Falkland Islands Defence Review

Rory Stewart Excerpts

Tuesday 24th March 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

I am grateful to the shadow Secretary of State for his comments and for his broad welcome for the review’s conclusions. I agree with him about the importance of the referendum and its verification and the overwhelming result showing that the islanders want to remain British.

The hon. Gentleman asked a number of specific questions, including about how often we conduct such a review. The last review was conducted in 2008 and this review was set in train in 2013, which is about right as an interval: we should look at the issue every four or five years.

The hon. Gentleman asked about the potential involvement of Russia and press speculation. I am not responsible for speculation in the newspapers about either Russia or, indeed, troop numbers. So far as the threat is concerned, I re-emphasise that the principal threat to the islands remains the unjustified claim of Argentina to ownership of them.

On the budget, I made it clear that the expenditure is a 10-year programme: there will be expenditure of £180 million over the next 10 years. On Rapier, we expect it to go out of service in about 2019 or 2020, and there will be no gap before we introduce its replacement.

The hon. Gentleman asked about diplomatic discussions with Argentina. He will have noticed the presence on the Front Bench of my colleagues from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, who are always ready to talk to Argentina. However, if the discussions are to be about the future of the Falkland Islands, it is very important that representatives of the Falklands Islands Government are present in the room when they take place.

[Rory Stewart (Penrith and The Border) (Con)]

On behalf of the Defence Committee, I welcome the Secretary of State’s statement on the Falkland Islands. May I pay particular tribute to my hon. Friends the Members for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) and for Colchester (Sir Bob Russell), who led the Committee’s trip to the Falkland Islands, and thank the Secretary of State for taking on board their recommendations?

[Michael Fallon]

I am grateful to the Chairman of the Defence Committee and I am particularly grateful to those two members of his Committee for undertaking that particular journey. It is not especially easy to visit the Falkland Islands at any time and it obviously involves a commitment of a number of days. We have, of course, reflected on the recommendations my hon. Friend set out in his letter to me.

Defence Spending

Rory Stewart Excerpts

Thursday 12th March 2015 Commons Chamber

[Rory Stewart (Penrith and The Border) (Con)]

I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney (Mr Havard) both for his service on the Defence Committee and for having set out very clearly the two central questions in the debate about defence spending: first, the focus on threat—what is the threat we face?—and secondly the fact that these threats are now concurrent.

The reason we need to spend at least 2% of GDP on defence is that the entire defence planning assumptions created in 1998 and in 2010—those in the national security strategy and strategic defence and security review, leading up to Future Force 2020—have been bypassed by events; they no longer hold. As the hon. Gentleman pointed out, the world has changed fundamentally, and those assumptions—this is why we cannot just tweak the NSS or be complacent about the SDSR—were essentially developed on two bases. The first was that the cold war had ended. The NSS stated again and again that the cold war had ended and that we needed to be much bolder about getting rid of cold war capacities.

The second assumption was that what we will be doing in the future is the same kind of things that were happening in 2010—primarily Afghanistan. Absolutely central to the SDSR was the idea that what we need is something called “enduring stabilisation operations”. That meant that we were planning to go into a single country—or, at most, in US planning, two countries at a time—for a very long time with a large number of troops. The concept was: Iraq and Afghanistan; 100,000 to 130,000 troops on the ground; Britain contributing 10,000 of those troops—or, in the latest Future Force 2020 structure, 6,600 troops. All our brigade structures were set up to sustain that. The idea was that we would have force structures to keep 6,600 troops on the ground for a decade.

The world has changed completely, however, and as the hon. Gentleman pointed out, it has changed in two ways. First, we have a return to a threat from a conventional state with an advanced military capacity—Russia. That is a major change: it reshapes the entire assumptions from 1998 to 2010. Secondly, as the hon. Gentleman also pointed out, we now have concurrent threats that are not just happening in one state at a time. General Sir Peter Wall pointed out that the basic assumption of the SDSR was for a benign security environment. We had come out of Afghanistan, and we assumed that there would not be anything looking like Afghanistan again very soon. Of course, if we look around the world, we see developments—I shall deal with them in greater detail later—in Yemen, Libya, Syria, to some extent in South Sudan and certainly in western Iraq and still in Afghanistan. We are seeing exactly the same threats, but they now happening in half a dozen countries at one time.

Let me deal briefly with this threat assumption. We need more defence spending because we need to deal with those two things: the conventional threat from Russia and the concurrent threats from all the fragile states that are currently harbouring Islamist groups, terrorist groups—groups that appear to threaten the west. Dealing with this requires imagination, new force structures and spending.

[Derek Twigg (Halton) (Lab)]

Is not part of the problem of dealing with these threats having a strategy in the first place? There has been an absence of a real strategy.

[Rory Stewart]

That is a fundamental point, so let me deal with it briefly. We need to work from the assumption of three things. First, we must agree that these things are threats. There is a huge debate within the civil service, where some people are beginning to say, “Perhaps failed states and terrorist groups are not really threats at all; perhaps everything we have done in Afghanistan and Iraq was mistaken, and we do not need to worry about what is happening in Libya, Iraq and Syria.” Secondly, we need to assume that Britain wants to do something and actually wishes to be a global power. There is another danger in this whole debate, with people in Whitehall saying, “Perhaps this is none of our business; perhaps these things are threats, but somebody else such as the United States will deal with those threats for us”—a freeloader problem. Thirdly and most importantly—this comes to the centre of the strategy—we need to believe that we have a doctrine that can deal with these things. We need to believe that we can deal with them and that we have the capability to engage.

I shall deal with resources needs separately. First, the threat posed by Russia’s recent actions requires serious imagination. We have had “reassurance measures”—the grisly jargon we produced in Wales, essentially to talk about setting up a high-readiness joint taskforce, about exercising in NATO at a divisional level and about air policing operations. Those things need to be resourced. It will be surprisingly difficult in practice to have that very high-readiness joint taskforce, with all its enablers in place and functioning, particularly when some of the framework nations are still insisting that they can take their forces out of that very high-readiness joint taskforce and deploy them somewhere else such as in the Central African Republic.

It is much more than that, however. This House will have heard that we need to invest. Here, however, the idea that flat real plus 1% is somehow going to be enough cannot be the case if we are serious about the threats. Let me run through some of the requirements. Maritime surveillance is an obvious one, so there is no point debating it here today. Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear capacity is another. Any Members present who were in the armed forces will remember training, walking around in NBC suits and thinking about how to deal with that kind of threat. All that capacity has gone out the window. We do not do that anymore, because we have been fighting for nearly 15 years against lightly-armed insurgents, and most of our planning was based on counter-insurgency warfare operations that did not require that kind of training.

Ballistic missile defence is a third requirement. If we are serious about taking on a country such as Russia, which has tactical nuclear weapons as part of its normal operational doctrine, we need ballistic missile defence. That will probably mean—I do not want to pre-empt procurement decisions made by the Ministry—finding some way of buying into an existing US system and persuading the US to locate it not just in continental Europe, but in the United Kingdom.

If we look at our Navy, we find that it is currently down to 19 frigates and destroyers. That is pretty radical. What we have heard in the other place from Lord Astor is that our attrition calculations are currently zero. That means that we function on the assumption that we are not going to lose any of these frigates or destroyers. Lord Astor said that we have not lost any of those things since the Falklands war, so we do not need to worry about that. Of course, the Falklands war was the last time that we were fighting a navy, so it does not provide a basis for making this sort of calculation if we are thinking about taking on Russia.

It is the same for the Royal Air Force. As we move down to just seven squadrons, our attrition calculations are again pretty close to zero. If we are serious about carriers, we need to realise that they cost a lot of money. If we are to put one carrier at sea, we need to think about how to resupply it and how to get the fuel and weapons to it. The fuel and weaponry supply vessels will be moving along at 9 knots, which poses a huge challenge to us. We need to work out where to get the money to buy the planes to put on that carrier. How can we have a comprehensive carrier strike capacity? We have not yet paid for it.

Then there is the Army. If we are thinking about manoeuvre warfare again, it amounts to a huge spending commitment. It means thinking about heavy armour and whether we want to relocate the Royal Air Force at an Army headquarters level rather than two levels up. It means wide water bridging capacity and all the things that any Members present who operated during the NATO era will be able to think of much better than me.

Then there is ambiguous warfare. If we are thinking about dealing with Russia, we are going to have to think about what to do on cyber, information operations, strategic communications; and we will need to think about whether we have the special forces capacity right the way around the edge of Russia to deal with the phenomenon of these “green men” in these insurgency operations. We need the knowledge of places such as Narva in Estonia.

That is the easy stuff. That is before we get on to the concurrent threats, mentioned by the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney. If we in this country take seriously the idea that we care about threats from failed states, terrorists and Islamist groups, we are going to have to think about northern Nigeria, Libya and Yemen, and we are going to have to think much more seriously about Syria and Iraq. We are going to have to think about continuing to support Afghanistan and, potentially, Pakistan, and if we do not do something about these places now as a coalition, it is just going to get worse. We will be reporting back to the House in two years’ time, and the Nigerian problem will have spread into Chad and Niger; the Libyan problem will have re-exploded back into Mali; Syria and Iraq will be destabilising Lebanon and Jordan even more profoundly than they are now.

Unfortunately, in dealing with these problems, we cannot base what we do on the Future Force 2020 structure. That was about the enduring stabilisation operations and heavy investment in counter-insurgency operations, with 100,000 people retained for a decade or more. That works if we have only one of these problems, but it simply does not work if we are dealing with a dozen of them at one time. So we need a much lighter, smarter approach to dealing with these countries. That will mean moving out of the world view of “one at a time” and not losing confidence. That is central; it cannot be about despair. It is about recognising that in Bosnia and Sierra Leone, we did these things quite well, but that if we are serious about them, we are going to have to upgrade our special forces and potentially look at—again, these are just ideas—type 2 special forces of the “green beret” type that they have in the United States. We may need to develop the idea of the Chief of the General Staff on defence engagement, but much more ambitiously, much more imaginatively and much more aggressively, including pre-posting officers into a dozen countries. We may be talking about 50 or 100 officers at a time, not about just one defence attaché covering three Baltic countries, and we may need to rethink the whole force structure that lies behind that.

I have run out of time, so let me say a few things in conclusion. I have sketched out a world which, as was made clear by the hon. Gentleman, is very different now. It is different in terms of the conventional threat, but—and this is something that we have only touched on so far—it is, above all, different in terms of the concurrent threats that are emerging from all the fragile states. We have not begun to think those through. We have not begun to consider the deep implications of the skills set, the force structures and the capacity that we would need in order to deal with those states simultaneously.

The 2% of GDP matters for several reasons. First, we can deal with these problems only as a coalition, because they are beyond the sort of problems that Britain can deal with on its own. The 2% matters because it is a way of raising the commitment of more than 20 NATO countries to matching that expenditure themselves. It is essential to keep the United States bound into the system, because it is currently spending 70% of the NATO money. The President, the chief of the United States army, and the United States ambassador to the United Nations have all made it clear that they view the 2% as a sign of seriousness and of Britain’s commitment to keep the United States involved. Above all, however, the 2% is needed because the threats are real. The world is genuinely becoming more dangerous, and Britain cannot be a freeloader.

One of the sad aspects of what I feel is happening is our growing obsession with kit. People stand up and list all the different bits of kit that we have bought, but they do not intend ever to use it. They are freeloading on the idea that Britain will never act alone, that the United States will somehow fill in all the gaps, and that therefore we do not need to be serious about what we are actually doing in countries such as Libya. The challenge to Ministers should be, “Explain how we are to deal with a situation like the one in Libya. Explain what we are going to do in Yemen and northern Nigeria. Explain how this kit will really prevent us from letting the Russians into Mariupol.” Do we care about those issues, or are we creating an isolationist world view?

That 2% of GDP will return confidence to the military. It is an increasing budget, so the military will have £1 billion a year more every year to finance imaginative ideas. They will be able to restructure our forces, invest in defence engagement rather than scrimping and saving around the edges, and give us back the confidence that we need as a nation.

Armed Forces (Service Complaints and Financial Assistance) Bill [Lords]

Rory Stewart Excerpts

Monday 9th March 2015 Commons Chamber

[Rory Stewart (Penrith and The Border) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment 24, page 1, line 9, leave out “is”

[Mr Speaker]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 25, page 1, leave out line 10 and insert—

“(a) has been a member of the regular or reserve forces in the last five years ending with the day on which the appointment is to take effect, or”

Amendment 26, page 1, line 11, after “(b)”, insert “is”

Amendment 27, page 1, line 13, at end add—

“(4A) (a) The period for which a person is appointed shall be not less than five years and not more than seven years.

(b) A person who has been appointed as Ombudsman may not be re-appointed to the office.”

Amendment 28, in clause 2, page 3, line 15, at end insert—

“(5A) Before making regulations under this section the Defence Council must consult the Service Complaints Ombudsman.”

Amendment 23, page 5, line 15, at end insert—

“(2A) Regulations made under section 340E(1)(b) must specify that in relation to any service complaint which includes allegations of discrimination, harassment, or of being victimised as a result of making such allegations—

(a) where a person is appointed by the Defence Council for the purposes of section 340C(1)(a) or 340D(2)(d) that person must have a proven understanding of discrimination and harassment;

(b) where a panel is appointed by the Defence Council for the purposes of section 340C(1)(a) or 340D(2)(d) at least one member of the panel must have a proven understanding of discrimination and harassment.”

This amendment would require that any regulations made by the Secretary of State must specify that the person, or at least one of the panel members, involved in dealing with Service complaints involving allegations of discrimination or harassment should have a proven understanding of discrimination and harassment.

Amendment 29, page 7, line 32, leave out subsection (2).

Amendment 30, page 7, line 34, leave out from “subject to subsection (2),”

Amendment 31, page 7, line 39, leave out subsection (5).

Amendment 32, page 9, line 25, leave out paragraph (c) and insert—

“(c) provision for the imposition on those to whom reports are sent of obligations of confidentiality in the interests of—

(i) national security; or

(ii) the safety of any person.”

Amendment 33, page 9, line 30, at end insert—

“(aa) accept the findings and recommendations of the Service Complaints Ombudsman.”

Amendment 34, page 9, line 32, leave out “(if any)”

Amendment 35, page 9, leave out lines 35 to 37.

Amendment 36, page 12, line 14, at end add—

“( ) The Ombudsman may report to the Secretary of State on any matter relating to service complaints and the procedure for the handling of service complaints as the Ombudsman considers appropriate.”

[Rory Stewart]

These very important amendments were tabled by the Defence Committee. We shall not press them to a vote, but we want to explain crisply and clearly why we believe them to be very important. They focus above all on four things: the independence, freedom, power and scope of the ombudsman. I shall briefly go through each of the amendments in turn.

The principle on which the Defence Committee has acted is the need to get the balance right with regard to the very particular needs of military law and military discipline, which we accept are completely different from those in the civilian sphere. The kinds of things that soldiers are required to do are quite different from those required by a conventional employer. It is not necessary to lay those differences out in detail, but military discipline and military law have been quite different from civilian law in a series of important respects for 400 years.

It is important that, along with preserving the independence of the military and of military discipline and military law, we ensure that the ombudsman is genuinely trusted and respected. The first ingredient of that is, of course, the ombudsman’s independence and making sure there are no conflicts of interest, which is what the first set of amendments in this group—amendments 24 to 27—seek to ensure. They would make sure that the individual had not been in the military—either in the regular or the reserves—in the previous five years. That conflict of interest is obvious, so it is not worth trying the House’s patience. Put simply, if someone had been a senior general a month before they became the ombudsman, there would be a potential conflict of interest in the relationships they might have developed, so we think that a five year gap is sensible.

The second ingredient, which is in amendment 27, is to push for the term to be non-renewable. That is also about having no conflicts of interest: as the ombudsman do their job, they should not be perpetually thinking about how to get the job again. Our focus is on ensuring that they do the job clearly and crisply, without worrying about whether they will be reappointed—that is independence.

The second set of amendments, Nos. 28 to 32, deals with the freedom of the ombudsman. The Committee is pushing to ensure that the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Council do not put regulations or procedures in the way of the defence ombudsman or the Service Complaints Commissioner for the Armed Forces that prevent them from doing their job. We are trying to ensure that although the Ministry of Defence can set the parameters within which the ombudsman operates, it is not in a position to micromanage individual procedures. We believe that the Ministry of Defence should consult the ombudsman on regulations. Finally, on the question of power, we do not believe that the Ministry of Defence should be able to use confidentiality as a reason for denying access to the ombudsman, except in two particular cases: the personal safety of the individual and national security. Except in those cases, the ombudsman should have the scope to pursue an investigation.

The third conceptual issue for the Committee is about the power of the ombudsman. In amendments 33 to 35, we argue that the ombudsman’s recommendations should be binding on the Defence Council. The final conceptual issue is about scope, and amendment 36 touches on thematic reviews. In other words, should the ombudsman find a systemic issue—say, repeated examples of bullying—it may think it necessary to conduct a thematic review of the broader issues.

The Committee will not press the amendments to a vote because the Government have so far addressed them in a constructive fashion. We very much welcome the fact that they have accepted our major amendment to allow the ombudsman to look not simply at maladministration but at the substance of cases. We note that the Government, in appointing Nicola Williams, have already taken into account in practice many of the recommendations that the Committee wanted. We note that in the contract negotiations with her the Government have already ensured that the ombudsman appointed has not been in the armed forces during the previous five years—in fact, Nicola Williams has never been in the armed forces—which deals with our amendments 24 to 26. We note that the Government have said that the appointment will be non-renewable, which is our amendment 27. In practice, the appointment deals with the conflict of interests problem, and we understand that the Government will set out measures in regulations to deal with our anxieties about freedom, power and scope.

However, the Committee will of course watch the Government’s performance on such issues very carefully. Given that the Government do not want to agree to the amendments, that they assure us we can trust them and say that we should look at the precedent set by the appointment of Nicola Williams, and that they will introduce individual regulations to achieve all the measures that the Committee want, we will watch them very carefully. The Committee reserves the right to reintroduce the amendments, particularly in the Armed Forces Bill to be introduced in the next Parliament, if we believe the Government have reneged on what at the moment appears to be a commitment made in good faith, to ensure that the ombudsman’s principles are upheld.

[Sir Bob Russell (Colchester) (LD)]

I am grateful to the Chairman of the Select Committee for the way in which he is setting out its views. Will he expand a little more on the concerns expressed in some quarters about the ombudsman not having any military knowledge and experience? How will she address that problem, if it is a problem?

[Rory Stewart]

My hon. Friend raised that central question during the Defence Committee’s pre-appointment hearing. We were very pleased that the Committee had an opportunity to meet Nicola Williams and to conduct a pre-appointment hearing with her. We focused very heavily on whether, without military experience, she would feel comfortable in the role. We were very impressed by Nicola Williams. Her arguments and explanations were extremely convincing, she displayed real independence in her role in the Cayman Islands, and she seemed to have the right balance of independence and respect for the institution. We were very happy, as a Committee, to approve her appointment.

To conclude, this matter is very important to the Defence Committee. We are not conventionally a Committee that looks at legislation. The nature of our work is not usually to scrutinise individual Bills, because a great deal of the work of the Ministry of Defence is not connected with legislation. However, we feel that it is very important in the setting up of the ombudsman that Parliament, and the Defence Committee in particular, is carefully involved.

We accept that it is a step in the right direction that the post of ombudsman has gone from thee days a week to a full-time job, and from having five employees to having more than 20. We accept that it is a good move that the Defence Committee has the power to hold an appointment hearing on the ombudsman. We also think it is good that the Government have accepted amendments from the Defence Committee. Aside from the inherent merits of those amendments, it is simply good procedure that in setting up an ombudsman, the Executive listen to the legislative branch and give Parliament and the Defence Committee the chance to influence the procedure. The ombudsman will have trust only if they bring not just the Ministry of Defence but Parliament, the public and institutions such as the Defence Committee with them. On those grounds, I move the amendment, but will not press it to a vote.

[Mrs Madeleine Moon (Bridgend) (Lab)]

I shall speak briefly to the amendments tabled by the Defence Committee and to amendment 23, which I tabled.

The armed forces, as I frequently tell my constituents, are a closed institution with their own language, dress code and standards. Most personnel live a closed life that is mostly unobserved by society, but which represents the highest values of our society. The armed forces also have their own internal disciplinary system and legal system—AGAI 67. Abuses of the system can remain hidden and have done, as seen in the double jeopardy cases I have discussed in the House and in the Public Bill Committee. Those cases were revealed only because of whistleblowers.

One of the most important things we must accept about the armed forces is that innate to them is a huge desire for justice. Armed forces personnel have a huge recognition of the importance of justice and the importance of people being dealt with fairly. However, papers frequently come through my office that demonstrate that the service complaints system to date has not necessarily been working fairly.

I welcome the changes that the Minister of State, Ministry of Defence, the hon. Member for Broxtowe (Anna Soubry), accepted in Committee. I also welcomed her intervention on Second Reading when she revealed that the issue of double jeopardy would be addressed. I hope we shall have regular updates on the efforts to access the 587 ex-employees, 194 of whom had their service terminated and five of whom had their rank reduced.

Armed forces personnel have limited access to employment tribunals. It is therefore critical that the internal system operates well and gives a sense of confidence to armed forces personnel. We know that the delays are growing. As the number of armed forces personnel decreases, the pressure on personnel increases. The number of people who investigate and adjudicate in the matter of service complaints is also decreasing. As I have said, the creation of the service complaints ombudsman and the changes that were introduced in Committee are the last chance for the armed forces to maintain the current closed system.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Soubry]

Yes, I do. Both the hon. Member for North Durham and my hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border have said that we have seen a progression to where we are today, and we must understand and recognise that some think this is a step too far. They think we have gone too far and perceive some threat to the chain of command. I absolutely do not believe that, but things often take time to develop in the ways we want. I am absolutely confident that we have struck the right balance.

[Rory Stewart]

The question of whether this is a fundamental threat to the chain of command is a central point. Although people are very polite and do not put this about, I know a lot of colleagues and people in the armed forces are concerned that this is going too far. Will the Minister lay out more clearly why this is not a threat to the chain of command?

[Anna Soubry]

This Bill—it has now been amended and we have accepted the amendments—changes the ombudsman’s remit but not her powers. Somebody who brings a complaint to Nicola Williams can be absolutely confident that it will be thoroughly and properly dealt with, and that she will be in a position to make her recommendations. She has access to Ministers and to others in the chain of command, and can go to them at any time. That chain of command is not under threat because of her. Indeed, I am confident that the creation of the ombudsman will give the chain of command the understanding—the hon. Member for Bridgend or the hon. Member for North Durham made this point—that it has nothing to fear from the ombudsman, nor from a better system, because if complaints are dealt with properly and expeditiously, and fairly and justly, we will have a better team and group of people. This will only strengthen the chain of command’s ability to conduct its business.

--- Later in debate ---

As I have said before during the passage of the Bill, there is no bar in this Bill to the ombudsman raising matters that concern them with whoever they wish and whenever they wish, but that does not need to be set out in legislation. The previous service complaints commissioner, Dr Susan Atkins—we pay tribute to her for her work—raised a wide range of matters with the chain of command during her tenure, and, if I can put it in this way, she took no prisoners. She also made mention of whatever matters she so chose to in her annual reports with provisions that were the same as those provided for in this Bill, so we have no reason to think that the ombudsman will not do exactly the same. For all the reasons that I have outlined, these amendments are resisted.

[Rory Stewart]

I reiterate what the Defence Committee said, which is that the amendments are extremely important conceptual points relating to the independence of the ombudsman and conflict of interest; the power of the ombudsman; the freedom of the ombudsman to operate; and the scope of the ombudsman. We will not press the amendment to a vote at this time. That is a good will gesture to the Government, who have made a concession on an important amendment.

I also wish to take this opportunity to pay tribute to the hon. Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon), who has been the guiding spirit and soul of this process from the beginning to the end. She has kept the Defence Committee focused and she has kept it honest. I hope that she feels a real sense of achievement at having got through this extremely important amendment.

[Mr Speaker]

For the avoidance of doubt, if the hon. Gentleman could just say the words that he seeks leave to withdraw the amendment.

[Rory Stewart]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 2

Reform of System for Redress of individual Grievances

[Anna Soubry]

I beg to move amendment 1, page 6, line 28, after “may”, insert “, on an application to the Ombudsman by a person within subsection (1A),”

This amendment clarifies the provision made in new section 340H(1) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (inserted by clause 2 of the Bill) about the making of applications to the Service Complaints Ombudsman. See also amendment 5.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Soubry]

If somebody says that there has been undue delay, but the commissioner finds that there has not, she can certainly say so, though at that stage, of course, she would not be looking at the merits of the case. If somebody makes a complaint and goes through the system, and there is no finding in their favour, and then says, “I will now go to the ombudsman on the question of the merits of the case”, it is absolutely the ombudsman’s role to look at whether there is any merit to the case. If she thinks that there is no merit to it, she will not flinch from saying so. I hope that satisfies my hon. Friend.

It is now possible to apply to the ombudsman alleging undue delay when a complaint in the internal system has not been concluded, or indeed when a complaint has not even been made, so it is important that the Bill sets out for the avoidance of doubt what is meant by the internal process having been completed. That is effected by putting the phrase “finally determined” in proposed new section 340H(1); an explanation of the term is provided in proposed new subsection (5). Several hon. Members raised that issue with me before the debate in private—I mean nothing untoward by that. I want to make it clear for the Hansard record that the phrase “finally determined” does not in any way preclude the ombudsman’s looking into the merits or maladministration of a complaint. It is simply there to make it clear that she can do that only once consideration of the complaint by the services through the internal system has been completed, and only when the applicant has asked the ombudsman to investigate in accordance with the requirements of the Bill. The phrase brings clarity.

It remains important for the ombudsman to have a reasonably clear idea of what the applicant wants them to look into, and for investigations to remain focused and proportionate. One of the amendments would insert a new subsection (4)(b) in section 340H, requiring the applicant to specify which type or types of investigation the complainant wants the ombudsman to carry out. This is not an onerous obligation, and it will help to focus the efforts of the ombudsman on what is most important to the applicant. That is connected with the amendment that would insert new subsection (1)(b) in new section 340I, giving the ombudsman the discretion to decide whether to investigate the whole service complaint or allegation, or just part of it.

New section 340H also reflects the change to the ombudsman’s ability to report on any maladministration identified during an investigation of a complainant’s allegation of maladministration. We want the ombudsman to be free to report on any other aspect of mishandling that she may come across, and have amended the Bill accordingly to make this clear throughout the relevant provisions. Our changes provide an essential clarification to the amendments agreed in Committee; those amendments would have required the ombudsman to look for any maladministration in every investigation, whether or not it had been alleged by the complainant. The amendment that we propose to new section 340H(6) clarifies the scope of this new aspect of the ombudsman’s investigative power.

It is equally important for everyone that it is clear what the ombudsman can do on completing an investigation. Her ability to produce a report with findings and recommendations is fundamental to the view that many will rightly have about whether this new role really does have teeth. The Government amendments will also fill a gap that was left when amendments were made in Committee. We would amend new section 340L to make it clear that the ombudsman must, after carrying out an investigation, prepare a report setting out her findings and recommendations. After an investigation of a service complaint, the ombudsman will need to issue findings stating whether the complaint was well founded, and will need to make any recommendations to ensure appropriate redress. The Defence Council retains responsibility for responding to those findings and recommendations, in accordance with new section 340M. The Government amendments also clarify that the ombudsman must set out any recommendations as a result of a finding of maladministration or undue delay.

This group of amendments is a relatively large one, but it is necessary to ensure that the provisions of the Bill are clear. The amendments also ensure that the drafting is coherent and complete, while giving full effect to the amendments agreed to in Committee, which had cross-party support. In a couple of important respects, which I have outlined, they also improve the amendments which were agreed to in Committee.

We could have been, shall I say, a little bit naughty. When we saw what had been voted for, we could have left it there, knowing that it did not do the job that we knew the Committee wanted it to do. We accordingly went to our draftsmen and draftswomen and we have made sure that the spirit of the Committee is now being put into law.

[Rory Stewart]

Without being too pedantic or too pompous at this point, there is an important procedural point here when we discuss being naughty or otherwise. There is an important conceptual element in setting up an ombudsman, which is showing respect to Parliament, respect to the Committee system—respect to both the Bill Committee and the Select Committee. Rather than getting into the ins and outs of politics, I encourage the Minister to see this as a great success and a great model for the way such things can go forward in the future.

[Anna Soubry]

I think the hon. Gentleman misunderstands me. We could have played politics, but I absolutely was not going to do that. My officials would not dream of such a thing, of course, but we could have done that because the amendments were not clear. I took the firm view that it was clear what the Committee wanted and that we should do everything we could to put it into effect. There was a good argument for waiting until the next armed forces Bill, but I took the view that that would not be right. It was clear what the Defence Committee wanted and what the Public Bill Committee wanted. That is why the Government have tabled the amendments. We know that that is, in effect, the will of the legislature. I am pleased to see my hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart) nodding.

The amendments will give us a Bill and a process that will help our people understand when they can approach the ombudsman, on what matters and at what stage of the process, and they will give the ombudsman the teeth needed to hold the services and the MOD to account. I therefore commend amendments 1 to 21 to the House.

Defence and Security Review (NATO)

Rory Stewart Excerpts

Monday 2nd March 2015 Commons Chamber

[Rory Stewart (Penrith and The Border) (Con)]

I should like to begin by talking about the House of Commons Defence Committee’s report. The key element in the report, and in what I hope will be my relatively brief remarks, is that Russia poses a significant and substantial threat to Europe. That argument has been made in great detail by the Defence Committee and, in the months since the report was published, it has become increasingly evident that it is correct.

I remind the House that, while we were working on the report, we had a statement from the Foreign Secretary that he had been assured by Lavrov that Russia would not invade Crimea. Four days later, Russia invaded Crimea. We then heard a number of specialists and analysts say that Russia would not go into eastern Ukraine, but it then did so. We also heard people say, after the Malaysian airliner was shot down, that that would be the moment at which Russia would back off because it was embarrassed by what it had done. Russia did not back off. People then made it clear that Russia would not extend its activities to Mariupol or Odessa, but as we can now see, separatists with Russian support are moving towards those two cities.

What does this mean for the United Kingdom, the Ministry of Defence, NATO and defence spending? The House of Commons Defence Committee’s report focuses on two things: the conventional threat posed by Russia, and the threat that we describe as next generation warfare, ambiguous warfare or the asymmetric threat posed by Russia. Although those two things are related, it is worth analysing them separately.

On the conventional threat posed by Russia, the report argues that, through its Zapad exercise in 2013, Russia showed its ability to deploy almost 70,000 troops at 72 hours’ notice. The current estimate is that it would take NATO almost six months to deploy that number of troops. Russia has also displayed its ability to fly nuclear bombers to Venezuela and to exercise for a full amphibious assault on a Baltic state. It has upgraded its nuclear arsenal and it is committed to spending $100 billion a year on defence. All of that is taking place in the context of a decline in NATO defence spending.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I thank the Chairman of the Committee for giving way so early in his speech. One of the reasons that he has had to consider only two aspects—namely, conventional and unconventional warfare—is that our strategic nuclear deterrent is still in place, and if either the Opposition or the Conservative party has anything to do with it, that will remain the case. Does my hon. Friend agree that it would be madness to think about disposing of our deterrent and ending our continuous at-sea deterrence? Is it not strange that there is not a single Member present who represents the party that proposes that we should abandon that continuous at-sea deterrence—namely, the Liberal Democrat party? [Interruption.] Oh, the hon. Member for Colchester (Sir Bob Russell) has just appeared. I hope that he disagrees with his party on that matter.

[Rory Stewart]

That is an invitation to go into exactly this theme: in terms of responses to the Russian conventional threat, we have planned, for 20 years, for fighting enemies in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan. We have planned on the basis of such expeditionary warfare. The planning assumptions at the base of Future Force 2020 or the strategic defence and security review were about being able to put 6,600 people—or 10,000, in the past—into the field and maintain them there for enduring stability operations. We have not really thought about taking on an enemy such as Russia. In the national security strategy, the threat of what we have seen done by Russia was marked down as a tier 3 or bottom-level probability.

That means a lot of things: it has implications, of course, for nuclear weapons; it has implications for many capacities that we have got rid of in Britain over the past 20 years, such as our ability to exercise at scale —in the mid-1980s we used to be able to exercise with 130,000 or 140,000 people, whereas last year we were exercising with about 6,600 people, at a time when Russia was exercising with about 70,000; it has meant that we got rid of our significant capacity in wide-water crossing—that is engineering; it has meant a reduction in armour, because we did not expect to be fighting tank battles; and, more relevantly to the question posed by my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), it has also meant that we need to think much more seriously about ballistic missile defence, and about chemical, biological and radiological and nuclear.

[Mr John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

I accept my hon. Friend’s Committee’s recommendation that as a minimum we have to spend 2% of GDP, but even at that level how many of these missing things could we put back into our capabilities?

[Rory Stewart]

That is a very good question, which I hope to be able to deal with towards the end of my speech. The assumption of spending 2% of GDP on defence, which is essential because we organised an entire NATO summit around the idea of doing that, is of course the hope that as the economy grows, defence spending will grow and we can make the necessary five-year planning, which will return confidence to the armed forces and allow us to make some of these investments. The question is a good one, because we would still face significant constraints in relation to Trident and to operating our aircraft carrier. If we wanted to make significant investments in restoring armour capacity, even 2% of GDP would be pushing it.

[Mr Jim Cunningham (Coventry South) (Lab)]

I apologise for coming in late. About 30 years ago, when Denis Healey, as Defence Secretary, looked down the road at the defence needs, he said that modern warfare for the future would rely more on conventional weapons than nuclear weapons and that sort of thing. On the hon. Gentleman’s other point, although we may not have planned for any war with Russia, I imagine the United States has, because it plays “war games”, for want of a better term, and examines various scenarios. What does he think about that? Does he know anything about that?

[Rory Stewart]

The hon. Gentleman rightly says that we have not been focused on Russia, and the United States certainly has more capacity, but it is striking that even the US significantly reduced its capacity to deal with an adversary such as Russia. There has been a lot of criticism within the entire Pentagon administration about the focus on counter-insurgency warfare, and a man called Colonel Gentile ran a huge campaign to try to get the US to focus more on conventional threats. Britain has got rid of a lot of our Russian analysis capacity. One thing my Committee’s report pointed out is that we got rid of the Advanced Research and Assessment Group, which did the basic Russian analysis, we sacked our Ukraine desk officer and the defence intelligence service reduced its Russian analysis. The same has been happening in the United States, although it is now building this capacity up rapidly, but when we go to Supreme Allied Commander Europe and look at the American capacity, we see that that Russian capacity is being built up from a very low base again, which is troubling.

I do not wish to speak for too long, because I know many Members wish to contribute, so let me return to the basic framework of my argument: conventional; unconventional; and what we should be doing. I have set out the conventional, so what should Britain be doing? The Committee believes we should be looking to exercise at a larger level, so we should begin to return to some of the kinds of exercises we did in previous eras, which involve exercising at least at a divisional level. Encouragingly, NATO is beginning to look at an exercise at a level of 35,000 people—we would like to see more of that, and we would like politicians and policy makers to be involved in that. We would like to see all-armed exercises. We are going to be looking closely at Norway 2018, which seems to be a big opportunity to do this.

We have to look carefully at this very high readiness taskforce. One thing the Committee recommended was the setting up of a deployable force under SACEUR like the allied rapid reaction corps, which could go out and respond rapidly within 72 hours to a Russian threat. It was a very good sign at the Wales summit that that commitment was made, but the details need to be improved dramatically. The framework nations are struggling to provide 5,000 people and they need to produce one brigade standing up, one currently in exercise and one standing down. We have not yet seen what is happening with the enablers. We need to see whether they will be able to move forward with ISTAR––intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance—and whether they are going to have the cyber-capacity connected. Here is another question, perhaps for the Minister: France has committed as a framework nation, but are we certain that it is committing its troops uniquely to SACEUR or are we in danger of a situation in which people are double-hatting? In other words, are the French retaining the ability to deploy their brigade to Africa when it suits them, so that this very high readiness taskforce will then be a second-order call?

But it is on asymmetric warfare that we need to focus most of all, because although Russian tanks crossing the border into Estonia would be a high-impact event, we estimate at the moment that it is a low-probability event. It is not one we should ignore, because of course were Putin to do it, we really would not know what to do. Were Putin to roll tanks across and take over even a mile or two of Estonia, NATO would be in a very serious problem. As the Swedish general Neretnieks has pointed out, it would be very difficult—it would require very considerable political will—to get Russia out of that situation. But the most likely move is asymmetric warfare first.

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

On that point about capacity, it is interesting to note that in 1989 there were 5,000 US battle tanks stationed in Europe, whereas now there are 29. The capacity is not there, even if we look just at what the Americans are providing, never mind our failure to provide.

[Rory Stewart]

That is a significant point. It is true that, ultimately, the theoretical NATO capacity dwarfs that of Russia, but a lot of this stuff is extremely difficult to deploy; many nations are very reluctant to pay the money required to exercise; a lot of this money is absorbed in pension schemes; and our problem is that we are defending an enormous, multi-thousand-mile border, where Russia could, should it wish, cause trouble all the way from the Baltic to the Caucasus. We have to deal with that entire area, which may be very difficult to do, even with the 3.3 million troops we currently have in NATO.

[Mike Gapes (Ilford South) (Lab/Co-op)]

The hon. Gentleman referred to Estonia. Clearly, under article 5 of the NATO treaty all the other 27 member states would have an obligation to respond to an armed attack on Estonia, but there is a level of ambiguity, given the hybrid warfare that the Russians are engaged in and have been engaged in—cyber-attacks and others. Given that Putin does not necessarily wish to invoke a major military conflict, how does NATO deal with those hybrid attacks?

[Rory Stewart]

The hybrid attacks are exactly what I was getting on to: the asymmetric and next-generation warfare attacks. As the Labour former Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee has just pointed out, the conventional attack is a low-probability, high-impact event. Much more probable is this asymmetric, hybrid warfare. In other words, we are more likely to find cyber-attacks of the kind we saw in Estonia in 2007, and separatists popping up claiming that they are being abused or that minority rights are being abused in places such as Narva, in eastern Estonia. As we saw, 45% of the Russian population of Latvia supported the Russian occupation of Crimea in a survey at that time. So what are we supposed to do? The answer is: it is really difficult and we absolutely need to raise our game in three areas. As has been indicated, those are cyber, information warfare and special forces operations.

[John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Lab/Co-op)]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way. The Defence Committee, which completed its report on deterrence just before he assumed the Chair, made it clear that in the event of a cyber attack we should be prepared to say to a potential adversary such as Russia, “We will not necessarily wait for 100% proof before we enact counter-measures.” We should do that despite the fact that it might have tried to create some uncertainty and ambiguity over the exact emanation of such an attack.

[Rory Stewart]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to raise that point about cyber-attacks. Crucially, very few of us in this House—I certainly include myself in this—understand cyber in detail. We are taking it on faith that we are developing a significant cyber-capacity. It is extremely difficult for us to be confident about what we are doing in this regard. I have two questions on cyber that I would like to put to the Minister. One is to do with NATO’s cyber-capacity. The members of the Committee visited the cyber-centre in Estonia and discovered that there were only two UK personnel posted to that site. It was very difficult to be confident about what deterrent effect that kind of cyber would involve.

My second question is to do with doctrine. Are we prepared to threaten a cyber response as a way of deterring a Russian cyber-attack? In other words, if Russia were to mount a cyber-attack against a NATO member state, would we respond with a cyber-attack in kind?

[Sir Gerald Howarth (Aldershot) (Con)]

I agree with everything my hon. Friend has said, particularly with regard to the importance of cyber. He will remember that in the SDSR 2010 one of the Secretary of State’s “up arrows”—areas in which we need to invest—was cyber-security, where we set aside £650 million over four years. Part of that was cyber-attack.

[Rory Stewart]

That is very important. The thing about cyber-defence that is difficult for us as a Committee to deal with—given that when we look at cyber we are often told that much of it is the job of the Intelligence and Security Committee—is just how good it is. Clearly, the Government have committed a lot of money to it, but at the same time, many Members come to us having spoken to the Ministry of Defence which is concerned about our cyber-capacity, and are not confident that we have really got to where we want to be or that we fully understand what the technology is.

The second issue is around information operations. It is very clear that the basic problem for Russian minorities in the Baltic states is the fact that they watch Moscow television. We need to ensure that we have the ability to project television into the Baltic states in the Russian language that is entertaining and engaging, that the minorities in those areas are prepared to watch, and that counters propaganda not with propaganda but with the truth. Such broadcasts must provide an objective, truthful and honest conversation about what is going on in the world and, above all, that is able to draw attention to the things that Putin is doing. That means that centrally we must invest in the BBC World Service. We spend a lot of time talking about this, about Russian-language television, but the reality is that we have yet to see the evidence from this Government, or from the United States, that the real investment is being made to create a genuinely watchable, attractive Russian language service that could be watched by Russian minorities around the edge of NATO.

The final and most difficult thing is dealing with special forces, insurgents, “little green men” and exactly the kinds of events that we saw in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. The reason that that is the most difficult of all is that it is a challenge of understanding not only for us and the Ministry of Defence, but also for the Foreign Office and the intelligence agencies. If Putin does something, the first question will be one of interpretation or understanding. He will operate under the thresholds. As the hon. Member for Ilford South (Mike Gapes), who was the Labour Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, pointed out, Putin will not initially do something that crosses the article 5 threshold. Let me provide a couple of examples to illustrate the threats. If, for example, the Polish electricity infrastructure were to go down, there might be an immediate claim that it had been taken down by a Russian cyber-attack. Britain would need very rapidly to be in a position to know whether that was in fact the case and to determine how to respond. In order to do that, we would need to have what we currently do not have—namely, the people on the ground in Poland with the necessary relationship with the Polish electricity Minister to get to the bottom of the matter very quickly and to pass the information through to us. We lack intelligence and information at every level from the strategic political level all the way down to the ISTAR level of watching Russian kit moving around.

[Mr Brooks Newmark (Braintree) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is quite rightly focusing on the clear and present threat of Russia, but when looking at asymmetrical war, we should also be looking at the threats from the middle east and considering how to deal with those challenges. There are also cyber-threats from China and North Korea. We should be cognisant not just of the Russian threat but of other areas of the world that pose a direct threat to the UK.

[Rory Stewart]

That provides me with a good way to drive towards a conclusion. As my hon. Friend has just pointed out, the kind of threats that Russia or Putin can bring will be very unpredictable. I will be humiliated by what Putin does over the next five to 10 years. It is very difficult to guess what he will do next. What is clear about Putin is that he has been thinking very hard, since at least 2008, about how to unsettle or unbalance NATO. He will be pulling levers and pushing buttons that we cannot yet anticipate.

I imagine that he will be tempted to do things in relation to Iran—perhaps in relation to the Iranian nuclear negotiations. We have already seen Putin’s very direct contribution to the civil war in Syria through the protection of Bashar al-Assad. We can see his control over the gas supplies in Bulgaria. It is not very difficult for us to imagine how he could cause trouble in Narva, or how he could put a few Spetsnaz troops in a forest in Latvia, just sit them there and wait to see what we do. If we are dealing with threats along that arc, we need to change the way we think in the Ministry of Defence. We cannot rest in the comfortable world we have been in for the past 20 years—imagining that we will have a neat deployment of 6,600 soldiers on an expeditionary warfare campaign, that they will stay there for five to 10 years doing stabilisation operations and then come home. We will have to respond to very nuanced, ambiguous and unpredictable attacks all the way along an arc between the Baltic and, potentially, Iran. In order to do that, we need to invest very heavily in Russian language expertise, defence engagement, and defence attachés in all those countries. The United States currently has three defence attachés in each Baltic state; we have one defence attaché covering three Baltic states. That is not enough.

The Ministry of Defence would not be able tell us whether the defences in Mariupol were adequate to deal with a Russian advance because the defence attaché currently in Kiev is not permitted to travel up to the front line. We need to invest in defence intelligence staff in the Foreign Office. To do that—this is what I will conclude on—we must make this investment of 2% of GDP in defence. We need to do that for many, many reasons.

[Sir Bob Russell (Colchester) (LD)]

I do not want the Chair of the Select Committee to ignore one part of the world. With regard to all the countries that he has mentioned we can act as part of the NATO family, but what about the Falklands? He will be aware that Argentina has not given up its ambitions, but who will support us down in the South Atlantic?

[Rory Stewart]

That is a very significant question. It is definitely worth thinking about in the next SDSR. As the hon. Gentleman points out, many of our assumptions are based on the fact that we will operate with the US coalition, but in relation to the Falklands we cannot be so confident that that will happen.

[Crispin Blunt (Reigate) (Con)]

The figure of 2% is just a number that has been dragged out of the air, but it happens to be the level of our defence expenditure—about 2.07% of GDP. The conclusions of the summit in Wales seemed remarkably similar to the British posture of what NATO’s targets should be. The fact is that Russia has taken a disappointing divergence from the path that we had hoped it was on after the end of the Soviet Union. That is now beyond contradiction, and we are back to where we were in 1977. Regrettably, we should now be preparing for conflict, and 2% does not cut it.

[Rory Stewart]

I am very supportive of the idea that we should be spending even more.

[Mr Andrew Robathan (South Leicestershire) (Con)]

So am I, if I may say so. My hon. Friend is giving an excellent analysis of the situation. At the NATO summit, Britain was at the forefront of demanding that all NATO countries use 2% of GDP for defence spending. I absolutely support the Prime Minister on this. We want to spend 2% of GDP. Personally, I would rather go further and spend more.

[Rory Stewart]

To come to a conclusion, I am giving the four reasons why we need to spend 2%. The first, which has just been pointed out by the former Defence Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for South Leicestershire (Mr Robathan), is UK credibility. The UK led the push for 2% at the Wales summit only six months ago. We stood alongside the United States and went around every other country at the summit saying, “If you’re going be serious, you have to commit 2%.” We emphasised again and again that we were spending 2% of our GDP on defence and that they should spend 2% of their GDP on defence. That was very important in getting a range of countries to commit to spending 2% of GDP on defence over the next five to 10 years. The first reason why we must do it is simply out of a sense of shame. The honour and credibility of the United Kingdom are bound up in this.

[Richard Drax (South Dorset) (Con)]

The Chairman of the Select Committee is giving a fantastic analysis of the situation. May I add my concern that 2% simply is not enough for the commitments that we will inevitably have? Our forebears fought and died for freedom and democracy. What concerns me even more is that some people do not seem to appreciate that it takes years to get ships and aircraft carriers, and to get groups and battalions reformed and retrained. Once they are gone, if we are called to action we simply will not have the manpower to deal with it.

[Rory Stewart]

That is the second point that I was coming to. The second reason why we have to spend 2% of GDP or more on defence is that we have concrete tasks that we need to perform. There are some real requirements if we are to deal with the new threat. The problem with the threat assessments since the end of the cold war is that they have been done in a vacuum. Now that we can see a threat in the form of Putin, we realise that there are considerable capacities that we need to rebuild. Those capacities cost money, so we need to invest in them.

The third reason is that deterrence is about psychology. Deterrence is about will-power and confidence; it is not just about kit. The 2% is about what Putin thinks of us; it is about whether he thinks that we are serious. Often, we think that the way to deal with a Russian conventional threat is with a conventional response, and that the way to deal with a Russian unconventional threat is with an unconventional response. Of course, the Russians, particularly Gerasimov, the chief of staff, use the phrase “asymmetric warfare”, which means that they understand very well that often one should deal with a conventional threat with an unconventional response and vice versa. One of the best ways of deterring Putin from mucking around either conventionally or unconventionally is to let him see the confidence of that NATO commitment towards 2% of GDP. As he begins to see the exercises, the spending and the increasing confidence of our armed forces, that will act as the deterrent.

That brings me to my last argument for why spending 2% of GDP on defence is central: it will provide a fantastic framework of planning for our armed forces for the next five years. The fundamental problem in defence and foreign affairs is, of course, that the electoral cycles and financial cuts of modern democracies simply do not operate in sync with the realities of the world and its crises.

[John Glen (Salisbury) (Con)]

Is it not also the case that the rigour of the SDSR process needs to do justice to the nature of the threats we face? It should not be an argument about 2% or bust; it should be about correctly assessing the world as it exists today and as it will exist and ensuring that we have the capabilities to meet the threats that will exist over the next 10 years.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rory Stewart]

The process will be led—must be led—by the SDSR. The entire problem that we face starts with the fact that the SDSR put the Russian threat down at tier 3. It will be impossible in the system to argue for more defence spending unless the Foreign Office and the agencies agree with our assessment that Putin represents a significant threat. We must make that absolutely central to the entire debate in the House today to establish that we really believe in this threat and that it is not a joke threat; that this is not special pleading by the Ministry of Defence, nor an attempt to sneak resources in by the back door, but that what Putin has done since the moment he entered Crimea—in fact, probably since the moment he entered Georgia—is to demonstrate the reality that to hold the order of Europe, to maintain NATO and to deter future Russian expansion, we must have the credibility, the capacity and the confidence.

To come back to the final point, the 2% will allow us to step away from the political debates and say to the armed services, “Your budget is protected. You can plan over the next five years on the assumption that your budget will rise in real terms. If the economy rises by 3%, your budget will increase by £1 billion a year. You will be able to use that money to make the investments we need, whether in cyber, in ballistic missile defence, in CBRN or—as I have been trying to argue—“in the massive panoply of intelligence, defence engagement and assessment, which allows us to work out what is happening in the world.” It is that which will draw a new generation of soldiers and officers into the armed forces, because they will see that confidence. Above all, it is Russia and our adversaries who will see that confidence and who will see that, at a time when the world is becoming increasingly dangerous and unstable, our commitment to collective security is generous, clear and long term.

Oral Answers to Questions

Rory Stewart Excerpts

Monday 23rd February 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Francois]

My right hon. Friend is nothing if not a survivor, as have been his illustrious predecessors who have served in this House. With regard to his specific suggestion, he is one of a number of Members of Parliament who have made the suggestion to me recently. We have passed the proposal on to the Chief of the General Staff, who is now considering the issue, and we are awaiting the CGS’s comments. The idea might well have merit.

[Rory Stewart (Penrith and The Border) (Con)]

Following on from the comment made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Mid Sussex (Sir Nicholas Soames), will the Minister specifically consider the notion of a Sikh company within the reserves as a starting point? There seems to be much more possibility within the reserves to begin what seems like an excellent idea.

[Mr Francois]

I thank the Chairman of the Select Committee for his additional suggestion. I said earlier that the idea might have merit, and we are considering as one specific option the possibility of a reserve company that would inherit many of the proud traditions of Sikh regiments in the British Army going back many years. My hon. Friend the Minister responsible for the reserves is leading on that aspect and he, too, remains in contact with the CGS on the matter.

Armed Forces (Service Complaints and Financial Assistance) Bill

Rory Stewart Excerpts

Monday 2nd February 2015 Commons Chamber

[Anna Soubry]

I disagree with my right hon. Friend’s interpretation of Dr Atkins’s views. Obviously, I have seen the Select Committee’s excellent report. I may be wrong—I am quite happy to be corrected if I am—but I do not think she said that we should go as far as thematic reviews.

[Rory Stewart (Penrith and The Border) (Con)]

As a point of information, I spoke to Dr Susan Atkins this morning and she was very clear that she believes that thematic reviews should be conducted.

[Anna Soubry]

So that is her view now. With great respect to Dr Atkins, I do not agree with her and I will—

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

All I will say to the hon. Gentleman is that he should read the report of the debate we had when the Service Complaints Commissioner was introduced, because this is not about interfering in the chain of command. The present commissioner has done a very good job of highlighting the delays in the processes, particularly in the Army. Anyone who deals with complaints, whether in industry, local government or anywhere else, knows that it is better to resolve a matter quickly, rather than leaving it for a long period. The present commissioner has certainly been highly critical. When we look at some of the cases set out in the last report, we have to ask ourselves why on earth they took so long. They could have been resolved quite quickly, which would have not only improved the Army’s reputation for dealing with such matters but given the complainants satisfaction.

[Rory Stewart]

To address the comment made by my hon. Friend the Member for South Dorset (Richard Drax), and also the public, who are not necessarily focused on the details, perhaps it is worth clarifying that military discipline is exempt from the things that the Service Complaints Commissioner looks at. In other words, the commissioner is not set up to deal with questions of military discipline, which remain exempt. That is quite important for the operation of this law.

[Mr Jones]

I agree with the hon. Gentleman. Certainly, the armed forces Act—I cannot remember which one, having dealt with so many over the years—helped by streamlining the three service Acts, because there had previously been a lot of inconsistency across the three services. I think things are now much clearer, especially as we now have joint operations, so the equal and correct interpretation of military law, rather than the silo system we had previously, with three different service Acts, has helped.

Ultimately, we are asking servicemen and women to do very dangerous things on our behalf—I am not suggesting for one minute that the Service Complaints Commissioner should be on the front line telling generals what they should and should not do—but that does not mean that the general things that we and the current service chiefs certainly accept should be best practice in the three services should not be scrutinised and that there should not be support for individuals who find that the high standards that we all expect are not being met.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr James Arbuthnot (North East Hampshire) (Con)]

This is probably the last defence debate in which I shall speak.

It is good that the subject is the introduction of a service complaints ombudsman, because the Defence Committee has been making points about that issue steadily since before I became a member in 2005. As far as I know, the only person who has been a member of the Committee since the beginning of the campaign for the establishment of a Service Complaints Commissioner —which was followed by the campaign for the appointment of an ombudsman—is the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney (Mr Havard), who, like me, will stand down as a Member of Parliament in a couple of months. He will leave a gaping hole in the Defence Committee and in the defence community, and I pay tribute to him.

I also pay tribute to the rest of the Committee, and to the amazingly dedicated and talented staff and advisers who support it. Under the chairmanship of my hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart)—and I must say that I am delighted with my successor—it has continued to pursue the matter of the need for an ombudsman, and has produced a most thought-provoking and useful report on the Bill.

I agree with some of the Committee’s recommendations. I listened to the passionate and thorough argument advanced by my hon. Friend the Minister about the ombudsman’s ability to investigate thematic issues, and, on balance, I think that I still disagree with her, although she slightly destabilised my views. I think that she is wrong to rely too much on the idea that the ombudsman would be doing someone else’s job. Given all her expertise and access, the ombudsman might be able to add something helpful by producing a report. From time to time, such a report might be a cause of some discomfort in the Ministry of Defence, but an ombudsman is not there to be comfortable; an ombudsman is there to right injustice, and to be a catalyst for improvement.

However, I am not sure that I agree with all the Committee’s recommendations. I say that with complete diffidence, not having sat in on its evidence sessions. I do not entirely share its view that the ombudsman’s recommendations should be binding on the Defence Council. That position would differ from the position relating to the local government ombudsman, in an area that is even more sensitive because of concerns about the chain of command. On the whole, I agree with the Service Complaints Commissioner, who says that the Bill contains several “reasonable compromises”.

The big picture, I think, is this. For more than a decade, the Defence Committee has been pressing for the replacement of the commissioner by an ombudsman, and, over time, it has won both the argument and the battle. I congratulate it on that, but I also congratulate Ministers on listening to the Committee. I especially congratulate my hon. Friend the Minister. Last year, she took the unusual step of delaying the appointment of a successor to the excellent Dr Atkins, because, among other things, she wanted to be sure that we were all getting the right person. She and other Ministers have taken the matter truly seriously. They have taken the Defence Committee seriously, and they have overcome resistance in the chain of command.

Talking of the chain of command, I well remember Dr Atkins telling the Committee:

“Some of the Service Chiefs said they didn’t quite understand what an ombudsman did, but they were sure they didn’t want one.”

It was because of the quality of Dr Atkins’s work that she was able to persuade the service chiefs that an ombudsman would in the long run be beneficial. All I can say about her replacement, whom I have not met, is that they have my sympathy because Dr Atkins will be a hard act to follow.

[Rory Stewart]

On a point of clarification, the courts have ruled that the findings of the ombudsman in a case of maladministration and particular injustice will be binding on the Defence Council. The disagreement is simply about whether that should be in the Bill. I am interested in whether my right hon. Friend is opposed to the idea that the findings be binding, or should that be in the Bill?

[Mr Arbuthnot]

I spoke earlier of my diffidence. I think I should move into full retreat and just carry on with my speech because my hon. Friend already knows far more about that than I do, and I pay tribute to him again.

I want to change the subject slightly. I have only a page and a half left of my notes. I hope that I can have a little indulgence. Dr Susan Atkins stood up for the men and women of our armed forces as they came under real strain. They have fought overseas, in conflicts not really understood or supported by their countrymen back home, when warfare is changing, technology is evolving, stability is crumbling and new threats are arising on a monthly basis. Against that background, at the NATO summit, which the UK hosted, we set out to persuade other European countries of the imperative of doing what NATO agreed only in 2006—that each country should spend at least 2% of its GDP on defence. How right we were to argue that. How important it is that, as the world becomes less safe, we do what we can to increase our security and reduce our reliance on others, particularly the United States. So it comes as a real shock that this country appears to be drifting towards an election with not one single party committed to spending 2% of GDP on defence. As the economy recovers, defence must share in that recovery.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rory Stewart (Penrith and The Border) (Con)]

I will try to speak quite briefly. I pay a huge tribute to everyone involved for the way that this debate has been conducted. There has been a very good debate in the House of Lords, some very serious work by the Defence Committee since 2005 and the contribution of my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot). In particular, I wish to pay tribute to the hon. Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon) who has put an enormous amount of energy, thought and focus into getting these very specific amendments in place.

Broadly speaking, the Defence Committee is very positively disposed towards the Bill, as it reflects its work since 2005 and is a huge improvement even on where we were in 2008. The commissioner has gone from being a three-day-a-week job to a full-time job, and gone from having nine staff to 20 staff. The scope and the powers of the ombudsman will be massively expanded, and all of that is good. However, there is a “but”, and it is that “but” on which we want to focus for a brief moment.

We are not, I hope, being pedantic. It is an important point because this is an unbelievably complex area of legislation. It is easy for people to turn up and try to suggest that the way that the armed forces are treated should be the same as the way that civilians are treated. Clearly, the contexts are completely different. Military discipline is very different from civilian discipline. Many of the criminal Acts that apply to military personnel simply do not apply to civilian personnel. Military personnel live under completely different conditions from civilian personnel in terms of their housing, health, non-union status, 24/7 jobs, and risk to life and limb, all of which put an incredible onus on the Defence Committee and on the Government to get this kind of ombudsman right.

The problems that we have had from the start of this debate are twofold. First, there has been a very strong degree of abstraction. Understandably, people have been very reluctant to talk about concrete examples. When taking testimony in the Defence Committee, it was very striking that almost nobody mentioned the Deepcut case. Much of the conversation around this matter is taking place in a vacuum without people using individual examples. The second problem has been a very comfortable consensus. We have a strange situation in which, when we were taking testimony, there was very little push-back from the chain of command and from Ministers, but now we find that the Committee’s recommendations are not being accepted, and we have no clear sense of why that is. The oddity is that there is a basic disagreement between liberty and the chain of command, but that disagreement is not really brought out in public, which is another reason why this Chamber seems to be so empty.

When we have private conversations with people, we realise that the disagreement is really profound. In a private conversation, some human rights lawyers will say that they disapprove of the entire military system and that things that can happen to military personnel would not be acceptable for civilian personnel. Equally, outside this Chamber in private conversations, we might hear retired generals in the House of Lords rejecting the idea of the ombudsman completely. Curiously, in the case of the Committee testimony, there was very much a push towards consensus that papered over some fundamental principled disagreements.

The five principles that the Committee focused on are: independence, flexibility, the scope of the ombudsman, the power of the ombudsman and the transparency of the ombudsman’s findings. On independence, the Defence Committee suggested that nobody who had been a member of the armed forces within the previous five years would be suitable for appointment; that the term of appointment should be between five and seven years, as three years was too short for someone to get their feet under the desk and really understand the job; and that the job should not be liable for reappointment. That is standard practice for such a role around the world. If somebody is up for reappointment, the tendency would be for them to pull their punches in order to get their job back.

On flexibility, we put a big focus on ensuring that there was more flexibility around timelines and procedural control. On scope, we pushed to ensure that any maladministration, the substance of the complaint and thematic issues could be addressed. Power has been another important point. What is going to be the power and how binding will those recommendations be? We went back and forth on that matter with my distinguished predecessor, my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire. Finally, there is the issue of transparency, confidentiality and whether or not the Government can use national security to make the findings of the ombudsman confidential.

The odd position that the Defence Committee finds itself in is that the Government have said to us that, basically, they agree with almost everything that we say. In line after line in response to our recommendations, the Ministry of Defence comes back and says, “We agree, we agree, we agree, but we do not believe that this should be in the Bill.” Looking through the eight amendments proposed by the Defence Committee, there seems to be only one with which the Government have any in-principle disagreement, and that is on the question of thematic investigation. Government seem to be comfortable with the other seven.

Why is it then that the Government seem to agree with seven out of eight recommendations, but are not prepared to put them in the Bill? The answer appears to be that the Government believe that putting these things in the Bill would be over-prescriptive. Indeed the Government are attempting to elevate to a grand point of principle the idea that legislation should not be over-prescriptive. The Defence Committee respectfully argues back that those grand points of principle about what should or should not be prescriptive in legislation are marginal, if not irrelevant, to the specific Bill under consideration. One role on which we should be explicit is that of an ombudsman. The Government should put in the Bill the basic terms of independence.

There is no time here to go through every one of those eight recommendations, but let us take as an example the question of independence. The Defence Committee has stipulated that we believe that the person should be appointed on a non-renewable term for five to seven years, and that they should not have served in the armed forces in the previous five years. The Government accept those recommendations but will not put them in the Bill. Why not? Apparently, because they think it would be over-prescriptive to do so. However, this should be an easy concession for the Government to make. To have the point clearly stated would reassure the public and reinforce the credibility and independence of the ombudsman. In fact, not putting it in the Bill seems to be based on a very abstract and theoretical notion.

Our eight recommendations should be taken seriously because, bluntly, the Defence Committee is an elected Committee of the House of Commons. It is disappointing that, out of eight recommendations made by the Committee, the Government have inserted in the Bill not seven or five of them but none. No amendments went through in the House of Lords and no amendments appear to be proposed at this stage. Given that we are moving into a world where we have elected Committees, where we want these Committees to play a more active role and where every member of those Committees is elected, we would expect the Government to respond, at least in part, to the Committee’s recommendations, if for no other reason—this relates to the Geneva processes on the setting up of an ombudsman—than that we should follow the proper process of inclusion of stakeholders. The first Geneva principle is the inclusion of Parliament in this process. Even if the Government seem to have deep theoretical objections to the independence of the ombudsman, we believe that in this case, purely for procedural reasons, they should listen to the Defence Committee.

In conclusion, Parliament has been deeply involved in setting the rules for the military from the very beginning. It tightened up the articles of war in the 1660s and again in the mid-18th century. It loosened those articles of war in 1776, and it did so again after the first world war and in the 1950s and 2006. That is exactly the sort of thing that Parliament should be doing.

To get this right—and this is a very good opportunity for Britain to do so—we must do it in a way that is honest to our history, confident about the conceptual disagreements, and clear and precise about resolving the reality of the military justice system with the concerns of the rights community. That sounds jargony, but what I mean is that we need to be really clear that the military is different from civilian institutions. Various military criminal offences—such as mutiny, desertion and conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline—do not exist in civilian life. At the same time, however, the right not to be bullied or harassed, as well as other rights, must be protected. Finally, if the Government can find a way of incorporating the Defence Committee’s recommendations, Britain has an opportunity to set a model for the world.

This has been a good process for the House of Lords and the Committee and because of the inclusion of Dr Susan Atkins. It has been a particularly good process because of the amount of energy the hon. Member for Bridgend has devoted to it from the beginning. Let us finish the process with as much positive spirit as we began it. I ask the Government to show some flexibility in their response to the independence, flexibility, scope, power and transparency of the ombudsman, as set out by the Defence Committee.

Trident Renewal

Rory Stewart Excerpts

Tuesday 20th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Godsiff]

The hon. Gentleman is knowledgeable about defence issues, but he will recognise that one of NATO’s founding beliefs was, and still is, that an attack on one is an attack on all. The view that the country could be subject to a nuclear attack without the response of the American nuclear umbrella is, in my opinion, inconceivable, and is completely contrary to what NATO is and why it has been successful.

[Rory Stewart (Penrith and The Border) (Con)]

Is there not a paradox? If we reduced the nuclear arsenals so that only the United States and NATO possessed one we would have the problem that an attack on one would be a response by one. The absence of diversity would make the NATO structure much less resilient.

[Mr Godsiff]

I have consistently said throughout this speech that I believe our security is based on our membership of NATO. I strongly support NATO and always have, and I strongly support the basis on which NATO was set up, which is that an attack on one is an attack on all. The idea that just because one country, America, which provides the nuclear umbrella, has far, far more nuclear capability than our 40 missiles or than the French nuclear capability—

[Rory Stewart]

I am trying to understand this more broadly, strategically speaking. Is this not in danger of being an argument simply that the whole of NATO should be freeloading on the United States?

--- Later in debate ---

[Rory Stewart]

The hon. Gentleman has spoken fluently about the kit, but I still do not understand the strategic vision. What threats does he think we face? Why does he think that the frigates are important and that nuclear weapons are not for deterring that threat? What kind of intent does he think Russia has? What kind of obligations does he believe we have for NATO, and why are nuclear weapons irrelevant to that obligation?

[Sir Nick Harvey]

The 2010 national security strategy identified the primary threats faced by the United Kingdom. Personally, I think it was correct in identifying the threat from international terrorism, cyber-attack, international crime, the security consequences of the sudden mass migrations of peoples, and pandemics as a result of climate change. All those are very real threats that we face, and they are probably greater than the threat we face from direct state-on-state warfare. We see every day that our armed forces—through, for example, the work they perform off the African coast countering piracy and in the Caribbean countering narcotics—are very flexible and capable of dealing with this wide and diverse range of threats. It is actually maintaining a broad spectrum of capabilities to deal with such diverse situations and the willingness to use them that secures us our place at the United Nations Security Council, not the fact that we happen to be a nuclear state. In any case, we can change the composition of the United Nations Security Council only by unanimity, and there is no reason why the UK should agree to give up its seat.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rory Stewart (Penrith and The Border) (Con)]

It is a great privilege to follow the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock), who gave an extremely eloquent, entertaining and serious speech.

I will try to speak briefly. The great challenge here is to try to work out, after nearly 60 or 70 years of this debate, what new there is to say. The huge ethical issues that have been raised by Opposition members and the huge strategic issues that have been raised on this side of the House have been gone through again and again.

The one thing we should perhaps say is that, at the beginning of the 21st century, certain kinds of argument should no longer be relevant. The first argument that I do not believe we should be having is fundamentally an argument about economics. This is a large question. As was pointed out by Opposition Members, it is a question of Armageddon. It is question of deep, deep strategy. This is the fifth-largest economy in the world and we should not be making the decision on whether to keep nuclear weapons on the basis of either the belief that we could save some money by cutting them or alternatively the belief that we should retain them in order to keep some jobs in a marginal constituency. It is much more important than that.

What can we say? The first thing that we notice is that the nature of deterrence and the threats that we face have changed. The threats that we are facing now, particularly posed by Russia in Ukraine, which has been raised again and again, are not exactly the same as the kind of threats raised by the Soviet Union. I say absolutely straight out that I will be voting in favour of the retention of the Trident nuclear deterrent. It is a very important thing for us to do. But I have enormous respect for the people on the Opposition Benches who have anxieties about it, and it is to them that I want to address a few short remarks.

The history of the last 30 years, unfortunately, has shown that the kind of arguments made by people in favour of nuclear disarmament were, in the end—although well intentioned and frequently led by impressive intellectuals, bishops and scholars—proved wrong. In the end, it turned out that the people who were characterised as Dr Strangelove—the people written off as irrational and macho—had a better understanding of the mentality of Stalin and a better idea of how to protect western Europe. They should be thanked for the work they did, which contributed in no small way to ensuring that, today, we have had 70 years of the greatest and most productive and prosperous period of peace in Europe conceivable. We should also thank the Labour party for its contribution to the setting up of NATO and the commitment it has made to the nuclear deterrent since the second world war. We should continue to work together on this.

But the threat that we now face is a different one. We do not know what Putin is doing and before we decide how to deter him, we need to work out what the threat is. Is he intending to use nuclear weapons? We have noticed, for example, that he has been investing heavily in his tactical nuclear arsenal. He has also committed a great deal of money towards modernising his nuclear arsenal. He has been running exercises recently, including the deployment of a nuclear bomber to Venezuela. At the same time, the activities in which he is engaged, and which have been laid out by his chief of staff Gerasimov, are all arranged around the idea of ambiguous warfare, almost at the very opposite end of the spectrum from nuclear war; the use of special forces, intelligence operatives and cyber-warfare to create a situation such as in Donetsk where he continues to be able to try to claim deniability while putting Russian special forces and Russian weapons in on the ground. The question for us in coming up with a deterrent is how we deal with that threat.

What does the United States do to protect NATO? What is the United Kingdom prepared to do to protect NATO? Listening to the debate, I am not clear—I would be interested to hear what the shadow Spokesman says on this—as to what Britain is proposing to do with our nuclear weapons if Russia were to attack a Baltic state. We knew what we were proposing to do in the 1980s. The basic concept of the tripwire was that we had forces on the ground and were the Soviet Union to attack those forces, nuclear weapons would be fired at Moscow. In this debate there now seems to be some ambiguity. Are British nuclear weapons used only to defend British soil, or would they be used to defend the Baltic?

[Paul Flynn]

Is not the question: what will America do if there is an attack on the Baltic states from Russia? Our involvement in this is peripheral. We do not provide a deterrent; America does. We are clinging to this virility symbol as a gesture of our old national pride when it is not relevant. The whole point of multilateral disarmament is to reduce the number of nations with nuclear weapons down to two. By possessing them we are encouraging other nations to acquire them.

[Rory Stewart]

The hon. Gentleman makes a very good point, but I think the fundamental nature of our disagreement is going to be about our whole relationship to the NATO structure and the kind of role we wish to play within it. Although the hon. Gentleman is speaking very eloquently about nuclear weapons, I suspect he would also disagree with many Government Members about conventional weapons, and the role we generally play in protecting countries like the Baltic states against attacks from Russia.

[Paul Flynn]

rose—

[Rory Stewart]

If the hon. Gentleman wishes to intervene again, I would be very interested to hear what he proposes Britain should do to defend the Baltic states against such an attack.

[Paul Flynn]

I know the Baltic states very well: I visited them four times in the ’80s and ’90s. I am not suggesting that we pretend some fantasy nuclear war is going to take place with us as the main participant. Where we have been successful is in humanitarian interventions in places like East Timor and Sierra Leone. Where we have failed is where we have gone into Iraq and Afghanistan with all guns blazing. We are good at humanitarian intervention and that is where our money should be invested.

[Rory Stewart]

With respect, as I suspected, the hon. Gentleman is focused on issues like East Timor and humanitarian intervention which have very little to do with the question of NATO. This whole idea of an attack on one being an attack on all is fundamentally predicated on the idea of deterrence. It is fundamentally predicated on the idea that we in the UK, as a major member of NATO, would protect these states if they were attacked, and my suspicion is that the hon. Gentleman has no strategy whatsoever on how to defend them. Giving up on the nuclear weapon is simply a symbol from the hon. Gentleman—a virility symbol, perhaps—of actually giving up in general on our obligations to protect NATO states. If I have misunderstood, I am very happy to take another intervention.

[Paul Flynn]

The hon. Gentleman is being very generous. If he went to Tallinn or Vilnius and asked the people there who they would look to to defend them if Russia attacked, they would say they look to America, not us.

[Rory Stewart]

We can, of course, agree with the hon. Gentleman on that. That is true. One of the questions is working out what Britain is going to do, but of course the biggest question for Vladimir Putin is what the United States is going to do. But the reason why these questions, and the uncertainty around them, are relevant is that Vladimir Putin’s decisions on whether to use ambiguous warfare, conventional troops or nuclear weapons will be guided by his perception of what we—the United States or Britain—are likely to do in response.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

Does my hon. Friend agree that the whole point of article 5 of the NATO treaty is not the question of which of the members of NATO an attacked country will look to to get most military help; rather, it is to take any uncertainty out of the question of who will declare war if a NATO country is attacked? Therefore, if a NATO country is attacked, our existing obligations are to declare war on the attacker. Does that not mean that we must be very careful how widely we extend NATO membership?

[Rory Stewart]

I agree absolutely, and that is a very important point. This NATO obligation is an unbelievably serious and important obligation. We have stretched it absolutely to its breaking point. If we are going to be serious about it, we have to follow through and that absolutely means we should not be giving guarantees to people we have no intention of protecting. We should not be writing cheques we are not prepared to have cashed.

The nub of this issue is, of course, that deterrence depends not on whether Britain would use a nuclear weapon, but on whether the other side believes that we would use it. Therefore, the most important support for our nuclear warheads lies not in the Trident missiles or even the submarines; it lies in the character of our nation, which is why there is absolutely no point in our having a discussion about a nuclear deterrent without looking at our defence strategy and posture in general. Deterrence cannot make sense if we get ourselves into a situation, which I sometimes worry my hon. Friend the Member for North Devon (Sir Nick Harvey) is getting himself into, where we believe that simply investing in fancy bits of kit is going to keep us safe. If people do not believe we are going to use them—that we are serious about using them—they will be entirely meaningless.

We can see the problems already, so let us just run through the various justifications that have been laid out here for nuclear weapons. The first was P5 membership. The big question for Britain on P5 membership is whether we are serious about our role in the United Nations at all. Why are we not contributing more to UN peacekeeping?

The subject of Iraq has been raised. The big question on Iraq is not our posturing about caring about terrorism or saying it is a tier 1 threat, but what we are actually doing? At present on the ground outside Kurdistan, while Australia has 300 soldiers, and Italy and Spain are deploying 300, we have exactly three. That means that Britain is not displaying and consistently demonstrating seriousness. This is not about combat troops; it is about being able to analyse the mission, have an intelligent conversation with the Iraqi Government, engage with our coalition allies and play the global role that our enormous defence budget is supposed to provide us with.

On Ukraine and Russia, again, we cannot simply rely on kit; we need to be doing things. The big question for us in Britain is how are we responding to the ambiguous warfare that we can see being propagated in Ukraine? What kind of investments are we making in military intelligence? What kind of investments are we making in cyber and in special forces? How much do we understand the situation on the ground in Ukraine and Russia?

On NATO, it is fine to talk about how important it is for us to be in NATO and to have nuclear weapons, and indeed it is. But it is meaningless if we are not going to stick to the commitments that we made in Wales of 2% of GDP. The most important thing we can do to deter Russia now is to ensure that Russia believes that NATO is serious about defending itself. If we say in a Wales summit that we will spend 2% of GDP, and if we go around telling other countries to spend 2% of GDP—and we should be telling other countries to spend 2% of GDP—we must retain our own promise and commitment, otherwise the nuclear deterrent will not be taken seriously.

Putin will look at us and ultimately conclude that there is a minimal chance of our doing anything if he were to intervene in the Baltic, because in respect of the rapid reaction force commitments, the framework nations—Germany, France and Britain—appear to be struggling to commit in 2016 to maintaining a deployable brigade. It seems to be very difficult to get the countries to work out how that will be funded in 2016. Whereas Russia can deploy 40,000 troops at 72 hours’ notice, the NATO deployment rates are running at about six months.

If we do not reach out to the public, which is why this debate is important, if we do not talk about why Britain is a global power, why we care about the Baltic, why we care about the global order, why we set up NATO, why we have nuclear weapons in the first place, all this will be lost.

To conclude, the fundamental rationale for all this depends on something on which the hon. Member for Newport West (Paul Flynn) and I disagree. This is the nub of the disagreement: do we believe in a world order? Do we believe in NATO? Do we believe Britain is a global power? Do we wish to play a role in the world? If we do, I will vote in favour of those weapons, but the deterrent will not make sense unless the character of the nation is in place, otherwise what we will be doing is creating something a little like the gold inkstand on the Table—a golden pinnacle on top of a cathedral, when the foundations and the structure of that cathedral are lacking and the faith of the nation has been lost.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Lewis]

Yes, and that should serve as a warning to us not to enter lightly into agreements that we have no intention of defending—I mean defending in the military sense.

It is just over 100 years since the outbreak of the first world war. I remember looking back in the archives of the inter-war period when a great debate was raging over whether or not it was safe to continue with the 10-year rule. I have mentioned it in the House before. It is highly relevant, so I will mention it again. The idea of the 10-year rule was that the Government would look ahead for a decade and see whether they thought there was any danger of a major war breaking out. If they did not see any such danger, they would cut the defence budget. That was rolled forward from 1919 right through to the early 1930s when it was eventually scrapped when Hitler came to power. It had a very damaging effect on our level of preparedness.

Lord Hankey, as he later became, was the Military Secretary of the Cabinet. In 1931, as an argument for scrapping the 10-year rule, he looked back to that summer of 1914 and said that far from having 10 years’ warning of the outbreak of the first world war, we had barely 10 days because of the rapidity with which the various alliances triggered each other into action. Suddenly, from nowhere, we have found ourselves drawn into a conflict with practically no notice whatever.

[Rory Stewart]

My hon. Friend pointed out in an essay that Maurice Hankey had said that we had failed to predict the 1870 Franco-Prussian war. Most recently, we failed to predict Russia going into Ukraine and Daesh taking over western Iraq, so I agree very wholeheartedly with my hon. Friend.

[Dr Lewis]

I am flattered to know that my hon. Friend the Chairman of the Committee reads my writings, and even quotes them back to me. I am very grateful to him.

I want to stress that I believe that the SNP has chosen this debate today—I congratulate the hon. Member for Moray (Angus Robertson), who I am pleased to see back in his place to hear my contribution, on securing it—with a particular political scenario in mind. SNP Members know that the majority of Labour Members and their supporters across the country agree with the concept of nuclear deterrence. They know that an overwhelming majority of Conservatives agree with nuclear deterrence. They are hoping to obtain something that they can use in the event of a future hung Parliament, in precisely the way that the Liberal Democrats were able to use their bargaining power to secure the postponement of the passing of the maingate decision from this Parliament to the next one. I think that was a terrible decision and it set a terrible precedent, but I am greatly reassured by the strength of the speech made by my right hon. Friend the Defence Secretary today.

When my hon. Friend the Minister winds up, I wish to hear that something will be done about the future of Trident and the holding of the maingate vote on time, as scheduled, in 2016 similar to what we have said about other areas of policy. We have seen authoritative statements in the press that no coalition will be entered into by the Conservatives unless it provides for an in/out referendum on the EU; similarly we have seen that no coalition will be entered into by the Conservatives unless it provides for passage of the draft Communications Data Bill. Those are two very important issues, but I submit that the future of the British minimum strategic nuclear deterrent is just as important as those two issues, if not more so. Until that vote is held, and held successfully, I shall continue to press those on my Front Bench for a commitment that we will never again allow the future of the strategic nuclear deterrent to be used in the way that it was in 2010 by a minority party in coalition negotiations.

Oral Answers to Questions

Rory Stewart Excerpts

Monday 12th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

We are already co-operating closely with France in particular, and we have reinforced our offer of assistance to France over the last few days. If ISIL is to be defeated and the threat to our own country and other European countries reduced, we will of course depend on the co-operation of the entire international community, but especially on the co-operation of partners in the region. The hon. Gentleman is right to draw attention to the role that Turkey and other regional partners can play.

We have been training Iraqi and Kurdish forces, and are doing so at the moment. Training courses in Kurdistan are being managed and led by British troops, and I hope that they will help the peshmerga, in particular, in their fight against ISIL.

[Rory Stewart (Penrith and The Border) (Con)]

Setting aside the fact that there will be no foreign combat troops on the ground, will the Secretary of State tell us what is the difference between the 2007 strategy in Iraq and the strategy today? In particular, have we a new counter-insurgency doctrine, is there a new Sunni outreach strategy, and have we adopted a new approach to building the capacity of the Iraqi Government and army, or are we fighting the same target with the same strategy and fewer resources?

[Michael Fallon]

I can tell my hon. Friend—who, I know, brings a great deal of experience from Iraq to the House—that the biggest difference between now and 2007 is that we now have a genuinely inclusive Government in Iraq, who represent both Shia and Sunni, and, indeed, Kurdish elements in Iraq. The new Defence Minister, Minister Obeidi, is himself a Sunni. It is important for that Government to concentrate on precisely the kind of Sunni outreach that the hon. Gentleman has mentioned, so that their forces can enjoy the support of the tribes in the Anbar region, where ground must be recaptured from ISIS.

Al-Sweady Inquiry Report

Rory Stewart Excerpts

Wednesday 17th December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

I am grateful to the shadow Defence Secretary for what he has said and for the tone in which he said it. I agree with his comment about the baseless untruths. He started by saying that our armed forces must be accountable to the law, and it is important to emphasise that—that they are accountable under both domestic law and the law of armed conflict, and that where there are allegations they will always be investigated. We should be open and frank about that. Where instances of some ill treatment or harsh treatment occur, they should be fully and honestly investigated. I do think that there are very few countries and judicial systems that would put themselves through this kind of inquiry to get to the truth.

The hon. Gentleman asked me some specific questions. On the recommendations, I am studying the report in detail and I will respond, as is customary, within the next few weeks on the detail of the recommendations. I hope it is clear that I accept the spirit of them all and the principle behind them all. I just have to look at some of the practicalities of implementing at least one or two of them.

I do not have any up-to-date information about where the personnel are currently serving. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman would allow me to write to him on that specific point.

On the procedural changes, these were the procedures that applied 10 years ago, in 2004. Sir Thayne himself acknowledges that many of the procedural changes have already been introduced. On the public inquiry, it might have been easy for the incoming Government—the inquiry was set up under the previous Government—simply to halt the public inquiry, but I believe that it was the right decision to allow it to run its course. However, we now have the Iraq historic allegations team, which will be able to get at the truth of these allegations probably in a different format and a little more quickly than a public inquiry, inevitably. That is not a criticism of Sir Thayne—far from it.

[Rory Stewart (Penrith and The Border) (Con)]

I join the Secretary of State in absolutely commending the report for reinforcing the honour and respect of the British soldiers. Having been based in Abu Naji and Maysan at the time, I encourage the Secretary of State to focus on the broader political context. It was completely tragic that not just a few Iraqis, but most of the Iraqi leadership in the province were convinced of these unimaginable atrocities. I encourage the Secretary of State to ensure that in future we have the right role for political officers on the ground to ensure that bodies are treated in the correct fashion, that the survivors’ families are reached out to in the correct fashion and that trust is built between the British military and the local political leaders to ensure that our soldiers are protected from these baseless allegations.

[Michael Fallon]

My hon. Friend makes the very important point that we need to reflect on the extent to which these lies and untruths were believed by the local community in the area. He makes the point all the more powerfully because of his personal experience and knowledge—not simply of Iraq, but of that particular province of Iraq. I will certainly reflect further on the point he makes about the role of political officers.

UK Armed Forces (Iraq)

Rory Stewart Excerpts

Monday 15th December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

I will certainly look at that suggestion. We gained expertise in countering IEDs and vehicle-borne explosive devices in Afghanistan and, as the hon. Lady says, we also accumulated considerable expertise in dealing with the injuries that they cause.

[Rory Stewart (Penrith and The Border) (Con)]

I urge the Secretary of State please to ensure that, along with the trainers, we deploy people who have expertise in Iraq, both military and civilian, to look specifically at the role of the Shi’a militia and the Sunni tribes so that we can credibly sit at the table with the Iraqi Government and the United States to challenge and debate the overall strategy, and drive a Sunni reconciliation.

[Michael Fallon]

I absolutely endorse what my hon. Friend, the Chairman of the Defence Committee, said. It is vital that the new Iraqi Government not only consider themselves to be inclusive, but demonstrate that they are inclusive. They must command the support of the Sunni tribes and show that the Shi’a militia that are associated with the effort to halt ISIL are part of an overall inclusive effort that cuts across political, religious and tribal divisions. I have emphasised that throughout. There are encouraging signs in the Iraqi Government, in the reform of the Iraqi military and in Defence Minister Obeidi’s proposals for a national guard that can help to secure ground that has been won back from ISIL. However, there is a long way to go in ensuring that that effort is genuinely inclusive.