Telecommunications Infrastructure (Leasehold Property) Bill

Oliver Dowden Excerpts

Report stage & 3rd reading & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Tuesday 10th March 2020 Commons Chamber

[Mr David Davis]

My hon. Friend makes a very good point, but I suspect that seven years is a massive overestimate. Like our telephones, this technology changes every 18 months. Seven years is the achievement of an Einstein of this sector. That is point No. 1: our expert argument in the UK is that we are the only ones in step. That is not an argument that stands up very often.

My second point, to which my right hon. Friend the Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox) referred earlier, is that this is a national security issue. The most recent debates on national security in this House in the past decade or so have been about terrorism, rather than potential massive conflicts between major powers. The House will remember that the IRA always used to say that we have to be lucky all the time, but they had to be lucky only once. That is a demonstration of the sort of analysis we must apply to security issues. Let us consider the Government’s argument. Let us imagine that the Government are right and we are wrong, but we do what we want to do. The worst case is that we spend a little more money and we introduce a technology, possibly better technology, maybe a year or two later. That is the worst-case outcome for our analysis. But if we are right and they are wrong, and we do what they say, the outcome will be to allow the undermining of our complete national infrastructure. This is not just a telecoms system; it is fundamental to the lifeblood of our entire national infrastructure. On a security analysis approach, it is just plum wrong.

Finally—this is designed to help the Secretary of State—there is the argument about time. I confess that I probably take the hardest line in our group on timing. My view is simple: we should separate this into two pieces. One is what happens about new installations. In my view, since they are called high risk vendors—the clue is in the name—there should be no more installations. I can see no loss in not installing another single piece of Huawei equipment. The argument that it cannot be done by anybody else has been proven by several speakers so far to be completely without foundation. My argument to the Secretary of State is that when he stands up, he must tell us whether his proposal involves continuing to put in place Huawei kit that we will then have to take out in our move to zero. On that basis, I am afraid it is very clear that the Back Benchers are right and the Government are wrong.

[The Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Oliver Dowden)]

Connectivity is the lifeblood of any modern digital economy. It is vital if we are to create the conditions where anyone can succeed and thrive, regardless of their background or their postcode. The Bill is crucial if we are to deliver that. It is one of a number of steps that the Government are taking to increase connectivity speeds, reduce costs and create the right environment to encourage investment. The Bill is a crucial plank in delivering the manifesto commitments, on which we on the Conservative Benches stood and were elected three months ago, to deliver broadband to the whole of the UK and to support the levelling up agenda. However, I have concerns that some of the amendments would undermine that work. They could mean the UK risks losing out on the economic benefits of nationwide access to faster broadband networks and that many families living in blocks of flats would not be able to benefit from new broadband services.

It has been clear from the debate so far that there is one principal amendment at stake, amendment 1, in the name of my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith). Amendments 4 and 5, which I will deal with together, relate to high-risk vendors. The first point I would like to make is that I genuinely understand concerns, which many hon. Members have raised with me, that they have not had the time to consider these issues or to scrutinise them properly. The reason for that is that we will be bringing forward a Bill—as my right hon. Friend the Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox) said, my first task as Secretary of State is to convince the House on the approach to high-risk vendors—on telecoms security, which will enable the House to consider all these points. We will bring forward that legislation before the summer recess, so all hon. Members will be able to debate these points extensively. There will be opportunities for amendments to be made and an opportunity for the whole House to consider all these issues at great length. I will proceed to set out the steps that have led us to this point and the further steps that we are announcing today.

[Dr Fox]

Will the Minister give way?

[Oliver Dowden]

If my right hon. Friend will allow me to set out those steps, I assure him that I will take as many interventions as he wishes me to.

We looked at this issue over many months and in great technical detail through our telecoms supply chain review. This review was informed by technical and security analysis undertaken by GCHQ’s National Cyber Security Centre. It was the most detailed study of what is needed to protect 5G, anywhere in the world. The recommendations from the review will substantially improve the security and resilience of the UK’s telecoms networks, which are a critical part of our national infrastructure.

The Government’s decision on high-risk vendors remains. As we have said, we are clear-eyed about the challenges posed by Huawei. That is why the National Security Council has decided that high-risk vendors should be excluded from sensitive and critical parts of networks and that there should be a strict 35% cap on the market share in the rest of the network—

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Oliver Dowden]

I assure hon. Gentlemen that I will give way if they allow me to proceed a little more, because I want to set out the context, which may address some of the points that they intend to raise.

We will of course keep the 35% cap under review and, over time, our intention is to reduce our reliance on high-risk vendors as the process of market diversification takes place. We want to get to a position where we do not have to use high-risk vendors in our telecoms networks at all, but to do that, we have to work with our Five Eyes and other partners to develop new supply chain capacity in our critical national infrastructure. I can tell the House that we will do that in this Parliament.

We are not in a position today to set out a specific date or timetable for reaching no high-risk vendors. That would require a new decision to be taken by the National Security Council, but we will continue to engage with hon. Members over the weeks ahead.

[Mr David Davis]

Will the Minister give way on that exact point?

[Oliver Dowden]

I will make a final point and then I will give way to Members. Hon. Members will have the opportunity to discuss controls on high-risk vendors when the Government bring forward legislation. I confirm that we will do that before the summer and that there will be an opportunity for colleagues to engage fully on how and when the commitments will be implemented. That will include the National Cyber Security Centre ensuring—exceptionally—that it will give evidence to parliamentary Committees, in addition to the Intelligence and Security Committee.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Oliver Dowden]

It would be fair to give way to my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green first.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. Let me bring him back to the Government’s position. Is it correct, and does he agree, that the position of Her Majesty’s Government is now to move towards no involvement—I repeat: no involvement—of high-risk vendors in our system and that that, in the five-year period that he is talking about, will be the purpose of what they engage in?

[Oliver Dowden]

I think we are all in agreement—certainly on the Government side of the House, and I believe that many Opposition Members also agree—that in an ideal world, there will be no need for any high-risk vendors at all. However, what we have to do, as a first step to getting to that point and within this Parliament, is ensure that we have developed the supply chain capacity. The point has been made by many right hon. and hon. Members that there is a lack of capacity on the supply side at the moment. That is why we are making this very strong commitment—by the way, this relates to the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis)—which will involve considerable expenditure by the Government to ensure that we work with our Five Eyes and other partners to develop new supply chain capacity in our political and national infrastructure in this Parliament, so that we can then commence the process of ensuring that we move away from high-risk vendors.

[Mr David Davis]

Point No. 1: there is unavailable capacity—well, Ericsson says that that is not true. It said that at Davos earlier this year and Samsung says that it is not true, but if we want proof of that, the Australians, who denied Huawei, already have 5G operations in Sydney and Melbourne being put together and the fastest 5G operations in the world exist already in America. There is not the shortage that the Minister claims.

[Oliver Dowden]

I understand the point that my right hon. Friend is making, but I hope that he would accept that at the moment, aside from Huawei, there is Ericsson and Nokia, which we are currently reliant on, and we need to enhance that capacity. That is why the Government are committing today to ensuring that within this Parliament, we work with our Five Eyes and other partners to ensure that we develop the extra capacity.

[Dr Fox]

My right hon. Friend said that a change in the decision by the National Security Council would be required. In fact, it would require a change in the decision by the Government. The NSC does not govern the United Kingdom—Her Majesty’s Government do. However, I still cannot understand the idea of our having to remove high-risk vendors—we should not be incorporating risk to our national security into 5G at all. That capacity will emerge. The United States will not build a 5G network that incorporates that risk. What is the rush?

[Oliver Dowden]

My right hon. Friend raised two points. First, he referenced the role of the National Security Council. As he will be aware, that was created when he served as Defence Secretary under the former Prime Minister, David Cameron. It is a committee of the Cabinet. That is how decisions are made on behalf of the Government. The Cabinet delegates decisions to the National Security Council. That is the Government’s decision-making process and, of course, it is endorsed by the Cabinet. Forgive me, his second point was on—

[Dr Fox]

The incorporation of risk.

[Oliver Dowden]

The National Security Council looked at that. The National Cyber Security Centre advised on it, working with GCHQ. We took that analysis of the risk. That was then assessed by Ministers through the National Security Council, who weighed up that risk. The Government took the decision that we should have a cap of 35% for high-risk vendors—principally, Huawei—and we would then seek to diversify and reduce that. We are clear in that commitment: we want to diversify away from Huawei. What we are setting out today is the process for achieving that, and that is, first of all, about ensuring that we get the capacity there in the first place.

[John Redwood]

Why is there no sense of urgency about getting the alternative capacity in? This is not a unique technology to the Chinese company. These are potentially massive orders. Put it out to bidding and see what is out there.

[Oliver Dowden]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his intervention. There is a huge sense of urgency in this. That is why we are committed to working with our Five Eyes partners to make sure that, for the first time, we set out a timetable to say that within this Parliament, we will get the capacity, so that we can then ensure that we will start to move away from our reliance on high-risk vendors. It is already capped at 35%. We want to get to a position where we do not need to rely on them at all. This is the important first step and it is about assuring the House that we are on the path towards diversification.

[Mr Paterson]

I very much welcome the Bill coming up and the commitment to move. However, the commitment to having no high-risk vendors so that we do not have to use them at all is where we are today. No company has to use this equipment, but they are forced to by the imperatives that they will be undercut if they do not. The Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, my hon. Friend the Member for Boston and Skegness (Matt Warman), who wound up the debate last week, said that

“we will work to move towards no involvement of high-risk vendors.”—[Official Report, 4 March 2020; Vol. 672, c. 299WH.]

Can we not just have a commitment that that is the destination to which we will move? That will send a massive signal out to our allies and customers and it will encourage the Five Eyes alliance to work together, all of which we know will take time, but there has to be a clear commitment to zero.

[Oliver Dowden]

We are clear in our commitment to diversification. That is the path by which we get to that point and those are the steps we are setting out today.

[Steve Brine (Winchester) (Con)]

I thank the Secretary of State for his commitment that as well as the ISC—I would love to know when it will be re-formed—scrutiny in this space will be given to Select Committees; I am a member of the Select Committee that scrutinises his work. But there is clearly an impasse here and a problem. My right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) says there are other suppliers in the market that can do this now. The Secretary of State is talking about diversification in the supply side of the industry. I do not understand—where is the difference between those two positions? Can it be done now without Huawei, or not? Which is the truthful position?

[Oliver Dowden]

Of course it can be done now without Huawei, but what we have set out is, first, the cap, at 35%, and then the process of diversification to get from that point—

[Mr William Wragg (Hazel Grove) (Con)]

Will my right hon. Friend allow me?

[Oliver Dowden]

I will allow one more intervention, but then I should make some progress.

[Mr Wragg]

Could my right hon. Friend kindly explain the rationale behind 35%? Why not a per cent. more or a per cent. less?

[Oliver Dowden]

The rationale, as decided by the National Security Council, on advice from the agencies, was that that was a sustainable point—a cap from which we could start to work down. As my hon. Friend well knows, of course, there is a degree of arbitrariness in any number, but on balance it was decided that 35% was the appropriate place for us to land.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

--- Later in debate ---

[Oliver Dowden]

I will give way one more time, but then I must proceed.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I am trying to help my right hon. Friend, believe it or not. I understood from the discussions that our position was clear. I accept that the engagement of the Five Eyes is a new position. I congratulate them on that. But critical to that is that the point of our engagement will start with, as the Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, my hon. Friend the Member for Boston and Skegness (Matt Warman), said, moving towards no involvement of high-risk vendors. If we start by having diversification, we have no position for our Five Eyes partners. But if our purpose is to get this right for no involvement—I want the Secretary of State to say that now. If I do not get that—others can do as they like here—it will be my purpose to press the amendment to a vote.

[Oliver Dowden]

When the telecoms security Bill comes forward, we will have the opportunity to have exactly this kind of debate. This is an amendment to a Bill that is about ensuring that we get broadband into blocks of flats. I completely appreciate why my right hon. Friend and others have chosen to table the amendment. The concerns of hon. and right hon. Members have been clearly heard and understand. This can be dealt with in the telecoms security Bill, but ahead of that, in recognition of those concerns, we already setting set out a pathway. First, we have made clear our intention to reduce our reliance on high-risk vendors as that diversification takes place. That gives further clarity to the House about the diversification process set out in the announcement from the National Security Council. Further, we have said we want to get to the position where we do not have to use them at all, which gives a sense of the clear endpoint and trajectory. But we are saying that in order to get from point A to point B we need to develop capacity, which is why we have said we will work with Five Eyes and other partners to develop this new supply chain capacity in our critical national infrastructure. Beyond all that, I recognise that this gives rise to tremendous questions about the basis on which the National Cyber Security Centre reached its decision. That is why for the first time we are saying that other than the ISC other Committees will have a chance to scrutinise and hold it to account for that decision.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Oliver Dowden]

I really feel that at this point I need to make a little more progress and deal with some of the other amendments, because I can see that you are concerned, Madam Deputy Speaker. I will happily take further interventions later on, though I feel I have dealt with a wide scope of them.

[Chi Onwurah]

rose—

[Oliver Dowden]

Yes, I will give way, as it is the Opposition Front-Bench spokesperson.

[Chi Onwurah]

This is clearly a question of great importance, yet unfortunately I hear nothing new. The Secretary of State seems to be committing to diversification, but what is the new commitment? Is it diversification of the supply chain, which was in the review, or is it diversification of the supply chain leading to the elimination of high-risk vendors, and if so by what date?

[Oliver Dowden]

We have made at least three new commitments today. First, we will bring back the telecoms security Bill by the summer, which will enable the House—[Interruption.] The hon. Lady repeatedly challenged me over when the Bill would be brought back. We have said when we will bring it back for the House to debate. In the announcement from the National Security Council —from the Government—we said we wanted to diversify away from the 35% cap over time. For the first time, we are now setting out the process by which we will work with our Five Eyes and other partners to develop the new supply chain capacity to enable us to do that, and we have set a timetable for doing it within this Parliament. Finally, we have also said for the first time that we will allow much greater scrutiny by allowing the National Cyber Security Centre to—

[Bob Seely]

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

[Oliver Dowden]

I will.

[Bob Seely]

I understand that the Secretary of State and his Front-Bench team are trying to make sense of a bad situation, but he is not saying what point B is. He says we will “diversify away”. Are we doing that because it will give us a bit more leverage with China, or are we diversifying to the point of 0% high-risk vendors, and if so by what date?

[Oliver Dowden]

The Government—I think we all share this objective—would like to get to the point where we do not need any high-risk vendors at all, and we are setting out that process. That said, I want to be candid with hon. Members: I am not today repeating the words of the Under-Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, my hon. Friend the hon. Member for Boston and Skegness (Matt Warman), lest they be misunderstood. We are not today setting out a timetable or date to get to a point where we do not have to rely upon them at all. When we introduce the telecoms security Bill before the summer, hon. Members will have the opportunity to debate this further.

I will make a little more progress and turn my attention to amendment 2. The issue of who is able to request a service from an operator is something that we were conscious of when we were drafting the Bill. As drafted, the Bill, particularly the term “lessee in occupation”, refers to a person who occupies a property under the terms of a lease. For the avoidance of any doubt, this could include assured shorthold tenancy or assured tenancy agreements. It is these types of tenancy agreements that I believe the shadow Minister is seeking to ensure are captured by the Bill, so we will not be supporting that amendment. My concern is that to expand the definition of persons who can make the service request would be disproportionate and potentially undermine a key policy aim of the Bill, which is for operators and landowners to reach agreements between themselves.

The Bill also reflects the fact that the evidence we have received does not suggest that the policy needs to be expanded. I am sure Members will agree that this is a sensible approach that maintains a healthy balance between all parties involved. I hope this clarifies who is likely to be a lessee in occupation and that this satisfies the shadow Minister.

I turn now to my concerns about amendment 3. The Bill aims to support leaseholders to gain access to broadband services from the providers they want. As drafted, the Bill already ensures leaseholders are not locked into services provided by a single provider. Nothing in the Bill prevents a lessee in occupation with an existing gigabit-capable connection from requesting a new service from another alternative provider. That alternative provider will need to give notices to the landowner in line with the electronic communications code. Should that landowner repeatedly fail to respond, that provider could apply for a part 4A order of its own in order to deliver that service. The Government cannot and should not compel independent, commercial companies to alter the way they choose to deliver their services unless there is evidence that a problem exists. Furthermore, far from improving competition and access to services, the amendment might have the unintended consequence of doing the complete opposite. Much of the cost of connecting premises is in the initial installation.

Finally, let me deal with amendment 6. The new connections provided by operators as a result of the Bill will allow greater efficiency and connectivity for consumers and give them an opportunity to benefit fully from certain services including “smart” or internet-connected products, which are often described as the internet of things. The amendment proposes that any operator exercising a part 4A code right must supply provide written information to new customers in the target premises. That would cover best practice on cyber-security in the use of the network connections that have been provided.

I appreciate the sentiment behind amendment 6, and the Government are committed to ensuring that the UK is one of the safest places to be online, but the amendment would impose an additional and disproportionate burden on operators, who may not be best placed to provide consumers with up-to-date information.

The Government have ambitious plans for the roll-out of greater connectivity throughout the United Kingdom, and I can assure the House that in doing so we will never compromise the safety and security of our telecoms networks. Trust in these networks is vital if we are to encourage the take-up of new technologies that will transform our lives for the better.

I have talked at great length to my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green and others about our proposals and their amendments. I understand their genuine concerns about the decision taken by the National Security Council and the Government, which was presented to the House about a month ago. I hope that I have given them some comfort, although I accept that it is not all that they have been seeking. I hope I have at least reassured them that the Government appreciate their concerns, and that we are embarking on a path towards the ideal point that we all want to reach where we will have no high-risk vendors. I also hope that they in turn will appreciate that this is not the end of the process but an opportunity for their concerns to be expressed in the amendment, and that the substantial debate will come when we introduce the telecoms security Bill.

Ahead of that, for several weeks—indeed, a few months—there will be the opportunity for intensive engagement in all these issues, including full access to, and scrutiny of, the National Cyber Security Centre and its representatives. I hope that that will enable the House to make progress, but when the Bill is introduced there will of course be huge opportunities for all Members to table appropriate amendments, and the Government will address each one of them.

[Steve Brine]

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

[Oliver Dowden]

I will take one last intervention, but then I really must stop.

[Steve Brine]

This has been a good discussion, although heated. I do not think that this is the right Bill for the amendment, so I will not be supporting it. My right hon. Friend has mentioned the telecoms security Bill. Will it come before the relevant Select Committee and the aforementioned Intelligence and Security Committee for pre-legislative scrutiny, or will it be introduced in the House first?

[Oliver Dowden]

The convention is that representatives of the NCSC appear only before the ISC, but when I spoke to the NCSC’s director this morning, I suggested—and he agreed—that he should appear before any appropriate Committee, such as, perhaps, the Defence or the Foreign Affairs Committee. We will seek maximum engagement before that, so that the Committee can have all the relevant information.

I have made my points about the Government’s position, and about the opportunity to debate these issues again. I do not know whether I have convinced my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green, but I hope that he will consider withdrawing his amendment and allowing the House to discuss his proposal in due course when the telecoms security Bill is introduced, before the summer recess.

[John Nicolson]

I support amendment 1. I think that the Secretary of State took eight or nine interventions, and I was interested in his language. As a journalist, I know that when politicians talk about “moving towards”, it means that there is no end in sight, and that “like to” means “perhaps, but I am not going to give any commitment of any kind”. We could sense the feeling of disappointment on the Conservative Benches.

The Secretary of State said that he would never compromise safety and security, and then went on to detail all the ways in which he was compromising the nation’s safety and security. Huawei is not a normal company. Huawei is an arm of the Chinese state., which is exactly why our fellow members of Five Eyes are so frustrated by the Government’s behaviour. We are also being told repeatedly that only a certain percentage of the nation’s infrastructure will be surrendered, but, as I said in my intervention on my hon. Friend the Member for Inverclyde (Ronnie Cowan), that suggests a misunderstanding of the whole nature of 5G.

I apologise for my hoarseness, Madam Deputy Speaker. Please excuse me while I drink the water with which I have been provided. I always think it is terribly unfair that Labour Front Benchers are given glasses while we are forced to rely on plastic—that is yet another example of anti-Scottish discrimination in this place—but I thank the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central (Chi Onwurah).

The distinction in 5G between core and edge collapses. There is no distinction: that is the point. It is meaningless twaddle to keep talking as if 5G were no different from current technology. I recognise, of course, that the Government are between a rock and a hard place, facing a decision between spiralling costs and high security, but here in the UK we have spent, and continue to spend, billions of pounds on the development, maintenance and renewal of 20th-century defence systems that simply are not fit to face the security challenges of the modern era. Those who pose the biggest threats that we now face— terrorism, climate change and, of course, cyber-attacks—will not be deterred by multi-billion-pound nuclear missiles in the Firth of Forth.