency provisions in the Online Safety Bill go much further. This is a bit in the weeds of the Online Safety Bill, if you will forgive me, but there is a very good clause in that Bill, clause 136, which says that Ofcom should ask whether researchers should be given access to data. It is an important clause, but it says, “Ask the question,” and it gives Ofcom two years to do it. I do not think it needs two years; I think we know that the answer is “Yes, researchers desperately need access to data.”

Almost all the stuff that is caught about malign information operations is caught via Twitter’s API. Twitter makes 10% of all the tweets public, and researchers use that to run analysis, so if you ever want to do research on disinformation, you always use the Twitter API. In many cases, that is mapped over to Facebook to identify the same operations on Facebook, but they are always caught in the first instance because of open data. I think that the Online Safety Bill, if this Committee and this Bill want to back it up, could bring that forward and say, “Either do the report in six months or don’t even ask the question.”

By the way, the European legislation that is equivalent to the Online Safety Bill makes that happen as of Tuesday this week, so researchers should, in theory, be able to access data. I would bring the transparency provisions forward, and I would really want the Bill to call out co-ordinated inauthentic behaviour.

[The Chair]

That brings us to the end of this panel. On behalf of the Committee, I thank our witness for taking the time to give evidence.

Examination of Witness

Dan Dolan gave evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sally-Ann Hart]

Q We heard from a Law Society witness earlier that the provisions relating to arrest without warrant—in clause 21 and schedule 3—that include the ability to delay access to a lawyer and delay notifying a person’s family of their detention are proportionate and necessary. Do you regard it as proportionate and necessary?

Dan Dolan: I am afraid I might have to give the frustrating answer that our evidence does not cover clause 20. There is clearly a concern there, but I am probably best leaving that to more expert witnesses to answer.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Sally-Ann Hart Excerpts

Consideration of Lords amendments
Wednesday 20th April 2022 Commons Chamber

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

I call Sally-Ann Hart to speak until 5.47 pm.

[Sally-Ann Hart (Hastings and Rye) (Con)]

Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker. I shall be quick and focus on Lords amendment 7. The question whether asylum seekers are able to undertake work after six months was raised in March, when the Bill was last debated in this House. Replying to our right hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Swindon (Sir Robert Buckland), the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Corby (Tom Pursglove), spoke about getting casework right. Will he confirm that the measures in the Bill, together with the UK and Rwanda economic development partnership, will mean that there should be no asylum seekers still in a state of limbo, waiting for their asylum status to be determined, after six months, and that such an amendment is therefore not needed?

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank Members across the House for their contributions to this afternoon’s debate on issues that are of the utmost importance. I would argue that there is a moral imperative to act that underpins the Government’s approach in addressing the challenges. It simply is not good enough for people to say what they do not want and what they do not like: when criticising and arguing that something is wrong, they have to present a credible alternative plan, particularly if they have ambitions to govern. This Bill delivers our comprehensive plan—the only credible plan—to address these issues. Now is the time to get on and deliver it.

Marriage and Civil Partnership (Minimum Age) Bill

Sally-Ann Hart Excerpts

Friday 25th February 2022 Commons Chamber

[Sally-Ann Hart]

To go back to the forced marriage unit, it set out additional information on the cases it dealt with in 2020. Of the cases that it provided advice or support to in 2020, 26% involved victims below 18 years of age, 37% involved victims aged 18 to 25 and 9% involved victims with mental capacity concerns, while 79% involved female victims and 21% involved male victims.

Last year, the Government published their tackling violence against women and girls strategy, which sets out a range of actions aimed at tackling acts of violence or abuse that disproportionately affect women and girls, and forced marriage is identified as one such issue. The strategy states that

“the Government remains committed to the goal of ending child marriage in this country. We also recognise the need to signal to other countries that child marriage is something which needs to be tackled.”

The strategy also states:

“Child marriage and having children too early in life can deprive children of important life chances, which is why the Government will support raising the age of marriage and civil partnership in England and Wales from 16 to 18, when an appropriate legislative vehicle becomes available, to help stamp out marriage of minors. The age of 18 is widely recognised as the age at which one becomes an adult, and at which full citizenship rights should be gained.”This Bill is the legislative vehicle to stamp out the marriage of minors, and I wholeheartedly support it and the amendments agreed to today.

Marriage and Civil Partnership (Minimum Age) Bill

Sally-Ann Hart Excerpts

Report stage
Friday 25th February 2022 Commons Chamber

[Sally-Ann Hart (Hastings and Rye) (Con)]

I welcome the Bill, which is to:

“Make provision about the minimum age for marriage and civil partnership, and for connected purposes.”

When I was researching the Bill to write this speech, I came across an American news channel reporting that the minimum age for marriage in Carolina was going to be raised from 14 years old to 16 years old, that the teen’s spouse would be required to be no more than four years older, and that the teen’s written parental consent would be required to marry. I have to admit that I was rather flabbergasted. A 14-year-old is a child. A 16-year-old is a child.

Time and again, as with the trauma of the poor Russian skater, Kamila Valieva—who is a child at 15—at the recent winter Olympics that I am sure many hon. Members witnessed, we see situations where adults are not making the right or best decisions for children. Children are children until they reach adulthood at 18 years old. It is absolutely right that the Bill has been brought forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Derbyshire (Mrs Latham), and I welcome the fact that it and the amendments discussed earlier today have been supported by hon. Members on both sides of the House and by the Government.

Children need to be children, to be permitted to be children, and to enjoy all the joy and freedom without adult responsibilities. Child rights are fundamental freedoms and must be inherent in all children under the age of 18, irrespective of race, religion, sex or any other status. Children are not the property of their parents. They are human beings and they have rights.

The convention on the rights of the child sets out the rights that must be realised for children to develop their full potential. It offers a vision of the child as an individual and as a member of the family and community, with rights and responsibilities appropriate to his or her age and stage of development. In recognising children’s rights in that way, it firmly sets the focus on the whole child.

All children should have and deserve to have access to opportunities. Children are innocent. They are full of hope and joy, and they are trusting. Rather than be thrown or forced into an adult life, they should be allowed to mature gradually through new experiences that are age appropriate. It is a travesty that for far too many children, the reality of their childhood is all too different. Throughout history, children have been abused and exploited by adults, whether through slave labour, hunger, homelessness, limited education opportunities and so on.

Childhood must be protected and children should be allowed and encouraged to develop in their own time. Marriage or a civil partnership is an adult decision and requires thought. A party to a marriage should not take a passive approach. It is not something for someone to go along with or have done to them—it requires mature thought. Marriage is an important part of building healthy and protected relationships, families and societies.

Marriage should not cause harm to either party. Early and forced marriages often take place in communities where there is a wider social context that denies women’s and children’s rights. Currently, in England and Wales the minimum age for marriage or civil partnership without parental or other third-party consent, or judicial consent, is 18. A person who is 16 or 17 may marry or form a civil partnership only with consent—with some very rare exceptions, in which a 16 or 17-year-old is a widow or widower, or a surviving civil partner. A marriage or civil partnership is void if either of the parties is under the age of 16.

The Bill would raise to 18 the minimum age for marriage and civil partnership in England and Wales. That might affect marriages and civil partnerships that take place outside England and Wales. A change in the common law will also mean that any marriages involving under-18s that take place overseas, or in Scotland or Northern Ireland, will not be legally recognised in England and Wales if one of the parties is domiciled in England or Wales. That change to recognition will also apply to civil partnerships. I acknowledge the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Derbyshire about issues to do with Scotland and Northern Ireland; I, too, encourage Scotland and Northern Ireland to take the Bill on board.

The Bill will also make it illegal for a person to arrange the marriage of a person under the age of 18 in England and Wales in circumstances where that is not already illegal. In 2018, the most recent year for which data is available, 147 16 to 17-year-olds entered into a legally binding marriage with a person of the opposite sex, representing a very small proportion—0.06%—of all marriages that took place in England and Wales in 2018. Marriages of same-sex couples or civil partnerships are not reported with a detailed age breakdown. The issue is about not the small number, but each of those individuals who have had something done to or for them over which they have had no control.

The majority of 16 to 17-year-olds who marry are female. In 2018, 119 of the 16 to 17-year-olds getting married were female, while 28 were male. Over the past five years, an average of 79% of all 16 to 17-year-olds getting married have been female. UNICEF considers that child marriage is a violation of human rights, regardless of sex, but has emphasised that child marriage often compromises a girl’s development by resulting in early pregnancy and social isolation, interrupting her schooling, limiting her opportunities for career and vocational advancement, and placing her at increased risk of domestic violence. Although the impact on child grooms has not been extensively studied, marriage may similarly place boys in an adult role for which they are unprepared and may place economic pressures on them and curtail their opportunities for further education or career advancement.

Gender equality and ending the exploitation of women and girls are vital. One of the United Nations sustainable development goals agreed by world leaders is to eliminate all harmful practices such as child early and forced marriage and female genital mutilation. The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child recommends that there should be no legal way for anyone to marry before they turn 18, even if there is parental consent.

The Bill would also expand the existing criminal law on forced marriage to make it illegal for a person to arrange the marriage of a person under 18 in England and Wales. In 2020, the forced marriage unit gave advice or support in 759 cases related to a possible forced marriage and/or possible female genital mutilation. A significant majority related to forced marriage, as my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Derbyshire has already pointed out. The forced marriage unit notes that the overall case number represents a 44% decrease on the average number of cases received annually between 2011 and 2019, which was 1,359. The decrease is thought to be attributable to the pandemic, owing to restrictions on weddings and overseas travel.

Proceedings interrupted (Standing Order No. 11(4)).

Nationality and Borders Bill

Sally-Ann Hart Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 7th December 2021 Commons Chamber

[Imran Hussain]

I also rise to speak in support of amendment 12.

Citizenship is a fundamental right that speaks to our very sense of belonging and identity, which is why it is enshrined not just in law but in the UN charter, the universal declaration of human rights and the 1954 convention relating to the status of stateless persons.

Under this Home Secretary, the Government have failed to treat citizenship with the reverence and respect it deserves. By removing the requirement to give notice, she has done away with due process and has expanded her already draconian powers that allow her to deprive anyone of British citizenship, provided she believes it is in the interest of the public good.

Reference has been made to powers that, according to the analysis of the Office for National Statistics, could affect 6 million people, many from a Pakistani, Indian, Bangladeshi, Jamaican or Nigerian background. Let me be absolutely clear: that is the group of people the Bill will disproportionately impact, which is why this House must vote the clause down today.

Over the past fortnight since I originally raised this issue, I have had people telling me, much like some of the arguments we have heard from the Government Benches, “As long as you don’t break the law, you have nothing to fear from the Home Office.” I absolutely disagree: working-class people from a black, from an Asian or from any ethnic minority background have everything to fear from this Home Office. Let us not forget that it is this Tory Home Office that presided over the mass deportations in the Windrush scandal; that it is this Home Office that continues to prosecute a hostile environment against migrants, refugees and asylum seekers; and that it is this Home Office that uses Orwell’s “Nineteen Eighty-Four” not as a warning, but as a guidebook. I therefore have no confidence, and neither do my constituents, that, based on its record, the Home Office will not further expand the scope of its powers to deprive someone of British citizenship on more spurious grounds.

The powers that the Home Secretary has even now to deprive someone of British citizenship already create two tiers in society based on foreign ancestry, but removing the requirement to provide notice takes things even further. An individual stripped of citizenship will not be told or given reasons and will therefore have no real right of appeal—and all this can happen even as they are being deported. Frankly, such a move should send shivers down the spine of anyone interested in upholding liberty and due process. I simply ask those who want to accuse me of sensationalising the situation to come walk for a day, for a year, for a lifetime in the shoes of someone the Home Office has decreed to be a second-class citizen, and then tell me that they honestly believe that these are not the real fears of those from ethnic minority backgrounds in our own country today.

[Sally-Ann Hart (Hastings and Rye) (Con)]

I wish to focus on clause 9 but will refer to amendment 12.

Clause 9 amends the deprivation of citizenship powers in the British Nationality Act 1981. Currently, as Members have highlighted, section 40(5) of that Act requires the Secretary of State to give a person written notice of a deprivation order, the reasons for it and the person’s right of appeal. The power to deprive an individual of their citizenship has been available for more than a century, since the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 1914, and is currently also contained in the 1981 Act. Home Office powers to strip British nationals of their citizenship were introduced after the 2005 London bombings and broadened in 2014.

As we have heard, there has been some criticism of the clause in the House and outside the House. For example, the Runnymede Trust states that citizenship is not a privilege and that the Bill is

“a threat to ethnic minority Britons”.

I wholly disagree. Citizenship of any country is a privilege, not a right. We are all privileged to be British citizens. It is a privilege that comes with responsibility.

The deprivation of citizenship on conducive grounds is rightly reserved for those who pose a threat to the UK or whose conduct involves very high harm. It is integral to the national security of this country that if an affected person cannot be contacted, or if knowledge of their whereabouts derives from sensitive intelligence sources, we can act in the best interests of this country and our citizens.

Removing someone’s British citizenship is a last resort against the most dangerous people who pose a risk to society, or those whose conduct involves very high levels of harm. It is rare and always come with a right to appeal. Deprivation of citizenship on fraud grounds is for those who obtained their citizenship fraudulently and so were never entitled to it in the first place.

The Bill does not change any existing rights, or the circumstances in which a person can be deprived of their citizenship. Decisions are made following the careful consideration of advice from officials and lawyers, and always in accordance with international law. Each case is assessed individually. With regard to seeking to deprive an individual of their British citizenship on the basis that that is conducive to the public good, the law requires that this action should proceed only if the individual will not be left stateless.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sally-Ann Hart]

I agree, in that I, too, have constituents who have been waiting for five years for their asylum status to be decided. I am sure that the Minister agrees that the Home Office officials who deal with people need to have proper and efficient processes in place.

More generally, although human migration has been going on for millennia, we face increasing global challenges caused by a range of complex climate, economic, social and political factors. Uncontrolled mass migration has caused a swing to nationalism in some European countries, and we must not let that happen here. This country has always welcomed immigrants; we have lived together in a tolerant society that welcomes immigrants. The developed world, including our allies in Europe, needs to take better measures to control migration, but also to help people thrive in their homeland, rather than facing the indignity and lack of worth that they face in Europe, where people are exploited or detained in facilities. No man, no woman, no Government, nor any faith should be upholding this new form of slavery.

[Afzal Khan (Manchester, Gorton) (Lab)]

I rise in support of amendment 12, which was tabled by the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis). Before I speak to the amendment, let me put on record my complete and absolute opposition to this Bill in its entirety.

This Bill is a sham. This Home Secretary is intent on extending her predecessor’s hostile environment policies to ensure that migrants and asylum seekers feel unwelcome and unwanted in the UK. The legislation is not only atrocious, but poorly written, as is demonstrated by the fact that the Government tabled 80 amendments to their own Bill after it had undergone line-by-line scrutiny in Committee.

Let me turn to clause 9, which amendment 12 seeks to remove. The inclusion of this clause, which allows the Home Secretary to deprive a person of their British citizenship without any warning, is deeply worrying. In the last couple of weeks, more than 60 of my constituents have contacted me to say that they are concerned about the clause. The Government declare that citizenship is a privilege, not a right. They have got it backwards; citizenship is a right, not a privilege, and this clause represents a fundamental breach of the rule of law.

I secured my British citizenship in the ’80s, after nearly two decades in this country. It is people like me and those with migrant heritage who have the most to fear from this clause and this Government. Black, Asian and minority ethnic people—whether they are migrants or not—are frightened of what this Government could do to them, particularly in the wake of the Windrush scandal. Depriving someone of their citizenship is a serious undertaking; it should be subject to appropriate safeguards, which must include giving individuals notice. For this reason, I support amendment 12, which would remove the clause from the Bill.

I want to finish with the words of one of my constituents, who said:

“As an aunt to five children of mixed heritage, as someone with a sister-in-law who is Moroccan, as someone with friends who were not born in Britain, and as a human being who exists in this world, I believe this bill is inhuman, unconscionable, and evil in its intent.”

Registers of Births and Deaths Bill

Sally-Ann Hart Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 26th November 2021 Commons Chamber

[Sally-Ann Hart (Hastings and Rye) (Con)]

I welcome the Bill introduced by my hon. Friend the Member for Meriden (Saqib Bhatti), which seeks to make provision on the keeping and maintenance of registers of births and deaths.

In Hastings and Rye we have Hastings register office and the beautiful Hastings town hall, and I thank all staff for all their hard work, particularly over the past 18 months when their patience and empathy has been so important for so many people in my constituency.

Since 2009 all birth and death registrations have been captured both electronically and on paper. This duplication of processes is unnecessary, does not represent value for money, and is time consuming. Furthermore, this is an old-fashioned process that uses a lot of paper—and, Madam Deputy Speaker, the same might be said about this place. With global warming and too much carbon being emitted, polluting our environment, we can see the value in going green and decreasing our carbon footprint. This Bill removes the requirement for paper registers to be held but does not remove the requirement of having a lovely birth certificate.

[Lia Nici]

Does my hon. Friend agree that this will eliminate not only paper and paper production but lots of unnecessary journeys in cars and other vehicles, and therefore perhaps help to get us to net zero a little more quickly?

[Sally-Ann Hart]

My hon. Friend raises a valid point and I absolutely agree.

The Bill removes the requirement for paper registers to be held and stored securely in each registration district, and with records already stored electronically there is no need for on-paper storage. This will save space and eliminate the cost of that extra storage, as explained by my hon. Friend the Member for Meriden. As paper comes from trees, going paperless by utilising electronic document management systems helps cut down on deforestation and pollution, leaving more trees to absorb carbon dioxide, helping to mitigate climate change.

[Sir Christopher Chope]

My hon. Friend is rightly concerned about hacking down trees unnecessarily but will she address her remarks to the problem of hacking electronic records?

--- Later in debate ---

[Sally-Ann Hart]

My hon. Friend raises a very good point and I will come to it shortly if he will continue to listen to my little speech.

It has been estimated that a single person uses up to 10,000 paper sheets in one year; imagine the quantity of paper utilised by the register of births and deaths and many other organisations, including this place, and businesses globally.

But is going paperless really saving trees? Is going digital better for the environment? Many in the paper industry dispute this, saying that those who claim going paperless is better for the environment are misleading consumers and that such claims are not substantiated by adequate research. Obviously they have a vested interest and paper manufacturing does lead to deforestation and contributes significantly to climate change. At first glance, digitisation seems to be more sustainable and renewable—electronic products are used over and over again, and information is stored in an invisible cloud—but manufacturing electronic products also leaves a carbon footprint, and energy is needed to power them. What do we do with old computers and laptops, et cetera? These are all waste, which is something we have to think about.

Although there are some environmental benefits of going paperless, there are also cost savings, as highlighted by many Members today. When it comes to being fiscally sensible, as Conservatives are, and taking care of how we spend taxpayers’ money, cost savings are vital, especially if we can provide an equal or even better service.

The Bill would remove unnecessary duplication and facilitate a more efficient registration of births and deaths. Data could be accessed immediately, giving staff and service users the ability to make faster, better-informed decisions, for example, but we need to ensure, as my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch (Sir Christopher Chope) highlighted, that digital security is paramount for all things stored or otherwise used online.

Digital files are far easier to copy, share, hack and destroy than physical files, and we must ensure that all legislation is up to date, which is why I welcome the passage this week of the Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021 to better protect people’s smartphones, smart televisions, smart speakers and tablets, and so on, which means people can safely register births and deaths with such devices.

[Lia Nici]

My home filing cabinet contains birth certificates and copious romantic family records. Does my hon. Friend agree that if somebody wanted to, they could easily steal that paperwork, just as they might be able to steal it digitally?

[Sally-Ann Hart]

My hon. Friend makes a good point. If people really want to target us and steal paperwork from our house, they would have to break in. That might be a little more difficult than just hacking a computer, but I take her point.

[Saqib Bhatti]

I have heard the points raised on hacking, but it is important to reiterate that this system has been running in parallel since 2009. My understanding is that the information is kept on multiple servers. I invite the Minister to clarify the security side, but there has never been an instance of hacking or suchlike.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sally-Ann Hart]

I thank my hon. Friend for explaining that point. Obviously with all electronic information storage it is vital that we have the right security and that legislation is kept up to date to ensure we are always one step ahead of those who wish to do us harm.

[Mr Bone]

My hon. Friend is making a powerful speech, and she is persuading me even more to vote against the Bill. She rightly says there is a problem with paper records, because they can be stolen, but there is a problem with computer records because they can be hacked. Surely the current system of having both is the right way forward, unless she can guarantee that it is impossible to hack the records.

[Sally-Ann Hart]

I do not think we can guarantee that anything cannot be hacked, but the fact is this is a good Bill. It would cut costs and protect the environment, and this is something we must modernise.

The Bill would streamline processes to bring the registration of births and deaths into the 21st century, which we need to do. I am sorry to my hon. Friend the Member for Gedling (Tom Randall), but at times we need to modernise. Modernisation and conservatism run hand in hand, and that is what we are good at. The goal of the Bill is clear and achievable, and it would cut bureaucracy, saving time and resources. A well-developed, modernised and functioning civil registration system would promote transparency and safeguard efficient Government planning, including the effective use of resources. This Bill deserves the support of the House.