Read Bill Ministerial Extracts
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Winterton of Doncaster
Main Page: Baroness Winterton of Doncaster (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Winterton of Doncaster's debates with the Home Office
(5 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberBefore I call the Home Secretary, I want to remind the House of what was said earlier regarding the Sarah Everard case. Charges have now been brought in that case. The sub judice resolution does not apply formally when the House is legislating. However, I would urge all Members to exercise caution and not say anything about the detail of the case or the identity of those against whom charges have been brought that might affect any subsequent court case.
It is absolutely right that we look at every single measure and approach to ensure that victims of rape receive justice. As the hon. Gentleman will know, the rape review is taking place and will soon be published.
We want to improve accessibility to our justice system for people with disabilities. Reasonable adjustments can be made for most people with disabilities to enable them to complete jury service. However, the law has to date prevented deaf people who require the services of a sign language interpreter from having an interpreter in a jury deliberation room with them. We are changing that to ensure that all deaf individuals are able to serve as jurors unless the circumstances of a particular case mean that it would not be in the interests of justice for them to do so.
As I said at the beginning, this Government were elected on a clear manifesto commitment to keep our country safe. That is what the British people rightly expect, and that is what this Bill will deliver, by supporting the police, by preventing and cutting crime and by restoring confidence in the criminal justice system, because giving people the security they need to live their lives as they choose is an essential part of our freedom. As we emerge from the coronavirus pandemic, we will build back safer and increase the safety and security of our citizens. This Bill will enable us to do exactly that, and I commend it to the House.
I should inform Members that we will start with a time limit of five minutes, but it will go down very quickly to three minutes.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Winterton of Doncaster
Main Page: Baroness Winterton of Doncaster (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Winterton of Doncaster's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(5 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am grateful to be called in this debate. I wish to place on record my thanks to the Under-Secretary, the hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), for meeting me to discuss this Bill. The scale of the Bill, the wide-ranging import of its provisions and indeed the two days set aside for the Second Reading debate all indicate the magnitude of what is contained within it.
First, I wish to indicate my support for the provisions that directly apply to Northern Ireland. The ability to access information from encrypted devices, the ability to take samples from human remains, changes to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and mutual recognition across our United Kingdom are all welcome provisions that will assist in the fight against serious crime. Ministers are aware that I have raised my concern that, although they are not part of this Bill, unexplained wealth orders, provided for in the Criminal Finances Act 2017, have not yet commenced in Northern Ireland, despite our Department of Justice seeking a commencement order.
With paramilitarism and organised crime still having a significant impact in Northern Ireland generally, and in my constituency of East Belfast particularly, we need immediate progress on this issue. I am prepared to table amendments to the Bill if necessary, though I am somewhat assuaged to hear that progress may come in the next week or two. I would therefore be extremely grateful if confirmation of that could be given from the Dispatch Box this evening.
Separately, the House is well aware of the strength of feeling following the abhorrent murder of Sarah Everard so I am pleased that the Bill will increase the time served in prison from half to two-thirds of the sentence as a minimum for the most serious sexual offences. It will bring in provisions on abuse of positions of trust and enact Kay’s law with greater protections linked to pre-charge bail.
Finally, and regretfully, I rail against in the strongest possible terms the overarching sweeping and draconian provisions on protests. I have heard what the Government’s intention is, but the loose and lazy way the legislation is drafted would make a dictator blush. Protests will be noisy. Protests will disrupt. No matter how offensive we may find the issue at their heart, the right to protest should be protected.
Unless we wish to proceed with societal constraints that permit only graceful, genteel and humble protest, I urge the Government to indicate that they accept the strength of feeling on this issue, that they will work with colleagues across the House to amend the provisions significantly, and that they will not proceed without publishing guidance underpinned by statute on the operative implications.
I wish you, Madam Deputy Speaker, and all colleagues a happy St Patrick’s Day for tomorrow.
Thank you. We now go by video link to Dame Angela Eagle.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Court Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Winterton of Doncaster
Main Page: Baroness Winterton of Doncaster (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Winterton of Doncaster's debates with the Home Office
(5 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberI know that Mr Speaker has urged right hon. and hon. Members to take between three and a maximum of four minutes, so I shall just re-emphasise that.
I am not going to give way, because so many people want to speak and there is not much time. I hope the right hon. Lady will forgive me.
New clause 90 is much better, and I hope hon. Members will support it. I will support new clause 31 as well, but new clause 90 is much better. These workers deserve our support. They have done so much for us over recent years. Surely the least that they can expect—the least that they can expect—from this House is for them to see that we are on their side, respect the job they have done and understand the terrible abuse they get, often, as I say, for very little reward, at the hands of their customers. We should be there to protect them.
This will just give the Crown Prosecution Service and the police an extra tool in their armoury to make sure that those who assault frontline workers and shop workers are brought to justice and to make sure that those shop workers and frontline workers get the justice they deserve. This House should be on their side, and I very much hope the Government, at this late stage, will reflect on this and accept new clause 90. It only uses the same wording as the Sentencing Council uses when it considers whether this should be an aggravating factor. It is well-used terminology to describe people who are providing a service to the public, including shop workers. This is a really important moment for the Government, and I hope that they will show they are on the side of our shop workers and frontline workers to whom we owe so much, particularly over the last 15 months.
As we will have to suspend the debate for the statement at 5 o’clock, after the next speaker I am going to put on a time limit of four minutes just to help guide colleagues.
Because of the time available, I am going to speak to the amendments tabled in my name. First, I will focus on new clauses 26 and 27, which would encourage the public to report all cases of sexual offending, including low-level or non-contact sexual offending, and amendments 20 to 24, which would put in place early interventions for referrals to treatment services to stop sexual offending escalating. There is a great deal of evidence that those who commit low-level or non-contact sexual offences will take more risks if not stopped, and move to increasingly violent sexual crimes.
Let me highlight the amendments and new clauses that I seek to support, including those on the right to protest in the names of the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael) and my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry South (Zarah Sultana). I support those amendments that seek to stand up against the discrimination and persecution of the Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities, particularly those tabled by my hon. Friends the Members for Liverpool, West Derby (Ian Byrne) and for City of Durham (Mary Kelly Foy), and those that challenge wider inequalities in the criminal justice system, from class to age, race, sexuality, disability and gender, including the new clause tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester East (Claudia Webbe). I oppose the introduction of secure academies for 16 to 19-year-olds, which is essentially the expansion of child prisons, as reflected in the new clause tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Poplar and Limehouse (Apsana Begum). I will also support any other amendment or new clause that seeks to remove or address the sinister nature of the Bill.
We can be under no illusion—this is yet another authoritarian clampdown on our civil liberties. The right to peaceful assembly and protest is a fundamental principle of any democracy, and the rich tradition of dissent in this country shows us that such actions can change the course of history. They are the reason that someone of my race, class and gender has the rights I have, and why I can stand here as a Member of this House. We must not forget that the struggles and protests being demonised by this Bill are seen as the milestones of progress in our society. The suffrage movement, for example, faced considerable state repression and police brutality.
My new clauses 56 and 57 call respectively for a review of stop-and-search powers and for a public inquiry into how the criminal justice system affects black, Asian and minority ethnic people. BAME people are more than nine times as likely to be stopped and searched by police, yet this Government think that it is okay just to plough ahead, exacerbating the situation further. Just last week, the United Nations released a report analysing racial justice in the aftermath of the death of George Floyd and called on member states, including the UK, to end impunity for police officers who violate the human rights of black people. A 2019 report by the Women and Equalities Committee recognised that Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities are one of the most persecuted groups in Europe, yet the Government seek literally to persecute them further through the Bill.
We need a full public inquiry into the disproportionality that exists at every single level and junction of the criminal justice system. High prosecution rates, higher custody rates, longer-than-average custodial sentences, disproportionate representation in the prison system and deaths in custody—this is what under-represented communities have come to expect. We need answers, and then we need justice in order to move forward.
The Black Lives Matter movement and the protests that sprang from it sought to challenge these injustices—and what was the Government’s response to national calls to end institutional racism? It was to commission a report that said there was no institutional racism, and to introduce a policing Bill that will only further criminalise and brutalise these communities. If the Government were actually listening to what the BLM protesters said, they would not be bringing in a Bill like this.
Why not follow the example of the England football team, who have inspired us during Euro 2020 not only with their football prowess, but with their collective and principled bravery in taking the knee, representing the very best of us and our communities? To quote Gareth Southgate, it is about a
“duty to continue to interact with the public on matters such as equality, inclusivity and racial injustice, while using the power of their voices to help put debates on the table, raise awareness and educate”.
He is a football manager—he does not work for this House, but he does much better than we do, day to day.
I know with all my heart that I am on the right side of history. I urge hon. Members to stand with me and stop the criminalisation of black, Asian and minority ethnic communities, of Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities and of every single under-represented group that will be destroyed by legislation such as this.
Could the last two speakers stick to four minutes?
Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I will speak quickly about new clauses 42 and 55, which concern the regulation of abortion.
New clause 42, tabled by the hon. Member for Ealing Central and Acton (Dr Huq), proposes the creation of censorship zones around abortion clinics. The intention behind it is to stop the harassment of women seeking abortion.
We already have laws against harassment which can be, and are, applied. We also already have public order laws that allow councils to impose restrictions regarding specific clinics that are experiencing any real public order difficulties, so the activity that the new clause proposes to criminalise is peaceful, passive, non-obstructive activity—less disruptive than the sort of protests that Opposition Members are so busy trying to defend today. I recognise the good faith behind the new clause, but in practice it is an attempt to criminalise the expression of an opinion. I cite the campaigner Peter Tatchell, who said today that it is an
“unjustifiable restriction on the right to free expression.”
I urge the House to vote it down.
New clause 55, tabled by the right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Dame Diana Johnson), would not criminalise anything; it would decriminalise something, namely abortion itself up to term. It would effectively legalise abortion on demand up to birth. She is keen that we pay attention to the text of her new clause, so I shall quote from it:
“No offence is committed…by…a woman who terminates her own pregnancy or who assists in or consents to such termination”.
The effect would be to legalise or to decriminalise abortion up to birth.
I am not arguing that the new clause is an attempt to deregulate abortion, although I believe that that might be the effect; my objection is to the principle. It says a very, very terrible thing about the value that we place on an unborn life if we simply say that it should be determined by whether or not the mother would like to keep it—by whether that baby is wanted or not. Let us think of that in terms of other lives—a newborn child, a disabled person or a vulnerable elderly person: when their family is unable to look after them, the community and the state step in. We should apply that principle in the case of a child in the womb, especially one that is still viable and could live outside the womb. I urge the House not to support new clause 55.
I am sorry, but I will have to ask the right hon. Gentleman to take 30 seconds.
And 30 seconds, because of the nature of the programme motion that the House has passed, is inadequate, so I am afraid I will pass the hon. Gentleman up on that. There might be some future point at which we can return to it. That shows the inadequacy of the way the Government are dealing with this. In the absence of any amendable propositions, I urge the House simply to take these provisions out of the Bill.
Debate interrupted.
I am going to suspend the House for one minute. After the statement, there will be a three-minute limit on speeches.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Winterton of Doncaster
Main Page: Baroness Winterton of Doncaster (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Winterton of Doncaster's debates with the Home Office
(5 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberAlthough I have grave concerns about many aspects of this Bill, I will limit my remarks to the amendments in my name, those of my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, West Derby (Ian Byrne), and new clause 102.
This Bill needlessly criminalises Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities. It will turn civil offences into criminal ones and punish littering and inconvenience with prison and homelessness. The Bill does not target a problem; it targets minority and ethnic communities. It is driven by hatred and division and will serve only to fuel hatred and division. Only last month, the hon. Member for Ashfield (Lee Anderson) demonstrated this by saying:
“The Travellers I am talking about are more likely to be seen leaving your garden shed at 3 o’clock in the morning, probably with your lawnmower and half of your tools.”––[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 8 June 2021; c. 410.]
Those words racially stereotype Travellers and paint an entire community as criminals. They were racist and repugnant and show the bigotry that this Bill promotes.
On top of this, the draconian powers included in the Bill are being pushed upon police despite their insistence that they do not want or need them. The National Police Chiefs Council and the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners have said that
“trespass is a civil offence and our view is that it should remain so”,
while 93.7% of police bodies support increased site provision as the solution to unauthorised encampments. Both the police and the travelling communities are in agreement on this. I urge the Government to listen and to support new clause 102 and the amendments in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, West Derby. The Government should be focused on improving society for everyone, yet they have become fixated on attacking an already much persecuted minority at the expense of many and to the benefit of none. In doing so, they are ignoring ready-made solutions. Organisations such as Friends, Families and Travellers have called for increased and improved site provision while highlighting the value of negotiated stopping, because the reality is that if Travellers cannot stop with authorisation, then they must stop without it.
I tabled my amendments because I believe that it is the role of politicians to protect minorities, not persecute them. New clause 51 seeks to address the racism that GRT communities face every day by forcing the Government to review the prevention, investigation and prosecution of crimes against these communities, while new clause 52 would require the Government to provide proper training for the relevant public bodies. Although valuable amendments to this dystopic Bill will undoubtedly fall today, I would like to reassure my constituents that the fight against legislation is not the end—
Order. I have to bring the hon. Lady’s remarks to a close because we are running very short of time.
I rise to speak as co-chair of the justice unions parliamentary group. There is an awful lot that I would like to say about this Bill, but unfortunately I have to restrict my comments to amendment 47.
The amendment seeks to correct an anomaly in the legislation brought by the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) in his Assaults on Emergency Workers (Offences) Act 2018, whereby the only members of prison staff included in the protected category of emergency workers are prison officers and some healthcare workers, while other prison workers, such as teachers or instructors, are not protected. That is simply unfair and increases the risks for those staff: it effectively paints a target on their backs because prisoners are well aware of the law and know that the penalties for attacking a prison officer are way more severe than those for attacking the teacher who might be standing next to them.
The 2019 “Safe Inside” survey conducted by the Joint Unions in Prisons Alliance showed that all prison staff—not just prison officers, but prison educators and teachers as well—are subjected to shocking levels of violence and are routinely exposed to harmful drugs. More than a quarter of staff reported having been a victim of physical violence in the last 12 months. Of those, 14% said that they had been assaulted more than 10 times in that period.
The youth estate, for example, often houses children who are locked up hundreds of miles from family and support. The resulting strain on mental health is a contributing factor towards violence against staff. Of course, in Wales, as education is devolved, things run differently so the Bill’s impact will be felt differently, which is something my hon. Friend the Member for Arfon (Hywel Williams) will raise later.
Here is one horrific example from an educator in a young offender institution:
“I turned to press the radio and as I did so I felt the young offender’s arms around my neck and he put me in a headlock and began to strangle me, I managed to say “Assistance” on the radio, but before I could say my location, he had my arm above my head to stop me calling for help, he dragged me down to the ground, he continued to strangle me with his left arm and he hit me repeatedly in the head with the other. As he was doing so, he said he had mental health issues. It felt like longer but, I think the officers arrived in approximately five minutes after the incident began and physically removed him from me.”
No teacher, educator or instructor should be expected to work in an environment where terrifying assaults like those are not treated with the same severity as those against prison officers. For that reason, I urge all Members to show those brave front-line public servants that we prioritise their safety as emergency workers, too.
I understand that the hon. Member for Stockton South (Matt Vickers) does not wish to press new clause 90 to a Division.
Having received commitments from the Government that they will bring forward measures to tackle this issue during the passage of the Bill, I do not wish to press the new clause.
New Clause 91
Review of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971
(1) The Secretary of State must conduct a review of the criminal offences in the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971.
(2) In undertaking the review, the Secretary of State must consult—
(a) the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs;
(b) the Scottish Ministers;
(c) the Welsh Ministers;
(d) the Northern Ireland Department of Health, and
(e) any other person the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
(3) The Secretary of State must, before the end of the period of 9 months beginning with the day on which this Act comes into force, lay before Parliament a report on the review, including any proposals for legislative change.—(Anne McLaughlin.)
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to undertake a review of the criminal offences set out in the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971.
Brought up.
Question put, That the clause be added to the Bill.
We come to group two. After I have called the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) to move new clause 3, there will be a four-minute limit on Back-Bench contributions.
New Clause 3
Restriction on evidence or questions about complainant's sexual history
‘(1) Section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1)—
(a) starting in paragraph (b) omit “in cross examination, by or on behalf of any accused at the trial,”;
(b) at end insert “with anyone other than the defendant”.
(3) In subsection (2)—
(a) for “an accused” substitute “a party to the trial”;
(b) in paragraph (a) omit “or (5)”.
(4) For subsection (3) substitute—
“(3) This subsection applies if the evidence or question relates to a relevant issue in the case and that issue is not an issue of consent.”
(5) For subsection (5) substitute—
“(a) For the purposes of subsection (3) no evidence may be adduced or question asked unless the judge determines in accordance with the procedures in this subsection that the question or evidence has significant probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice.
(b) In determining that question the judge shall take into account—
(i) the interests of justice, including the right of the accused to make a full answer and defence;
(ii) the need to preserve the integrity of the trial process by removing from the fact-finding process any discriminatory belief or bias;
(iii) the risk that the evidence may unduly arouse sentiments of prejudice, sympathy or hostility in the jury;
(iv) the potential threat to the complainant’s personal dignity and right to privacy;
(v) the complainant’s right to personal security and to the full protection and benefit of the law;
(vi) the provisions of the Victims Code;
and any other factor that the judge considers relevant.”
(6) In subsection (6), for “subsections (3) and (5)” substitute “subsection (3)”.’
This new clause excludes the admission in evidence of any sexual behaviour of the complainant with a third party, whether by the prosecution or the defence, to show consent, whilst leaving it admissible if it is relevant to any other issue in the case. It sets out the additional requirement that to be admitted the material must be more probative than prejudicial and sets out the considerations the judge must have in regard to considering that extra requirement.
Brought up, and read the First time.
With this it will be convenient to consider the following: RTA Section 170(4A) Failing to stop and give particulars after accident involving actual or potential serious or fatal injury or to report accident On indictment 14 years Obligatory Obligatory 6-11
New clause 4—Definition of “issue of consent”—
‘(1) Section 42 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 is amended as follows.
(2) For paragraph (b) substitute—
“(b) “issue of consent” means any issue where the complainant in fact consented to the conduct constituting the offence with which the defendant is charged and any issue where the accused reasonably believed that the complainant so consented;”’
This new clause re-defines “issue of consent” for the purposes of section 41, including in the definition the defendant’s reasonable belief in consent, and thus removing it as a reason for the inclusion of a complainant’s sexual history or behaviour.
New clause 5—Admission of evidence or questions about complainant’s sexual history—
‘(1) The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 43 insert—
“43A In any trial or contested hearing to which section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 applies, if no pre-trial application in accordance with Part 36 of the Criminal Procedure Rules has been made, or if such application has been made and refused in whole or in part, no further application may be made during the course of the trial or before its commencement to call such evidence or ask such question, and no judge may allow such application or admit any such questions or evidence.”’
This new clause would have the effect that no section 41 evidence or questions could be admitted by a judge at trial unless there had been an application before trial in accordance with the practice directions; and the amendment would ban applications from being made immediately before or during the trial.
New clause 6—Complainant’s right of representation and appeal on an application to adduce evidence or questions on sexual conduct—
‘(1) The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 43 insert—
“43A In any trial to which section 41 applies, where notice is given that there will be an application under Part 36 of the Criminal Procedure Rules for leave to ask questions or to adduce evidence as to any sexual behaviour of the complainant—
(1) The complainant may not be compelled to give evidence at any hearing on the application.
(2) The complainant will be entitled to be served with the application and to be legally represented (with the assistance of legal aid if financially eligible) as “a party” within the meaning of the Criminal Procedure Rules in responding in writing to the application and in presenting their case at any hearing on the application.
(3) If the application succeeds in whole or in part, the complainant will have a right to appeal for a rehearing of the application to the Court of Appeal on notice within 7 days of the judgement being delivered.
(4) On any such appeal, the Court of Appeal will rehear the application in full and may grant or refuse it in whole or in part.
(5) The Secretary of State may, by regulation, set out rules of procedure relating to any hearing or appeal under this section.”’
This new clause would give the complainant a right of representation, with legal aid if they are financially eligible, to oppose any application to admit section 41 material about them. This new clause would also give complainants a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal if the application is allowed in whole or in part. The new clause also provides that the complainant is not compellable as witness at the application.
New clause 7—Collection of and reporting to Parliament on data and information relating to proceedings involving rape and sexual assault—
‘(1) The Secretary of State shall collect and report to Parliament annually the following data and information—
(a) The time taken in every case of rape or sexual assault for the case to progress from complaint to charge, from charge to pre-trial plea and management hearing; and from then until trial.
(b) The number of applications to ask questions or adduce evidence of any sexual behaviour of the complainant under section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (“the 1999 Act”) made in the Magistrates and Crown Courts of England and Wales, irrespective of whether a trial was subsequently held.
(c) The number of cases which involved questions on or evidence of any sexual behaviour of the complainant in all rape, sexual abuse and other trials or contested hearings in the Magistrates and Crown courts in England and Wales, irrespective of whether an application was made to admit such questions or evidence in advance of the trial or hearing.
(d) In cases to which section 41 of the 1999 Act applies—
(i) whether Part 36 of the Criminal Procedure Rules was followed in each application and if it was not, how it was not;
(ii) the questions proposed to be asked;
(iii) the evidence proposed to be called;
(iv) whether the prosecution opposed the application and if so the content of their representations;
(v) whether evidence was called to support or oppose the application;
(vi) whether the application was allowed in whole or in part and a copy of the judgement made on the application;
and
(vii) any other material which might assist in an assessment of the frequency, basis and nature of applications for the use of such questions or evidence and the likely impact on any parties to any trial and the trial outcome.
(2) The data and information to be collected under subsection (1) shall include—
(a) all the material from any pre-trial application;
(b) the questions in fact asked and the evidence in fact called about any sexual behaviour of the complainant in the trial;
(c) any application at the start or during the course of the trial to vary or alter any judgement given in any earlier application or any further application to admit such questions or evidence;
(d) whether any material not previously authorised was used in the trial;
(e) whether the prosecution objected; and
(f) any ruling made or action taken by the judge on the further conduct of the trial as a consequence of the admission of questions or evidence under section 41 of the 1999 Act.
(3) The data and information to be collected under this section shall be collected from the date of Royal Assent to this Bill.’
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to collect and report to Parliament data and information on trial delay and section 41 matters.
New clause 8—Training for relevant public officials in relation to the conduct of cases of serious sexual offences—
‘(1) The Secretary of State shall, on this Act coming into force, publish and implement a strategy to provide training on the investigation of rape and alleged rape complainants, and the admissibility and cross-examination of complainants on their sexual history to—
(a) the Crown Prosecution Service;
(b) Police Forces;
(c) the Judiciary; and
(d) such other public bodies as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
(2) The Secretary of State shall ensure that any judge who is asked to hear a trial where the accused is charged with rape or any other serious sexual offence has attended and completed a training programme for such trials which has been accredited by the Judicial College.’
This new clause ensures that all criminal justice agencies shall be trained and that no judge can hear a sexual offence trial of any kind unless they have attended the Judicial College serious sexual offence course.
New clause 9—Requirement for a pre-sentence report when sentencing a primary carer—
‘(1) Section 30 of the Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.
(2) After subsection (3) insert—
“(3A)A court must make inquiries to establish whether the offender is a primary carer for a child.
(3B) If the court establishes that the offender is a primary carer for a child, unless there are exceptional circumstances before sentencing the offender the court must obtain a pre-sentence report containing information to enable the court to make an assessment of the impact of a custodial sentence on the child.”
(3) After subsection (4) insert—
“(5) In this section—
(e) “child” means a person under the age of 18; and
(f) “primary carer” means a person who has primary or substantial care responsibilities for a child.”’
This new clause amends section 30 of the Sentencing Act 2020 to make clear the requirement for a sentencing judge to have a copy of a pre-sentence report, considering the impact of a custodial sentence on the dependent child, when sentencing a primary carer of a child.
New clause 10—Duty of the court to state how it has considered the consequences for the child when sentencing—
‘(1) Section 52 of the Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.
(2) After subsection (9) insert—
“Offenders who are primary carers
(10) A court sentencing a primary carer for a child must state how the best interests of the child were considered in determining the sentence (including, if appropriate, consideration of the views of the child).
(11) A court sentencing a pregnant woman must state how the best interests of the baby were considered in determining the sentence.
(12) In this section—
(a) “child” means a person under the age of 18; and
(b) “primary carer” means a person who has primary or substantial care
responsibilities for a child.”’
This new clause amends section 52 of the Sentencing Act 2020 to require a sentencing judge to state how the best interests of a child were considered when sentencing a primary carer of a dependent child.
New clause 11—Welfare of child to be a distinct consideration when sentencing a primary carer—
‘(1) After section 227 of the Sentencing Act 2020, insert—
“227A Restrictions on imposing imprisonment on a primary carer
(1) This section applies where a court is considering imposing a custodial sentence on—
(a) a primary carer for a child, or
(b) a pregnant woman.
(2) The sentencing court must—
(a) consider the impact of a custodial sentence on the child or unborn child, and
(b) presume (subject to victim impact and any other sentencing considerations) that a non-custodial sentence is in the best interests of the child or unborn child.
(3) In this section—
(a) “child” means a person under the age of 18, and
(b) “primary carer” means a person who has primary or substantial care responsibilities for a child.”’
This new clause would create a requirement for a sentencing judge to consider the impact of a custodial sentence on a child when sentencing a primary carer of a dependent child.
New clause 12—Welfare of child to be a distinct consideration when determining bail for a primary carer—
‘(1) Section 4 of the Bail Act 1976 is amended as follows.
(2) After subsection (9) insert—
“(10) Where a court determines whether to grant bail in criminal proceedings to a person to whom this section applies who is a primary carer for a child or pregnant, the court must—
(a) consider the impact of not granting bail on the child or unborn child; and
(b) presume (subject to victim impact or other relevant considerations) that it is in the best interests of the child or unborn child for bail to be granted.
(11) In this section—
(a) “child” means a person under the age of 18, and
(b) “primary carer” means a person who has primary or substantial care responsibilities for a child.”’
This new clause would impose a requirement for the judge to consider the impact of not granting bail on a child when determining, in criminal proceedings, whether to grant bail to a primary carer of a dependent child.
New clause 13—Data collection in relation to prisoners who are primary carers—
‘(1) The Secretary of State must collect and publish annual data identifying—
(a) how many prisoners are the primary carers of a child,
(b) how many children have a primary carer in custody, and
(c) the ages of those children.
(2) In this section—
(a) “child” means a person under the age of 18, and
(b) “primary carer” means a person who has primary or substantial
care responsibilities for a child.’
This new clause would impose a requirement on the Secretary of State to collect and publish data on the number of prisoners who are the primary carers of a child and the number of children who have a primary carer in custody.
New clause 17—Maximum sentences for causing or allowing a child or vulnerable adult to suffer serious injury or death—
‘(1) Section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 is amended as follows—
(a) in subsection (7), for “a term not exceeding 14 years” substitute “life”, and
(b) in subsection (8), for “10” substitute “14”.
(2) Schedule 19 of the Sentencing Act 2020 is amended by the insertion of the following after paragraph 20—
“Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004
20A An offence to which section 5(7) of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 applies.”’
This new clause seeks to increase sentencing levels under section 5 of the Domestic Violence Crime and Victims Act 2004 (causing or allowing a child or vulnerable adult to suffer serious injury or death) by raising the death offence to life imprisonment, and the “serious injury” offence to 14 years.
New clause 18—Custody for own protection or own welfare—
‘(1) The Bail Act 1976 is amended as follows.
(2) In Part 1 of Schedule 1 (Defendants accused or convicted of imprisonable offences) omit paragraph 3.
(3) In Part 1A of Schedule 1 (Defendants accused or convicted of imprisonable offences to which Part 1 does not apply) omit paragraph 5.
(4) In Part 2 of Schedule 1 (Defendants accused or convicted of non-imprisonable offences) omit paragraph 3.’
This new clause would repeal the power of the criminal courts to remand a defendant into custody for their own protection (or in the case of a child, for their own welfare) pending trial or sentence.
New clause 19—Justice impact assessment for Wales—
‘(1) Within six months of the passage of this Act, the Secretary of State must issue a justice impact assessment for any provision of this Act, or regulations made under this Act, which impacts on matters which are devolved to the Welsh Parliament / Senedd Cymru.
(2) The Secretary of State must, within one month of the date on which they are made, issue a justice impact assessment for any regulations made under this Act which are not included in the assessment required under subsection (1) which impact on matters which are devolved to the Welsh Parliament / Senedd Cymru.’
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to issue an assessment of the impact of the Bill on devolved policy and services in Wales within six months of it passing, and to issue such an assessment of any further changes to regulations under the Bill within one month of making them.
New clause 20—Failing to stop or report accidents involving actual or potential serious or fatal injury—
‘(1) After subsection 170(4) of the Road Traffic Act 1988, insert—
“(4A) A person who fails to comply with subsections 170(2) or 170(3) when he knew that the accident had caused serious or fatal personal injury, or where he ought reasonably to have realised that it might have done so, is guilty of an offence.”
(2) In Part 1 of Schedule 2 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 (prosecution and punishment of offences: offences under the Traffic Acts), after the entry relating to an offence under RTA subsection 170(4), insert the following—
(3) After subsection 34(3)(d) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, insert—
“(e) section 4A (failing to stop and give particulars after accident involving actual or potential serious or fatal injury or to report accident)”’.
This new clause creates a new offence of failing to stop or report accidents where the driver knew that the accident had caused serious or fatal injury, or where he ought reasonably to have realised that it might have done so, with a maximum sentence of 14 years custody.
New clause 21—Definition of “exceptional hardship”
‘In the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, after subsection 35(4), insert—
“(4A) (a) In subsection (4)(b) above, the hardship that would be caused by an offender’s disqualification should be regarded as exceptional if and only if it is significantly greater than the hardship that would arise for a large majority of other drivers if the same disqualification were imposed on them.
(b) In assessing whether the hardship arising from the offender’s disqualification would be exceptional, a court may take account of—
(i) any circumstances relating to the offender’s economic circumstances or location of residence that would make it exceptionally hard for him to access key services such as grocery shops and postal, banking and healthcare facilities,
(ii) any hardship that would be incurred by the offender’s family or others who are disabled and who depend on the offender to provide care for them, and
(iii) any other circumstance which it believes would make the hardship genuinely exceptional.”’
This new clause provides a definition of “exceptional hardship” for the purpose of RTOA ss35(4)(b). It requires that a court should only regard hardship as “exceptional” if it is significantly greater than the hardship that would arise for a large majority of other drivers if the same disqualification were imposed on them.
New clause 22—Special measures access for eligible witnesses—
‘(1) The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 19(2), omit paragraphs (a) and (b) and insert—
“(a) inform the witness of the special measures which are available to them by virtue of this Act; and
(b) give a direction under this section providing for whichever measure or measures as the witness may decide they wish to be applied to apply to evidence given by the witness.
Provided that a direction under paragraph (b) shall ensure that the measure or measures provided for do not inhibit the evidence of the witness being effectively tested by a party to the proceedings.”
(3) Omit section 19(3).’
This new clause would mean that once witnesses are determined as eligible for special measures they will be informed of all provisions and able to decide which option best suits them, rather than relying on the court to decide which measures would best improve the quality of evidence.
New clause 25—Restriction on evidence or questions about mental health counselling or treatment records relating to complainant or witness—
‘(1) The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 43 insert—
“43A Restriction on evidence or questions about mental health counselling or treatment records relating to complainant or witness
(1) If at a trial a person is charged with a sexual offence, then, except with the leave of the court—
(a) no evidence may be adduced, and
(b) no question may be asked in cross examination, by or on behalf of any accused at the trial, about any records made in relation to any mental health counselling or treatment which may have been undertaken by a complainant or witness.
(2) The records made include those made by—
(a) a counsellor,
(b) a therapist,
(c) an Independent Sexual Violence Adviser (ISVA), and
(d) any victim support services.
(3) The court may give leave in relation to any evidence or question only on an application made by or on behalf of a party to the trial, and may not give such leave unless it is satisfied that—
(a) the evidence or question relates to a relevant issue in the case which will include a specific instance (or specific instances) of alleged sexual behaviour on the part of the complainant,
(b) the evidence or question has significant probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice, and
(c) a refusal of leave might have the result of rendering unsafe a conclusion of the jury or (as the case may be) the court on any relevant issue in the case.
(4) For the purposes of making a determination under paragraph (3)(b) the judge shall take into account—
(a) the interests of justice, including the right of the accused to make a full answer and defence;
(b) the need to preserve the integrity of the trial process by removing from the fact-finding process any discriminatory belief or bias;
(c) the risk that the evidence may unduly arouse sentiments of prejudice, sympathy or hostility in the jury;
(d) the potential threat to the personal dignity and right to privacy of the complainant or witness;
(e) the complainant’s or witness’s right to personal security and to the full protection and benefit of the law;
(f) the provisions of the Victims Code; and
(g) any other factor that the judge considers relevant.
(5) Where this section applies in relation to a trial by virtue of the fact that one or more of a number of persons charged in the proceedings is or are charged with a sexual offence—
(a) it shall cease to apply in relation to the trial if the prosecutor decides not to proceed with the case against that person or those persons in respect of that charge; but
(b) it shall not cease to do so in the event of that person or those persons pleading guilty to, or being convicted of, that charge.
(6) Nothing in this section authorises any evidence to be adduced or any question to be asked which cannot be adduced or asked apart from this section.
(7) In relation to evidence or questions under this section, if no pre-trial application in accordance with Part 36 of the Criminal Procedure Rules has been made, or if such application has been made and refused in whole or in part, no further application may be made during the course of the trial or before its commencement to call such evidence or ask such question, and no judge may allow such application or admit any such questions or evidence.”’
This new clause would restrict evidence or questions about mental health counselling or treatment records relating to complainant or witness unless a defined threshold is met.
New clause 54—Equality Impact Analyses of provisions of this Act—
‘(1) The Secretary of State must review the equality impact of the provisions of this Act in accordance with this section and lay a report of that review before the House of Commons within six months of the passage of this Act.
(2) A review under this section must consider the impact of those provisions on—
(a) households at different levels of income,
(b) people with protected characteristics (within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010),
(c) the Government’s compliance with the public sector equality duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010, and
(d) equality in different parts of the United Kingdom and different regions of England.
(3) A review under this section must include a separate analysis of each section of the Act, and must also consider the cumulative impact of the Act as a whole.’
New clause 73—Unduly lenient sentences: time limit—
‘(1) The Criminal Justice Act 1988 is amended as follows.
(2) In Schedule 3, paragraph 1, after “within” leave out “28” and insert “56”.’
New clause 74—Reviews of sentencing: assaulting an emergency worker—
‘(1) Schedule 1 to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Reviews of Sentencing) Order 2006 (descriptions of cases to which Part IV of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 is to apply) is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph 2, after sub-paragraph (i) insert—
“(ia) an offence under section 1 of the Assaults on Emergency Workers (Offences) Act 2018.’
New clause 75—No automatic early release for prisoners who assault prison staff whilst in jail—
‘(1) The Criminal Justice Act 2003 is amended as follows.
(2) In Section 244, after subsection (1A) insert—
“(1B) Subsection (1) does not apply if the prisoner has assaulted a member of prison staff whilst in prison and instead the prisoner must not be released until the end of his original sentence.’
New clause 76—Dangerous driving: increased penalties—
‘(1) Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 (prosecution and punishment of offences: offences under the Traffic Acts) is amended as follows.
(2) In the entry relating to section 2 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (dangerous driving), in column (4) (punishment), under (b) for “2 years” substitute “5 years”.’
New clause 77—Limitation of use of fixed-term recalls—
‘(1) Section 255A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Further release after recall: introductory) is amended as follows.
(2) After subsection 4, insert—
“(4A) A person is not suitable for automatic release if—
(a) he is an extended sentence prisoner or a specified offence prisoner;
(b) in a case where paragraph (a) does not apply, he was recalled under section 254 before the normal entitlement date (having been released before that date under section 246 or 248); or
(c) in a case where neither of the preceding paragraphs applies, he has, during the same term of imprisonment, already been released under section 255B(1)(b) or (2) or section 255C(2).”’
New clause 78—Open prisons: murderers—
‘No prisoner serving a sentence for murder can be moved to a Category D prison.’
New clause 79—Resettlement licence: murderers—
‘No prisoner serving a sentence for murder will be eligible for resettlement licence.’
New clause 80—Open prisons: serious offenders—
‘No prisoner serving a sentence for an indictable only offence can be moved to a Category D prison.’
New clause 81—Open prisons: deportees—
‘No prisoner serving a sentence for which he is liable for deportation can be moved to a Category D prison.’
New clause 82—Resettlement licence: deportees—
‘No prisoner serving a sentence for which he is liable for deportation can be eligible for resettlement licence.’
New clause 83—No difference in sentencing between using a knife in a murder in a home compared to taking a knife to murder someone—
‘(1) The Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.
(2) In Schedule 21 (Determination of minimum term in relation to mandatory life sentence for murder etc), after sub-paragraph 4(2), insert—
“(3) Sub-paragraph (2) above applies where the knife or weapon is taken to the scene from anywhere within the same premises.”’
New clause 86—Review of domestic homicide—
‘(1) Within 18 months of the commencement of this Act, the Secretary of State must commission a review and publish a report on the effectiveness of current legislation and sentencing policy surrounding domestic abuse, with a particular view to making policy recommendations to increase sentences for domestic homicide, and reduce the gap in sentence length between domestic homicide and other homicides.
(2) A review under subsection (1) must be conducted by a person who meets the criteria for qualification for appointment to the Supreme Court, as set out in section 25 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005.
(3) A review under subsection (1) must consider—
(a) trends in the incidences and types of domestic abuse, with a focus on domestic homicide,
(b) sentencing policy as it applies to domestic abuse, with a focus on domestic homicide,
(c) current sentencing guidelines as they relate to domestic abuse, with a focus on domestic homicide, and
(d) the creation of new defences and/or mitigating circumstances to protect victims of domestic abuse who commit offences as a consequence of that abuse.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (1) domestic homicide is to be defined as circumstances in which the death of a person aged 16 or over has, or appears to have, resulted from violence, abuse or neglect by a person to whom they were related or with whom they were, or had been, in an intimate personal relationship, or a member of the same household as themselves.
(5) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before Parliament.
(6) A Minister of the Crown must, not later than 3 months after the report has been laid before Parliament, make a motion in the House of Commons in relation to the report.’
This new clause compels the Government to commission a review and publish a report on the effectiveness of current legislation and sentencing policy surrounding domestic abuse, with a particular focus on increasing sentences for domestic homicide. The review would also consider the creation of new protections to assist victims of domestic abuse who commit domestic homicide.
New clause 87—Maximum sentence for publishing the identity of a sexual offences complainant—
‘(1) Section 5 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1), leave out “and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale”.
(3) After subsection (1), insert the following subsection—
“(1A) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or both, or
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding twelve months, or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or both.”’
This new clause would give courts the power to hand down custodial sentences of up to 2 years to those convicted of naming a sexual offences complainant.
New clause 88—Law Commission consideration of the use of complainants’ sexual history in rape trials—
‘The Secretary of State must seek advice and information from the Law Commission under section (3)(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 1965 with proposals for the reform or amendment of the law relating to the use of complainants’ sexual history in rape trials.’
This new clause would compel the Government to seek a Law Commission review on the use of complainants’ sexual history in rape trials.
New clause 89—Minimum sentence for an offence under section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003—
‘(1) This section applies where—
(a) an individual is convicted of an offence under section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and
(b) the offence was committed after the commencement of this section and at a time when the individual was aged 18 or over.
(2) The court shall impose an appropriate custodial sentence (or order for detention) for a term of at least the required minimum term (with or without a fine) unless the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances relating to the offence or to the offender which justify its not doing so.
(3) In this section “appropriate custodial sentence (or order for detention)” means—
(a) in the case of an offender who is aged 18 or over when convicted, a sentence of imprisonment, and
(b) in the case of an offender who is aged under 18 at that time, a sentence of detention under section 91 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000.
(4) In this section “the required minimum term” means seven years.’
This new clause creates a statutory minimum sentence for rape of 7 years. A court must impose at least the statutory minimum unless it is of the opinion there are exceptional circumstances relating to the offence or to the offender which justify not doing so.
New clause 92—Sentencing escalator—
‘(1) Any person convicted of the same criminal offence on a second or subsequent occasion must receive—
(a) a longer custodial sentence than his longest previous custodial sentence for the same offence if a custodial sentence has previously been given; or
(b) a more severe sentence than his highest previous non-custodial sentence for the same offence if a custodial sentence has not already been given for a previous offence unless the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances which—
(i) relate to the offence or to the offender, and
(ii) justify not doing so.
(2) Where the sentencing options available for the current offence do not permit the court to increase the sentence under the provisions of subsection (1), the court must impose the maximum sentence available to it, unless the court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances which—
(a) relate to the offence or to the offender, and
(b) justify not doing so.
(3) In determining a sentence under subsection (1), a court is not bound by Section 59 (Sentencing guidelines: general duty of court) or Section 60 (Sentencing guidelines: determination of sentence) of the Sentencing Act 2020.’
New clause 93—Effect of remand on bail on time served in prison (amendment of Criminal Justice Act 2003)
‘(1) The Criminal Justice Act 2003 is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1B)(c) of section 237 (Meaning of “fixed-term prisoner” etc), leave out “or section 240A”.
(3) In the italic heading before section 240 (Crediting of periods of remand in custody: terms of imprisonment and detention), after “custody”, leave out “or on bail subject to certain types of condition”.
(4) Omit section 240A (Time remanded on bail to count towards time served: terms of imprisonment and detention).’
This new clause, together with NC94 would remove tagged curfew from time on remand on bail which is deducted from time served in prison.
New clause 94—Effect of remand on bail time served in prison (amendment of Sentencing Act 2020—
‘Sections 325 (Time on bail under certain conditions: declaration by court) and 326 Section 325: interpretation) of the Sentencing Act 2020 are omitted.’
This new clause, together with NC93 would remove tagged curfew from time on remand on bail which is deducted from time served in prison.
New clause 95—Magistrates’ sentencing powers—
‘The following statutory provisions shall, notwithstanding any commencement provision in any Act, come into force—
(1) Section 154 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (General limit on magistrates’ court’s power to impose imprisonment).
(2) Section 282 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Increase in maximum term that may be imposed on summary conviction of offence triable either way).
(3) Paragraphs 24 and 25 of Part 5 of Schedule 22 of the Sentencing Act 2020 (Increase in magistrates’ court‘s power to impose imprisonment).’
This new clause would bring into force provisions which would increase magistrates’ sentencing powers from a maximum of 6 to a maximum of 12 months for one offence.
New clause 96—Power of police to stop vehicles—
‘(1) Section 163 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1), after “vehicle” in the second place in which it occurs, insert “, and switch off the engine,”.’
This new clause to the Road Traffic Act 1988 would require a person to switch off their engine after being stopped by a constable in uniform or a traffic officer, and make it an offence not to do so.
New clause 97—Video recorded cross-examination or re-examination of complainants in respect of sexual offences and modern slavery offences—
‘(1) Section 28 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 comes into force in relation to proceedings to which subsection (2) applies on the day on which this Act is passed.
(2) This subsection applies where a witness is eligible for assistance by virtue of section 17(4) of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (complainants in respect of a sexual offence or modern slavery offence who are witnesses in proceedings relating to that offence, or that offence and any other offences).
(3) This section has effect notwithstanding section 68(3) of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.’
This new clause would bring section 28 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, which provides for the cross-examination of vulnerable witnesses to be recorded rather than undertaken in court, fully into force for victims of sexual offences and modern slavery offences.
Amendment 50, in clause 102, page 87, line 41, at end insert—
“(bb) the abduction, sexual assault, and murder of a person”.
This amendment would ensure those found guilty of abduction, sexual assault, and murder receive a Whole Life Order as a starting sentence.
Amendment 48, in clause 110, page 99, line 41, at beginning insert—
‘(1) In subsection (3) of section 239 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (the Parole Board), after 3(b) insert—
“(c) the views of the victim or victims of the crime to which the case relates”’.
This amendment would amend the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to ensure victims/survivors are consulted in parole decisions which will affect them.
Amendment 49, page 99, line 41, at beginning insert—
‘(1) In subsection (4) of section 239 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (the Parole Board), at end insert “, including the views of the victim or victims of the crime to which the case relates.”’
This amendment would amend the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to ensure victims/survivors are consulted in parole decisions which will affect them.
Amendment 63, page 127, line 33, leave out clause 139.
Amendment 122, in clause 139, page 127, line 43, at end insert—
“(8) A secure 16 to 19 Academy will be subject to annual inspection by—
(a) Ofsted;
(b) Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons; and
(c) Care Quality Commission.”
This amendment would make secure 16 to 19 academies subject to annual inspection by Ofsted, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons, and the Care Quality Commission.
Amendment 123, page 128, line 25, at the end insert—
“(5) The Secretary of State must, within six months of this Act coming into force, prepare and publish a report on the progress made towards opening the first 16 to 19 academies and must lay a copy before Parliament.
(6) A Minister of the Crown must, not later than four weeks after the report required by subsection (5) has been laid before Parliament, make a motion in the House of Commons in relation to the report.
(7) The Secretary of State must, within one year of the opening of the first 16 to 19 academy, prepare and publish an impact assessment on the effectiveness of 16 to 19 academies and must lay a copy before Parliament.
(8) A Minister of the Crown must, not later than four weeks after the impact assessment required by subsection (7) has been laid before Parliament, make a motion in the House of Commons in relation to the impact assessment.”
This amendment would ensure the Secretary of State lay a report and update Parliament on progress made towards opening secure academy facilities and lay an impact assessment before Parliament and provide a debate on the impact assessment.
Amendment 124, in clause 169, page 191, line 37, at end insert—
“(4) The Secretary of State may exercise the power in section 176(1) so as to bring this section (and part 3 of Schedule 19) into force only if the condition in subsection (5) is met.
(5) The condition in this subsection is that a review of the impact of the expansion of audio and video links in criminal proceedings has been conducted in accordance with subsection (6).
(6) The review mentioned in subsection (5) must—
(a) collect evidence of the impact of live audio and video links on—
(i) sentencing and remand decisions,
(ii) the effective participation of defendants,
(iii) the experience of victims and witnesses,
(iv) the cost to the wider justice system, including costs borne by the police and prison systems; and
(b) be undertaken by a person who is independent of the Secretary of State.
(7) The review mentioned in subsection (5) may also consider any other matter which the person conducting the review considers relevant.”
This amendment would ensure that the expansion in the use of audio and video links will not be undertaken until an independent review of its impact has been undertaken.
New clause 14—Offence of buying a pet for cash etc—
‘(1) A person “P” must not pay for a pet except—
(a) by a cheque which under section 81A of the Bills of Exchange Act 1882 is not transferable, or
(b) by an electronic transfer of funds (authorised by credit or debit card or otherwise).
(2) The Secretary of State may by order amend subsection (1) to permit other methods of payment.
(3) In this section paying includes paying in kind (with goods or services).
(4) If P pays for a pet in breach of subsection (1), P is guilty of an offence.
(5) If P is guilty of an offence under this section, P is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.
(6) For the purposes of this section, “pet” means and animal which—
(a) provides companionship to any human being,
(b) provides assistance to any human being, or
(c) provides assistance to any human being in the course of their work.’
New clause 15—Offence of failing to scan a microchip—
‘(1) When a relevant animal is presented for a consultation with a veterinary surgeon (or registered veterinary nurse), the veterinary surgeon (or veterinary nurse) must—
(a) scan the microchip of the relevant animal,
(b) check that the microchip number is registered on a database by a database operator which meets current conditions set out in law,
(c) check that the person accompanying the relevant animal is either the registered keeper of the relevant animal or has, to the satisfaction of the veterinary surgeon (or veterinary nurse), the permission of the registered keeper of the relevant animal to accompany that animal, and
(d) if the condition in paragraph (c) is not met, report to the police the fact that the relevant animal is not accompanied by the registered keeper or a person authorised by the registered keeper.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a “relevant animal” means an animal which is required by law to be microchipped.
(3) If a veterinary surgeon (or veterinary nurse) is in breach of subsection (1), they are guilty of an offence.
(4) If a veterinary surgeon (or veterinary nurse) is guilty of an offence under this section, they are liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale.’
New clause 16—Offence of pet theft—
‘(1) The Animal Welfare Act 2006 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 2 (“protected animal”) insert—
“2A Definition of pet
A protected animal is a “pet” for the purposes of this Act if it—
(a) provides companionship to any human being,
(b) provides assistance to any human being, or
(c) provides assistance to any human being in the course of their work.”
(3) After section 8 (fighting etc.) insert—
“8A Pet theft
A person commits an offence if they dishonestly appropriate a pet belonging to another person.”
(4) In section 32 (imprisonment or fine) before subsection (1) insert—
“(A1) A person guilty of an offence under section 8A (pet theft) shall be liable—
(a) on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks, or a fine, or both;
(b) on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years, or to a fine, or both.
(A2) When the court is considering for the purposes of sentencing the seriousness of an offence under section 8A it must consider the following as aggravating factors (that is to say, a factor that increases the seriousness of the offence)—
(a) the theft caused fear, alarm or distress to the pet, the owner of the pet or another person associated with the pet;
(b) the theft was for the purposes of commercial gain.”
(5) In section 34(10) (disqualification) after “8,” insert “8A,”.’
New clause 98—Offence of pet theft—
‘(1) The Animal Welfare Act 2006 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 2 (“protected animal”) insert—
“(2A) Definition of pet A protected animal is a “pet” for the purposes of this Act if it provides companionship or assistance to any human being.”
(3) After section 8 (fighting etc.) insert—
“8A Pet theft
A person commits an offence if they dishonestly appropriate a pet belonging to another person with the intention of permanently depriving that other person of it.”
(4) In section 32 (imprisonment or fine) before subsection (1) insert—
“(A1) A person guilty of an offence under section 8A (pet theft) shall be
liable—
(a) on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks, or a fine, or to both;
(b) on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 4 years, or to a fine, or to both.
(A2) When the court is considering for the purposes of sentencing the seriousness of an offence under section 8A it must consider the following as aggravating factors (that is to say, a factor that increases the seriousness of the offence)—
(a) the theft caused fear, alarm or distress to the pet, the owner or the pet or another person associated with the pet;
(b) the theft was for the purposes of commercial gain.”
(5) In section 34(10) (disqualification) after “8,” insert “8A,”.’
New clause 99—Offence of pet theft (Scotland)—
‘(1) The Animal Health and Welfare (Scotland) Act 2006 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 17 (protected animals) insert—
“17A Definition of pet
A protected animal is a “pet” for the purposes of this Act if it provides companionship or assistance to any human being.”
(3) After section 23 (animal fights) insert—
“23A Pet theft
A person commits an offence if they dishonestly appropriate a pet belonging to another person with the intention of permanently depriving that other person of it.”
(4) In section 40 (disqualification orders) after subsection (13)(b) insert—
“(ba) an offence under section 23A,”.
(5) In section 46 (penalties for offences) after subsection (1) insert—
“(1A) A person guilty of an offence under section 23A (pet theft) shall be liable—
(a) on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks, or a fine, or to both;
(b) on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 4 years, or to a fine, or to both.
(1B) When the court is considering for the purposes of sentencing the seriousness of an offence under section 23A it must consider the following as aggravating factors (that is to say, a factor that increases the seriousness of the offence)—
(a) that theft caused fear, alarm or distress to the pet, the owner or the pet or another person associated with the pet;
(b) the theft was for the purposes of commercial gain.”
(6) In Schedule 1 (powers of inspectors and constables for Part 2) after paragraph 4(5)(a) insert—
“(aa) an offence under section 23A,”.’
New clause 100—Offence of pet theft: consequential amendments—
‘(1) The Police and Criminal Evidence Act is amended as follows.
(2) In section 17(1)(c)(v) (entry for purposes of arrest, etc in connection with offences relating to the prevention of harm to animals), for “and 8(1) and (2)” substitute “8(1) and (2) and 8A”.’
New clause 30—Voyeurism: breastfeeding—
‘(1) Section 67A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (Voyeurism: additional offences) is amended as set out in subsection (2).
(2) After subsection (2), insert—
“(2A) A person (A) commits an offence if—
(a) A records an image of another person (B) while B is breastfeeding;
(b) A does so with the intention that A or another person (C) will look at the image for a purpose mentioned in subsection (3), and
(c) A does so—
(i) without B’s consent, and
(ii) without reasonably believing that B consents.”’
New clause 3 would deal with a problem that the Government have acknowledged: that on the question of rape, the justice system lets women down and lets men off the hook. There are many problems that contribute to that, but one that the Government have rightly identified is that the process focuses on the complainant rather than on the defendant. The investigation becomes an investigation of the complainant—her mobile phone, what she was doing, her attitudes—and not of the suspect. The trial becomes the trial of the complainant, not of the defendant, in one very material way: the use by the defendant of the complainant’s previous sexual history by bringing it into evidence.
It has been acknowledged since as long ago as 1999 that the complainant’s previous sexual history is not the issue, and it is wrong for the defendant to try to use it to deter her from supporting a prosecution for fear that all her dirty washing will be washed in public, in open court, or that it will undermine her standing and credibility in the eyes of the jury. That was supposed to be outlawed in 1999, but it has become clear that a loophole was left when we changed the law.
In a third of all rape cases now, one way or another, the defendant brings into court the complainant’s previous sexual history. When the Victims’ Commissioner was a police and crime commissioner, she conducted research that showed that in one third of rape trials observed, the previous sexual history of the complainant was brought into evidence. That research is backed up by work done by the Criminal Bar Association.
The Victims’ Commissioner gives the example of a complainant who had her parents in court to support her. They did not know that she had had an abortion, but the defendant brought that into evidence in order to undermine her and throw off her ability to give her evidence—there were her parents, sitting in court, and they did not even know that she had had an abortion. Another report was of a case in which the jury were told, “This is a woman who has had adulterous affairs,” thereby trying to undermine her. Of course, that is not relevant to the issue of whether or not a rape has been committed, so we need to tighten up the law.
I have drafted a perfectly good, watertight clause to tighten up the law so that where the question of previous sexual history is relevant, especially if it is with the same partner in respect of whom the rape is alleged, it is allowed in evidence with the permission of the judge, but where it is not relevant, it is not. However, our Front Bench and the Government in their rape review have said that they are minded to send it to the Law Commission to look at. I would have preferred the Government to legislate in the Bill, which is after all the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill, but they have decided not to do that; they say that they will refer to the Law Commission the whole question of the focus on the complainant, so I make two requests in that respect.
First, I think that the Law Commission should sit with an independent reference group. I have a great deal of respect for the Law Commission, but quite frankly we cannot leave it to get on with it on its own. We need an expert, independent reference group that is steeped in understanding of the issue and that can help the Law Commission. I suggest that Rape Crisis England & Wales should be on that group, and so should the Victims’ Commissioner.
My second request is that there should be a time limit on the Law Commission’s work. The Law Commission goes into things very deeply, but we do not want this to go on and on for years—it has been a problem for years, so we do not want it to go into the long grass with a never-ending Law Commission investigation. We want the findings to be ready for when the Government are thinking of bringing forward their victims Bill, which they will consult on shortly and which arises out of the violence against women and girls consultation. If we are not going to accept this today, and the Government are not, let us have the Law Commission looking at it, with an independent reference group and with a time limit. Then, the Government will have done more than just apologise to rape victims for justice not being done; they will make sure that in future justice is done.
We now go to the Chair of the Justice Committee, Sir Robert Neill, and the four-minute time limit comes into force for Back Benchers at this point.
It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) and to talk on these important matters. Although I understand the motives behind the series of amendments standing in her name, I must start by disagreeing with the fundamental approach in some respects. I think it is right that this does go to the Law Commission, because these are potentially very important changes and they affect, inevitably, the balance that must be achieved in a criminal trial between the proper protection of the interests of any witness and the right of any defendant to have a fair trial in which all relevant issues—I stress that—are ventilated. Frequently, the issue of consent would not be relevant to the defence, but there are circumstances in which it is and we should not be making substantive changes here without very careful consideration. The same applies in respect of a number of the other amendments that the right hon. and learned Lady and others have tabled. Again, I understand the reasoning, but, for example, changing the definition of “consent” in relation to recklessness would make a significant change to the substantive criminal law in this area, and that should not be undertaken via an addition to an already large Bill, with limited scrutiny.
There are significant arguments to be considered on both sides, and the Law Commission is the right route for all of these matters. In my experience, and that of the Select Committee, the Law Commission is well able to move swiftly given the resources and the support to do so. I hope that we can leave this on the basis of having a proper look at what are very significant matters, affecting not just the question of the protection of victims, but the right of any defendant to a proper airing of the evidence. Although I am clear that there are still areas where complainants in such cases do not receive the treatment that they should, the position both in the courts and in the investigation of such offences is very much improved from where it was. We can always continue to do more, but inevitably now cases of this kind are tried by highly experienced and senior judges. My experience of having both prosecuted and defended in many such cases is that the courts are robust and swift in dealing with such matters and in rejecting inappropriate applications to stray beyond the relevant issues.
In the time available, may I also touch on some of the other amendments? I would be troubled at anything that fetters the discretion of the courts in relation to minimum sentences. At the end of the day, all aggravating features can properly be set before the courts. The Government and this House have increased maximum sentences in a number of areas, and I have a concern in principle at the imposition of minimum sentences, which have the potential in certain circumstances to tie the hands of the courts. There is an amendment on the representation of families of the deceased at inquests in certain circumstances. I do not think this Bill is the right place for that, but I strongly commend to the Lord Chancellor, whom I am glad to see on the Treasury Bench, the Justice Committee’s report on this, and I hope that in his response we will be given a constructive way forward to deal with those matters.
Order. I have absolutely no problem with interventions, but it may be that we can get everybody in if people still stick to four minutes, even if they take interventions.
Politics is about values. It always has been, actually, but in the modern age too many politicians —perhaps timid of inspiring or of their capacity to do so, or frightened of causing contumely—have retreated into a drear, dull, mechanistic discourse. Tonight, this Bill and these amendments are a chance to break free of that—a chance to change—because the Government are at last responding to the will of the people who, for a very long time, have believed that the criminal justice system was not weighted in favour of victims or law and order, but too heavily weighted in favour of making excuses for those who commit crime.
The world is a dangerous place. In fact, unimpeded, evil men and women will impose their cruel will upon the innocent. C. S. Lewis said that in living the reality of human imperfections,
“the art of life consists in tackling each immediate evil as well as we can.”
Law-abiding Britons do their everyday part in keeping the fire of social solidarity burning bright, yet too many with power appear to have forgotten how to tackle the evil that seeks to snuff out civilised order. Instead, those who see crime as an ill to be treated have held too much sway for too long. Evil too often receives a slap on the wrist, a stern telling off, and the public’s desire for retributive justice goes unheeded.
We must never forget, as was said earlier, that we serve here at the pleasure of our constituents. Public order and faith in the rule of law depend on popular confidence in the justice system—a confidence that must be earned. People’s sense of right and wrong has changed little over the decades. In 1990, four out of five Britons thought sentencing was too lenient. Today, four out of five Britons think the same. With the number of custodial sentences for sexual offences, theft and criminal damage all falling, it is time for this place to listen. Our constituents despair of having violent deviants freed to hurt again, of seeing non-custodial sentences for yobs and thugs, and of halfway automatic release for some of the most violent people in our society. Many gentle, peaceful people are appalled at all of this. Soft sentencing allows rapists, paedophiles and violent offenders to walk free having served only half their sentence. Given the pain of victims, that is an insult to decency.
This Bill, in seeking to ensure that the most despicable criminals face their just deserts behind bars, is welcome. That may shock the liberal establishment, filled by doubts and fuelled by guilt, but it is much yearned for by the silent majority of Britons and it is long overdue. Shame on those who wish to use the Bill for narrow ends. However, I will not go into the amendments on abortion because you would not let me, Madam Deputy Speaker, but you know what I mean.
Disraeli said:
“Justice is truth in action.”
That is not a relative individual truth but an extension of absolute virtue that people intuitively understand and to which this Bill gives life. Amendments to tackle the wicked scourge of pet theft affirm that truth, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) made clear.
The Bill before us today begins to signal that the Government are no longer distracted by the plight of the guilty. It proudly declares that we are devoted to the cause of the innocent and to the pursuit of justice. We must never be timid about being fierce in defence of the gentle, for in being so we stand for the majority of law-abiding Britons. I commend the amendments in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Philip Davies), which, in laying down the truth that I have described, further reinforce a good Bill. It is a start: the beginning of a fightback on behalf of the silent majority.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Winterton of Doncaster
Main Page: Baroness Winterton of Doncaster (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Winterton of Doncaster's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(4 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberI spent last Friday evening in St Peter’s Rooms in Ruddington with a nurse, councillors, shop owners, a reiki practitioner, childcare professionals and many more members of the community. We were taking part in a training programme to help people to identify signs of domestic abuse, talk to survivors they might come across in their place of work and put them in touch with local professional services. The programme is called J9, after Janine Mundy, who was brutally murdered by her ex-husband. I think I must have taken part about 15 times now in the course, which I am delivering across the constituency with my constituent Nicola Brindley, but it never gets any easier to hear the stories of abuse suffered.
I therefore strongly welcome Lords amendment 57, which extends the time limit for prosecution for common assault or battery in domestic abuse cases. There are so many reasons why it takes time for victims to come forward. We must do everything we can to stand with them and support them when they do.
I also welcome Lords amendment 13, which clarifies the inclusion of domestic abuse and sexual offences in the serious violence duty, and Lords amendment 56, which protects women doing the most natural thing in the world: breastfeeding their child. I commend the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy) for all her work in the area.
Also before the House is the issue of making misogyny a hate crime, as set out in Lords amendment 72. I fully support the intention behind the amendment, as I think every Member does, but having read the Law Commission’s report, I share some of the concerns voiced. I take very seriously the concerns raised by organisations such as Rape Crisis, which believes that adding sex or gender as a protected characteristic would further complicate the judicial process and make it harder to secure convictions.
Lords amendment 72 also carves out sexual offences and offences related to domestic abuse from the scope of prosecution as a hate crime motivated by sex or gender, because there are considerable difficulties with keeping them in. As the Law Commission’s report shows, research has shown that sex or gender-based hostility is much more likely to be identified or proven in the context of sexual violence perpetrated by strangers in public settings, particularly where it is accompanied by physical violence. Using misogyny as an aggravating factor in such cases would risk perpetuating the highly damaging myth that there is a hierarchy of sexual violence, which already does so much damage to victims whose experience is different, but whose suffering is no less.
In many crimes of violence against women and girls, such as those in cases of domestic abuse where the victim is known to the perpetrator or is in an intimate relationship with them, it may be more difficult to evidence hostility to gender, so I understand why those offences have been left outside the amendment’s scope. I understand the very strong views of Opposition Members that the amendment should be made without including them, but I worry what sort of message we would send as a Parliament if we made crimes such as domestic abuse and sexual violence—some of the most serious crimes against women and girls—exempt from an aggravating sentencing factor of misogyny. Those concerns, which have been set out by the Law Council, Rape Crisis and Women’s Aid, are the reason I cannot support the amendment.
The findings of the Law Commission, which I believe began its consultation with the expectation of supporting such a change, show why it is so important that changes to law are based on evidence so that we can focus on the most effective measures, which is why I welcome the Home Office’s public consultation on the issue of sex for rent—
The Bill is dangerous and undemocratic and has united a broad church of organisations in opposition. Even if all the Lords amendments that I rise to support today are agreed to, there would still be a huge amount in it that causes me concern. Our task today, though, is to try to improve what is before us.
Lords amendment 72 would play a key role in updating our existing hate crime laws to give our police forces and courts the vital tools that they need to tackle violence motivated by misogyny. By including sex or gender in hate crime reporting and sentencing, with exceptions for more serious sexual violence offences to ensure that sentences for them remain higher, it would give our police and courts the ability to track and hold to account those who target people for crimes purely because of who they are. As we have heard, selected police forces have already identified when crimes are motivated by hatred of someone’s sex or gender. They have already seen an increase in victims’ confidence to come forward and report those crimes.
The Government’s position is that making misogyny a hate crime goes against the Law Commission’s advice, but as the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy) set out extremely eloquently, that is not entirely correct; the Law Commission was not commenting on the Bertin amendment. In line with concerns raised by the Law Commission about changing the burden of proof in relation to sexual or domestic offences, the amendment creates a carve-out whereby it would not apply to such offences. It uses the wording “sex or gender”, which is in line with the approach proposed in the Law Commission’s report on hate crime, and which would ensure that all crimes motivated by misogyny, or indeed misandry, are captured by the new law rather than leaving loopholes that could undermine the system.
This simple but powerful change would send an incredibly important signal. It would be part of the cultural change that we have been talking about. It would give women and girls the same protections that we give to others who are targeted solely because of who they are. It would show how seriously we take crimes motivated by misogyny. Frankly, the Government have been kicking the issue into the long grass for too long. It is time to step up and do the right thing by women and girls.
I will speak briefly to Lords amendments 114 to 116. As numerous organisations from Liberty to the End Violence Against Women Coalition and the Runnymede Trust attest, serious violence is a human rights issue. It devastates communities across the country and demands an evidence-based approach that works with, rather than against, those communities that bear its brunt. There is simply no evidence that serious violence reduction orders will protect communities from harm, however, and there is a wealth of evidence that they will sanction injustice and discrimination and risk fracturing public trust in public services and in the authorities. There is a risk that they will entrench the harms of ineffective, suspicion-less stop and search and that they will expand the injustice of the doctrine of joint enterprise, with a disproportionate effect on over-policed and marginalised groups, including young women experiencing domestic abuse and criminal exploitation.
It therefore seems entirely right and sensible that a robust pilot be carried out and that decisions to roll out SVROs nationally be informed by its findings and come before Parliament, as Lords amendments 114 to 116 propose. The amendments, which I support, reinstate democratic oversight of laws engaging rights and equalities issues and affirm the importance of an evidence-based approach to tackling serious violence.
I turn to Lords amendments 141 and 142. I have received emails from a number of constituents about how tens of thousands of women are being propositioned by predators offering free or discounted accommodation in exchange for sexual favours. Only one person has ever been charged for that kind of crime, because the law is woefully inadequate, leaving men to get away with sexually exploiting renters in need of a home. The Lords amendments specifically criminalise such landlords; they also implement financial penalties on websites and platforms. That is why they have my support.
I find this fascinating. So often in these debates, it is entirely understandable for the Opposition to say that the Government have not been in listening mode, and therefore amendments from the Lords have been turned down. Today, however, the evidence is striking. The Government are accepting, I believe, 22 Lords amendments on a wide range of matters, including emergency workers, domestic abuse, breastfeeding, common assault, data, hare coursing and child cruelty. I think that that is a good indication of both Houses working together.
I want to say a few words on Lords amendment 70 on spiking, and the Government amendments in lieu of it, and then on Lords amendment 72 on misogyny. On spiking, I am grateful to the Minister for his kind words about my 10-minute rule Bill, which is supported by Members from five different parties in this House, and which I think has helped to ensure that spiking is covered in this Bill. Certainly, when I originally proposed it, the thinking was that that would not be possible, so I recognise the movement that the Government have made.
The specific reason that I do not think the Lords amendment does the job that it could do is that it specifically calls for an amendment to the offence under section 61 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The truth, as we covered in the 10-minute rule Bill, is that there is more to spiking than sexual offences, although they are a big part of the problem. I am therefore satisfied that the amendments in lieu tabled by the Government will make a significant difference to the issue of spiking. As the Minister has said, it is clear that this behaviour is not exclusively linked to sexual activity, and the requirement on the Home Secretary to provide a report on the wider issues is therefore important. I believe that the Minister’s commitment—he might want to nod to repeat it—that the Home Secretary will be required to publish and lay the report before Parliament within 12 months of the Royal Assent of this Bill, is significant.
I note that the Minister has also asked officials to explore the need for a specific criminal offence to target spiking directly. I believe that this would change patterns of behaviour. It would have a preventive effect, and it would give young people—particularly young women—more confidence, especially at university. I would be delighted if he was able to commit to come back to this within six months of Royal Assent with a decision on whether to proceed with this further specific criminal offence, and I hope that he will say something on that in his winding-up speech. I have decided to pull my 10-minute rule Bill from its Second Reading, which had been proposed for 18 March, on the basis that the Minister has given that commitment, and I hope he will give a further one in his winding-up.
On Lords amendment 72, we have heard from distinguished colleagues including my hon. Friend the Member for Newbury (Laura Farris), the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas), my hon. Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Ruth Edwards) and the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy)—four powerful advocates balancing strength of feeling with legal expertise on this issue. My own feeling is that, since I have just explained why I believe that a spiking Bill will help in terms of having a preventive effect and giving young people more confidence, there is something to this and I am glad that the Minister will come back and report to the House—
With the leave of the House, I shall respond to the debate. I am grateful to all the Members who have spoken, and I hope that what has been exhibited is our shared concern for many of the issues we have talked about today, not least the safety of women and girls, which has naturally and rightly dominated the debate. A number of undertakings were sought from me, latterly by my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester (Richard Graham), who has done so much work on the offence of spiking. I am happy to give him a commitment that we will come back within a six-month period, as he requested. Obviously we will be producing a wider report within 12 months, but we should be able to give him an indication at the time.
My right hon. Friend and neighbour, the Member for Romsey and Southampton North (Caroline Nokes), asked for a specific legislative vehicle, but I am afraid that I cannot preview the Queen’s Speech, much as I would love to. I cannot give her a specific vehicle, but I can tell her that we will be responding to the Law Commission’s report within six months. We are giving serious consideration to the work streams that I have talked about. As I have said to her, it is my personal view that we have an issue that needs to be addressed, either through public order offending, through recording or through a specific offence. I hope that on that basis she will feel able to support us this evening.
The work that we will be doing in this area sits alongside an awful lot of other work looking at the issue of street harassment, including our safety of women at night fund and the safer streets fund. In September we launched the new StreetSafe tool, allowing the police to access greater information and data about where people feel, or indeed are, unsafe. I am told that more than 12,000 reports have already been submitted through that line. In December, the College of Policing published new guidance showing what the police can and should do when they receive a report of public sexual harassment. The criminal offence is already available and other protective tools can be used. As I hope my right hon. Friend the Member for Romsey and Southampton North has just been to see, we have also launched a new communications campaign this evening. There is an awful lot to cover in this first group of amendments, but I hope that we have looked at a wide range of offences and I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester for pointing out that we have been listening. The number of amendments we have accepted weigh in the balance of support for the votes that we are about to undertake.
On the misogyny issue, I commend the motivation behind the set of amendments that we are sadly declining. We understand people’s genuine concern about the safety of women and girls in the public sector, and indeed we share it. We are determined to make significant inroads in this area. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Mrs Miller), my hon. Friend the Member for Calder Valley (Craig Whittaker) and my hon. Friend and neighbour the Member for Newbury have pointed out so effectively, we cannot in all conscience support an amendment that the Law Commission and other large groups interested in this area believe runs the risk of damaging the cause of women’s safety. That puts an obligation on us to bring forward alternatives that will do something positive for women’s safety. That battle is under way, and we commit to doing exactly that.
Lords amendment 2 agreed to.
Lords amendment 70 disagreed to.
Government amendments (a) and (b) made in lieu of Lords amendment 70.
Motion made, and Question put, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 72.—(Kit Malthouse.)
I beg to move, That this House agrees with Lords amendment 1.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Lords amendment 58, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 107, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendments 61 to 69, 94 to 106, 121 to 140, 144, 145, 149 to 152 and 155 to 161.
There are no less than 161 Lords amendments for the House to consider this evening. To ensure that as many hon. and right hon. Members as possible who wish to speak can do so, I do not propose to detail all the amendments in this group, as many were uncontentious and will have the support of the whole House. I will, however, outline the key Lords amendments in this group brought forward by the Government, before commenting on the two amendments in this group that were agreed by their lordships contrary to the Government’s sound advice.
I know that MPs from across the House will want to share our support for the family and friends of PC Andrew Harper and their campaign to strengthen the law so that no other families go through the same heartbreak they have suffered. We were therefore pleased to announce our amendment in the other place, following our commitment to look at what action may be possible in this area. Lords amendment 1, known as Harper’s law, will impose mandatory life sentences on those convicted of unlawful act manslaughter where the victim is an emergency worker acting in the exercise of their functions as such a worker. The amendment will apply to adult offenders and 16 and 17-year-olds. The amendment will also contain judicial discretion for the court to impose an alternative sentence in exceptional circumstances.
In the case of Andrew Harper, the court did not impose life sentences on any of the defendants. Each received sentences of between 13 and 19 years for manslaughter—sentences that were subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeal. They will all be incarcerated for a significant period, but the Government believe that where a person is convicted of unlawful act manslaughter and the person who has been killed is an emergency worker, that should be punished with life imprisonment, except where there are exceptional circumstances relating to the offender or the offence.
The successful campaign of Lissie Harper, PC Harper’s widow, and the Police Federation drew this issue to the Government’s attention, and we are grateful for that. Lissie has shown incredible bravery, fortitude and courage in campaigning for this change, and I know that it has had a profound impact on Members from all parts of the House and on our constituents in communities across the country, who have come together to support this change.
We now move to the third set of amendments. When I call the Minister to move the motion, it would be useful if those who are trying to catch my eye indicate they wish to speak.
After Clause 54
Accountability of public authorities: duties on police workforce
I beg to move that this House disagrees with Lords amendment 71.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Lords amendment 74, and Government amendment (a) thereto.
Lords amendment 88, and Government amendment (a) thereto.
Lords amendment 73, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 80, Government motion to disagree, and Government amendments (a) to (f) to the words so restored to the Bill.
Lords amendment 81, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 82, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 87, Government motion to disagree, and Government amendments (a) to (f) to the words so restored to the Bill.
Lords amendments 89 and 146, Government motions to disagree, and Government amendments (a) and (b) in lieu.
Lords amendment 143, Government motion to disagree, and Government amendments (a) to (c) in lieu.
Lords amendments 75 to 79, 83 to 86, 90 to 93, 118 to 120 and 148.
Lords amendment 71 would introduce a duty of candour for the police workforce. I am sure that hon. Members know that the Government take police integrity and accountability extremely seriously. So much so that, in February 2020, we introduced a statutory duty of co-operation for serving police officers as part of wider integrity reforms.
A failure to co-operate in that way constitutes a breach of the statutory standards of professional behaviour by which all officers must abide and could therefore result in a formal disciplinary sanction. It is our view that the duty to co-operate puts a greater onus on officers than the duty of candour provided for in the Lords amendment, as they could ultimately be dismissed for a breach. In essence, the Lords is proposing a dilution.
Hon. Members will also be aware of the Government’s forthcoming response to the Daniel Morgan independent panel and to Bishop James Jones’ report concerning the bereaved Hillsborough families’ experiences, and we will set out our view on a wider duty of candour for all public authorities. Before the Government respond to those reports, however, it is clearly imperative that the Hillsborough families are given the opportunity to share their views.
None the less, we are closely monitoring the impact of the new legislation on police co-operation with inquiries and investigations. As we consider the case for a wider duty of candour for other public servants and bodies, we will determine whether there are gaps in the existing framework that need to be filled to ensure public confidence. I assure the House that we will set out our conclusions later this year.
Before I turn to the Lords amendments to part 3 of the Bill, I point out to hon. Members that over the last couple of years, with regard to public order, we have all seen that the police have struggled with some of the demonstrations that we have seen on our streets. Last autumn, Insulate Britain’s new tactics put a lot of police officers in danger, caused a significant amount of misery to many thousands of people who simply wanted to get to work or to otherwise go about their daily lives, and were difficult to address. Since, we have seen further examples of wholly unacceptable forms of protest. I am afraid that their lordships may regret the day that they voted down the significant number of measures that we had inserted in the Bill.
The House of Lords did, however, recognise that freedom of speech and assembly are qualified rights under the European convention on human rights, and there are times when it is appropriate to restrict those rights to protect the rights of non-protesters. For that reason, we are sympathetic to Lords amendment 143, which would introduce fast-track public space protection orders. The Government have listened to the concerns raised in the other place about the harm caused by disruptive protests outside schools and vaccination centres. We agree in principle with the amendment, and our amendments (a) to (c) in lieu of Lords amendment 143 will have a similar effect but will ensure that provision for expedited PSPOs works with the grain of the existing legislative framework.
Several hon. Members rose—
Order. We have very limited time, so after the next speaker from the Opposition Front Bench there will be a time limit of five minutes. I suspect that that may have to come down during the course of the debate. Priority will be given to people who have not spoken previously.
I want to begin by making a comment in this House on the Government’s procedure in the other place. The Government tried to sideline the Commons from its role in the democratic process by bringing into the Lords substantial but last-minute amendments on protests that would have had a fundamental impact on our rights. The Lords had very little time to scrutinise them and that is generally considered to be very poor form. Instead of chasing headlines and rushing in last-minute sweeping amendments clearly not thought through, they should be focusing on driving up prosecution rates, improving their woeful record on crime and dealing with the problems that really matter to the British people.
Labour voted against the Bill in its entirety on Second Reading and Third Reading because of parts 3 and 4, which represent a power grab that effectively bans peaceful protests and will compound the inequalities experienced by Gypsies and Travellers. I want to pay particular thanks to colleagues in the other place who have stood up for democracy and prevented the draconian provisions on protests that the Government tried to get through at the last minute.
Before I come to the protest amendments, I want briefly to touch on the other amendments in this grouping. First, we are grateful that the Government have listened to reason on so many of our amendments. I want to mention two in this grouping in particular. I pay tribute to the hard work of Lord Bassam in pressuring the Government to extend football banning orders to online racist abuse in Lords amendments 148, 118, 119 and 120. Racists who abuse football players do not deserve to be anywhere near a game of football. The amendments send a strong message that disgraceful racist behaviour has no place in the world of football, online or in person.
We are also glad that Lords amendment 89, which will repeal the Vagrancy Act 1824, has been accepted by the Government and that they have finally decided to act. No one should be criminalised simply for sleeping rough. But I hope the Minister can provide some reassurance to the House that this crucial change will not be kicked into the long grass and that the new legislation will be brought in at the earliest opportunity.
I want to touch on Lords amendment 71. The Government are refusing to introduce a duty of candour on police officers at this stage to co-operate with inquiries. The Minister claimed that the existing schedule on standards of professional behaviour is sufficient, but we do not believe that it is. It states that police officers must act with honesty and integrity, which of course they should, but the amendment passed in the Lords goes significantly further to ensure that where the police are required to provide information to inquiries or other such proceedings, they must have regard to the pleadings allegations terms of reference and parameters of the relevant proceedings, but not be limited by them, in particular where they hold information that might change the ambit of the proceedings inquiry or investigation. That is a really important distinction. The Lords amendment goes significantly further than the statutory duty of co-operation.
In June 2021, the Daniel Morgan independent panel, which took eight years to report, recommended the creation of a statutory duty of candour to be owed by all law enforcement agencies to those whom they serve. It is time for decisions to be made and for actions to be taken to restore public confidence in the police service.
Part 4 of the Bill represents an attack on the Gypsy, Traveller and Roma communities, even though the police have made it clear that they neither want nor need these powers. The Government have rejected our calls to remove part 4, and that is one of the major reasons why we voted against the Bill in its entirety. Although Lords amendments 91 to 93 are very small technical amendments, they confirm the principles around the powers of seizure of property that we Opposition Members believe are unfair.
The problem that many Government Members seem to articulate whenever we debate this issue is actually one of antisocial behaviour. The solution to antisocial behaviour, wherever it comes, is tougher antisocial behaviour action. Under this Government, we saw 1.7 million incidents in the year to September 2021 and nothing has been done. Marginalising an entire minority is not the answer to antisocial behaviour. We need to distinguish between the two and not criminalise a minority.
I turn to the Lords amendments on protest. Over the past five days, thousands of people have been arrested and detained at anti-war protests across Russia. We would all defend their right to protest and yet here we are, in the mother of all democracies, debating an amendment to a Bill that would criminalise singing at a peaceful protest in this country. Britain has a long-standing and important democratic freedom to gather and to speak or to protest. The Minister quoted an HMICFRS report, but he misunderstood its conclusions. The report said that we need a
“modest reset of the scales”
because police forces are usually good at planning protests but the “balance may tip”. The report’s recommendations were not legislative; they were to update and improve guidance to senior police officers, to improve the way in which the police assess the impact of protests, to improve police intelligence and to improve debrief processes, all of which are very sensible.
The Government asked the HMICFRS to look at some legislative options, which it did, and it gave some qualified support to some of them, but at no point was noise any part of that conversation. I have spoken to many senior police officers and at no point have any of them asked for any changes to the law on noise. The Bill goes way beyond the right balance between the right to protest and the right for others, which we agree with, to go about their daily lives.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Winterton of Doncaster
Main Page: Baroness Winterton of Doncaster (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Winterton of Doncaster's debates with the Home Office
(4 years, 3 months ago)
Commons ChamberFinancial privilege is not engaged by any of the items in the Lords message relating to the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill.
Clause 55
Imposing conditions on public processions
I beg to move,
That this House insists on its disagreement with Lords in their Amendment 73, insists on its Amendment 73C to the words restored to the Bill by its disagreement to that Amendment, insists on its Amendment 74A to Lords Amendment 74, disagrees with the Lords in their Amendment 74B to that Amendment in lieu, disagrees with the Lords in their consequential Amendments 74C, 74D, 74E, 74F and 74G, insists on its disagreement with the Lords in their Amendment 87, insists on its Amendments 87A, 87B, 87C, 87D, 87E, 87F and 87H to the words restored to the Bill by its disagreement to that Amendment but proposes Amendment (a) in lieu of Lords Amendment 73 and additional Amendment (b) to the words restored to the Bill by its disagreement with the Lords in their Amendment 87.
With this it will be convenient to consider the following Government motion:
That this House insists on its disagreement with the Lords in their Amendment 80, insists on its Amendments 80A, 80B, 80C, 80D, 80E, 80F and 80H to the words restored to the Bill by its disagreement with that Amendment, disagrees with the Lords in their Amendment 80J instead of the words left out by that Amendment but proposes additional Amendment (a) to the words restored to the Bill by its disagreement with the Lords in their Amendment 80.
I rise to speak to the motions in the name of my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, including the associated amendments in lieu. We return yet again, I have to say with a smidgin of ennui and irritation, to the issue of police powers to attach conditions to protests. It is disappointing that the debate on these provisions continues to be characterised by misinformation about what the Bill actually does and irrationality.
I shall start with the issue of noise. As I said in round 2 of ping-pong, at the Opposition’s behest, we have added provisions to the Bill that can be used to limit noise and disruptive protests outside schools and vaccination centres. I am therefore at a loss to understand why they would not agree to these provisions outside, say, a convent, a hospital, an animal sanctuary or, God forbid, a factory. What happened to the workers’ rights?
It cannot be that a protest can inflict any amount of noise on those living or working in the vicinity for prolonged periods of time, day or night. I agree that it would not be necessary or proportionate, for example, to attach conditions relating to the generation of noise to a procession that will pass a particular location within a matter of hours, but the same cannot be said of an ongoing raucous protest, perhaps encamped in a residential area, which includes the banging of drums and the use of loudhailers. It is intolerable that local residents should have to endure that day and night, and it is right that in those circumstances, the police should have the power to act. I do not understand why those residents’ rights are so lightly set aside by the Opposition. When the hon. Member for Croydon Central (Sarah Jones) rises to address the motions, I hope she will answer that question.
I can, however, assure the hon. Members for North Antrim (Ian Paisley) and for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson)—they questioned me on this in the last round—that there are no new powers here to restrict what is said and, for that matter, sung. These provisions are simply about the harm caused by excessive noise; the content is irrelevant. Of course, the existing criminal law relating to hate or intimidatory speech will continue to apply.
I am sorry that the Minister finds himself bored by the democratic process, but this is the process, and sadly he has to come to the Dispatch Box to engage in this debate. There is one—[Interruption.]
Order. The hon. Lady is giving a speech. Carry on, Sarah Jones.
Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I do not mind how noisy the Minister is; I do not want to curtail his right to be as noisy as he likes.
We are debating one topic: the right to protest and make noise. We have indeed debated it several times. Members from across the House have spoken passionately about why this issue matters, and why the Government have got this so wrong. One might think that, with crime up 14%, the arrest rate having halved since 2010, and prosecution rates at an all-time low, the Government might spend their time on the bread-and-butter issues of law and order, such as fighting criminals. Instead, they seem intent on criminalising singing at peaceful protests. That suggests that the Government are tired, out of ideas and have no plan, and are searching round for anything eye-catching to distract from their years of failure.
The Lords responded to the Minister’s defence of his policy by voting against it again. Lords amendments 73 and 87 remove the Government’s proposed noise trigger, which would allow the police to put conditions on marches or one-person protests that are “too noisy”. Labour agrees with the Lords, and we support Lords amendment 80, which removes clause 56 from the Bill altogether. As with most Government policies thought up on the hoof, there are many questions about how the proposed powers would work.
The right hon. Member brings a lot of experience to the House, and I listen to him carefully. I agree with him about noisy neighbours, which are a distressing part of my case load because we often struggle hard to do something about it. However, the Bill does not do anything on that; it is about protests. We need to be clear that those are two completely different things. There are rules on antisocial behaviour and neighbours, and local authorities and the police have powers to deal with that—sadly, often those cases do not get dealt with—but that is not what we are arguing about.
Order. May I give a little reminder that interventions should be quite brief?
Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker, you made my point exactly. With respect to the shadow Minister, they are different, and I agree that the Bill has nothing to do with noisy neighbours, but noisy demonstrations blight people’s lives in exactly the same way, and that is why the legislation is trying to do something about them.
We may disagree, and that is probably right and proper—this place is about debating and not just agreeing with each other all the time—but the principle must be that this House, with huge majorities, has voted for these measures. I respect many of the people on both sides of the other House—they bring huge amounts of experience—but they are not elected. They should listen to this House and consider the size of the majority. If it had been tiny, we could argue about the principle, but it was not, and the measures have been voted through. On that, I completely agree with the Minister, who is in the position where I used to be.