Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Pete Wishart Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 10th February 2025 Commons Chamber

[Yvette Cooper]

The right hon. Gentleman makes an important point. I can assure him that our approach is for both immigration and asylum to apply right across the UK, recognising the importance of border security as part of that UK-wide approach.

Most people across the UK want strong border security and a properly controlled and managed asylum and immigration system, so that the UK does its bit, alongside other countries, to help those fleeing persecution, but also so that those with no right to be here are swiftly returned and the rules are respected and enforced. None of that has been happening in recent years. When this Government took office, basic rules had stopped being enforced, the asylum system had been crashed, and smuggling gangs saw the UK as an easy target. The last Conservative Government completely lost control of our borders.

[Pete Wishart (Perth and Kinross-shire) (SNP)]

rose—

[Yvette Cooper]

I will give way to the hon. Member, but I inform Members that although I will take many interventions, I must make progress first.

[Pete Wishart]

That is fair enough, and I am grateful to the Home Secretary for giving way. She talks about how much the whole of the UK wants this Bill, but my little part of the UK has experienced population stagnation, with decline coming in the 2030s. What we want and need are the tools to address that. A Scottish visa, supported by every sector and business organisation, would help our nation. When will we get that to help with our issues?

[Yvette Cooper]

Let me repeat the answer that I have just given: our immigration and asylum system applies right across the UK. I say to the hon. Member that when net migration soared under the previous Government, it did not address the labour market issues in Scotland. That is why we need a proper strategy that addresses the labour market issues, rather than always seeing migration as the answer.

The last Conservative Government completely lost control of our borders. Net migration quadrupled in the space of three years to a record high of nearly 1 million people, as overseas recruitment soared while training was cut in the UK. Immigration is important for the UK, but that is why it needs to be controlled and managed. The party that told people that it was taking back control of our borders instead just ripped up all the controls.

Six years ago, barely a handful of boats crossed the channel: 300 people arrived by small boat in 2018. Within four years that number had risen to more than 30,000—a 100-fold increase—which not only undermines our border security but puts huge numbers of lives at risks. The Conservative Government failed to act fast with France and other countries to increase enforcement and prevent the gangs from taking hold. Instead, criminals were let off and an entire criminal industry was established along our borders in just a few short years, with tragic consequences.

--- Later in debate ---

[Pete Wishart (Perth and Kinross-shire) (SNP)]

Well, here we go again—another Government with the same old, tired, failed approach to asylum and immigration. Other than getting rid of the truly bizarre Rwanda Bill, this Bill just picks up where the Tories left off, with the added extra of further criminalising asylum seekers.

I cannot help feeling that a lot of the activities and debates around this Bill have quite a lot to do with Reform’s rise in the opinion polls. Its Members usually sit behind me but, bizarrely, they have not turned up to debate this immigration Bill. The bizarre videos of the Home Secretary going to deportation centres and the posters celebrating the Government’s success in deporting and kicking people out play right into Reform’s territory. I say to Labour Members that they will never out-Reform Reform—they are masters of the art of anti-immigrant rhetoric. Regardless of how hard Labour Members try, they are mere amateurs by comparison. All Labour is doing by going on to Reform’s territory is legitimising it. You do not pander to the populists and the likes of Reform; you take them on.

The Bill does nothing to address the real issues we will confront in the middle-to-late part of this century. The Bill is totally fixated on the small numbers of people who come across the channel in small boats, but it does nothing to tackle the massive structural problems that are about to come our way because of population stagnation and population decline.

If anything, this Bill is designed for the early part of the century, not for the part of the century we are about to enter. Nations across the industrialised world, including Italy, Spain and France, are taking action to increase their population. South Korea has pumped $200 billion into what it calls the demography crisis. Japan has historically been resistant to immigration, and with a birth rate of one child for every three women, its population is predicted to fall by 25% by 2050. Japan will fall from third in the GDP league to eighth—that is what is coming our way.

Even the Bill’s purpose of defeating the gangs is doomed to failure. This Bill does nothing to address the root causes of irregular immigration, and it does not even start to get curious about why there is a problem with immigration in the first place. All it will do is make immigrants take even greater risks. It will have very little impact on the gangs the Government are targeting, as the gangs will adapt their business models accordingly.

The Government might inadvertently make the gangs’ obnoxious trade even more lucrative. The smuggling gangs are successful because they have exclusive rights and a monopoly on the irregular immigration market. There is nowhere else for people to go other than to the illegal gangs, as there are no safe routes to get into the UK.

We have particular problems in Scotland. Our population is currently around 5.43 million, and it has grown modestly over the past few years because of the Conservative Government’s immigration debacle, but Scotland will be one of the first parts of the UK to experience population decline, and it could come as early as 2030. That is why we have been so resolute and persistent in calling for a Scottish visa, and all sectors in Scotland now support that call.

[Chris Murray (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)]

rose—

[Pete Wishart]

I think Scottish Labour also supports it, as the hon. Gentleman will probably clarify.

[Chris Murray]

Of course, the issue is that Scotland is not the same everywhere. My community in Edinburgh and East Lothian is seeing its population grow, while other parts are seeing their population decline. The reason is Scotland’s labour market and economy. Even when we had access to 300 million people as an EU member, with net migration of 900,000, there were still parts of Scotland that were unable to attract migrants. The problem was not the immigration system; the problem was our labour market.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

Order.

[Pete Wishart]

I do not think the hon. Gentleman understands the scale of the problem in our nation of Scotland. Twenty-two per cent of our population is over 65, compared with 19% in England. We have one of the lowest birth rate ratios, with one child for every three women. If we do not do something quickly, this will have a huge impact on every sector of our society and every part of our economy.

I thought Scottish Labour supported a Scottish visa. I have heard Jackie Baillie speak very interestingly about it, but all of a sudden Scottish Labour has abandoned it. Every time I raise it with the Home Secretary, I am totally rebuffed. Every time my colleagues ask the Government to give us the tools to help address our predicament, we are told where to go.

We need the tools so that Scotland can grow its population, and so that we can equip ourselves for the problems that are already coming our way. We need a new mindset on immigration, which we have to start seeing as a benefit to communities. We have to recognise how it enriches our society. For the Government, immigration is a bad that has to be dealt with, and that is such an early-century approach. We will soon be facing population stagnation and decline. Unless we get ready and prepare for what is coming, we will be in serious trouble.

I look across at Labour Members who are singularly uninterested in any of this. They want to be as hard on immigration as the Tories and the Reform party. It does not work, it cannot work, and it is the wrong solution for where we are heading. I encourage them to think once again about what we all need across the United Kingdom.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (First sitting)

Pete Wishart Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Mike Tapp (Dover and Deal) (Lab)]

Q We have met previously, Mr Solomon, and I want to declare that I have worked for the National Crime Agency in the past and in a counter-terror role. I understand the points you made on enforcement, but what are your views on the fact that the Bill also includes strong disruptive measures, which is of course pre-enforcement, such as search and seizure?

Enver Solomon: I think those measures are legitimate. As I said, it is important to take steps to disrupt the activity of gangs that are causing huge harms to the lives of individual men, women and children, who are often extremely vulnerable. Attempts such as the powers you referred to are important and have a role to play—I am not disputing that. What I am saying is that they need to be used proportionately and to be clearly targeted at the individuals behind the criminal gangs and the trade of the criminal gangs.

Our concern is that, by broadening criminal powers in the Bill and specifically by introducing new offences, individuals will be caught up in that process. People who are coming across in very flimsy and dangerous vessels will end up being criminalised through no fault of their own. We are also concerned that using further laws—as has been seen across a whole range of different areas of public policy—is a blunt instrument to try to change the behaviour of people.

People will not stop getting into flimsy dinghies and coming across the channel or the Mediterranean because of new offences that they might face. They will probably know very little about the nature of those offences. They will know very little about the new rules that mean, if you get refugee protection, you will no longer be able to go on and gain British citizenship. We know that from our experience: they will know nothing about that, so it will not change behaviour or provide the deterrence that I think it is hoped it will provide.

That is why you need to use these powers in a very targeted, proportionate way that deals with the prosecution of the criminal behaviour but does not result in, in effect, punching down on those vulnerable people who are getting into the boats because they want to seek safety. It will not change their behaviour. That is our experience from having worked with refugees and people seeking asylum over many decades.

[Pete Wishart (Perth and Kinross-shire) (SNP)]

Q Welcome; thank you for coming along and giving your evidence, and for your written evidence. I think you are absolutely right to focus on the new criminal clauses that are included in the Bill, and to comment on how invidious they may be in how they might be broadly applied to asylum seekers. Do you agree that, if we could find some provision or series of amendments that removed asylum seekers from the focus of these new criminal laws, that might be a useful development? One of the clauses I would like you to comment on is the one that introduces an offence of endangering another person during sea crossings. You are experienced in working with asylum seekers and refugees—do they have any cognisance of the hardening of immigration and asylum laws in the UK when they are trying to get their family to safety from a war-torn region?

Enver Solomon: I would say not. I will come to clause 18 in a second, but I encourage the Committee to look at clauses 13 and 14. In our submission, we proposed that they should be amended to ensure the focus of the new offence is on people smugglers and not on those seeking protection in the UK. We also said that clause 15 should be amended to include other items that are important for reducing the risk that people face when attempting to cross the channel, and that the Government should consult widely to ensure the list is as extensive as is necessary.

On endangering others, given that, as Committee members will know, many of the boats now used are barely seaworthy and overcrowded, and that the numbers crammed into them are increasing, clause 18 could cover many more people than those whom the offence is apparently targeted at—that is, the people smugglers. On Second Reading, the Home Secretary gave some useful examples of the types of behaviour that could result in people being prosecuted, including physical aggression, intimidation, the rejection of rescue attempts and so on. We think the wording should be amended to reflect specific actions to ensure that the offence is very clearly focused.

We argue overall that these new offences are an extremely blunt instrument to change behaviours, and they will not have the desired effect of changing behaviours and stopping people getting into very dangerous, flimsy vessels.

Daniel O'Malley: To add to what Enver says, yes, it is a blunt instrument. We operate a refugee support service across the whole of Scotland, and when people come to our services they do not talk about the deterrence or anything like that; they talk about what they see once they get here. The environment that is created around people seeking asylum and refugees does not deter them from coming here, but once they are here, they feel that there is a threat to their protection and that their status here is under threat.

The language in these deterrents does not deter anybody from coming here; it just causes a hostile environment. That was the situation created by the previous Bills under the previous Government. We hope that will not be continued with the new Bill and other changes the Home Office is making. At the end of the day, when people come to our services and talk about stuff like this, they talk about how it makes them feel when they are in the country, not about how it deters them from coming here.

[Chris Murray]

Q I should probably declare that I used to work on refugee and asylum issues in Scotland, including with the Scottish Refugee Council. Enver, you talked a bit about the fundamental system meltdown, and the disfunction that the IMA and the Rwanda Act caused. I want to ask you a bit more about that. Would I be right in saying that those Acts basically caused a complete stop, or a complete slowdown, in any processing of asylum applications? What impact does that have on the communities where asylum seekers are placed, and on the people who serve those communities—the councils and charities? Does it make it hard for them to do their job? Does it cause local tensions? If we are repealing those components of the IMA and the Rwanda Act, would that address some of the challenges those communities are facing as a result of migration?

Enver Solomon: In short, what happened with the system meltdown that I referred to is that processing did pretty much come to a standstill. You had a huge and ever-growing backlog, and people were stuck in limbo indefinitely in the system. The number of people in hotels—asylum contingency accommodation, as it is called—reached record numbers. Hotels were being stood up in communities without proper prior assessments with relevant agencies of the potential needs—health, the NHS, and tensions vis-à-vis the police.

We work in Rotherham, where a hotel was brutally attacked and refugees were almost burned alive in the summer. My staff were in contact with people in the hotel who were live streaming what was happening. They thought that they were going to get burned alive. That hotel in Rotherham should never have been opened. It was always going to be a flashpoint. It was located in an incredibly isolated area, there were not appropriate support services, the local services were not properly engaged with in advance and there was no appropriate planning and preparation. That story, I am afraid, was repeated across the country because of the dysfunction and the system meltdown that the previous pieces of legislation resulted in. It is absolutely critical that we learn the lessons from that and do not repeat those mistakes.

There is no need to use asylum hotels. As I understand it, there are roughly 70,000 individual places within the asylum dispersal system today. If we had timely decisions being made in a matter of months, people moving through the system, a growing backlog in the appeal system dealt with by ensuring the decisions are right first time, and people having good access to appropriate legal information and advice from representation, which is a huge problem, you would begin gradually to fix the system.

It will take time to fix the system and create efficiencies, but it is absolutely vital that plans to move away from the use of hotels are taken forward rapidly, and that the current contracts in place with the three private providers to provide dispersal accommodation are radically reformed, because they just create community tensions. They are pivoted towards placing people in parts of the country where accommodation is usually cheap and where there are going to be growing tensions, often without support in place for people in those communities.

Mubeen Bhutta: I did not fully catch your question, Chris—I apologise.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Murray]

Q Dr Walsh, you said something fascinating that the Minister picked up on about the Dublin system and the driver of people getting on small boats. Could you say a little bit more about that? First, what is the evidence for that? Secondly, we know that people getting on to a small boat on the French side of the channel are part of a long stream of networks, illegal organisations and people fleeing. They are travelling through multiple countries. Could you give us a bit more detail on how those networks are functioning now, how they have evolved over the last couple of years in response to various conflicts and drivers, and the routes that people are taking?

Dr Peter Walsh: The Dublin system provided a mechanism for asylum seekers to be transferred between EU member states and prioritised the idea that people should have their claim processed in the first state in which they arrived. There are other things that the decision can be based on—one might be having family members in the country; that could also be the basis for a transfer.

There is emerging evidence from when researchers have spoken with migrants in and around Calais. They ask them, “Why have you taken this dangerous journey to the UK?” They talk about family, the English language and perceptions of the UK as being safer. Often they have experienced harsh treatment at the hands of the French police. Increasingly, they specifically mention Dublin.

What we can infer from that is that these people have an outstanding or rejected claim—or claims, potentially in a number of EU member states, even though there are rules and processes to prevent that. They have exhausted what they view as the opportunity to receive a successful asylum claim in the EU. That leaves the UK. They understand that because the UK is no longer a part of Dublin, we are effectively not able to return them to the continent. That is fairly recent evidence we have found.

On the smuggling networks and how they work, one of the big challenges is that they operate transnationally, so they are beyond the jurisdiction of any single authority. That, by its very nature, makes enforcement more difficult because it requires quite close international co-operation, so the UK would be co-operating with agencies that operate under different legal frameworks, professional standards and norms and maybe even speak a different language. That challenge applies with particular force to the senior figures, who are often operating not only beyond the UK’s and EU’s jurisdictions but in countries where there is very limited international law enforcement co-operation with both the UK and the EU. I am thinking of countries such as Afghanistan, Syria and Iran.

More generally, the smuggling gangs have become more professionalised. They are very well resourced and are highly adaptable. There is a sense that law enforcement is constantly having to play catch-up. The gangs are decentralised, and there are quite small groups of, say, eight to 12 individuals, spread out across the continent, who are responsible for logistics—for example, storing equipment like motors and engines in Germany that are imported to Turkey from China and then transported in trucks to France. Those networks stretch out across the continent. That is why it is so hard for law enforcement to fight them.

[Pete Wishart]

Q I would like to pick up on that point, because it is very important. I think I saw somewhere that you commented that there is a lack of evidence about the long-term effects of prosecuting people smugglers, because they will just be displaced. It strikes me that given that there are no other means or safe routes to get to the UK and the people-smuggling gangs effectively have a monopoly on the irregular migration business, surely all they are going to do with all the legislation that the Government are bringing forward is adapt the models to accommodate what the Government are introducing. It always seems that they are a few steps ahead of Government.

Unless we tackle the demand, surely there will not be anything we can effectively do to tackle the illegal gangs, particularly if we are going to be cutting international aid budgets, which will exacerbate the problem and drive more people into the hands of the gangs. Ms Bantleman, you have written to the Government urging them to amend the good character guidance to ensure compliance with the UK’s international obligations. Could you expand on that and elaborate on what you are intending from the Government? You are right to remind the Government of the range of their commitments and international obligations. I will come to you first, Dr Walsh.

Dr Peter Walsh: It is true that there is a real lack of evidence on what the likely impact of specific policies to disrupt smuggling networks will be, but the policies could assist in disrupting smuggling activities. If you invest more resources in enforcement and agencies have greater power of seizure, search, arrest and investigation, then you would expect that more smugglers would be brought to justice. The bigger question for me is: will that reduce people travelling in small boats? There is the separate question of whether this will eliminate the market for smuggling.

What we do know is that a lot of people are willing to pay a lot of money for the services that smugglers provide. If the effect of the policies is to disrupt smuggling operations, that could conceivably raise the cost of smuggling—a cost that would be passed on to migrants. It may be the case that some are priced out at the margins, but I suspect that demand is fairly inelastic. Even with an increase in price, people will still be willing to pay.

Another challenge is the people most directly involved in smuggling operations on the ground—the people who are tasked with getting the migrants to shore, the boats into the water and the migrants into the boats. It does not require substantial skill, training or investment to do that job. You can apprehend those individuals, and that requires substantial resource, but they can quickly be replaced. That is why it has been described as being like whack-a-mole. I think that is one of the real challenges.

Zoe Bantleman: I would like to add to that point, before I address the second question. I completely agree with what Peter says about how the most fundamental challenge in breaking the business model of smugglers is that, simply, smuggling will exist for as long as there is demand. There will be demand for it as long as there are people seeking safety. For as long as we fail to have accessible, safe, complementary routes for people to arrive here, and for as long as carriers are too fearful to allow people on to safe trains, ferries and planes to the UK, people will feel that they have no choice but to risk their lives, their savings and their families’ savings on dangerous journeys.

The focus of the Bill is not on tackling trafficking or the traffickers, or on protecting the victims of trafficking; it casts its net much wider. It is really about tackling those who assist others in arriving here, as well as those who arrive here themselves.

That leads me on to the second point, which is in relation to the good character guidance. There was a recent change, on the day of Second Reading, that also resulted in a change to the good character guidance, which is a statutory requirement that individuals must meet in order to become British citizens. The guidance says that anyone who enters irregularly—it actually uses the word “illegal”, which I have substituted with “irregularly”—shall “normally” not have their application for British citizenship accepted, no matter how much time has passed.

Fundamentally, article 31 of the refugee convention says that individuals should be immune from penalties. It is a protective clause. It is aimed at ensuring that exactly the kind of person who does not have the time or is not able to acquire the appropriate documentation, who has a very short-term stopover in another country on the way to the UK, and who is allowed to choose their country of safety can come here and is immune from penalties. There is also an obligation under the refugee convention to facilitate the naturalisation of refugees.

We also mentioned many other conventions, including the convention on the elimination of discrimination against women, and the convention on the rights of the child. Children have a right to obtain citizenship, so stateless children should not be barred from obtaining British citizenship. In addition, they should not be held accountable for things that were outside their control. Children placed on small boats may have had no control or understanding of their journey to the UK, so arriving here in a way outside their control, in a way that the Government consider to be illegal but is not illegal under international law, is not a reason for them to be barred from citizenship. That is the substance of what we have said.

[The Chair]

This may be the last question, unless anybody else has indicated that they wish to ask one.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Murray]

Q We heard from the previous panels about how the Illegal Migration Act and the Rwanda Act caused wholesale dysfunction in the immigration system and especially in asylum. I want to ask you about the impact that that dysfunction had on children. As we were moving unaccompanied asylum-seeking children from Kent around the rest of the UK, how dysfunctional was that system? What was it like for local authorities that were trying to support them and the local communities? They have statutory obligations about child protection.

Dame Rachel de Souza: Down in Kent, because needs must, hotels were set up, so I visited the hotels that children were in. The situation was wholly inappropriate. Many children were languishing there for months, without English teaching. Kent county council was doing its best. Some of the best provision that I saw for children who were just arriving was put on by Kent, which had managed to get school going and get interpreters in, but it was overwhelmed.

What I will say, to pay tribute to local authorities around the country, is that whenever there was a very young child or a disabled child, they would step up and help. But it was hard to get the national transfer scheme going and the children were confused by it as well. The Hghland council offered a range of places to some of the children, and they were like, “Where is the highlands and what are we going to do there?” It felt discombobulated at best. It was really tricky.

Of course, let us not forget that a lot of those children were older teenagers, and a lot of the provision that they were going to was not care, but a room in a house with all sorts of other people—teenagers and older people. They were left to fend for themselves, which was incredibly disorientating. We have a problem with 16 and 17-year-olds in the care system. There was a massive stretch on social care. Every director of children’s social care who I spoke to said that it is a massive stretch on their budgets, and that they do not know what to do with those children.

I think we could be more innovative. Again, there is massive good will out there in the country. We should be looking at specialist foster care, and not sticking 17-year-olds in rooms in houses on their own. There are so many things we could be doing to try to make this better, such as settling children in communities with proper language teaching.

The No.1 thing that children tell me that they want, given that they are here, is to learn—to be educated—so that they can function well. For me, particularly with some of the children who I have seen, they do not in any way mirror the stuff that we read in the media about freeloading—coming here for whatever. Most of them are really serious cases, and given that they are here, they want to try to learn and be good productive members of our communities. There is much that we can do.

[Pete Wishart]

Q I commend you for the work you do. I think what you do is amazing, and I pay tribute to that. You are absolutely right to raise some of the issues about the age assessment procedures, and their almost quasi-scientific applications. You are right to reference the debate in the House of Lords, because I think it captured that quite well. Why do you think there is an increasing trend to try to label quite obvious children or teenagers as adults?

We are keeping parts of NABA, so that will be a feature of the Bill. There are concerns about modern slavery and the impact on children with that. Are there any amendments that we could bring to the Bill that would help to deal with that and meet some of those concerns, so that we can get to a much better place with how we deal with children in our asylum system?

Dame Rachel de Souza: Obviously, both of those issues are concerns of mine—age assessment and the modern slavery provisions not being allowed to be applied. On age assessment, it is important that we know how old children are. I have seen 14-year-olds in hostels with 25-year-olds, which is totally inappropriate. I have seen girls who say that they are not 18 be age assessed as 18 and put in adult institutions with adult men. We do not want people masquerading as children to be put in with younger children. We need to do everything we can to determine age.

The technology around scientific age assessment is going to be difficult, not least because when you are dealing with an international population—as Lord Winston talked about—it is really difficult to be precise. Being precise matters. When children arrive in Kent, they get their new clothes, then if they are sick, they are put into a shipping container until they are not sick any more. They maybe then have to sleep a bit on a bench, and then they are age assessed. That age assessment is the most important thing about the rest of their journey here. If that goes wrong, that is it; if you get that wrong, they are an adult. It is a really important and tricky thing, and it is often not supported.

There are things we can do—I always look for solutions. Maybe we ought to be saying, “This is obviously a child. This is obviously an adult.” But there is a group where there are questions and perhaps we should be thinking about housing people in that group and spending a bit more time to work out how old they are and try to get the evidence, rather than making these cut-and-dry decisions that will change people’s lives. As I said, I found a 14-year-old boy in Luton who was there for years with 25-year-olds and was really upset.

On the modern slavery provisions, all I would say—I hope this is helpful—is that I have seen with my own eyes a 16-year-old Eritrean girl arriving at Kent with an older man who was her boyfriend. She obviously said, “It’s fine—I’m 16. We can come in.” She had lost her parents. It was obviously going to be trafficking. We need parts of the Bill to pick that up. That is real, so we need to be really careful about these things.

[The Chair]

We have only two minutes left, and three questions to go.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Second sitting)

Pete Wishart Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Pete Wishart (Perth and Kinross-shire) (SNP)]

Q I can sense your enthusiasm for the new criminal clauses in the Bill. To a certain degree, I get it, but it is going to keep you busy, is it not? There will be a lot of asylum seekers caught up in the various provisions in clauses 13 to 18. I am wondering what the proportion of ordinary asylum seekers will be compared with members of gangs and people who operate this business.

Mr Jones, I am struck by your confidence that you are going to end this. I think you made a comparison with illegal drugs. You are probably right to make that comparison—they are both demand-led and operated by illegal gangs—but we have not been particularly successful with illegal drugs over the course of the past decade.

Lastly, Ms Dineley, you said something about pilots of the boats. I hope your intelligence is telling you exactly the people who are piloting the boats. It is not the gang members or people associated with this crime. It is ordinary asylum seekers who cannot afford the fare or are forced into piloting these boats. I hope that when approaching the new powers in the clauses you will be proportionate, you will know what is going on and will not endlessly prosecute innocent people who are just asylum seekers fleeing oppression and warfare.

Rob Jones: We are not looking to pursue asylum seekers who are not involved in serious and organised crime. That is not what we do. This is about tackling serious and organised crime and being as effective as we can be in doing that. There are examples of people involved in piloting boats who are connected to the organised crime groups.

[Pete Wishart]

Q Would you be able to supply the Committee with evidence of that?

Rob Jones: People have been convicted of those offences, so that has passed an evidential test. Our role is undermining a specific element of the business model. It is not like drugs trafficking. Drugs trafficking has been established since the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. It is a lot older, a lot more established and involves billions of pounds and tens of thousands of people internationally, if not more. The small boats threat is different from that. It is the highest harm manifestation of organised immigration crime. I have not said that I will stop organised immigration crime. I said that we will tackle the small boats business model and then continue to tackle the OIC threat, as we have been doing since 2015.

Sarah Dineley: In relation to asylum seekers piloting boats, under the Immigration Act 1971 we have two offences: sections 24 and 25—section 25 being the facilitating offence. Our guidance is very clear on when we charge the section 25 facilitation offence. It is very clear from our guidance that it is not just about having a hand on the tiller; it is about being part of a management chain and being part of the organisation of that crossing.

You mentioned people who are coerced into taking the tiller. We would look under section 24—arriving illegally—on whether an offence of duress would be sustained. That would form part of our considerations on whether evidentially it is made out and, secondly, whether it is in the public interest to prosecute that person. We do look at the whole set of circumstances, and our guidance sets out in very clear terms what is required, both in terms of the evidential test and the public interest test—that balancing exercise. We also have specific guidance in relation to how we treat refugees and asylum seekers. Again, that plays into the charging decision equation, as I will put it, and the balancing exercise.

Jim Pearce: I am not sure what I could add to my colleagues’ comments.

[Pete Wishart]

Q You could say what proportion of asylum seekers compared with gang members you think you will secure with the new powers under the Bill?

Jim Pearce: I am not sure I am going to be able to answer that question, but I can tell you that for 12 months since November 2023 the police were involved with just under 2,000 inland clandestine incidents. What I mean by that are, for example, relevant persons who have been found in the back of an HGV who walk into police stations declaring asylum or those who have been left at petrol stations and are then picked up by police patrols and brought in. There were 2,000 incidents and nearly 3,000 persons. Obviously, they are not all being arrested for organised immigration crime offences, because they have not necessarily committed them, and my colleague here has spoken about the aggravating factors that sit within section 24, which are the key points to prove. As I say, that is probably all I could offer you at this time.

Sarah Dineley: Perhaps I could put things into some sort of numerical context. Last year, we had 37,000 arrivals in the UK through small boats crossings alone, and, in the period from April to September last year, there were only 250 prosecutions.

[Pete Wishart]

And were they gang members?

Sarah Dineley: I cannot break that down, but that would include gang members. That is the total number of prosecutions.

[Kenneth Stevenson (Airdrie and Shotts) (Lab)]

Q This might be a lag question, which is quite engineering-based, but you mentioned proactive, pre-emptive and disruptive, and those are engineering terms as well. I am really interested in how they react and would work within the Bill, how they would help the Bill and how the Bill would help them. Could you give us some idea of that?

Rob Jones: In relation to the powers in clauses 13 to 16?

--- Later in debate ---

[Jade Botterill (Ossett and Denby Dale) (Lab)]

Q All three of you have expressed disappointment at our scrapping the Rwanda scheme as part of the Bill. What part of the £700 million spent by the previous Government do you think was good value for money for the taxpayer?

Tony Smith: I do not think any of it was good value for money for the taxpayer, was it? The history and record speak for themselves. But we need to think about why it did not work and look at the reasoning behind why it took three years to try to get the process going. An awful lot of work was done in Rwanda and the Home Office to try to make it happen, but it was subject to continual legal challenge. Legal challenges were made in Europe, in the domestic courts and by judicial review. On a number of occasions, flights were lined up that did not happen, and a lot of money was therefore wasted in the process.

I am not a big fan of the Illegal Migration Act. Some of it was cumbersome, because it put all the eggs in the Rwanda basket. Rwanda was a limited programme—obviously, we could not send everybody to Rwanda—but under NABA, you had the option to triage and put some people into the Rwanda basket: those hard country removals, where you could not remove them anywhere else. You had that option, but you could still do what you are doing now and process people from places like Turkey and Albania, put them through the asylum system and return them to source.

Losing that triage option is going to be a big drawback, and it is going to cost a lot more money in the long run. The intake will continue to come, and you will then have to rack up the associated asylum, accommodation and settlement costs that run along with that.

Karl Williams: I would ask: “Value compared with what?” There is one argument around the counterfactual of if you had a deterrent, but I would also refer to the Office for Budget Responsibility’s analysis last summer on the fiscal impact of migration. It estimates that a low-skilled migrant, or low-wage migrant as the OBR puts it, will represent a lifetime net fiscal cost to the taxpayer of around £600,000. We know from analysis from Denmark, the Netherlands and other European countries that asylum seekers’ lifetime fiscal costs tend to be steeper than that, but even on the basis of the OBR analysis, even if everyone ends up in work, if 35,000 people cross a year, which is roughly where we were last year, at that sort of cost range, it will probably be £50 billion or £60 billion of lifetime costs. Compare that with £700 million—it depends on what timescale you are looking at.

[Pete Wishart]

Q Does the panel agree that there will be increasing demand to come to the UK from right across the world? We are not going to deal with war-torn situations, oppression and absolute poverty, so people are going to continue to move in. The movement of peoples has never been so profound as in the last decade. I do not know exactly how you plan to stop that.

If I am unfairly characterising your view, you can correct me, but your view is that they should not get into the UK, that they should be stopped either in the sea or the minute they arrive in the UK, and that at that point they should be booted out somewhere—if not Rwanda, some other country—or just put back to country of source. Is that roughly your view? You can just shake your head or nod.

Tony Smith indicated assent.

[Pete Wishart]

Q That is fine. I am just wondering: have you even the slightest scintilla of sympathy, compassion or concern for these poor wretched souls who end up on our shores with absolutely nothing and who have fled oppression, warfare and extreme poverty?

Tony Smith: I do have sympathy with them. I do sympathise. Many of us, I suspect, would do the same. My issue is that they have travelled through a great many countries to make it to the UK. We used to have the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees resettlement programme, when we had control of our borders. I was a big fan of that; I went to Canada and studied it for three years. We were actually searching the world and working with the UNHCR to identify the most vulnerable people and set a cap on the numbers that we could take. That was going on in Canada, Australia and the UK.

If you look at the UNHCR website and see the numbers of people who are going through that programme now, they are not getting resettled. The reason why not is that the business model has been taken over by the smugglers. That is why we are getting large numbers of young men who can afford to cross multiple borders and pay smugglers to get here. I would like to see a return to the system where we have control of those irregular routes. Then we could start looking, as Karl said, at reintroducing UNHCR resettlement programmes, going to the UNHCR and taking a certain quota into the UK in a managed way.

Alp Mehmet: Out of Gaza, there are going to be potentially 2 million people who would like some comfort, so they would like to move to somewhere a bit more convivial than Gaza is at the moment. But, if I may ask the question, why is it assumed that—because people like us advocate control and discouraging people, a lot of the time, from risking their lives, not just in crossing the channel but in living rough as they do—discouraging them from coming is in some way inhuman, insensitive and unkind?

[Pete Wishart]

Q That is not what I said. I was just asking for your response to the people who arrive on our shores, and whether you feel empathy, compassion and concern about them.

Alp Mehmet: We do, and even in my day as an immigration officer 50 years ago, that was exactly what we did. Tony rose to run the show, but I would argue that we had far more leeway in the ’70s as very junior, humble individual immigration officers. We were properly trained, we were monitored, we did things entirely within the law and we dealt with people humanely. It does not mean that that will not happen because we are saying, “No, you shouldn’t jump into a dinghy and make your way over here.”

[Jo White (Bassetlaw) (Lab)]

Q From the moment the Rwanda deal was signed until the moment it was scrapped, 84,000 people arrived here on boats. How can you define that as a deterrent?

Alp Mehmet: Tony, you start, and then I will catch up with the question, because I did not quite hear.

Tony Smith: We may well say the same thing. The question was about the fact that the Rwanda plan did not deter anybody because we still had 84,000 people arrive. I think the reason for that was that it was never, in fact, implemented. The intelligence coming across from Calais was that the smugglers and migrants never believed that it was going to happen. Once it became clearer that the Safety of Rwanda Act had passed, and that it might well become a reality, there was intelligence to suggest that some people were thinking twice about getting into dinghies, and there was some displacement into Ireland as a result. Of course, we will never know now, because we never actually implemented it.

We had a change of Government, and the new Government made it very clear that they were going to abolish the Rwanda plan, so we are where we are, but I would have liked an opportunity to see what would happen if we had started at least some removals. We had flights ready to go. I would have liked to see the impact that starting some removals would have had on the incoming population. We will never know now, I am afraid. Clearly, we hardly removed anybody to Rwanda in the end—I accept that—but I would have liked us to at least try, to see if it had an impact.

Alp Mehmet: It was never going to be the solution. It was not going to be the way to stop those people jumping into boats and coming across, but it was going to help. There needed to be other changes. I appreciate that we are not going to resile from the European convention on human rights any time soon, but while it is there, it is very difficult to be certain that people will be dissuaded. Some will be, some would have been, and we know that some were already being deterred. It was a pity, I am afraid, that the Rwanda deal went.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Q Of course, asylum claims are up because they were not being processed, but now they are. That is dealing with the backlog that was caused by the problems with the Illegal Migration Act.

David Coleman: I do not know how important the Illegal Migration Act was in increasing the number of the backlog, to be perfectly honest. In the past, it has been the same height without the Illegal Migration Act. About 15 or 20 years ago, it was also 90,000 per year, and that was way before any of the past legislation was enacted.

[Pete Wishart]

Q I was actually very excited when I found out that there was a professor of demography coming to this panel; I have a particular interest in population demography. Using your vast knowledge of the subject, could you explain what the population and demographic trends will be for practically every European nation towards the middle part of the century and the end of the century? How will these nations cope with population stagnation, population decline and the assorted problems with a smaller working-age workforce supporting an older generation, with a falling birth rate around the world? What will they do to deal with that?

David Coleman: This is a formidable tutorial group to try to give such an answer to. If I could say with any kind of confidence what was going to happen by the middle of the century, I would deserve a Nobel prize.

[Pete Wishart]

Q We all know. Professor, you must know.

David Coleman: I can do my best. The present situation, as you are obviously suggesting, is rather dire from the point of view of domestic demography, such as the fact that the so-called total fertility is down to 1.44 and may fall further. Therefore, it presages considerable population ageing and decline should it continue.

At the risk of being technical and boring, I would point out that total fertility is a snapshot. It is only a calculation of, on average, how many babies the average woman—if you can imagine an average woman—will produce over a lifetime, if the same levels of age-specific fertility were to continue, which refers to the same levels of birth rate at the ages 15 to 19, 20 to 24, and so on. If that continues at the present level, in the long run you will get 1.44 babies. This is a very volatile measure; it goes up and it goes down. Back in 2010, it was 1.94, which is really very healthy and probably as high as you could possibly get.

[Pete Wishart]

Q You need two to one. You need two children per woman to sustain it—I am not telling a professor that.

David Coleman: Yes, or 2.1. That is true, although there is a risk of starting another hare. I suggest that some degree of population ageing and population decline is tolerable, particularly when we are faced with a world whose habitable area is shrinking and productivity is declining, thanks to the inevitable level of global climate change. The last thing we want, it seems to me, anywhere, is population growth. Population stabilisation and population decline, as long as it is modest and eventually comes to an end, is to be welcomed. I have said that with colleagues on a number of occasions.

I do agree that the present level of fertility is very unsatisfactory; it would be much healthier if it were higher. One gets into perilous waters trying to persuade people to have more children. The important thing is to identify those obstacles that stand in the way of the family size that people keep on saying they want to have. Despite all the problems at the present time, opinion polls suggest that people still want to have, on average, almost two babies or even more than two babies, but they cannot, for all sorts of reasons. In this country, some of those reasons are very obvious. One is the atrocious cost of housing. House prices are now at nine times the level of the average income, compared with three or four times, which was normal in the past.

[The Chair]

Sorry, we have four minutes left and I have three people to get in.

David Coleman: Forgive me; I ran away with myself. I am so sorry.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Murray]

Q Or four.

Professor Brian Bell: Well, four went voluntarily, but if the policy had been implemented in full, there were never any guarantees. We certainly would not have been able to send 100,000 a year to Rwanda; Rwanda was never going to accept that. The cost was astounding, given the likely deterrence effect. It illustrates a problem in the Home Office at the time: there was little rational thinking about what the costs and benefits of different policies were. My personal view is that getting asylum claims dealt with more quickly would have been a much more effective use of public resources. That is in the interests of not only the British public but asylum seekers, as most of their claims are accepted. If we could have got them through the system faster, got them approved if they were approved, got them into work and integrating within their communities and, if they were rejected, actually deported them, that would have been a much better use of public resources.

[Pete Wishart]

Q You are an expert in immigration and crime—you have been doing some work on that. The clauses concerning criminalisation are main features of the Bill. How many more asylum seekers do you think will be put through the criminal courts as a result of this legislation, and how many members of gangs, and those that do the people smuggling? What, roughly, will be the proportion of each of those groups?

Professor Brian Bell: I think the numbers will be quite small. In some senses, a good piece of legislation makes a criminal offence so serious, and a penalty so severe, that no one commits the crime. There is a risk that you think you have failed because no one is convicted, but actually if you deterred the behaviour then it succeeded. The reality is that if there are any convictions, it will be almost entirely asylum seekers who are convicted. I do not see how the gangs will be convicted because, as I understand it, they are not on the boats.

[Pete Wishart]

Q It is not really going to affect the gangs, and very few of them will be caught under the Bill. I had a dispute earlier with a director general of the National Crime Agency about piloting the boats, which will, as you know, be an offence under the new legislation. In the last three years, 205 people were convicted on that basis, and it is not even in the Bill. Are we likely to see more people convicted for steering a boat because they were probably forced or compelled to do so?

Professor Brian Bell: That is the implication of the legislation. I am not a lawyer, so I should be careful here, but I understand that there is a defence in the legislation that would allow you to claim that you were essentially forced into doing it, under sort of human slavery conditions.

[Pete Wishart]

Not according to the current numbers: 205 is a lot of people being convicted for being compelled to drive a boat—

[The Chair]

Order. Sorry—we only have eight minutes.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jo White]

Q Thank you, Ministers, for your evidence. In his evidence, Tony Smith, who retired 12 years ago, was very critical of the role of the Border Security Commander and defined him as a “co-ordinator”. Do you believe that the Border Security Commander’s powers need to be enhanced?

Dame Angela Eagle: Well, the Border Security Commander is very happy with the powers that he has—he has been appointed. Again, we will talk about this in some detail, but it is important that we get co-ordination across different areas of activity. I think you will have heard what the NCA witness said about how he wants somebody else to do the co-ordination while he does the basic work. Everybody is working together very well across the people who have to have regard. The Border Security Commander is bringing together a range of very important players in this area to strategise and co-ordinate, and he has not told me—I meet him regularly—that he needs any more powers.

[Pete Wishart]

Q I know that we do not have much time, but I have two quick points following the compelling evidence we have heard today. It has been a very good session. One of the things that came across powerfully was the view that this Bill will do very little to actually tackle the gangs; we heard consistently throughout the evidence that, “They’ll just adjust their business model; they’ve got a monopoly on the irregular migration trade, so they are obviously going to do what they can to maintain it.”

The other thing is that it will have very little impact on people making the decision to come to the United Kingdom. They are fleeing oppression, poverty and war, and they do not care about the laws of the United Kingdom—what Angela Eagle is doing in a migration Bill is not going to deter them from coming here. So what are we going to do to get on top of this issue? Should we not be thinking, as we go through this Bill process, about fresh, new ideas to tackle it?

Dame Angela Eagle: Well, we have just come out of a period of fresh new ideas and gimmicks—

[Pete Wishart]

Yes, but that is gone.

Dame Angela Eagle: And very expensive they turned out to be. We have inherited such a mess, with huge backlogs and very long waits for appeals, that we have to try to clear up. We have an asylum system that essentially broke down—I think one of our witnesses was talking about it being “in meltdown” earlier today.

We are going to do the day job and start to get that system working. I think that having fast, fair and effective immigration decisions is a very important part of all of this, as is removing those whose claims fail so that we can actually get to the stage where people know that, if they come to this country and they do not have a reasonable chance of being accepted as an asylum seeker, they will be returned. I think that is what the deterrent is.

Seema Malhotra: If I may add one point, it is absolutely valid and right to say that this Bill is one part of trying to tackle both the criminal gangs and the demand. Certainly, the other side of the work that the Home Secretary has been leading on—in terms of agreements with other countries for returns, as well as the reasons why people are coming and what more could be put in place as a deterrent—is work that was also talked about in evidence today; international diplomacy is also an important part of the overall framework. That is going on in parallel, and it is important to be working upstream through diplomacy and agreements with other countries too.

[Kenneth Stevenson]

Q Listening today has been very interesting; I have written down some of the points. There were the points about organised crime, and about the Border Security Commander and the border post that he—or it might be a “she”, and I am not ultra-woke—would be in charge of. There is also the point about 2 million people coming over from Gaza, and that the tagging system has not worked, although I did not hear any evidence of that—I wanted numbers; as an engineer, I wanted to hear the background to that.

I then heard that there were no magical solutions and that war was not easy to win—so we are in a “war” with migrants. We then spoke about unkindness to asylum seekers. I think that the most important words that I heard today were proactive, pre-emptive and disruptive— that is what the Government are trying to be. Do you agree that that has to start with the gangs who are starting this and are pulling—or pushing—people across?

Dame Angela Eagle: Yes. There are many genuine asylum seekers, many of whom are granted asylum when they are finally processed, who have come in that way. There are also people who are trafficked, who are in debt bondage, who go into sex work in nail bars, say from Vietnam, or who end up—as the police chief told us—growing cannabis in hidden farms in all our communities or being involved in serious crime. Some of them are victims of modern slavery, and some of them are the perpetrators of all that kind of evil.