Rare Cancers Bill

Luke Evans Excerpts

Friday 11th July 2025 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

I call the shadow Minister.

[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

I rise to speak on behalf of His Majesty’s official Opposition in support of the Rare Cancers Bill, and to welcome its thoughtful and necessary intervention on behalf of a group of patients who have been under-researched, under-represented, and under-acknowledged for too long. I commend the hon. Member for Edinburgh South West (Dr Arthur) on bringing this Bill forward, and on his ongoing dedication to the issue.

The case for the Bill is clear: rare cancers—defined, in line with the UK rare diseases framework, as conditions affecting fewer than one in 2,000 people—are individually uncommon but collectively account for more than 20% of all cancer diagnoses. However, as we know, patients with rare cancers routinely face delayed diagnosis, limited treatment options and far fewer opportunities to participate in clinical research.

The Bill does not claim to be a silver bullet, but it does mark a significant step forward in how we think about and legislate for research, regulation and data access in rare cancer care. It is focused, proportionate and strategically aligned with the existing NHS and National Institute for Health and Care Research frameworks.

Clause 1 places a duty on the Secretary of State to carry out a review of the law relating to marketing authorisations for orphan medicinal products that are for the diagnosis, prevention or treatment of cancer. It also rightly requires that the review includes comparisons with regulatory approaches in other countries. This is vital. The explanatory notes rightly observe that research into rare cancers is often commercially unattractive because of small patient populations and high developmental costs. If our regulatory environment creates further barriers to entry, patients suffer—not because the science does not exist but because the system does not support it.

The UK’s current approach to orphan designation lacks the pre-authorisation incentives found in systems such as the European Medicines Agency and the US Food and Drug Administration. The review required under the Bill is the opportunity to ask whether we are doing enough to attract the research and development that rare cancer patients deserve.

[Sir Christopher Chope]

I am not quite sure whether my hon. Friend is responding to the amendments or making a Third Reading speech. I hope he will address the amendments I have tabled, including those that relate to clause 1, about which he has just spoken.

[Dr Evans]

If my hon. Friend bears with me, I will turn directly to his amendments. It is important to first set out the context, because we must understand the clauses if we are to debate the amendments to them.

Clause 2 makes crucial changes to the Secretary of State’s duty under the National Health Service Act 2006 by stating explicitly that it must include research into cancers that, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, are rare. Although this matters, the research agenda is often driven by numbers and funding scales. By mandating that rare cancers be part of the agenda, the Bill begins to shift the culture towards inclusion, equity and long-term thinking.

I particularly welcome the creation of the national specialty lead for rare cancers, modelling the NIHR’s existing structure of research delivery leaders. This individual will be tasked with promoting and facilitating research, advising on trial design and convening collaboration. The success of this role will depend on it not just being symbolically supported but having a clear remit, adequate funding and a strategic alignment with the wider NIHR research delivery network.

Clause 3 amends section 261 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 to allow NHS England to disclose information from cancer registries for the purpose of identifying and contacting potential clinical trial participants. This is a significant and necessary step. The Bill distinguishes between a disease registry, like the National Disease Registration Service, and a contact registry, such as Be Part of Research. Making sure that these systems can speak to each other will be of significant benefit when it comes to matching patients with opportunities. Importantly, the clause reaffirms that any such data sharing must remain compliant with the Data Protection Act 2018. As proposed new subsection 6A to the 2012 Act makes clear,

“A power conferred by this section to process information does not authorise the processing of information which would contravene the data protection legislation”.

This is a safeguard that we must preserve, not weaken, if we are to maintain public trust in the system.

At this point I turn to the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch (Sir Christopher Chope). He approaches private Members’ Bills in the way that a jeweller examines diamonds—with a magnifying glass, a steady hand and absolutely no tolerance for flaws. We may grumble as the clock ticks on, but deep down we all sleep better knowing that he is reading the footnotes. This Bill is no different; he has approached it with rigour, and I thank him for his commitment to precision and improving clarity and accountability. As he pointed out, the Bill is not trivial. Therefore, it is not only right, but indeed the duty of this House, to scrutinise closely legislation and amendments laid before us.

To that end, several of the amendments aim to tighten the Bill’s drafting or introduce firmer deadlines. For example, amendment 4 would reduce the timeframe for the review under clause 1 from three years to two. Amendment 2 would require the Secretary of State to

“set out a timetable for implementing any changes in the law recommended by the review.”

I understand the concern that reviews can drift, but the three-year period reflects the complexity of the subject: a UK-wide review of the Human Medicines Regulations 2012, including benchmarking against other jurisdictions and engaging multiple agencies. Compressing the timeline might jeopardise the depth or quality of the analysis. Likewise, a statutory timetable for implementation could constrain the Government prematurely, before the review’s conclusions are even known.

[Sir Christopher Chope]

I am very grateful to my hon. Friend for his unprompted comments. He will know that the funding is sufficient to staff the review only for one year. If there is only funding for one year, why does it take three?

[Dr Luke Evans]

My hon. Friend knows, far better than I, not to look at legislation in isolation. The Government will at some point bring forward the cancer plan, which will have a direct crossover with the Bill, so it is right to give the Government the freedom and space to implement the legislation. If we rush it, we could get it wrong, which would be even more detrimental for those who suffer with rare cancers.

Other amendments address definitions and discretion. For example, amendment 5 would remove

“in the opinion of the Secretary of State”

from the definition of rare cancer, and amendment 8 would remove similar wording in relation to NHS England’s discretion. At first glance, the amendments may seem like matters of tidy drafting, but retaining discretion is important, especially as regards rare cancers. Prevalence data can be uncertain or lagging, and flexibility allows for expert judgments about edge cases in which rigid definitions may unintentionally exclude patients from trials or research that could benefit them.

On top of that, there are concerns even about simple definitions. We are still exploring the difference between, for example, pre-cancerous and cancerous cells. If someone goes for a smear, that is what they are told. This is a new area. Who knows what will come up in the future? Simply defining rare cancers on the basis of lagging prevalence data is a risk, and it is therefore right that the Government and the Secretary at State have discretion to direct in one way or another.

However, I would grateful if the Government would answer the question, which has been rightly posed, of who or what will fill the role when NHS England is abolished. It is not clear exactly what that will look like. I have asked the Minister this question several times, in relation to the Mental Health Bill and other areas, and it is a question that this House should rightly ask. Who will be responsible for what, when and why?

That said, amendment 7, which would ensure that the proposed national specialty lead is appointed within six months of Royal Assent, deserves serious consideration. Patients have waited long enough. If the Government are confident that the post can be established promptly and resourced effectively, I would welcome that ambition being stated at the Dispatch Box today.

Finally, I must express my concern about amendment 9, which proposes to remove the data protection safeguard in clause 3(4). Although the provision may be declaratory, in that it reaffirms existing legal obligations, it none the less offers clarity and reassurance. In an area as sensitive as health data, such clarity matters, and the subsection’s removal could cause unnecessary concern, even if the underlying law remains unchanged.

In conclusion, this Bill is not about grandstanding. It is modest in financial cost, careful in its drafting and realistic in its scope, but its impact could be significant. For patients living with rare cancers, and clinicians and researchers striving to support them, the Bill offers real hope—hope for faster access to innovation, hope for more inclusive research and hope for a regulatory system that works for the many, not just the minority. Every patient matters, whether they are one in two or one in 2,000. As we stated on Second Reading and in Committee, we support the Bill, and I thank the House for giving me the chance to explain why.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Luke Evans]

I again thank the hon. Member for Edinburgh South West (Dr Arthur) for his tireless work on this important Bill. It has united the House, and rightfully so, because it speaks to something fundamental: the need for people with rare cancers to be seen, heard and addressed.

The Opposition have supported the Bill from the outset, and as the shadow Secretary of State, my right hon. Friend the Member for Melton and Syston (Edward Argar), and my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Dr Johnson) have said, we will continue to do so today. We would like to thank the charities and campaigners who have worked tirelessly to bring this issue forward: Pancreatic Cancer UK, the Brain Tumour Charity, Cancer52 and many more. Their work has helped to put rare cancers firmly on the agenda, and this Bill is part of their legacy.

I have been on the other side of this, delivering the news, particularly when I worked on an upper gastrointestinal hospital ward as a junior doctor. Delivering the news that someone has pancreatic cancer is one of the toughest things I have ever had to do, and it is worse still for the relatives who have to receive that news. I long for a day when no doctor has to deliver a death sentence to a patient, and this Bill brings that a step closer.

My hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham spoke in Committee about the repurposing of drugs, and I want to highlight its importance. Treatments that were developed for other conditions may be lifesaving for people with rare cancers. It is vital that the Bill’s scope allows for innovation to thrive. Conservative Members urge the Government to embed the provisions of the Bill in the forthcoming national cancer plan. I hope the Minister will confirm that that will happen, and hopefully he will tell us when it will be published.

Finally, as the expert jeweller, my hon. Friend the Member for Christchurch (Sir Christopher Chope) said on Report—his keen eye for a flaw is important—there is the glaring problem of the pending abolition of NHS England, which poses practical questions about data sharing and, of course, oversight. Conservative Members will do all we can to ensure that the legislation remains workable under the new structures, and I hope the Government will do that too.

The Bill will not solve everything overnight, but it is a serious step forward and a statement that even the rarest conditions deserve our fullest attention. As Maya Angelou said,

“when you know better, do better.”

The House knows better, thanks to the tireless work of the hon. Member for Edinburgh South West, and the Bill will help ensure that we do better too.

Glaucoma Awareness

Luke Evans Excerpts

Wednesday 9th July 2025 Westminster Hall

[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Pritchard. I, too, thank the hon. Member for Leicester South (Shockat Adam), who is a colleague both in my region and in primary care. His powerful testimonies about patients and what they suffer are exactly why he is an asset to this House. He presents information that we all need to hear when we debate health issues.

The hon. Member for Alloa and Grangemouth (Brian Leishman) spoke about the fantastic Perth royal infirmary. It is lovely to hear a success story. We do not hear enough success stories about the NHS, because the good news, despite what we hear in this place, is that the NHS broadly does a fantastic job for many patients, and we should never forget that. The experience he described is what we want to see across the country when it comes to dealing with glaucoma.

The hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) is nothing if not tenacious and consistent because, when I checked the records, I saw that in April 2024 he introduced a similar debate to raise this cause and to make sure people hear about it. He is a credit to his party and the people he represents when it comes to raising health issues.

The hon. Member for North Ayrshire and Arran (Irene Campbell) talked about NHS working groups. I have worked in places that have had PEARS—primary eye care acute referral schemes. Patients love them, GPs love them and I think the opticians and those who work in the services love them too, because they allow better joined-up care, which is what we all want.

Glaucoma is actually a spectrum of conditions. Ocular hypertension affects 3% to 5% of people in the UK aged over 40. Primary open angle glaucoma affects about 2% of people in the UK older than 40, but when we break that down, it affects 1% of people aged 40, 3% of people aged 60 and about 8% of people aged 80. With a growing elderly population, we can see why this is a problem. Primary angle closure glaucoma affects about 0.4%. There are also some rarer ones, but the point is that glaucoma affects about 700,000 people, who could potentially go blind.

Are the Government considering the call of the Association of Optometrists, and it is a simple one, to commission a national glaucoma pathway? I ask the Minister to think about that.

The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence guidance on glaucoma is very clear:

“If any of the following risk factors for glaucoma are present, consider advising people to have their eyes examined by an optometrist…Older age. People 60 years of age or older should be examined every 2 years until they are 70 years of age, when they should be examined annually—free examination is available through the NHS…Family history of glaucoma. People older than 40 years of age who have a first-degree relative (parent, sibling, or child) with open angle glaucoma should be examined annually—free examination is available through the NHS…Ethnicity. People older than 40 years of age who are of black African family origin should be examined…Certain people are entitled to…NHS-funded eye examinations by optometrists…These include people …With a family history…as described above…Aged 60 years or older…In receipt of certain benefits”

or

“Who have been advised by an ophthalmologist”

to have a follow-up. This is really important, as we have heard today, when we are talking about awareness. People should get their eyes checked, check their availability and, if they are 60 or over, make sure they understand that they can get their eyes checked through the NHS.

This issue was raised in a debate at the end of April 2024, just a few weeks before the election. It is worth looking at what was said by the then shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Gorton and Denton (Andrew Gwynne), who went on to be a Health Minister:

“I have a degree of frustration with the Government’s approach to the issue. Given the statistics, I would like to see the Minister commit today to turbocharge access to ophthalmology services and make eye tests more commonplace for people who do not routinely test their eyes, but also to get people access to eye care services once conditions have been diagnosed.”—[Official Report, 30 April 2024; Vol. 749, c. 51WH.]

And he finished his remarks by saying:

“We will support the Government in the remaining weeks or months that they have to get this policy right, but mark my words: the next Labour Government see this as a priority and we will act.”—[Official Report, 30 April 2024; Vol. 749, c. 53WH.]

Now that we are one year into this Government, it is worth checking the record to see whether that priority has been given.

Forgive me for being a bit of a pedant, but I checked Hansard to see how many times glaucoma has been mentioned. There have been four mentions since the election, only two of which were in the context of health. One mention was made by the hon. Member for Leicester South last month, and the other was made by the hon. Member for Strangford in a debate on rare retinal disease. That does not seem like it is a priority.

I am being a bit of a pedant, but I also looked through the 10-year plan again, and there were two mentions of eye care, one of which was “ophthalmology” and the other was “optometrists”. The Minister will argue that it is a strategy document, but it raises the question: what is the plan for glaucoma?

The last Government concentrated on several areas. These included early detection and greater use of community optometry, with an emphasis on the importance of routine tests. There was £500 million a year for sight tests and optical vouchers, supporting more than 12.5 million NHS sight tests provided free of charge. The budget was demand-led rather than limited by volume, and the public were encouraged through campaigns and social media advertising to get tested. Integrated care boards expanded local services for minor and urgent eye care, pre- and post-cataract checks and glaucoma referral filtering. The post-covid backlog recovery programme also received £8 billion.

I am getting death stares from you, Mr Pritchard, so I will move on to my main points and my questions for the Minister.

[Mark Pritchard (in the Chair)]

The shadow Minister needs to be brief. He has had five minutes, and I gave six minutes to the Liberal Democrat spokesperson. I will give the shadow Minister another 30 seconds.

[Dr Evans]

Is there a plan or a strategy for considering a glaucoma pathway? Will the Government also commit to the workforce? The Health Service Journal has noted that the plan, as it stands, has no delivery chapter. Where is the delivery chapter for the 10-year health plan?

[Mark Pritchard (in the Chair)]

To be clear, it is important that the Chair is both neutral and fair in the distribution of time.

[The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)]

Thank you, Mr Pritchard. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship.

I thank the hon. Member for Leicester South (Shockat Adam) for securing this important debate to raise awareness of glaucoma. I enjoyed our meeting some time ago, when we discussed this and other related issues at length. I am keen to ensure that we keep that dialogue going, and not just in this Chamber. This is a timely debate as it follows Glaucoma Awareness Week, which ran from 30 June to 6 July.

Losing one’s eyesight can be devastating, and I pay tribute to the charities that do so much to help people live with glaucoma or to research a cure, such as Glaucoma UK, the Glaucoma Foundation and the Royal National Institute of Blind People, to name just a few.

Last week, the Prime Minister set out our plan to get the NHS back on its feet and fit for the future. Underpinning our plan are three big shifts: from hospital to community, from analogue to digital and from sickness to prevention. The plan was developed through extensive engagement with the public, patients and staff, including the eye care sector. All three shifts are relevant to preventing and managing conditions such as glaucoma in all parts of the country. More tests and scans delivered in the community, and better joint working between services, will support the management of conditions, including glaucoma, closer to home.

I turn to glaucoma detection. This Government take glaucoma very seriously, as it is one of the main causes of sight loss. It is a time-sensitive condition, and early detection and treatment can help to slow down or prevent vision loss. I acknowledge the vital role played by community optometry in protecting people’s eye health across the country. That includes the hon. Member for Leicester South, who of course is an optometrist and has significant expertise in this sector. I also pay tribute to all the hon. Members who have contributed to this debate with such passion and conviction.

Sight tests play a vital role in the early detection of glaucoma. Most glaucoma patients are identified through routine sight tests. It is not possible to “feel” glaucoma; it does not cause any symptoms and the eye pressure does not always cause pain. That is why regular sight tests are so essential, so that conditions such as glaucoma can be diagnosed and treated as early as possible.

It is recommended that everyone should have a sight test every two years, and more often if it is considered clinically necessary. The NHS invests over £600 million annually in the provision of sight tests and optical vouchers, and high street opticians deliver more than 13 million NHS sight tests annually, which are free of charge for eligible patients. NHS sight tests are widely available across the country for millions of people and those who are entitled to receive them include children, individuals over the age of 60, individuals on income-related benefits and individuals diagnosed with glaucoma or considered to be at risk of glaucoma.

We understand that some people might not prioritise sight tests, compared with other healthcare, or they might not know that sight tests are recommended every two years. That is why we always look for opportunities to remind the public through social media. I was pleased that the Department supported Glaucoma Awareness Week and highlighted the importance of regular sight tests through our social media platform last week. I will also take this opportunity to urge anyone who might be watching or reading this debate, “Visit your optician if you have not had a sight test in the last two years. Please check on the NHS website to see whether you are eligible for any help in paying for a test.” NHS sight test providers in the high street also display information about NHS sight test eligibility.

Some high street optical practices are also being commissioned by integrated care boards to provide glaucoma referral refinement services. Moving more care into the community is one of the key priorities in our 10-year plan; we want to see care happening as locally as possible for patients. Where a patient has been identified as having raised eye pressure, local glaucoma referral refinement schemes provide additional tests to confirm whether a referral into secondary care is absolutely necessary. These schemes can save patients time and worry, and reduce unnecessary referrals, while freeing up space for others who need specialist attention in hospital. More than 70% of ICBs currently have some coverage of referral refinement in place.

For those patients who do need to be seen in secondary care, it is vital that they have access to timely diagnosis and any clinically necessary treatment. We have wasted no time in getting to work on cutting NHS waiting lists and ensuring that people have the best possible experience during their care. We promised change and we have delivered early, with a reduction in the list of over 230,000 pathways, including ophthalmology. The waiting list has been reduced by over 24,000 patients since July 2024; it has fallen from 606,819 to 582,385 as of February 2025. In addition, we have exceeded our pledge to deliver an additional 2 million operations, scans and appointments, having now delivered over 4 million additional appointments.

[Dr Luke Evans]

The Minister will probably be aware of the Full Fact and Sky News report that examined the speed at which appointments are being delivered. The Government have indeed delivered 4 million appointments, but under the last Conservative Government there were 5 million appointments within a similar time period, so we are actually seeing a slowdown in appointments. How will that affect people with eye conditions or other health conditions?

[Stephen Kinnock]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. In our manifesto, we of course set a target of 2 million additional appointments within the first year of a Labour Government, and we have delivered 4 million. The key thing is to ensure that we get people off the waiting list. Regarding the figure of 5 million that he referred to, I do not know whether there was more activity, but somehow it was not helping to reduce the waiting lists, because we saw the waiting lists rise consistently. The key metric is, of course, the waiting list being reduced, and I am very pleased to say that, when it comes to eyecare, a reduction of 24,000 patients has been delivered since July 2024.

That marks a vital first step to delivering on the commitment that 92% of patients will wait no longer than 18 weeks from referral to consultant-led treatment, in line with the NHS constitutional standard, by March 2029.

In addition to making progress on reducing waiting lists, we recognise the challenges facing ophthalmology services as one of the largest out-patient specialities in the NHS, and demand is set only to increase due to the ageing population. NHS England has worked with 11 ICBs to test a new way of delivering eyecare that aims to reduce pressure on hospital eye services.

The new model is emblematic of our shift from analogue to digital, as it uses IT connectivity between primary and secondary care services to improve the referral and triage of patients, with patient data and images being assessed by clinicians to determine whether patients need a secondary care appointment. It is called the single point of access approach. The SPOA approach reduces unnecessary hospital appointments, reduces the time from referral to treatment and allows more patients to be managed in the community. The ICBs testing the SPOA model have consistently demonstrated a reduction in unnecessary secondary care appointments and a significant reduction in wait times, both in time to treatment and to follow-up care. NHS England is continuing to share the learning from the accelerator sites for the SPOA with ICBs.

I want to see more ICBs adopting that approach for the benefit of patients, including those with suspected or diagnosed glaucoma. I believe that the SPOA has tremendous unharnessed potential and is a great example of how, by harnessing technology, we can improve the way the overall system works and facilitate the interface between primary and secondary care that we know is at the heart of so many of the challenges that we face across our health and care system.

Looking at the shift from sickness to prevention, although glaucoma cannot be cured, if it is caught early, treatment can prevent sight loss. The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence plays a crucial role in evaluating new medicines, medical devices and other technologies to determine their clinical and cost-effectiveness before recommending them for NHS use. NICE has published guidelines on the diagnosis and management of glaucoma. It has also published guidance on interventional procedures that provide recommendations on whether glaucoma-related procedures are safe and effective enough for wider use in the NHS.

A number of treatments are available for glaucoma, including eye drops, laser treatment or surgery, aiming to lower eye pressure and prevent or slow down optic nerve damage to reduce the risk of sight loss. Although there are treatments for glaucoma, it is a lifelong condition that requires regular monitoring. Historically, that has taken place in hospital but, in line with our aim to move more care from hospital to the community, there is no reason why, when clinically appropriate, that activity could not be undertaken outside of hospital. We know that some ICBs are already commissioning glaucoma monitoring in the community.

We must also recognise that, if diagnosed late, glaucoma can sadly lead to irreversible sight loss. The hon. Member for Leicester South spoke passionately from clinical experience about the significant impact that sight loss can have on an individual. Emotional support is therefore vital. There are various resources that aim to improve the support, including mental health support, available to patients through their sight loss journey. That includes NHS England’s patient support toolkit for commissioners and providers and the RNIB’s 2023 patient support pathway. Those sit alongside talking therapies and psychological therapies, which are widely available and to which patients can refer themselves directly. We are also taking steps to update the form for certificates of visual impairment to improve the signposting of patients to local support services.

Finally, I recognise the potential for research and innovation to help us to understand sight loss and to develop new treatments, including for glaucoma. The Department for Health and Social Care funds eyecare research through the National Institute for Health and Care Research. NIHR infrastructure funding provides investment in research expertise, specialist facilities, a research workforce and services that help to support and deliver research studies through a range of clinical areas, including eyecare research. That includes the NIHR Moorfields Biomedical Research Centre, which received funding of almost £22 million for five years from 1 December 2022, and is solely dedicated to eyecare research. The Moorfields BRC has been key in advancing research through a range of studies and clinical innovations in the glaucoma field. One of its flagship projects is a large-scale trial investigating the use of vitamin B3 to slow the progression of glaucoma. Recruitment for that study is ongoing at multiple sites across England.

As I have set out, the Government take glaucoma extremely seriously. Community optometry continues to play a vital role in preventing glaucoma. We are committed to improving eyecare services and patient outcomes, to reducing avoidable sight loss and, in particular, to harnessing the power of technology to drive those improvements forward. I also hope that this debate has further helped to raise awareness and may prompt a few more sight tests as a result. Once again, I congratulate the hon. Member for Leicester South on securing this important debate.

GP Funding: South-west England

Luke Evans Excerpts

Wednesday 25th June 2025 Westminster Hall

[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your leadership, Dame Siobhain, and to be here. I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Newton Abbot (Martin Wrigley) for securing this debate on a topic that I am all too familiar with, having spent time as a GP. This place may not be so familiar with the inner workings of GP practices, so it is fantastic to have the chance to discuss it. I declare an interest: many of my immediate and wider family are GPs, and it is important to put that on the record.

This debate has allowed us to discuss a huge variety of things, including the Carr-Hill formula and the QOF. We did not touch on DES and LES—directed enhanced services and local enhanced services. Rural dispensing practices are a really important funding stream. We have talked about the partnership model, retention, joining up services, ICBs and their toolkits, the interaction with the planning department and rurality, which has a particular impact on services in my area.

I want to pick up on the comments made by the hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole (Vikki Slade). Fair play to her for going out and shadowing a GP to see what their life is all about. At the heart of what she said was the good care that goes on. If we were to believe the Daily Mail, every GP is on the golf course and only cares about the money. The money is important, but GPs care far more about the patients and the quality of care they give. That is what drives them and gets them out of bed each day. We in this house must not forget that when we discuss healthcare, because it is important. We will get far better healthcare than ever before in the last few decades, and we must not lose sight of that.

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Newton Abbot for giving me my first chance as a shadow Health Minister to debate general practice and ask the Minister some questions. Without further ado, I will turn to those questions. First, what is the Government’s current position on primary care and its models? In an interview in The Times in January 2023, the current Secretary of State for Health and Social Care said:

“I’m minded to phase out the whole system of GP partners altogether and look at salaried GPs working in modern practices alongside a range of other professionals.”

He went on to speak at events held by the King’s Fund and the Institute for Public Policy Research, where he acknowledged that he has

“observed a GP partnership model in decline where very soon we’re going to have more salaried GPs than partner GPs”

and that the

“status quo is not an option”.

Then 18 months ago, just six months before the election, the Secretary of State stated,

“What we were minded to do is to sort of phase it out over time. I’m still not sure whether or not the GP partnership can survive in the longer term. But I haven’t reached a sort of firm conclusion that says that it shouldn’t.”

In the light of that, and given the importance of the partnership model, could the Government clarify their position with regard to the partnership model and any other models that are being considered?

[Vikki Slade]

I thank the hon. Member for his comments about my visit to the GP, because it was an absolutely wonderful experience. If the proposal is to phase out the partnership model and move to a salaried model, how would that work, given the severe cuts that ICBs are facing? With 50% cuts to most of the ICB funding, somebody will have to pick up the costs of running these organisations, rather than the clinical side of it.

[Dr Evans]

The hon. Lady is spot on. I posed my question to the Government because we know that primary care is one of the most efficient parts of the NHS. Why? Because the people running those businesses—they are businesses, and we have to be open and honest about that—pay attention to where the money comes in and goes out. They take full pride in it, first, because they care, and secondly, because their salaries are paid from the profit that comes out of that. Again, “profit” is a dirty word that people do not like to use, but it is the reality of what we are dealing with when it comes to how we break down the funding.

The Government have proposed to get rid of NHS England, and it is still unclear not only how much that will cost, but how much it will save and where the administrative burden will fall. On top of that, we do not know what will replace the partnership model if we lose it, and this is the question to be asked. Given that it was only six months before the election that the Secretary of State stated his intent, I too am keen to find out the answer.

I have a second question to pose to the Government. There are concerning reports this month in the Health Service Journal, which has had sight of a leaked version of the Government’s 10-year plan to improve the NHS. It says that the plan will push back the Government’s ambition to increase the share of NHS spending on primary and community care to 2035, rather than 2029 as originally promised. Can the Minister confirm or deny those reports?

When it comes to funding, the Government raised taxes directly on GPs as part of the national insurance increase. Has the Department made any assessment of how much of the £886 million uplift that has been allocated to GP practices will be needed to meet the increase in employer’s national insurance contributions?

I turn to the figures for the ARR scheme. The Government announced in April that they thought they had reached 1,500 new GPs, but as the RCGP pointed out at the time, although having

“more GPs employed in the workforce is encouraging, when considering full time equivalent GPs—which gives the most accurate picture of the GP workforce and the care and services GPs are able to deliver for patients—the numbers published today are lower, at 851 GPs”.

The increase is encouraging, but when we dig into the data, it appears that we are simply seeing more locum doctors coming back into the scheme. I would be grateful to understand exactly how the numbers are made up, and where the inference of 1,500 GPs comes from.

More importantly, where is the scheme going in the future? Is it time-limited? Will it continue? Will it be expanded and, if so, what does that look like? Although it is an important part of addressing provision, we also need to understand exactly what is going on. Initial reviews of the data suggest that appointments have not kept up with the pace of the introduction of GPs, so I am interested to understand from the Minister why, despite the supposedly new GPs coming in, the number of appointments has not increased proportionately. I would be grateful for any comment on that.

Finally, I turn to recruitment. Training new GPs has understandably been seen as the priority when it comes to solving the long-term workforce problems in England. As Pulse magazine puts it:

“This is probably one of the areas of workforce planning that could be considered a success. Health Education England, which has been incorporated into NHS England, has been able to meet its target of over 4,000 new GP trainees a year.”

The NHS workforce report, launched under the previous Government in 2023, made commitments to increase that. It set goals to increase the number of GP specialist training places to 6,000 by 2031, ensure that all foundation-year doctors do a rotation in general practice, and require GP registrars to spend the full three years in general practice.

There has been progress, but along with progress come new problems. The British Medical Association has warned that up to 1,000 GP registrars could face difficulty when qualifying in summer 2025 without funding for GP practices to recruit newly qualified, unemployed or underemployed GPs. What active steps are the Government taking to avoid that, and what support will they be offering newly qualified GPs?

[Dr Simon Opher (Stroud) (Lab)]

The ARR scheme in my practice at May Lane surgery in Dursley is employing newly qualified GPs who provide a lot of extra appointments for the surgery, so the scheme is working quite well for newly qualified GPs.

[Dr Evans]

I am pleased to hear that the scheme is working well, but the question is—as the hon. Member would know if he had been here for the start of the debate and all the way through it—what does it look like going forward?

In other places, are locums simply being stepped into the ARR scheme because there has been a shift in the way that GPs commission their work and PCNs are looking to deal with that? That is the question at the heart of it. We seem to be training more GPs than ever, yet at the same time, we have a disproportionate number of people at the top end who are not able to find work.

It is important to build up multidisciplinary teams that take account of the pharmacists, nurses and mental health workers around GPs, and I welcome the fact that the ARR scheme allows that. It has been widened to get more funding but, as the hon. Member will know, there is a discrepancy in how much doctors are funded for and there are limitations on how long they can work in the scheme. If I were to return to practice, I would not qualify under the scheme. The Government need to pose these questions; although the scheme is welcome, does it solve the whole problem? I do not think so, and my final set of questions relates to that.

We have seen a trend in international medical graduates coming to work in the UK, with the number of international medical graduates overtaking domestically trained medics for the first time in 2023. Have the Government considered something similar to the Australian scheme? Australia classifies locations using the modified Monash model or the Australian statistical geography standard to rank areas from major cities to remote regions, and then prioritises overseas doctors into the areas of most need. That could help to deal with the disparities across different parts of the UK. Will the Government consider that model in attempting to address those disparities? Whether it is right for the UK is for the Government to decide.

Hospitals might save your life, but your GP has been quietly guarding it for decades. That fact is often lost in our debates, so it has been a privilege to remind the Government, the House and the public of that fact today. I look forward to the Government’s response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

I am impressed by the way the hon. Gentleman did that and I congratulate him on it. If he would care to write to me to set that out, I will have a look at it and get back to him.

I want to take this opportunity to briefly outline what we have done since July 2024, and what we intend to do, to ensure that GP funding and services in the south-west are fit for purpose and capable of meeting the needs of the local population. In February, we concluded the annual consultation between the Department of Health and Social Care, NHS England and the general practitioners committee of the British Medical Association. For the first time in four years, GPC England voted in favour of the GP contract package, which illustrates the progress we are making to rebuild our relationship with the profession.

The 2025-26 contract is already improving services for patients and making progress towards the Government’s health mission. It supports the three key shifts the Government want to achieve: from analogue to digital; from sickness to prevention; and from hospital to community care. Patients across the country can expect online GP services to be available throughout the day, and better continuity of care for those who would benefit most. Patients can also expect a stronger focus on prevention, in particular to tackle the biggest killers, such as cardiovascular disease.

In 2025-26, we are investing an additional £889 million into the core GP contract to fix the front door of the NHS. Despite the difficult financial situation this nation faces, we are backing our health workers with above-inflation pay rises for the second year running. We are accepting the Doctors and Dentists Review Body’s recommendation of a 4% uplift to the pay element of the GP contract on a consolidated basis.

[Dr Luke Evans]

The Minister talks about contracts, which is an appropriate point to question him again on his Government’s position on the GP partnership model. It is not clear what that looks like from any of the documentation, so I would be grateful to understand that or, if the Secretary of State is considering new models, what they are and when we can see them.

[Stephen Kinnock]

We recognise that the partnership model has many strengths. It is a very important part of the system, and it helps to drive efficiency, innovation and a kind of go-getting approach to general practice. That is what we want to see—innovative approaches.

We are committed to substantive GP contract reform. We see the partnership model as a really important part of that, but we also recognise that fewer GPs are interested in going into partnership. The partnership model is not the only model delivering general practice; GP practices can and do choose to organise themselves in different ways. Many practices cite evidence of good outcomes on staff engagement and patient experience through the partnership model. I do not think it is right to say that there are any specific plans to change the partnership model, but we recognise that there are a number of other ways, and we will always keep the way in which the contract is delivered under review.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

That is an extraordinary statistic. There are clearly major imbalances in the way the system works and general practice is funded in our country. A little later I will come to the Carr-Hill formula; I am sure hon. Members will have seen announcements trailed in the media today about what my right hon. Friend the Health Secretary will say shortly in a speech in Blackpool. The issue raised by the hon. Member for Tiverton and Minehead (Rachel Gilmour) is directly pertinent to the work we are doing around the formula for funding GPs, to ensure that it is needs based, unlike the current, deeply anachronistic and dysfunctional funding system.

On funding, general practices are funded through a range of streams, the majority from core payments known as global sum payments. The rest is made up of incentive schemes, premises payments and enhanced and additional services. The Carr-Hill formula is applied as a weighting of 50% to 60% of GP funding allocated through the core contract, and is a workload-based formula designed to reimburse practices for their expected workloads.

The formula takes into consideration patient demographics, such as age and gender, and factors such as morbidity, mortality, patient turnover and geographical location. I am truly proud that today my right hon. Friend the Health Secretary is in Blackpool to announce that we are reviewing the Carr-Hill formula, which is outdated and not fit for purpose. Currently, GP surgeries that serve working-class areas receive on average 10% less funding per patient than practices in more affluent areas, and that needs to change.

Politics is about choices. For 14 years, the Conservatives —propped up for five years by the Liberal Democrats, I am afraid to say—chose to favour the richest. Who can forget the right hon. Member for Richmond and Northallerton (Rishi Sunak) boasting about how he had deliberately redirected funding from deprived urban areas to leafy suburbs? This Labour Government are reversing that ethos. Our decision to reform the Carr-Hill formula is a clear example of how we are putting our Labour values into practice.

We recognise the importance of ensuring funding for core services is distributed equitably between practices across the country. In our upcoming 10-year health plan, that is what we will do, through our review and reform of the Carr-Hill formula. Alongside that work, the Advisory Committee on Resource Allocation—ACRA—will be asked to advise on how the setting of ICB allocations can better support the reduction of health inequalities, to ensure that resources are targeted where they are most needed.

On workforce and recruitment, we recognise the difficult situation whereby patients have been unable to get GP appointments and recently qualified doctors have been unable to find jobs. That is why, in August last year, we announced £82 million in ringfenced funding, allowing primary care networks to recruit newly qualified GPs through the additional roles reimbursement scheme. More than 1,700 GPs have now been recruited through that scheme.

As part of the 2025-26 GP contract package, we made the additional roles reimbursement scheme more flexible, to allow PCNs to accommodate local workforce needs better. That includes removing restrictions on the number or type of staff covered, including GPs and practice nurses. When I took up my ministerial responsibilities in July, I was astonished to find that it was not possible to recruit GPs through the ARRS. We have bulldozed that red tape, which has resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of GPs on the frontline.

[Dr Luke Evans]

On that point, what would the Minister say to junior doctors, now coming to be registrars, who will be looking for a job? Should they look to the ARRS as the way forward when they qualify? What will he say to them if they do not get a job? Should that be the route they look to? Is it an expansion he is asking for? What are the alternatives for those graduating in August?

[Stephen Kinnock]

We have been really pleased with the take-up under the ARRS. It is a rapid and clear way of recruiting, particularly because it has the ringfence and the reimbursement system underpinning it. We absolutely encourage newly graduating GPs to take up opportunities through the ARRS; it is an important tool for bringing more GPs on to the frontline. The challenge is not so much the number of qualifying and graduating GPs in the pipeline, but getting them to the parts of the country that need them most. That variation in provision is the No. 1 priority. The review of the Carr-Hill formula will also have important synergy with the issue of recruitment and workforce.

[Dr Luke Evans]

It seems pertinent to ask this question now: the Australian scheme I mentioned is one way that another country has dealt with the issue. Would the Government consider placing overseas doctors in the areas of most need? Is that something under consideration?

Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Ninth sitting)

Luke Evans Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 24th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Zöe Franklin]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause would require local authorities and commissioning bodies to promote and report annually on mental health wellbeing in regard to any guidance published by the Secretary of State.

[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

I thank the hon. Lady for giving way so early in her speech. I mentioned my concern about this provision on Second Reading: a rough road is not the same as a broken bridge. We are dealing here with the most severe mental health issues. The new clause talks about wellbeing, which affects everyone. Trying to report that and fit it into this criteria risks diluting the very aim of the Bill in trying to deal with the most severe mental health issues. I would be grateful for clarification on the difference between mental wellbeing, which affects everyone, and mental health issues, which not everyone has.

[Zöe Franklin]

When it comes to enabling the Mental Health Act to function, having an understanding on the ground of the picture across our communities regarding mental health wellbeing is very important. That is why we tabled the new clause, which would allow us to get community care right. That would then feed into the crisis care that we are discussing in this Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Dr Evans]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

I rise to speak in support of the new clause, which was tabled by the Conservative party. It would place a duty on the Secretary of State to review the effectiveness of the regulatory authority’s role under the Mental Health Act 1983 within one year of the Act’s passage.

Allow me to provide the current legal and regulatory context. Under the framework in the Mental Health Act 1983, the Care Quality Commission, which is the regulatory authority in England, is tasked with monitoring and regulating providers of mental health services. We have debated some of this, and there are issues still to be addressed.

The CQC inspects hospitals, community mental health teams, and other relevant services to ensure compliance with statutory safeguards and standards. It publishes reports on providers and issues recommendations where it identifies failings. Additionally, there is an existing reporting framework under the Act whereby the Secretary of State is expected to oversee and ensure the Act’s proper implementation, with periodic ministerial reports to Parliament and CQC inspection outcomes made publicly available. However, there is currently no statutory requirement to review the CQC’s own role and effectiveness in carrying out these specific mental health functions. The gap means that although providers are scrutinised, the regulator itself escapes similar structured accountability and review.

This question was debated in the other place and I welcome the comments from the Minister in the Lords, Baroness Merron, who, in a letter, rightly highlights existing transparency measures. She states that,

“findings from CQC’s monitoring activity are reported annually in their Monitoring the Mental Health Act report, which is laid before Parliament and published publicly.”

That is true. She also notes the annual quality account reports produced by NHS healthcare providers under the Health Act 2009, which cover patient safety, treatment effectiveness, and patient feedback. True. Those are indeed important components of the current oversight framework, and we support the continuation and strengthening of those transparency mechanisms.

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

My hon. Friend makes a powerful point about transparency, but it is not just about that. Does he agree that it is also about having an evidence base that allows reform and improvement of the regulator?

[Dr Evans]

I do, and to expand the point, this is about understanding the performance of CQC as well. We know from the Dash report and from Mike Richards that there are, and have been, concerns about CQC performance. That is at the heart of this new clause—to try to make sure we actually look at the performance and regulation of the regulator. Those reports focus on the performance of mental health services and providers, but they do not amount to a dedicated statutory review of the regulator itself—specifically, the CQC’s role, effectiveness, and capacity under the Mental Health Act.

Annual reports primarily reflect the CQC’s monitoring outcomes rather than a comprehensive, independent evaluation of whether its regulatory functions are being discharged optimally, or whether it is adequately equipped to meet the new challenges posed by the legislation. In other words, reporting on what the regulator monitors is not the same as reviewing how well the regulator performs its duties.

The new clause would address that distinct gap by mandating a focused review with a parliamentary report and a Government response, thereby strengthening accountability at the regulatory level. The new clause aims to establish an additional layer of scrutiny, not duplicative reporting. It would require the Government, within 12 months of the Bill becoming law, to conduct a formal review of the CQC’s effectiveness, specifically in regulating mental health services under the 1983 Act. It mandates an assessment of whether the CQC is adequately fulfilling its duties, including monitoring, inspection, and enforcement responsibilities, as well as whether it will be capable of carrying out its duties under the new legislation. Given the well-documented problems in mental health, it seems entirely appropriate to address the key point: is the regulator regulating effectively?

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

My hon. Friend makes a strong point about having a review to ensure that the regulator is operating effectively. Does he share some of my concerns that a one-off review may not demonstrate ongoing oversight and scrutiny of the performance of the regulator?

[Dr Evans]

We do not want to introduce too much bureaucracy, but ensuring an accountable statutory mechanism to ensure adequate oversight is incredibly important. Much of the debate about the Bill has been about whether we put things in primary legislation or in policy, or whether we allow policy and legislation to be done at a secondary level—or even leave them for the organisation to deal with. My concern with the CQC is that we have not seen the organisation step up in the way that it should do. That does not mean that it is not making progress, but we need to see further progress.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

I am grateful to the Opposition spokesman, the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, for bringing this issue forward.

Two major independent reviews into the Care Quality Commission have reported under this Government: one by Dr Penny Dash, on the CQC’s operational effectiveness as a regulator of all health and social care providers including those in mental health, the other by Professor Sir Mike Richards on its single assessment framework. The CQC has accepted those recommendations in full, and although we are confident in the progress that the CQC is making, we recognise that the reviews did not closely inspect its statutory role in relation to monitoring the use of the Mental Health Act.

Those powers and duties are entirely distinct from those that the CQC uses to regulate the health and social care sector under the Health and Social Care Act 2008. In recognition of that gap, as the Opposition spokesman pointed out, we committed in the other place to report on that specific aspect of the CQC’s role in the first of the Government’s annual reports on the implementation of the Bill, which will be laid before Parliament one year after Royal Assent.

[Dr Evans]

The Minister mentioned the Government’s annual reports, but at other times he has said that they will issue written ministerial statements. Will he clarify which it will be? There is a big difference between a couple of paragraphs in a written ministerial statement laid before the House, and a full report. When debating the other clauses, new clauses and amendments, the Government’s answer has been that they will report back to Parliament in a year’s time. I am grateful for that, but clarity would be helpful, because a full and comprehensive report would give more weight to the Opposition in terms of understanding and transparency.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I can confirm that the information will be in a section of the written ministerial statement that will be tabled within 12 months of Royal Assent. We think that requirement makes the Bill more robust and effective, because it is an integral part of the entire ecosystem that we are looking at in terms of implementing this legislation and making sure we have the institutional capacity and capability. We think it helps to have the information as an integral part of the written ministerial statement, but the hon. Gentleman is right to point out that we should be clear in the definitions and language we use.

The written ministerial statement will be an overall implementation report. It will contain a number of sections, one of which will be on the role of the CQC and the inspection function. It will include reflections from the new chief inspector of mental health, Dr Arun Chopra, on the CQC’s statutory functions under the Mental Health Act, as well as its role as a key partner in the delivery of the reforms. The written ministerial statement—the report—will be laid before both Houses of Parliament within 12 months of Royal Assent. I hope the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth therefore feels able to withdraw his new clause.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

Finally, clause 59 states that the Bill’s short title will be the Mental Health Act 2025, once it becomes an Act of Parliament. I therefore commend clauses 55 to 59 and Government amendment 39 to the Committee.

[Dr Evans]

I will be brief. On this clause, I will be grateful if the Government can ensure good co-operation between the devolved powers, and if the Minister can set out how he will engage with the Welsh Government before exercising the power.

On clause 57, what consideration has been given to cross-border issues to ensure that there are no unintended consequences between the likes of England and Wales or Scotland and England? Clause 58 covers commencement; will there be a clear published timetable for that over the next 10 years? Will Government allow Parliament sight of the transitional provisions? We have talked about the annual written ministerial statement, which we have clarified, but will there be further tracking reports that we can look at?

Clause 59 states that the Bill will not impose new public spending or taxation, and yet the impact assessment lists £1.9 billion for the NHS in England, £396 million for local authorities, £2.5 billion for supporting housing and social care, and £287 million for legal costs and tribunals. Clearly, costs are associated with the Bill’s implementation over the next 10 years, so a money resolution is rightly required. When I raised those issues on our first and second days in Committee, the Minister rightly could not answer, because we had not had the Government’s settlement. We have now had that settlement, so I will be grateful to understand how the funding is to be applied to mental health on the community side and with regards to the Bill. Finally, given that we are dealing with Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, what are the Barnett consequentials of the Bill in ensuring the support implied in the clauses?

I am grateful to the Committee, the Clerks, the Chairs, everyone here and everyone who has helped me prepare. Committee stage has been a joy, but also a long trial to get through. I am glad to be present as the Bill proceeds, because it is the right thing for the country.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I thank the shadow Minister for his question about devolved powers. We have worked closely with the Welsh Government on the Bill. The Senedd has yet to vote, but the Welsh Government in their legislative consent memorandum recommended that it grants consent to the Bill. We also seek a legislative consent motion from the Northern Ireland Executive for extending—in Government amendments 37 and 38—the remit of the Human Rights Act 1998 to cover private care providers when providing certain services arranged for or paid by local by public authorities. I will look into the cross-border issues and, if something is there, I will certainly write to update the shadow Minister.

On the published timetable, the written ministerial statement will absolutely be a report on progress over the 12 months and will have a forward plan in it. I cannot say at this moment whether it will be a forward plan all the way through the proposed 10-year commencement period, because some of that will go beyond the spending review period, for example, but I assure the hon. Member that a timetable will at least cover the period of the initial spending review. I do not know whether there will be tracking reports—I will check that point with officials—but my sense is that the written ministerial statement will be the main hook to hang this on.

The shadow Minister asked about the money resolution. We have the overall financial envelope for the DHSC. There is now—how should I describe this?—intense dialogue going on between departments within the DHSC and across portfolios, so I think it will take a couple of weeks before we get the carve-up of the envelope across the different portfolios.

I note the shadow Minister’s point about the Barnett consequentials. I will look into it and come back to him.

It remains for me to thank you, Mr Vickers; everyone in Committee, for their very hard work; and all the staff and officials, to whom we are hugely grateful. I commend the Bill to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 55 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 56 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 57

Extent

Amendments made: 37, in clause 57, page 68, line 3, at end insert “subject to subsection (2).”

This is consequential on amendment 38.

Amendment 38, in clause 57, page 68, line 4, leave out “This section, section 55” and insert—

“Section (Human Rights Act 1998: extension to certain private care providers), section 55, this section”.—(Stephen Kinnock.)

This ensures that NC10 extends to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

Clause 57, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 58 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 59

Short title

Amendment made: 39, in clause 59, page 68, line 25, leave out subsection (2).—(Stephen Kinnock.)

This removes the privilege amendment inserted in the Lords.

Clause 59, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Bill, as amended, to be reported.

Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Seventh sitting)

Luke Evans Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 19th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I remind the Committee that with this we are considering clauses 43 and 44 stand part.

[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

I know that the Committee has been waiting in earnest for me to deliver this speech on clauses 42 to 44. As the temperature gets to almost 30° today, I will try to maintain the same gumption that President Trump had when introducing his flagpoles, because this is an exciting topic and I am keen to treat it with verve.

Clauses 42 to 44 will introduce new duties on hospital managers to provide information about complaints procedures to patients under different legal regimes within the Mental Health Act 1983. The clauses move important safeguards from the code of practice into primary legislation, thereby giving them statutory force, which is a welcome step. I acknowledge the Government’s intentions to strengthen patients’ rights and accountabilities within the mental health system.

Clause 42 concerns information for detained patients. Under the current law, section 132 of the Mental Health Act 1983 requires hospital managers to give patients information about their rights under the Act, including their rights to apply to the mental health tribunal and to access independent mental health advocates. Although complaint procedures are mentioned in the code of practice, however, they are not explicitly covered in statute. Clause 42 will amend section 132 to impose a new statutory duty to provide information on how to make complaints about: the carrying out of functions under the Act, any medical treatment received while detained, and the outcome of any such complaint, including routes for escalation such as through the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman.

Importantly, the information must be provided both orally and in writing, and steps must be taken to ensure that the patient actually understands it. Those duties must be carried out on initial detention and then repeated either annually for restricted patients or on the submission of renewed report under section 20 of the Act. The Opposition welcome that positive and necessary step. We know from independent reviews, including the Wessely review, that many patients do not know how to complain or fear that doing so will affect their care. By placing these requirements in primary legislation, we provide more robust legal protection.

I would be grateful if the Minister clarified some points. How will “understanding” be assessed or evidenced in practice? For example, what guidance will be issued to ensure that the needs of patients with a learning disability, cognitive impairment or limited English are met? Will independent mental health advocate services play a formal role in supporting patients to understand the Act with regard to this information about complaints? Is that part of their expanded role? Will complaints about poor complaint handling, not just about the original matter, be clearly included in the framework, as implied in the explanatory notes? To whom would such complaints be reported: NHS England, the Department, the integrated care board or a regulator such as the Care Quality Commission?

As we are talking about complaints, I notice that paragraph 327 of the explanatory notes states:

“New subsection (2A)(c) ensures the duty covers information about the patient’s right to complain to the Parliamentary and Health Services Ombudsman about the maladministration of complaints about medical treatment.”

That is very welcome, but it brings up an entirely new set of questions about the role of the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman in this guise—an institution that embodies the public’s right to accountability, redress and justice when our health and public services fall short. In essence, it is the final arbiter; at best, it is the final safety net for those who feel they have nowhere else to turn. In particular, I want to focus on its critical yet often underappreciated work in relation to mental health complaints and how it intersects with the new Bill.

The ombudsman investigates unresolved complaints about NHS services in England, including those related to mental health care, alongside complaints against Government Departments and other bodies. For many families affected by failings in mental health provision, be that in crisis care, discharge planning or secure settings, the ombudsman provides a route to independent evidence-based resolution. We must therefore ask whether it is functioning with the efficiency, compassion and authority that patients deserve.

To pick just some of the data, in 2022-23 the PHSO received more than 35,000 complaints, which was an increase of 20% on pre-pandemic levels. If we look at timelines, performance remains under pressure: only 32% of investigations were completed within 13 weeks, 50% within 26 weeks and 81% within 52 weeks—that comes from the annual report. In the mental health sphere, such delays can exacerbate trauma and deepen distrust in public systems, in particular if the complainant is already experiencing severe distress.

The PHSO has reported a rise in callers exhibiting suicidal ideation, a tragic indicator of the depth of need and the urgency of timely reform. Over the past few years, to its credit, the ombudsman has introduced reforms for a new case severity assessment framework to triage cases more effectively; investment in digital case management; training for frontline staff to deal more sensitively with mental health complaints; and a proactive push for transparency, including publishing more case outcomes and data.

That is important work, but there is still some way to go. What assurances can the Government provide that PHSO’s funding is sufficient to cope with increased volumes of complex mental health cases, especially as it has a somewhat unique structure? The PHSO reports to the Public Accounts Committee. It does not have a departmental home. It is appointed by the King on the advice of the Prime Minister, after scrutiny by the PAC, but it is funded through the House of Commons Commission. That makes the PHSO rightly independent, but we need to ensure that it has the ability to deal with the top level of complaints about severe cases of mental health issues.

Under this legislation, we will be creating more automatic referrals to tribunals; we are rightly empowering more patients to complain; and we are putting more reports in for accountability. We need to ensure that when there are complaints—as there could well be—they will still be dealt with. Therefore, has an impact assessment been carried out, or will one be carried out, about PHSO funding, capacity and ability to deal with more mental health complaints?

As we debate a new Bill, we must ensure that accountability mechanisms fully integrate with any legislative reform. The Bill will, rightly, enhance patient rights and restrict inappropriate detention, but the ombudsman must be equipped to robustly investigate breaches of those rights. We should also ensure a clear reporting pathway for detained individuals when their families go to the ombudsman. My overarching question for the Minister, which I hope he will address is: how will the Bill, empowered in this way, interface with the PHSO? Will it strengthen the ombudsman’s ability to investigate complaints relating to involuntary treatment or detention?

Clause 43, on information about complaints for community patients, will make an equivalent amendment to section 132A of the Mental Health Act, which governs patients subject to a community treatment order. Again, patients are currently told about their rights to tribunal and IMHA support, but not necessarily about how to raise concerns or complaints about their care in the community. The clause will therefore require hospital managers to provide information about how to make complaints about functions carried out under the Act, about medical treatments for mental disorder while on a CTO, and about the outcome of any such complaint.

Clause 43 will also add a new requirement to repeat the information as soon as practicably possible after the CTO renewal. Again, that seems sensible and overdue, because clear repeat information can help to balance the power dynamics and support the patient voice. However, what steps will be taken to ensure that community patients who do not have regular contact with hospital staff are still given the information promptly and meaningfully? Will that be the duty of the new community clinician, for example? What is the role of community mental health teams or primary care staff, such as GPs or community psychiatric nurses, in delivering or enforcing the duties? Will the Minister confirm whether patient carers or families beyond the nominated person will be supported in understanding how someone can make a complaint?

Finally, clause 44, on information for conditionally discharged patients, will introduce proposed new section 132B of the Mental Health Act, extending the same principles to patients who are conditionally discharged, including restricted patients under section 42, 73 or 74. Such individuals often remain subject to significant restrictions in the community, such as curfews, reporting conditions or residence in supervised accommodation, and they can be recalled to hospital at any time, yet under the current law they have no statutory right to be informed of how to complain about or challenge decisions that affect them.

Clause 44 will require hospital managers to inform those patients about which section they are discharged under, how the Mental Health Act continues to apply, their rights to apply to a tribunal, and—crucially—how to make complaints about the carrying out of MHA functions, medical treatments and complaints outcomes. That requirement must be met as soon as practicable, in both oral and written form. A copy must also be given to the nominated person.

The explanatory notes state that the duty applies to

“patients subject to transfer directions”

from prison, and that the information should be given before discharge if possible. That is welcome, but it raises a question why, unlike clause 42, clause 44 does not impose a duty to repeat that information periodically. Given that conditionally discharged patients may remain under conditions for many years, have the Government considered adding a requirement to re-provide the information, say, annually? What support or advocacy will be available to conditionally discharged patients, particularly those in forensic or community forensic services, to help them to make complaints or understand their rights? Finally, will the Minister clarify how the provisions will work for patients who lack capacity, or who have no nominated person? Will there be a fall-back or safeguard in those cases?

In clauses 42 to 44, the Government are rightly seeking to embed the right to complain, and to understand that right, into the framework of the Mental Health Act. These are technical but powerful reforms. As ever, however, the challenge lies in not what is required but how it is delivered, especially for the patients who are most marginalised, restricted or isolated. I hope that the Minister can provide some reassurances about monitoring for compliance, clear statutory guidance, and the support of the advocacy structure, particularly at the very top, for dealing with complaints.

[The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I will respond to the questions that have been asked.

The hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon asked what training would be provided to staff on communicating the information clearly and compassionately. We will seek to clarify the complaints process and, when we come to revise the code of practice, we will consult on the guidance for how information on complaints should be provided. The Department will work with the NHS, Social Work England and other partners to develop appropriate training for staff on the reforms. Once the code of practice has been updated, professionals working under the Act will be required to undergo training to maintain their competence and awareness of the Act.

The hon. Member also asked how to ensure that information is genuinely accessible. It is important that the complaints process is accessible to all patients. Hospital managers must take practicable steps to ensure that patients have understood complaints procedures, and information about complaints must be provided both verbally and in writing. We expect all healthcare organisations to meet people’s communication needs to support equitable access, experience and outcomes, including when someone is in hospital for their mental health.

NHS England sets out guidance for providers on how to support individuals with their communication needs. That support may involve providing access to interpreters, providing information in a range of formats—such as in translation, large print, braille and easy read format—or the use of augmentative and alternative communication, video clips and visual diagrams to aid understanding. The accessible information standard requires all applicable organisations to identify, record, flag, share and meet the information and communication support needs of patients, service users, carers and parents with a disability, impairment or sensory loss.

On the question of whether there will be an audit of whether patients feel genuinely informed and empowered to complain, we know that some service users are not aware of the avenues by which they can make a complaint. The changes in clauses 42 to 44 seek to address that problem, and to increase awareness of the complaints system. To ensure that patients are supported and empowered to exercise their rights, we are expanding the right to an independent mental health advocate to all mental health in-patients. Complaints information must be provided to both the patient and the nominated person. Family and carers also have a right to complain about care and treatment given under the Mental Health Act.

The hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley asked for reassurance on oversight, and that feedback from complaints will identify issues. I think that the hon. Member for Chester South and Eddisbury also asked about that, as well as asking what mechanisms will be in place to give feedback on how the system is working. Complaints data enables CQC Mental Health Act reviewers and mental health inspectors to understand trends and focus on areas of concern in their respective monitoring and inspection activities. Focused activity— for example, a focused Mental Health Act visit or inspection activity—can also be scheduled in response to concerns raised in MHA complaints. When looking at trust and provider-level MHA inspection activity, complaints information informs the CQC’s questioning of trusts or independent providers about their complaints processes.

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Advance choice documents

[Dr Evans]

I beg to move amendment 46, in clause 45, page 57, leave out lines 5 to 11 and insert—

“(1) All eligible patients shall have a right to create an advance choice document.

(1A) For the purposes of this section, an ‘eligible patient’ is a patient who—

(a) has previously been detained under Part 2 or Part 3 of this Act,

(b) has been diagnosed with a mental disorder which may lead to the possibility they will be detained under this Act in the future, or

(c) is an English qualifying informal patient (see section 130CA).

(1B) NHS England and each integrated care board must make such arrangements as it considers appropriate for—

(a) ensuring that all eligible patients for whom it is responsible for the purposes of this section are informed of their right to create an advance choice document, and

(b) helping an eligible patient to create an advance choice document.”

This amendment gives all eligible patients the statutory right to create an advance choice document if they so wish.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 32 and 33.

Amendment 18, in clause 45, page 57, line 33, at end insert—

“(3A) An ‘advance choice document’ under subsection (3) should include consideration of the person’s financial circumstances.”

This amendment ensures that the advance choice document includes matters relating to the patient’s financial circumstances.

Government amendments 34 and 35.

Clause stand part.

[Dr Evans]

I am grateful for the opportunity to speak to clause 45 and amendment 46. I will also speak to the amendments from the Government and the Liberal Democrats.

The Bill introduces advance choice documents as a new tool to empower people with lived experience of mental health conditions. This is a significant development in mental health law and policy. Currently, people who are detained or treated under the 1983 Act often have limited ability to influence decisions about their care at times when they lack capacity. Although the Act includes some mechanisms such as advance statements, they have been criticised for their limited legal weight and inconsistent application.

Clause 45 will insert proposed new sections 130M and 130N into the Act, and place duties on NHS England, integrated care boards in England and local health boards in Wales to facilitate access to information about ACDs and to provide support to individuals who want to create such documents. As the Government’s explanatory notes state, ACDs are written statements

“made by an individual while they have capacity or competence …setting out their decisions, wishes and/or feelings about matters that may be relevant to their assessment for admission…and treatment”

should they lack capacity. That extends the scope of patients’ involvement in care planning and respects autonomy in a way that the current law does not fully achieve.

I commend the Government for recognising the importance of enabling people to set out their wishes in advance, especially when they have previously been detained or treated informally. That can help to reduce stress, improve trust between patients and professionals, and potentially prevent crisis escalation to detention. Nevertheless, I have some constructive questions that I hope the Committee will consider.

On the strength of duty on the NHS bodies, proposed new section 130M(1) will require NHS England and each ICB to

“make such arrangements as it considers appropriate”

to provide information about and support with ACDs, which leaves considerable discretion. Will that discretion lead to inconsistencies across regions and vulnerable populations? Should the Bill include clear minimum standards or benchmarks for what constitutes “appropriate” arrangements, for example by mandating proactive outreach to high-risk groups, such as those in secure children’s homes or immigration centres, where awareness of rights or access to support is often poor?

There is then the legal status and practical use of ACDs. The clause defines ACDs but does not specifically set out their legal weight in decisions about treatment or detention. How will clinicians balance these documents with their clinical judgment or clinical care needs? The explanatory notes mention that ACDs may include

“advance decisions under the Mental Capacity Act 2005.”

The Bill could clarify how conflicts will be resolved; this is a recurring theme in our discussions. It would be helpful to have explicit guidance on safeguards to ensure that ACDs are given full weight and respect while maintaining clinical safety.

I turn to the issues of training, resourcing and monitoring. This is a big change, and supporting people to make meaningful ACDs requires skilled staff and resources. Who is expected to provide that support? Is it the CPN, the community clinician, the IMHA or even the GP? Will there be training programmes for clinicians and care staff on how to discuss, record and use ACDs effectively? Furthermore, will there be monitoring and reporting requirements so that Parliament and public can hold the services to account? Who will those requirements sit with if NHS England is abolished? Will it be the CQC, the ICBs or even the Department of Health and Social Care?

We then have the issues of access and equity. We have already identified that people with learning difficulties and certain racial groups find themselves in contact with mental health services more than other groups. These groups can be less keen then to interact with services, either by choice or due to ability, so how do the Government intend to ensure that ACDs are accessible to people from diverse backgrounds, including those with communication difficulties, learning disabilities or limited English? What consultation will there be with charity and representative groups to ensure that documentation is accessible enough for all, yet thorough and robust enough to properly reflect wishes correctly?

Clause 45 is a welcome step towards enhancing patient autonomy and improving mental health care, but to ensure that the new powers deliver real benefits, the Government should consider how to strengthen the duties placed on various bodies. That leads me to amendment 46, tabled in my name. Embedding ACDs into mental health is long overdue, but the clause places duties on NHS England and integrated care boards only to “make such arrangements” as they consider “appropriate” for providing information and support for ACDs. The intention is good, and a marked step from where we were, but the language risks creating a postcode lottery in which patients’ access to this important right depends on where they live or how proactive their local systems happen to be.

That is why my amendment seeks to move from discretion to entitlement. It would replace the current discretionary wording of the clause with a clear legal right for eligible patients to create an advance choice document. The amendment defines “eligible patient” as a patient who has previously been detained under parts II or III of the Act, who has a diagnosis that may lead to future detention, or who qualifies as an informal patient under proposed new section 130CA. It would also require NHS England and ICBs to proactively inform eligible patients of their rights and offer them support in exercising them. This is a targeted and proportionate amendment. It would not mandate ACDs for all, nor would it impose burdensome new duties; it would simply create a right to be offered and supported to make an ACD.

The letter of 3 June from Baroness Merron to my colleague in the Lords appears, in part, to address the issue, so I will talk a little about what she wrote. I thank Baroness Merron for the letter and the tone of the letter, which reflects genuine engagement on the issue and acknowledges the importance of reflective care after detention. She notes:

“The impact assessment for the Bill accounts for multiple hours being spent with the individual by health and care professionals to inform and support them to make choice in advance of a potential future mental health crisis.”

That is welcome. She also stated that the Government had tabled an amendment that day that

“requires commissioners to make arrangements for bringing information and help available regarding ACDs, to the attention of people…especially those in the 12 months following their discharge from hospital.”

I believe that that is a reference to one of the Government amendments to this clause. I hope I am right; if so, I will return to that amendment once I have set out the position on ours. As set out in the letter, the Government amendment is another step forward, and I acknowledge that the Government have appeared to move in response to concerns raised by my colleagues in the Lords and by many stakeholders, but I gently suggest that it falls short. It retains the same permissive language—duties to do what is a “appropriate”, decided locally by commissioners. That may allow for good practice in some areas, but it does not create enforceable rights for individuals. Without a clear entitlement, patients who need this the most may never even be told that it was an option.

Let me give a practical example to illustrate why statutory rights matter. A person with bipolar disorder may be detained under the 1983 Act during an acute episode, but once well, they may want to specify in writing that in future they do not want a particular medication or that they want to be admitted to a specific hospital near family. Those are reasonable, clinically relevant requests, but unless the person is informed of the right to make an ACD and offered support to do so, that opportunity could be lost, especially for those facing health inequalities or language barriers, or those who have a history of mistrust with services.

The Government have said that those conversations will happen anyway within the care planning or under the community mental health framework, but the reality is that the systems are patchy. People discharged from hospital often face month-long waits to be re-engaged by community teams. They may not have a named worker. They may receive support only from overstretched primary care. ACDs must not rely on assumptions about care pathways, which too often do not work as intended.

On trauma and mandating reflection, I want to take seriously a point that Baroness Merron raises in her letter: for some individuals, reflecting on past detention may be traumatic, and that support should be user-led. Absolutely—that is why my amendment would create a right, not an obligation. No one should be forced to make an ACD, but people should be informed that they can, and they should receive its support if they so choose. Choice is not trauma; it is autonomy.

Let us remember that, for many, reflecting on what went wrong in past care is not re-traumatising but restorative. It is how people regain control and how the services learn. I believe this is a thoughtful and sensible amendment. It would strengthen clause 45 by creating clear, predictable entitlements for those most at risk of future detention. It would respect clinical discretion while affirming patients’ rights. It would not undermine the Government’s intent but fulfil it. We all agree that ACDs could be transformative. Let us give them the best chance to succeed by ensuring those who need them the most are offered them, not just as a maybe.

I will touch quickly on amendment 18, tabled by the Liberal Democrats, and spend the rest of my speech addressing the Government amendments. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Winchester for highlighting an important part of dealing with mental health, but I simply wonder whether primary legislation is the correct place to do what he suggests. Could it be done in codes of practice? What if people are admitted, but when they produce plans do not want to disclose their financial arrangements? Might compulsions have to be created for them to do so? I wonder about the unintended consequences of amendment 18, and I look forward to the hon. Gentleman’s addressing them.

I think the Minister in the other place was referring to Government amendments 32 and 33, so I am grateful to be able to address what has come forward. Government amendment 32 appears to be a step in the right direction. It seeks to insert new paragraph (c) into proposed new section 130M(1), with the following wording:

“bringing the availability of that information and help to the attention of such people as it considers appropriate.”

That is welcome, as it moves beyond simply making information available, which could mean leaving a leaflet in a waiting room or uploading something to a website, and instead encourages proactive communication. However, the language still leaves a significant loophole: it is limited to

“such people as it considers appropriate”.

That allows NHS England or integrated care boards to withhold communication for individuals who may be eligible, based on subjective judgment or resource constraints. Although it improves the duty, it still falls short of a universal and consistent approach to ensure people with serious mental health needs know their rights.

Government amendment 33 will insert two further subsections, (1A) and (1B). Proposed new subsection (1A) states:

“The arrangements that must be made…include such arrangements…for people to be given information or help by having a conversation with someone who is suitably qualified”.

Proposed new subsection (1B) states:

“NHS England or an integrated care board must have regard to the particular benefits to a person of making an advance choice document within 12 months of their discharge”.

The amendment rightly recognises that a conversation, not just a form, is often essential for meaningful care. It also acknowledges that the post-discharge period is a crucial window in which individuals are stabilising and may be open to shaping a future care plan in a thoughtful way, but again the language is discretionary. There is no guarantee that the conversation will happen, even where a person is recently discharged from hospital and known to be at high risk of readmission. Who is “suitably qualified”? Is it the clinician, an independent advocate or a voluntary sector worker with lived experience? If the amendment is to be meaningful, the Government must provide clarity in the codes of practice or in regulations.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Dixon (Shipley) (Lab)]

The hon. Gentleman makes some very good points about the importance of patients being offered advance choice documents and being supported to make them, as the Bill describes. The evidence submitted from the General Medical Council makes it clear that it supports the duties as set out in the Bill, and it says that they are in line with the current good medical practice guidelines for professionals. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the Bill, as it stands, fits very well with current medical practice?

[Dr Evans]

I am grateful for the hon. Lady’s point. It would be interesting to know if that advice came when the Bill was debated in the Lords, because these clauses were not in place, but were introduced through the Government’s amendments. This is an extension to that. Our amendment to give a right to a patient would be a further strengthening. I entirely agree that the Bill is a good step forward, but if we are not going to address this again in the next 40 years, the Opposition would like that right to be enshrined. To be offered the opportunity is the key bit here—no mandation. It is good practice to let people know their rights, and we are affirming that. The worry is that while there is good intention to allow it based on the system, what happens if times are stretched? The amendment would give someone a statutory chance to say they have that right, and that it is upheld in law. That is what the Opposition are pushing for.

In essence, we are both trying to solve the same problem, but taking different approaches. The key distinction between the approach of the Government and that of the Opposition is that the Government’s creates a duty on the system, but no individual entitlement, while the Opposition’s proposes a patient right matched by a clear responsibility to inform and support the individual. The Government’s clause says that NHS England and ICBs must make arrangements as they consider “appropriate”. We say all eligible patients should have an informed right to create one. I anticipate that the Government might turn around and say, “Well, this is too rigid,” or that it imposes unfunded burdens on the ICB. I argue that it is targeted; we are not extending the right to everyone with a mental health condition but only to those at the most risk of future detention.

[Sojan Joseph (Ashford) (Lab)]

As a clinician, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will understand what I am trying to say. There are many mental health patients who do not have any insight into their illness and often refuse to take medications. It is important that, as the clause says,

“‘qualifying person’ means a person who has capacity or competence to make the statement,”

so that people do not make inappropriate decisions in their advance choice documents. It is important to keep the clause as it is, whereby a qualifying person is someone who can make a competence decision.

[Dr Evans]

The hon. Gentleman is spot on. We do not want people making decisions about their care when they do not have capacity. The whole point of what we are trying to do—as is the Government’s intent—is to allow people to make advance care decisions when they have capacity, so that when they are not lucid in the future and come back into contact, their preferred decisions are already set out. The clause does allow for a handbrake mechanism for clinical safety, to overstep them. However, what I am worried about is finding ourselves in a situation where patients never even find out that they have the right to create one of these ACDs.

The hon. Gentleman will know, as I do from my time, that good clinical practice is to ensure that patients have a plan. We do that for asthma: we expect patients to have an emergency plan for what happens, who they contact, where they go, what they take and what it looks like, personalised to them. Why should mental health be any different? My amendment actually gives ACDs legal footing, rather than simply saying that the system should offer it to them.

The amendment is cost-effective. Evidence suggests that ACDs can reduce the use of coercive powers, prevent relapse and improve continuity of care. That reduces costs, not adds to them. It is already good clinical practice; many mental health trusts already encourage care planning conversations. Our amendment would simply raise the standard across the country.

The Opposition understand that the Government have the numbers on this Committee. Will the Government clarify the role of the code of conduct? Do the Government intend to issue national guidance or benchmarks to ensure that ICBs do not apply widely different criteria for who is appropriate to be informed or held? Could the Government explain further, in response to the letter and in this Committee, why they do not accept ACDs as a basic right, narrowly defined, for only the most vulnerable individuals to be offered this opportunity? What mechanism will be used to monitor compliance with these new duties? How will patients know whether they are being fulfilled?

To my eyes, Government amendments 34 and 35 will do the same as amendments 32 and 33, but covering the Welsh system and local health boards, so I will not rehearse the arguments that we have just had. However, I would be interested to know whether this creates an issue for data collection on compliance across the two countries. We touched on this in relation to clause 2, but if different health authorities take different approaches to monitoring data, does that not risk making it even more opaque when we try to see both good and bad performance? Could the Minister address that point?

[Jen Craft (Thurrock) (Lab)]

I rise to speak briefly to clause 45, Government amendments 32 and 33, Lib Dem amendment 18 and Opposition amendment 46. I am very supportive of clause 45. The ability to make an advance choice document is incredibly important to people who may come under the scope of the 1983 Act and be subject to detention under mental health legislation.

We have spoken at length about the importance of patients’ input into their care and the improvements in outcomes when they feel that they have been involved and their wishes and feelings are taken into account. An advance choice document allows someone at risk of being detained under the Act to set out their choices, thoughts and opinions before becoming so unwell that they may need to be admitted to hospital. Other hon. Members have spoken about how an advance choice document can help prevent detention in a mental health unit, as it can stop issues escalating to the point where there is no option but detention, to ensure patient safety or the safety of others. I am broadly supportive of clause 45, and I urge the Committee to be.

I turn briefly to Opposition amendment 46. I have heard the thoughts of the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth. My understanding is that clause 45, along with Government amendments 32 and 33, will effectively create the rights for those who should have an advance choice document to be able to take advantage of them. Government amendments 32 and 33 will go further in ensuring that people who may benefit most from an advance choice document are informed of their ability to do so.

I note that Government amendment 32 will put a duty on an integrated care board to bring information to such people as it deems appropriate. I welcome the duty being on an integrated care board or commissioner locally, particularly because there are such nuances in localised care and localised populations. There are areas of the country in which the prevalence of things like learning disability and autism is higher than in others. The amendment will allow an ICB or local commissioner to consider what may be appropriate for the population in their area.

[Dr Evans]

I appreciate what the hon. Lady is saying. There are differences—rightly so—and regional variation. By definition, different regions will take different approaches to dealing with this issue. My argument is simply that someone with a learning disability should have the right to decide to make an ACD, as should someone with bipolar disorder or anorexia. There should be no regional variance in that; it should be a right given to the individual there and then. Regional discrepancy should not come into the system to deal with this. I appreciate that there will be regional discrepancy, but, fundamentally, we want to engage the right, not just the responsibility for the ICB to decide who it thinks is appropriate. I am interested in the hon. Lady’s take—I think this goes to the heart of what we are trying to do.

[Jen Craft]

I agree on the notion of a right; where we vary is that I think that the Bill as written, and Government amendments 32 and 33, enshrine the notion of a right without it having to be spelled out as such. Local variation includes localised populations, such as those from marginalised communities. We might consider different translations of support that is available. That will not be the case across the board—it will vary from area to area. This does not remove people’s ability to make an advance choice document; it simply gives local commissioners the ability to determine what is most appropriate for their area, how that support should look and how it will be targeted.

Without getting ahead of the Minister, I hope that he will say what guidance on best practice for local commissioners and ICBs will be set out, particularly in relation to those with learning disabilities and autism. We have spoken about easy-read documents, for example, which should probably be made available, as should advice on how commissioners can best make sure that all those who might benefit from an advance choice document are meaningfully engaged and informed of their right and ability to do so.

The Minister has agreed previously to make sure that he works with disabled people’s organisations, including those run by and for people with learning disabilities and autism, on bringing forward a code of practice on the Mental Health Bill. Input on patient experience into how best to contact and meaningfully engage people who would benefit from an advance choice document would be particularly beneficial.

Very briefly, the aim of Liberal Democrat amendment 18 is to include consideration of financial circumstances in an advance choice document. I have looked into this—in my opinion, it is outside the scope of what an advance choice document does. An advance choice document sets out how an individual would wish to be treated if they became so unwell that they were unable to make those decisions for themselves. I am not fully sure how one’s financial circumstances fit into how one would be treated relative to detention or, potentially, in a community-based setting. I understand that financial circumstances have an impact on people’s mental health—we have talked about that in debates on other clauses—but they do not necessarily have a place in this specific part of the Bill.

I encourage the Committee to support clause 45 and to adopt Government amendments 32 and 33. This is, once again, a big step forward in ensuring that those with serious mental illnesses are able to input into their care and treatment in a real and meaningful way.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

I will speak first to amendment 46. We agree with the principle of the amendment, but do not think it necessary. Under the Bill, if an individual who is likely to benefit from making an advance choice document approaches services to create one, they should be offered information and appropriate support to do so. The approach that we have taken in the Bill is therefore functionally equivalent to a right to request an advance choice document.

[Dr Evans]

If I am correct, the Minister said “if” a patient “approaches”. That is the fundamental point: that the onus is on the patient to know what their right is to approach the authorities. We are trying to do it the other way, by saying that their right is to be told about what is going on. Will the Minister clarify what he meant, because this is essentially what we are concerned about?

[Stephen Kinnock]

What I meant is what I said. I will read it again: if an individual who is likely to benefit from making an ACD approaches services to create one, they should be offered information and appropriate support to do so. The approach that we have taken in the Bill is therefore functionally equivalent to a right to request an advance choice document.

We are also concerned about prescribing that commissioners inform and support some of the groups of individuals identified by the amendment. For example, it may be practically challenging and not always appropriate to contact people who were detained or admitted informally many years ago about making an ACD. We agree, however, that that there is a good rationale for encouraging past voluntary and involuntary patients, especially those discharged in the past 12 months, to create an ACD. That is reflected in the Government amendments to strengthen the duties on health commissioners, which I will come to shortly.

The approach is based on research findings that suggest that the optimal time to write an advance choice document is shortly after discharge from hospital. That also recognises that many of the individuals are likely still to be under the care of mental health services and therefore well positioned to receive support and advice from services to make their ACD. Ultimately, the amendment was debated in the other place and not considered workable. In recognition of concerns expressed by Earl Howe and Lord Kamall, however, my noble Friend Baroness Merron made a commitment to strengthen duties on health commissioners in relation to the advance choice documents.

Government amendments 32 to 35, which we tabled in response to the amendment, will strengthen the duties in three ways. First, they will require that health commissioners proactively make arrangements to bring information on and help with making an advance choice document to the attention of the appropriate people. That is to prevent the risk of commissioners taking a minimal approach to discharging the duties.

Secondly, the Government amendments will require that information and help is provided through discussion with a suitably qualified person, such as a health or care professional, advocate, support worker or peer support worker. That is to ensure that people can rely on the guidance and support of a professional, where they wish to receive it.

Lastly, the Government amendments will encourage commissioners to have regard to the benefits of a person making an advance choice document within 12 months of discharge from a mental health hospital. That builds on research findings that suggest the optimal time to write an advance choice document is shortly after detention.

Government amendments 32 to 35 will help to further secure the success of advance choice documents by ensuring that people who are at risk of contact with the Act are given the opportunity to make an ACD, as well as being offered the dedicated support that they may need to do so.

On amendment 18, we agree that there is value in encouraging people to include details of any relevant financial matters within their ACD. Financial matters, such as problem debt, can worsen or even trigger a person’s mental illness. We expect that doing so will help to ensure that people receive the care and support that they need if they later experience a mental health crisis. We feel that it is important for individuals to have autonomy over what they include in their ACD, however, rather than prescribing the contents in legislation. We therefore think that the intention behind the amendment is better achieved by other means.

We plan to develop guidance and a template ACD to support service users in making their document. Those will include prompts to consider any relevant financial matters. Furthermore, the guidance that we plan to include in the code of practice for mental health professionals will cover the need to support the person to consider any relevant financial matters that may be important to their mental health recovery.

Finally, I turn to the clause in its entirety. Advance choice documents provide a place for people to set out their wishes, feelings, decisions, values and beliefs, while they are well, regarding their care and treatment. That is in preparation for the scenario in which they are too unwell and lack capacity to express such things at the time. At that point, the contents of their ACD should be considered by mental health professionals to inform their decision making regarding the person’s admission to hospital, detention under the Act, and care and treatment.

Research shows that ACDs can have a range of benefits, including reducing the risk of hospital admissions. To help to unlock those benefits and ensure the uptake of ACDs among service users, the clause will place duties on health commissioners to make appropriate arrangements so that relevant individuals are informed and supported to make an ACD. The duty aims to ensure that individuals who are likely to benefit most from making an ACD are proactively given the opportunity to make one while they are well.

Other clauses create the framework to ensure that the contents of a person’s ACD have a real impact on care and treatment decisions, for example the clinical checklist, the compelling reason test and the new framework for creating a nominated person. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth to withdraw amendment 46, and I ask Liberal Democrat Members not to press amendment 18. I commend Government amendments 32 to 35 and clause 45 to the Committee.

[Dr Evans]

I would like to press amendment 46.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. In many ways, the best way to look at the issue of discharge is to start thinking about it almost as soon as the patient is admitted. We need to be thinking holistically about what place they are in, what the aftercare plan might look like and how it might relate to the discharge plan. The earlier we do so, the better. In so many cases, upstream intervention is important to avoid having to scramble to deal with a crisis further down the line. My hon. Friend is absolutely right to raise that point.

I turn to clause 47. Section 117 of the Mental Health Act places a duty on the NHS and local social services authorities to provide aftercare to certain patients who have been detained under the Act once they leave hospital. Aftercare services seek to reduce the risk of readmission, and they must be provided until the NHS and local social services authorities are satisfied that the person is no longer in need of such services. However, there is currently no requirement to notify the person when that ends. Clause 47 requires that the provision of aftercare lasts until the NHS and local social services authorities jointly give notice to the person in writing that they are satisfied that the person is no longer in need of such services. This will clarify when aftercare services have ended.

Decisions on entitlement to and responsibility for aftercare services are heavily contested. Deeming rules are used to deem a person to be ordinarily resident in one area, even though they are living in a different area. They ensure continuity of financial responsibility when a person is placed in a local authority area and prevent the local authority from placing someone out of area to ease its financial burdens. Currently, section 117 does not contain any deeming rules.

Clause 47 will apply existing deeming rules under social care legislation to identify which local authority is responsible for arranging aftercare for an individual patient. This change will add clarity and consistency to an often litigious system and more closely align local authority social care and NHS rules for determining ordinary residents. This aims to support organisations to work together to provide and plan for aftercare services and reduce the number of disputes that have arisen in recent years.

Finally, I thank the hon. Member for Guildford for tabling new clause 21, which seeks to place a duty on the responsible integrated care board to ensure that advice and support is offered to the family or carers of the patient being discharged. The statutory guidance on discharge from mental health in-patient settings sets out how NHS organisations should exercise duties to co-operate under sections 72 and 82 of the National Health Service Act 2006 in the discharge process. This includes providing information or support on housing, social services provision and financial support. The Mental Health Act code of practice also provides statutory guidance on the information that should be provided to patients, families and carers.

We do not believe that it is necessary to place additional duties on integrated care boards to provide information and support, as existing duties are sufficient. We will consider whether to use the revised code to bring together guidance on discharge into one place and explore how to clarify best practice on information and support to carers. I hope that what I have set out satisfies the hon. Member for Guildford and that she will not press new clause 21. I commend clauses 46 and 47 to the Committee.

[Dr Evans]

I will speak to clauses 46 and 47 and then to new clause 21. Clauses 46 and 47 form a significant part of the Government’s effort to strengthen discharge planning in continuity of mental health aftercare. Clause 46 extends tribunal power. Under the current Mental Health Act, when a first-tier tribunal considers a patient detained under part II of the Act and decides not to discharge them, it may still make non-binding recommendations, for example that the patient be transferred to another hospital or given leave of absence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Zöe Franklin]

The hon. Member makes a really good point. There is definitely a place for ensuring that we work on this further to make sure that it covers that. I will come on to that later, if she will allow me.

We know that early intervention is key. We know that families, carers and those around an individual are often the first to spot the warning signs, and that they need to feel empowered, not sidelined. I hear time and again, as I am sure hon. Members across this Committee Room have heard, from people who have been left out of the discharge planning for their loved ones. They say that they have received no clear information and that they feel unsupported and unable to fully support their loved one when they return home.

Importantly, the new clause sets out a process whereby, if a family member wants to raise a concern, the team must consider whether that individual should be added to the register of persons at risk of detention under part II of the Mental Health Act. We believe that this is a sensible, joined-up approach to prevention, spotting risks early and acting before a crisis point is reached. Finally, the new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish national guidance and ensure consistency and clarity across the system.

We often speak of carers as the invisible workforce of our NHS. The new clause would make their contribution visible by recognising their role and giving them the information and support they need to fulfil it well.

[Dr Evans]

Forgive me if I missed it, but I did not hear any discussion of this point. I am slightly concerned about the way the new clause is written, as it could be a duplication of the support, protections and duties put in place through the Care Act 2014. Could the hon. Member set out how the new clause would run in parallel with the Care Act? Is it complementary, or does it work against it?

[Zöe Franklin]

In my final comments, I was going to say to the Minister that, having considered the points he set out in his opening statement in relation to this clause, I am prepared not to press the new clause. I appreciate that some of the information already exists in the Bill and in the existing documentation to which the shadow Minister referred. I also acknowledge the point made by the hon. Member for Thurrock, that some aspects around consent must be dug into.

However, I ask the Minister to work with me, my hon. Friend the Member for Winchester and other hon. Members with an interest in the issue, so that he can hear our constituents’ experiences of where the current guidance is clearly not working, and ensure that appropriate additions are made to the supporting documents for the Bill to address the concerns that we have raised in the new clause.

Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Taiwo Owatemi.)

Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Eighth sitting)

Luke Evans Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 19th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

I urge the Government to provide guidance, oversight and support, to engage not only with the legal professionals but with those who live under guardianship regimes, and to use the noble principle of least restriction not as a slogan but as a functional safeguard. If the Government can do that, and if they can meet the high standards to which the clause aspires, that will represent meaningful reform. If not, I fear that we risk crafting a well-meaning provision with good intentions that will be undermined by poor execution. I urge the Government to get this right for those living with mental health illnesses, for the professionals who support them and, crucially, for the integrity of our legal system as a whole.

[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley. I would expect nothing less from him than a fantastic canter through this important clause. I will not repeat a lot of what he said, but I will try to emphasise it.

Although clause 48 is short, it speaks to the much larger principle of the balance between public protection and individual liberty. I will not go through all the details, as the Minister laid out the changes, but the burden of proof is currently on the patient to convince the tribunal that they no longer meet the criteria for guardianship. The clause will change that. Instead, the burden will fall on the local authority or relevant public body to prove that guardianship remains justified. The Government’s explanatory notes put it plainly:

“the patient should be discharged by the Tribunal unless the local authority can prove that the patient continues to meet the guardianship criteria.”

The clause is not just a technical amendment; it is a fundamental realignment of legal principle. It reinforces the presumption of liberty. It aligns guardianship cases with the principle that when the state restricts an individual freedom, it is for the state to justify that restriction, not the individual to justify their freedom. It echoes the evolution of mental health law towards a less restrictive approach, a principle we put in place on the first day of our deliberations on the Bill. Although clause 48 amends only a few words, it reflects a big change in principle: liberty is the default, and restriction must be justified and not presumed.

There are some important questions that I want to echo and emphasise, again leading on from my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley. Are local authorities prepared for the reversal of burden? Have they been consulted? Do they have the legal resources, documentation, standards and evidential processes to meet the burden before the tribunal? On top of that, we have already agreed that there will be automatic referrals. We would therefore expect more referrals to the tribunal as well as a change in how they operate. This is a huge undertaking. If they fail through a lack of capacity organisation, we risk a situation in which patients are discharged not because they no longer meet the criteria, but because the case was poorly presented. How will the Government ensure that that does not happen?

Secondly, will the Government issue statutory guidance or regulations to ensure that consistency in how the burden is discharged? We do not want a postcode lottery in the quality of guardianship applications or tribunal evidence. Thirdly, we must always consider public protection. The guardianship regime is not designed for high-risk individuals, but it can still apply in cases where behaviour poses a serious risk to self or others—for example, individuals with profound learning difficulties who might place themselves in danger if not properly supported.

We also talked about cumulative or escalating behaviour in one of our first debates. The reason for doing so is that we are at the fringe of significant cases. What safeguards are in place to ensure that public safety considerations are given due weight in cases where the evidence might be incomplete or borderline? Finally, do the Government intend to monitor the impact of the clause? Will data be published on whether tribunal discharge rates increase following this reform, and whether that leads to any unintended consequences?

I want to be clear that His Majesty’s Opposition support the principle behind the clause. We support a mental health system that is rights-based, person-centred and built on the presumption of liberty. But that principle must be matched by a system capable of meeting the duties it imposes. Rights on paper are meaningful only if public authorities are resourced and able to support them and uphold them in practice. I look forward to the Minister addressing those points.

[Stephen Kinnock]

On the assessment of impact, it might be useful for the Committee to know, for context, that the use of guardianships under the Act is small: the number of new cases has declined from 470 in 2004-05 to just 40 in 2024-25. The number of open cases has also fallen in recent years. I think pretty much all the questions from the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley and the shadow Minister are addressed by that point. We are talking here about small numbers, so the cost would be relatively minor.

[Dr Evans]

That is a staggering drop in numbers. Is there a reason behind it? Is it that the burden of proof was always put on the patient, so they did not feel that they were in a position to do something? If we are inverting that, does the Minister expect the numbers to go back up?

[Stephen Kinnock]

I do not have any data to suggest that the numbers will go back up. That relates to the question that the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley asked about having a statutory review. We will be vigilant. As with all the changes in the Bill, we will closely monitor implementation and impact. That goes right across the board and, hopefully, addresses the Member’s questions.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 48 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 49

Removal of police stations and prisons as places of safety

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

Removing police stations is patient-focused and police-focused. My concern about this—perhaps, again, the Minister can clarify and reassure me—is ensuring that there is sufficient support in place for the police and ambulance services to deal with the transition. Again, at the heart of my support for the clause is that I think it will deliver a more therapeutic, suitable and effective process for the patient, while also, I hope, allowing our public services to do the job they are intended to do with the right support and resources.

[Dr Evans]

As we have heard, the proposals set out to remove police stations and prisons as places of safety. It does this in both relation to people detained under civil powers—sections 135 and 136—and in respect of certain part III patients involved in the criminal justice system, who may currently be held in such settings when a hospital bed is not available. The Government’s explanatory notes describe the rationale clearly:

“This is in response to evidence that suggests these settings are not suitable environments for individuals with a severe mental health, in crisis, awaiting assessment and treatment.”

As we have discussed in some of the earlier clauses, it is not just treatment, but the environment that plays a part in helping harbour a holistic care approach, so this is very much welcome. To that end, the Opposition can agree on this position in principle. A police station or prison cell is no place for someone with acute mental distress. They are not therapeutic environments; they can be frightening, disorientating and, in some cases, re-traumatising, particularly for children and young people. The clause aims to remove that contradiction in the law.

As the law stands, when police officers encounter someone in a public place who appears to be suffering from a mental disorder and is in immediate need of care or control, they can detain them under section 136 and take them to a place of safety. Under section 135, a magistrate can issue a warrant to remove a person from their home or another place to a place of safety. Currently, that place of safety includes a police station, although section 136A limits that to exceptional circumstances—for example, when the individual poses an imminent risk of serious injury to themselves. Similarly, under part III of the Act, a person appearing before a criminal court can be held in a place of safety, which can currently include a police station or prison, pending hospital admission.

Clause 49 will remove that. It amends section 55 to redefine “place of safety” and exclude police stations and prisons. It alters section 35, repeals section 136A, which has previously allowed police stations to be used in limited situations, and retains transitional protections for individuals already detained under early directions before the clause comes into place. That is a bold and principled legislative step, and I acknowledge that it builds on progress under the last Government. The 2017 Conservative Government, following public outcry and recommendations from the Care Quality Commission and the Wessely review, pledged to eliminate police cells as a place of safety for children. Since then, the numbers of such detentions have significantly decreased. Data from NHS Digital shows a downward trend in the use of police stations under section 136, which is evidence that change is possible with the right investment and inter-agency collaboration. That work deserves credit, so I thank the Minister for that.

Clause 49 must not only move the law forward, but ensure that the practice can be followed. I therefore want to raise a number of questions, which I hope the Minister will take in good faith. The classic one is “Where would people go instead?” The explanatory notes are right to say that hospitals and healthcare-based settings are more appropriate, but do those settings exist in sufficient numbers, with trained staff, beds and security protocols to receive safely all those who would otherwise have been taken to police stations? If they do not, we risk creating a gap between the law and the real world—a dangerous vacuum, whereby someone in crisis may end up in an ambulance bay, in a police car or in a general A&E without specialist support. It could have wider impact on the safety of not only the individual patient suffering, but other patients in healthcare settings such as A&E, interacting with an acutely ill mental patient. Without proper capacity, we risk many more police officers having to be at health settings to keep the mental unwell patients safe from themselves and others.

I appreciate that the Government have said that it will take 10 years to implement the Bill fully, but this clause will come into force immediately. What assurances can the Government give that there will be not only capacity, but capacity in the right places, so that, for example, people are not transferred to other areas of the country to ensure that the legal requirement is met? Although it is welcome not to be in a police station, being miles from family and support circles would be just as detrimental.

What provisions are being made for children and young people? The clause rightly states that for minors, the place of safety must now comply with the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, but excluding police stations. Are there sufficient CAMHS—child and adolescent mental health services—crisis beds and child-friendly places of safety in each region? What guarantees are there that children will not end up in adult settings, or worse, in informal or unlawful detention?

I turn to the transitional support given to the police. Officers may no longer be able to use their custody suites, but what training, resources and alternative pathways are being made? What happens in the middle of the night in a rural police force, where there is no mental health professional on call and the nearest hospital bed is 80 miles away? How would the Government monitor performance? Will the Government commit to publishing annual data on delays in finding a place of safety, the use of inappropriate settings post reform, and outcomes for those detained under sections 135 and 136? Will the CQC or another body be tasked with auditing local compliance?

Clause 49 reflects a consensus that mental healthcare belongs in health settings, not custodial ones. I urge the Minister to answer the questions in the good faith in which they were asked, because we all want to see this become a reality.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I think it is probably right to say that the questions asked by the hon. Members for Solihull West and Shirley and for Chester South and Eddisbury and the shadow Minister basically all relate to building capacity to ensure that we are ready to absorb this change. We have committed to lay an annual report on implementation, which will set out progress made and future plans for implementation. We are working closely with the Home Office, the police and NHS England to better understand the implementation requirement for switching on this change. There is considerable variation across the country in the way in which police stations are being used, so there is a need to target support.

I would add that the number and shape of dedicated health-based places of safety that are needed in a local authority will depend on the mental health needs of that population and the wider mental health crisis pathway provision. We are taking steps to ensure that people in crisis receive support and treatment sooner, so that fewer people need to be taken to a place of safety. It is worth noting that the Government have hit the ground running on this issue since we came into office last July. We are committing £26 million in capital investment to open new mental health crisis centres, which will aim to provide accessible and responsive care for individuals in mental health crisis.

Evidence from systems with established crisis centres indicates that they can help to streamline urgent mental health care pathways and reduce unnecessary conveyance to A&E by ambulance, health-based transport or the police. We have also selected six areas to trial a new approach to mental health support by providing 24-hour neighbourhood mental health centres, seven days a week, bringing together all aspects of community mental health services.

[Dr Evans]

The Minister has partially answered my question. He talked about the £26 million investment being targeted at certain areas of the country, but will that be based on the areas of highest priority? The danger is that if the highest priorities are all in the north, the south will be left out.

[Stephen Kinnock]

We have selected six areas, but off the cuff I cannot tell the shadow Minister exactly what they are or whether they have been announced yet. If they have not been announced, I will not be able to tell him, but if they have been, of course I can share that information. I suspect that the areas will primarily be based on assessed need, but they are trial pilots, so there is no reason to suspect that they will be limited to six. Let us see how much traction they get.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 49 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill

Clause 50

Removal of patients by authorised persons

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

The hon. Gentleman speaks with a huge amount of experience and knowledge in this area. Of course, what he describes would be the default setting, but there may be scenarios in which a qualified healthcare worker is in the vicinity and can provide the support that that individual needs before the police can get there. The clause seeks to provide that flexibility. I acknowledge the split in the Committee on this, but the clause has some significant advantages: reducing police involvement in mental health crises, where that is most appropriate; improving response times, as I have just touched on; and supporting de-escalation.

I accept that there are operational and legal questions to be addressed, but we are here to look at all the potential scenarios. The Minister has clearly set out the consequences of removing the clause from the Bill, but it is perfectly possible that a Government Member on the Committee will choose to support it, and I therefore seek some clarification from the Minister on the operational and legal challenges around training, oversight and the uniformity of authorised roles were the clause to remain part of the Bill. How would training standards be mandated for authorised persons and who would accredit them? How would consistency in practice be ensured across NHS trusts and ambulance services? Will the Minister also clarify the liability position in a case in which an authorised person used force or restraint during a removal?

[Dr Evans]

I am pleased that the Minister has clarified that the Government intend to take out clause 50, because that allows me to take out some of my speech. It would not be appropriate for me to retread the entirety of the argument—we have been through it, and I am aware of the numbers on the Committee—but I will address a few points, because the clause is important.

The clause would keep the role of authorised persons for the purposes of sections 135 and 136. Hon. Members will know that this is not a new issue, as we debated the removal of the definition of authorised person in relation to clause 5. On that occasion, I expressed my concerns about the risk of doing so, which were shared by Baroness May, who rightly argued that we must stop treating mental health as a policing issue and start enabling care to be delivered by the right person in the right way at the right time. This clause gives us a chance to make that principle real.

Clause 50 allows certain non-police professionals, defined as authorised persons, to use existing powers under section 135 to enter premises under a warrant and remove a person in a mental health crisis to a place of safety or assessment of care. It also allows those professionals to use powers under section 136, which is even more sensitive, permitting the removal and detention of a person from a public place without a warrant if they appear to be suffering from a mental health disorder.

The clause is not about weakening safeguards. It is about strengthening the frontline and moving away from a model where the police are the default responders to every mental health crisis, which is often not because they are best placed, but because no one else has the authority. As modelling has shown, 95% of mental health-related police calls do not require a criminal justice response. Officers are spending hours, even days, sitting in A&E with patients in distress, because no one else is trained and empowered to act.

Clause 50 helps to break that cycle. It creates a legal basis for trained health professionals—mental health nurses, paramedics and approved mental health practitioners —to intervene in crisis situations, rather than relying solely on the police.

The hon. Member for Ashford asked how we decide, but we already triage people when they ring 999 or 111. How do we decide who gets an ambulance for what sounds like a heart attack or stroke? That decision is made by clinicians. We have the ability to make those triaging decisions, and I think it is completely appropriate to try to empower the health services to find a better way of dealing with these people.

[Anna Dixon]

Does the hon. Gentleman recognise that health professionals do not wear stab vests or cameras? They are not equipped to go into dangerous situations. It is essential to protect healthcare workers and not put them at risk. We should maintain the current situation, whereby they work in tandem with the police, but the police are present for the detention.

[Dr Evans]

The hon. Lady is absolutely right. A paramedic never knows what they are going to when they are called out. It could be a terrorist incident; it could just be a person in distress who is hysterical. A paramedic never knows, but that is part of the point—when they get there, they would be able to make that assessment rather than having to call the police out. At the moment, they do not have those powers, so that is a reason to give them the option. I am not saying that that is always the right option, but it gives them the option. The clause allows us to think of new, innovative ways to deal with the complex, changing world of mental health in the modern age.

The Government have argued elsewhere that the definition of who detains could be too rigid or unnecessary, but I would say the opposite. Professionals on the ground need clarity—a lawful mandate to act in the best interests of a person in crisis, with clear boundaries of competence and training. The Lords were right to include a definition of “authorised person” that sets out the conditions of suitability. Clause 50 builds on that framework.

Having these powers in the Bill gives NHS trusts the chance and confidence to design alternative crisis responses. The clause is by no means a blanket approach—it actually drives innovation. Health professionals have the clarity to act and police forces have the breathing space to return to their core purpose: preventing and investigating crime.

Of course, the power must come with safeguards; it is not a blank cheque. The use of coercive powers by the police or anyone else must always be subject to training, regulation and oversight. Entering someone’s home or detaining them in public is a profound interference with their liberty and dignity, so the power must be exercised with care and caution.

We believe that clause 50 takes us in the right direction towards a health-led approach to mental health crisis, rather than a security-led one, as my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley said. It supports the police by lightening a burden from which they have long asked to be freed. It supports patients by increasing the chance that they will be met by someone who understands their needs. It supports the wider public by allowing police officers to return to doing what they are trained to do and passionate about doing: keeping communities safe. We should be building on this type of reform, not rowing back from it. I urge the Government to reconsider.

[The Chair]

Before I call the Minister, I remind Members that interventions are meant to be short and to the point, and that responses are meant to be short and to the point.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

I ask for a series of clarifications from the Minister about all three clauses. On clause 51, how will the courts be supported in identifying community-based alternatives to remand? What training or guidance will be provided to judges in applying the provisions effectively? What assurances can the Minister give that support pathways will be available before and after the changes have taken effect?

I accept that clause 52 is a technical a change to the legislation, but it is an important clarification none the less. It will require some robust co-ordination between jurisdictions and clearer procedural safeguards. How will the Government monitor the implementation of proposed new schedule A2 to ensure that patients’ rights are preserved during transfers? Will guidance be issued to courts and practitioners in the UK and the Crown dependencies about the new procedures, particularly their cross-jurisdictional nature? What consultation has taken place, and will continue to take place, with authorities in Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man before the measures are implemented in law?

Finally, I recognise that clause 53 is arguably a sensible safeguard. The challenge will be to ensure compliance on the frontline, especially where legal duties to share information and duties to protect confidentiality can butt against some degree of tension. With that in mind, what support or training will be given to health and care professionals to navigate overlapping legal duties? Will the Minister publish sector-specific guidance on data sharing as a consequence of the Bill? How will the Government assess whether the legal framework strikes the right balance between patient safety and privacy?

[Dr Evans]

Clause 51 amends the Bail Act 1976 to restrict the court’s ability to remand individuals in custody for their own protection or, in the case of children, for their welfare, where the sole concern is mental health. Under existing law, the court may refuse bail to a defendant if it is satisfied that the individual should be kept in custody for their own protection. For those under 18, the relevant test is whether custody is required for their own welfare. Those provisions are found in schedule 1 to the Bail Act.

There is currently nothing in statute that precludes the court from remanding someone entirely on the basis of their mental health conditions—for example, if the defendant appears to pose a danger to themselves but no suitable mental health provision is immediately available. Clause 51 aims to change that. It amends all three parts of schedule 1 to the Bail Act—those dealing with imprisonment and non-imprisonment offences—so that the adult defendant, aged 18 or over, may not be remanded in custody for their own protection if the only concern is mental health.

Paragraph 360 of the Government’s explanatory notes states:

“Evidence suggests that in some cases this power is being used by the courts to remand defendants into custody where they would otherwise have been bailed were it not for the court’s concern for their mental health.”

The intent here is good: to end the inappropriate use of custody—especially in prison, as we have been discussing—as a place of safety for people with acute mental health needs. The clause is consistent with the wider direction of the Bill, which seeks to ensure that people in crisis are met with healthcare and not handcuffs. Although I support the clause, I have a few questions and concerns about how it will operate in practice, and invite the Minister to consider further safeguards.

Where is the alternative provision? That is a question we will keep asking, not in the form of an attack, but as something helpful for our consideration. We are told that instead of custody, courts may impose bail conditions under section 3(6) of the Bail Act, such as requirements to engage with mental health services or, where the statutory criteria are met, remand the person to hospital under the Mental Health Act. That sounds reasonable, but the reality on the ground is often different. We know from NHS data, and from countless reports by inspectors and charities, that community mental health services are stretched, beds are scarce and out-of-hours support can be lacking.

What assessment has been made of local mental health capacity to absorb those individuals who, under clause 51, will no longer be eligible for a custodial remand? Do the Government know, for example, how many are currently in that position? If the law changes overnight, how much extra provision will be needed for these specific patients? How will the Government, specifically on remand patients, ensure that there are places? What are the requirements, if any, on NHS integrated care boards to ensure that a place of safety or support is available in every local area? Without that, there is a real risk that the courts will be left with no safe options, particularly when a person presents in crisis late at night, in distress and with nowhere else to go.

Are the bail and hospital powers workable substitutes? The explanatory note refers to courts using the power to remand for mental health reports or treatment, but the orders depend on medical evidence, the availability of beds and local agreement. They are not always available at the moment when bail is being considered. Meanwhile, bail conditions, however well-meaning, cannot guarantee care or prevent harm if services are not responsive. Has the Department considered issuing new statutory guidance to accompany the clause, outlining what courts should do when no hospital or community support is available, but the defendant is clearly at risk? Further to that, will there be a formal route for courts to escalate concerns to NHS bodies where no safe custodial options exist?

We also need to consider children and young people. As I read it, the clause applies only to adults. The Government are arguing that section 98 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 already prevents the remand of children solely for mental health reasons. Does that not potentially leave a loophole? I am no lawyer, but the Bail Act still allows for remand for the child’s own welfare, and the revised wording in clause 51(2) and (4) does nothing to prevent that being interpreted in practice as the mental health concern that we have been discussing. Why have the Government not taken the opportunity to clarify in statute the status of children? They must not be remanded to custody solely on the basis of mental health-related welfare concerns.

Finally, how will we track the effects of the changes? I suggest that there must be ongoing scrutiny of how the clause operates. To that end, will the Minister commit to releasing annual statistics on the number of people refused bail under the provisions, to reporting on incidences where a safe, non-custodial alternative was not available, and to monitoring outcomes for those affected by the changes? Does the data fall under NHS or Ministry of Justice datasets? It is important that we understand who is responsible.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

That is an invitation that I will remember as we go on in this Committee. On this occasion, I have just two questions. First, will any interim guidance be issued while the review is ongoing? Secondly, can the Minister commit that the consultation will be undertaken on a wide basis, and include patient advocates, child psychologists and safeguarding boards?

Because I cannot count, I will add a third question: did the Government consider an alternative to a two-year review period, either through an immediate extension of regulation 18 or perhaps a shorter period, so that these important changes can be put in place without delay?

[Dr Evans]

I will first speak to clause 54, to give context to my comments about new clause 12, which is in my name, and new clauses 17 and 20, tabled by the Liberal Democrats.

Currently, under regulation 18 of the Care Quality Commission (Registration) Regulations 2009, registered providers must notify the CQC if a child under 18 is placed in an adult psychiatric unit for longer than 48 continuous hours. The notification duty enables the CQC to monitor such placements and take appropriate action to protect young people.

The clause places a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to review whether the duty to notify should be extended to other cases when a child is admitted to a hospital or registered establishment for treatment or assessment of a mental disorder—that bit is really important. It also requires a review of whether the current 48-hour notification timeframe remains appropriate. As the explanatory notes make clear, the purpose of the review is

“to ensure that where a child is admitted...notifications are made to the CQC in appropriate circumstances”,

so that the regulator can respond effectively. That is a welcome and sensible provision. It recognises that safe-guarding in mental health settings must be comprehensive and responsive in changing circumstances. For example, children placed in settings other than adult psychiatric units, such as specialist units or community hospitals, may also face risks that warrant timely CQC oversight.

However, I have a few questions for the Minister. Given the potential risks to children placed even briefly in adult psychiatric units or other settings, is the 48-hour threshold for notification too long? Would early notification—perhaps on admission—provide better protection for young people? Are there known gaps in the current notification system? For instance, how often do incidents involving children in mental health treatment go unreported under the existing framework?

The review is to be completed within two years of Royal Assent. Given the urgency of safeguarding children’s mental health and wellbeing, would it be possible to provide interim updates to Parliament to maintain transparency? Will that be part of the written statement, or stand alone? Will the review consider notifications from private and third sector providers, as well as NHS trusts, to ensure that no setting is overlooked?

We must look at the role of the CQC. In another letter from Baroness Merron, the Minister in the House of Lords, she addressed some of the issues raised and laid out the rationale for her confidence in the CQC as it stands. The letter emphasises the CQC’s “multiple roles” under the Mental Health Act as an independent regulator of services, an investigator of complaints and part of the national preventive mechanism to safeguard human rights. It points out that in 2022-23, the CQC carried out 860 monitoring visits and spoke to over 4,500 patients and 1,200 carers. Those impressive figures speak to a considerable degree of activity and reach.

However, as we have debated, the Bill puts significantly more requirements on the CQC, and clause 54 is a further one. The letter also stresses the CQC’s evolving role and notes that the creation of a new chief inspector of mental health is under way—a recommendation from Professor Sir Mike Richards. The aim, we are told, is to

“put mental health on an equal footing with physical health in CQC”

and to ensure “better information sharing” and

“stronger focus on Mental Health Act compliance.”

All that is welcome, but we also need to scrutinise what is not said. While the letter asserts that

“we will have a regulator that all of us can trust”,

it concedes that that

“will take time to achieve.”

That is a fair admission, but it weakens the case for relying on the status quo while reforms are still being bedded in. If the CQC’s systems are currently being rebuilt or recalibrated, can we be confident that they are robust enough right now to identify and respond to safeguarding concerns, especially when they are about children?

Then, there is the 48-hour threshold for notification when children are placed in adult units, which clause 54 seeks to address. Do we really believe that a child being in an inappropriate or unsafe environment for 47 hours is acceptable? Should the default not be real-time notification on admission, with durations used only to prioritise the level of scrutiny? We should aim for real-time notification in the 21st century—after all, we can track a bus on our phones anywhere in the world. Should we not aim for real-time data to spring services into action? Forty-eight hours is a long time in a young person’s life.

The clause rightly instructs the Secretary of State to review those questions, but I urge the Government to approach the review with openness—not just to minor procedural tweaks, but to the possibility that more fundamental changes might be necessary. On that point, does the Minister envisage the review as a desktop-type data review, or will it engage with children and families who have experienced these placements? Will it examine how well the notifications currently translate into timely action by the CQC? Seeing the data is important, but acting on it is more so. How will Parliament be kept informed before the two-year deadline for reporting? Will that be part of the written statement?

All that leads me to our new clause 12, which aims to address a lot of the background I have set out. At present, the Mental Health Act provides for the detention of patients who require treatment for mental health disorders, including children. Section 131A of that Act governs the accommodation of patients in hospital wards, but lacks explicit safeguards preventing children from being placed in adult wards, except in limited circumstances. That has led to troubling examples across the country, where children have been admitted to adult wards because of a lack of appropriate CAMHS beds.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

The new clause takes forward a commitment made in the Lords by Baroness Merron to address issues relating to the unequal application of the Human Rights Act 1998 for some mental health patients. Sadly, this issue was highlighted following the death of Paul Sammut. I extend my deepest condolences to his family.

We now wish to take action to ensure a more equal application of the Human Rights Act, with the aim of extending its protection to certain mental health patients. Under this amendment, private providers will be taken to be exercising a function of a public nature for the purposes of section 6(3)(b) of the Human Rights Act when they are carrying out certain services and when those services are arranged and/or paid for by either local authorities or the NHS. Those functions are section 117 aftercare; services provided in pursuance of arrangements made by a local authority in Scotland, discharging its duty under section 25 of the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003; and in-patient treatment and assessment for mental disorder, whether or not a patient is detained under the Mental Health Act.

When carrying out those services, private providers will be required to act compatibly with the convention rights set out in the Human Rights Act. Many patients in private facilities already have those protections. Private providers are already taken to be exercising a function of a public nature for the purposes of section 6(3)(b) of the Human Rights Act when caring for patients detained under the Mental Health Act or providing care for patients due to the effect of section 73 of the Care Act 2014. The new clause seeks to extend those protections to other mental health patients in private provision, where care is arranged and/or paid for by the NHS or a local authority. As the new clause is a modification of the Human Rights Act, this is a reserved matter and the amendment will therefore apply in all four nations.

Government amendments 37 and 38 are minor technical amendments to the Bill’s extent provision in clause 57 to ensure that our amendment—new clause 10—relating to the Human Rights Act extends UK-wide. The Human Rights Act, which the new clause 10 seeks to modify, extends UK-wide. The amendments are therefore necessary to ensure that the same Human Rights Act protections extend to all four nations. I hope that hon. Members feel able to support the amendments.

[Dr Evans]

I welcome the opportunity to speak on these important provisions, which apply the Human Rights Act 1998 to certain private care providers delivering mental health services. At present, the Human Rights Act applies directly to public authorities and to those exercising functions of a public nature. However, an increasing proportion of mental health care and aftercare services are delivered by private providers, under arrangement with NHS bodies and local authorities. The current legislation leaves some ambiguity about whether private providers are legally bound to comply with the Human Rights Act when delivering such services. That creates a potential accountability gap that risks undermining the protections that we want to guarantee to vulnerable patients.

The Government’s proposal to explicitly extend the application of the Human Rights Act to registered private care providers when they deliver specific services commissioned or paid for by public authorities is a welcome step towards closing the gap. By doing so, it will ensure that these providers are treated as performing public functions under section 6 of the Act. That means that they will be directly accountable for upholding the rights enshrined in the Human Rights Act, including the rights to liberty, dignity, privacy and freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment.

This approach is not without precedent. For example, in the case of prison outsourcing, courts have established that private companies running prisons are subject to the Human Rights Act because they perform public functions. Similarly, private care providers delivering publicly funded mental health services should be held to the same standard as NHS bodies or local authorities.

It is worth noting that although this explicit statutory extension of the Human Rights Act to private providers is a new provision in the Mental Health Act 1983 for England and Wales, similar principles already apply in Scotland through case law and existing legislation. Under the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003, local authorities have a statutory duty to provide aftercare services, which may be delivered by private providers. Scottish courts recognise that when private providers perform public functions, such as delivering those statutory services, they are subject to the Human Rights Act, following key judgments such as YL v. Birmingham City Council.

This Government proposal provides much-needed clarity and an explicit statutory footing across all four nations of the UK. It also ensures consistency across the four nations, referencing equivalent legislation in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. This helps to remove ambiguity and ensure consistency. However, we must also consider the practical impact. Although these changes strengthen rights and protections, they also increase the regulatory burden on private providers. Providers may face new compliance costs, legal challenges and the need for enhanced training and oversight. That could have a knock-on effect on service availability, particularly in a market already facing staffing pressures and financial constraints.

The Government should therefore consider how to support providers to meet the new obligations without destabilising service provision. There is also a need to ensure that commissioners and regulators have the necessary resources and powers to monitor and enforce compliance effectively. In that spirit, I will pose some questions to the Minister for clarification and look for reassurance.

How will the Government monitor compliance with the Human Rights Act among private providers, and what enforcement mechanisms will be used? Has there been any consultation with private care providers about the potential operational and financial impacts of this extension, and will the extension apply only to services arranged or paid for by NHS bodies? What protections exist for patients receiving private mental health care outside these arrangements? How do the Government plan to ensure consistency in application across all four nations? Do the Government foresee private provision of mental health-related services expanding? If so, by how much?

I agree that the final two amendments look like two small consequential amendments that clarify and ensure that the human rights extension applies equally across England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The insertion of “subject to subsection (2)” appears to be technical. I would just welcome confirmation from the Minister that it will not inadvertently limit the scope of the new protections. Otherwise, Opposition Members will support them.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I thank the shadow Minister for those questions. I will have to get back to him in writing, because the questions that he asks obviously have an important legal dimension, and it was physically impossible to get the information in the time between his sitting down and my standing up to speak. I am not a human rights lawyer either, so it is best if I write to him on those points.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 10 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Taiwo Owatemi.)

Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting)

Luke Evans Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 17th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your leadership, Sir Desmond, especially on such a warm day. I hope that there is not too much hot air in the Committee to keep us even warmer.

Clause 22 will introduce a series of important amendments to the operation of community treatment orders under the Mental Health Act 1983. The clause has the stated aim of strengthening clinical safeguards and ensuring continuity of care between hospital and community settings. The Opposition support these goals in principle.

Let me set out the current legal position. At present, decisions to place a person on a CTO require two professional inputs: the patient’s responsible clinician and an approved mental health professional. The responsible clinician can vary, suspend, recall or revoke the order, often with no statutory obligation to consult the clinician who will be managing the patient’s care in the community. 

Clause 22 will change that. It introduces the new role of the community clinician—defined as the approved clinician who will oversee the patient’s care in the community—and requires their involvement at key decision points in the life of a CTO. Specifically, it requires a written statement from the community clinician that the CTO criteria are met, where they are not the responsible clinician. It obliges the responsible clinician to consult the community clinician before varying conditions, recalling or revoking a CTO, unless such consultation would cause unreasonable delay. It also includes the community clinician in the process of renewing a CTO, again via a written statement. 

These are not insignificant changes. They mark a shift towards multidisciplinary accountability and a greater emphasis on the continuity of care between in-patient and community settings. The Opposition strongly support both principles. However, there are several points that I would like to probe constructively, and I hope the Minister will respond in the spirit of improving what is clearly a well-intentioned clause. 

First, the term “unreasonable delay” appears multiple times in the clause as an exception to the duty to consult the community clinician, but I cannot see it defined in the Bill or in the explanatory notes. Could the Minister clarify what constitutes “unreasonable delay” in practice? Will guidance be issued to ensure consistency across trusts and clinicians? We must ensure that this exception does not swallow the rule or become a loophole in time-sensitive situations.

Secondly, what happens when clinicians disagree? The clause requires the agreement of the community clinician in writing before a CTO can be made, but it is silent on what happens when there is disagreement between the responsible clinician and the community clinician. This is not a hypothetical concern; differing clinical views are common and can be a healthy part of multidisciplinary practice. Could the Minister confirm whether there is a proposed resolution mechanism where clinicians differ? Would the decision default to a tribunal or a second opinion, or is the CTO simply not made?

Thirdly, as the Minister has mentioned, on the operational readiness to implement this clause, the new duties on community clinicians are not trivial. They are being asked to produce written statements, engage in formal consultations and be available to advise on time-sensitive decisions such as recalls and condition changes. Can the Minister reassure the Committee that a workforce impact assessment has been or will be conducted? Will there be investment in community mental health staffing and digital infrastructure to ensure that this duty is workable?

Fourthly, I want to raise the issue of handover and role clarity. The clause will introduce a new statutory role—the community clinician—but patients often transition rapidly between settings. There may be uncertainty about who holds that responsibility at a given time. Will guidance ensure that community clinicians are formally designated and that responsibilities are clearly recorded at the point of discharge?

I want to end on a constructive note. Clause 22 is a step in the right direction. It reflects many of the recommendations of the independent review of the Mental Health Act, including the emphasis on least restriction and on therapeutic benefit. I encourage the Government to consider defining or clarifying unreasonable delay in regulations or guidance, introducing a clear process for resolving professional disagreement, and committing to publish a plan detailing workforce support, guidance and digital infrastructure to ensure that this takes place.

Clause 23, which is linked to clause 22, will introduce two important amendments to the operation of community treatment orders under the Mental Health Act 1983. As things stand, section 17B(2) allows a responsible clinician to attach conditions to a CTO if they are necessary or appropriate, to ensure the patient receives treatment, to prevent risk to health or safety or to ensure engagement with services. Such conditions can include where the person lives, their attendance at appointments and even lifestyle restrictions such as abstaining from alcohol or drugs. However, we know that these conditions can be seen as coercive. Patients often feel that breaching them means automatic recall to hospital. In practice, some CTO conditions may drift toward overreach rather than clinical necessity.

The clause responds to these concerns in two ways. Subsection (1) will remove the words “or appropriate” from section 17B(2), meaning that CTO conditions must now be strictly necessary, not just advisable or convenient. The Opposition support this narrowing of the threshold. It sends a clear message that CTO conditions must be clinically justified, proportionate and tailored to the individual’s needs. However, I ask the Minister how clinicians will be guided in applying the new “necessary” test. Will the code of practice be updated with examples and scenarios? Crucially, what measures will be taken to ensure that patients are clearly informed that a breach of a CTO condition, in itself, is not automatic grounds for recall?

[Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. Taking a step back to my hon. Friend’s point about “necessary”, is he concerned, as I am, that it is not clear to those responsible what “necessary” means? We could open ourselves up to potential legal challenges and disputes, which would give lawyers lots of money but would have no benefit for the patients.

[Dr Evans]

My hon. Friend makes an incredibly important point. Some later clauses try to address a problem where a patient was consenting to a community order, but the restrictions were so tight that it worked out as deprivation of liberty. My hon. Friend is absolutely right that knowing what is necessary is important to provide a clearly defined structure for the patient. Patients worry that if they breach that protocol, they will be automatically recalled. That might prevent them from breaching the conditions in the first place, but on the other hand it is a sword of Damocles above them. In no way does that create a beneficial therapeutic environment for them.

[The Chair]

Order. I am afraid we have to suspend the sitting, as the sound is unworkable. I am assured that a sound engineer is on the way.

9.37 am

Sitting suspended.

On resuming—

[Dr Evans]

Brevity is an important skill that you have exemplified in this House for many years, Sir Desmond, so I will not subject the Committee again to matters that I have already covered.

I ask again the question that I posed just before the suspension: how will clinicians be guided in applying the new “necessary” test? Will the code of practice be updated with examples and scenarios? Crucially, what measures will be taken to ensure that patients are clearly informed that a breach of CTO conditions is not, in itself, an automatic ground for recall? That concern has come across in evidence and is a long-standing source of misunderstanding and mistrust, as has been highlighted in cases and in the Wessely report.

Clause 23(2) will insert new subsection (3B) into section 72 of the Mental Health Act, giving mental health tribunals the power to recommend that the responsible clinician reconsider whether a CTO condition is necessary, even when they do not discharge the patient. That is a welcome enhancement of patient rights. Currently, if a tribunal decides not to discharge a patient, it has no power to challenge potentially excessive conditions. The clause strikes a useful middle ground, offering oversight without overturning clinical decisions. Having said that, will there be any requirement for the responsible clinician to formally respond to the tribunal’s recommendations? Without such a duty, there is a risk that recommendations may be quietly disregarded and the benefit of the provision may be undermined.

Clause 23 is a positive and proportionate reform, but to strengthen its practical impact I suggest that the Government consider updating the code of practice to clarify what constitutes a “necessary” condition under section 17B of the Mental Health Act; introducing a duty to respond to tribunal recommendations under proposed new section 72(3B), with a short time limit and a written explanation if the recommendation is rejected; and providing clear information to patients.

New clause 4, tabled by the Liberal Democrats, seeks to place a general duty on ICBs to ensure that sufficient resources are available for community-based mental health services, particularly in the context of implementing provisions under the Mental Health Act. It speaks to a concern that many Committee members will have heard time and again from patients, practitioners and families alike: that the success of any reform to the Mental Health Act will ultimately rest on the capacity of community services to deliver. We know the reality: patients can be discharged to under-resourced settings or subject to CTOs that depend on clinicians who may be overstretched or unavailable. Clause 22 will rightly expand the role of community clinicians in CTO decisions, but that works only if they exist, are available and have the time and tools to engage meaningfully.

I acknowledge that new clause 4 identifies a genuine structural risk in the way in which we approach reform, and I commend colleagues for raising it, but should it sit in primary legislation? I am not so sure. I have some questions for the hon. Member for Winchester not about the intention of the new clause, but about the appropriateness and practicality of placing such a duty in primary legislation. Primary legislation is best used where duties are clear, enforceable and universal. The duty proposed in the new clause, although admirable, is qualified by the words

“insofar as is reasonably practical”,

which reflects the reality that integrated care boards do not control all the levers of workforce, capital investment or even, in many cases, service design.

With that in mind, I ask the hon. Member the following questions. What mechanism would be used to enforce the duty? If an ICB fails to meet the duty, what would the consequences be? Would the duty not create legal ambiguity or even the potential for judicial review where service users feel that resources are inadequate, or even where the ICB has acted reasonably in difficult circumstances? Furthermore, how would the duty interact with the existing statutory duties on ICBs under the Health and Care Act 2022, including the duties around health inequalities and integration?

A stronger element of the new clause, which merits closer consideration, is the assessment and publication of findings on local community mental health capacity. This kind of transparent, data-led accountability could be an effective tool not only for Parliament and regulators, but for local patients and advocacy groups. Perhaps that element could be taken forward in secondary legislation as part of the updated NHS England commissioning guidance. The Minister will forgive me, but I am not sure whether such a tool already exists, so perhaps he will address that point.

Does the Department plan to require ICBs to assess and report on community mental health capacity in the light of the new duties being created by the Bill? Could there be scope for a reporting duty to be included in regulations or guidance, even if a general resourcing duty is not placed in primary legislation? The Bill refers to commissioning, and under earlier clauses we have talked about dynamic registers. Will the Minister set out whether the issue is covered here or in another way?

We cannot ignore the resource dimension, so I am grateful to colleagues for pressing the Committee to address it. However, we must be careful about the tools we use, what we write into law, and what we deliver through planning, commissioning and political will. I look forward to hearing from the hon. Member for Winchester and the Minister in response to my questions.

[Sojan Joseph (Ashford) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I welcome the changes proposed in clauses 22 and 23. Clause 22 seeks to amend the Mental Health Act to require the community clinician responsible for overseeing the patient’s care as a community patient to be involved in decisions regarding the use and operation of community treatment orders.

While I was practising as a mental health professional, I was personally involved in many community treatment orders and in recalling patients to hospital. Although I acknowledge the concerns raised by various charities and members of the Committee about the overuse of community treatment orders and restrictions on patients, such orders have many benefits. As the Minister has highlighted, they help to release the pressure on in-patient settings. They also help patients to live in a home environment: without such provision, some patients would have to stay in hospitals for longer, which can be more restrictive than being in the community.

The Committee needs to understand the kinds of patient who are often considered for community treatment orders. These patients are already well known to mental health services. They may have a long-term serious mental illness and may have to take medication continuously. More often, they are on regular injections of what is called depot medication; mental health professionals administer such medication either once a month or once every three months. Community treatment orders enable clinicians to make sure that patients receive the medication they need, so that they do not relapse and so they can have a good quality of life.

By introducing an additional professional check on whether the patient really needs the support of a community treatment order, and by requiring more evidence that the patient needs the support of the community treatment order to get better, clause 22 will adopt two of the four principles of treatment proposed in Sir Simon Wessely’s independent review, namely the principle of least restriction and the principle of therapeutic benefit.

[Dr Evans]

The Committee is very lucky to have the experience and expertise of someone who has used community treatment orders in the field. Will the hon. Member address my point about clinical conflict? We are introducing two new people: a community clinician and a responsible clinician. Has he seen any difficulties in practice with a difference of opinion between clinicians? How were they resolved? Does he see any way in which the clause could create or resolve a problem? My worry is that there is no clear resolution that would deal with discrepancies. I would love to know what is happening at the moment, as the law stands, in the hon. Member’s clinical experience.

[Sojan Joseph]

I thank the hon. Member for that important intervention. Healthy conflicts between professionals can be useful and can be used as a reassurance to people who are concerned about the overuse of CTOs. However, capacity can sometimes be an issue, especially in community settings, an issue that new clause 4 addresses.

It is also important to understand that mental health services have changed over the years. The consultant who treats the patient in hospital may not know much about them or how they are in the community. In the past, all those patients were followed by a care co-ordinator—not necessarily a mental health psychiatrist, but a mental health nurse or social worker who followed the patient throughout their journey and kept an eye on them. We do not have enough capacity these days, so nobody is following the patient. A community treatment order helps them to have at least minimum contact when they have to go and see a patient to administer medication. I support that conflict—sometimes it can be very healthy—but I also acknowledge that we need more capacity in the community.

Clause 22 makes a new distinction between a patient’s responsible clinician with overall responsibility for them, including in hospital, and a community clinician with the responsibility for the patient in the community. It will impose specific duties on the community clinician where they are not the responsible clinician. For example, subsection (2) will amend section 17A(4) of the Mental Health Act to require that where the responsible clinician is not the clinician who will have care for the patient in the community after their discharge, that community clinician must also agree in writing that the community treatment order criteria are met. That will ensure continuity of care of the patient from the hospital into the community, and it will have the added benefit of additional professional oversight in respect of the need for a community treatment order. That is to be warmly welcomed.

I also highlight subsection (4), on the power to recall a community patient to hospital. That will mean that if the community clinician is not the responsible clinician, the community clinician will still need to be consulted before a patient can be recalled under the community treatment order, unless such a consultation would lead to an unreasonable delay. That seems an entirely welcome and sensible reform. In some cases, an unreasonable delay may not be helpful, because some patients need to have their medication at regular intervals. For example, a patient on clozapine who misses their medication for three or four days in a row may have to restart their whole treatment regime, which will mean an even longer in-patient admission process.

Subsection (6) will require a community clinician to make a statement in writing, if they are not the responsible clinician, in support of the renewal of a patient’s community treatment order, if that is the conclusion of the responsible clinician. Getting written confirmation from the community clinician who is intimately involved in the patient’s care that a renewal of the community treatment order is both necessary and appropriate and is the correct thing to do. Once again, it is about ensuring that a further professional opinion is considered; it is also about checking whether the patient still needs the support of a community treatment order.

Clause 23 will make changes in relation to the conditions that a person subject to a community treatment order may be required to follow. It will amend section 17B of the Mental Health Act so that conditions can be imposed only if they are “necessary”. This is a simple and welcome update from the current wording, “necessary or appropriate”.

Clause 23’s second modernisation is to give the tribunal a new power to

“recommend that the responsible clinician reconsider whether a condition…in the community treatment order is necessary”.

This would apply when the tribunal has decided not to discharge a patient completely from a community treatment order, but has come to the conclusion that not all its conditions are required. Once again, this is a welcome reform and is in line with the principle of therapeutic benefit. Some conditions put on patients can be seen as restrictive: for example, if a condition states that patient cannot use alcohol or illicit drugs, the clinicians will be looking at whether the patient’s use of alcohol or illicit drugs has an impact on their mental state or on their non-compliance with treatment. That is very important. I welcome the changes in clause 23.

[Dr Danny Chambers (Winchester) (LD)]

It is an honour to serve under your chairship, Sir Desmond. I thank the Minister and the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth for their comments on Liberal Democrat new clause 4.

This is another good example of how, although we are aware that it has laudable aims, the Bill will fail without the supporting infrastructure. As everyone will be aware, community mental health services are among the issues that generate the most emails and correspondence—certainly in Winchester, where young people especially are struggling to access mental health care. In that context, we are alarmed that mental health spending has fallen as a share of overall health spending in the last financial year. That has been coupled with the decision to drop a number of mental health targets, including targets for the number of people receiving mental health interventions such as talking therapy, and the target to ensure that 75% of people with a severe mental health illness receive an annual physical check. Priority has not been given to the services necessary to deliver better mental health care.

For the Bill to make a meaningful difference, the Government must ensure that community mental health care services receive the investment that they need to fulfil their obligations under the Bill—I know that that is a bit of a circular argument—and reduce the overwhelming pressure on in-patient services.

There is also the impact on schools, police services and families. When I went out with the police in Winchester not long ago, they told me that between 40% and 50% of their time is spent dealing with people who have a mental health issue in some capacity. The lack of community mental health care is not just a resource burden on the health service; a lot of our other services are also affected.

[Dr Evans]

The hon. Member rightly talks about resources and about the cuts as a proportion—although small, it is a cut in NHS spending. The last Conservative Government brought in the mental health investment standard to try to ensure parity between physical health and mental health in investment so that, regardless of how big the pot was, mental health was prioritised. Does the hon. Member agree that there is a concern that that could be slipping under this Government? Does he agree that that needs to be addressed in the context of the community provision that we are discussing?

[Stephen Kinnock]

Where is the evidence for that?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Evans]

I am grateful for the clarification. Does it mean that, in essence, there will be a hierarchy, so the responsible clinician is above the community clinician and trumps them? If a community treatment order cannot be signed off, it does not exist. I want to explore that angle; is that what the Minister is suggesting?

[Stephen Kinnock]

Yes, the responsible clinician has primacy.

On the workforce impact, our impact assessment, which was published alongside the Bill, sets out the additional hours of required clinician activity. We will invest in implementing these reforms.

On the meaning of the word “necessary”, we will provide further guidance in the code of practice to provide for a range of scenarios to help to clarify necessary conditions, as well as to clarify that failure to meet those conditions should not always result in recall to hospital.

On the requirement for a responsible clinician to respond to recommendations, we considered giving the tribunal the power to change or remove conditions on a person’s community treatment order. However, the outcome of our stakeholder engagement was that tribunal colleagues did not consider that it was appropriate for them to make clinical judgments, for example whether a condition is of clinical benefit. Providing the power to recommend that the responsible clinician reconsiders the conditions allows the tribunal to provide additional scrutiny but also allows for clinical discretion in decision making.

The hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon asked about training. The training plan will be in the first written ministerial statement.

On where the terms are defined, clause 10 defines responsible clinician and clause 22 defines community clinician. We will define the distinction between the roles in the code of practice.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 22 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 23 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 24

Nominated person

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

I will discuss a number of issues concerning the topic of the nominated person, one of the Bill’s key reforms. I will first address clause 24 and schedule 2, which seek to replace the current nearest relative provisions with the nominated person, chosen by the patient, who can protect their rights when they are detained. The independent review found the nearest relative provision to be outdated and inappropriate. It allocates someone based on a hierarchical list, which does not reflect modern families and could result in someone unfamiliar or potentially risky to the patient being given the role.

 We have ensured that appropriate safeguards are in place to protect patients as well as to enable choice. A health or social care professional or an advocate must witness the nomination and confirm in writing that the nominee meets the criteria and that no undue pressure has been put on the patient. Children and young people with the relevant capacity or competence can choose their own nominated person. We expect this will be their parent or guardian, but sometimes a step-parent or other relative over 18, without parental responsibility, may be more suitable to protect a patient’s rights. Safeguards will be put in place to support children in making this choice.

If a patient of any age lacks capacity or competence to make a nomination, an approved mental health professional will appoint a nominated person on their behalf. For children under 16, this will be someone with parental responsibility, including the local authority if the child is subject to a care order. This appointment is temporary until the patient has capacity or competence to make their own appointment.

For all patients, the responsible clinician or approved mental health professional can temporarily overrule the use of a particular nominated person’s power, for example to discharge the patient, if the patient is likely to act in a manner that is dangerous to themselves or others. A nominated person can be removed by the county court if deemed unsuitable—for example, if they misuse their powers or neglect the patient’s welfare or the public interest. Anyone with an interest in the patient’s welfare, such as their parents, can apply to the court. The Bill extends the nominated person safeguard to some restricted part III patients, but their nominated person’s powers will be limited, as appropriate, in the interests of public safety and criminal justice.

Amendments 54 and 55 would require nominated persons for patients under 16 to have parental responsibility for the child, whether chosen by the child or appointed for them. The Bill currently requires this if the child lacks competence to appoint their own nominated person. However, where a child has competence to decide, we think it is right that they can choose the person to represent their interests. That view was supported by the majority of respondents to the White Paper consultation on reform of the Mental Health Act, and it is in keeping with the principles of choice, autonomy and treating the person as an individual.

Like the current “nearest relative” provision, which the nominated person will replace, the amendments do not take into account the greater diversity of modern family structures—for example, where a step-parent may play a vital role in a young person’s life but does not have formal parental responsibility. Our engagement with children and young people during the development of the Bill suggests that the vast majority will appoint a parent as their nominated person. However, we think having choice is important to prevent children from having to have a nominated person who may not engage with the role or act in accordance with their best interests, just because they have formal parental responsibility.

Where children have competence to choose their own nominated person, a health or social care professional, or advocate, will be required to witness the nomination and confirm in writing that the nominated person is over 18 and suitable to take up the position. Regardless of nominated person status, parents should be involved in a child’s care and treatment, and they will retain their legal rights under parental responsibility. Safeguards are in place to allow for the overruling and displacement of the nominated person if they are behaving in a way that is not in the child or young person’s best interests.

Government amendments 40 and 41 will remove paragraph 11(3) to 11(5) of schedule 2 from the Bill, as it is unnecessary to specify in legislation which person with parental responsibility the approved mental health professional must appoint as nominated person for an under 16-year-old. A prescriptive list of who an approved mental health professional must appoint for a child under 16 may prevent a more suitable adult from being chosen as the nominated person. The Bill states that for under-16-year-olds lacking competence, an approved mental health professional must appoint a parent, or whoever has parental responsibility, to be the child’s nominated person. This would include consideration of special guardians and child arrangement orders.

The Government do not agree that a person with residual parental responsibility should always be blocked from being a nominated person, as the child arrangement order or special guardianship may be in place for reasons other than the parent being a risk to the child. For example, the parent might struggle with their own health issues, but that does not necessarily mean that they would not be an effective nominated person. The situation is different in the case of a care order because the local authority is being given lead parental responsibility. We have engaged with the Children’s Commissioner on that point.

If there is no suitable person with parental responsibility willing to act, the approved mental health professional must take into account the patient’s past and present wishes and feelings, so far as reasonably ascertainable, when deciding who to appoint. We will establish an expert taskforce to support the development of the statutory code of practice to provide clear guidance for professionals involved in the nominated person appointment process for children and young people.

Clause 25 will require the approved mental health professional to consult the nominated person before they make an application for admission for treatment or guardianship. This is an existing right for the nearest relative. However, currently if the nearest relative exercises one of their powers, such as the ability to block admission, but the professional believes their objection is unreasonable, the only means of overruling them is to remove or displace them as the nearest relative. This can leave patients without someone to represent their interests during detention.

Clause 25 will allow the approved mental health professional to make use of the existing barring order to temporarily overrule the nominated person, if the patient would be likely to act in a manner dangerous to other persons or themselves if their admission was blocked. This is a well-established process. Although the nominated person can continue to represent the patient in other ways, they can still be displaced by the court from the role entirely if their actions indicate they are unsuitable for the role—for example, if they are repeatedly objecting to admission without considering the welfare of the patient or the interests of the public. Approved mental health professionals can continue to use that process.

Clause 26 will transfer the nearest relative provisions relating to the power to order discharge of a patient to the new nominated person role. The power can be temporarily overruled by a responsible clinician if they think that the patient’s discharge would result in danger to themselves or others. It is a well-established process that allows for clinical discretion, but means that the nominated person can continue to represent the patient’s rights in other ways. Clause 26 also reduces from six months to three months the time period during which the nominated person cannot make another order for discharge. That reflects the changes in detention periods under clause 29.

Clause 27 will give the nominated person a new power to object to the use of a community treatment order. We also recognise, however, the importance of protecting patients and the public, so if the responsible clinician is concerned that without a community treatment order, there would be a risk of danger to the patient or others, they can overrule the nominated person’s objection. Those changes will help both to reduce the number of inappropriate community treatment orders and to ensure that safeguards are in place for patient safety and public protection.

Finally, clause 28 provides that before deciding to transfer a patient, the person responsible for taking that decision must consult the patient’s nominated person, unless consultation is not reasonably practicable or would involve unreasonable delay. The nominated person will not be able to object to a transfer, because there may be good reasons for transferring a patient—for example, if a different trust can provide better care, such as a specialist eating disorder unit. Consulting the nominated person, however, means that they are aware of the reasons for transfer and how it will benefit the patient. That will help the nominated person to remain actively involved in protecting patients’ rights and kept informed about a patient’s care and treatment.

[Dr Evans]

I welcome the chance to contribute to the debate on clauses 24 to 28. I will then turn to Government amendments 40 and 41 and to amendments 54 and 55, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer).

Clauses 24 to 28 represent a significant reform to the Mental Health Act 1983. They seek a shift from the traditional concept of a nearest relative to giving patients more control by allowing them to nominate a person to act on their behalf. Clause 24 is the cornerstone of the reform, establishing the role of a nominated person as the patient’s chosen individual to take over certain rights and responsibilities previously held by the nearest relative. It represents a fundamental change from a fixed family-based system to one centred on patient choice and autonomy.

Currently, the nearest relative, often by blood relation, holds a range of statutory powers under the Mental Health Act, regardless of the quality of their relationship with the patient. The clause will enable patients, especially adults, to nominate a trusted person—a family member, friend or advocate—who can act in their best interests. That is a progressive and patient-focused change relating to modern social realities, where family ties are complex and a biological relative is not always the best supporter.

Empowering patients to select their nominated person can enhance trust, improve communication and ultimately lead to better care outcomes. It does, however, raise pressing questions. For children and young people, particularly those aged 16 and 17, who gain legal capacity to nominate, what safeguards ensure that parental concerns and children’s welfare remain adequately considered? How will disputes between nominated persons and relatives, or between the nominated person and clinicians, be resolved? Part of that might be addressed in Government amendments 40 and 41, but I am keen to understand a little more. What training and oversight will ensure that nominated persons understand their duties and, importantly, their boundaries? Finally, for a patient who does not or cannot nominate someone, will the nearest relative still have a role, and how will that be managed?

Clause 25, on applications for admission or guardianship, builds on clause 24. It will require the approved mental health professional to consult the nominated person before making applications for admission or guardianship, except where consultation is not reasonably practicable or would cause unreasonable delay. It will also allow the nominated person to object to such applications, requiring a barring report from the approved mental health professional if an objection is made.

The clause will formalise the nominated person’s involvement at a critically early stage of the intervention, ensuring that their voice can influence decisions that deeply affect the patient. The power to object introduces an important check, though it is balanced by the professional’s ability to override objections on the grounds of safety. The Opposition agree with that, but there are still some questions. How will professionals navigate conflicts between their clinical judgment and objections by the nominated person? Will there be clear guidance to avoid delays that could jeopardise patients or public safety?

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[Gregory Stafford]

I thank my hon. Friend for his comprehensive analysis of the provisions under discussion. Does he understand amendments 54 and 55 to mean that, although there would be a narrowing of who can be chosen as the nominated person, there would still be some flexibility for the child to choose? Does he have any concerns about a situation in which a minor—someone under the age of 16—may, for whatever reason, choose somebody who the health professionals believe is not the most appropriate person, and does he have any sympathy with the idea that, given a parent has responsibility for the child in every other aspect of their life, the parent should have that same responsibility in this context?

[Dr Evans]

My hon. Friend has identified the nub of the issue, and his intervention leads me on to an example that demonstrates the problems that we are talking about. I have chosen to debate these provisions in the order shown on the selection list because I wish to understand whether the Minister believes that Government amendments 40 and 41 will deal some of the issues that I am about to raise. There clearly has to be flexibility in dealing with these situations, but it is worth exploring what could go wrong. The nub of the issue is that they may well go wrong. Let us take an example.

Say that A is 16, and she is struggling with anxiety and behavioural issues. She has had serious suicidal episodes and previous drug use. She lives at home with her loving, supportive parents, who have always acted in her best interests and want to engage constructively with her care, but A is under pressure from a 19-year-old boyfriend. He is controlling, and discourages her from speaking to her parents or professionals. When asked to nominate a trusted adult, A names him. Under the Bill as drafted, the nominated person could be accepted, provided A is deemed to be competent. That would give her boyfriend access to her care decisions and significant legal standing. Under amendments 54 and 55, that would not be possible because he does not have parental responsibility, and therefore could not be appointed.

That example illustrates why the amendments matter. Children, especially those in crisis, may be vulnerable to coercion, grooming, or misplaced trust. Loving parents, who have legal obligations to protect and care for their children in every other walk of life—as my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon pointed out—could find themselves legally sidelined.

Are there risks in amendments 54 and 55? We must consider the edge cases. Not all children under 16 live with those who are trusted and have parental responsibility. There are estranged families, kinship carers, informal fostering arrangements and situations of abuse. A strict parental responsibility requirement could exclude the very people relied on by a child. I ask the Minister whether there is flexibility in the amendments for exceptional cases in which someone without PR may be appropriate, with oversight. Do Government amendments 40 and 41 already address that point? Forgive me if I have misinterpreted, but they seem to be bridging amendments. Would guidance or a statutory code of practice provide a better mechanism to balance protection and flexibility? What assessment has been made of children in care or informal arrangements, where parental responsibility might technically lie with a local authority or estranged parent, especially under the changes proposed by Government amendments 40 and 41?

There are potential routes forward. One option might be to require PR by default but allow exceptions if the child expresses a clear competence preference, the AMHP agrees that a person is suitable and poses no safeguard risks, and a senior commissioner or legal oversight has sign-off. That is a possible way of keeping amendments 54 and 55 alive, and it would keep within the spirit of the amendments by protecting children from harmful influence without removing their voice in complex or marginal cases. We could also explore adding an explicit safeguard power to override a child’s nomination where there is concern of coercion or abuse, regardless of parental responsibility status. Again, I think that may be what Government amendments 40 and 41 are trying to do, but I would be grateful to see whether that is the case.

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[Dr Evans]

I commend the team in Winchester and the citizens advice bureau for what they are doing, but the hon. Gentleman slightly undermines his case. He is arguing that, in legislation, we should expand the independent mental health advocates—

[The Chair]

Order. We have strayed on to amendment 49, which is a separate debate. Can we come back to the amendments before us?

Oral Answers to Questions

Luke Evans Excerpts

Tuesday 17th June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Minister.

[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

I am pleased to hear the Minister speak about Pharmacy First, which was brought forward by the previous Government and welcomed by communities, the public and the pharmacists. Although I am pleased to see the Government continue it, why have they decided to cap the number of consultations that a pharmacist may do?

[Stephen Kinnock]

Part of that is about the financial arrangements for Pharmacy First, which need to be set at a level that incentivises pharmacists. Sadly, given the way in which the scheme was set up under the previous Government, those incentives were not working, which is one reason why the take-up of Pharmacy First has not been what it needs to be. It is a question not of capping but much more one of getting the right level of financial compensation for Pharmacy First so that it works and incentivises the system.

[Dr Evans]

I am grateful to the Minister for his answer, but part of the problem is that once pharmacists hit that cap, they are no longer paid the £17 per consultation. In turn, that means that either patients will be turned away, or the pharmacist must take the hit and pay for it themselves. That disjoins the system and could create extra costs, because patients who are turned away will turn up in other areas of primary care, such as their GP surgery. How does that fit with Darzi’s push towards community-based services?

[Stephen Kinnock]

The hon. Gentleman will have seen—and I am sure will welcome—the record uplift of £3.1 billion that we are putting into the pharmacy sector after years of underfunding, incompetence and neglect from the Conservative party. A big part of this is ensuring that the shift from hospital to community takes place, and we want pharmacists to be taking pressure off primary care. We have to make Pharmacy First work effectively, which means getting the allocation of funding right. That is what we are working on in terms of reforms. Now that we have the spending review and the package, that is what we will be delivering.

Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting)

Luke Evans Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 17th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Stephen Kinnock]

I can assure my hon. Friend on that. We have safeguards in place both to ensure that the selection is appropriate in the first place and that, if there are behaviours that indicate that the person is not right for the task, they will be removed and their powers taken away.

[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

Can the Minister clarify where these powers are and what they look like? For example, if a 15-year-old decides to appoint someone who is 23—maybe a boyfriend, maybe not—the problem is that once they make that nomination, we are waiting for something to happen. The idea behind the clauses we have been debating, and the use of exceptional circumstances to try to solve this problem, is to ensure that we prevent any problem from happening in the first place. That is the bit I am not clear on. I thought that Government amendments 40 and 41 were possibly intended to address that point, but my worry is that once the person is chosen, we do not know how they will behave. The whole idea is to give parental responsibility first. Could the Minister address where this is in the Bill, or what it looks like in the code? This is the critical bit to get right for children.

[Stephen Kinnock]

My understanding is that it is in schedule 2.

[Dr Evans]

I would be grateful if the Minister pointed it out.

[Stephen Kinnock]

With all due respect to the hon. Gentleman, I am not going to spend time shuffling my papers around. If he cares to look at schedule 2, I think he will find it there.

Government amendments 40 and 41 have been tabled because we believe that it is not necessary to specify in legislation which person the parental responsibility the approved mental health professional must appoint as nominated person for an under-16-year-old. We have committed to clarify this in the code of practice. We have committed to establishing an expert taskforce to support the development of a statutory code of practice to provide clear guidance for professionals involved in the nominated person appointment process.

The fourth question was whether we need parental responsibility by default. The current nearest relative provision assigns an automatic relative according to a hierarchical list, which does not reflect modern family structures. For instance, step-parents and parents who live abroad are not included. That can mean that children and young people may have a nearest relative who can make decisions about their care but who may not know the child well or engage with the role, or who could even be a risk to them. Without formal care proceedings, the child would be left to be represented by a relative who will not act in their best interests.

Fifthly, questions were raised about how to ensure that young patients are not isolated from family support if needed. Engagement with children and young people suggests that they are most likely to appoint their parent as a nominated person. If they appoint someone who is not their parent, then parents could still be involved in their care and treatment where appropriate. Safeguards are in place to allow for the overruling and displacement of the nominated person if they are behaving in a way that is not in the child or young person’s best interests.

Similarly, where a child is under a care order and parental responsibility sits primarily with the local authority, the local authority will retain its parental responsibility for the child even if the child chooses a nominated person who is not the local authority. The code of practice will provide guidance on how practitioners should include those with parental responsibility and care in key processes and decisions.

Sixthly, in cases where there are safeguarding concerns, what safeguards exist to ensure that the nominated person acts in the best interests of the child? The witness will determine whether the child’s nomination is suitable. Clinicians will also have the power to overrule decisions made by a nominated person if they think there is a danger to the patient or to others. The patient, an approved mental health professional, parents and anyone with an interest in the child’s welfare can apply to the court to displace the nominated person if they think they are behaving in a way that is not in the child’s best interests.

Finally, there was a question about how we will ensure that there is no coercion, including in the example involving an older partner. We will provide guidance to the witness on how to check that no coercion has taken place, as well as wider suitability criteria. A nominated person cannot be appointed if coercion or undue pressure has taken place. We intend to state in the code, subject to consultation, that an advocate should be involved early on to provide support to the child or young person throughout the nomination process. Advocates could work with witnesses to ensure that they have the relevant information about the child to make an informed appointment.

I hope that hon. Members are satisfied with those answers and will not press their amendments. I commend Government amendments 40 and 41, clauses 24 to 28 and schedule 2 to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 24 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 2

Nominated persons

Amendment proposed: 54, in schedule 2, page 77, line 21, at end insert—

“(3) Where the patient has not attained the age of 16 years, a nominated person must have parental responsibility for the patient.”—(Dr Evans.)

This amendment would stipulate that the nominated person for a patient under 16 must have parental responsibility for the patient.

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[Dr Evans]

This morning, we touched on amendment 49, so I will not repeat my remarks. I will simply ask a pithy question of the hon. Member for Winchester. He rightly talked about the incredible work that his local citizens advice bureau carries out. How will the amendment blur the lines between social workers, caseworkers and the independent advocates who are already doing this work? How does he perceive that working? I worry about the complexity that it would create. I would be grateful if the hon. Member addressed that point.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Winchester for bringing this issue before the Committee. The intention of his amendment is to extend the support offered by independent mental health advocates

“to cover social and financial stressors and support for family carers and other members of the household when the patient is discharged.”

It would amend paragraph 18 of schedule 2, which deals with amendments relating to nominated persons. It should more properly be inserted into schedule 3, which deals with independent mental health advocates.

The Bill will already extend the support that advocates can provide to help patients to be involved in decisions about their care and treatment, to be able to make a complaint and to be provided with information about other available services. Those other services could include support following discharge from statutory or voluntary organisations, which may cover social and financial issues, and help to support carers. Those organisations would be better placed to support patients with these specific needs, rather than independent mental health advocates, whose skillset is specific to supporting patients to understand their rights under the Mental Health Act and participate in decisions about their care and treatment. We will consult on guidance in the code of practice to help independent mental health advocates to understand their extended role.

In addition to policy regarding independent mental health advocacy, advance choice documents give individuals the chance to give instructions about practical aspects of their life. Examples of such aspects include domestic, financial or caring responsibilities, such as children or pets. This provision allows the individual to be looked after when unwell and aims to ease additional anxieties. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Winchester to withdraw his amendment.

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[Gregory Stafford]

I have some brief questions for the Minister about this important clause, which has serious implications for patient liberty and for public protection. We must ensure that decisions are clinically and legally sound. First, how will the proposed changes to initial and renewal detention periods help conditions and services and manage public risk more effectively, particularly in forensic or high-risk cases? Secondly, do longer detention periods after revocation of a community treatment order reflect a higher perceived risk, and if so, is there clear clinical evidence supporting that extension to six months? Thirdly, are we confident that the new timelines strike the right balance between protecting the public and ensuring patients are not detained longer than necessary? Finally, and as an adjunct to that, what other considerations are there in the clause or the Bill to keep the public safe and to make sure that decisions are correct in the context of clause 29?

[Dr Evans]

Clause 29 addresses the length and renewal of detention periods under the Mental Health Act. I begin by acknowledging the important step that this clause represents in shifting towards a more rights-based, patient-centred model, as enshrined in the Bill.

Clause 29 would shorten the initial period of detention for treatment under section 3 of the Mental Health Act from six months to three months. Subsequent renewal periods are, likewise, reduced from six months to three months and then from one year to six months. This is clearly informed by the principle of least restriction, as is rightly highlighted in the explanatory notes in paragraph 212.

On that basis, we welcome the direction of travel, but, while we agree with the principle of moving towards shorter, more proportionate detention periods, we have questions and concerns about implementation, consistency and safeguards, which I hope the Minister will address.

First, will shorter periods lead to better outcomes, or just more paperwork? The goal here is to ensure that detention is not allowed to drift and that patients are not held in hospital for longer than is necessary without rigorous justification. However, the clause still allows for indefinite renewal in increments, once those shorter initial periods expire. Can the Minister assure us that these changes will result in more meaningful reviews and not just more frequent rubber-stamping of detention? It would be helpful to understand whether the Government have assessed the clinical capacity, particularly among responsible clinicians and approved mental health professionals, to conduct these reviews with real rigour. If not resourced properly, we risk replacing one form of inertia with another.

Secondly, what safeguards exist against the resetting of detention periods on transfer? I am by no means a legal expert, so forgive me if I have completely misinterpreted this, and I bow to the legal expertise of the Minister, the Government and, most importantly, to able staff in the Box. However, clause 29(2) introduces into section 19 of the Mental Health Act new subsection (2A), which provides that if a guardianship patient is transferred to hospital, they will be treated as if they had been admitted on the day of transfer. In practical terms, does that not reset the detention clock?

To my eyes, this concept of resetting the detention clock appears most clearly in subsections (2) and 29(5)(d) of clause 29, where a patient who is transferred from guardianship to hospital, or who has their community treatment order revoked, is treated as if they had been newly admitted to hospital on that day. This effectively resets the start date of the detention period. Clause 29(2), which will insert proposed new section 19(2A) into the Mental Health Act, states:

“But, in the case of a patient falling within subsection (2)(d), section 20 has effect as if the patient has been admitted to hospital in pursuance of an application for admission for treatment on the day on which the patient is transferred.”

New paragraph 5B of schedule 1 to the Mental Health Act states that the modifications

“apply in relation to a patient transferred from guardianship to a hospital in pursuance of regulations made under section 19…In section 20(1)(a)…for “admitted”…there is to be substituted “transferred”.

In new paragraphs 5C and 5D of that schedule, the same resetting principle applies to patients whose CTOs are revoked, with renewal detention starting from the date of revocation, not from their original hospital admission or order.

In practice, this could mean that if a patient is placed under guardianship on 1 January and transferred to hospital on 1 April under section 19(2)(d) of the Mental Health Act, then under proposed new section 19(2A), they would be treated as if they had been newly admitted on 1 April. Therefore, even though they have been under compulsion since 1 January, the new three-month detention clock begins on 1 April. Likewise, a patient under a community treatment order that was issued on 1 February and revoked on 1 August will, under paragraph 5D, start a new in-patient detention period on 1 August, not 1 February.

On one hand, that makes sense. We do not want people whose state is fluctuating to be released, or simply to time out. On the other hand, if we are looking purely from the patient’s perspective, as the legislation asks us to do, with regard to the principles in clause 1, that could be a problem. Will the Minister clarify how many times such a reset could occur for a single individual? Is there any form of oversight, review or reporting requirement where this happens? That mechanism might be necessary in some clinical contexts, but without safeguards it could become a back door to prolonging detention, which is something that the clause seeks to reduce. Is there some kind of register or mandatory recording of these incidents to spot repeat patterns?

Thirdly, another issue that needs addressing is the creation of possible complexity. Paragraphs 218 and 219 of the explanatory notes set out a separate but equally important issue. Clause 29’s welcome shortening of detention periods—from three months to start with, then three months, then six months, then annual reviews—is not applied evenly to patient groups. Who gets the shorter periods? Most civil patients detained under part II and some patients on revoked community treatment orders. Who does not get them? Patients detained by a hospital order from a court, if their CTO is revoked within six months of the order, as in paragraph 218. And, of course, restricted patients—typically those involved in more serious offences.

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[Stephen Kinnock]

The aim of the clause is to ensure that a patient’s detention is reviewed sooner. The planned reforms will not change the fundamental power and purpose of the Act, which is to detain and treat people when they are so unwell that they become a risk to themselves or others. Where a patient continues to meet the criteria, their detention will be renewed.

Opposition Members have asked about extra paperwork and workload in general for both clinicians and tribunals. In the impact assessment that we published alongside the Bill, we set out the estimated costs and benefits of the reforms and the expected workforce requirements that are critical to our implementation planning. That includes consideration of the impact on clinicians of additional detention reviews, which we have calculated is estimated to be around four hours of additional workload by the clinician for each patient who is detained beyond three months.

On the clinical evidence for shortening the detention period, in the independent review we found that in 17% of cases referred to the mental health tribunal, discharge happened in the 48 hours before the hearing, which strongly suggests that some patients are being detained for longer than is necessary.

[Dr Evans]

Could I ask the Minister—

[The Chair]

Order. I am afraid that the Minister had sat down.

[Dr Evans]

On a point of order, Mrs Harris. The Minister had not sat down. He had said that he was finishing, but he had not sat down. There is an important point that was not addressed: the issue of resetting, which is fundamental to detention.

[The Chair]

Minister, do you wish to answer the question?

[Stephen Kinnock]

I did not catch the question to which the hon. Gentleman is referring. Could he repeat it, please?

[Dr Evans]

The issue is about resetting. As the legislation is written, it would suggest that because people are moving from one place to another, the clock resets. Clinically, that could make sense, but part of the problem is that every time the clock resets, so does the person’s detention. That is a key part. Fundamentally, in this clause we are trying to stop people being detained when they do not need to be. In fact, the Minister has just said that 17% of people were discharged before the tribunal could happen. The question is around specifying, when it comes to admission and transfer, that the clock resets. What safeguards do we have to make sure that we are counting the number of times it is reset, that it is clinically appropriate and, most importantly, that we are not substituting one way of dealing with this with a back-door way of creating a reset motion?

[The Chair]

Order. Dr Evans, this is an intervention. Can we please keep it as such?

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[Natasha Irons (Croydon East) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris. I rise to speak in support of clauses 30 to 33. I echo many of the remarks of the gallant and learned hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley, but I will try not to go over too much of the same ground.

These clauses seek to provide clarity and improvement in access to the tribunal process, both for patients detained under the Mental Health Act and for those on conditional discharge, and seek to implement key recommendations from the independent review. Section 66 of the Act is amended to extend the period in which a patient detained under section 2 can apply to the tribunal from 14 days to 21 days. Clause 30 also allows for auto-enrolment in a hearing, reducing that time from six months to three months. It clarifies that conditional discharge patients are included in this package, so they also have the right to have their treatment reviewed at a tribunal. Providing for auto-enrolment simplifies the system for people who, as the hon. Member mentioned, are perhaps not in the best position to make administrative decisions and fill in the paperwork to apply to a tribunal.

Although this framework and these changes are necessary to bring clarity and autonomy back into people’s healthcare, it would be good to hear from the Minister about how we will support patients throughout these processes as we learn about the different timelines. How will we ensure people can access this change in the system and understand what they are entitled to under this new provision?

[Dr Evans]

Clauses 30 to 33 deal with the tribunal access and automatic referrals of patients detained or conditionally discharged under the Mental Health Act. Let me begin, again, by welcoming these provisions, which seek to improve safeguards, ensure timely oversight, and extend the rights of individuals, particularly those under deprivation of liberty conditions in the community. These are serious matters of liberty and I acknowledge the Government’s intention to modernise and strengthen protection. Nevertheless, it is important that we look carefully at how the clauses operate in practice. I will take each in turn.

Clause 30, on tribunal application periods, will make important changes to when patients can apply for the tribunal. First, it will extend the time that patients detained under section 2 of the Act have to apply from 14 to 21 days. This is a welcome change. We know that the first few days in hospital are incredibly disorientating, so allowing patients a bit more time to seek legal advice is entirely sensible.

Secondly, the clause will reduce the period for patients detained under section 3 to apply from six months to three. I can understand the logic of that, given that clause 29 also shortens the initial detention period, but is there any reason for choosing that mark? Is there any evidence that the three-month window will still allow patients to have sufficient time and support to exercise their rights?

Thirdly, the clause will introduce new provisions for conditionally discharged restricted patients, setting out different application timeframes depending on whether the patient is subject to conditions amounting to deprivation of liberty. Those under the deprivation of liberty safeguards will be able to apply between six and 12 months after discharge and then every two years. For those not under such conditions, the window begins at 12 months. That reflects the impact of conditions on a person’s liberty, and I recognise that distinction, but can the Minister clarify how patients will be informed about which track they are on? That will be fundamental to exerting their rights. Will any guidance be issued to ensure consistency? Will patients have access to advocacy or legal advice at this point?

On clause 31, automatic tribunal referrals are a crucial safety net for those who for whatever reason do not exercise their right to apply. The clause introduces a new framework of relevant periods after which the hospital managers must refer, as we have heard. For section 2 patients, it will be three months. For section 3 and CTO patients it will be three months, then 12 months and every year thereafter. Significantly, the current three-year review period for many detained patients is reduced to one year.

The clause marks a substantial increase in oversight, which I support, but it also raises practical questions. Given that we have put these backstops in place, have the Government made any estimate of how many extra tribunals will be needed and how much extra work they will generate? The Minister was kind enough to say that there were four hours of clinical work involved in doing the plans, but I do not think we have yet heard how much work the Government estimate that the tribunals will take.

More importantly, what support is being provided to ensure that the tribunal system can meet that increased demand? I am particularly concerned that the benefits of these reforms may not be felt if backlogs or delays undermine the safeguards they are intended to deliver.

[Gregory Stafford]

Does my hon. Friend think that if there is a backlog, that could undermine patient rights or clinical progress in some way? How will the tribunal system be able to cope with that increased workload and meet its legal obligations to provide timely tribunals so that patients get the best care?

[Dr Evans]

That is a difficult balance to get right. I appreciate that the Government have said that the Bill will take 10 years to implement, but if these measures come into force from day one, we will start to see automatic referrals come through. There will be a lag as the transition happens, but my hon. Friend is absolutely right: we can foresee scenarios where patients who want to be referred into the tribunal are waiting in inappropriate care places, which may be to the detriment of their personal care and may actually make their recovery worse. He is right to highlight that question, which is why having a broad understanding of how many extra referrals are coming would be useful.

Clause 32 focuses on conditionally discharged restricted patients who are subject to deprivation of liberty conditions. It rightly ensures that those patients are brought within scope of automatic referral, first after 12 months and then every two years. Again, that is a positive step, ensuring that even those not detained in hospital will still have access to a review of their conditions. Crucially, the clause also gives the tribunals the power to vary or remove those DoL conditions.

Can the Minister say more about how that important power will be used? What criteria will the tribunals apply to assess whether a condition is genuinely necessary and proportionate? Will patients be legally represented in those hearings by default? Will another advocate be there, or will it be someone else in their place? Here, too, I would welcome some clarification from the Minister. I hope he will forgive my legal naivety, but my mother always said, “It’s better to ask a dumb question than stay dumb forever.”

The explanatory notes talk about DoL conditions. The current legal framework for authorising the deprivation of liberty for individuals who lack capacity is complex and in transition. Under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, deprivation of liberty safeguards have been the established mechanism since 2009 to ensure lawful deprivation of liberty in care settings. However, the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019 introduced liberty protection safeguards as modernising replacements, designed to simplify and broaden protections.

LPS are widely seen as an improvement to DoLS, because they extend safeguards to a wider range of settings, including hospitals and people’s own homes where deprivation of liberty might occur. They also streamline the assessment process, reducing bureaucratic delays and better reflecting person-centred decision making. The Law Commission and various stakeholder groups have supported LPS as a way to address the significant practical and legal challenges posed by DoLS, including the so-called DoLS backlog, where assessments have been delayed for many vulnerable individuals.

Despite that, I do not believe that LPS have yet been implemented, leaving DoLS still in force. I wonder if we are therefore creating ambiguity as we update the Mental Health Act through the Bill’s clauses, such as those addressing conditional discharge and deprivation of liberty, without clarity on how those will intersect with the forthcoming LPS framework that will be introduced under separate legislation. That raises important questions about the sequencing and co-ordination of legislation reform. How will the Government ensure coherence and avoid conflicting provisions when different statutes address overlapping issues at different times?

Given that context, have the Government abandoned the planned implementation of LPS, or do they remain committed to bringing them into force? If the implementation is still planned, will the Government provide a clear timeline for when LPS will replace DoLS? How do the Government intend to ensure that the provisions we are debating will align with or adapt to the introduction of LPS? What steps are being taken to ensure that vulnerable individuals and professionals who navigate this complex legal landscape will have clear, consistent safeguards and guidance through the transition? Clarification on those points is essential to avoid legal uncertainty and to ensure that the reforms provide coherent protection for those deprived of their liberties.

Clause 33 deals with patients who are not under DoLS conditions. It will ensure that even those who are under DoLS conditions, such as detained restricted patients or conditionally discharged patients with lesser restrictions, receive automatic tribunals. It will reduce the current three-year referral intervention for detained restricted patients to 12 months and introduce automatic referrals for non-DoL conditionality discharge patients after two years and then every four years. Again, that is a step forward, but four years feels like a long gap between reviews for those discharged with conditions that still significantly affect their daily lives. Will the Minister explain the thought behind the chosen timeframe? If a person’s condition changes, is there a mechanism to trigger an early referral outside the normal cycle?

The clauses show progress. They reflect a clear intention to strengthen patients’ rights, increase oversight and address historical injustices, particularly for those living under deprivation of liberty conditions in the community. But with complexity comes risk, and we need to ensure that patients understand their rights and the legal support available. The tribunal system must be properly resourced to uphold the safeguards that we place in the legislation.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I will try to answer some of the questions. On tribunal capacity, people who are conditionally discharged and those with restrictions that amount to a deprivation of liberty represent only a small fraction of tribunal business—well under 1% of all mental health tribunal cases. The modest increase in hearings is therefore expected to be absorbed within existing capacity, while delivering significant rights benefits to the individuals concerned. It is worth noting, too, that the mental health tribunal continues to perform strongly. Amazingly, it is one of the very few areas of our public services not to be left with a massive backlog by the previous Government. The open caseload has remained stable at approximately 3,700 cases for a decade, despite 31,226 appeals in 2024-25.

I was asked about LPS and replacing DoLS. The previous Government paused the implementation of the liberty protection safeguards; they decided to focus on other priorities. In the absence of LPS, the deprivation of liberty safeguards system will continue to apply. The Department has made it clear that all bodies with legal duties under the DoLS must continue to operate these important safeguards to ensure that the rights of people without the relevant mental capacity are protected.

[Dr Evans]

Does the Minister have any plan or implementation timetable for LPS, given that their introduction has been paused?

[Stephen Kinnock]

We have made it clear that we are going to continue with DoLS. Basically, we have to look at whether replacing them with LPS will achieve the stated objectives of the exercise, and I am not entirely convinced about that. It is under review.

On supporting patients, the independent mental health advocate will ensure that patients are aware of their rights. Throughout the Bill we are ensuring that patients have support by moving to an opt-out model. Additionally, if a patient does not bring a case, they will be referred automatically to the tribunal if a specified period has passed. Patients will be supported in getting tribunal oversight, as the referrals are made by a hospital manager.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 30 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 31 to 33 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 34

Discharge: process

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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[Dr Evans]

I rise to speak to clause 34, which inserts new consultation requirements into section 23 of the Mental Health Act 1983. The requirements relate to the discharge of individuals detained under parts II and III of the Act, as well as those subject to community treatment orders or guardianship.

Currently, under the Act, the responsible clinician has the power to discharge patients detained under sections 2 and 3, as well as unrestricted patients subject to a hospital order under part III, without any formal requirement to consult other professionals. This is already considered outdated practice in most clinical settings, where decisions are typically made within the multi-disciplinary team. However, that is not required by law. By contrast, discharge decisions for restricted patients remain with the Secretary of State for Justice or the mental health tribunal and are not affected by the clause.

Clause 34 seeks to change the current situation. It will insert proposed new subsections (2A) to (2C) into section 23 of the 1983 Act, placing a statutory consultation duty on responsible clinicians, local authorities and, in some cases, the patient’s nominated person. The aim, as outlined in the Government’s explanatory notes and by the Minister, is to formalise best practice and ensure that no discharge decision is made unilaterally without appropriate professional oversight. The Opposition welcome the intention behind the clause—strengthening safeguards, encouraging multidisciplinary collaboration and protecting patients from unsafe or premature discharges are all necessary and overdue steps—but we have a few questions about it that I hope the Minister will address.

First, proposed new subsection (2A) requires the responsible clinician to

“consult a person—

(i) who has been professionally concerned with the patient’s care or treatment, and

(ii) who belongs to a profession other than that to which the responsible clinician belongs”.

That is a sound principle, but there is an ambiguity in the phrase “has been professionally concerned”. Who do the Government have in mind? The Minister set out that it could be a nurse or a counsellor, but would it stretch as far as a GP or a practice nurse? Will there be a codifying list, either in statute or in the code of practice, so that we know who is expected to speak to that person? Does it require current involvement in the patient’s care? For example, could a professional who saw the patient only briefly many months ago qualify? If so, is that adequate to meet the clause’s intention? We would welcome clarification from the Minister on whether a definition of who and what an appropriate consultee looks like will be covered in guidance or regulations.

Secondly, I fully understand the good intent behind proposed new subsection (2B)(c), but as a good Opposition we should point out a possible unforeseen problem. It states that when the nominated person—that is, the person chosen by the patient to act in their interests—is making a discharge decision under guardianship, they

“must consult the responsible local social services authority.”

That raises both legal and practical questions. Is it appropriate to place a statutory duty on a layperson, who may be a relative, a friend or a carer with no formal training or professional support? What is the consequence if they fail to consult? Would their decision be invalid, or could it be legally challenged?

I know that the Government are trying to ensure that relatives and advocates are consulted, which is commendable. I am sure there will be no issue in the vast majority of cases, but there is a risk that the duty may unintentionally create legal uncertainty and administrative burdens for families. Has the Minister thought about whether it might be better framed as a duty on the local authority to advise or support the nominated person, rather than vice versa? I am sure we both agree on the motive and principle of shared decision making; it is simply a question of where to place the burden.

Thirdly, under proposed new subsection (2C), if someone is on a community treatment order, the responsible clinician and hospital managers must consult the community clinician before they discharge the person from that order. Again, that seems sensible, but what happens if there is no identified or available community clinician? As we have discussed, they are legally named, so could that requirement create a bottleneck to discharge? Will there be provision for proceeding with discharge if consultation is not practicable within a reasonable time? Without such a safeguard, there is a risk that patients remain subject to detention, such as conditions under a CTO, even when all parties agree that discharge is clinically appropriate.

Furthermore, the clause does not appear to require the consultation outcome to be documented, nor any disagreement to be recorded. If the responsible clinician consults someone and then disregards their view—as we heard earlier, according to the Minister they have precedence—that may be entirely justified, but surely transparency demands the recording of the reasons. Will the Government consider adding a requirement to document consultation, perhaps in the code of practice, to ensure that reasons are given when discharge proceedings are taken against clinical advice?

The clause represents an important step towards improving safety, accountability and multidisciplinary care in discharge planning, but the Opposition believe that to realise its full potential and avoid creating uncertainty or delay, the Government should look again at the clarity of key terms, such as “professionally concerned”; the appropriateness of placing duties on laypeople, such as the nominated person; the practical challenges around consultations when key professionals are not available; and the need for clear documentation requirements to uphold transparency and safeguarding in decision making. I look forward to hearing the Minister address those points.

[Stephen Kinnock]

The hon. Member for Chester South and Eddisbury asked about differences of opinion. The second professional does not have to agree. The ultimate decision in such cases sits with the responsible clinician, to ensure the clear accountability of decision making.

The hon. Lady also asked about delays. We see consultation with another professional as important to making a more informed decision on whether the patient is ready for discharge under the Act. It is especially important that the second professional involved in discharge decisions is from a discipline different from that of the responsible clinician. That will ensure a broader perspective, particularly when the second professional, such as a nurse, may have had more frequent contact with the patient.

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[Gregory Stafford]

Like the hon. Lady, I see many benefits from the clause. Like many Committee members, I am surprised that the Government intend to vote against it.

As has been mentioned, the clause was inserted in the House of Lords by my noble Friends Earl Howe and Lord Kamall. I think it introduces a very valuable and forward-looking provision—namely, a mandatory debrief session within 30 days of discharge. It introduces a formal mechanism for learning from patient experiences following detention under the Mental Health Act. Although patient feedback mechanisms exist in some services, they are not consistently applied or mandated. The clause ensures that every detained patient has the opportunity to reflect on their care with an independent advocate, and that their feedback contributes to service improvement. It reflects a broader shift in mental health law towards transparency, accountability and the patient voice, and aligns with the recommendations from the 2018 independent review of the Mental Health Act, which the Government have used as an argument in favour of many of the other clauses.

Clause 35 is more than just a procedural addition. It represents a shift in culture towards embedding the patient voice and accountability in the mental health care system. It recognises the importance of empowering individuals after detention, supporting their recovery, and learning from their lived experience to improve future services. Mental health charities and third sector organisations have strongly endorsed the clause, seeing it as a meaningful step towards a more rights-based, transparent approach to care.

Clearly, the clause empowers patients, because it gives them a structured opportunity to share their experiences and influence service provision. It promotes transparency by requiring hospitals to report publicly on what they have learned and how they have responded. It supports quality improvement by encouraging services to reflect on and address systemic issues in the delivery of care. Furthermore, it has independent oversight through the involvement of IMHAs, which helps to ensure that feedback is gathered impartially and respectfully.

The reforms prioritise professional clinical opinion, safeguard children from inappropriate influence during periods of acute vulnerability, and elevate the patient voice in the post-care process. In doing so, they align the Mental Health Act much more closely to modern standards of care, international best practice and evolving public expectations. I believe that the clause is essential to strengthening the Bill and ensuring that our mental health system becomes not only more effective but more compassionate, responsive and just.

[Dr Evans]

I rise to speak to clause 35, which would insert new section 23A into the Mental Health Act 1983. It was introduced and passed in the Lords, and rightly so. As the hon. Member for Thurrock said, it seems surprising that anyone might want to take it out.

The clause was introduced as a new duty to offer all patients detained under the Act a consultation with an IMHA within 30 days of discharge. The purpose is to review their experience of hospital and learn from that experience through a report shared with hospital managers. Currently, the Mental Health Act makes provisions for access to IMHAs primarily during detention, particularly around decisions concerning treatment and care planning. However, once a patient is discharged, formal advocacy tends to fall away, unless pursued through broader NHS complaints mechanisms. There is no statutory duty to engage with patients post discharge, to understand how they have experienced their care or to systematically learn from those experiences.

In that context, the clause represents a welcome and important step forward. We know from successive reviews from the Care Quality Commission, NHS England and, of course, the independent review of the Mental Health Act, led by Sir Simon Wessely, that patients often feel disempowered during their detention. Many describe experiences of coercion, poor communication or even trauma. Yet those experiences frequently go unheard: lost in the silence that can follow discharge. Clause 35 seeks to change that, creating a pathway for those voices to be heard, and, more importantly, for services to learn from them. I strongly support that principle.

We need to clarify one thing first: the clause says a patient must “be offered” a consultation within 30 days —it is no more formalised than that. It is not a statutory requirement to take part, but purely to offer. That is important when it comes to making sure that reports are made in partnership with the patient. That is positive language, which would help to support the decision making and feedback loop.

In their rebuttals, I appreciate that the Government may ask whether the clause would mean hospital managers marking their own feedback. They might also ask how we would deal with CQC capacity. Those are reasonable questions, but at the heart of the clause, as agreed by the Lords, is the fact that all too often patients’ thoughts after discharge are not fully taken into account.

[Gregory Stafford]

Surely the fundamental part of the Bill is self-assessment and self-reflection. That does happen in some cases, and certainly in other parts of the healthcare system, but in this area generally does not; when it does happen, it is done in an inconsistent manner. The clause seeks to formalise things and to ensure that there is a benchmark by which service users and patients can feed back to the service they have just come from, to improve services. Does my hon. Friend share my confusion about why the Government would want to take that out?

[Dr Evans]

My hon. Friend makes a strong point. In clinical practice, we know that reflective learning is important, but that is not mandated. As we have seen from the reports, part of the reason why we do not see improvements is that we do not know about them. The clause gives patients the chance to empower themselves in a statutory, regulated way, which then allows us further transparency on how those issues arise.

Let us not forget that patients with good experiences would also have the chance to feed those back, further helping to support the services and hopefully leading to beacons of best practice up and down the nation so that we could then learn from those. That is the idea behind the clause: making sure that the likes of the regulator would be able to share lessons about not only those who have struggled but those who have done well. Clause 35 really offers a rare opportunity to hardwire the patient voice into the feedback loop of mental health services. That is a principle that I and my Opposition colleagues strongly support.

[Stephen Kinnock]

Fundamentally, we do not support the clause because it is overkill. It simply puts too much burden on to a system that is already carrying out the tasks that the clause seeks to impose on the system, particularly through the CQC. Given that advocates currently have no role in relation to discharged patients, it is clear that the clause would present a new burden; that has been confirmed through my officials’ engagement with advocates and other stakeholders. One hospital manager said that within their small trust alone, the clause would result in contacting and interviewing more than 1,000 individuals discharged from the Act each year.

[Dr Evans]

The Minister says that advocates had no role in discharge, but they do when advising patients about their rights—that is fundamentally what they do. At the point of discharge, they enable patients to know what their rights are. I take his point about capacity issues. If the Government want to take the clause away, how will they hardwire patients’ feedback into the heart of the Bill?

[Stephen Kinnock]

The CQC visits and interviews thousands of detained patients each year under its statutory duty to monitor the use of the Mental Health Act. Those visits can lead to the CQC requesting improvements from service providers. The CQC publishes annual reports highlighting key findings and themes from those visits.

Trust boards are responsible for collecting and acting on service user feedback to improve services. Under the NHS contract, the patient and carer race equality framework requires trusts to have clear and visible systems in place for gathering and responding to feedback from patients and carers. What is more, Healthwatch England and its local branches also play a key role in representing the views of health and social care users. I do not really know what more the system could do. The clause simply over-embroiders and over-complicates; when that happens, we usually end up with vast numbers of unintended consequences.

We appreciate that concerns have been raised around the CQC’s role in collecting in-patients’ views. As I said, we would prefer to work with stakeholders to understand those concerns and improve the feedback mechanisms that we have, rather than reinvent the wheel and create something new. We recognise that, although there are multiple aims to the clause, the primary one is to provide a space for people to heal from their experiences of being detained. We are strongly of the view that inviting the individual to share their experiences as part of their advance choice document or care plan—

--- Later in debate ---

In summary, clauses 36 to 40 represent a judicious blend of reform and refinement. Clause 36 resolves a significant legal ambiguity while embedding rigorous safeguards. Clauses 37 and 38 modernise and humanise the framework for transferring detainees to hospital, and clauses 39 and 40 ensure statutory alignment with the current law and best practice. Collectively, these provisions do not revolutionise the Mental Health Act, but they do arguably enhance it, ensuring that it remains lawful, clinically relevant and respectful of both public protection imperatives and individual rights.

[Dr Evans]

I rise to address clauses 36 to 40, which focus on patients involved in criminal proceedings or serving custodial sentences, and how we better align their care and liberty and the protection of the public. These clauses engage serious and sensitive issues—individual liberty, the management of risk and the functioning of the justice and health systems in tandem.

I turn first to clause 36. Under the current Mental Health Act, a restricted patient—typically someone who has been detained under a hospital order with restrictions due to the risk they pose—can conditionally be discharged under section 42 by the Secretary of State for Justice or under section 73 by the tribunal. Conditions can be placed on their discharge, but they cannot amount to deprivation of liberty. This is key. If conditions require constant supervision or control, such as being escorted at all times, then the patient cannot be discharged at all, even if they no longer need in-patient treatment. This was confirmed in the Supreme Court case, MM v. Secretary of State for Justice, in 2018.

Essentially, at the heart of the clause is a group of individuals who have been detained in a hospital under a restricted hospital order. In other words, they are people who have committed serious offences but were found to be suffering from mental disorders at the time. These individuals are not sent to prison; instead, they are detained in secure hospitals under the Mental Health Act. In some cases, clinicians and tribunals decide that someone can be discharged from hospital, but only if they comply with very strict conditions. These can include requirements such as living in a particular place with 24-hour supervision, not leaving without permission, being monitored at all times and other limits that can seriously restrict their liberty.

The issue arose in the case MM v. WL, in which a patient with capacity had consented to highly restrictive discharge conditions involving 24-hour supervision. The court found that the discharge under such conditions could not lawfully take place under the Mental Health Act, even with the patient’s consent, because it amounted to deprivation of liberty, and it was not lawful to call it a “conditional discharge”.

The law as it stands does not provide for that, which is where this clause comes in. Clause 36 seeks to address the impasse by amending sections 42 and 73 of the Act. It allows both the Secretary of State and the tribunal to impose deprivation of liberty conditions upon discharge only where they are necessary to protect others from serious harm, and where conditional discharge is no less beneficial to the patient than continued hospital detention.

I also welcome the intent of the clause: to introduce the principle of least restriction, ensuring that patients are not kept in hospital simply because the law offers no safe option. Paragraph 281 of the explanatory notes states:

“This power supports the principle of least restriction by allowing patients to be discharged from hospital and treated in the community, where otherwise this might have been prevented.”

However, I would like to raise several probing questions for the Minister. Do we know how many patients are currently affected by the MM judgment and held in hospital longer than clinically necessary? How will patients be supported to challenge these conditions, particularly if they have capacity and disagree with the restrictions? Equally, if we flip it and argue for more restrictions, what if there are concerns or disagreements from the services, clinicians or families? How will they be able to challenge the decision in reverse?

I am pleased that my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley is here, as I am not legal expert, but when I was prepping for this, I also noted the retrospective effect of clause 36(5), which allows certain conditions to be applied to those already detained or conditionally discharged when the clause comes into force. The retrospective effect of clause 36 is noted specifically in subsection (5) and reinforced in the explanatory notes. Subsection (5) states:

“The amendments made by this section apply in relation to any person who is a restricted patient within the meaning given by subsection (1) of section 79 of the Mental Health Act 1983, or is treated as a restricted patient as a result of that subsection, whether the person became such a patient (or treated as such a patient) before or after the coming into force of this section.”

This is a clear signal of retrospective application. I believe, in legal terms, this has the effect of changing legislation to make a provision apply as if it has always been in law in the past, not just from the date of commencement. What does this mean? This clause effectively retroactively legalises conditional discharges that include deprivation of liberty before the Bill becomes law, even though under current law, following the MM judgment, that was not permissible.

The explanatory notes to the Bill make this point more directly. For example, paragraph 284 on page 53 states:

“Clause 36 subsection (5) allows the new measures to operate retrospectively by providing that deprivation of liberty conditions can be imposed on restricted patients who are already detained, or who are conditionally discharged, at the time the provisions come into force.”

Again, I am no lawyer, but this makes it clear that the Government are intent on validating past decisions, particularly those made before that are contrary to the MM judgment, which held that the Mental Health Act did not permit deprivation of liberty as part of the conditional discharge. Can the Minister confirm that article 5 of the ECHR safeguards has been fully considered in that respect? On page 72 of the explanatory notes, paragraph 394 says that the right hon. Member for Ilford North (Wes Streeting) believes that the Bill is compatible with the ECHR. To my surprise, when I was working on this at the weekend, I noticed that it says, “in her view”—a small drafting error that highlights my hours and hours of prep for this.

On a serious note, the real-world effect of clause 36(5) is to retroactively legalise the use of conditional discharges that involve deprivation of liberty even though, under current law as interpreted by the courts, such decisions were unlawful at the time that they were made. Why does that matter? The retrospective provision protects public authorities, particularly the Secretary of State for Justice, and mental health professionals from legal liability for decisions made before, or in disregard of, the MM judgment. It shields decisions that may have breached a patient’s rights, particularly their right to liberty under article 5 of the ECHR, by making those actions lawful after the fact.

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[Anna Dixon]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that one of the challenges of that court ruling, which will stand unless the Bill amends the law, is that there will be people detained for longer than is appropriate because a conditional discharge is not possible under the law as it is currently interpreted? The whole Bill is about the principle of least restriction. Does he not agree that we need to make this change to fit with that principle?

[Dr Evans]

I agree on that, and we will support the clause. But, as the hon. Member rightly pointed out earlier, we need interoperability between the moving parts to make sure that they all align with the provision in the clause. She is absolutely right: this measure is in the Bill because the patient in the MM case had capacity and had agreed to being discharged with deprivation of liberty impositions, and that was found to be unlawful because of a parallel Act. What I am worried about, and the point that I am trying to make, is that there are so many moving parts in these Acts that we could be in danger of complicating the situation further.

Clause 36 seeks to address the uncertainty by legislating for a new power to impose deprivation conditions as part of a conditional discharge, as the hon. Member rightly pointed out. However, in doing so, the clause effectively runs parallel to, and perhaps even conflicts with, the as yet un-implemented LPS framework. The Government introduced the LPS framework through the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019. It was intended to be more flexible and responsive than DoLS. But given that the LPS framework has not been commenced, and that there is no clear timetable for implementation—the Minister seemed to suggest that he was unsure whether he will implement them, even though the 2019 Act was passed by Parliament—are we legislating for an entirely separate deprivation of liberty route under the Mental Health Act, and potentially bypassing or duplicating existing safeguards under the Mental Capacity Act?

It all comes back to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley about good record keeping and legislative housekeeping. I ask the Minister how the new conditional discharge power will interact with either the DoLS or the liberty protection safeguards—if they are eventually implemented. Are they simply a subsection of the deprivation of liberty conditions, and therefore would not matter? Can the Minister foresee a time where a patient could be subject to both the new powers and the LPS, and if so, who is the decision maker and where do the appeals rightly lie? Should we not wait for the full implementation of the LPS before layering further deprivations in place? That is an open and rhetorical question, but one that vexes me when we are discussing this Bill in detail. There is a real risk here of fragmenting the legal landscape, leading to confusion for clinicians, patients and carers.

Clause 37, which is about conditions relating to the transfers of prisoners and others to hospital, addresses a barrier to timely transfers from prison to hospital. At present, under the case R (ASK) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department of 2019, a transfer from prison under section 47 or 48 of the Mental Health Act cannot be authorised unless a specific hospital bed has already been identified. While well intentioned, that threshold has arguably had a negative effect in deterring referrals and delaying access to treatment.

Clause 37 rightly lowers that threshold. It amends section 47 and 48 of the Act so that a hospital place need not be available at the point of referral. Instead, the clinical decision about suitability for hospital can proceed earlier, allowing for better planning and quicker transfers. That seems a pragmatic response to a bureaucratic bottleneck, but how will this amendment be implemented in practice to ensure that it does not create the false expectation of imminent transfer? Will there be national guidance issued for uniform application of that new test across the entire prison estate?

Clause 38 deals with transfers from prisons to hospitals, and their timeline. It introduces a new statutory duty for transfers from prison or detention to hospital to be completed within 28 days of initial review for assessment via proposed new sections 47A and 48A. As we have heard, that reflects good existing practice. The NHS England guidance already recommends that transfers should be completed within 28 days. However, clause 38 now gives that statutory force subject to exceptional circumstances, which the Bill carefully defines. For instance, as we have heard, shortages of staff and hospital beds do not qualify unless they are caused by exceptional events such as fires or flooding.

This clause is welcomed as an important safeguard for therapeutic benefit, because delays in transfer can cause serious deterioration. It must, however, be supported by sufficient resources and capacity, on which I have a few questions. What assessment has been made of compliance with the 28 day target, and what proportion of cases currently fall outside of it? Will investment be made to ensure bed availability and staffing so that those statutory duties may be fulfilled? When this was debated in the other place, the Justice Minister said:

“I am pleased to share that this Government have recently established a health and justice strategic advisory group, which will bring together key partners with responsibility for the various parts of the transfer process. This group will be chaired by a national clinical director, who will report regularly to Ministers and be responsible for agreeing a joint work plan to support implementation of the statutory time limit, identifying solutions to common barriers to timely transfers and holding partners to account.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 31 March 2025; Vol. 845, c. 102.]

That is laudable, so I tabled a written question to find out about the group that Lord Timpson talked about. Fortunately, the answer to my written question came back today. The group have not met and are not meeting until 1 July, so I ask for some clarification around that committee. It seems welcome, and this is a complex area. Given that the Justice Minister raised that issue, who will the group report to—the Ministry of Justice or the Department of Health?

Later in his remarks, Lord Timpson talks about the written ministerial statement coming to Parliament. We have heard the Government say that a couple of times about reporting timescales, but in his speech Lord Timpson talked about reporting to Ministers. What kind of time- scales and frequency can we expect if the group has not even met yet? What reporting will there be to Ministers, either in the Ministry of Justice or the Department of Health, to address some of the issues that we are debating today?

Clause 39 deals with transfer directions for persons detained in youth detention accommodation. It is rightly pointed out that this is a gap in the law. There is no power under section 48 to transfer to hospital a child who has been remanded to a youth detention accommodation by the Crown court, even if they urgently need in-patient care for mental disorders. That really does seem to be an anomaly. Such power exists for magistrates court remands, so clause 39 rightly corrects this, and I support it. Do we know how many children have been affected by that gap since 2012? I ask because if this is to come into law with immediate effect, it will have an immediate resource effect. We of course want to make sure that everyone—particularly young people—is in the right place. The fact that some of them legally are not may well cause another problem for us all.

Finally, I turn to clause 40, which appears to be a technical clarification of schedule 1 of the 1983 Act, confirming that the whole of section 66(2)(d) is disapplied for unrestricted part III patients. It clarifies the right of application to the tribunal, and to me it seems uncontroversial and helpful.

I acknowledge the thoughtful work being proposed in these clauses, and I understand what they are trying to do. They represent a clear attempt to modernise and humanise the way the Mental Health Act applies to some of the most vulnerable and high risk patients in our system, but we must ensure that any new powers, particularly those involving deprivation of liberty and retrospective legislation, are subject to clear safeguards, scrutiny and proper resourcing. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to my questions.

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[Dr Evans]

I rise to speak to clause 41 and schedule 3, which introduce the independent mental health advocate system under the Mental Health Act 1983. I recognise the positive intentions behind the reforms. The proposals respond to long-standing concerns about access to advocacy for people receiving mental health treatment, especially for those who are not detained, but are nevertheless vulnerable, and may struggle to understand the challenges within their care.

Currently, IMHA services are guaranteed only to a relatively narrow group—namely, patients detained under the Act, those under community treatment orders or guardianship, and certain patients undergoing serious medical treatments under sections 57 or 58A. As the explanatory notes make clear in paragraph 313, that excludes a substantial number of informal or voluntary patients, many of whom may be experiencing significant distress or coercion, even if they are technically not detained.

The clause expands eligibility to a new category of English qualifying informal patients, bringing England more in line with a system already used in places such as Wales. This welcome and overdue development reflects the principle that the right to advocacy should be grounded not in a legal status alone, but in need and vulnerability. The introduction of the opt-out referral system for detained patients is also a step forward. Concerns have been raised that eligible patients never access IMHA, often because they are unaware, overwhelmed or too unwell for self-referral. Making the referral automatic is likely to increase the uptake and strengthen patient voices in critical decisions about care, treatment and discharge.

Although the direction of travel is right, I want to raise several probing questions in areas of concern, particularly relating to implementation, scope and safe- guarding. On resource and workforce readiness, the Government are significantly expanding both the pool of eligible patients and the responsibility of advocacy providers. That is welcome, but it inevitably raises the question of capacity. Can the Minister confirm whether additional funding will be made available to local authorities, or is it up to the NHS and IMHA providers to ensure the expansion is deliverable? Are the new roles of the IMHAs explicitly addressed in the new workforce plan that he is introducing? What assessment has been done of the number of new IMHAs that will be required to meet the duties, particularly now we are using an opt-out model? Without the workforce and training in place, there is a risk that the rights introduced in the legislation will not be fully realised in practice.

My second point is about capacity, consent and best-interest decisions. I would like to clarify a couple of points on schedule 3. It would appear, as drafted, that IMHA providers will be required to assess whether a patient has the capacity to decide whether to receive advocacy, and if not, whether it is in their best interests to do so. That gives providers a significant and quasi-clinical responsibility.

Proposed new section 130B(2C) states:

“Arrangements under section 130A must require a provider of advocacy services, on becoming aware of an English qualifying compulsory patient for whom they are responsible, to arrange for an independent mental health advocate to visit and interview the patient (if possible) with a view to determining”,

first,

“whether the patient has the capacity or is competent to take a decision about whether to receive help from an independent mental health advocate”;

secondly,

“if the patient does have that capacity or competence, whether the patient wishes to receive such help”;

and thirdly,

“if the patient does not have that capacity or competence, whether it is nonetheless in the patient’s best interests to receive such help (which, if so, is to be provided under the arrangements).”

On the first point about whether the patient has the capacity or is competent to take a decision about receiving help from an IMHA, my understanding is as follows. The role of independent mental health advocates is to support people detained under the Mental Health Act, to understand their rights and to be involved in decisions about their care and treatment. IMHAs do not, I believe, have the legal authority to assess mental capacity. The assessment of mental capacity is typically carried out by a qualified healthcare professional such as a doctor, psychiatrist or specially trained nurse, following guidance under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. IMHAs are there to help patients understand the information about their treatment and their rights, and can support them in expressing their views, but they do not perform capacity assessments. So is this a change in professional scope? Is it an oversight? Is it an update? Or is it simply what is happening in practice, which now has legal backing?

[Chris Bloore (Redditch) (Lab)]

The hon. Gentleman makes an interesting point, but is not the point of an IMHA to ensure that the patient understands their rights under the previous Act and the Bill? That is how they participate in taking decisions about what is available to the patient. Although they might not be clinically trained, they know the legislation inside out, and that gives power and advocacy to the patient.

[Dr Evans]

The hon. Gentleman identifies exactly what the point of an IMHA is. The way the Bill is written, the IMHA determines whether a patient has capacity or competence to make a decision. That determining means that they are making the choice, which is quasi-clinical. According to the definition that the hon. Gentleman has just given, that would fall out of the IMHA’s scope, because that would involve the ability to make decisions about capacity.

My concern is whether we have scope creep here. If so, we should be explicit about it—perhaps it is something we want to consider—but the way it is written, IMHAs will make capacity-based decisions about whether a person has the capacity to decide whether they need help. I would argue that that should be done by someone who is qualified as a doctor, a psychiatrist or community psychiatric nurse, as currently happens. That is the clarification that I am looking for from the Government. If I have the wrong end of the stick, I will happily back down, but this area of the Bill needs clarifying.

To that end, and if the Bill is written as I fear, I would welcome it if the Minister can tell us how IMHA providers will be supported to make best interest decisions appropriately, especially in cases involving fluctuating capacity or complex presentations. Will there be clinical oversight or statutory guidance to avoid inconsistency or overreach in these assessments? Although I support the principle of proactively offering advocacy, we must ensure that the decisions made on a person’s behalf are done with the appropriate checks and accountability, and by the right people.

My third point is about the exclusion of emergency section patients. The welcome change in the clause and the schedule expands the pool of support, but we should also pay attention to those who are, by definition, excluded. Paragraph 317 of the explanatory notes make it clear that individuals detained under sections 4, 5, 135 and 136 will not benefit from IMHA support. Those are often people detained in crisis situations, sometimes in police custody, or brought in under emergency powers.

For completeness, will the Minister clarify why that group is being left out, given their heightened vulnerability and the likelihood of distress or disorientation? Are the Government satisfied that patients under these emergency powers are receiving adequate information and support at the most critical moments of intervention? Is there a mechanism to support the nominated person if the patient does not have capacity, so that the nominated person receives the information they need to make a fully informed decision? If the answer is that the duration of detention is too short to justify IMHA involvement, I ask the Minister: how short is too short when a person’s liberty and medical autonomy are in question?

It may be that Government amendments 42 and 43 address some of those points, so I will return to this in a second before moving on to my fourth point. In terms of information sharing and patient autonomy, I welcome the retention of the duty to inform patients, especially informal patients, of their right to advocacy, and for that provision to be given both orally and in writing. However, I note that the responsible person must also—except where the patient requests otherwise—be provided with written information to the nominated person. What safeguards are in place to ensure that that does not inadvertently breach the patient’s privacy, such as in situations involving estranged family members, controlling relationships or very personal health issues, which could be disclosed but are not relevant to mental health? It is essential that the nominated person framework enhances advocacy and support and does not undermine the person’s right to control who knows about their care.

Finally, I would welcome clarity from the Minister about how the uptake and impact of expanding the IMHA system will be monitored. Will there be reporting requirements on providers? If so, will that be through the integrated care boards, or is that part of the CQC? Will patients have the opportunity to feed back on the effectiveness of the support they receive?

Before I turn to the amendments, I reiterate that the Opposition support the principle of strengthening advocacy in mental health services. Clause 41 is an important step towards a more rights-based and person-centred system, but the detail of the implementation is key.

I note that proposed Government amendments 42 and 43 to schedule 3 specifically change the definition of “English qualifying informal patient” and “Welsh qualifying informal patient” to exclude patients detained under any

“legislation or by virtue of a court order”,

rather than limiting exclusion to those detained solely under the Mental Health Act. That important clarification partly improves on one of the problems I mentioned when discussing clause 41.

In simple terms, those amendments try to address the issue of clarity and coverage for patients detained under other laws, and I believe that this is how they do that. Originally, the Bill excluded only patients detained under the Mental Health Act from being classified as informal patients eligible for IMHA services, but some patients might be detained under other laws or court orders, such as criminal justice laws, which the original wording did not cover. The amendments change the definition to exclude anyone detained under any legislation or by a court, not just the Mental Health Act. In practice, this means that patients detained under other laws will not mistakenly be considered informal patients eligible for IMHA services under this part of the Bill.

The proposals close a gap so that the right groups get advocacy services, and there is less confusion for hospitals and advocates about who qualifies. In essence, by broadening and bettering the definition and defining the exclusion, this will ensure that patients detained under other legislation, such as the Criminal Justice Act, or other court-mandated detention powers, are not mistakenly classified as informal patients eligible for IMHA services under those provisions. That reflects a more comprehensive and legally coherent approach to defining eligibility.

This clarity is welcome, as it reduces potential ambiguity in respect of providers. That said, will the Minister comment further on how these changes will interact with existing IMHA provisions or advocacy entitlements for those detained under other legislation? Are there parallel safeguards or advocacy rights for those groups? What guidance will be provided to practitioners and IMHA providers to navigate the complexities of overlapping detention regimes, especially when a patient’s status might shift rapidly between voluntary Mental Health Act detention and court orders? Will this amendment necessitate any further changes in regulations or operational policies to ensure smooth implementation and clarity for patients, families and service providers? Ensuring that no patient falls through the cracks due to definitional nuances is crucial for integrity in our mental health advocacy services.

Finally, Lib Dem amendment 19 would insert after “patient”, in schedule 3, page 91, line 13,

“or English qualifying informal patient under 18”.

As the hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford and Opposition Members rightly pointed out, it is quite hard to see why the Government would not want to put that in place. The explanatory statement says that it aims to extend

“the provision of opt-out advocacy services in England to informal inpatients under 18.”

It seems clear in what it does and is a well-defined amendment to that end. I am keen to understand why the Government do not want to support it. Do they believe that this is currently balanced elsewhere in the system? Are there already provisions elsewhere? If not, why—if it is good for adults and we are strengthening their opportunities—should it not be the same for our children?

I will finish on that point. I would be grateful for answers on the clause, the schedule, the Government amendments and the Lib Dem amendment.

[Stephen Kinnock]

The hon. Member for Chester South and Eddisbury asked who can make referrals in addition to hospital managers. The list of responsible persons is in proposed new section 130CC, in paragraph 6 of schedule 3. In addition to hospital managers, the responsible local social services authority is also required to notify providers of advocacy services about qualifying patients; whether it is a matter for the hospital or the local authority depends on the patient.

I was asked whether there are enough people to fulfil the tasks of the IMHA. The impact assessment gives our current best estimate of likely workforce and funding requirements and sets out the expected expansion required for each workforce group. We will recruit approximately 330 additional IMHAs.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

As has been discussed, as soon as the Bill gets Royal Assent we will launch an extensive consultation around the code of practice. The code of practice will cover everything from training to recruitment to capacity building, and the plan will be set out in the first annual written ministerial statement, which will take place one year after the Bill receives Royal Assent.

My hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford asked about children admitted informally. We are introducing a duty on hospital managers to inform informal patients of their right to a mental health advocate. We will set out the importance of independent mental health advocate representation for children and young people in the code of practice. That could include the importance of a proactive approach for hospital managers.

We will also describe in the code the new role for independent mental health advocates in relation to informal patients, including vulnerable in-patient groups, such as children and young people, people from ethnic minority backgrounds and people with a learning disability or autism.

The hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon asked whether we have the money for it. The funding requirements will, I think, be related to our best estimate of likely workforce and funding requirements. If we are going for 330 additional IMHAs, the funding requirements will be defined by that number.

The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, asked whether it will be local authority funding. We are obliged to fund new burdens on local authorities to resource this expansion of the independent mental health advocates. He then asked a blizzard of additional questions; I got lost in the thread of them all. We will go through Hansard and write to him.

[Dr Evans]

Will the Minister give way on that point?

[Stephen Kinnock]

No, I have finished.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 41 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 3

Independent mental health advocates

Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting)

Luke Evans Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 12th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Stephen Kinnock]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Furniss.

Government amendments 26 to 29 seek to remove previous amendments to the clause tabled by Lord Kamall, Earl Howe and Baroness May of Maidenhead, which added police and other authorised persons to sections 2, 3 and 5 of the Mental Health Act 1983, giving the police additional powers to detain people under the Act where they currently have no powers to intervene. We do not support extending police powers in that way, and we understand that the police do not support an extension either. It would not be appropriate to involve police officers in clinical decision making about whether a person meets the criteria for detention for assessment or treatment under the Act, or to involve them unnecessarily in the temporary detention of patients who are already in hospital to enable a Mental Health Act assessment to take place. We also seek to remove clause 50 from the Bill; we look forward to discussing that at the appropriate time on a future day in Committee.

I will now move on to clause 5 in its entirety. The grounds for detention provide decision makers with criteria that must be applied when deciding whether it is appropriate to detain, or to continue to detain, a person under the relevant sections of part II of the Mental Health Act, covering civil patients. The clause will replace the existing criteria, which the independent review of the Mental Health Act found were too vague, and will take forward changes recommended by the review. It will strengthen and clarify the criteria to require a risk of “serious harm” to justify detention. Consideration must also be given to the nature, degree and likelihood of the harm. For a patient to be detained for treatment under section 3, there must be a “reasonable prospect” of therapeutic benefit.

The code of practice already directs clinicians to consider the “nature”, “likelihood” and “severity” of harm. We believe it is right to formalise those considerations by putting them in primary legislation. We have not defined serious harm in the Bill. We will work with stakeholders to provide guidance on that in the code of practice. We are not seeking to raise the bar on detention, which could put patients and the public at risk. However, we think that when the serious decision is taken to deprive someone of their liberty, and potentially to treat them against their wishes, there needs to be consistent consideration of the potential risk of harm to a person or to others to justify that.

The revised risk criteria will not apply to part 3 patients. There are already tailored risk criteria for patients in the criminal justice system. Those are considered by the court and the Secretary of State for Justice, and allow for all relevant factors, including public protection, to be considered on a case-by-case basis. For those reasons, I commend Government amendments 26 to 29 and clause 5 to the Committee.

[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to be here on day two in Committee. I will first address clause 5 and then the Government amendments.

The clause marks significant reform to the legal foundations of mental health detention in this country. At its core, the clause seeks to update the grounds for detaining individuals under the Mental Health Act. It will amend several critical sections—sections 2, 3, 5, 20 and 145—to ensure that detention is used only when absolutely necessary and in line with the principle of least restriction, which was put forward in the Wessely review and is now in the Bill.

Let me outline what the changes will do in practical terms, as the Opposition see it. Under section 2 of the Mental Health Act, “Admission for assessment”, detention will now be justified only if “serious harm” may occur to the “health or safety” of patients or others. The decision must weigh the “nature, degree and likelihood” of that harm, a much more structured and risk-based framework than previously existed. Under section 3, “Admission for treatment”, we will see a clearer threshold. Detention will be permitted only if “serious harm” may occur without treatment, if the treatment is necessary, if the treatment cannot be provided unless the individual is detained and, crucially, if appropriate treatment is available.

Section 5(4), on emergency hospital detention, will be updated to align with the same “serious harm” test, recognising that even urgent situations demand clear legal justification. Section 20, which governs the renewal of detention process, will be brought in line with the same standards, such that they apply not just once but every time detention is extended. That is an important safeguard. A statutory definition of “authorised person”, those empowered to detain, will be introduced in section 145, ensuring that such persons are appropriately trained and regulated.

Those changes respond to real and long-standing concerns. The 2018 independent review of the Mental Health Act warned that our current criteria are too broad and that they allow for detention that is often unnecessary, sometimes prolonged and, in too many cases, distressing for patients and families. Clause 5 seeks to change that by grounding detentions in a clear, evidence-based assessment of risk and necessity.

The clause has significant advantages. It will introduce stronger safeguards against inappropriate detention and will shift the focus away from diagnosis alone and towards the actual risk of serious harm. It will offer greater clarity for professionals, giving them structured criteria for making decisions that are ethically and legally sound. It will enhance patients’ rights by aligning the law more closely with the principles of autonomy and proportionate care.

However, with every reform there are challenges, and we must not ignore them. The terms “serious harm” and “likelihood”, although essential, remain open to interpretation. We must ensure that the forthcoming code of practice offers clear, detailed guidance that minimises subjectivity and inconsistency in their application.

Furthermore, there is a question mark over public safety, which the Minister seemed to point to but which I want to explore a bit further. We have not tabled an amendment, but I am keen to understand how this works. Given that the definition is potentially ambiguous and in practice quite difficult to judge, has the Minister considered inserting the words “cumulative” or “escalating”? To be clear, this is a call not to water down those safeguards, but to shore them up with a safety net, so that this reform does not inadvertently trade off liberty against safety, especially in communities.

We need to ensure that we are not inadvertently introducing a real risk that someone, particularly someone on the margins of eligibility, may fall through the cracks. There are individuals whose behaviour is escalating and whose pattern of deterioration is known to services, but who do not yet meet the “serious harm” threshold at the time of assessment. I have seen this at first hand as a clinician—a picture that goes round and round. These are some of the most complex situations that one will ever have to deal with in one’s clinical career. The words “escalating” or “cumulative” may help to give further clarification to clinicians on the frontline.

For those on the margins, what consideration have the Government given to the notion of a duty for professionals to produce a risk management plan in any case in which detention is considered but not authorised, so that we do not simply assess and walk away, but assess and act in a community setting? That would not lower the threshold, but contextualise it. It would ensure that detention remains a measure of last resort, but not too late a resort.

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is making a powerful point about some of the challenges around the interpretation of the Bill. Does he agree that there needs to be a clear plan for the training of professionals so that there is consistency across the board?

[Dr Evans]

My hon. Friend is spot on about training. It is one thing to enshrine these measures in primary legislation; it is another thing to have the training and interpretation that go with them. One of the reasons that we have not tabled an amendment on the matter, as yet, is that there could be some concerns about what “cumulative” or “escalating” behaviour looks like. Ask any clinician and they will say that they have seen patients who are on the borderline and are struggling. It can be unclear whether they are within or outside the definition; they could be wavering between the two, given the state of their mental health. That is a real concern, but the broader pattern of identifying the picture of what is happening could be helpful and important.

One way to address the issue would be to review the data and legislation. Would the Government consider carrying out a review two years after the implementation of the Bill, specifically to look at the working of the legislation through the lens of public safety? I hope that there will be no concerns, but that would provide a backstop and a legal safety net. We do not want to wait another 40 years if there are changes that need to be made.

[Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)]

I entirely agree with my hon. Friend’s request to the Government for a review two years after implementation. Does he agree that it needs to be cross-governmental? The Home Office and other bodies such as the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and the NHS will need to be involved.

[Dr Evans]

My hon. Friend makes an incredibly important point. We heard on day one how these services interact, and that is completely correct. We need to look through the lens of public safety, because while we are quite rightly enshrining the autonomous nature of the patient as an individual, there is also the question of what we look at as a society. It includes the likes of local councils, mental health care and NHS care. Schooling could also be involved, as well as the judiciary and the Home Office. I think it is reasonable to ask the Government to look at that, in the light of recent high-profile cases, and say, “What are we doing? Does the legislation really do what we think it does?”

Clause 5 is a good step forward, but we must make sure that it is fit for purpose and that we have a review mechanism in place. I do not think that it necessarily needs to be in statute yet, but it will be interesting to hear the Minister’s response. Conducting a review on such a change, through the lens of patient safety, would be very useful.

There is also the matter of resources, which we keep coming back to. Change in detention criteria will rightly push us towards community-based alternatives—that is the whole point of what we are doing—but unless those alternatives are properly resourced with staffing, crisis services, housing and follow-up care, we will risk replacing one form of system failure with another. I appreciate that the Secretary of State is committed to reporting each year to the House, but will the Government publish a timetable and framework to support the implementation?

As we heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley, training is also critical. Professionals need the tools and time to learn the framework. They need support, implemented in real time, often under pressure and in complex, high- stakes circumstances.

Clause 5 is a welcome and thoughtful step in modernising mental health law. It will strengthens patients’ rights, sharpen clinical practice and bring us closer to a system that balances safety, liberty and humanity. However, we must be mindful about the risk of delayed intervention. In borderline cases in which the threshold is not clearly met but concerns remain high, we must ensure that there is still a route to timely, compassionate support. Otherwise, we may swing the pendulum too far in the opposite direction, from the overuse of detention to the underuse of care.

On Second Reading, I said:

“There is little greater moral burden than deciding for someone who cannot decide for themselves where care ends and control begins.”

Clause 5 typifies that burden: we are deciding who should be detained and why. I said:

“Make no mistake, this is what this House is grappling with”,

and indeed it is what our Committee is now looking at in detail. I also said:

“Involuntary care should never be the first instinct or answer, but a resort to prevent harm to both the individual and those around them.”

I said that compassionate care demands precision not only in its delivery, but in its design. I concluded:

“Without precision, we simply have sentiment.”

I promised then, as I promise now, that

“we will endeavour to ensure that the Government’s sentiment becomes a commitment.”—[Official Report, 19 May 2025; Vol. 767, c. 850-851.]

That neatly sets the scene for discussing Government amendments 26 to 29.

[Gregory Stafford]

Before my hon. Friend moves on to the amendments, I want to press him on the point about training, which my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley brought up. I support the change to the thresholds for detention but, given that it is potentially quite a significant change, what level of training will be required? Does my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth have any suggestion about how long it will take to train the relevant professionals so that there is consistency when the Bill becomes law? Does he feel that there should be a period of cooling off or training time before this part of the Bill is implemented, so that the training can catch up?

[Dr Evans]

My hon. Friend makes an important and poignant point. The Government have rightly stated that this change could take up to 10 years to implement, but we need to ensure that the most important safeguards are set out. Elsewhere, the Government have suggested that they will be in the code of practice. When we were discussing section 5 of the Mental Health Act and other issues, I said to the Minister that we need a constructive timetable, not only to know what the roll-out will look like but so that we can consult with the professions and ensure that they are able to deal with it.

Later, we will again discuss the interface between the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the changes that bring in new tests. That will be really important. We will also discuss the change of statutory safeguards for electroconvulsive therapy and changes to the statutory safeguards around who the second clinician will be—there is quite a feast of movements through this legislation. Make no mistake: that is what the country wants, but the Government must clearly set out some rationale for the timetable.

Unfortunately, the Opposition’s proposal for a costed plan was defeated. We wanted to set out some kind of concrete timetable over 18 months to ensure that we do not slip back, and to give the Government the flexibility to make the necessary cultural and legal changes. I hope that that addresses some of my hon. Friend’s concerns, but he was right to put that point to the Minister.

I oppose Government amendments 26 to 29, which would remove the reference to detention

“by a constable or other authorised person”,

and to delete the proposed definition of “authorised person”. I support the argument advanced powerfully in the other place by Baroness May, whose experience as a former Home Secretary gives her deep insight into the interaction between policing and mental health. Of course, it was under her premiership that the entirety of this discussion was progressed. I thank her for everything she has done, although I am not quite so thankful for the workload that it has created for me in my evenings and weekends. Her central message was clear: we must stop treating mental health as a policing issue and start delivering the right care from the right person in the right place. I wholeheartedly agree, as I am sure the Committee does.

I understand what the Government are trying to achieve. On the face of it, the amendments are technical. They seek to ensure that detention under the Bill is solely based on necessity where there is a risk of serious harm or the need for urgent treatment, and that it is not tied to who is doing the detaining. On paper that sounds reasonable, but in practice those changes will remove vital clarity and will risk baking in a system that has already failed too many people in mental health crisis.

Let us look at the problem with removing “authorised person”. The Bill, as amended in the Lords, wisely recognises the need to broaden the group of people who can respond to mental health incidents so that they include not just police officers, but trained and equipped professionals, mental health nurses, paramedics and approved mental practitioners—people who are qualified to care, not just to detain. The definition of “authorised person” in clause 5(7) ensures that only those with training competence and safety considerations are empowered to act, so it provides a framework for accountability, not a free-for-all. By removing the framework, the Government amendment would create a legal vacuum: it tells us that someone must be detained, but not by whom. In doing so, it would leave NHS trusts, police forces and local authorities with a lack of legal guidance and with a risk-averse default to the police.

I think we agree that the police should not be the first responders. As Baroness May has reminded us, and as many officers have told me, the police are routinely called out to mental health incidents, not because they are best placed to respond but because there is no one else available or authorised. That is neither fair to the police nor fair to the individuals in crisis. A police uniform can escalate distress. A custody cell is not a place of recovery. An officer guarding a patient in accident and emergency for 29 hours, as the Metropolitan police have reported, helps no one—not the patient, not the police and not the public. The 2019 College of Policing snapshot found that 95% of mental health-related calls did not require a police response. That is staggering. It underlines why we must build up the capacity and legal authority of clinical professionals, not erase them from the statute.

I turn to the Government’s argument and why it falls short. The Government’s case is that removing the phrase

“by a constable or other authorised person”

will de-emphasise the police and make the law more flexible. Ironically, however, removing the clarity about who may act risks re-entrenching police dominance in these scenarios, simply because no one else will feel legally empowered to intervene. The Government argue that the definition is unnecessary or potentially restrictive, but I say the opposite: a well-drafted enabling definition gives confidence, clarity and a lawful mandate for healthcare-led responses. This is not about excluding the police altogether. There will always be situations in which an immediate threat to life or serious violence requires a police presence, but that should be the exception, not the structure around which our mental health law is designed.

[Gregory Stafford]

I think, from what my hon. Friend has said and what the Minister said at the outset, that Members on both sides of the Committee want the same thing, which as far as possible is to keep the police out of the making of these decisions, unless of course—I made this point on Second Reading and was intervened on by the hon. Member for Ashford—someone with a mental health issue has a firearm or something like that. The clear point of dispute is about whether the phrase that was placed in the Bill in the other place achieves that. Would my hon. Friend not agree that someone who has served as Home Secretary and Prime Minister and the noble Lords, who have vast experience in healthcare over many years, have probably got the definition right, which is why the Government should support the wording currently in clause 5?

[Dr Evans]

My hon. Friend is right: we agree that this is not a place for the police unless there is an absolute sign of criminal intent. The problem is that what happens is a member of the public sees something, reports it to the police and, naturally, it is the police, the fire service or the paramedics who come forward. If a person is unsure about someone behaving in an irrational manner, which by definition someone with a mental health issue could well be doing, the likelihood is that they will call the police and the police will be the first responders. We know that they tend to be the fastest to respond.

Slightly widening and refining the definition of who can respond would allow us to build a framework and culture that might encourage a first responder—we often say that the AA is the fourth emergency service; it may well be that mental health services would be the fifth emergency service and could respond. That is what we need for service provision. The idea behind this is to try to crowbar the police out of that position, unless absolutely necessary, as my hon. Friend rightly says. Allowing a new framework would be good for safety and good for the police, because they would be freed up to do other stuff. More importantly, it would get the care as quickly as possible to the people who need it the most.

[Anna Dixon (Shipley) (Lab)]

I think there is some agreement between us, in the sense that obviously a police officer is not necessarily best placed to deal with those who are in mental distress. Having spoken to my local police team, I know that they would much rather there were frontline mental health professionals with the capability to take a person to a place of safety that is not a police station. We will come on to that in relation to later clauses, but does the hon. Gentleman agree that we already have some highly skilled professionals who are closely involved in these decisions in the form of approved mental health professionals? The vast majority of them—95%—are social workers. They play a very strong and excellent role, particularly to counterbalance the narrower clinical health perspective that there may sometimes be. Does he agree that, in a way, we already have in place some highly skilled individuals who are closely involved in making sure that these decisions are made in the best interests of the patient and the public, but also with clinical input?

[Dr Evans]

The hon. Lady makes an incredibly important point about the range of people who can and do respond in such cases. The Opposition are not saying that is a problem; we want to support them by giving them the legal backing and framework to step up to be the first port of call. Unfortunately, by default it is always the police, because they are the only ones whose ability to deal with such situations is covered. The amendment aims to create a culture so that the people she mentions have the confidence to deal with them, and the accountability so that we can say, “The police should not be there first; it should be the first responders that we have.” We are starting to see cross-fertilisation; we are simply providing a legal framework that says that this should be the way forward by default and design, not an exception where people are working around the system.

I think we are on the same page here. It is about the nuances of how we do this, and whether it requires primary legislation. The House of Lords voted that it requires primary legislation, and the Opposition share that belief. That is why I am asking Government Members to reconsider when the amendment comes to a vote whether the balance is right because we would give people the security, legal certainty and ability to do exactly what they want to do, which is to care for patients, not worry about whether there will be some criminal side to the situation, and what the police interaction could be.

[Anna Dixon]

Obviously, the Lords amendment puts the role of the police into law. I think we agree that we do not want to have the police’s role enshrined in legislation. Over the implementation period for this important Bill, the idea is that community health services will be in place, including urgent response for those who find themselves in crisis. We need to remove this provision to make sure that the default position remains for community support.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Evans]

The hon. Lady points to the fact that the police are named, as they should be. Imagine if we took out the police completely—whowould then have the power to restrain, restrict and detain people under the Mental Health Act? That is the whole point of having the provision. What we are trying to do is refine and constrict the definition to make it clear for everyone in this country exactly who is entitled to do what. Emergency incidents could happen outside this House—would the police and mental health responder be there? That will come down to the clinical judgment of the 999 responder, the call handler and the clinician there, so I do not want to make it too restrictive. At the same time, we have to consider the evidence that is right under our nose, which is that 95% of the time the police are being called out inappropriately for mental health conditions. I guess that is the rub of what we are trying to sort out.

Our responsibility in this House is not only to write good law, but to enable better systems of care. That means ensuring that the law empowers the right professionals to act at the right time, and centring the needs of the individuals in crisis, not just managing risk from the top down. I therefore ask the Minister to reconsider the amendments. Instead of deleting the definition of “authorised person”, let us work to try to strengthen and clarify it to support a wider, safer and compassionate response to mental health crises. Let us seize this opportunity to reset the balance between policing and care, which the police themselves are asking for and our continents desperately need.

Much was made of the amendment in the other place, and I am grateful to the Lords Minister, Baroness Merron, for writing to Baroness May with an explanation of her concerns about the changes. The letter is dated 3 June and a copy was kindly laid before this House and the Committee. It is worth working our way through some of the issues raised. I fully recognise the Government’s concerns within it, and I agree with the need for extreme care when legislating on the deprivation of liberty, but I express reservations about the Government’s decision to overturn the amendment.

According to the letter, the Government’s central concern seems to be the unintended extension of police powers. The Government argue in the letter:

“Your amendments to clause 5 would give the police additional powers under the Mental Health Act. We do not support extending police powers in this way, and we understand that the police do not support this extension either.”

That is also what the Minister has said in Committee. Respectfully, that is a mischaracterisation of the amendments. The original Lords amendments do not extend the powers of the police; they reflect current practice where the police are often involved in detaining individuals in mental health crises.

[Sojan Joseph (Ashford) (Lab)]

Does the hon. Member agree that, since detentions under sections 2, 3 and 5(4) of the Act often happen in clinical settings, are completed by consultants, psychiatrists and social workers, and do not involve police, we do not actually need police presence on these occasions?

[Dr Evans]

I bow to the hon. Member’s expertise on this; the problem is that all the evidence shows that the police are the first there. I would like to see much more of him and his colleagues being able to respond and carry this out. We are giving them the legal certainty to do so. That is the argument for making sure that we have codified safeguards around who is and is not able to make such decisions. At the moment, it is purely the police who are called out to these situations, but this gives us another legal weapon with which we could fight this inappropriate use.

The aim is to codify the safeguards around who can exercise detention, ensure accountability and, importantly, enable health-led alternatives to police detention. Are the Government confident that the decision does not leave a legal grey area around which profession or agency has the statutory power to detain, especially during urgent community or hospital-based crises?

On the authorised person category in the section 135 and 136 powers, the Government say in their letter:

“Extending these powers to ‘authorised persons’…could potentially lead to staff, patient and public safety issues.

That is precisely why the Lords amendment included a tightly defined category of authorised person, subject to the Secretary of State’s regulation, mandatory training and safety provision. The intent is to ensure that when a professional, such as a trained mental health nurse, is better placed to respond than the police, they can do so lawfully and appropriately.

The Government say:

“Section 135 and 136 powers have been designed for police officers who have specific training, equipment and access to rapid support”.

Many frontline NHS and social care professionals, including AMHPs, crisis team members and community psychiatric nurses, already respond to acutely distressed patients in highly volatile environments. They lack the police powers, but not the clinical expertise. The amendments would bring clarity and lawful backing to the situations they already manage. Take, for example, a mental health nurse in a community who arrives at a person’s home to conduct an urgent assessment. The individual is clearly experiencing psychosis, and is at immediate risk of self-harm. Under the current law, the nurse must call the police, delaying the care and potentially escalating the situation. Under the amendment, they could lawfully detain, provided they are authorised and trained.

There are also confusions over the emergency response roles. The Government letter states:

“There is a very real risk of confusion over who should respond in an emergency if multiple agencies have the same powers, which could lead to delays.”

That concern is valid, but confusion is far more likely under the current law, where roles are unclear and NHS professionals must sometimes act unlawfully or wait for overstretched police. A regulated and accountable authorised person category, established in law and detailed in the code of practice, would clarify responsibilities, not blur them. Have the Government done any modelling of the delays and safety risk caused by not empowering suitably trained healthcare professionals to act in urgent situations?

The letter also highlights concerns from stakeholders that this is

“a radical proposal with a number of serious and potentially dangerous consequences and should not be pushed through without proper consideration”.

These proposals were not developed in isolation; they were advanced in the House of Lords, where the former Mental Health Act reviewers, legal experts and mental health professionals carefully considered their scope. They are also consistent with the direction of the 2018 independent review, which emphasised reducing coercion, racial disparity and the overuse of police powers.

The “right care, right person” initiative already expects health professionals to step in, but—unless I stand corrected—the initiative is not underpinned by any legal reform. Without amending the Act, health staff are still expected to take on crisis care without the powers of protection that they need to safely or lawfully do so. How can we expect health-led responses to mental health crises without giving health professionals the power in law to act?

Turning to guidance and the code of practice, the Government say that they will issue further guidance on police handover protocols and the legal frameworks. While guidance is welcome, it is not a substitute for statutory reform. Guidance cannot grant powers to detain or protect professionals from liability. We can have legal clarity with this framework.

If the Government want to push ahead with removing the amendments, will the Minister consider committing to a formal consultation with NHS England, the AMHP leads, frontline staff and patients on creating a legally robust authorised persons role? Would he consider piloting models of community-based urgent response teams that include AMHPs and trained nurses with delegated powers? Would he legislate for police exit strategies in A&E and community crisis responses that are enforceable, not just guidance based? Given our discussion about new clause 24, there is clearly scope for a sensible piece of work in the grey area to improve the interface for patients, clinicians and police. I think that is one we can all agree on.

[Gregory Stafford]

I agree with my hon. Friend. I think we agree on both sides of the Committee that, where appropriate, police should not be the first responders to this issue, although, obviously, there will be situations where they should be. If the Government push ahead with removing the amendments, is there any indication in the Bill, or indeed elsewhere from the Government, of what they will do to achieve what Members on both sides of the Committee seem to want, which is to avoid, as far as possible, having the police as the detainers and responders? If there is nothing else, I cannot see why the Government would want to remove the amendments made by the noble Lords in the other place.

[Dr Evans]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Under the last Government, the “right care, right person” initiative was launched with the Humberside police force to try to ensure appropriate care, but that is an example in isolation.

One solution would be to include guidance in the codes of practice, but it would not have the statutory footing to allow that legal certainty, which is the concern. Another would be to include something in the annual statement that we will receive from the Government. We should work collaboratively to try to find a decent piece of work to look for the evidence base and build a delivery plan to help the police extract themselves from situations, when appropriate, and care givers to insert themselves. It is admirable to share a problem that is difficult not just in England but in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

I agree that the Government are right to proceed with caution, but caution is not the same as inaction, especially when lives are at stake and the law no longer reflects the reality of mental health care. The amendments are not about expanding police powers; they are about reducing the need for police involvement by giving others the lawful authority to act. Although maths may not be my strong point, I am not blind to the make-up of this Committee; I realise that the change will inevitably happen. I want to press the Minister on how he proposes to reduce the burden on the police to safeguard them from thousands of hours spent dealing with mental health crisis issues. In extreme cases, they are not appropriate responders.

This is the key issue to improve so many aspects of our society. We could improve the working life of the police, allowing them to do what they are paid to do, trained to do and passionate about: policing and protecting their communities. We could improve life for the public, because it would free up the police to tackle crime and keep them safe. Most importantly, we could provide the correct care to those patients at their biggest time of need. I hope the Minister will set out how the Government plan to achieve that.

[Sojan Joseph]

I rise to support the Government amendments, which will simply remove the words

“by a constable or other organised person”.

On Second Reading, I highlighted my concern about the amendments made to the Bill in the other place that sought to extend police powers of detention under sections 135 and 136 of the Mental Health Act to other organised persons, including medical practitioners, approved mental health professionals, mental health nurses or doctors and further healthcare and social care professionals.

I know that the noble Lords who introduced the amendments intended to remove the need for the police to be present at mental health incidents in the absence of any risk. However, they would grant the police greater powers; as an unintended consequence, they would also apply to detentions under sections 2, 3 and 5 of the Mental Health Act, where the police currently do not have power to intervene.

A section 2 application is completed by two doctors and a social worker, and the patient may already be in a clinical setting. Section 3 relates to somebody who is already receiving treatment or already has a known diagnosis in a clinical setting. Doctors’ powers extend to that section; the police currently do not have any role in completing a section 3 application. Section 5(4) provides nurses with a holding power for a patient who is already in the clinical setting, where the nurse believes that the patient is at immediate risk; again, the police have no role.

If we did not make the Government amendments, we would give more power to the police to get involved under those sections of the Mental Health Act and put more pressure on police services.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

I will touch on the questions that have been asked on cumulative and escalating behaviour, on having a review of public safety and on the training plan. The details will be provided for in a mixture of the code of practice and the annual written ministerial statement.

The code of practice will be based on consulting both those who use the new criteria, such as clinicians, approved mental health professionals and members of the tribunal and, then, of course, on the other side, those with lived experience, service users, families and carers. It will be shaped and drafted on that basis. It will then go out to public consultation and will be laid before Parliament so that Parliament will have an opportunity to debate it. It will be a comprehensive and detailed development of the code of practice, and will address the issues around cumulative and escalating behaviour, the public safety issues and training.

On cumulative and escalating, it is worth noting that under the reforms in both the Bill and the current Act, clinicians have the power to detain on the basis of a risk of harm that may occur, not that already has or is happening at the time. That power already exists.

[Dr Evans]

Maybe it is my clunky naivety as someone stepping into the legal statutory framework, but I was hoping the Minister would guarantee he could take that away to look at with the team. I know from my clinical experience and from speaking to colleagues that it is one of the hardest things to measure and look for. Later, we will discuss areas where there are good case examples of people who have shown the problem of escalating behaviour that is missed by the authorities. This might be a clumsy and clunky way of trying to highlight that point, which is why we have not yet come up with amendments, but I would appreciate the commitment to look further at that when the Government takes the point away. It is really important to make sure we can give clinicians more certainty around what this looks like.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I thank the hon. Member for the intervention, but I simply repeat that under both the Act and this Bill, which will reform that Act, clinicians have the power to detain on the basis of a risk of harm that may occur, not one that has already or is happening at the same time, so, in my opinion, this power already exists. What is the point of over-embroidering and adding more questions and considerations when those questions and considerations are already answered? Let us just try and streamline things, please, and make things simple rather than complicated.

We had a lengthy debate on the amendment. Let us just boil this point down to its essence: the majority of mental health incidents are managed without police involvement. Approved mental health professionals have powers under section 115, section 6 and section 137 to enter a person’s home and to assess and convey said person to a hospital. That is the first point: all the concerns that have been raised by the Opposition are very clearly addressed by the powers that already exist for AMHPs.

We support “right care, right person”. Policing is of course operationally independent, and those “right care, right person” arrangements are planned and developed through detailed multi-agency partnerships on the ground. We need to be pragmatic and recognise that “right care, right person” is the right way forward. The Government are committed to it, so let us let the practitioners, the experts and the police on the ground work in a practical and pragmatic way to address these incidents as they occur. In many cases, it is simply impossible to legislate for these incidents. By definition, every person experiencing trauma experiences it for different reasons, and it manifests itself in different ways, so top-down micromanagement of that would be deeply counterproductive and unhelpful.

Officials in the Department of Health and Social Care and in the Home Office have engaged with senior representatives of the police on these amendments in great detail. I can give the Committee an 100% assurance that the police do not support an extension of their powers to sections 2, 3 and 5. I am therefore baffled by the fact that Opposition Members appear to be claiming that they know better than the police whether their powers should be extended.

Let us stop trying to pretend that we have the police’s expertise. Let us please take a pragmatic approach to this. The police do not want an extension of these powers, and the Home Office is clear that that is the case. There seems to be a fundamental misunderstanding at the heart of the lengthy debate that we have just had. On that basis, I thank hon. Members for their interventions and I commend the amendments to the Committee.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Zöe Franklin]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Furniss. Our amendment would ensure that people who are subject to community treatment orders receive information about their right to advocacy. People under CTOs should not miss out on advocacy because they were not aware. CTOs can have a significant impact on how people are able to live their lives, and ensuring that those who are subject to them are effectively represented is crucial. I am delighted that advocacy is a crucial part of the Bill, but this seems something of an oversight.

Not being aware of mental health advocacy could lead to a damaging lack of autonomy and voice for an individual. This simple change would ensure that people receive the support to which they are entitled. People in this situation are in acute mental distress, so the idea that they must actively seek out information on advocacy seems an unfair burden that will make the welcome provisions around mental health advocates far less effective.

We also need to be aware that CTOs have consistently been shown to be a point of disparity in care for black and minority ethnic groups. Clearly pointing towards an advocate may help to alleviate that and ensure that the patient is adequately supported on leaving the hospital.

Is the Minister satisfied that people subject to CTOs will have adequate access to advocacy under the Bill? Is he satisfied that information on rights to mental health advocates will be clear enough? My Liberal Democrat colleagues and I are concerned that the answer to those questions is no, which is why we tabled the amendment.

[Dr Evans]

I rise to speak to clause 6 and Government amendment 30. Clause 6 will make important amendments to conditions for community treatment orders under the Mental Health Act. CTOs are a tool that allows certain detained patients to receive ongoing treatment in the community rather than in hospital, providing continuity of care and supporting recovery outside institutional settings. Since their introduction in 2007, they have offered a mechanism to maintain contact with mental health services and prevent relapse while balancing the patient’s right to live more freely.

However, CTOs have not been without controversy. There is concern about their overuse and their disproportionate effect on black and ethnic minority patients. There are also a number of questions about the evidence for their effectiveness in reducing relapse or readmission. Moreover, concerns about coercion and the infringement of patient autonomy have been raised repeatedly. The 2018 independent review recommended tightening their use. Some also argue for going further by abolishing them completely.

Clause 6 seeks to address many of those concerns. It will introduce stronger safeguards, clear risk-based criteria and a maximum 12-month duration to prevent indefinite or inappropriate use. It will mandate patient involvement through consultation and regular review, promoting shared decision making. Accountability is enhanced by aligning CTOs with a code of practice and introducing external oversight. Crucially, CTOs will now be used only when there is a clear and necessary risk, focusing on clinical need and safety.

Challenges remain. The new requirements bring complex administration and an increasing workload for clinicians. Despite reforms, CTOs remain a form of compulsory treatment, raising concerns about ongoing coercion. Their success depends heavily on the availability of community services, which are not always adequately resourced. Finally, terms such as “serious harm” may be open to interpretation, risking inconsistency. To unpack all that, we must take a closer look.

Clause 6 rightly seeks to update and clarify the legal framework governing CTOs to ensure that their use is proportionate, justified and consistent with evolving standards of care and risk management. It does so primarily by aligning the grounds for making and renewing a CTO with the new, more precise risk criteria for detention. It specifies that a CTO should be made only if there is real risk that

“serious harm may be caused to the health or safety”

of a patient or others without treatment, and if that treatment is necessary given

“the nature, degree and likelihood of the harm”.

Again, there is an argument about the definition of “serious harm”, and the same discussion as the one we had under clause 5 about escalation of behaviour or cumulative concerns applies here.

In the light of that discussion, it might be helpful if the Minister clarified the interface between CTOs and grounds for detention. Is there scope for the code of conduct to cover the management of risk, both to the public and to patients themselves, across both? Given the emphasis placed on real risk of serious harm, clause 6 aligns CTOs more clearly with the threshold for detention, with the aim of reducing the inappropriate use or overuse of CTOs, which is much more welcome. It will help to safeguard and protect patients from unnecessary restrictions on their liberty, while maintaining the ability of a responsible clinician to act decisively when there is genuine risk.

[Sojan Joseph]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that CTOs help to keep people out of hospital so that rather than having long-term admissions, they can live in the community and in their own house, and that clinicians can recall patients to hospital if they are not complying with the agreed treatment?

[Dr Evans]

Spot on. The hon. Gentleman will have used them far more than I ever have, and that was exactly the point of them when they were brought in in 2008. The reason they have been so contentious is their misuse, misapplication and ongoing use. That is what we are trying to highlight. With clause 6 the Government are trying to streamline their use.

That leads me neatly on to why the Lords introduced clause 6(3), which Government amendment 30 would remove. It is about how to ensure that there is adequate oversight so that people do not remain on CTOs in perpetuity or, more likely, have them applied inappropriately. Concerns have been raised about racial disparities in the use of CTOs—particularly for black men, but there is also work to be done on those from other communities who find themselves on CTOs. The hon. Gentleman is right: that is the ethos behind ensuring that we push people to community care. The problem is how to set that against the legislation on CTOs and how to provide the resources to enable an appropriate setting for that care.

[Sojan Joseph]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that this is more an issue of practice than of the law itself?

[Dr Evans]

Yes. As the Minister pointed out on the Committee’s first day, legislation sets the culture. One the main reasons for the Wessely report was the racial disparities that had been found. We still have to look into the cause and effect of that, but one of the big markers was that CTOs were increasing indefinitely and seemed to hit certain communities disproportionately, without there being a full understanding of why. That was why in the House of Lords some argued that we should get rid of CTOs completely. The Opposition do not agree with that; we agree that clause 6 is important and that CTOs serve a purpose, for the reason that the hon. Gentleman explains so eloquently. The emphasis is on getting people into community treatment where we think it will be better for them, but ensuring that CTOs are not an undue burden on clinicians or patients and are not used inappropriately.

Clause 6(3), introduced in the Lords, sets out a maximum duration of 12 months for CTOs, after which an extension would require thorough review. That process would demand consultation with the patient, their nominated persons and relevant mental health professionals, and the written agreement of a qualified psychiatrist. That multi-layered review process is vital to ensure that any extension is based on clear therapeutic benefit and necessity rather than routine or bureaucratic inertia. Moreover, the requirement of regular reviews every six months to extend CTOs would further strengthen oversight and accountability. The involvement of tribunals, which may recommend variations or terminations, would add yet another layer of protection for patients’ rights, as the Government and Opposition both acknowledge.

While the reforms are, on the whole, positive, we must remain vigilant. The consideration of risks must be applied carefully and consistently to avoid unintended consequences such as deterring clinicians from using CTOs when they are genuinely needed.

Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Taiwo Owatemi.)