Courts and Tribunals Bill

Marie Tidball Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 10th March 2026 Commons Chamber

[Dr Caroline Johnson (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)]

I should first declare an interest as an NHS consultant paediatrician who has given evidence in court in that capacity. The references to the Magna Carta are particularly profound for a Lincolnshire MP, because one of the copies of Magna Carta from 1215 is kept in Lincoln. The Father of the House, my right hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh), and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and Tavistock (Sir Geoffrey Cox) talked eloquently and at length about jury trials, why they should remain, and why removing the right of appeal for magistrates court decisions is the wrong thing to do, so I will not focus on that in the few minutes I have.

I will focus on clause 17, which removes the presumption of involvement of parents in their child’s life. When there is dispute over who cares for a child, courts can make decisions: they can decide who a child is to live with; they can decide who has contact with the child, for how long, and when; they can decide what form that contact takes, whether it is by telephone, in a supervised contact centre or face to face; and they can make specific decrees such as where the child is to go to school.

The law is clear that when courts are making those decisions, the welfare of the child is paramount. They can take into account the child’s wishes if old enough and capable of making decisions in that respect. They can think about whether the child has been subject to any harm. They can talk about whether the child is at risk of further harm. They can talk about whether the parents are capable of providing for the needs of the child. However, section 1 of the Children Act 1989 is clear that the courts must presume, unless shown otherwise, that the involvement of both parents is in the child’s best interests.

[Dr Marie Tidball (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Lab)]

Does the hon. Lady recognise that in 2020 the harm panel said that that section creates a “pro-contact culture” that puts children at risk, and that post the publication of that review, it received no response from her Government?

[Dr Johnson]

That is why I have explained that the presumption is that the parents have involvement. The court must take the risks to the child into consideration and, unless shown otherwise, give contact to both parents. If the child is at risk, however, the court has the absolute right to prevent the child from seeing those parents or to restrict contact to different forms and timeframes. The welfare of the child is key in those decisions.

That is in line with international law, which I know the Government are fond of. The UN convention on the rights of the child says that parents and children should maintain

“personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child’s…interests.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Jim Allister (North Antrim) (TUV)]

We have heard some powerful speeches today, none more so than that from the hon. Member for Warrington North (Charlotte Nichols), and we heard something very striking from the Justice Secretary: he told us that juries are the “cornerstone” of our criminal justice system. What is a cornerstone? A cornerstone is the most important part of something, on which everything else depends. What is the cornerstone of democracy? It is voting. We would not think of getting rid of voting, but we are invited in this House to get rid of the cornerstone of jury trials in a huge spectrum of cases.

[Dr Tidball]

Does the hon. and learned Member agree that, in fact, we are getting rid of them in only a quarter of 3% of cases that go through the court process?

[Jim Allister]

We are getting rid of them in thousands of cases, which will deny to those who are accused in those cases the right that each one of us would claim for ourselves: to be judged by our peers. We are doing it in cases that involve a large sentence. Three years is no trifling sentence—it is a substantial sentence that is life-changing, and yet we are suggesting that we should move away from that cornerstone of justice in all those cases.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Marie Tidball (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Lab)]

I rise to support this Bill, particularly clause 17— Jack and Paul’s law—to finally repeal the presumption of contact in the family courts. It is the result of 11 years of campaigning by my incredible constituent Claire Throssell MBE, who is in the Gallery today, following the tragic deaths of her beautiful sons, Jack and Paul. They were killed in a house fire by their father, a known domestic abuser. Their dad lured Jack and his nine-year-old brother Paul into the attic with the promise of a train set, but he started 14 fires around their family home, killing himself in the blaze.

Jack and Paul’s deaths happened during a two-hour, court-ordered, unsupervised contact visit permitted by a family court and allowed to go ahead by the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service. The state failed Jack and Paul; it failed to put their wellbeing first, after a decade of their father’s abuse, neglect and coercive control of them and their mother. This House must act today and vote through this Bill to save the lives of a future generation of children by ending contact at any cost.

The presumption of parental involvement is a legal principle in the Children Act 1989 that means that any parent, even those who are known domestic abusers, should always be given contact with their children, but the retention of presumption continues to be fatal. Some 68 children—that we know of—have died at the hands of known domestically abusive parents since Women’s Aid started research on this issue. This Bill presents a life-changing opportunity to prevent such deaths and puts children’s wellbeing at the heart of our family courts.

[Sarah Russell]

Does my hon. Friend agree it is absolutely crucial that we fund contact centres properly, so that there are properly supervised options for courts to order?

[Dr Tidball]

I do indeed. In combination with the provisions in the Bill to effect structural reform, to stop criminals from gaming the system and to triage trials effectively, such measures will embed a child-centred and victim-centred approach in the courts.

[Kirith Entwistle]

I commend my hon. Friend on her exemplary campaigning on behalf of her constituent Claire Throssell. Does she agree that it is not right that rape victims are waiting 400 days to be heard?

[Dr Tidball]

I do indeed agree with my hon. Friend.

When Jack and Paul died, Claire promised them that no more children should lose their lives like they did, at the hands of an abusive parent. When I first met Claire, I told her that if I was elected, I would do all I could to help her. That was in 2023. On the 11th anniversary of the boys’ death, in October last year, I took Claire to No. 10 Downing Street to meet the Prime Minister—the first Prime Minister to personally commit to fulfil Claire’s promise to her beautiful boys.

I ask this House to vote for the Bill today, so that we can collectively fulfil Claire’s promise to her sons Jack and Paul; so that children like Jack and Paul are listened to, not ignored; and so that no more towns like mine are left to grieve. I urge this House to make that world a reality and support the Bill.

Victims and Courts Bill

Marie Tidball Excerpts

Report stage & 3rd reading
Monday 27th October 2025 Commons Chamber

There is a postcode lottery. We must deliver change by placing a duty on authorities to commission specialist services everywhere, so that victims and their caregivers can rely on consistent support across the board. The victims of these crimes deserve more than just words and sympathy: they deserve a system that stands with them and provides the support they need. I hope this Government will deliver practical steps that will deliver the changes we need.

[Dr Marie Tidball (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Lab)]

Being a parent is a privilege, not a right. I rise to speak to Government new clause 14, on the restriction of parental responsibility for a child conceived as a result of rape. It will appear on the face of this Bill because of the fierce campaigning force of my hon. Friend the Member for Bolsover (Natalie Fleet)—my friend and my hero. Her law change, to be engraved in the Government’s Bill, puts the needs of survivors above the needs of rapists, casting in law a shield for women who have had a child as a result of rape, and for their babies. Those rapists will no longer be able to retraumatise the mothers, nor to demand access to or endanger the children.

If anyone says politics does not make a difference, I say, “Look at my hon. Friend, who shared her own experience of being groomed and abused and having a child as a result.” Her extraordinary strength raised that beautiful baby girl. That strength meant that she did so alongside becoming a Member of this House and, within her first year as a parliamentarian, will today change the law to protect a generation of women, girls and children. This is the difference that politics in the hands of Members like my hon. Friend makes for our communities and our country: protecting women and children from vile sex offenders. It is a non-negotiable priority, central to our Government’s mission to halve violence against women and girls within a decade.

This matters. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bolsover said, 10 babies a day are currently born as a result of rape. Yet we still do not know the true scale of physical and sexual abuse at the hands of known domestically abusive parents. We do know that 60% of cases in the family courts involve domestic abuse, and that 40,000 children will have experienced domestic abuse in the private law Children Act cases that were received by the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service in the nine months from April 2024.

My formidable constituent, Claire Throssell MBE, lost her two beautiful boys 11 years ago, at the hands of her known domestically abusive ex-husband, while they were on a five-hour court-permitted contact visit. He lured them into the attic of their home with the promise of a train set, and set fires around their house. Claire promised her boys that she would ensure their voices were heard by campaigning to repeal the presumption of contact, the legal principle brought about by the Children and Families Act 2014, amending the Children Act 1989. The principle means that the courts always prioritise having both parents in a child’s life over the child’s safety, including when there is a known history of domestic abuse.

There have been 67 deaths at the hands of known domestic abusers since Women’s Aid started to report on this issue just 30 years ago. Five previous Conservative Governments—look at the empty Benches opposite—did nothing, despite the Conservative Government in 2020 leading the harm panel report, an expert review of domestic abuse and the family courts; despite that report recommending that the presumption of contact should be urgently reviewed; and despite Women’s Aid research finding there have been 19 more child deaths at the hands of known domestic abusers since Jack and Paul died. No response was published for four years under those Conservative Governments. Where are Conservative Members today?

I first met Claire at a remembrance event at my old school—the same school that her eldest son Jack went to. I knew of the tragic deaths of her sons, but hearing from her what happened was heartbreaking. I promised her that if I was elected as her Member of Parliament, I would help to fulfil her promise to her boys. Last week, I took Claire to No. 10 Downing Street to meet the Prime Minister—the sixth Prime Minister since her beautiful boys died, but the first to promise Claire that he will deliver Jack and Paul’s law. Last week, on the 11th anniversary of the boys’ deaths, he announced in this Chamber that our Government will repeal the presumption of contact.

The Prime Minister’s promise made it clear that the repeal of the presumption of contact will form part of a broader package of family court reforms aimed at better protecting children involved in private law proceedings. That is truly decisive action by our Government to change the law to protect generations of children where the Conservatives failed to do so. The reforms will ensure that decisions about child arrangements put the child at the centre of decision making and are based on a robust assessment of the potential risks, particularly when domestic abuse is present.

Our message is clear: the safety of children is paramount. We will stop at nothing to make sure that they are protected in our courts, prioritising children’s safety and wellbeing and their right to grow up free from harm. The changes will reinforce new clause 14 and the exceptional work set out in the Bill by putting children at the centre of the family courts.

I am proud that our Labour Government is packed full of brilliant women who stood behind Claire Throssell, Natalie Fleet and I to ensure that our Government fulfil her promise to her boys. Those women include the Minister of State for Courts and Legal Services, the Minister for Victims, the Minister for Safeguarding and Violence Against Women and Girls, and my hon. Friends the Members for Lowestoft (Jess Asato), for Milton Keynes Central (Emily Darlington) and for Bolton North East (Kirith Entwistle). I also thank my hon. Friend the Member for Calder Valley (Josh Fenton-Glynn) for his work and allyship.

Repealing the presumption of contact is urgent. Will the Minister confirm that it will be repealed as soon as the parliamentary time allows, thereby fulfilling the promise that the Prime Minister made to Claire Throssell last week? Expediting the repeal of the provision in the statute book will ensure that no more towns like mine will grieve, and it will ensure that Jack and Paul’s law is at the heart of our family justice system, where it belongs. I commend the Bill to the House.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

Oral Answers to Questions

Marie Tidball Excerpts

Tuesday 8th July 2025 Commons Chamber

[Shabana Mahmood]

What absolute nonsense. Let me tell the House the definition of soft justice: it is what the Tory party did, building only 500 prison places in 14 years in office. That is why we are in this mess and that is the mess that I am cleaning up.

[Dr Marie Tidball (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Lab)]

T2. Last month, a devastating report by Women’s Aid revealed that a total of 67 children have been killed over a 30-year period by a known domestically abusive parent, in circumstances related to the courts’ use of the principle of the presumption of contact. Two of those children, Jack and Paul Sykes, are the sons of my formidable constituent, Claire Throssell. All these deaths were preventable. Will the Minister update the House on the progress of the Government’s review of the presumption of contact?

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Sarah Sackman)]

The killings of Jack and Paul were horrendous crimes and I would like to pay tribute to my hon. Friend and to her constituent, Claire, for their tireless campaigning on these issues. I am sure that she would agree that the guiding principle for any reform must be children’s welfare. That is why we have requested a review of the presumption of contact. We will be publishing findings and next steps very shortly.

Victims and Courts Bill

Marie Tidball Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 20th May 2025 Commons Chamber

[Dr Marie Tidball (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Lab)]

Imagine a school night with a child being repeatedly asked by his father if he had completed his homework. The child replied, in an exasperated tone, “Yes”. His dad came towards him with his fist, ready to punch him, but the boy’s mum stepped into the space in front of that fist and pushed her son out of its way. The full force of that fist hit her so hard that she was spun around and fell down the stairs, bruising her arms, legs and back. From the top of the stairs, the child’s father shouted to his son, “Look what you made me do.”

The boy’s mother left her husband, taking the children with her. Social services were aware that the same father made statements that he was capable of killing. Then imagine a situation where, despite knowing all of that, a family court permitted that father of those two boys five hours of unsupervised contact per week.

My constituent Claire Throssell does not need to imagine this nightmare: she and her two sons, Jack and Paul Sykes, lived it. On a two-hour contact visit, permitted by that court and allowed to go ahead by the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service, Jack and Paul Sykes were locked in the attic by their father. Using gasoline, their dad set multiple fires alight across their home. Paul, aged nine, died at the scene after his older brother tried to save him, and then Jack, aged just 12, died later in hospital. The father also killed himself in the blaze. Jack and Paul’s voices were not heard by social services, by CAFCASS or by the family court. The only time Jack’s voice was heard was when, as he was held in the fireman’s arms, he used the last of his strength to say, “My dad did this and he did it on purpose.”

There must be urgent reform of the presumption of contact in law, on the basis of evidence, principle and to ensure children’s voices are put at the heart of our family courts system. Legal principle means that parents should always be given contact with their children, even in circumstances where there is a known domestic abuser. The harm report, published in 2020 by the Ministry of Justice’s expert panel on harm, was clear that the presumption should not remain in its present form.

The Bill before us today presents the ideal opportunity to make changes to the family courts and to deliver for the victims of domestic abuse and violence against women and girls. It already ensures that the justice system serves victims, rather than subjecting them to further trauma on top of what they have already suffered.

Labour’s important mission to halve violence against women and girls within a decade will require a national effort and the use of every single tool available to target perpetrators and address the root causes of abuse and violence. Now we need to do what the previous Conservative Government failed to do and hold family courts to the same standard by taking a child-centred approach and repealing the presumption of contact where a parent is a known domestic abuser.

The Government must act now to save the lives of children for generations to come by ending contact at any cost. Let us not just imagine a world in which the voices of children are put at the heart of our family court system, where children such as Jack and Paul are listened to, not ignored, and no more towns such as mine are left to grieve—

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-seventh sitting)

Marie Tidball Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 19th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Sarah Olney]

I want to make a couple of further points in response to some of the those raised by Members. First, I have looked at amendment 500, which the hon. Member for Spen Valley directed me to, and I thank the hon. Member for Reigate for showing it to me—her record keeping is much better than mine. I was going to say that amendment 500 does not cover a lot of the areas that I have raised, but the hon. Member for Spen Valley has just referred me to amendment 455.

However, it is important to say that amendment 455 refers only to “protected characteristics” under the Equality Act 2010. I specified particular characteristics in amendment 273 in response to some of the evidence that we received. In particular, I included the person’s age in response to evidence that we received from Together for Short Lives, which represents children’s hospices including Shooting Star in Richmond. It had specific concerns about the issue of assisted death being raised with young people under 18, and that is why I specified that. I also included gender and ethnicity, which I mentioned earlier, and that came through very strongly in a lot of the oral evidence that we received.

To address the point made by the hon. Member for Sunderland Central, I did not hear sexuality being raised as a risk factor at any point. Obviously, members of the LGBTQ+ community experience a great deal of discrimination, but I have not heard it raised as a specific risk factor for assisted dying, which is why it is not on the list. I have included the person’s postcode because I do not know a better way of assessing whether someone is from a low-income background. I particularly draw the attention of hon. Member for Spen Valley to that characteristic, because it is obviously not protected under the Equality Act, so I remain really concerned.

[Dr Marie Tidball (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Lab)]

For the avoidance of doubt, socioeconomic status would have been a protected characteristic under the Equality Act, were it not for the previous Conservative Government.

[Sarah Olney]

I thank the hon. Lady for that useful intervention. As I say, socioeconomic status is not currently a protected characteristic under the Equality Act.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kim Leadbeater]

That is very helpful indeed. In that case I am very pleased to support amendment 523 in the name of the hon. Member for East Wiltshire as well. I am also minded to support amendment 394 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford, which I think is very sensible, like his other amendments that I have supported. I am not sure that amendment 534 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich is entirely necessary, but I fully understand the sentiment and therefore I am minded to support that amendment as well.

That brings me on to the final amendment, 448. I wanted to support this amendment, but I have taken on board the Minister’s comments on the lack of clarity about what it means to be registered and qualified. As such, I cannot support that amendment this evening, but I think we could look at coming up with something on Report that would achieve the objective that my hon. Friend the Member for York Central intended.

Amendment 447 agreed to.

Amendment made: 394, in clause 30, page 18, line 24, at end insert—

“(ba) the provision of information and support to persons with learning disabilities who are eligible to request assistance to end their own life under this Act, including the role of advocates for such persons;”—(Daniel Francis.)

Amendment made: 416, in clause 30, page 18, line 25, leave out paragraph (c).—(Jack Abbott.)

This amendment is linked to Amendment 417.

Amendment made: 430, in clause 30, page 18, line 30, at end insert—

“(da) responding to unexpected complications that arise in relation to the administration of the approved substance under section 18, including when the procedure fails;”.—(Daniel Francis.)

[Dr Tidball]

I beg to move amendment 517, in clause 30, page 18, line 30, at end insert—

“(da) arrangements for a qualifying person requesting assistance to end their own life to receive the support of an independent advocate under section [Independent advocate].”

This amendment would add arrangements for a qualifying person to receive the support of an independent advocate (NC25) to the list of matters that codes of practice may be issued on.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 25—Independent advocate—

“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision as to the appointment of persons as independent advocates.

(2) The regulations may, in particular, provide—

(a) that a person may act as an independent advocate only in such circumstances, or only subject to such conditions, as may be specified in the regulations;

(b) for the appointment of a person as an independent advocate to be subject to approval in accordance with the regulations;

(c) persons that may appoint independent advocates;

(d) provision for payments to be made to, or in relation to, persons carrying out the function of an independent advocate under this section;

(e) training that such advocates must undertake before being appointable; and

(f) obligations on persons performing functions on this Act to ensure the presence of an independent advocate for a qualifying person.

(3) The role of independent advocates is to provide support and advocacy to a qualifying person who is seeking to understand options around end of life care, including the possibility of requesting assistance to end their own life, to enable them to effectively understand and engage with all the provisions of this Act.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (2) a person is a ‘Qualifying person’ if they—

(a) have—

(i) a learning disability;

(ii) a mental disorder under section 1 of the Mental Health Act 1983; or

(iii) autism; or

(b) they may experience substantial difficulty in understanding the processes or information relevant to those processes or communicating their views, wishes or feelings; or

(c) they meet criteria that the Secretary of State may specify by regulations.

(5) Regulations may not be made under this section unless a draft of the statutory instrument containing them has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to, by regulations, make provision for independent advocates to provide assistance to qualifying persons.

[Dr Tidball]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Harris. I rise to speak to my new clause 25 and my related amendment 517. I note with pleasure that the Committee has agreed to amendment 447, which mandates the need for the code of practice. I also support amendment 394, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford.

My new clause 25 would require the Secretary of State to make provision by regulations for independent advocates to provide assistance to qualifying persons under the Bill. Amendment 517 would add

“arrangements for a qualifying person…to receive the support of an independent advocate”

to the list of matters provided for by the codes of practice in clause 30.

The issue is deeply important to me. On Second Reading, I said:

“so often control is taken away from disabled people in all sorts of circumstances.

In order to ensure that there is compassionate choice at the end of life, it is right that the Bill is tightly drawn around the final stage of terminal illness for adults and includes the strongest safeguards.”—[Official Report, 29 November 2024; Vol. 757, c.1052.]

Those safeguards must include strengthening the voices of disabled people, both in the Bill and in the monitoring of its impact on disabled people if it is ultimately enacted. I tabled new clause 25 and the related amendment 517 alongside my proposed new clause 27, which would mandate a disability programme board to strengthen disabled people’s voices, empowering and better enabling them to be treated with dignity and respect when they are a qualifying person seeking to understand their options around end-of-life care.

Subsection (3) of new clause 25 states:

“The role of independent advocates is to provide support and advocacy to a qualifying person who is seeking to understand options around end of life care, including the possibility of requesting assistance to end their own life, to enable them to effectively understand and engage with all the provisions of this Act.”

During one of the Committee’s oral evidence sessions, Professor Tom Shakespeare—the leading disability scholar and public policy expert—was asked which of the Bill’s measures could be strengthened to further protect disabled people. He said:

“We could have more of an advocate for the person who is requesting assisted dying—somebody who will support them, within the law, to make that decision or to think about their decision.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c.144, Q181.]

My new clause responds to the evidence from witnesses during those sessions and augments proposals made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford. It extends those proposals in two ways. Under the new clause, “qualifying person” would include those with a learning disability, those with autism and, importantly, those who have a mental disorder under section 1 of the Mental Health Act 1983. It also extends the scope to cover those who, as set out in subsection (4),

“may experience substantial difficulty in understanding the processes or information relevant to those processes or communicating their views, wishes or feelings; or…meet criteria that the Secretary of State may specify by regulations.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Tidball]

I take on board and appreciate my hon. Friend’s point. I hope he will agree that subsection (3) emphasises the purpose of the new clause, which is that it should apply across the spectrum of access to assistance and enable people to effectively understand and engage with all of the provisions in the Bill. I very much wanted to ensure that it would apply and be accessible at every stage.

[Daniel Francis]

My hon. Friend knows my concerns but she knows that I will be supporting the amendment this evening.

Advocates must have an understanding of the available end-of-life options and be able to communicate clearly and explain to patients the medical treatments available: palliative care, social care and assisted death. That is quite complex. As I have said previously, my own experience of mental capacity relates to my daughter: she would never have the capacity to be able to make such a decision. But on a daily basis, including this morning, I have to explain a two or three-point decision-making process. It is vital that advocates are there and that they have the training.

For many people such as my daughter, who is almost blind as well as being learning disabled, there are additional communication skills given that they have those extra sensory difficulties. It is vital for people such as Mrs Cook’s daughter, who might be vulnerable to influence, that the advocate must be able to explain all the options clearly without pressurising the person down one route. I believe the amendment will provide important support to those with less capacity or difficulty in understanding all the options in front of them.

As I have said, the two things that I have banged on about consistently in this process have been about learning disability and mental capacity. There has been a conflict for me, even with this amendment, but I am confident that the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge comes from a very good place. We will come to this next week but, like my hon. Friend, I have consistently listened to Mencap’s evidence, which also talked about reviewing the Bill at an earlier stage than is currently envisaged. That is why I have tabled amendments 493, 494 and 495 for next week.

My view is that if the Bill becomes law, the system will work well if the regulations are implemented correctly. I will support the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge; I thank her for bringing it forward. I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has listened hard, and I am grateful. I think there will be a degree of unanimity this evening.

[Danny Kruger]

I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge for the amendments that she tabled and to the work that she has been doing on our Committee. I regret her victory over my friend, the former MP for Penistone and Stocksbridge, but the hon. Lady is bringing a lot to Parliament and to this Committee.

I am happy to follow the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford in supporting the amendments. I do not know whether the hon. Lady is in a position to respond with a further speech or by intervening, but I have some concerns about their operation. I recognise that the role of the independent advocate exists in our system already, very usefully and importantly: I see its value and appropriateness for an assisted dying regime. But if the amendments are accepted, we will be introducing the role of the independent advocate with the sombre recognition that it is necessary, in consequence of a Bill that will allow doctors to discuss ending the patient’s life as an option with anybody, no matter how well-equipped or ill-equipped that person may be to handle such a conversation on their own, and no matter how old they are—they could even be 18 years old. I support the amendments, but I do so in recognition of the very significant dangers that I think the Bill represents to all potential applicants.

I want to ask the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge, or perhaps the Minister or the Bill’s promoter, whether they feel that the amendments go to the heart of the concerns raised by the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford. I am pleased to hear that he is satisfied and will support the amendments, although I echo some of the suggestions of concern that he just made.

New clause 25 makes it clear that the advocate is there to provide support if the person

“is seeking to understand options around end of life care, including the possibility of requesting assistance to end their own life”.

Amendment 517 addresses the need for a code of practice when a qualifying person is requesting assistance to end their own life.

My question is whether the new clause and the amendment fully cater for a situation in which that individual is not requesting assistance to end their own life—when they are not seeking to explore that particular option. Given that we have retained the right of medical professionals to raise the possibility of assisted dying unprompted with patients, I am concerned about whether, as I think the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford implied, the medical professional initiates the conversation, or the advocate themselves is supportive of assisted dying and they deliberately or inadvertently have the effect of encouraging the patient to consider that option.

As I think the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge said in her intervention on the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford, new clause 25 creates the role of independent advocate to provide support to a patient, to help them to effectively understand and engage with all the provisions in the Bill. It does not specify that the advocate should be obliged, equipped or experienced in supporting the patient to engage with other options.

[Dr Tidball]

First, it is necessary that a patient should be able to engage with all the provisions in the Bill. The reason I did not support the previous amendments from my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford was that they would only have provided advocacy at too late a stage and would not effectively support a patient at that point we talked about in clause 4, which is around the moment of seeking assistance. I hope that answers the question.

[Danny Kruger]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady. That is very helpful. That is my concern: we need to ensure all necessary support for the patient at the earliest stage possible.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Tidball]

I should add that new clause 25(2)(e), on training, is central and will also assist in that respect. If the Chair will permit, that is why I talked about new clause 27, which builds in a strong structure that can reflect on how the provisions operate in practice.

[The Chair]

Order. The Member will have an opportunity to speak at the end of the debate. I call Danny Kruger.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kim Leadbeater]

My hon. Friend the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge has made a powerful and passionate case for the provision of independent advocates, and, as always, has done an outstanding job of advocating for people with disabilities, including learning disabilities, mental disorders and autism, as she has done throughout this entire process.

It is essential that anybody considering the choice at the end of life made possible by this Bill should fully understand the nature and consequences of any decision they may make. These amendments have made me reflect on comments—I think made by the hon. Member for East Wiltshire a few weeks ago—about the purpose of the Bill. He proposed that the Bill is either about choice and autonomy or it is about safeguards. Actually, this group presents very clear evidence that it is and must be about both, and I hope he can support the amendments.

I take on board the Minister’s comments. I heard an element of caution from him, and I am happy to work with the Government and my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge if there are any further requirements prior to Report stage, but I am very happy to support the amendment and the new clause.

[Dr Tidball]

I am grateful for the support of my hon. Friends the Members for Spen Valley and for Bexleyheath and Crayford. It sounds that I may also have the support of the hon. Member for East Wiltshire, which also makes me very happy at this stage of the evening!

I tabled these amendments because I passionately believe in inclusive healthcare for disabled people, removing barriers to such healthcare where possible, and ensuring that disabled people have a strong voice in advocating for themselves and the healthcare they need or desire. I have tried to write the amendment and the new clause to ensure that access to an independent advocate operates across the functions of the Bill. I have been keen to ensure that this provision acts in conjunction with new clause 27, which I will speak about at a later stage. I hope, as I said in an earlier response to the hon. Member for East Wiltshire, that that will provide a solid and robust opportunity to monitor the impact on disabled people of the Bill, if it does pass through Parliament, through its implementation and in practice. Taken together, the measures will create a solid foundation to enable disabled people to have a voice and will provide a strong structure for accountability in the Bill.

I acknowledge the Minister’s comments, and will work with him and my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley to ensure that it is watertight.

Amendment 517 agreed to.

Amendment made: 534, in clause 30, page 18, line 30, at end insert—

“(da) the forms of proof of identity that are acceptable for the purposes of section 6.”—(Jack Abbott.)

Amendment made: 523, in clause 30, page 18, line 31, leave out paragraph (e) and insert—

“(1A) The Secretary of State may issue one or more codes of codes of practice in connection with any matters relating to the operation of this Act not required under subsection (1) as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”—(Danny Kruger.)

This amendment, which works together with Amendment 447, would clarify that the Secretary of State is not required to issue a code of practice under subsection (1)(e) but instead has the discretionary power to issue further codes of practice as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

Amendment made: 417, in clause 30, page 18, line 32, at end insert—

“(1A) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, issue one or more codes of practice in connection with the arrangements for ensuring effective communication in connection with the provision of assistance to persons in accordance with this Act, including the use of interpreters.”—(Jack Abbott.)

This amendment is linked to Amendment 416.

Amendments made: 216, in clause 30, page 18, line 37, leave out subsection (4).

See the statement for Amendment 188.

Amendment 217, in clause 30, page 18, line 38, leave out “that procedure” and insert “section 39”.—(Kim Leadbeater.)

See the statement for Amendment 188.

[Danny Kruger]

On a point of order, Mrs Harris. Before I move the next amendment, I wish to correct the record. I do not know if this is the moment to do so, but I wish to correct a mistake I made earlier today.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-sixth sitting)

Marie Tidball Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 19th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Naz Shah]

I absolutely do not think that, because her abortion rights are set out in law. However, I also think that when that woman is going into a refuge, that refuge will make it clear that she may choose not to. It is about empowering both sides.

I am grateful for the right hon. Member’s intervention, but let us follow that argument. Let us say that somebody wants to pursue assisted death, and they want to go into a place, but they are informed that that organisation does not want to provide or has not signed up to providing an assisted death. It comes back to the issue that my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central rightly raised, which is that people do not deliberately go out looking to offend people. If we were in that space—I cannot imagine being there, but I am trying to understand it—would we want to access that service, because its religious belief differs from assisted dying as a principle?

[Dr Marie Tidball (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Lab)]

Just so I am clear, if a young woman is escaping domestic abuse and goes to a domestic violence space close to her home so that her children can carry on going to school, but finds out once she is there that she is pregnant by the abuser, does my hon. Friend think that that is acceptable?

[Naz Shah]

Sorry, do I think which bit is acceptable?

[Dr Tidball]

That the domestic violence protection centre or home can refuse to let that lady stay there because she has latterly discovered that she is pregnant as a result of the abuse and wants to seek an abortion.

[Naz Shah]

Absolutely not. I would be horrified if that were the case. I know we have had cutbacks and we do not have the access, but I cannot imagine any refuge of any religious belief in this country turning away a woman in the situation that my hon. Friend describes.

[Dr Tidball]

I am glad to hear my hon. Friend’s answer. I ask that question because I can imagine an analogous situation of a woman suffering from breast cancer who is allergic to opioids but does not know that when she enters the care home. If her cancer reaches a stage of terminality but she cannot pursue palliative options because of her allergy to opioids, assisted dying would be the only option for her to die with dignity and not in great discomfort. Under my hon. Friend’s scenario, that woman would not be able to pursue an assisted death in that care home.

[Naz Shah]

My hon. Friend makes a really important point, and I absolutely hear what she is saying. If the woman were going into that hospice or care home when she was pursuing an assisted death, I am not sure how that would work.

[Dr Tidball]

To clarify, in my very clear example—it is a real-life example that reflects the experiences of someone who attended this Committee yesterday—the person has a terminal condition and enters a care home that makes her comfortable and is near her family, but discovers while the hospice or care home is trying to find methods to palliate that she is allergic to opioids and therefore her condition cannot be palliated. In the hon. Lady’s scenario, she would not be able to choose assisted death because that care home has a blanket policy against it. That would discriminate against that young woman, who has an allergy to opioids that means that she cannot be palliated.

[Naz Shah]

I thank my hon. Friend for her intervention, which gives me a lot to think about. That is why I said that I genuinely do not have the answers. I want to have this discussion so that I can make the choice whether to support the amendments. I want to explore this issue further, because it is really important.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-third sitting)

Marie Tidball Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 12th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Danny Kruger]

The hon. Lady must not apologise for intervening on me. I can hardly be one to object to people intervening. This is a very good forum for the kind of exchanges we are having, so I am very happy to take interventions. She is absolutely right that lots of evidence has been presented. I cite it myself all the time. Further evidence is coming in, and much of it is very critical of the new proposals. That is an absolutely fair point, but my point remains that we invited witnesses and had three days of evidence on a Bill whose core safeguard has now fundamentally changed—well, it has not changed yet, but I suspect it is about to.

[Dr Marie Tidball (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Lab)]

I supported the Bill on Second Reading on the basis of the High Court proposal, but then read very closely the evidence from Justice Munby on the need for a strengthened evidentiary process so that this is not just a rubber-stamping exercise. He said, secondly, that it would be better to replace the High Court with another system because of the position that it would place judges in. Having listened to 50 witnesses, I am satisfied with this proposal; I was persuaded through this cross-party process, which is an incredible example of deliberative decision making. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that our ability to amend the Bill where the evidence shows that we must do so demonstrates the strength of this process, and has enabled us to produce something much better and more in alignment with public opinion?

[Danny Kruger]

I greatly respect the position that the hon. Lady has come to. She has been persuaded that this is an improvement on the Bill, and I respect that. I recognise that that is what the hon. Member for Spen Valley and others think, but I am afraid I do not accept that the process has been adequate. The hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge cites Justice Munby and others who criticised the High Court proposals. I also have my criticisms of them—I think they were inadequate—but the response to that is not to scrap them all together, but to strengthen them, as Justice Munby suggested. The hon. Lady will know that Justice Munby is not supportive of the new proposals either; he thinks they also fail the essential test of being an effective safeguard. Nor does the new proposal—the panel—provide the opportunity for evidentiary investigation, which would indeed be appropriate if we were to have a proper safeguard at this stage. I respect the hon. Lady’s position, but I am not persuaded.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-third sitting)

Marie Tidball Excerpts

Wednesday 12th March 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Danny Kruger]

The hon. Lady must not apologise for intervening on me. I can hardly be one to object to people intervening. This is a very good forum for the kind of exchanges we are having, so I am very happy to take interventions. She is absolutely right that lots of evidence has been presented. I cite it myself all the time. Further evidence is coming in, and much of it is very critical of the new proposals. That is an absolutely fair point, but my point remains that we invited witnesses and had three days of evidence on a Bill whose core safeguard has now fundamentally changed—well, it has not changed yet, but I suspect it is about to.

[Dr Marie Tidball (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Lab)]

I supported the Bill on Second Reading on the basis of the High Court proposal, but then read very closely the evidence from Justice Munby on the need for a strengthened evidentiary process so that this is not just a rubber-stamping exercise. He said, secondly, that it would be better to replace the High Court with another system because of the position that it would place judges in. Having listened to 50 witnesses, I am satisfied with this proposal; I was persuaded through this cross-party process, which is an incredible example of deliberative decision making. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that our ability to amend the Bill where the evidence shows that we must do so demonstrates the strength of this process, and has enabled us to produce something much better and more in alignment with public opinion?

[Danny Kruger]

I greatly respect the position that the hon. Lady has come to. She has been persuaded that this is an improvement on the Bill, and I respect that. I recognise that that is what the hon. Member for Spen Valley and others think, but I am afraid I do not accept that the process has been adequate. The hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge cites Justice Munby and others who criticised the High Court proposals. I also have my criticisms of them—I think they were inadequate—but the response to that is not to scrap them all together, but to strengthen them, as Justice Munby suggested. The hon. Lady will know that Justice Munby is not supportive of the new proposals either; he thinks they also fail the essential test of being an effective safeguard. Nor does the new proposal—the panel—provide the opportunity for evidentiary investigation, which would indeed be appropriate if we were to have a proper safeguard at this stage. I respect the hon. Lady’s position, but I am not persuaded.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Tenth sitting)

Marie Tidball Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 12th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Rebecca Paul]

I support my hon. Friend’s comments. Outside of this place, I speak about this topic in a manner that is as sensitive as possible. When we are talking about the legislative changes that are needed to this Bill and how it interacts with other legislation, I will use the correct legal terminology, because I think it is really important that we do that.

[Dr Marie Tidball (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Lab)]

I appreciate the hon. Lady raising the need to use accurate legal language. Does she agree, therefore, that introducing “undue influence”, which is used regularly in the law of equity but not in the criminal law, would unhelpfully complicate matters, considering that coercive behaviour is defined in section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 where it provides for an offence of controlling or coercive behaviour in that context? We have 10 years of case law. The hon. Lady rightly pointed to the importance of looking at case law and at how courts have dealt with this; the understanding of coercion in the criminal law offences is well known and well rehearsed, whereas the use of undue influence in the context of criminal law offences, which is what we are dealing with in clause 26, is not.

[Rebecca Paul]

I thank the hon. Lady for that point, but I do not think we are talking about criminal law here. This debate is not relevant to clause 24—it is relevant to eligibility. We are simply saying, through this amendment, that if a clinician thinks someone has been unduly influenced, they would not be eligible. I think the hon. Lady is crossing over to the encouragement point, but these are separate points.

[Dr Tidball]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Rebecca Paul]

I am sorry, but I am going to give way to the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford, if he still wishes to intervene, as I am aware that he has been waiting.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jake Richards]

Let me just make this key point. Members have raised the case of Re T. I must admit that I do not know that case, but I believe it is a 1992 Court of Appeal case about a refusal of treatment, so it is 33 years old. The law has moved on. As the Minister said earlier, the terminology of coercion and pressure is much more modern, and is used in legislation that has been drafted in the last decade, rather than the Suicide Act drafted in the 1950s and that Court of Appeal case from the early 1990s.

Last night, I briefly went back to my law books—I sound like I am really missing my old job—and looked into where the concept of coercion is used across different jurisdictions and areas. This is what I read: “Coercion is a phenomenon the courts have experience of handling. Generally, coercion as a concept in our law involves applying pressure, whether physical, psychological or moral, to force someone to act against their free will or better judgment. This pressure can manifest in various forms, such as threats of intimidation and undue influence, and is recognised across criminal, family, consumer and contract law.” It is used in forced marriage legislation. It is used in criminal legislation. Case law has made it very clear that coercion is used interchangeably with duress, defined as a constraint on a person’s choice.

I feel that we are dancing on the head of a pin. The law has been drafted by one of the most senior parliamentary draftspeople. The Government Minister has confirmed that the Ministry of Justice deems this to be a sensible course of action if this legislation is to proceed.

[Dr Tidball]

Does my hon. Friend agree, as Max Hill did in oral evidence, that it would be helpful to have definitions of the three concepts in clause 26? Although we are discussing an earlier clause, it is important to thread the needle with this statute and ensure that we are looking ahead, as the hon. Gentleman has rightly pointed out.

[Jake Richards]

That sounds very sensible—I think my hon. Friend is talking about her amendment.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Marie Tidball Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 12th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Rebecca Paul]

I can confirm that I did not contact the promoter on this. My understanding is that if something is not legally coherent, it would normally be the Government who would contact the relevant MP to have that discussion and allow that reflection. That was the point I was trying to make; my apologies if I focused on the promoter more than I should have. I always enjoy meeting the promoter of this Bill.

[Dr Marie Tidball (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Lab)]

I thank the hon. Lady for the work she has done today. As a fellow new Member who sat on the Employment Rights Bill Committee, I can tell her that we debated many amendments from both sides. Sometimes, they arrived from both sides on the day and we had to absorb them on the day.

[The Chair]

Order. Those points are not relevant. We are discussing the amendment.

[Dr Tidball]

Okay. Would the hon. Lady not agree that it has been an extraordinarily rich discussion that reflects our ability to build on the oral evidence that we heard the week before last to develop amendments that reflect that evidence in an extraordinary scenario? This discussion is among the most deliberative that we have had.

[The Chair]

Order. We are having a lot of conversations about the process. [Interruption.] Can the hon. Member sit down, please? There are a lot of conversations about the process and none about the amendment. Can we stick to the amendment?

--- Later in debate ---

[Kit Malthouse]

The hon. Lady is quite right, and she makes my point very neatly for me: the language here is so wide-ranging that it could be anything. Other provisions in the Bill deal with exactly the concerns she expresses. A specific part of the Bill talks about people benefiting financially and how they may not participate. We had a long discussion about coercion and pressure.

[Dr Tidball]

I am delighted that the right hon. Gentleman has made that point. Inserting the amendment—and the language of, and focus on, “benefit”—in a paragraph that deals with the two criminal concepts of coercion and pressure, actually undermines the existing focus of the paragraph. Does he agree that it is better and stronger to keep the focus on the two criminal concepts, which would require the mens rea—which I think some colleagues are indicating—and the actus reus, and that that is not achieved by inserting the language about benefits?

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Kruger]

I am very conscious that people feel like a burden at the end of their life. It is quite right that at the moment the system says, “No, you are not. You have value. You might feel a burden, but we want to sustain your life until its natural end. If you want to withdraw or decline treatment, that is your autonomous choice, but we do not recognise you as a burden.” It is very important that the British state does not tell people or confirm to people that they are a burden, which is what we would do in the Bill.

To the point that the British people are very self-effacing, I should say that I suspect we would be at extreme risk from this law. I think many people would indeed feel like a burden. If we pass this law, we are explicitly saying, “Yes, you may well be a burden and it might well be right for you to seek an assisted death.” My right hon. Friend the Member for Braintree, who tabled the amendment, makes the powerful point that a right to die should not become a duty to die. Nobody wants that. Nevertheless, the implication of a law that confirms that people may seek to get the state’s help to kill themselves—not for their own sake but because they feel a burden to others—is incredibly dangerous for our society and for our culture. I would be very concerned if we proceeded with it.

I will now conclude on the amendment before quickly talking about pain. It addresses the motivation of doing things for one’s own sake. I do not underestimate the difficulties. My right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire has stated a number of them at least, as have other Members.

Implementing this safeguard will be difficult, but the fact is that the Bill’s sponsors have already put enormous faith in doctors and judges, or other experts, to detect external coercion and make all sorts of judgments—to ferret around in people’s minds and in their lives to understand what they are doing. We have to consider how best to implement this safeguard, but at the moment the Bill does not even say that asking for an assisted death for other people is something that should be protected against. That is wrong, and it is right that we make the amendment.

I will proceed quickly to a few points about the amendments in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Dr Johnson), which specify that the purpose of seeking an assisted death must be the avoidance of pain. They would make the Bill honest. The point has been made repeatedly by advocates in the media and in Parliament, including in our evidence sessions, that the reason why we need an assisted dying law is that so many people die terribly. My right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire has referred to some of that today, and he did so very powerfully on Second Reading too.

Sir Nicholas Mostyn made a fairly unarguable case that if we are honest about what we are trying to do here, it is unclear why we have a period of prognosis as a qualifying factor: why should people have to be within six months of their death in order to qualify if we are concerned about the avoidance of suffering? If the logic of the Bill’s proponents and the argument for it is followed through, of course it should be only about the avoidance of pain. I recognise that “suffering” is a more complicated word, but I do not agree with my right hon. Friend that pain is too difficult to determine. The motivation of avoiding pain is straightforward. It should be simply about pain, and unless someone is a full-blown ethical egoist who believes there should be no restrictions on someone seeking the assistance of others to take their life—

[Dr Tidball]

The hon. Gentleman may remember the speech that I made in the Chamber about my own experience of extreme physical pain, and indeed extreme physical suffering, as a child. The level of morphine that I needed was so high that my skin began to itch. I would not have voted for the Bill to proceed to Committee if it had been based on suffering. I voted for it because it was defined very tightly around the language of terminal illness. With the greatest respect to the hon. Gentleman, I think he undermines that case by arguing that we should move to the extremis and focus on pain. We all want to ensure that the Bill gives people the choice to seek assistance with six months’ terminality, set among other choices, including the ability to palliate and achieve other support at the end of life. I am afraid that the amendments would undermine that and, for the reasons that I set out on Second Reading and have just highlighted, I do not support them.

[Danny Kruger]

I remember the hon. Lady’s very powerful speech on Second Reading and I fully recognise that, which is why I said that I recognise that including suffering would be problematic. I understand her point about pain as well. I think we need belt and braces. If we are going to do this, we should have strict restrictions on prognosis, because I want to restrict the time limit. I could go further than six months; we keep hearing about people in the very last stages of their life, and I think it should be restricted to them, but I also think the purpose of seeking an assisted death should be consistent with all the arguments that we keep hearing about people suffering terribly at the end from an agonising death, and we need to restrict it to those cases as well. It should be for people at the very end of their life, for the avoidance of suffering terrible pain. Those are the reasons that the public, in so far as they do support the Bill, support it—they support it for those reasons only.