Immigration Bill (Fifth sitting)

Paul Blomfield Excerpts

Tuesday 27th October 2015 Public Bill Committees

[Mrs Emma Lewell-Buck (South Shields) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Bone.

I will speak briefly about amendment 55, which has the modest aim of making it explicit that the new director of labour market enforcement should have a duty to stand up for those who are at risk of exploitation. This amendment has been tabled because Labour Members believe that if such a position is going to exist, whoever holds it should be responsible for enforcing all aspects of labour market law and not just some of them.

If they accept this amendment, the Government will signal that part 1 of the Bill is truly about improving labour market enforcement and not simply about grabbing headlines to bolster their credentials of being tough on immigration. If the Government are willing to make that commitment, I think we will all welcome the creation of the new director.

The amendment is important because without it there would be a worrying ambiguity in the new role of the director, which could see the resources allocated to the director directed primarily at illegal migrants in work rather than at those who employ them.

There is a tonal shift in the Bill towards criminalising the employee over the employer, which is concerning because it seems to focus on the symptom rather than the cause; the focus appears to be on the workers rather than on the organised gangs who traffic and exploit them. That approach will not have a lasting impact on illegal labour market activity in Britain. The reason is simple: if workers are arrested and deported, employers will find others to take their place. If you strike at employers, however, that market soon disappears. There is even a risk, as witnesses told us last week, that an emphasis on criminalising workers will actually be counterproductive in fighting illegal working. If people fear that they will be harshly punished if their immigration status is discovered, that can be used by their employers as a threat, driving them even further underground and opening them up to worse forms of exploitation.

The Government therefore need to make it explicit that the new director will have powers and duties that allow them to act in all areas of the labour market and that the role will be used to tackle exploitation at its source. Without that commitment, the director is unlikely to be an effective office because it will be limited to clearing up the symptoms, rather than the root causes, of labour market exploitation. Such an approach might bring some great headlines for the Home Secretary, but it will do little to prevent trafficking and abuse or to reduce the number of illegal migrants working in this country. I am sure that the Minister will agree that if public money is going to be spent establishing a new agency, we need to be sure that it is going to get results, and that is why he and his colleagues should back this amendment today.

[Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve on the Committee with you in the Chair, Mr Bone. I echo the comments made by my hon. Friends, save that I have one caveat in relation to the point made by my hon. and learned Friend the shadow Minister. I hope that we do not need to push the amendment to the vote. I hope that there can be agreement, because we are on the same page on several of these issues, in the wider sense in relation to an effectively managed immigration system, and particularly on labour market enforcement. Many Opposition Members commended the Government on their work on the Modern Slavery Act 2015. We had differences on points of detail, but very much agreed with the main thrust of that legislation. There is strong support for the principle of more effective labour market enforcement. The Prime Minister spoke powerfully about that when he spoke, at that stage, not about a director but about the establishment of a labour market enforcement agency. Clearly, the Bill has a slightly different, but nevertheless welcome, approach to seek to co-ordinate the efforts of those agencies dealing with more effective enforcement in the labour market.

However, it does not sit comfortably that our debate about labour market enforcement is in the context of an immigration Bill—so there is perhaps a point of confusion. At the heart of this clarificatory amendment is the desire to be absolutely clear on the role of the director of labour market enforcement. The post—the function—should do what it says on the tin: it should be focused on labour market enforcement. My hon. and learned Friend the shadow Minister has cited international examples. It is useful to learn from other countries, though we do not do it as often as we might. There are powerful examples of where confusion between labour market enforcement and immigration control and enforcement is counterproductive. It neither supports effective immigration enforcement—because it drives undocumented workers underground and out of the way of the authorities—and does not help with labour market enforcement either.

[Sarah Champion (Rotherham) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. If I may add to what my hon. Friend is saying, Caroline Robinson, the policy director of Focus on Labour Exploitation, said in her witness statement,

“The point about the protective purpose of the director is very important. For us, the core purpose of that role should be the protection of vulnerable workers and the prevention of exploitation.”––[Official Report, Immigration Public Bill Committee, 20 October 2015; c. 27, Q54.]

That is what the amendment is trying to get at.

[Paul Blomfield]

I thank my hon. Friend for her helpful intervention. Throughout our deliberations, we should seek to draw on the evidence that we heard. The evidence cited by her and by my hon. and learned Friend the shadow Minister has powerfully made the case that the confusion of immigration functions and labour market enforcement is damaging and counterproductive to our objectives for the labour market and for immigration. The amendment seeks to provide absolute clarity. I hope that the Government will accept it.

[Anne McLaughlin (Glasgow North East) (SNP)]

The Scottish National party tabled the amendment with Labour because we believe that the primary purpose of the director of labour market enforcement should be to enforce the rights of workers and protect people from exploitation. Indeed, the Government’s background briefing states that the new labour market enforcement agency will be established to protect people against being exploited or coerced into work. The Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association has said:

“Where those working or living in very poor conditions are deterred from accessing assistance because of their immigration status”—

this will clearly make it harder for them—

“or because of their vulnerability to threats by unscrupulous employers in relation to their immigration status, agencies will be restricted in their ability to gather the intelligence needed to exercise their regulatory functions and protect against labour market exploitation. A lack of clarity over the protective function of the labour market enforcement agency may therefore undermine its aims.”

It would be good to have a little more clarity.

Last week, one of the Conservative Members really shocked me with a statement about illegal workers. On reflection, I wonder whether there is a genuine, fundamental misunderstanding about some of these people that might need to be addressed. The comment was that if people knew that the Bill was being introduced and that it was going be so much harder to work here illegally, they would be less likely to allow themselves to be trafficked. That really shocked me. We are talking about the most vulnerable people, who are taken from other countries against their will. They do not choose or allow themselves to be trafficked. They are used and abused. The Bill will make it so much worse for them. Does the Minister believe that people are trafficked here because they choose to be or not? If there is a belief that there is an element of choice to trafficking, I understand where the measures come from. I would like to know that the Minister intends to protect the most vulnerable people.

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[Paul Blomfield]

I wanted to develop the point, because I think that some of the discussion about trafficking is a diversion. Does the hon. Lady agree that the primary purpose of this amendment is simply to clarify the role of the labour market enforcement director and make it clear that there is no disagreement on either side of the House that such a director should focus on preventing those vulnerable to exploitation in the labour market?

[Anne McLaughlin]

If the hon. Gentleman was asking me to agree with him then I agree with him.

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[The Minister for Immigration (James Brokenshire)]

I welcome you to the Chair, Mr Bone, and other members of the Committee to our consideration of part 1 of the Bill, which deals with labour market enforcement. I look forward to the debates that we will have in the coming sittings to, I hope, improve the Bill and to reflect on significant issues relating to labour market enforcement and immigration more generally. I look forward to debate that I am sure will be wide ranging and well informed and that I hope will be good natured. These Committees are about scrutiny of the detail of the legislation. There will be strong views on certain issues, but the approach that I always take on Bill Committees is to listen and to reflect, and I hope to be able to inform and provide evidence and further background to the Committee during the detailed consideration of this Bill. With those words of introduction, I will move on to clause 1 and the amendment tabled by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras.

The effect of the amendment would be to specify the primary purpose of the director of labour market enforcement in clause 1. Although I appreciate the desire to include a strong statement up front on the director’s remit, I believe, for reasons that I will explain, that the amendment is unnecessary. The director’s role and remit are already clearly set out in clauses 1 to 7. When we look at the provisions in clauses 2 and 3, which we will debate in the course of this morning, and the specific definitions of “labour market enforcement functions” and “labour market legislation”, we see that that provides a clear framework as to the intent behind the creation of the director, but I will explain this a little further.

We are creating the director of labour market enforcement to lead efforts to tackle abuse and non-compliance in the labour market. As we will explain in the debates on later clauses, that will include setting the strategy for the Government’s work to tackle all types of labour market exploitation and creating an information hub to facilitate better sharing of tactical and operational intelligence. I think that that is equally important. On some of the issues of vulnerability that have already been flagged in terms of identification, it is important to be able to share that information and get it to the right agencies so that they are able to act. I think that that goes beyond the remit specifically of the director, but I certainly understand and respect the points that have been made.

[Paul Blomfield]

I want to push the Minister on that point. As I said, the confusion arises because a director of labour market enforcement is being proposed in the context of an immigration Bill and it is a post that will report to the Home Secretary. Were the director of labour market enforcement sitting in a different Department, reporting perhaps to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, the necessity for this absolute clarity might be diminished. Does the Minister agree that the fact that the labour market enforcement function is within an immigration Bill and the post reports to the Home Secretary means that it would be helpful to have absolute clarity on the purpose, so that this post holder is not distracted by other—quite legitimate but other—considerations of Government?

[James Brokenshire]

I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s welcome for the creation of the director of labour market enforcement and what he said about the way in which it is framed and the intent behind it. I will go on to respond to his direct point, but let me address the issue about whom the director reports to. It is to the director of business and to the Home Secretary. Let us look at the agencies in relation to which the director has a remit. One of those is the Gangmasters Licensing Authority. That sits within the Home Office and therefore it is appropriate for the director to report to the Home Secretary in respect of the overarching work; the GLA is a Home Office-sponsored and led agency. The hon. Gentleman may want to engage in a broader debate as to whether he thinks that that is appropriate, but it is important that it is structured in that way.

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[James Brokenshire]

It is important to stress that they are separate roles. We make that point clearly in the consultation document, where we say that the director will have a role that is distinct from the commissioner’s role. Obviously, the commissioner looks at all types of modern slavery, whereas the focus of the director will be on labour market exploitation and enforcement. The practical roles are equally different:

“The Director will set the strategic plan, priorities for targeted action and overall approach”,

whereas

“the Commissioner has a broad role to look at the effectiveness of all the bodies engaged in the fight against modern slavery, encourage best practice, and make recommendations for improvements. That role will in future include looking at the effectiveness of the new Director and the reformed GLA”,

which we are consulting on now. I hope that is helpful and explains that these are complementary roles. I think that the commissioner, Kevin Hyland, is doing an excellent job. He has a great deal of practical experience from his time in law enforcement. I remember a couple of years ago going out with Mr Hyland on an enforcement raid to do with trafficking, so I know the real passion he has for that job. I think that he will use and work with the new director in a very positive way to continue to confront the appalling evil that is slavery and trafficking, with people being horribly exploited and enslaved for gain. We continue to need to shine a light on this, so that it is seen for what it is.

[Paul Blomfield]

I endorse the points that the Minister made on enforcement, but I want to come to the issue he raised about the review of the Gangmasters Licensing Authority. I agree that effective enforcement is important. The opportunity for exploitation in the labour market is growing. Can he reassure us that the review of the GLA will not mean that we will be moving to voluntary licensing?

[James Brokenshire]

I think that the hon. Gentleman may be straying a little from the specific amendment. He will have seen the clear manner in which the consultation document is set out and the various questions that are being asked about the licensing function in ensuring that that is conducted appropriately, is evidence-based and is used as a tool to prevent exploitation in the highest-risk sectors. I direct right hon. and hon. Members to the relevant sections on pages 40 and 41 of the consultation document, which set that out. Obviously, we will reflect carefully in the context of the feedback we receive around the consultation.

[James Brokenshire]

I think I have already explained that the functions of the director of labour market enforcement are by their nature framed within the context of the various pieces of legislation that the hon. and learned Gentleman set out. I have also explained, as set out in the consultation document, that the measure is about promoting good practice and highlighting issues where employers can equally comply. That is why I responded as I did to a number of hon. Members about the spectrum of activity engaged here.

We are very clear that the purpose of the director of labour market enforcement is to tackle labour market exploitation across the field. We believe this measure will give the stronger drive to deliver that step change in tackling exploitation. The director will have that purpose set out in terms of appointment and, in delivering that, will be accountable to the Home Secretary and Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills.

We also believe that the requirement to publish the strategy and annual report—it will not be a private document but will be visible according to the legislative framework—will demonstrate the clear commitment to protecting the vulnerable and tackling exploitation. That is again why we are clear on the remit, role and function. From a tactical operational perspective—I am sure we will come on to the information hub—that will support the activity.

[Paul Blomfield]

I am grateful to the Minister for being generous with his time. I have listened carefully to his comments and there is little in them that I can disagree with. Given that we are seeking to be on the same page as far as we can on all these issues, will the Minister explain why he feels that the Bill would be diminished by the amendment?

[James Brokenshire]

As I have already indicated, I simply do not think it is necessary, because the Bill is already framed so as to cover the points hon. Members are highlighting. I have always taken the approach in legislation that, if the situation is clear through other mechanisms, adding provisions that are not needed is not appropriate. I had hoped in my comments to assure the Committee why the amendment is not necessary, the purpose of the provisions and the intent of the Government. Transparency will be provided through the annual reporting to see what is happening in practice, and therefore the amendment as expressed is not needed. The director’s strategy will be evidence-based, which will allow the plan to be from year to year, based on where non-compliance is most likely to cause harm. That will be reflected in the plan.

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Amendment 58 would ensure that the functions of the director were exercised for the purpose of enforcing all existing labour market standards, rather than prioritising a limited number of areas. It would link the director’s strategy with his or her assessment of non-compliance with labour market standards. The Bill proposes that there is an assessment of compliance in the labour market, as well as a strategy to address the situation. I anticipate the point that a strategy would necessarily address as well as assess, but we think that our amendment would clarify in the Bill what the strategy should include. That would strengthen the strategy which, in the end, is all important. We need the post and we need the strategy, and it is putting the two together that will make the approach truly effective.

[Paul Blomfield]

Is my hon. and learned Friend, like me, keen for the Minister to give us a bit more clarity about what seems to be a shift in narrative towards more serious issues of exploitation, which has not been defined? Our hope is that we are seeking to enforce all standards for all workers.

[Keir Starmer]

Yes, I thank my hon. Friend for his contribution. I will come later to where the director will put his or her emphasis—on what might be called the higher end breaches, or on more routine breaches. I welcome that contribution and I ask the Minister to deal with it if he can in his comments.

Amendment 59 is intended to clarify the relationship between the director of labour market enforcement and the UK’s existing labour inspection agencies, ensuring that the current role, remit and resources of labour inspectorates are safeguarded. By way of background, I give an example, because practical realities follow from what we hope is a very good initiative. This year we saw the pay and work rights helpline merge with the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service. The pay and work rights helpline used to provide vital advice; it was a service with an annual cost of £500,000, yet, when it was merged, the money did not go with it, which has led to a strain on the service. As a result, ACAS struggles to meet extra demand with no extra resources. There is some evidence that representatives have been asked not to use it. By making explicit the resource implications in the strategy, we hope to avoid this sort of implication. Where there is a merger of various functions and enforcement without the resources, it becomes ineffective.

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[Gavin Newlands]

My hon. Friend has highlighted the paucity of resources in this area, something that we will come back to time and again throughout this debate.

The resources question, raised by amendment 56, was also a cause of concern for Professor Sir David Metcalf, the chair of the Migration Advisory Committee. During our evidence session last Tuesday, Professor Metcalf raised concerns about the resources required to enforce measures and punish rogue employers who are failing to abide by labour market enforcement. After we have gathered evidence on labour market enforcement, we cannot be put in a position where we cannot use that evidence effectively because of a lack of resources. Professor Metcalf stated that, as things stand, he does not believe that the director will have the resources to be able to effectively deal with the problem of worker exploitation.

Professor Metcalf also stated that when working on the implementation and enforcement of the minimum wage he estimated that an employer would get a visit from HMRC once every 250 years and there would be a prosecution once in 1 million years. Quite frankly, that is a ridiculous position for us to find ourselves in, and we cannot allow ourselves to be put in it when it comes to tackling the issue of workers who are being exploited. Amendment 56 would require that the resources required to tackle the problem should be set out and calculated.

As I have said, we broadly support the clause, but clarification is required on a few matters, not least resourcing for the position of director. In our evidence session last week, Professor Metcalf said

“I suspect we just do not have the public finances for sufficient enforcement”

before going on to say that

“in the Bill, it does not actually set out quite what the resources are.”––[Official Report, Immigration Public Bill Committee, 20 October 2015; c. 18-19, Q33-36.]

I hope the Minister will go some way to answering that point today or else will support amendment 56, which would allow the new director the opportunity to assess the required resources.

[Paul Blomfield]

I will speak to a number of the amendments in the group, starting with amendment 14. Following on from our earlier discussion, it is important—

[The Chair]

Order. Which amendment?

[Paul Blomfield]

I meant amendment 57, Mr Bone. I apologise—I do not know where I got 14 from; you ought to see my notes!

It is important that the director has a broad oversight and is able to inform Government and the agencies, when they are taking work forward, of all the issues that are a challenge for us, in government and in this place, when trying to ensure effective labour market enforcement.

It is worth mapping out the scale of change within our labour market, as that causes some of the difficulties. For example, according to the Office for National Statistics labour force survey, from 2010 to 2014 jobs paying below the national minimum wage went up 14.8%, zero-hours contracts were up 343%, the number of agency workers went up 20% and bogus self-employment rose substantially.

We all celebrate the entrepreneurial spirit that leads to genuine self-employment, but the level of self-employment in the construction industry is of particular concern—66.7% of workers are now self-employed, which compares with 9% in the finance and insurance sector and 8% in manufacturing. There is concern in the construction industry, where we know that exploitation is rife, that about half those in self-employment are bogusly self-employed.

That sets part of the context for the need to ensure that we have a proper and comprehensive assessment. Kevin Hyland, the independent anti-slavery commissioner, who has been mentioned already this morning, talked about the scale of the problem in the Daily Mail, which I was reading last week—I note the Minister’s surprise, because that is not my habit, but I happened to be catching up with the paper last week. The article stated:

“Up to 13,000 people in Britain are forced to work in factories…sold for sex…or kept in domestic servitude, among other forms of slavery...But in 2014 only 2,340 potential victims were referred to the National Referral Mechanism…And there were only 39 convictions”.

The commissioner made the point that many people have fled from countries where confidence in the rule of law and in the authorities is low, which makes them reluctant to come forward in Britain. He said:

“Victims who come here with a promise of a better life and then become exploited, they’re going to be fearful of going to the authorities through previous experience.”

Such barriers and issues are precisely those that ought to be within the scope of the consideration of the director of labour market enforcement.

The amendment also relates to the remedies secured by victims. Compensation is of enormous importance. Earlier this year I asked the Secretary of State a written question about compensation for victims of trafficking identified by the Gangmasters Licensing Authority. The answer on 17 September was:

“During the financial years 2010/11 to 2012/13, no prosecutions”—

no prosecutions—

“by the Gangmasters’ Licensing Authority resulted in compensation orders for victims.”

I find that shocking. Again, that sort of issue ought to be within the scope of the director of labour market enforcement and within the strategy. Amendment 57—not, indeed, 14—provides that clarity.

On amendment 59, the whole purpose of the director of labour market enforcement is to provide co-ordination, but we need greater clarity. I am interested in the Minister’s response about the relationship between strategic planning, co-ordination and line management. For example, the Gangmasters Licensing Authority is a non-departmental public body and has its own board, which sets its budget and defines its priorities. We want to see an overall strategy, but a number of us would be concerned if the integrity of the GLA as originally constituted was in any way undermined. Amendment 59 will, I hope, draw clarification from the Minister.

Amendment 65 is on the Health and Safety Executive. As the shadow Minister pointed out, we are seeking clarity. Why has the HSE, among others, been excluded from the director’s remit? The Minister will recall from the evidence we received from the chair of the Migration Advisory Committee that there is a real case to include the HSE, local authorities and, potentially, sections of DWP. When we look at the scale of labour market enforcement between different agencies, the Employment Agency Standards Inspectorate has nine inspectors, the GLA has 69, the national minimum wage inspectorate has 232, and the HSE has 1,047 staff, of whom 972 are front-line inspectors. If we are to have a coherent approach to labour market enforcement, it would be useful to have a clearer understanding of the Government’s thinking on why at this stage the HSE is excluded.

I am not sure whether this is an oversight on the Government’s part—again, clarification would be helpful—but amendment 64 is seeking simply to ensure that labour market offences committed against all workers are included, because the current definition of “worker” suggests that it would not include—

[Craig Whittaker]

Not just amendment 64, which I shall come to, but all these amendments were perhaps summed up best by the hon. Member for Glasgow North East, who said that they are about the enforcement of employment law. Is not that amendment asking employers to specifically break employment law, which currently excludes them from employing anybody who is not legally allowed to work in this country anyway?

[Paul Blomfield]

No. I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention because it allows me the opportunity to clarify that the amendment is seeking to ensure that labour market offences by employers committed against all workers be included within the scope of the director of labour market enforcement’s work. The point is that, as currently drafted—unless the Minister can provide contrary clarification—the measure suggests that undocumented workers will be excluded. Clearly, it is nonsense that a labour market enforcement director who is seeking to challenge all abuse in all parts of the labour market would have excluded from his terms of reference that part of the labour market which, by definition, is most likely to be subject to substantial abuse and exploitation. The Minister might be able to provide clarification that makes the amendment unnecessary.

[James Brokenshire]

I thank all hon. Members for their contributions in this mini-debate. Equally, I should celebrate and recognise the contribution from the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North. I appreciate that this may be a rare moment in the consideration of the Bill—he is supportive of the measures—but, in good spirits, I welcome his comments and the support he has given. I think that there is a shared recognition that we need to deal with exploitation and to achieve better co-ordination, and that we need the strategic response that is provided by the Bill. I welcome his comments in the spirit in which they were made.

The hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras asked me at the outset about organised criminal activity and the evidence base. It is feedback from enforcement officers that tells us that the incidence of forced labour may be growing at a faster rate than other types of exploitation. It appears to be due to criminal gangs infiltrating the supply chain, which I know is a broader issue that was debated during the passage of the Modern Slavery Act. I will not stray widely, but perhaps that will give him a sense of what we have been looking at.

Amendments 57 and 58 relate to the contents of the director’s annual strategy to address non-compliance in the labour market in the forthcoming financial year. Although I agree entirely with the intention behind the amendments, they are unnecessary because it is the Government’s expectation that the director will feed information of that nature into the planning and reporting cycle. Page 24 of the consultation document says of the strategy:

“It will set out, for the financial year ahead: the priorities for enforcement; the outcomes required from the enforcement bodies; and the budgets for the enforcement bodies, within the total envelope of available funding.”

So we have been quite clear about our expectations.

The issue of how non-compliance in the labour market should be addressed is at the heart of the strategy, which is why clause 2(2)(b)(i) requires the director to propose how labour market enforcement functions should be exercised, or, to put it another way, how the three enforcement agencies under the director’s remit should operate to address non-compliance.

The Government would not consider the strategy to be effective if it did not identify the threats and obstacles to effective labour market enforcement. We expect the director to turn over stones to tell us where the gaps are and to propose how they can be addressed. That is a crucial and valuable aspect of the role. Similarly, the Government would not consider any strategy or report to be effective if it did not examine the important issue of securing remedies for victims, which would naturally include recovering wages owed to workers and sanctions against employers for labour market offences.

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[Paul Blomfield]

Will the Minister elaborate a little on how he sees that information sharing developing? Given the scale of the HSE inspectorate’s opportunity to identify, for example in the construction industry, wider labour market abuses, that is clearly significant. I am keen to hear how the Minister anticipates HSE inspectors being briefed, trained and supported on those wider potential labour market infringements, in a way that would inform and guide the other three agencies under the jurisdiction of the director of labour market enforcement.

[James Brokenshire]

The hon. Gentleman will be aware that information sharing is a specific point in our consultation. There are barriers—legal and otherwise—to sharing data between enforcement bodies. That is why we are consulting on that point, and some suggestions have been highlighted in the consultation document.

We are reflecting carefully on that and have put it out to consultation to consider the most effective and appropriate ways to do so. We want these gateways to information sharing, which we have in other enforcement spheres. I want to reflect on the responses to the consultation on that point to ensure that we act appropriately.

I hope I have set out why we think this role is different in character and nature, in terms of workplace safety and the best interests of the child, and why we do not think it would be appropriate to include the proposal in this part.

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[James Brokenshire]

I think it is the latter of the two points that the hon. and learned Gentleman has articulated. We think it is covered by other means, but, for the purposes of defining the specific role, it is about lawful entitlement to be within the UK. For the reasons that I have outlined, there are other mechanisms and ways in which the issue is being addressed. It is about labour market enforcement and the lawful upholding of existing legislation. The amendment appears to take us in a direction that would apply new rights to those who are here illegally, whereas there are other mechanisms through the linkages, through the rights that the Gangmasters Licensing Authority will have, and through the consultation. It is about the extension of those aspects through other means. That is why I made the point about the specific role for the director in supporting this crucial work through a different mechanism, through the work that the Gangmasters Licensing Authority will take forward. The role concerns the lawful upholding of existing labour rights, rather than the extension of those rights, which the amendment appears to suggest. That is why we have not found the amendment attractive.

The director’s role that we have proposed supports our wider strategy on modern slavery, enhancing the response to labour exploitation. Crucially, it should not confuse or undermine the responsibility of the National Crime Agency and the national policing lead to lead the operational law enforcement response to modern slavery, overseen by the independent anti-slavery commissioner. Where an illegal worker is a victim of modern slavery, appropriate support mechanisms are available to them via the national referral mechanism. Their status as a victim will be reflected in how they are subsequently treated by the immigration system, including the relevant reflection periods during which the person will be granted leave to remain. There are also crucial protections within the criminal justice system, which we will come to later.

Amendment 62 seeks to specify the content of the director’s annual report in the same way as amendments 57 and 58 did for the director’s strategy. I do not propose to repeat the same arguments that I made in respect of the earlier amendments, but I want to be clear that this amendment is unnecessary.

Clause 4 as drafted states that the annual report must include:

“an assessment of the extent to which labour market enforcement functions were exercised in accordance with the strategy”.

As we expect the director’s strategy to propose how the enforcement bodies should tackle non-compliance, seek remedies for victims and overcome obstacles to compliance, it follows that the director’s annual report will set out how successful the enforcement bodies were at doing exactly these things.

[Paul Blomfield]

I am still puzzled by the Minister’s comments on amendment 64 and how the director of labour market enforcement would be able to consider all workers irrespective of their immigration status. If I understood him correctly, undocumented victims of trafficking would not be covered by the work of the director. If that was the case, would that not hinder his or her work?

[James Brokenshire]

No. It is complementary to the work of the National Crime Agency and the independent commissioner, so the Bill provides clarity in that regard.

Immigration Bill (Sixth sitting)

Paul Blomfield Excerpts

Tuesday 27th October 2015 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for Immigration (James Brokenshire)]

When we broke for our short adjournment, we were touching on the use of a particular term: we were looking slightly ahead to the use of the term “worker” in clauses 3 and 9. I want to ensure clarity about where that term is used because that may be informative to the Committee and perhaps help to narrow the debate and argument.

I assure hon. Members that the definition of worker in clause 3(6) applies only in one context, which is in respect of clause 3(4)(e)(i), which relates to sections 2 and 4 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. The definition of worker in all other Acts in the director’s remit is unaffected. The hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras may find that and the context in which the definition applies helpful.

The definition of worker in the Employment Agencies Act 1973 is unaffected. The Employment Agency Standards Inspectorate will continue to take action against rogue employment agencies and businesses regardless of whether the worker is here legally or illegally. Similarly, the definition of worker in the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004 is unaffected. The Gangmasters Licensing Authority will continue to take action against rogue gangmasters regardless of whether the worker is here legally or illegally. That matches the concerns raised in contributions this morning.

Furthermore, the definition in the National Minimum Wage Act 1998 is also unaffected. That will continue to apply only to legal workers—that is how it is framed. The provisions are about not extending rights to illegal workers, but bringing strategic oversight together under one person. We do not think it is appropriate to give illegal workers the right to the national minimum wage. Of course, the employer who employs an illegal worker and pays them less than the national minimum wage will still be committing an offence under section 21 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, which comes with a higher penalty. The Bill also includes measures to enable us to take a tougher enforcement approach to employers of illegal workers, including increased prison sentences if they employ people whom they know or reasonably suspect are illegal workers.

The definition of worker in clause 3(6) has no effect on section 1 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. All offences of slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour will be within the director of labour market enforcement’s remit, because it would be illogical to exclude those forced to work from the director’s purview. Indeed, all offences of trafficking under sections 2 and 4 of the Modern Slavery Act that involve slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour will also be within the director’s remit.

The definition in clause 3(6) also has no effect on the trafficking offences criminalised by sections 2 and 4 of the Modern Slavery Act. The only effect the definition has is on which type of trafficking offences are in the director’s remit. Offences involving sexual exploitation, removal of organs, securing services by force and securing services from children and vulnerable persons will be in the director’s remit only if they relate to workers or work seekers provided for in the definition—legal workers. It will still be an offence to traffic an illegal worker for any of those purposes, but we do not think it appropriate for that to be in the director’s remit. Instead, such offences will be dealt with by the police and the National Crime Agency. All modern slavery offences will be in the Independent Anti-slavery Commissioner’s remit.

As I explained before, the definition is not about granting new rights or curtailing offences. It is simply about creating the right remit for the director of labour market enforcement, which I believe the clause does. We are clear that the remit provides the director with the ability to tackle the broad spectrum of labour exploitation, from non-compliance to the most serious harm against workers.

I recall the comment I made earlier about the relationship between the commissioner and director, where the commissioner will effectively have that oversight role. Therefore, we believe that that will lock things together in a clear fashion.

I appreciate that this has drawn us into something more technical than contemplated at first sight by the amendment. I hope, for the sake of clarity, I have spelled out the context in which the definition is used.

[Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way and for the statement he has just shared with us. I am not absorbing its detail as quickly as I would wish; perhaps we can find a way to reflect on it before we reach a final view.

Notwithstanding the points the Minister has made, the concern remains that we are in danger of including only offences committed against workers as defined in the Employment Rights Act 1996, that is, those with a valid contract of employment, so by definition, regular migration status. Although we are trying to achieve the same objective here, the provision might risk leaving the director powerless to investigate trafficking in the very sector of the labour market—illegal working—that the Bill is designed to target.

As the Minister indicated, this is about not conferring new rights on workers, whether in relation to the national minimum wage or whatever, but ensuring that the director can cover all the listed offences, no matter against whom they are committed. As it stands, the clause is potentially in violation of article 3 of the European convention on action against trafficking in human beings, which guarantees the provisions of that convention, irrespective of national origin.

I take it that the purpose of clause 3(4)(e)(i) is to narrow the remit of the director so that he or she covers human trafficking offences only for labour exploitation, as opposed to sexual exploitation or organ harvesting. In that case, subject to reaching agreement on the position in our amendment, the Minister would have our support. The way the clause is currently drafted seems to exclude human trafficking of illegal workers from the remit. Further confusion is created by including human trafficking offences committed against “a person seeking work” in the director’s remit. We just need a bit of time for reflection on that, if the Minister would agree.

[The Chair]

Before the Minister answers, these are detailed and complex matters, which is why I am allowing the interventions to be relatively lengthy. I would not normally stand for an intervention that long, but I will because it is on a technicality. Do not think, ladies and gentlemen, that you will get away with it later.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Brokenshire]

As the hon. and learned Gentleman has highlighted, the amendment seeks to clarify the role of the proposed information hub. In our ongoing consultation on tackling labour market exploitation, we set out the intention behind our proposal for an information hub, which is to

“inform and support delivery of the Director’s strategic plan”.

The hon. and learned Gentleman highlighted the relevant section in paragraph 71 of the consultation document. We will continue to reflect on that as we receive submissions in response to the consultation.

I stress that there is already close co-operation between the different labour market enforcement bodies, often in tackling abuses. However, that is sometimes impeded by barriers to sharing data and because the bodies cannot share data. The clause therefore gives the new director the responsibility to lead an information hub, which will form a coherent view of the nature and extent of exploitation and of non-compliance in the labour market.

The director will use the hub to formulate the strategy. The information hub will gather available data from the labour market enforcement bodies and other sources, such as immigration enforcement, the police, the National Crime Agency, the Health and Safety Executive, local authorities and the voluntary sector. The hub will analyse information and develop a much richer picture of the nature, extent and impacts of exploitation in the labour market. It will identify where workers are at risk of abuse and use that information to formulate the enforcement strategy. It will also provide tactical intelligence to the enforcement bodies for use in targeting their enforcement activity. The hub is intended to help strategically and tactically. It will be able to assist in the tasking of operations and to see and understand what practice might inform strategy. It will assist in the promulgation of good practice and in employers fulfilling their duties and responsibilities.

The hon. and learned Gentleman highlighted resourcing. Resources will be provided by the Secretary of State and may include officers from the enforcement agencies, their parent Departments and the wider law enforcement community, so there is that sense of people, as well as of how data are provided and linked. We are giving further consideration to how things would work practically and who would be involved, but in fairness we also want to allow the consultation to inform further development. I am highlighting the nature of what we envisage that the hub will provide—a centre for the sharing of intelligence and data to inform the director and to inform, potentially, the tactical response.

[Paul Blomfield]

I reassure you, Mr Bone, that this is a brief intervention. I thank you for your indulgence earlier; I thought that that was an important point that needed to be resolved.

On the question of funding, the Minister spoke earlier about the integrity of the budgets of the three separate agencies over which the director of labour market enforcement will have strategic overview. He pointed out that the agencies sit within individual Departments. He is obviously right—we agree—that data sharing and better use of data are critical to the effective development of the role, but that will presumably require, apart from people pooling, some additional resource. Is he saying that that resource will not be drawn from any of the three existing budgets and will, therefore, be found by the Secretary of State as an additional support?

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful to the Minister. Of course, any measures to give people the confidence to come forward should be pursued. There would be general agreement about that—in particular, in relation to some of the offences we have been discussing. However, adding an offence when there is no evidence that it is needed simply makes a bad situation worse. If the Minister has evidence that anybody at all has ever said, “The problem here is that we haven’t got an offence for the employees”, I have not seen it and it has not been set out in any great detail.

[Paul Blomfield]

Does my hon. and learned Friend accept that the nub of the Government’s argument in relation to this offence, as we understand it, is to reduce pull factors—to create a disincentive for those coming to this country to enter into illegal work? Is he concerned, as I am, that the Government seem to have no evidence that it will work? We have heard substantial evidence that this may be counterproductive, but there is no evidence from the Government that it will work as a deterrent and undermine pull factors.

[Keir Starmer]

I agree with my hon. Friend and am grateful for his intervention. What is important is that the objective behind the Bill is properly pursued. There is a real risk that introducing an offence against the employee will be counterproductive if it drives underground the very group of people who are the most vulnerable when there is little or no evidence that the offence is needed.

I want to go a little further than that, because this is an offence without any mental element in the Bill. It is strict in the sense that absent the right status, the offence is made out, and then it is an offence without a defence, which is an unusual combination in criminal law. For example, some people will be here working in the belief that they have the right status because they are sponsored by the employer or somebody else. However, unbeknown to them, they may not have status because their employer has not correctly completed all the necessary arrangements for sponsorship. They fall into a category of individuals who are here without the required status, but without any knowledge of that or any intention to be in that position. Given the inflexibility of the offence, they would be immediately criminalised without even the opportunity of raising a defence of reasonable excuse. Their defence would be, “I am working. I had understood that my employer or somebody else had completed all the necessary forms and legalities. It now transpires they haven’t, but I had absolutely no reason to think that to be the case.” At the very least, if the clause is to stand, such an offence—there could be many other examples—ought to have a reasonable excuse defence, and that argument lies behind the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anne McLaughlin]

It would depend on whether he had been caught working. He would be prosecuted and could have been imprisoned. Thankfully for Mehdi and Rezi, that did not happen, but there are many other people like them. She was extremely vulnerable. Had the Bill been around and they had been imprisoned, she would have been left destitute, facing deportation without him by her side. With him by her side, she was terrified enough. He would have gone to prison and then, undoubtedly, he would have been deported separately from her.

A fit, healthy married man in his 30s who is working illegally is not someone we typically highlight when trying to attract compassion from those who wish to control illegal working and are also concerned about vulnerable people, but who among us could not feel compassion for Mehdi and Rezi? We should remember that even those who are not the archetypal exploitable worker often have truly heart-breaking stories and are often left with no choices. The Bill would make it even riskier for them. If it is riskier, they will become ever more dependent on their abusive, exploitative employers. They deserve our compassion and support to get out of those situations. They do not deserve the threat of a prison sentence hanging over them.

[Paul Blomfield]

On amendment 68, I welcome the observations the Minister made in his latter comments. The Bill creates an unreasonable anomaly between the caveats it provides for employers and the absence of any for employees. As I understand it, under clause 9, employers are only guilty of the offence of employing an illegal worker if they do so “knowing” or

“having reasonable cause to believe”

that the person is an illegal worker.

We are saying to employers that there is a test of reasonableness before they are criminalised for the act of wrongful employment. The problem with clause 8 is that there is no such test of reasonableness. With the amendment, we seek to bring some equivalence between the way we approach employers and the way we approach employees by enabling them to be able to demonstrate “reasonable excuse” for the predicament in which they find themselves. Although I have reservations about the entire clause, were the Government successful in retaining it, I hope they would look generously on the amendment, which could provide that equivalence.

I have concerns about clause 8 more generally, as it criminalises the act of illegal working. I take the point made by my hon. and learned Friend the shadow Minister that we might disagree on this matter across the House. However, I do not think we need to. A number of us have said that we are at one on the objectives of the Bill, as we were with the Modern Slavery Act. In seeking to ensure that clause 8 does not stand part of the Bill, we are at one with the Government’s policy objectives of achieving effective labour market enforcement and, indeed, of combating modern slavery. Less than two years ago, in November 2013, the Home Secretary made combating modern slavery a priority. I do not have the experience that Conservative Members and, indeed, my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham have of serving on that Bill Committee but I commend those who were involved on that legislation, just as I commend the Home Secretary on the priority that she placed on combating modern slavery. That aim won wide support, found expression in the Modern Slavery Act, and took us in the right direction. The problem with clause 8 of this Bill is that it risks undoing some of the good of the Modern Slavery Act.

I am sure that the Government do not intend to undermine their own legislation so soon after it has become law so I hope that the Minister will give serious regard to the points that we are raising in suggesting that clause 8 should not stand part of the Bill. I hope he recognises that if it does, slavery is more likely to thrive. I notice that he is shaking his head and I look forward to his response.

I put this to the Minister: what do we know? What is all the evidence clear about? I am happy for him to intervene if he disagrees, but all the evidence is clear on one thing. The more vulnerable workers are, the stronger the hand of the gangmasters or the unscrupulous employers who seek to exploit them. I am sure that the Minister agrees, as I notice he does not wish to intervene. Vulnerability plays into the hands of those who seek to exploit, such as unscrupulous employers. The more vulnerable workers feel, the less likely they are to come forward to report their abusers. Clause 8 increases that vulnerability and strengthens the hands of the gangmasters. I note that the Minister is again shaking his head. I would be happy for him to intervene if he can provide any evidence to suggest that that is not the case. When we took evidence from witnesses, we heard from many experts who said that this was the case; none said that it was not.

The clause, by threatening exploited workers with 12 months in prison if they are deemed to have committed the offence of illegal working, gives another crucial card to the suit of cards that gangmasters can play. It does not only affect those who have committed the offence of illegal working; it changes the psychology and relationship even between the employer and the employees who have not committed an offence. According to the National Crime Agency, in cases that it has taken up, 78% of those who have been exploited for their labour in the UK actually have the right to work here as EEA nationals. Rights awareness among those workers is low and their options are limited, which allows unscrupulous employers to hold the threat of removal over them.

[James Brokenshire]

I have listened carefully to the hon. Gentleman. In the example he just gave, he said that the individuals concerned had the right to work. How would they be caught under the clause if they would not be working illegally?

[Paul Blomfield]

I thank the Minister for that intervention because it gives me the opportunity to explain more clearly; I apologise if I did not do so before. The point I am making is that clause 8 affects those who do not have the right to work, because it criminalises them and makes it less likely that they will whistleblow and report their employers. Rights awareness is low, even among those who have the right to work here. We have seen various cases where exploitative practices have been blown apart. Part of the intimidation and the way in which employers were enforcing compliance was by cloaking a series of threats that did not apply in those cases. That is my point.

[James Brokenshire]

The hon. Gentleman makes an interesting point, but he seems to be articulating some of the broader issues that we know are redolent around slavery and trafficking, on debt bondage, housing, and physical enslavement. It is those threats and issues and the threat of deportation that might be more redolent in the examples that he has given, rather than law enforcement.

[Paul Blomfield]

I take the Minister’s point, but why give those who exploit yet another card to play? The threat of 12 months’ imprisonment and criminalisation is the card that will be exercised both in relation to those who have no right to be here, or to be working, and in relation to those who do.

[Sarah Champion]

One of our witnesses, Caroline Robinson from Focus on Labour Exploitation, said:

“We know that 78% of those exploited for their labour are, in fact, documented in the UK.”––[Official Report, Immigration Public Bill Committee, 20 October; c. 28, Q59.]

[Paul Blomfield]

My hon. Friend makes exactly the point that I was seeking to make. Even where people have rights to work, the lack of rights awareness and the intimidatory relationship between exploiter and exploited make this another card to play. I see the Minister is still shaking his head. Even if we were to restrict the measure simply to those who did not have the right to work, we are still giving the exploiter another card to intimidate and therefore make it less likely that people would be willing to whistleblow. I am happy for the Minister to intervene on me. Perhaps he could illustrate the evidence that suggests the clause will be of assistance—not the intuition, the belief, the view, but the evidence.

[James Brokenshire]

The hon. Gentleman is encouraging me to intervene. I will take him through the logic as to why we think the clause is necessary. The interesting and thoughtful way in which he always presents his case identifies broader issues, and I do not see this offence changing the situation in the way that he says. The cases that he has enunciated and the evidence that the hon. Member for Rotherham highlighted show that in the majority of cases people did have rights and are not touched by the offence. The area is complex, and I know that the hon. Gentleman understands this. It is about the broader issues and themes that I touched on earlier.

[The Chair]

Order. Mr Blomfield, I have used that trick a lot of times, but, given that the Minister is going to speak and that some of the responses will have to be lengthy, the matter is not right for an intervention, so it might be better if the Minister deals with some of the issues in his remarks later.

[Paul Blomfield]

I am pleased to know that I am following in sound footsteps, Chair, but I will take your advice.

[Anne McLaughlin]

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that it is not only the exploitative employer who can continue to exploit the person who is working illegally? Undocumented workers face threats from all sorts of people. I spoke to somebody who had worked illegally for different reasons to the previous person I talked about. They were not only ruthlessly exploited by the employer, but were blackmailed by colleagues who themselves were working legally, but were aware or at least suspected that this person was working illegally. He faced blackmail, threats and intimidation. Although he said, “Actually, you don’t know what my status is”, the point that the blackmailers made was, “Are you willing to take that risk?” Of course, such workers are not. The exploitation comes from all around, not just from one employer.

[Paul Blomfield]

The hon. Lady adds another dimension to my argument that the clause makes those who are already in a precarious situation more vulnerable and open to exploitation. In an earlier intervention, my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham mentioned the evidence given by Caroline Robinson from Focus on Labour Exploitation, which works directly with victims of trafficking for labour exploitation and of which I am the trustee along with some Members from other parties.

FLEX has identified three drivers of labour exploitation. The first is the feeling among migrant workers that they deserve less or have fewer rights than UK citizens. The second is a lack of checks on labour standards in the workplace, including everything from health and safety to minimum wage enforcement. The third is a fear of officials, especially of immigration officials. The Bill makes each of those drivers worse, and clause 8 has a particular effect on the first and third factors.

First, on the rights of migrant workers, the clause puts the focus on immigration status as a condition of asserting labour rights. By criminalising the exploited worker, whether they are committing the offence of illegal working or not, they can be treated and threatened by a gangmaster as if they are. On the second driver, we have talked at length about a number of aspects of labour market enforcement. The Bill seems to reflect the Government’s desire to move further towards an intelligence-based approach to enforcement. Essential to that intelligence is whistleblowing. We need to ensure that we do nothing in the Bill to discourage exploited workers from coming forward and thereby give gangmasters another card to play. Sadly, the clause risks doing exactly that.

On the third driver of labour exploitation, the problem that we identified earlier—the overlap between labour market enforcement and immigration enforcement—is at the heart of the Bill. The clause gives undocumented workers another reason to be worried. The consequence is that labour exploitation is not rooted out and continues to be a pull factor for migration, which is against the Government’s policy objectives.

Mr Bone, I will take your advice. I will not ask the Minister to intervene, but I press him to share evidence from anywhere in the world that shows that the approach of criminalising workers, unlike many other aspects of the Bill with which we agree, assists in the policy objective that he outlined and we share.

[Sarah Champion]

Will my hon. Friend comment on something else that Caroline Robinson said, which gets to the nub of his point that clause 8 does not meet the Government’s objective? She said:

“What we think will prevent people from working here undocumented is to reduce the demand for undocumented workers. To do that, we require enforcement of labour standards across the board. To be clear, the demand for undocumented workers is not because employers prefer undocumented over documented workers; it is because they cannot pay documented workers below minimum wage as easily as they can undocumented workers.”––[Official Report, Immigration Public Bill Committee, 20 October 2015; c. 28, Q59.]

[Paul Blomfield]

My hon. Friend will not be surprised to know that I agree. The quotation adds very much to the case that I seek to make; perhaps it makes the point more clearly than I was doing.

I want to move on and talk about international examples. I have challenged the Minister and I am confident that he will come back with examples later. I have challenged him to give comparisons, but let me share one that was shared with me yesterday when I met representatives of the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings—GRETA. They shared with me the example of Italy. They had done some work and talked about the amendments made to the Italian Consolidated Immigration Act in 2002, the so-called Bossi Fini law, which was aimed at regulating migrant worker flows by introducing a system of entry quotas, and which was supplemented in 2009 by the criminalisation of irregular entry and stay. Their concern was that the requirements of a formal employment contract in order to obtain a residence permit exposed migrant workers who were already at risk of labour exploitation because of their irregular migration status. They were worried that irregular migrants would be afraid to report cases of exploitation to the authorities because they were concerned about being detained and expelled. The United Nations special rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially in women and children, reported on the negative consequences of the criminalisation of irregular migration for victims of trafficking.

In response to points made to them by GRETA, the Italian authorities indicated that there were 14 convictions for trafficking in human beings in 2010 and nine in 2011. GRETA was concerned that those conviction rates were very low and urged the Italian authorities to strengthen their efforts to ensure that crimes related to trafficking were proactively investigated and prosecuted promptly and effectively. They asked the Italian authorities to study the implications of their immigration legislation, particularly the offence of illegal entry and stay. As a consequence, in January 2014, the Italian Senate approved Government measures to decriminalise those aspects of illegal immigration. They had recognised that the approach of criminalisation was not only unhelpful and policy-neutral but actively counterproductive.

[James Brokenshire]

I am interested in what the hon. Gentleman is saying, but does he accept that the approach of immigration enforcement in relation to those who have entered the country illegally and committed an offence is to deport rather than prosecute?

[Paul Blomfield]

I accept that it is to deport. Clearly, those who are here without rights, having exercised due process to establish whether they have a right to remain, should be deported. There is no disagreement on that, but does the provision of criminalising illegal working in clause 8 assist in that process or not? All the evidence seems to suggest that it will drive people underground, out of sight and make them less likely to whistleblow. That will frustrate the aspirations of the Government, with which we agree, to tackle both illegal working and its exploitation.

[James Brokenshire]

We have had a wide-ranging debate on clause 8 and the amendment tabled by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras. It is important to take a step back. In all the contributions to date, the focus has been on the victims of trafficking and the effects of it; I will come on to those issues in more detail. There has not been much focus on the impact of illegal working on the rest of the population. For example, an illegal worker in effect takes a job from someone who is here legally—people born in this country, or those who have gone through all the right routes to come to this country.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Brokenshire]

If I may, I would like to make a bit of progress.

We are also keen to take action in the Bill to address a genuine gap in the law that currently impedes the Home Office’s ability to address the economic incentives behind illegal work and impairs our clear message that those engaging in such activity should not profit from it. It is already a criminal offence to enter or remain in the UK illegally, as I have highlighted. However, migrants who require permission to be in the UK but do not have it, such as overstayers, may not be committing a separate offence of working illegally if they engage in paid work, including employment and self-employment. That is the gap for overstayers who go on to work. In other words, they have not come into the country illegally, so the courts do not always regard earnings derived from working illegally as the proceeds of crime when considering cash seizure or asset confiscation cases. The new offence tackles for the first time the difficult issue of those in self-employed occupations.

What is important in the context of the Bill is how the offence links to economic incentives and proceeds of crime legislation. As hon. Members will see, there is a specific reference to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 in the clause. I would articulate this as focusing on some of the economic benefits that might be derived. We think that there are benefits in how this is framed to assist immigration enforcement officers in their work, because they have identified this specific element in the course of their activities when seeking the removal of people from this country.

[Paul Blomfield]

It would be helpful if the Minister could tell us how many people fall into the category of those who are working illegally because they are overstayers. I anticipate that the number will be much smaller than the general figures. This is about balancing the impact on one group against the negative impact on another. Will he provide those numbers, both specifically and as a proportion of overall illegal workers?

[James Brokenshire]

The hon. Gentleman makes an interesting point, but as he will well know, one challenge that we have faced is understanding overstaying, which was why we introduced exit checks at the start of this year to identify more clearly patterns of behaviour, sectors and other elements that are relevant to those who are not overstaying the leave granted to this country. He asks me for information that is not currently held, and it is equally difficult to estimate the size of the population who are working illegally. I am sure that the labour market enforcement director will consider that when he examines the size of the problem in his reports to Ministers, but that does not undercut what immigration enforcement representatives say to me about the gap in the existing legal framework.

We need to ensure that there is an overarching approach on criminal law and, as I have said, there is a criminal aspect of people entering the country illegally. We are creating an additional offence for those who are overstaying, who are not covered by the existing criminal law. That means that they are not subject to proceeds of crime legislation, which is having the negative impact about which we have heard.

I share the concerns of the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras about ensuring that an offence is used when circumstances suggest that it is the right approach. However, it is important to remember that individuals with an irregular immigration status will have committed a criminal offence under existing legislation by coming into the UK in the manner that I have described, regardless of whether they are working. Therefore, I do not accept arguments made about how the criminal law, or an extension to it in the form of the offence we are discussing, will make the situation more difficult, as has been suggested. However, there are some important points to which I want to respond, including what the hon. Member for Rotherham said about slavery and existing offences under the Modern Slavery Act 2015. She served on the Modern Slavery Public Bill Committee, so she understands these issues.

Immigration Bill (Third sitting)

Paul Blomfield Excerpts

Thursday 22nd October 2015 Public Bill Committees

[Craig Whittaker]

Q 229 I do not want to undermine or belittle the six cases by any stretch of the imagination, but from the thousands who have been through the system in the past four years, which is what you mentioned, it is an incredibly small part. It would therefore be very difficult to say that the system is broken. Is that right?

Jerome Phelps: I do not think any of us have suggested that everyone in detention is abused. It is a small part but we have functioning safeguards, such as the bail system. What is concerning about the Bill is that it is removing some of those safeguards.

[Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)]

Q 230 Could I follow up on Mr Newlands’ question about enforcement powers to which Mr Yeo gave a fairly powerful response? The provisions of the Bill give immigration officers what might be described as police-like powers. Could you reflect on the different way in which immigration officers are subject to challenge, scrutiny and oversight in the exercise of their powers in contrast with the police and the exercise of theirs currently?

Adrian Berry: My role in looking at enforcement is largely concerned with policy innovation rather than practice, because a lot of these things are not litigated in court. Immigration officers’ powers have grown piecemeal over the years through a series of legislative innovations, to the point where they now look like a parallel police force in respect of migration issues. In that context, there is not the same culture of scrutiny and oversight that one sees under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and with the Independent Police Complaints Commission and various other bodies. It is a developing situation.

Our concerns—whatever one thinks of the situation of the use of police powers by the police—is that this is a piecemeal accrual of powers without, if you like, a moment where it is recognised that you are dealing with a secondary form of police force. You need to develop not just the legislative framework, but the culture of scrutiny and good behaviour within an institution if you are going to have a police force. This sort of innovation—for example, the ability to enter private homes and search without warrant—can affect all of us. It is not just a situation of powers relating to migrants. Any investigation could come to anybody’s front door. The proper control and scrutiny of those sorts of powers is vital.

[Paul Blomfield]

Q 231 I wonder if anybody on the panel could develop that point about proper scrutiny. I am conscious, even within the regulatory framework that the police exercise, that careless use of police powers often has a much more significant impact in terms of community relations and tensions. I do not understand what checks and balances are in place for immigration officers. Which ones do you think ought to be in place?

Don Flynn: Presumably, one of the most important is the right of appeal if the seizure of property or evidence leads to an adverse decision—the possibility of challenging that decision through the appeal process. The sort of experience that we have had is with evidence of a breach of an immigration condition. Sometimes it is clearcut, but very often it is not. Very often the authorities think that it has emerged only after they have read a lot of private letters and diary entries. They might conclude that correspondence with somebody who, for example, acted as a sponsor at an early stage but subsequently turned acrimonious—arguments broke out—was evidence that fraud was used to support the application for a visa in the first instance. In the absence of an effective check on that—the ability to review it and to appeal a matter in circumstances where executive powers for administrative removal are much stronger—virtually any personal items or correspondences are regarded as evidence that will lead to a person being removed.

Colin Yeo: Again, I am thinking in terms of what problem the Bill is trying to address. In terms of enforcement, I am not sure what the ill or the problem is that needs addressing. No doubt, immigration officers would like more powers, but I am not aware of any evidence to show that they do not have enough powers as things stand. If we look, for example, at the ultimate end of enforcement, it is removals, basically. I have the statistics in front of me from the latest quarterly release. Enforcement by means of removal is falling year on year. That is not because officers did not have the powers at the start of that period. The powers are the same—in fact, they have increased under the 2014 Act. That is not the problem. The problem is making good use of existing powers and doing so in a lawful way.

[The Chair]

Thank you. I am conscious that we still have quite a lot of Members to get in, so I am going to move on—Kelly Tolhurst.

Immigration Bill (Fourth sitting)

Paul Blomfield Excerpts

Thursday 22nd October 2015 Public Bill Committees

[Chloe Smith]

Q 260 Would the rest of the panel like to make any comment on this notion of having to reduce our undesired costs to be able to do more for those who most need it?

Paul Greenhalgh: Absolutely, and we would want to do that to ensure that the relevant safeguards are in place, particularly for children in families.

Henry St Clair Miller: I agree with that, yes.

[Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)]

Q 261 I would just like to follow up a little on some of the witnesses’ answers to the Minister’s questions about the interaction that you have had with the Home Office. Mr Greenhalgh, you said in relation to the 2005 pilot by the then Labour Government that it not only failed but was counter- productive, in that it drove many people underground and made compliance more difficult. From the discussions that you have had with the Home Office, do you know what different measures the Home Office is putting in place that will mean this time it is different, and are you confident that that is the case?

Paul Greenhalgh: I spoke about the complexity of the current assessment system when families need to come to local authorities for support. So, as the Bill is currently drafted, we believe that the number of families that would inevitably come to local authorities for support would increase significantly.

One of the questions that we are exploring with the Home Office is whether it is appropriate to leave the legislation around the Children Act as it currently stands, which we then have to apply to those families, or whether we take migrant families without status out of the Children Act and provide support for them through schedule 3 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. There are some advantages to that, in terms of the potential for establishing a new simplified assessment system, for providing support in a way that takes more account of the family’s immigration status and for being more explicit about the fact that it would result in a clear new burden on the local authority, which would need to be funded. That is one mechanism that we are in discussion about.

[Paul Blomfield]

Q 262 I will come to funding in a moment, if I may. I was particularly interested in the issue of compliance. You pointed out that the previous pilot had been counterproductive. What indications have you been given in your discussions with the Home Office that you think, in terms of the policy objective, that it will be different this time?

Paul Greenhalgh: We still have concerns about the assumptions about behavioural change and the extent to which families will take responsibility for removing themselves from the country. That is why, in addition to the technical discussions about where changes might be made to the Bill or not, we think that that needs to go alongside closer partnership working between local authorities and the Home Office, to ensure that families who are no longer getting support and who need to think about removing themselves from the country have a more joined-up approach from the local authority and the Home Office working together. We think that that would make it more effective, more user-friendly and clearer for people and more nationally consistent, and so would present the potential for a series of arrangements that could be more effective than the Bill as currently drafted.

[Paul Blomfield]

Q 263 You are describing your aspirations for how it might be more effective, but I am thinking of where you have got to in your discussions with the Home Office. You have said that there is a constructive engagement. As we stand at the moment, in terms of what has been agreed, would it be unreasonable to say—I do not want to put words in your mouth—that there is nothing that gives you confidence that this would be any different from the pilot in 2005?

Paul Greenhalgh: No, I would not say that, actually. I think that there are some interesting ideas on the table. I think that we are seeking further assurance around the extent to which those new possible technical arrangements would provide the assurances that we think need to be in place, in terms of both safeguarding children and recognising the cost to local authorities.

[Paul Blomfield]

Q 264 On the cost, it is about that assurance. Representing a large northern city, I am conscious that local government has taken a disproportionate hit, particularly in areas where we have a concentration of asylum seekers. I am keen to know whether you have assurances from the Home Office that all the additional costs will be met. Yes or no will do.

Councillor Simmonds: The straight answer is no, partly because the Bill is still under debate. As a politician, I am really clear that there needs to be a decision one way or the other. Either we are willing to identify people to remove them from the country, or we need to make provision for their support while they are here. What we cannot do is say that they have no recourse to public funds. That just means that the UK taxpayer picks up the cost through a different route, which is local authority support. That is the thing that needs to change.

Immigration Bill (First sitting)

Paul Blomfield Excerpts

Tuesday 20th October 2015 Public Bill Committees

[Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)]

Q 25 I was in Stockholm last year on a cross-party delegation, where we were all impressed by the rate of compliance and returns under the Swedish system. I just wondered what lessons you all felt we could learn from other countries, particularly in relation to this issue of withdrawal of support, in terms of effective compliance, because that is something that we all share an interest in.

Judith Dennis: I do not know enough about the Swedish system, I am afraid. One of the things that worries me about the family returns process—

[Paul Blomfield]

Perhaps from other international comparisons.

Judith Dennis: One concern when families have come to the end of the asylum process is the lack of legal aid for their immigration cases. Somebody is not often either an asylum seeker or an immigrant; during their time here they may well be in both of those categories. Once their appeal rights are exhausted, they may need professional legal advice to help them pursue their case. There are families who go through the family returns process whose removal is not pursued because they are found to have a right to be there, so we need to remember that we do not always make the right decision first time.

Mike Kaye: The experience of other countries uniformly shows that you want a system that gets the decision right first time and has very little backlog, because that discourages unmeritorious claims. It also, conversely, ensures that you do not have backlogs where it becomes more difficult and, indeed, less reasonable to try to remove people, because the longer they are in the process, they more chance that they will have family obligations here; they have restarted their lives and they may actually have lived the majority of their lives here. If you want a system that works properly, it needs to be resourced to work quickly so that you get accurate and prompt decisions, and those decisions need to be implemented.

John Wilkes: The unintended consequence of backlogs is that when you get to address the backlog, what often happens is that the Home Office exercises its discretion and allows people to remain. The message that that sends to people further back in the system is that if you sit it out longer, you might get a better chance. We need to sort the system out to ensure that decisions are made right first time.

[Paul Blomfield]

Q 26 Briefly, is there any evidence from other countries that withdrawal of support along the lines proposed in the Bill assists compliance?

Mike Kaye: I cannot speak for other countries, but in the UK we can go right back to 1996 and look at how we have tried to use the removal of support either to reduce applications to the country or to encourage returns, and none of those attempts has worked.

[Byron Davies (Gower) (Con)]

Q 27 Good morning. I have heard what you have said in answer to the questions about what is proposed in the Bill. You have given your objections to what is in the Bill, so can I ask you what you think is the way forward to effect behavioural change? What is your answer to it?

Mike Kaye: My answer—I have referred to this before—is that you need to resource the system properly so that you get quick, accurate decisions and you enforce them. That is not about spending more money, because it is a spend-to-save policy. With each caseworker you employed, you would actually save money from resolving asylum cases earlier in the process. Once you reduce backlogs, you reduce incentives for people to make unmeritorious claims. You also ensure that you do not get, as John was saying, people who have been in the system for a long time whom you can no longer remove because they get other obligations to stay in this country. That reduces cost and makes the system work better, and it gives it credibility.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anne McLaughlin]

Q 45 Is a worker who does not have the right to work in this country—for example, a parent who is made destitute by this legislation—and who is being ruthlessly exploited, or physically or sexually abused, more or less likely to seek protection as a result of these provisions?

Professor Metcalf: I do not know all the details of the legislation, other than what I am talking about in terms of enforcement. I would hope that the director makes the enforcement issue more central to the labour market. If we enforce the minimum standards, a person in those circumstances would be more aware of the possibilities—often, particularly if they are migrants, they are not aware of them—and also more likely to go public. I would have thought that that would be quite a major component of the new director’s work. That basically follows up the question from earlier, because if you can stop the exploitation of the migrants, it is also helpful to British residents.

[Paul Blomfield]

Q 46 Sir David, I imagine that you would agree that labour market exploitation takes place where gangmasters and those exploiting people can create a climate of fear and intimidation. You will be aware that in the States, for example, there is a clear protocol between the Department of Labour and the Department of Homeland Security on firewalls between immigration control and labour market enforcement, to ensure the effectiveness of labour market enforcement and to create a climate in which people can properly express concerns. Is it important that we have such a firewall in the UK?

Professor Metcalf: I have never thought about that. I would need to ponder that a little. In some senses, when we went out in Wisbech, for example, we thought that having a Home Office official and somebody from the Department for Work and Pensions doing national insurance, as well as some people from the local authority and a community policeman from Latvia who spoke Latvian—the issue was about Latvians—made for a very strong enforcement team. So I am not sure, on the ground, when you do major inspections like this, that the firewall would be completely helpful, but I have not thought through the issue. I understand what you are saying in terms of the machinery of Government, but I can see that, on the ground, it would actually be quite helpful to have the different bodies.

[Paul Blomfield]

Q 47 Are you not concerned that those who are being exploited might be less willing to talk about their exploitation if they felt that that threatened their immigration status?

Professor Metcalf: No. I think that that would be the case. I mean, by and large, when we were dealing with this, we were dealing with A8 countries. But in terms of threatening immigration status, we do not want people to be exploited, but if their immigration status is that they should not be here, well, they should not be here.

[The Chair]

Time is again catching us out, so I think this will be the last question. Mims Davies.

--- Later in debate ---

[Byron Davies]

Q 64 What would your definition of harbouring be, out of interest?

Caroline Robinson: Harbouring was placed on the UN human trafficking protocol by the Americans at the time of the travaux préparatoires to the protocol. It was based on the definition of harbouring in US domestic law, which is about retaining individuals in a situation—keeping people in a situation and harbouring in the same situation.

[Paul Blomfield]

Q 65 I am keen to ensure that we learn from other countries, and I am interested to know what the panel thinks we can learn from them about effective labour market enforcement. In particular, I am interested in the line of questioning that I was pursuing earlier, which was about the relationship between immigration officers and labour market enforcement regimes. For example, in the States there are clear firewalls, which the Americans think enhance effective labour market enforcement.

John Miley: I have no view on that, I am afraid.

Caroline Robinson: FLEX has just conducted a review of other countries’ labour inspection frameworks, and we have also been looking at research; we have been conducting research as part of a pan-European project on improved identification of victims of modern slavery. That research in particular showed an interesting finding in the Netherlands, which we had previously held up as a great example of labour inspection; it has a very large labour inspectorate and has conducted work in this area in the past. However, the victims of trafficking we spoke to there said that the confused mandate of the SZW inspectorate caused problems on the ground, so that they were unwilling to come forward. That is because the inspectorate serves two functions: one, to identify undocumented workers; and, two, to identify exploitation.

The concern in our research then was that the people we had spoken to had not come forward to be identified by inspectors at the time of inspection, because of the overlap they saw between the inspectorate and the aliens police, which often conduct joint investigations; and the inspectorate has an overlapping mandate.

We are also concerned that where this overlapping mandate exists, it is quite hard to look for two things at the same time. We have our own example of that in the UK. We have the case R v. Khan, Khan and Khan, from 2010, about nine men who were held in in a restaurant by the Khan family in a situation of trafficking for labour exploitation. Those men were there for four years in situations of exploitation before they were discovered and before those perpetrators were convicted of trafficking. During that time, the judge’s report from the court said, there were regular inspections by Home Office officials. So the documents were in order, but the labour exploitation was not; those people were being held and trafficked for labour exploitation, yet regular Home Office inspections identified nothing. Eventually, they were able to seek help from family members or friends to leave that situation.

Kevin Green: Our take on it is that we are part of a global organisation of recruitment businesses called Staffing Industry Analysts. We recognise the need for strong labour enforcement, and there are lots of examples of where it works well.

One area that we would certainly flag up, and where we need to be careful, is in putting too much of an onus on business to address this issue through some kind of licensing regime. We have looked internationally and we cannot find any example of where we think this adds a huge amount of value. We think that a lot of this activity is about criminal activity, where people are trafficked and in forced labour.

We are very clear that the role is, first, to hold large organisations to account, as I have already talked about, through supply chain management, and, secondly, to have a strong inspectorate, which has the resources to investigate and bring people to bear, rather than creating a huge bureaucracy for a lot of legitimate businesses, where there is more responsibility to produce evidence, and which would add cost and complexity to legitimate businesses. What we are really doing here is trying to find the people who are undertaking this activity of forced labour and human trafficking.

[The Chair]

I am aware that time is getting on, and I also have quite a few Members who still want to ask questions. Undoubtedly, we could talk for a long time about the trafficking issue, but we will move on.

Minister, would you like to ask a question?

Immigration Bill (Second sitting)

Paul Blomfield Excerpts

Tuesday 20th October 2015 Public Bill Committees

[Craig Whittaker]

Q 85 On the face of the Bill then, it is a good thing.

Neil Carberry: Yes, I think so. We have never been against effective enforcement.

[Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)]

Q 86 You talked about parts of the labour market where abuse happens. I am conscious that many of your members might have had their reputations tarnished by unwitting involvement through supply chains. Can you share your thoughts about the Bill in the context of the most effective way of helping your members to achieve supply chain compliance?

Neil Carberry: Any answer to that question will have to take account of some of the responsibilities that companies will take on under the Modern Slavery Act 2015. I actually had a long discussion last night with some of our members about the challenges of doing that effectively—many of them are currently wrestling with that. Of course, there is a limit to what companies at one end of a supply chain can do and assure themselves of, but there is a duty to do some work, as the Act makes clear.

The most important thing is to ensure that, where companies at the top end of a supply chain suspect that something illegal is happening, they are clear about the route to take to obtain assistance from regulators and enforcers, and also that there are simple routes for enforcers to take towards targeted action. We would see that as one part of the role of the director as set out in the Bill. For instance, we would expect them to look to establish ways in which a major retailor could raise concerns effectively and then feed into an intelligence-led action.

[Paul Blomfield]

Q 87 You mentioned a situation in which companies at the top end of a supply chain have reason to believe that things are going wrong further down the supply chain, but the problem faced by many of your members is that it might be impossible to know what happens further down the supply chain. What more could be done to achieve effective enforcement of labour market standards down the supply chain and out of the sight of your members?

Neil Carberry: Clearly, it largely is out of the sight of our members. I will start from the test of what we want, which is something that brings an enforcement officer into the site where things are going wrong as quickly and effectively as possible, with the powers to change the situation. We know that, largely, where we find national minimum wage non-compliance, we tend to find immigration non-compliance.

The first thing is to make sure that, whichever body is resourced to do it, there is a clear thought process about where we believe this is happening in the labour market; within that, then, that there is some intelligence-gathering about where the issues might be. There should then be live discussions with businesses in the sector about what they hear and what they see; then, police and enforcement agencies should have the capacity to intervene. That much more targeted approach, I think, is the only way to protect workers who do not have the capacity to raise concerns about their own treatment, especially if they are being exploited. I would much rather see that intelligence-led, almost police-style action than anything that looks like a process for companies in the sector, because I think that some of these non-compliant organisations would just ignore that.

[Paul Blomfield]

Q 88 Do you think that there are sufficient resources, as the situation currently stands, to achieve the objectives you are talking about?

Neil Carberry: I mentioned HMRC’s rule earlier. I think to do it effectively, it may be necessary to look at resources for other parts of the system. Having said that, one of our biggest challenges at the moment is enforcement agencies talking to each other. A case in point is that if a business moved out of a GLA-regulated sector, the employment agency standards inspectorate would still have prohibition powers. There should be more discussion taking place about, “If this business has had a licence removed by the GLA, what is the case for prohibition more broadly via EASI?”

[Anne McLaughlin (Glasgow North East) (SNP)]

Q 89 Good afternoon. Do you think there is a risk of the Bill making it harder for migrant workers to access the labour market because employers are afraid that they will be breaking the law, and don’t understand how it works, so they err on the side of caution?

Neil Carberry: I think the section 8 checks that employers already do are largely embedded in companies’ operation now, so the mere existence of a non-UK passport at hiring is an issue. There is some nervousness, I think, about the fact that the quality of forgery is now very, very high, and I think businesses would welcome more support from UKBF and others on identifying forgeries when they do those checks. Broadly, we have not seen evidence of a chill effect on migrants being able to find work yet, and the performance of the UK labour market over several years now suggests that opportunities are still being created both for UK citizens and migrant workers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Craig Whittaker]

Q 105 Lord Green, you have already said there should be a duty on employers. I presume you put into the same category people such as landlords, whom the Bill specifically addresses. How can we better prevent illegal working without imposing additional burdens on business generally?

Lord Green of Deddington: I do not think you can, to be frank. There has to be a duty on employers and they have to fulfil it. They have to recognise that this is a serious matter of great public concern. It is a field in which some unscrupulous employers are making a packet at the expense of honest employers. They have to fulfil it.

[Paul Blomfield]

Q 106 I wonder whether I could follow up on your answer to the Minister, Lord Green. You were saying that the criminalisation of workers would be helpful in achieving labour market compliance.

Lord Green of Deddington: Sorry, I am not saying workers should be criminalised; I am saying that illegal work should be a criminal offence.

[Paul Blomfield]

Q 107 Effectively, the Bill criminalises undocumented workers, does it not?

Lord Green of Deddington: If they are here illegally, yes. That is the point.

[Paul Blomfield]

Q 108 In your evidence to the Migration Advisory Committee review of low-skilled work, you talked about the problem of fear in the workplace and of there effectively being a climate in which employees would not challenge their employers. Do you not think that creating a criminal offence assists the hand of unscrupulous and exploitative employers and gangmasters, and therefore negates the desire that we all share to achieve effective compliance in the labour market?

Lord Green of Deddington: Yes, there is clearly that possibility. You say, does it negate. I think not because the wider issue is that we must crack down on illegal employment, which is widespread. Another part of that is to enforce action against employers, very few of whom have actually been penalised.

[Paul Blomfield]

Q 109 I wondered whether you were hesitating because you wanted to add to that answer.

Lord Green of Deddington: No, not for the moment.

[Paul Blomfield]

Q 110 I wonder whether I can ask another question. Your evidence to the MAC review of low-skilled work also talked about the need for more effective enforcement of minimum wage compliance and other areas. Do you think that it is a problem that the Employment Agency Standards Inspectorate only has nine full-time staff, and do you think that more resources need to be allocated for effective enforcement?

Lord Green of Deddington: I think pretty well without question. One of the problems about expanding the legal base, it has to be done as a starting point but, if it is not then enforced, it becomes a waste of paper. If I may say so, I think that this Government have not devoted the resources that are necessary to what is an increasingly serious problem. They need to look again. The amount spent on the whole immigration system is about £750 million a year, I believe—absolute peanuts. It is one of the areas of government—I am sure that there are other areas—that needs more attention than it is getting.

[The Chair]

We are just over halfway.

Immigration Bill

Paul Blomfield Excerpts

Tuesday 13th October 2015 Commons Chamber

[Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)]

I wish to concentrate my remarks on part 1 of the Bill.

Less than two years ago, in November 2013, the Home Secretary said that combating modern slavery was her top priority. It was an aim that won wide support on both sides of the House and it found expression in the Modern Slavery Act 2015, but this Bill risks undoing the progress made with that Act.

I am sure that the Government do not intend to undermine their own legislation so soon after it has become law, but all the evidence shows that the more vulnerable workers are, the stronger the hand of the gangmasters over them and the less likely they are to come forward and report their abusers. So what does this Bill do? It increases their vulnerability and strengthens the hand of the gangmasters. It does that by threatening exploited workers with 12 months in prison if they are deemed to have committed the offence of “illegal working” in clause 8.

Let us be in no doubt: many will think that they have committed that offence even if they have not. Some 78% of those the National Crime Agency says have been exploited for labour in the UK actually have the right to work here as European economic area nationals, but rights awareness among these workers is very low, and options are limited, which allows unscrupulous employers to hold the threat of removal, and now imprisonment, over them—even when it is not a real possibility.

The charity Focus on Labour Exploitation, which works directly with victims of trafficking and of which I am a trustee, has identified three drivers of labour exploitation: the feeling among migrant workers that they deserve less, or have fewer rights than UK citizens; the lack of checks on labour standards in the workplace, from health and safety to minimum wage enforcement; and a fear of officials, especially immigration officials.

On each of the three drivers, the Bill makes the situation worse. First, on the rights of migrant workers, it puts the focus on immigration status as a condition of asserting labour rights. On that note, it would be helpful to hear from the Minister why the definition of “worker” in the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004 has not been used. The Bill criminalises the exploited worker who, whether they are committing the offence of illegal working or not, can be treated or threatened by a gangmaster as if they are.

Secondly, on labour market enforcement, it is deeply unfortunate that the review was published only today, meaning that we did not have the opportunity to consider it fully before the debate, and that the consultation will still close on 9 November, not giving adequate time for proper consideration of the proposals. From the quick look I have had at the Government’s proposals, I have found no evidence of the increased resources or powers that are clearly needed for the director of labour market enforcement. Last year, the Migration Advisory Committee powerfully found that

“on average, a firm can expect a visit from HMRC inspectors once in every 250 years and expect to be prosecuted once in a million years.”

Let us be clear that those of us who were calling for an extension of the Gangmasters Licensing Authority’s remit during the debate on the Modern Slavery Bill meant a genuine extension, building on the good work in the sectors where it already operates, and not the pick-and-mix approach with no additional resources suggested by the Bill and the consultation.

The third driver of labour exploitation is the overlap between labour market enforcement and immigration enforcement, which is at the heart of the Bill. The very decision to include labour in market enforcement measures in an Immigration Bill is hugely counter-productive, and the mistrust of immigration officials exists regardless of migrant status. The consequence will be that labour exploitation is not rooted out and that it will continue, contrary to all the wishes of this Government, to be a pull factor for migration.

In May, the Prime Minister set out the need for what he described as the labour market enforcement agency, of which the post of director suggested in the Bill falls far short. He set out that ambition to prevent exploitation and to stop migrants undercutting British workers.

[Mr Alistair Carmichael]

There is one further area of what we might call “legacy work” from the Modern Slavery Act, which is the position of overseas domestic workers. That was being reviewed by James Ewins, but we have heard nothing about it. Does the hon. Gentleman share my hope that we will hear something about that review during the Bill’s passage?

[Paul Blomfield]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention, as he puts his finger on one of the crucial issues in the 2015 Act about which many of us have reservations and which needs to be addressed. That is exactly the point that I am making: unless we give migrants the confidence to come forward and whistleblow on exploitation we will weaken the position and strengthen the hands of the gangmasters. Sadly, the Bill as it stands will fail to meet the Prime Minister’s aspiration to prevent exploitation and to stop migrants undercutting British workers. I genuinely hope that the Minister, for whom I have high regard, will take on board the comments of those of us who worked constructively with the Government during the passage of the Modern Slavery Bill so that we do not undo its legacy.

Oral Answers to Questions

Paul Blomfield Excerpts

Monday 12th October 2015 Commons Chamber

[Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)]

9. What progress the Government have made on their response to the refugee crisis.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Refugees (Richard Harrington)]

As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister announced on 7 September, the Government will expand existing resettlement schemes to resettle up to 20,000 Syrians in need of protection. In the past few weeks, we have established a cross-departmental operations centre for Syrian refugees, based in the Home Office, and we look forward to welcoming refugees in a well-organised way in the months and years to come.

[Paul Blomfield]

I thank the Minister for that reply, but one further practical step that the Government could take would be to expand the family reunion criteria, which, as he will know, are currently restricted to spouses and dependent children. Will the Government help to keep already traumatised families together by allowing elderly parents and other family members to find temporary protection in the UK, as the Refugee Council and the Red Cross have requested?

[Richard Harrington]

The family reunion scheme has been used successfully in the past, and it is still being used. In addition, we have the vulnerability criteria of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which include vulnerable families.

Migration

Paul Blomfield Excerpts

Wednesday 16th September 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

I undertake to consider the points that the hon. Lady makes. We will try to ensure that those who are claiming asylum here in the UK are dealt with properly and within a reasonable timescale. That is why I said to her hon. Friend the Member for Brent North (Barry Gardiner) that I would be interested in hearing the specifics of the case he raised, where somebody had not been dealt with within the timetable.

[Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)]

The Home Secretary is clearly right to say that we have to do everything possible to tackle smuggling by criminal gangs, and it was useful to get an update on the Government’s work in that area. She will also know that people turn to these gangs only out of utter desperation. Does she therefore accept the concern of the Refugee Council that if we simply stop illegal routes, we will leave vulnerable people stranded in potentially dangerous situations—in Libya, for example—unless we provide alternative safe and legal routes through which to make asylum claims? What is she doing to address that issue?

[Mrs May]

The hon. Gentleman’s point is one of the reasons why the European Union is looking at working with countries such as Niger to establish centres that will be safe for individuals, so that people do not have to make that journey and are not going through to a country where they might be at risk of exposure to people smugglers and human traffickers—or, potentially, face a dangerous journey across the Mediterranean. The establishment of safe zones in countries such as Niger is part of the work we are doing across the European Union.

Immigration Detention

Paul Blomfield Excerpts

Thursday 10th September 2015 Commons Chamber

[Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)]

I beg to move,

That this House supports the recommendations of the report of the Joint Inquiry by the All Party Parliamentary Group on Refugees and the All Party Parliamentary Group on Migration, The Use of Immigration Detention in the United Kingdom; has considered the case for reform of immigration detention; and calls on the Government to respond positively to those recommendations.

I thank the Backbench Business Committee for responding so positively to the request from myself and the hon. Members for Bedford (Richard Fuller) and for Enfield, Southgate (Mr Burrowes) that we have this debate. In a week in which so much parliamentary time has rightly been devoted to our role in supporting refugees outside this country, today is a timely opportunity for us to consider how we treat those who are already on our shores.

The focus of the debate is the joint report of the all- party group on migration, which I chair, and the all-party group on refugees, which was chaired at the time we commissioned the report by the then hon. Member for Brent Central, Sarah Teather. I pay tribute both to her leadership of our inquiry and her determined work on these issues over many years.

Our eight-month inquiry was undertaken by a cross-party panel of parliamentarians from both Houses, many of whom had enormous experience of the issues, including a retired Law Lord, a former chief inspector of prisons and a former Conservative Cabinet Minister from the last Government. I pay tribute to their contributions. It took place following several high-profile incidents within immigration removal centres, including deaths and allegations of sexual assault, and amid plans to increase the size of the detention estate by expanding Campsfield House immigration removal centre in Oxfordshire.

The problems have been well documented, but Parliament has never taken a systematic and comprehensive look at how we use detention, so we thought there was a need for that wider piece of work. We held three oral evidence sessions and received nearly 200 written submissions, and I pay tribute to all those who submitted evidence, particularly those who shared their often painful and harrowing experiences as detainees themselves. I am delighted that some are in the Gallery today. At our first oral evidence session, we heard from non-governmental organisations and medical experts but most powerfully from three men in detention centres at that time. We questioned them about their experiences via a phone link.

In her foreword to the report, the former Member for Brent Central describes a moment in the Committee Room during that session when everybody gasped. We were talking via the phone link with a young man from a disputed territory on the Cameroon-Nigeria border. He told us he had been trafficked to Hungary as a 16-year-old, where he was beaten, raped and tortured. He had managed to escape and eventually made his way to Heathrow using a false passport. It was discovered on his arrival, and he was detained. We then asked him how long he had been detained, and his answer was three years—three years in what is supposed to be an immigration removal centre. His detention conflicts with the stated aims of the Home Office: that those who have been trafficked should not be detained; that those who have been tortured should not be detained; and that detention should be for the shortest possible period. But he is just one of the thousands of people this country detains each year.

As the use of detention has expanded rapidly over the last two decades, so has the size of the estate. In 1993, there were just 250 detention places; by 2009, that had risen to 2,665; at the beginning of this year, it was 3,915. The number of people entering detention in the year to June 2015 was just over 32,000—up 10% on the previous year. By contrast, in 2013, Sweden, despite receiving three times the number of asylum applications we do, detained just 2,893, and Germany detained just over 4,300. The Home Office policy states clearly that detention must be used sparingly.

[Nia Griffith (Llanelli) (Lab)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend and the all-party groups on their report. Back in 2007, the Joint Committee on Human Rights in this House, in a rather briefer report, looked at limiting detention, as does his report, to 28 days. Given what is happening in other countries, does he share my intense disappointment that the numbers have so escalated since then?

[Paul Blomfield]

I do indeed. It underlines the urgency of today’s debate and the need to address the issue. Nobody, especially not the Government, wants to see the immigration detention estate expanding, but without a shift in policy along the lines recommended in the report, it will be an inevitable, deeply distressing and disturbing reality.

The UK is alone in the EU in not having a maximum time limit on detention. That lack of a time limit was a constant theme in the evidence we received during our inquiry and one on which we received some striking testimony. Time and again we were told that detention was worse than prison, because in prison people know when they will get out. As one former detainee said:

“The uncertainty is hard to bear. Your life is in limbo. No one tells you anything about how long you will stay or if you are going to get deported.”

A team leader from the prisons inspectorate told us that the lack of a time limit also encourages poor working.

[Mr Alistair Carmichael (Orkney and Shetland) (LD)]

Like others, I commend the hon. Gentleman for his work, and I am grateful to him for his comments about my former colleague Sarah Teather, who did tremendous work in this area in her time here. On the lack of a time limit, does he think that inadequate access to legal representation is one of the reasons why people end up in open-ended detention in that way? The briefing supplied to us today by Bail for Immigration Detainees points out that 11% of those detained have never had any legal representation at all.

[Paul Blomfield]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention and I very much agree with him. That was a feature of the evidence we received. Addressing that issue is important to ensure justice and speed in processing applications, which is in the interests of everybody.

I mentioned poor working in the consideration of cases, and the representation we heard from the prisons inspectorate suggested that, in one quarter of the cases it had looked at, prolonged detention was the result of inefficient case working. Therefore, having a time limit is not simply about justice and humanity; it is about ensuring a focus in the system and changing the culture. Medical experts also told us that the sense of being in limbo—the sense of hopelessness and despair—leads to deteriorating mental health. One expert from the Helen Bamber Foundation told us that those detained for more than 30 days had significantly higher mental health problems.

Although they are called immigration removal centres, we found that most people who leave detention do so for reasons other than being removed from the UK. That is an important point. According to the latest immigration statistics, more than half the detainees released are released back into the country, so this is not just about the impact on those detained; it is also about cost and the good use of public money. It costs some £36,000 a year to detain somebody for 12 months, so a huge amount of taxpayers’ money is being spent on detaining people who we will eventually release into the UK anyway.

Our central recommendation is for a maximum time limit set in statute, not simply to right the wrong of indefinite definition, but to change the culture endemic in the system. We settled on 28 days, not only because it reflects best practice from other countries, but because it is workable for the Home Office, given that in the first three quarters of 2014 only 37% of people were detained for longer. It also reflects the evidence of the mental health impact on those detained for more than a month. We also recommended that decisions to detain should meet the aims of the Home Office’s own guidance—that is, taken more sparingly and only genuinely as a last resort to effect removal. Deprivation of liberty should not be a decision taken lightly, nor should it be taken arbitrarily. Currently, decisions are taken by relatively junior Home Office officials, with no automatic judicial oversight. With no time limit, it has become too easy for people to be detained for months on end, with no meaningful way of challenging their continued detention.

The introduction of a time limit and the reduction in the reliance on detention would represent a significant change. In order to detain fewer people for shorter periods, the Government will need to introduce a much wider range of community-based alternatives. In our report, we give a number of examples of those alternatives, from places as different as the United States and Australia, which is often cited as an example because of its tough immigration system, as well as Sweden, which we visited in the course of the inquiry. These alternatives allow people to remain in communities while their cases are resolved, including when making arrangements to leave the country. These alternatives are not only more humane, but cost less and have a higher compliance level.

There is a UK precedent. When the coalition Government committed to reducing the number of children detained, they introduced a family returns process, which the House of Commons Library described as designed

“to encourage refused families to comply with instructions to depart from the UK at an earlier stage, such as by giving them more control over the circumstances of their departure.”

It worked. There has been a dramatic fall in the number of children detained, and the Home Office’s own evaluation of the scheme found that most families complied with the process—with no increase in absconding.

There are a number of other recommendations in the report; others will refer to them, but let me briefly cover them. We recommend that pregnant women and victims of rape and sexual violence should never be detained, and that the shocking harassment and abuse experienced by lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex detainees must be addressed.

[Stella Creasy (Walthamstow) (Lab/Co-op)]

I join others in congratulating my hon. Friend on securing this very important debate. Will he join me in putting on the record his thanks for the work done by Women for Refugee Women to uncover some of these problems in Yarl’s Wood—often against blanket denials from the Home Office that these problems are happening?

[Paul Blomfield]

I will indeed, and I thank my hon. Friend for her intervention. I understand that some of the representatives are here today, which is welcome. I hope to meet them after the debate.

We echo the call of the chief inspector of prisons to allow detainees more freedom when it comes to internet access, which was needlessly denied in many cases. We hope that the Shaw review will look at our concerns about the treatment of individuals with mental health problems and of vulnerable detainees for whom detention is clearly not suitable.

Our central recommendation, as I say, is for a statutory limit on detention—not simply because it is more just and more humane, but because it would be less expensive and more effective in securing compliance. Moreover, this unanimous recommendation stands in line with the practice of the majority of countries with which we would compare ourselves, and with the views of most experts in this country who have looked at the issue. We hope that the House will agree that the Government should positively consider our report and take up our recommendations.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)]

On behalf of the hon. Members for Bedford (Richard Fuller) and for Enfield, Southgate (Mr Burrowes) and my own behalf I thank all the Members who have contributed to the debate. I am delighted to say that there were too many speakers for me to mention individually. All the speeches were characterised by powerful stories and strong arguments. The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald) is right: we have stumbled into this situation under the auspices of successive Governments, and we all have a responsibility to resolve the position and sort it out.

We have heard from 25 speakers representing four parties on both sides of the House, and there has not been a dissenting voice on our central recommendation.

[Fiona Mactaggart]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Paul Blomfield]

I do not think that I have time, but I give way briefly.

[Fiona Mactaggart]

Does my hon. Friend share my disappointment that, although the Minister referred to Stephen Shaw’s report, we still do not know when it is going to be published, and we do not know what consultation will take place with medical experts and organisations representing people whose mental health is suffering in detention about the consequent conclusions of the Home Office?

[Paul Blomfield]

Yes I do, and I am also concerned about the fact that the remit of the report is too narrowly drawn.

Our central recommendation is for a statutory limit on immigration detention. The cultural change that that will produce—an end to the presumption to detain, and the development of community-based alternatives—will restore humanity and justice to the system, and it will be more efficient and effective.

I hope that the Government will take account of the debate. The Minister set out the Home Office’s policy and, indeed, the law on indefinite detention. The problem is that the reality does not match it, and I hope that he will acknowledge the need for change.

Let me end by joining others in thanking Sarah Teather for her work. I also thank all the detainees who gave evidence to us, many of whom have watched the debate today. I hope that they will see the difference that their contribution has made, and I commend the motion to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House supports the recommendations of the report of the Joint Inquiry by the All Party Parliamentary Group on Refugees and the All Party Parliamentary Group on Migration, The Use of Immigration Detention in the United Kingdom; has considered the case for reform of immigration detention; and calls on the Government to respond positively to those recommendations.