Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Pitt-Watson Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 8th June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, my professional background before I joined the House was as a finance practitioner. I still work pro bono with consumer organisations, including some who have a view on the Bill. Most relevant to what I will say is that I am a fellow at Cambridge, where I teach a course focused on how we create a purposeful finance industry that, like all good market institutions, prospers when it serves the outside world.

To help build such a purposeful industry should be the goal of this legislation. It is a profoundly important goal, partly because, as the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, said, this is the jewel in the UK’s economic crown. But it is more than that: we need a successful finance industry if we are going to solve the critical problems of the country and the world: growth, prosperity, looking after people in old age and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, was saying, addressing the growing climate challenge.

There is no successful finance industry without effective regulation. However, as the House of Lords Financial Services Regulation Committee noted, we do not have a blueprint for what the best regulation looks like, and we have made big mistakes in the past. The global financial crisis took place despite the then existing regulation; some might even argue that, in some ways, it happened because of the nature of that regulation.

I wonder whether the whole House might agree on a starting point: that we are trying to get a finance industry that will fulfil its purpose well in serving the outside world. That means keeping our money safe, helping us transact, allowing us to share risk, and, critically, allowing us to take our money from point A, where it is, to point B, where it is needed and can create growth and prosperity. But for that to happen, we need an industry that is trustworthy and trusted to carry out these purposes. Otherwise, people will not save or borrow.

That all seems pretty straightforward, but there is a problem which we should recognise. People do not express trust in the finance industry. According to FCA surveys, in 2024 only 36% of people felt that

“most financial firms are honest and transparent in the way they treat them”;

27% felt the opposite. Some years ago, the Bank of England asked British people to find one word to describe the finance industry. Do noble Lords know which word they chose? It was “corrupt”. The finance industry accounts for about 9% of GDP—the figure from the Minister was 8%, and 12% from the opposition Benches—and it is responsible for 42% of corporate fines that have been issued. The Local Government Ombudsman gets 22,000 complaints a year; the Financial Ombudsman gets 216,000. I could go on and on. This issue needs to be resolved.

Malfeasance is not the most concerning issue; it is productivity. On the best academic evidence we have, there is little evidence that the cost of getting money from point A to point B has fallen by very much, even over 100 years. No other major industry has such a poor productivity record over such a period. At the same time, 1.3 million British people do not have a bank account. According to the FT a couple of weeks ago, British bank lending to SMEs is the lowest percentage of GDP it has been this century. There are big gaps in our finance system.

These problems occur despite, or maybe even because of, the great amount of regulation we have. Robin Ellison was a pensions partner in one of the big law firms and has now retired. He reckoned that, in 1990, we had 3,000 pages of pensions regulation; a couple of years back, it had risen to 165,000.

We must be sure that we are not encouraging a world where finance practitioners spend their time thinking about how to get around the regulation. It is euphemistically called regulatory arbitrage, and it creates a game of whack-a-mole: there is a rule, and someone finds their way around it; we whack that, and they find their way around it again—and we end up with a burdensome and expanding rule book. As the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, said, we need a new settlement.

But in that settlement, regulation is just one piece of the ecosystem. There are also institutions, markets, incentives, ethics, professionalism and technologies, all of which are changing rapidly day to day. Getting the regulation right means that it needs to fit into this much larger system. I would have that as a background—a background on which I hope we might agree—and I think that has implications.

I applaud many parts of the Bill—for example, the encouragement of credit unions and thinking about how we can get credit to the people who need it fairly—but one concern, which it might be helpful to clarify, is that as we change the rules by which the Financial Ombudsman Service adjudicates, we need, as the noble Lord, Lord Burns said, to keep them principles based. Why is that? Because these are dynamic markets and we are trying to minimise regulatory arbitrage. Maybe it could be made clear from the outset that, when reference is made to the Financial Ombudsman Service adjudicating only on breaches of the FCA rules, those rules include the principles of business and the code of conduct.

There are many other comments that one might make, but I think they are best addressed in Committee. For now, my key point is that in any effective market economy, success should be contingent on serving customers well. There is a deficit of trust in the financial services industry. Regulation should align consumer, producer and society. My broader point for this House is that, in debating the Bill, it might be helpful to express a consensus, shared with industry and with consumer groups, that we want a finance industry that is there effectively to fulfil its proper purposes to the world. I look forward to our coming discussions.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Pitt-Watson Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 29th June 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

If I might talk on this point, I have huge sympathy with the overall direction of where people want to go on this. Climate risk is clearly relevant for any financial manager managing the assets—the cash—of any ordinary citizen, be they a vicar of the Church of England or simply a worker setting money aside, and that needs to be taken into account.

Even if you do not buy that argument, there are financial risks that go with climate that need to be recognised—for example, assets that will become stranded if we responded to the climate crisis, which should not be recognised as being valuable today. By the way, if I were to find an institution that is a mile ahead of the regulation in trying to make this take place, the Church of England pension fund is exemplary of what it is that we want to do.

As I look at this, I find it rather ironic that we are focusing on the FCA. In the past five years, if there is a financial regulator that has taken steps forward on this, it is the FCA rather than the others. I think—I have tried to check on the internet—the UK now has the highest number of transition plans by companies, and the highest standard of transition plans by companies, of any country in the world. I want to celebrate the companies doing that and the senior appointments that the FCA put in place to make these sorts of things happen.

It might be a good idea for us to scratch our heads about those regulators that, even where there are clear rules on reporting on financially material matters, are finding it difficult to see them enforced. We might want to raise those sorts of issues as well as additional reporting. If it is additional reporting, as the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, said, let us be sure that we know that the extra reporting is bringing about some good.

In Amendment 80, and perhaps in some other amendments, there is a question about parliamentary oversight. Does the Minister consider that parliamentary oversight might be kept under review so that we know that we have a financial services industry that is properly responding to the risk of climate change, and might perhaps do some other things as well?

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I shall be exceedingly brief because the position of my party has been so well-voiced by my noble friends Lady Northover and Lady Sheehan, and there is a great deal more to say in the clause stand part debate in today’s fourth group. My party has made it very clear that it has a deep commitment to the climate, nature and sustainability agenda. I am conscious that it has become quite fashionable in financial circles to say that this agenda should not be the concern of the Bank of England or of any of the regulators. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Pitt-Watson, can indicate to me where in the five-year strategy of the FCA he can find any reference to it, because I cannot.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

For five years, there has been a director of ESG at the Financial Conduct Authority who has specifically taken responsibility for ensuring that, where relevant, it is embedded in what the FCA is doing. Most of the feedback I get from the FCA and financial practitioners suggests that he is called Sacha Sadan, and that he had a senior role in financial services beforehand and has had considerable success in being able to do that. Is it perfect? No, I am sure it is absolutely not perfect. We have a long way to go, but I want to do something that says, “Let us celebrate some success when we have it”.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I always join in celebrating success but, from our perspective, this is a pivot moment away from what has been the practice and emphasis over the past several years. Indeed, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, said, there was consensus across the parties, with perhaps different strategies, but this appears to be a time when much of this has changed, or is about to change or is changing. I have to say that it makes absolutely no sense. Climate risk is so obviously a financial and economic stability risk, as indeed is the loss of nature and the issue of sustainable growth; surely “sustainable” belongs in growth programmes that we put in front of us.

I am also very conscious that the City and others, which have tended to have very short-term perspectives—typically the next quarter’s results—have voiced opposition to the inclusion of climate and nature in the financial regulators’ remit and that it should have the significance it has had to date, and I am very afraid that the Government are now responding to that particular set of views. Moving these regulatory principles from the Bill—from primary legislation—into a “have regard” for the five-year strategy strikes me as an acquiescence with those voices we are hearing from the City. To me, there is some confirmation in not finding a firm strand in the FCA’s own five-year strategy; that is its forward look, not its historic look backwards.

In a few minutes the Conservative Party will speak, and it will make its own position clear, but I understand that Kemi Badenoch has now said that her party, if in government, would scrap the Climate Change Act. That is a very significant change. I know it is motivated by fear of Reform, but it really has an impact on the overall discourse and the cross-party commitment we have had up to this point.

I agree with the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester—I think it was him, although I may have attributed this to the wrong person—that this is a very strange week in which to downgrade the significance of climate change. I happened to be in conversation with my daughter in the midst of last week’s heat. When I described what we were doing, she said, “I guess the universe has heard the intention and it’s decided to bite back”. I think it must have been the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, who made the remark; I am so sorry not to have recognised that.

I think that both Labour and the Conservatives hope that by Third Reading, we will have forgotten the extreme heat and they can reassert a much more convenient and easy agenda of pretending that climate change is no longer an issue of urgency. It has now dropped down the scale and there are other issues of much greater urgency on which we must focus, and this one can be largely set aside. But I and my party continue to look at it as a series of risks that will cause extraordinary pain to ordinary people in Britain, both relentlessly and increasingly—and not just to people in the UK but to far more vulnerable countries across the globe.

The Bank of England and the financial sector have crucial and powerful tools in their hands. Those tools are vital if we are to redesign our world to limit nature loss and climate change, and to ensure that we grow sustainably in the future. As the Bill is now structured, it takes away from those tools and will encourage their being regarded as secondary or tertiary instruments, to be used only when it does not irritate certain voices in the City of London. That is not appropriate for the legislation we pass today.

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[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly in general across this set of amendments and specifically to Amendment 141 in my name, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann.

In the general remarks, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, that I am excited and thrilled by his amendments in this group and I support every one of them—I would even open champagne; I am that pleased. I say to my noble friend Lady Tyler that I totally support the amendments that she has introduced here. I share with both of them the perception that financial inclusion is absolutely at the core of the requirement that we must place on our financial services sector and on the regulators that deal with it.

To pick up on a point that my noble friend Lady Tyler made, the consumer duty does not deal with financial inclusion, and that is exactly right. The consumer duty is very much a protection against mis-selling. It is not a duty of care, which could indeed have required that gaps left in the market are filled and the regulator take steps to fill them; the regulator was absolutely determined not to have that responsibility when this House attempted to make it address the issue, and the Government of the day were also very determined that the regulator should not play that role. We cannot look to the regulator to be a key player in financial inclusion.

In the five-year strategy of the FCA—I really have read that document—there is reference to financial inclusion; in fact, it is in big, black, bold letters. The problem is that what it anticipates as the role that it will play is to try to address how low financial capability holds people back from accessing financial services and how it could support them in managing their financial life. That is important and it matters, but the reality is that for many people who are excluded, the way to give them support is not to try to get them digital—it would be brilliant if you could but that is not the reality—but to deal with those people as they are in the world that they live in. There is absolutely no reference in this five-year strategy that you could in any way interpret as related to what has become the Richard Lloyd review—to things such as banking hubs. It is focused solely on the individual, whereas issues that we have addressed in previous groups have also been about the financial exclusion of small businesses from financial services. There is no reference to any of that.

I have had so many conversations with the FCA over the years, and it has said things like, “Yes, if we had a set of community banks, that would be absolutely brilliant; CDFIs are absolutely wonderful—not our job. If they appear, we will make sure that we regulate them appropriately, but it is not our job to fill that gap and we resolutely hold to that position”. That clarity needs to be here in this debate. I will not repeat what has been said because it was so well said by the three previous speakers, but I very much hope that the Minister will pay serious attention to this issue. From things that he has said in the past, I hope that he takes it to heart. It very much belongs in a very central way in primary legislation.

The issue I am raising is perhaps not an obvious one to raise in the context of this Bill, but it is in scope. It is dear to my heart, but I think it is widely supported. I am using this opportunity to deal with an issue that, frankly, the Government should have dealt with without any problem. It is child trust funds and the ability of young adults with learning difficulties to access those funds that sit in in their name. My party leader, Ed Davey, who, as I think all in this Committee know, has a son with very severe learning difficulties, has written of his eight-month battle to access the child trust fund put in place and invested in for the benefit of his severely disabled son, who is now 18. The fund should be easily accessible when a child turns 18, but, as the Davey family found out the hard way, this is not true for children with learning or other disabilities who lack the capacity to fill in the forms themselves.

The process of applying to the Court of Protection for a deputyship order is Kafkaesque, consumes endless time and places such a burden and cost that many parents give up altogether. The many steps, and my goodness there are many, include obtaining written permission from three different relatives to demonstrate that you are unlikely to abuse the funds that you will access, and obtaining various doctors’ assessments—well, perhaps that is fair—but then the courts kick in. The Court of Protection charges £412 for a deputyship order. It requires you to obtain insurance against misuse, and the Davey family found that that cost £48. Then comes the Office of the Public Guardian, which charges £100 for its assessment, and it then levies an annual supervision charge of £320. If you add this up, it basically becomes £1,000 to be able to access a child trust fund for your severely disabled child.

What is really extraordinary is that most child trust funds do not have a lot of money in them. I think the average amount is £2,000. You would have to spend 50% of it to be able to access that fund for your child. The people accessing it are parents whom the DWP already relies on to deal with a variety of much more significant pots of money to support that child. I use the Davey family not to ask for any kind of sympathy, but here is an MP whose wife is a lawyer, and they cannot work their way through this maze. How are people without those kinds of expertise going to work their way through this system?

Unfortunately, there is a new legal offering from specialists who will, for a significant sum, offer to negotiate the way through for you. That is a practice that none of us wants to encourage. There are a few child trust fund managers who handle the process a bit better and have been helping some of the people whose funds they manage to minimise the process, but it is a lottery in terms of finding that you have taken out your child trust fund with an entity that takes that approach. Charities estimate that 80,000 to 123,000 young adults are essentially locked out of their child trust funds.

I tried to look for what response the Government have been making to the overtures of the charities and other civic society groups that have been out there trying to speak for these youngsters. Two things came to my attention. The only response I could find from the Department of Justice was that it has now digitised the application form and provided a guide.

My amendment would force the FCA to simplify the whole process for CTFs paying out under £5,000 in any one year. It is formulated around an amendment put before the House in 2021—I am pretty sure that is the correct year—by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, who is really skilled in developing, designing and presenting the appropriate amendments. In speaking to that amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, who was the Minister when child trust funds were put in place, made it very clear that no one had thought of this particular set of problems and that that was why the system was designed in a way that set up this obstacle course. It was not intentional or planned; it was simply a failure to recognise what could happen and has in fact happened.

I say this to the Minister: all the arguments we hear in support of the Bill are about deregulation; here is a piece of deregulation that I think no one could argue with, and which I would definitely and clearly support, as would my party and, I suspect, many others. If the Minister cannot control this himself, could he please go away and berate his colleagues? These youngsters need to be able to access their funds. We are talking about small pots. Simply digitising the 106 sections of the application form is not the answer.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, if I might add to this debate, I begin by noting the huge cross-party agreement we have on lots of the issues the Bill raises, most particularly on this issue of ensuring access to financial services for everyone. That is what is behind so many of the amendments here. It is also the issue that was raised in the debate about affordable credit by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester, and at Second Reading by the noble Baroness, Lady Hyde, and the noble Lord, Lord Kamall. We all, from all parties, want to know that such services are available to everyone. The question is simply how we can make sure that that takes place and that the industry that has to be there to deliver it buys in to making sure that those services take place. We need to be sure that our actions as rule-makers are helpful in that regard.

At Second Reading, I heard a number of speeches about excessive regulation, all doubtless intending to encourage financial services to do their job better. But there is an issue with regulation and how much of it there is. If there is any concern about this amendment, that is absolutely not its objective. Critically, we need financial services to be available to everyone; the question is whether, by regulating them, that gets us to where we want to be. Maybe it will, but we might argue that, unless we have persuaded those whom we wish to influence that they will strive to improve performance in this regard, the danger is that it might just be another regulation. Whatever we ask the FCA to report, we need to first take a step back and think through how this will affect performance on the ground. It is the finance industry that has to deliver this, and we need to be working in partnership with it—with the industry, customers, potential customers, the Government and regulators, moving ahead together. There are also initiatives, some of which might work, and which, if they had real momentum, with everyone behind them, might start to deliver the sort of things we want.

As many noble Lords know, I have done quite a lot of work with the financial services industry in Scotland. Its industry body, Scottish Financial Enterprise, has laid out as its objective that it intends to

“have a financial services system that allows every citizen and business of Scotland to connect and access appropriate services”.

Wow. Is that not exactly what we are trying to get to happen? But who is following up to make sure that that statement, that vision is realised? It feels to me that we need a new settlement, and institutions to see that such a settlement is delivered.

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[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, this is the third of the trio. Clause 18 is a deletion clause, the final clause in the trio that removes consideration of the regulatory principles from the context of actual rule-making. It strips out the guidance duties, reporting duties and consultation hooks that once gave Parliament visibility into how the regulators applied their objectives and principles. Let us look at what is being systematically dismantled here. There is some overlap here with some of the things that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has addressed.

Clauses 18(1) and (2) delete the FCA’s and PRA’s guidance about their objectives—the very provisions which, as the Explanatory Notes admit, required the regulators to explain how they advanced those objectives. It is not a question that they still have to explain now; that has gone. Clauses 18(3) and (4) remove the explanations required on directions on consolidated supervision and authorised decisions. Clause 18(7) removes the FCA’s obligation to notify, consult or explain when issuing guidance relating to its objectives. Clauses 18(9) and (10) delete large parts of the FCA’s and PRA’s annual reporting requirements, one of the most sensible and accessible ways for Parliament to understand how objectives were dealt with in practice and would ideally be built upon. Clauses 18(12) to (14) remove linkages to other Acts of Parliament, including the auditor engagement duties that once provided an additional source of supervisory insight.

What is left? Guidance? Gone. Explanations? Gone. Participation? Gone. Annual reporting? Gone. Audit? Gone. These were the exact mechanisms through which Parliament and others scrutinised how the regulators applied their objectives and principles. Clause 18 removes them all. It is the inevitable consequence of the Clause 16 and 17 shift: the practical reality of decoupling principles from operational effectiveness and removing Parliament’s line of sight. It leaves us with no checks and absolutely no balances. For these reasons, I oppose Clause 18 standing part of the Bill.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 93 and 94. I have not audited a bank or sat on a bank board, but I was a member of the Sharman committee that looked at the problems with auditing following the global financial crisis. I sat on the board of one of the big four auditors, chairing its public interest committee, and I talked to a number of partners who audited the banks.

I think that we agree that audit is absolutely a foundation stone for the integrity of the capital markets. For those who are interested, it was part of the settlement following the collapse of the City of Glasgow Bank in 1878 that we would have audits of limited liability banks. It is particularly critical where entities are highly geared or where there is a considerable element of judgment in determining their value. If we look at the banks, they are hugely geared. People like to talk about the common equity tier 1 ratio, but if we look at the gearing that most companies use, it is the equity versus the liabilities. For a typical bank, equity is about 6%: on the back of that, you can borrow £94 and lend £100. That means that, if you have overvalued your assets by 3% and undervalued your liabilities by 3%, you end up with no equity whatever.

This is a really sensitive calculation and, historically, it would have been made with a degree of prudence and conservatism. Prudence and conservatism have now gone as guiding principles, and valuations are done neutrally. For example, this would allow a bank to declare a profit on a zero-interest credit card, on the grounds that it can bring forward the profits it thinks it will make in future. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has been great in raising these issues for some time.

There are of course huge temptations to optimism. Indeed, it is surely testament to the professionalism of our bankers, and the independent agents we employ to monitor and control bank behaviour, that banks have not got into greater trouble. There are four such agents: the independent non-executive directors; the auditors; the investors and the regulators. Many more resources are devoted to auditing banks than to regulating them, and vastly more than fund managers devote to their role as stewards. The auditors have inside knowledge and huge expertise, and it is precisely that insight, given independently, that regulators need in order to play their role.

I think that that was recognised by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, when she suggested that the PRA “may” ask to speak to the auditors. The problem is that the auditors have a delicate job: they are referees. The report is done for the investors, but they need the trust of the audited entity. Indeed, they are, in effect, appointed by the audited entity, and they even sometimes describe the audited entity as a client. They are unlikely to go to the regulator without having profound concerns.

Regulators may find it helpful to call in the auditors because of problems that are visible to them: the known knowns. Under those circumstances, this amendment would of course work. However, what the regulator really needs to know is the unknown knowns: something that is known by the auditor, who has gone inside, but not known by the regulator. That is why it makes sense to mandate that the regulator “must” talk to the auditor to hear their concerns, to pick up potential emerging problems before they become critical, and to understand how the auditor judged the numbers to be true and fair.

The audit is the foundation of the integrity of our capital markets. For auditors to have material knowledge of a bank’s position that is relevant to the stability of the system and for that not to be known by the regulator seems to be completely perverse and potentially very dangerous. With that perspective, I wonder whether the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, might be content with Clause 18, on audit reporting, to remain as it stands.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Pitt-Watson Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 1st July 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, my amendment concerns the impact of prudential capital requirements on lending capacity, borrowing costs, competition and growth. Since my amendment was tabled, His Majesty’s Opposition have announced a new policy position in this area, which I shall speak to now.

Our new policy is straightforward. The statutory basis for post-financial crisis bank capital requirements should be amended so that UK regulators are required to take proper account of equivalent capital regimes in competitor jurisdictions, and to identify, justify and, where not justified, remove any UK-specific overcapitalisation relative to equivalent international regimes. We want to consider the position in competitor jurisdictions, to benchmark equivalent regimes, to publish detailed analysis and to explain clearly where the UK is imposing requirements above international standards or above those imposed by comparable financial centres. That seems a basic requirement of a serious competitiveness agenda, on which the UK is particularly reliant. The UK is the world’s largest net exporter of financial services, whereas comparable jurisdictions, such as the US, rely much more on their domestic markets. It is therefore imperative that we remain competitive on the world stage.

Capital requirements matter, but there is a cost. Capital held solely for statutory compliance is capital that cannot otherwise be used to support lending, investment, home ownership, business expansion or economic activity. The central question is therefore not whether banks should hold capital but whether the UK requires materially more capital than comparable jurisdictions without a clear and evidenced stability justification. If we do, we are placing the UK at a competitive disadvantage: we are constraining lending, increasing borrowing costs, making it harder for firms to access finance and weakening growth, and doing so in a way that may not be required by international standards or by the actual risk profile of the system.

The analysis behind our policy suggests that the UK capital framework may materially exceed international Basel III requirements and competitor regimes. It has been suggested that the resulting constraint on UK banks’ lending and financing capacity could amount to £250 billion across overlapping capital requirements and £200 billion across leverage ratio constraints. Of course, not every pound of capital released would automatically translate into new lending—we understand that. Some may be used for business investment, dividends, buybacks or balance-sheet strengthening. The key point remains that capital deployed productively in the economy is preferable to capital trapped by a regulatory framework that is more restrictive than it needs to be.

We appreciate that the Government recognise this issue and have moved a little on it already. They have made the bank resolution regime more flexible, allowing the Bank of England to reduce or remove MREL for some firms where the new FSCS recapitalisation mechanism can substitute for pre-positioned loss-absorbing resources. Our proposal is a step to unlocking a lot more capital. We already require the PRA, in some contexts, to have regard to the UK’s relative standing against competitor jurisdictions, but that duty is incomplete. It does not apply across the whole capital framework and, in particular, it does not fully capture Pillar 2A, the PRA buffer or systemic buffers. The FPC has produced useful comparative analysis, but there is not yet a binding requirement for regular, systematic benchmarking against competitor jurisdictions.

Our proposed review is also about transparency. If regulators believe that the UK should impose higher requirements than comparable regimes then Parliament, industry and the public should be able to see the analysis behind that decision. That is how we preserve independence while improving accountability.

The amendment is part of a wider argument. Prudential regulation must be understood not only through the lens of stability but through the lens of growth, lending, and competitiveness. A capital framework that is more demanding than necessary does not make the economy stronger. It may make it less dynamic, less competitive and less able to support households and businesses, especially SMEs and scale-ups. I speak from experience as a director at a responsible and careful challenger bank, where the UK capital rules were a significant constraint on what we could do. They also consumed a great deal of management and board time.

I would like the Government to accept that the UK should not impose capital requirements above equivalent international competitor regimes, especially if there is no financial stability justification for doing so. The first step is to undertake the necessary analysis. Ours is a serious and responsible policy. It preserves regulatory independence and protects financial stability but recognises that excessive or unjustified capital requirements carry real economic costs. If we want growth, competitiveness and banks to support businesses and homebuyers, then we need a capital framework that is robust but not overrestrictive. That is the balance that our policy seeks to strike. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, both the amendment and the speech by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, were sensible in terms of making us think about bank capital requirements and whether we have got them right. As she says, the first step is undertaking proper analysis to be able to work out whether that happens. I noticed she caveated everything that they may not be right. They may be right, but they may not.

My worry is that that is a sensible position to take but it did not sound like the position being taken by the Leader of the Opposition when she made her speech last week saying that she was going to reduce bank capital requirements to release £450 billion in capital. Where did the calculation that hundreds of billions are sitting idly on bank balance sheets come from? Where do those hundreds of billions come from? If we are going to release £450 billion, what is the calculation in the reduction of bank capital requirements that sits behind that calculation? While I feel quite supportive of the issues that the noble Baroness was raising, we need to be sure—I hope she will agree—that we do not jump the gun on this.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Pitt-Watson, was rather generous in his comments. Sometimes it is important to speak truth to power. This is a lowest common denominator strategy. We have heard it before from the Conservatives, and it is repeated with enthusiasm today. I heard so many of these arguments back in the early 2000s. It contributed and was a fundamental part of the reasons why we ended up with such a major financial crash with huge financial and political consequences that echo through to this day. I could see the argument being made that we need to take proper care that we are looking at capital requirements and that we need to assess them and look at the consequences and do so on a regular basis. That is already part of the programme and certainly would always need to be part of it.

I notice that in line seven of the amendment the phrase is,

“while also considering financial stability”.

If ever there was a phrase lowering the significance of the primary objective with which we tasked the Bank of England, that phrase does it—merely a consideration of financial stability. I was afraid when the growth and productivity objectives were introduced as secondary objectives that quickly the attraction of the phrases would cause them to cannibalise the primary objective. This is a very good example of the way in which that, frankly, has been happening.

I have seen across so many of the measures in the Bill a step away from the precautionary principle—in this case, of looking for appropriate capital requirements, whether in equities or in MREL—to a notion that we deal with all this through a resolution regime. I am suspicious of resolution regimes and of after the fact ways of ensuring financial stability. I would much rather we did not have a bank failure that we must then attempt to remedy through the use of something like bail-in MREL, which I do not think will ever work. Frankly, MREL is held by insurance companies and pension funds, and we are never going to wreck them to save a major bank. I am very concerned about the change in approach that we are hearing today from the Conservative party.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Pitt-Watson Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 8th July 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, our amendments in this group concern the future of the bank ring-fencing regime. I will start by setting out clearly the position that we have reached as the Official Opposition. Through our diagnostic work, we have found a consensus that the bank ring-fencing regime is no longer fit for purpose. It adds costs to banks and their customers and it has been superseded by other rules since its introduction. A regulatory regime should not be preserved simply because it exists. It must continue to justify itself against present-day risks, tools and costs. In our view, the ring-fencing regime no longer does so. The next Conservative Government would repeal the post-global financial crisis ring-fencing regime, bringing the United Kingdom more closely into line with other international jurisdictions. Amendment 160A reflects that policy.

It is worth reminding ourselves what ring-fencing is. The regime was created through the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, which amended FSMA 2000. The implementing regulations and orders came into effect in 2019, more than 10 years after the onset of the global financial crisis. At its core, ring-fencing is the structural separation of certain retail banking activities from activities normally conducted by international wholesale investment banks. In practice, that means a separate legal entity, with restrictions on what it can do and how it can interact with the rest of the banking group. Retail and small business deposit-taking is placed inside the ring-fence, while certain other activities must be conducted outside it.

The regime was introduced for serious reasons. The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, convened after the financial crisis, identified three broad objectives: to make it easier to deal with failing banks without taxpayer-funded solvency support; to insulate vital banking services used by households and SMEs from problems elsewhere in the financial system; and to curtail implicit government guarantees, thereby reducing risks to public finances and incentives for excessive risk-taking.

Since ring-fencing was designed, the wider regulatory landscape has changed profoundly. We now have a much more developed resolution regime. We have recovery and resolution planning. We have operational continuity arrangements in resolution. We have stronger capital and liquidity requirements. We have the leverage ratio, the liquidity coverage ratio and the net stable funding ratio. The Bank of England, the PRA and the FPC have a broad toolkit for reducing the risk of bank failure and dealing with failure if it occurs. Moreover, we have sounder management of banks as a result of the senior management regime.

That is precisely the point that we wish to highlight in our amendment. The risks that ring-fencing was designed to address are now addressed through other more modern, more targeted and more internationally coherent tools. The 2022 Independent Panel on Ring-fencing and Proprietary Trading, chaired by Sir Keith Skeoch, reported that the regime has an annual cost to the UK banking sector of around £1.5 billion, which comes from running multiple separate legal entities, duplicating governance systems and raising the cost of capital and lending conducted by non-ring-fenced bodies. This is because large retail deposits inside the ring-fence cannot be used as sources of finance elsewhere in a group to support lending and investment. That review also found that the reduction in the implicit government guarantee and progress in ending “too big to fail” were not attributable to ring-fencing but instead to the development of the UK resolution regime. Ring-fencing is therefore a good example of a broader problem in financial services regulation: rules that are introduced in response to a crisis which then remain in place long after the conditions that justified the change.

We are now left with two regimes that are not aligned in the way that they aim to address “too big to fail”. That adds complexity, cost and burden. It also risks making the United Kingdom less competitive than jurisdictions that rely on resolution, prudential supervision and capital frameworks, rather than structural separation of this kind. Clauses 39 and 40 show that the Government recognise that there is a problem. They seek to make changes to the ring-fencing regime and give the PRA more flexibility over ring-fencing arrangements, but in our view these reforms do not go far enough.

Amendment 160A would repeal Part 9B of FSMA and the core statutory ring-fencing provisions introduced after the financial crisis. It would require the Treasury, the PRA, the FCA and the Bank of England to take the necessary steps to unwind the related rules and guidance. It would require an orderly transition, with attention paid to financial stability, continuity of core banking services and the competitiveness of the United Kingdom. Consumer savings would continue to be protected. Banks would continue to be subject to prudential supervision. Resolution planning would remain in place.

This reform matters for competitiveness. Other major financial centres do not operate a UK-style ring-fencing regime. If UK banks are required to carry costs and structural constraints that their international competitors do not face, that affects the cost and availability of finance. It affects the ability of banks to deploy capital efficiently and it affects the attractiveness of the UK as a place to operate and invest in. It also matters for customers. Regulations that increase costs without delivering commensurate benefit feed through into pricing, service innovation and lending capacity.

If the Government believe that ring-fencing remains necessary, will the Minister explain precisely what financial stability objective it now achieves that is not already achieved through the resolution regime and other prudential rules? Ring-fencing was created in response to a particular crisis at a particular moment for reasons that were understandable at the time. But regulation must evolve. It must be reviewed against current conditions. It must be removed when it no longer serves its intended purpose.

Finally, I would add that whatever changes are made, it is right to have a proper process of consultation with business and stakeholders and a follow-up report to Parliament. That is the purpose of my Amendments 159 and 174.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, if I may respond to that, I had thought until recently that what we were debating was a response to the Skeoch commission established by the last Government, but we have new amendments now, it seems—Amendment 160A and the abandonment of clauses—that are really throwing ring-fencing out. I guess that they are tabled in response to a speech by the leader of the Conservative Party, Kemi Badenoch—a speech underpinned by a policy document from her party. That speech, the policy document and this amendment are not asking to think things through further from the Skeoch report: they have made their minds up. Kemi Badenoch announced that a future Conservative Government will end ring-fencing—definitive end of discussion. That, I believe, would be a bad idea. So did the review by Keith Skeoch, who was commissioned by the Conservative Government to opine on this and whose recommendations we are now trying to take forward.

Worse still, the evidence for Mrs Badenoch’s statement is based on really questionable claims, numbers and Mickey Mouse logic. For example, the claim was that the Skeoch report reckoned that the cost of ring-fencing was £1.5 billion. In fact, the report notes that that figure was presented to the review and that

“it has not been possible to draw a strong conclusion based on aggregating these costs”.

The report recognises that there are some costs to ring-fencing, but notes that that was expected and acknowledged by the Independent Commission on Banking, which said that that would not be a cost to the economy, but rather

“a consequence of returning risk to where it should be—with bank investors, not taxpayers—and so would reflect the aim of removing government support and risk to public finances”.

The policy paper has a Mickey Mouse logic that costs should be placed on the taxpayer, when they should be paid by the banks and the investors in the banks.

We should of course be in favour of reviewing the ring-fencing regime to be sure that it is properly doing its job. This is what Skeoch did and, now, if this Bill follows that report, I ask the Minister to ensure that we are careful with definitions in the implementation. For example, we should ensure that, within the growth allowance, the definitions are very carefully drawn up. We do not in future want the taxpayer subsidising proprietary trading—what many refer to as “casino capitalism”.

Badenoch suggests that her reforms would release £450 billion in capital—another number from nowhere. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, will not have a lot of time to sum up, but I would be grateful if she might write afterwards on how these numbers have been derived and what reduction in bank equity capital they assume. If these numbers do not stack up, that pulls the rug from under the policy document and the speech that was made by the leader of the Conservative Party.

The policy paper suggests that we should abandon the Financial Ombudsman Service. In this industry, which represents 8% of GDP but attracts 42% of corporate fines, Mrs Badenoch has decided that the front-line institution that protects consumers should be abolished. We could say that this does not matter and that Kemi Badenoch is unlikely any time soon to be Prime Minister, but it should matter to us. As the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has pointed out, there is considerable expertise in financial services across all parties in the House. Although we have differences, we are united, I hope, in trying to set a framework for the industry that allows it better to serve its purpose: to serve the outside world; to help get money from point A, where it is, to point B, where it is needed; to keep our money safe; to help us transact; and to help us share risk.

If the Opposition Benches feel mandated to follow the policy documented last month, we have a problem. I could not find a single reference in that document to any input from any consumer group anywhere. It felt like a lobbyist document from the City, but I have talked to at least one lobbyist who said “No, it goes way further than we would ever suggest”.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

In Committee, it is normal to address the amendments and not opposition parties’ policy documents.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

The amendment has been put to us at the last minute. The points that it relates to have been there for weeks, indeed months, but I would argue that what has triggered the amendment is the speech by the leader of the Conservative Party and the policy document that underpins it. If the noble Baroness thinks, like me, that the policy document is lacking, I would be pleased to hear it because, as she knows, it would abolish the FOS and seek to mandate regulatory changes that come close to invading the independence of the regulator.

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[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

I did indeed talk to senior members of the Skeoch commission before writing my speech, and what I said is completely consistent with the conclusions of the Skeoch commission, which was set up by the previous Conservative Government, as I said.

[Lord Massey of Hampstead (Con)]

I am just reading the conclusions from the report, my Lords. They make it very clear that the continuation of ring-fencing made sense at the time the report was written, but the commission clearly envisaged that it might not be needed over the passage of time. I also remind noble Lords that Glass-Steagall was abolished some 25 years ago with no detriment to the American banking system. I say this just to make the point that it is not so obvious.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

I find it difficult to believe that someone has told me that the withdrawal of Glass-Steagall, which took place 13 years before the global financial crisis, had no detriment to the American banking system. As I say, I have read the Skeoch report and discussed it with senior members of Skeoch, and I believe that what I said is entirely consistent with the recommendations that they made to the Government and this House, which is recognised in the Bill.

[Lord Massey of Hampstead (Con)]

I also draw attention to the abolition of FOS, which the noble Lord mentioned. I draw the Committee’s attention to Amendment 172A, which discusses the changes proposed to FOS. It is to be abolished and replaced with something called the financial adjudication service, which is a broadly similar methodology to give redress to consumers and private clients, in the event of problems with the firms that serve them. While it is a change, it is a reform to FOS with an organisation with a different name, but it is not a straightforward abolition of that very important process. This will be dealt with in that later amendment—not in my name, I might add.

Governments, like some businesses, are very good at locking the stable door after the horse has bolted. Our reaction to 2008 was an example of just that. But we are now 18 years on and the banking sector has been solid during that time. However, as we know, growth has flatlined, despite many years of ultra-low interest rates. I am not suggesting that we are an exception here; there has been a similar experience across most of Europe. But we now have a substantial cost of capital for business to bear, with interest rates stuck at 3.75% and sadly not much prospect of a reduction in the near term.

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[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I have some experience of ring-fencing as, in my capacity as the chairman of the risk committee of a major bank, I oversaw the implementation of ring-fencing. At that time, it was a significant risk to the bank that we would not be in compliance with the ring-fencing legislation and therefore this required considerable oversight.

I am clear that ring-fencing has been a very expensive element of the post-financial crisis reforms. The Skeoch report, which has been referred to, put the upfront cost at £2.9 billion and the ongoing cost at £1.5 billion, which amounts to about £14 billion to date. The noble Lord, Lord Pitt-Watson, tried to undermine those numbers, but, from my experience, I do not doubt that order of magnitude. More importantly, the implementation, and, to a lesser extent, the ongoing element—

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

There were two points, one of which is that the Skeoch report says that the numbers given are not its numbers. The report is clear that whatever the cost of ring-fencing, it is not a cost to the economy—this is what the Vickers report said earlier —and that, by removing ring-fencing, it suddenly becomes a cost to the taxpayer rather than to the bank’s investor. That is the key point that Skeoch is bringing to our attention.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I understand the point that the noble Lord is trying to make, but I argue that the risk of the taxpayer picking up the tab is now considerably lower, which means that it is reasonable to re-examine whether ring-fencing should be an ongoing part of the regime.

I was about to say that, in addition to the cash costs, there was during the implementation, and to some extent on an ongoing basis, considerable diversion of scarce management resource, which will have damaged the banks in a number of ways. My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe has registered her opposition to Clauses 39 and 40 standing part of the Bill. I support Clauses 39 and 40 on the grounds that any improvement in the ring-fencing regime is better than none. The flexibility that will come with letting the PRA handle some of the changes via rules is a constructive solution. The PRA is, however, heavily invested in ring-fencing and no one should be under any illusion that the power will be used by the PRA to make significant changes to the regime. That is why I believe that we need to make provision to go further and I support the other amendments in this group.

As we have heard, since the implementation of ring-fencing, the parallel and very expensive requirement to maintain and develop resolution plans has been implemented, and the Bank of England has confirmed that the major banks are resolvable. In addition, bank capital levels are significantly above the levels that they were immediately after the financial crisis and well above regulatory minima. Regulatory capital is expensive and can restrict the ability of banks to lend to support the economy. I am always extremely sceptical about claims that reducing capital requirements on banks will immediately lead to masses of extra lending by the banks—there is some element of truth in it, but the effect is not as great as might be claimed.

We are hugely proud of the robustness of our financial regulation and what we do in the UK is often copied abroad. No one anywhere else in the world has ever copied ring-fencing and that is for a very good reason: it is a very expensive solution to a problem that can be and has been addressed in other ways. That is why I support the amendments from my noble friend, which pave the way for eliminating ring-fencing. It cannot be done away with overnight, so I support the measured approach taken in my noble friend’s Amendment 160A.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I am delighted to have the debate, and I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Pitt-Watson, for raising questions which have encouraged debate, but I support my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe’s opposition to Clause 39 standing part of the Bill. I also support her Amendment 160A about ring-fencing.

Clause 39 gives the Treasury powers to loosen the ring-fencing scheme. It has been anticipated, as others have said in this debate, by a number of announcements and reports, not least the Skeoch report—I hope I have pronounced it rightly, in the Celtic way—and the announcements this year by the Treasury itself. All of these point to and address a real problem. The question before us today is whether the Government’s solution in their Clauses 39 and 40 is sufficient to deal with the problems raised by reviews and announcements going back to the 1 March 2022 independent review of the working of the scheme.

I have a concern. The clause may seem to be the answer to some of the serious questions raised in that review and other concerns, and allow for the mitigation of problems arising from the ring-fencing regime—to allow for “proportionate” changes, to use a word which continues to recur throughout the assessments of how the scheme is working. However, in essence, it protracts the dominance of the regime and the regulators in what should be business decisions under good law, which is the spirit of the common law. It is a law which is permissive of risk-taking rather than prohibitive of the spirit of enterprise, or looking over the shoulder to the precautionary principle.

Officials and regulators can be very intelligent, competent and talented people, but it is not part of their skill set to drive through an entrepreneurial idea from the drawing board to production, sale, expanding their markets, developing a business, taking risk, and hiring and training people—which is an additional cost—while all the time keeping on top of the services sector, one of the fastest growing sectors in the UK and a jewel in the crown. Enabling officials to decide which activities should or should not be prohibited, and under which circumstances, does not tackle the fundamental problem to which the ring-fenced regime has given rise: the artificial and contrived structure. We are dealing with a structural problem—an artificially separated structure.

This structure inhibits the financial services sector from functioning in the best possible way, as an enabling hub for the whole UK economy, to allow small businesses, in particular, to grow and credit to flow. It is unlikely to remedy what we are dealing with, the fundamental problem of risk aversion imposed by ring-fencing law on businesses and the endemic risk aversion in the operation of the law.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

I wonder whether there might be some confusion here. The thing about the ring-fence is that there are activities within it that the Government are promising to bail out. Those things are being insured. By the way, the move in the ring-fence proposed by the Government will extend these a little, but they include lending to the small businesses that the noble Baroness has talked about. The question is: are we going to be rid of that? Is it the case that the implicit guarantee that the Government are giving can go to any other activity that the bank decides that it wants to undertake? That could include, although Skeoch would say it is not a problem right now, the sort of proprietary trading that brought the American banks down in 2008—of course, they had been allowed to do that because Glass-Steagall had been removed 10 years earlier. What we are talking about here is: how much of bank activity will the Government stand behind? As Mervyn King said, we must make sure that it is just the very most important things.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord, but it is about where the line is drawn in law, so that businesses can be certain and have predictability, because activities change day by day.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

With respect, that is what Skeoch is recommending and what is being allowed in what we are being asked to accept here—there is an extension of the ring-fence. He is saying, “Look, there are other important activities that go beyond the ring-fence that are administratively complicated for the banks. Please can you move this? Also, can you move this in a way so that it doesn’t need to go to primary legislation any time it needs to change, because all these things are moving?” What we are trying to do here is recognise that the independent commission is run by a senior financial businessperson—he used to run Standard Life—whom we are going to back. He indeed said that, in the long term, you may want to think about how ring-fencing goes together with the resolution regime, but that is not for now. He certainly did not say that we should abandon it.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord, but he was speaking about 2022, which was light years away for the financial sector. Things have moved on and have changed. We have different regimes in place now. As my noble friend Lady Noakes has explained, the banks are now resolvable. There are other schemes that will avoid the problems for the taxpayer. That should be borne in mind.

I had better finish quickly. That is my objection. It is about who decides for businesses. If you have a ring-fence, ultimately, no matter how much you relax it, the Government are never going to have the knowledge of the sector, and the detailed tactical and strategic ability, to be ahead of the game and make businesses grow. They will always play slightly safe, but maybe they are over-safe.

I will finish on why we need to repeal the ring-fence, not just why Clause 39 is not good enough. In a sense, we are seeing the inhibition of risk-taking and a structure that inhibits it. As other noble Lords have pointed out, we do not have parallels in other economies. I know that there is the Volcker rule in the US, but Switzerland has solved its “too big to fail” problem without a ring-fence and it has a very instructive banking sector. France and Germany have it individually but not the EU, which rejected it. Australia reviewed it again in 2019 and rejected it on the grounds that noble Lords have mentioned. It is well worth going back to the famous Skeoch review, which contends that, in the longer term, we will not need the ring-fence and we will have resolution schemes in place. For those reasons, I support my noble friend’s opposition to the clause standing part of the Bill and her Amendment 160A.

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The corporation is, however, unlike any other local authority in the UK, not least because the 8,500 residents of the City of London are dwarfed by the over 600,000 people who work there and whose interests also needs to be considered. There is no other municipality that contributes over £100 billion annually to the UK economy and is the centre of our world-leading financial and professional services sector. It is therefore right that the corporation should use its convening power to promote this sector, which is at the heart of its success, including through engaging with the FCA and the PRA. If noble Lords have specific concerns about a particular interaction between the corporation and the regulators, the right response is a specific question to the Treasury or to the regulators, or even to the corporation itself, rather than the statutory review panel with a long process that is being considered in this amendment. We do not legislate for a review every time a body engages constructively with a regulator, and we should not seek to do so here.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, has suggested that we inquire into the City of London’s role with the regulators and regulation. My noble friend Lady Bi summed it up well: there is no direct role there. But I wonder whether we could send a message to the City of London, perhaps a little more collegiate and, as a result, more effective. We all recognise that the role and constitution of the City corporation is quite difficult to defend from 21st-century principles. Why does one square mile of the country have these unique privileges? It has billions of pounds worth of property and investment, and the Lord Mayor of London has the status of a Cabinet Minister, apparently, when he or she goes on trips abroad. Why is it charged with the powers of a local authority but also with promoting Britain’s financial services industry? I point out that your Lordships’ House bears witness to the fact that historic institutions can—and often do—do good and important work. I wonder whether, harking back to the traditions of the City of London, there is one that we could help revive, in the spirit of what the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, may want to happen.

Historically, the City of London was responsible for the good conduct of the trades in the city, ensuring that the goods produced could be trusted to be of high quality. Indeed, I believe that Elizabeth I even had the goldsmiths of London check that the coinage that the Mint was producing was of a high enough standard, because the goldsmiths were more professional than the people at the Royal Mint.

Over time, that role of policing good conduct has passed to professional bodies and then to regulators, but we often forget that it is the professionalism that we need. Regulators cannot replace professionalism, for which so many people from Britain and around the world come to use Britain’s financial services industry. Professionals, whether individuals or institutions, are a disciplined group possessing special knowledge and skills in a widely recognised body of learning. They are prepared to apply this knowledge and exercise these skills in the interests of others. That professionalism, both for individuals and for institutions, harks back to that old role of the City of London: not regulation but professionalism. It is and should be the core and unique selling point of the UK financial services industry. I sense that that is what we in this Room would like to achieve.

The City of London promotes financial services, but surely, if it does that, it must be sure that the services it promotes—maybe not every financial service—serve a purpose in the world. There is still enormous room for the City to identify and help to encourage good practice, not just to promote financial services generally but to ensure that all the services it promotes deliver benefit to the customer and the world. That may, from time to time, involve talking to a regulator—I do not see that as a problem—but it should seek much more to ensure that professional good practice becomes a norm. The City already does some of this, but it could be so much clearer about its focus and role. There would be no better way to promote the success of financial services in Britain.

I have one last coda on this and a more immediate thought. Spokespeople from the City of London Corporation like to explain—correctly—that they represent the whole financial services industry of Britain, two-thirds of which works outside London. But those who work to promote the industry are exclusively employed in the square mile, and it is difficult to express the level of frustration that I have felt among some that the City talks the talk about employment around the country but maybe needs to walk the walk in its own practices on where people are employed. I hope that might be a constructive suggestion about how this venerable institution might serve its country better.

[Baroness Dacres of Lewisham (Lab)]

My Lords, I fear that Amendment 172C strays beyond the purpose of the Bill, which is concerned with improving the regulation of financial services and markets. It is not, in my view, the appropriate vehicle for reopening broader questions about the role and governance of the City of London Corporation. This amendment takes us into a rather different debate—it asks us to examine the role and function of the City of London Corporation—whereas the purpose of the Bill is to strengthen the UK’s financial regulatory framework, ensuring that it is effective, proportionate and capable of supporting growth, investment and innovation, while maintaining high standards. Our focus should remain on achieving those objectives.

It is important to be clear about the respective roles of the organisations involved. The City of London Corporation is not a financial regulator. It does not authorise firms, supervise markets or enforce regulatory rules. Those responsibilities rest with the Financial Conduct Authority, the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Bank of England, all of which are independently accountable to Parliament.

The City corporation performs a different, but none the less valuable, function. It acts as a convenor of expertise, an advocate for one of the United Kingdom’s most important industries and a champion of the UK as a global financial centre. Through its international engagement, it promotes inward investment, supports exports of financial and professional services, and works with industry to help maintain the UK’s reputation for high standards and innovation.

I question whether the amendment has demonstrated that there is a genuine accountability gap requiring statutory review. Before Parliament creates a new review mechanism, we should be satisfied that there is evidence of a problem that the existing arrangements have failed to address. I have not yet heard that case made. The City corporation is already subject to established governance and oversight arrangements, while the regulators are independently accountable to Parliament.

At a time when the Government are rightly seeking to promote economic growth and strengthen the United Kingdom’s competitiveness as a leading international financial centre, I am concerned that this amendment risks creating uncertainty without identifying a clear public benefit. Our efforts should be directed towards ensuring that regulators can carry out their duties effectively, while organisations such as the City of London Corporation continue to play their distinct role in supporting the wider success of the UK’s financial and professional services. For those reasons, I believe our attention should remain firmly on the purpose of the Bill: strengthening the United Kingdom’s financial regulatory framework. I cannot support Amendment 172C.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Pitt-Watson Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 7th September 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will be extremely brief because my Bench has just spoken very clearly on this issue. I share with the Conservative Front Bench concerns about accountability with a further removal of powers directly into the hands of the regulator, and had they pressed their Amendment 1, we would have supported it.

Very briefly, I will address the other amendments. I am still in a state of genuine concern that the Government will not accept an amendment that would confirm that the changes they are proposing to the Consumer Credit Act, which will be absorbed now into the role of the FCA, will not involve a diminution of consumer credit protection; this is the non-diminution of rights that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, described. Of course, the FCA could keep those rights in place, but there is nothing that compels it to do so. I find it extraordinary that we cannot be given this reassurance.

However, I am more exercised than anything else about the position of mortgage prisoners. The people who have been impacted, and many are now elderly, have dealt with a shocking situation over the past years. We could now give them relief for the remaining years in which they will be tangled with paying extraordinary levels of interest on mortgages that were taken out in good faith, for which they properly qualified and which were, at the time, market-standard mortgages. It has happened because, in essence, an arm of government has made mistakes when it has sold on those loans to vulture funds. It is shocking that we have not corrected this. The amendment before us today is new thinking. It is incredibly effective at making sure that, going forward, this incredible injustice is ended, and I hope very much that, even in these last few minutes, the Government will think again and provide support.

[The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Lord Pitt-Watson) (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a privilege to be here today to debate the Financial Services and Markets Bill. I put on record my thanks to my noble friend Lord Stockwood for leading the earlier stages of this debate and thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate in Committee and beyond.

If noble Lords would allow me, I would like to say a few things about the Bill itself before moving on to address the amendments that have been put forward. The Bill has a purpose on which I think we are all agreed: to construct rules that help the financial services industry to serve its customers better and to prosper as a result of doing so. Noble Lords will therefore see that, in responding to the debate in Committee, the Government have been persuaded of some significant points made then and are proposing some significant amendments which I hope will be welcomed by the House. There are also amendments that will be suggested on Report where the Government disagree with the specific measure proposed but, in many cases, have great sympathy with the ultimate goals of the particular amendment.

However, there are many amendments which we do not believe belong as part of the Bill, in part because they are complex and require consultation, and/or go beyond the scope of the Bill, and in part also because the aims of the amendment are not best served by changing primary legislation but where the Government often would want to help promote the goals of the amendment—indeed sometimes, they already are—and can perhaps seek to encourage better practice. Central to all this is accountability, which I will come to at beginning and end of this group and then again later today.

To turn to these specific amendments, Amendments 1 and 6 would remove Clause 1 and Schedule 1 from the Bill and prevent the Government’s programme of Consumer Credit Act reform. Amendments 2 and 3 would ensure that the reforms do not diminish consumer protections, and Amendments 4 and 5 relate to the assignment of student loans and of mortgages. Similar amendments were debated in Committee, and the Government have carefully considered the concerns raised. However, we have concluded that we wish to press ahead with these much-needed reforms.

I think that we all in this House agree that the FCA is the right body to take on the role of consumer protection, and Parliament has already given it the right powers and objectives to do so, including a consumer protection objective. Since the 2014 transfer of consumer credit to the FCA, important protections, including creditworthiness and affordability assessments, have successfully operated through the FCA framework. I recognise the concern, raised both in Committee and again today, that Parliament is being asked to approve reform before replacement FCA rules have been finalised. However, I emphasise that the FCA must consult on proposed rules and engage with parliamentary committees as part of an established statutory framework. This includes the Financial Services Regulation Committee, ably chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes.

Both the FCA and the PRA are clearly aware of scrutiny. Last week, they sent me a letter, which I think has been circulated to all noble Lords, making a number of commitments further to enhance parliamentary scrutiny, and I have placed those letters in the Library. I expect to cover this information, including that in the letter, in detail in a later grouping today.

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[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, and my noble friends Lord Holmes and Lord Mackinlay, for reminding us of the value of post offices and the importance of banking hubs, especially in this ever-expanding digital world. There are serious issues here across the country.

I will speak to my Amendment 10, which would do a very simple thing: remove Clause 3 from the Bill. My argument for it is equally simple: Clause 3 contains no detail about what the Government intend to do. Instead, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, explained, it grants Ministers extraordinarily broad powers, including the power to amend primary legislation on access to banking.

Once the Richard Lloyd review has concluded, the Government may legislate for whatever they subsequently decide is necessary. That could include anything on banking services, with huge implications for consumers, banks, other financial services and the high street. As the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, said, the Government will have the power to amend any Act of Parliament. That is a huge power grab by the Treasury and a very significant delegation of power to ask Parliament to approve in advance. We do not know what problems these powers will ultimately be used to address, what regulations the Government envisage making, or which Acts of Parliament they wish to amend. Yet Parliament is nevertheless now being asked to hand over the power to do all these things.

We should be very cautious about giving any Government powers of this breadth on the basis that they will decide later, in good faith, how they wish to use them. Parliament should not be asked to give Ministers carte blanche, particularly where the powers include the ability to amend primary legislation with minimal parliamentary scrutiny. That would set a terrible precedent.

The right course is straightforward: Clause 3 should come out. Once the Government have completed the review of access to banking and know what they wish to do, they can return to Parliament with legislation setting out the policy, the powers required to deliver it and the appropriate safeguards.

I am very grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Lady Altmann, the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and my noble friends Lord Massey, Lord Mackinlay and Lady Lawlor for supporting this amendment. The Minister has a problem: we have a lot of concern across this House, not only among those engaged on the Bill. The amendment reflects the concerns of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, with its very expert membership. The committee has also advised that Clause 3 be removed; I say to the Minister that that is usually a killer argument. For these reasons, I do not believe that Clause 3 can remain in the Bill. When Amendment 10 is called, I intend to test the opinion of the House.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, I am hearing two arguments here: a strong consensus across the House for the need for access to banking and for the appropriate actions to be taken to make sure that that takes place; and a concern, also raised in Committee, about the breadth of the power, particularly its constitutional implications and the degree of scrutiny that Parliament would be able to exercise over any regulations made under it. These are serious points and the Government have considered them seriously, but they have concluded that Clause 3 is needed at this stage. Because the independent Lloyd review of access to banking has not yet concluded, we do not know whether it will recommend intervention, which consumers may be most affected, the nature of any detriment, and what form any intervention should take. Removing Clause 3 altogether, as Amendment 10 would do, would risk leaving the Government without a mechanism in the Bill to respond promptly if the review identifies a focused and time-sensitive need for intervention.

Amendment 9 would remove the ability to amend primary legislation through regulations made under Clause 3. If acting on the review’s findings required changes to an Act of Parliament, removing this ability would risk removing the mechanism to respond promptly to the review and could delay implementation. Amendment 7 would take a different approach by limiting the powers to matters arising directly from the review. I understand the intention behind that amendment and the review should clearly play the central role in shaping any future intervention. That is why the Bill already requires the Treasury to have regard to the review’s recommendations, but it would not be right to prevent Ministers from considering other relevant evidence alongside the review when deciding whether and how to act. The Government need to preserve the ability to respond proportionately to the full evidence that is available.

Amendment 8 is probably one on which we all agree. The noble Lord, Lord Holmes, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, talked about the central part that post offices can play in making sure that banking access is available. I can confirm that the chair of the review into access to banking services has received representations from and has engaged with the Post Office and the National Federation of SubPostmasters and that officials will continue to engage as part of the development. As noble Lords know, the target is more than 350 full banking hubs, plus 10,500 post offices, involved in this, and I thoroughly commend the points that they have made.

I absolutely understand the concerns about the Henry VIII powers, which seem very broad. Clause 3 does not itself impose new obligations on firms, or any specific model of banking provision. Any regulations under the power would also be subject to the affirmative procedure. However, I assure noble Lords that the Government do not expect Clause 3 to remain in its current form. I forget how the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, said her hopes would be fulfilled, but I think they would be fulfilled by amendments that were focused on the thing that we all agree on, which is the need for proper access to banking for older people, for younger people—for everyone.

The Government remain committed to keeping the scope of the power under review as the independent review completes its work. We expect to narrow this power after the review reports in October, when I expect the Bill will be in the Commons. Once the Lloyd review has concluded, the Government will be in a better position to consider the correct scope of this power. It would therefore be premature to narrow the power at this stage. For those reasons, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment, though perhaps more in hope than expectation.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, given that the Conservative Front Bench have expressed their interest in moving Amendment 10, I will withdraw Amendment 7.

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The prize is considerable: a population who are more financially resilient and better equipped to make decisions for themselves. That is good for consumers, investment, financial services and growth.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

I am grateful to noble Lords for raising these issues around financial inclusion. The Government fully recognise the importance of improving access to appropriate and affordable financial services—particularly those for people on low incomes and in vulnerable circumstances—and of improving the financial education of the nation. We support the intention behind many of the amendments, but we are not persuaded that putting this measure into primary legislation is necessarily the right way forward. I hope to describe what the Government are doing, including actions that we have taken as a result of some of the issues raised in Committee.

I start with Amendment 11, which would measure what banks and building societies are doing about affordable credit then set standards for them; for example, setting up something such as a CDFI would count against what they would be required to do. I would like to take a step back because quite a lot is already happening and there are important things that the Government are doing, as was articulately described by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes. Let me start with small businesses. In the Mansion House speech in July, the then Chancellor announced the expansion of the British Business Bank’s growth guarantee scheme, doubling SME lending to £3.5 billion.

I share the focus of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, on community development through financial institutions. Through the Community Finance Taskforce, we have brought together banks, community finance advisers and the Government. At Mansion House, more than £10 million of philanthropic funding from JPMorgan Chase and support from BNY was announced for the sector. The taskforce will publish a road map early next year to support the ambition of unlocking a further £1 billion of SME lending over five years. The British Business Bank’s Community ENABLE Funding Programme committed nearly £120 million of funding, with a second phase intending to grow that to £500 million. We are improving competition and supply through the enhancement of commercial credit data sharing in order to strengthen bank referral arrangements.

On personal lending, the Government’s financial inclusion strategy includes measures to strengthen community finance and partnerships between mainstream lenders and CDFIs. We are supporting practical interventions, including a small sum credit pilot in which Monzo has already announced it will be the first participant, as well as a transformation fund for credit unions alongside the common bond reforms—those are even part of this Bill—to make sure that credit unions can do their job better. I was quite taken by what the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester said about the centrality of being able to provide this sort of fund; I note that the only businessperson to receive a Nobel Peace Prize was someone who did that by finding a way to lend unsubsidised money to poor people in Bangladesh.

This is important, but a lot is already going on, and I wonder whether supporting that might be something that we would want to think about. The amendment would require the FCA to act against firms that do not meet minimum lending standards. However, do we not want customers and businesses to access appropriate credit and balance that with risks of overindebtedness? The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, is right that what gets measured gets managed; equally, we need to be worried about creating a system where people are hitting the target and missing the point. For these reasons, the Government are not persuaded that these amendments are the right way of improving behaviour or pricing. I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment and, please, support the other actions that are being taken by the Government to address this critical question.

Amendments 57 and 61 concern how the regulators report on financial inclusion. Amendment 57 seeks to require the FCA and PRA to publish annual reports on how they have advanced financial inclusion. Amendment 61 seeks to require the FCA to publish an annual report on financial inclusion detailing how it has had regard to financial inclusion in exercising its functions and assess the impact of its activities on financial inclusion outcomes. These amendments would impose new statutory reporting duties that risk duplicating existing arrangements for how the FCA reports about the state of financial inclusion and its impact on it. Amendment 57 would also place reporting duties on the PRA, whose statutory duty is prudential regulation. This would create uncertainty about the PRA’s remit and what it would be expected to report against.

Financial inclusion is a shared responsibility across government, regulators and particularly the industry rather than a matter for regulators alone. We know that exclusion is driven by a broad range of complex and overlapping factors, including wider economic conditions, technological change and behavioural drivers. Accountability for improving financial inclusion should therefore remain a collective effort rather than being placed on one or two institutions whose powers extend to only part of the challenge.

The Government have set out this collective approach through our Financial Inclusion Strategy. We continue to work closely with regulators, firms and consumer groups to improve access to financial services and support those who are underserved. The strategy is subject to a public review, which will take place next year, to assess the progress that has been made through this collective effort and where further work is needed. I look forward to the input of Members of this House when that is published.

Amendment 60 concerns child trust funds, which have been spoken about passionately and very articulately by a number of noble Lords, including the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and the noble Lord, Lord Holmes. Decisions about who may act on behalf of persons lacking capacity are governed at bottom by the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and determined by the courts. The Act provides a well-established framework, including oversight by the Court of Protection, to ensure that access to and management of a vulnerable person’s account takes place where appropriate safeguards are in place and in that person’s best interest. This reflects the very real need to safeguard and protect vulnerable people.

This amendment seeks an alternative route of access outside that framework. However, it is difficult to ask the FCA to put that court protection aside—and the FCA does not even have the power to do that. Legislating to permit that would require giving the FCA the power to alter the effect of primary legislation through its rules via a Henry VIII power but without the same degree of oversight. That cannot be the right way forward.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, mentioned, on 8 July the Ministry of Justice convened a round table on mature child trust funds and young adults who lacked the mental capacity, not least because of debates in your Lordships’ House. That meeting was attended by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, other stakeholders and the previous Economic Secretary to the Treasury, Rachel Blake. My noble friend Lady Levitt spoke directly with the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and members of the public, and she made it clear that any solution to this issue would likely need to be delivered through primary legislation. Ultimately, this cannot be resolved through the FCA rules or changes to tax legislation. Primary legislation would be required.

However, we do take this matter very seriously, and I have raised it with the Ministry of Justice. I reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, that it is exploring how the Government can best facilitate access for parents and carers to child trust funds on behalf of their children. I do not have a solution, but we are trying. In the meantime, the FCA is conducting a review into provider practices under child trust fund accounts, including on whether there are barriers to vulnerable young adults accessing their money. We welcome this review. However, as I said, the underlying issue lies in the Mental Capacity Act, and it is not possible for the FCA to substitute or override the primary legislation in that Act.

Amendment 70 would require the FCA to ensure that financial institutions that are registered or regulated by the FCA facilitate the payment of inheritance tax by executors, before probate is obtained, through direct payment schemes. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Mackinlay, for raising this question. I am sorry to hear of the difficulties that he experienced. The duty of administering an estate often arises at one of the most difficult times in a person’s life, and I understand the noble Lord’s desire to ease that process for people who face similar circumstances.

The noble Lord has previously acknowledged that the direct payment scheme generally works well in its existing voluntary form and that it is rare to come across a case where an institution refuses a request to pay tax that is due. Following our debate on this amendment, we asked HMRC officials to contact the company where the money was lodged to understand more generally its policy on the direct payment scheme. The company confirmed that it does in fact facilitate direct payments to HMRC, normally through investment holdings, but there were some types of investment products that it did not consider suitable for release directly to HMRC before grant of probate. These included certain types of bond products. That is as far as we have got on this.

However, the noble Lord’s amendment proposes to mandate the use of the direct payment scheme by FCA-regulated institutions. Our experience—and, I think, his experience—is that most financial institutions facilitate direct payment schemes most of the time. There may be certain types of financial product where releasing funds to HMRC before the grant of probate presents a particular legal and technical complexity. Perhaps we can write to people who are not following the voluntary scheme well, but the advantage of a voluntary scheme is that institutions can assess the level of risk involved and make payment only if they are satisfied that they are releasing those funds correctly. The amendment as drafted would not allow for that to happen.

The noble Lord suggested that this change be made through FCA rules. However, changes to primary legislation may also be required to make this change. FCA rules do not generally displace the private law framework. Making this change through FCA rules could leave financial institutions on an uncertain legal footing. However, we have taken most seriously the points that the noble Lord has raised. They are good points and this area may still need to be addressed, but not by this amendment.

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Moved by

[Lord Pitt-Watson]

12: Clause 4, page 3, line 34, at end insert—
“(ga) in paragraph 14 (scheme rules), in sub-paragraph (2), omit paragraph (f);”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would remove the power of the scheme operator to make rules providing for the delegation of functions from the Financial Ombudsman to staff, given the Financial Ombudsman’s general power to delegate under new paragraph 1B inserted by clause 4(8)(b).

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to the amendments in my name in this group. Before turning to the detail, I should briefly note that almost all these amendments were previously tabled by the Government in Committee, where, in light of concerns expressed about the way in which they were tabled, the Government agreed to bring them back on Report. The group contains a modest number of minor and technical amendments, which are not unusual for a Bill of this size. They do not alter the underlying policy of the Bill. Their purpose is to ensure the Bill is relevant and that the relevant provisions in FSMA operate clearly and consistently. I will try to be quite quick, therefore, in going through them all, so as not to tire your Lordships.

First, turning to Amendments 18, 21 and 23 to 25. These are minor technical corrections to Schedule 2 to the Bill, which, taken with Clause 13, abolishes the Payment Systems Regulator and gives broadly equivalent functions to the FCA. Amendment 18 removes the duplicative provision from new Section 131Z19. Amendment 21 corrects a cross-reference so that the Bill refers to the correct FCA payment system. Amendments 23 to 25 ensure that references to the chair of the PSR, which should be obsolete after the PSR is abolished, are deleted in the correct places.

I hope this is all making sense, but if noble Lords have a particular thing they want to talk about, please do indicate. Amendments 73 to 75 are, once again, minor and technical amendments.

Amendment 12, which relates to Clause 4, makes a consequential amendment. New paragraph 1B of Schedule 17 to FSMA, inserted by Clause 4, permits any function of the Financial Ombudsman to be performed by any member of staff.

Amendments 76 to 79 relate to Clause 33. As noble Lords will be aware, the Bill introduces a more flexible senior management approvals framework, including the ability for firms to apply for conditional or time-limited approval in specified circumstances. These are technical amendments to ensure that the framework operates consistently and in line with the original policy intent.

As regards Amendment 81, finally, when the Bill before us gains Royal Assent, there will already exist a number of overseas recognition regimes created under existing powers in FSMA 2023 to restate regimes inherited from the EU. This amendment enables the Treasury to make consolidating provision, which would restate the existing regimes within the new overseas recognition regime framework. This is essentially a tidying-up exercise.

In summary, this group of government amendments makes technical corrections to ensure the Bill works as intended. I hope noble Lords will join me in supporting them.

[Lord Altrincham (Con)]

I thank the Minister for bringing forward these already tabled amendments, assembled this evening in group 4, and declare my interest as a director of South Molton Street Capital. These amendments, as the Minister explained, remove duplication, correct drafting, make the provisions of the Bill work better together, and make the Bill intelligible, internally consistent and ultimately more workable in practice. Therefore, we support them.

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[Lord Altrincham (Con)]

My Lords, we take a different view on the Financial Ombudsman Service. Our position is that the present FOS model now requires more fundamental reform. We propose that the Treasury should publish draft legislation to replace the FOS with a new financial adjudication service, alongside a dedicated financial services chamber within the First-tier Tribunal.

We accept the need for consumers and SMEs to have access to redress that is fast, expert and affordable. Our concern is that the FOS has evolved well beyond a simple dispute resolution function. Its decisions can shape market behaviour and influence how FCA rules are understood, without the same accountability as a regulator or the legal certainty created by binding precedent.

At the heart of that concern is the fair and reasonable test. A firm may comply with the law, FCA rules and its contractual obligations but still face uncertainty about whether the ombudsman will take a different view. We simply cannot have this situation if we want a regulatory landscape that is conducive to business confidence. We therefore understand the position taken by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, but we start from a different premise. Our position has not changed. We want a redress system that remains accessible to consumers but is also more predictable, legally certain and consistent.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, I start with an apology to the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, if I have failed to respond to him appropriately, but perhaps I can do so in the remarks that I will now make. In response to my noble friend Lord Davies, I am clear that treating customers fairly is one of the business principles of the FCA and is therefore one of the criteria by which a complaint will be able to be made to the FOS.

The FOS plays a vital role in the redress framework for financial services, ensuring that consumers have confidence that, if there is a complaint about a financial services provider, there is an independent, impartial service that can resolve that complaint and has the ability to put things right. That role will not be changing as a result of these reforms. However, the framework within which the FOS operates is not as consistent as it needs to be, and that is not good for consumers or financial services firms. That inconsistency is not surprising because the FOS’s fair and reasonable test was determined before the consumer duty came to the FCA.

The Government’s review of the FOS found that there is a small but possible minority of cases where that inconsistency in the framework could cause false determinations to have the effect of quasi-regulations by setting standards that may not be in line with FCA regulations. To be clear, these are all the FCA regulations. If noble Lords had been with me three months ago, they would have seen me writing letters to my predecessor confirming that that was indeed the case.

As far as the House of Lords is concerned, the Financial Services Regulation Committee stated in its report Growing Pains, that the FOS’s actions can,

“have regulatory impacts by creating precedents that the FCA requires firms to follow”—

again, a quasi-regulator. That is the background to why we are doing this.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

The key issue that I think the Minister has rather glossed over is the evidence base for making these changes. We have been told it would be coming; it has not come. Consistently, we have been told that letters are being developed, but letters have not arrived. I asked for a specific letter and was told that of course it could be provided. It is about the car finance scandal, which was basically exposed through the FOS while the FCA stood to the side, and what would be different now in the consequences of the complaints. What would happen to the complaints that would be different? This seems to be the issue that lies at the heart of this. The FOS exposed a major scandal. As the Minister will know, car finance is the second largest financial market in the UK. Nine out of 10 people who buy a car finance that car. The redress scheme that the FCA has been forced to put into place is currently £7 billion. If I understand correctly from listening to the Minister and his various advisers, in future the FCA approach to the problem would reign, this scandal would never be exposed and there would never be redress. I am waiting for the letter that is supposed to tell me whether that is exactly correct.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

Let me try to address that question. The FCA and the FOS are independent. It is not for the Government to decide what was a correct or a false decision. All that the Government are saying is that the criteria by which the FOS adjudicates should be similar to the rules that practitioners are trying to exercise in the way in which they are working. I think that is just good common sense. I believe there will be a publication coming out shortly from the industry with examples of where the industry may think that the FOS treated it in a way that was inconsistent with the FCA. It is not for me to judge whether that took place. It is for the FOS to judge whether that took place. That may be the reason that I am proving so frustrating in being able to write back properly to the noble Baroness.

Amendment 14 would remove Clause 8 from the Bill and add a list of factors that the FOS must take into account when determining what is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances. In Committee, the noble Lord and others raised concerns that Clause 8 might remove the ability of the FOS to consider fairness in the round. That is not the case. The FOS will still make its determination based on all the circumstances of the case.

The amendments made to FSMA by Clause 8 do not abolish the fair and reasonable test. That is the final adjudication that will be made by the FOS and, because of the principles of business, treating customers fairly is one of the criteria by which a complaint could be made.

Where the relevant FCA rules apply, the Government consider that FOS determinations should be consistent with those rules. Consumers and firms should be able to understand and rely on the FCA rules as providing the standards against which conduct is going to be assessed. I want to be clear: that extends to all the FCA’s rules—I think that addresses my noble friend Lord Davies’s question. That includes the principles for business, the consumer duty and the code of conduct. These are designed to secure high standards of conduct and consumer protection. If a firm fails to meet its obligations under these broad principles-based rules, the FOS may conclude that it should pay redress to the complainant, taking into account this failure and any other relevant information, such as the impact the failure had on the complainant. There is no requirement for a firm to have breached one of the more specific, detailed rules in the FCA’s rulebook.

The consumer duty was introduced by the FCA to improve consumer protection across all financial services, and the Government are confident that it sets a high standard of care that firms should provide to their customers. It includes a requirement to act to deliver good outcomes and an expectation that firms will act in good faith, avoid causing foreseeable harm and enable and support retail customers to pursue their financial objectives. The consumer duty, as I pointed out, did not exist when the FOS was established and the fair and reasonable test was introduced. It is right that the framework governing the FOS should be updated to reflect this landmark piece of consumer protection regulation. Without clarification, we are left with a situation where two different bodies are independently making assessments of what standards firms need to meet, and that does not seem like a sensible approach. The reforms to the fair and reasonable test strengthen consistency across the framework. They do not weaken consumer protection.

Amendment 13 would remove Clause 7. In Committee, the noble Lord suggested that the referral mechanism would in effect subordinate the FOS to the FCA. That is not the case. The FOS will remain completely independent and responsible for resolving complaints between consumers and financial services firms. The FCA will not determine individual complaints, it will not investigate disputes and it will not direct the outcome of cases. Those functions will remain entirely with the FOS.

The amendments to FSMA made by Clause 7 ensure that, where the FOS considers there to be an ambiguity within the FCA rules, the FCA must provide an opinion requested by the FOS. That is entirely consistent with its statutory role as a rule-maker. The FOS will then use that opinion, applying it to the individual circumstances of the case to make a determination.

Lastly, some noble Lords expressed concerns about the potential for referrals to lead to delays, including with reference to the FCA’s comment about the potential operational load. The Government recognise the importance of maintaining the FOS’s quick and informal model, but the Government anticipate that only a very small number of cases are going to be referred to the FCA. The vast majority will be resolved without the need for referral. To avoid delays, the timeline for the FCA to respond will be set out in secondary legislation.

The FCA and the FOS are already gaining practical experience of operating such a mechanism by trialling arrangements through their memorandum of understanding. The experience gained through this trial has provided valuable lessons for the implementation of the legislative mechanisms. The Government will continue to work closely with the FOS and the FCA ahead of those changes taking effect, preparing them to ensure that the new system works effectively. The memorandum of understanding, by the way, is creating a very small number of referrals from the FOS to the FCA.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Pitt-Watson Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 7th September 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Altrincham (Con)]

My Lords, notwithstanding the anomalies that have been discussed—there are significant anomalies in insurance in England as well—we have some concerns about this amendment. It would hand the Treasury very extensive powers to act through secondary legislation, including the ability to amend primary legislation. We have raised concerns consistently in Committee and on Report about the use of broad, delegated powers of this kind. The same concerns apply here. Regulations being subject to the affirmative procedure provides a degree of parliamentary scrutiny. However, it does not alter the fundamental point that Parliament will be delegating significant legislative discretion to the Treasury before the detailed regime on any transitional arrangements has been set out.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 16 would give the Treasury the power to extend regulation of claims management activity to Northern Ireland through secondary legislation. I am aware of the concerns relating to high insurance costs across the UK and would be supportive of action to tackle these where we can, but we should not rush to regulate without clear evidence.

The Government’s Motor Insurance Taskforce has examined the drivers of motor insurance costs, including claims-related costs and market practices. This work has not identified clear evidence that claims management companies are a primary driver of higher premiums in Northern Ireland. Moreover, any proposal in this area would also need careful engagement with the Department of Finance in Northern Ireland and proper consideration of the devolution implications. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw Amendment 16.

[Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, there I was thinking that we had a Minister who was going to be much more reassuring, but, in fact, that was a very negative response. All the things he said have already happened and could be happening in more detail if the Government were to move forward with this. It really is a missed opportunity for the Government and it is not going to go away; it will have to come back in a different form.

I had not realised until recently—probably like many people here tonight—how appalling this situation is. I do not know where the Minister got his facts and figures; perhaps from the Treasury, but certainly not from the people who know what is going on in Northern Ireland. There is obviously no point putting this to a vote tonight, but I hope that, following this, the Minister will meet a group of us who understand this a bit more and will make it clear to him that perhaps, sometimes, he might be given the wrong advice. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, we are concerned about the scale of fraud, and in particular by the continued growth of authorised push payment fraud and other forms of online economic crime. The Government and the banks have made progress, but the truth is that it is hard to keep up with the scammers, and the sums at stake are significant, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, has explained. I therefore strongly welcome the proposal from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for an annual report.

My noble friend Lord Howard of Rising is right to be concerned about the future protection of commercially sensitive information as part of a competitive UK sector. I am glad he has brought his amendment back, and I hope the Minister will be able to provide an assurance that this will be addressed.

The amendments in this group raise important questions about transparency, monitoring and the practical steps that firms can take to identify scams earlier, warn consumers, share information more effectively and pay compensation where that is appropriate. Indeed, there has been considerable progress since the APP reimbursement regime was introduced in 2024. I always remember my card being used in Korea to buy £2,500 worth of Louis Vuitton luggage. That would not happen today, as banking procedures and scrutiny are so much better.

However, the proposal from the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, is a difficult one, as it is not clear what the technology companies could do to stop fraud systematically. They are not passing money on in the same way as the banks do. That may have been what the noble Lord, Lord Stockwood, was getting at in Committee when he responded to this amendment at that stage. New regulations of this kind could also have a chilling effect on the supply of online services in the UK, so more analysis is needed before the FCA introduces new rules. We believe this is an area where the Government and the regulators should be prepared to make progress, but we also understand the constraints.

It is also important that people learn to avoid scams with simple procedures such as face ID, and to take care over what they buy online. This should be an important part of education, and indeed Ofcom, working with the FCA and the tech companies, should be able to make more progress here. I very much look forward to the Minister’s response on this important area and how he thinks we can best address this problem.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, before I respond, I must start with a correction. In the third debate, I said that commercial credit data-sharing schemes improve bank referrals and strengthen personal lending. However, the CCDS and the bank referral scheme are different schemes. To correct the record, I meant that the Government are improving competition and supply through enhancements to commercial credit data sharing in this Bill and working with industry to strengthen bank referral arrangements. Both these schemes help to improve lending to SMEs. I apologise for that; I was speed-reading my way through my responses. I will try to be more careful in future.

I am grateful to the noble Baronesses and noble Lords for tabling these amendments and to all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. On Amendment 17, fraud causes profound financial and emotional harm. As noble Lords know, this Government take the issue of fraud very seriously and are dedicated to protecting UK citizens. As my noble friend Lord Stockwood explained in Committee, the Online Safety Act requires tech companies to take proactive steps to prevent fraudulent content. The Government remain committed to ensuring that Ofcom makes full use of its powers to undertake fast and decisive action against illegal online harms, including fraud. At the request of the Secretary of State, Ofcom will share an annual update on its enforcement strategy for online safety with Parliament.

In July, Ofcom published the fraudulent advertising code consultation, proposing more than 40 new measures to tackle online fraud on the UK’s biggest digital services. Among these measures, Ofcom proposes the mandatory verification of financial services advertisers. This will support legitimate financial promotions from FCA-authorised firms while cracking down on illegal financial promotions such as scam investments and crypto ads.

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I am terribly sorry to interrupt the Minister, but perhaps he could explain why the FCA has stopped the reports that the PSR was previously providing.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

I am unable to answer the noble Lord’s question; might I write to him with an answer?

Amendment 20 was discussed in Committee and the Government’s position remains unchanged. As set out in Committee, a range of measures is already in place and further work is under way across government, regulators and industry. This includes firms using increasingly sophisticated fraud detection systems, confirmation of payee checks, work to improve data sharing between payment service providers and steps to ensure that fraud prevention is built into the design of future retail payments infrastructure.

Turning now to Amendment 95, concerning the protection of intellectual property, I agree that weak protections can be a drag on competitiveness. On non-compete clauses, in particular, there are no provisions in the Employment Rights Act 2025 that would affect the use of non-compete clauses by financial services firms. The Government published a working paper on options for reform of non-compete clauses in employment contracts at Budget 2025. We are currently reviewing responses and will respond to the working paper in due course. The focus of the paper was on options for reform of non-compete clauses in employment contracts. It does not consider reform to intellectual property law or other means to protect confidential information. The Government understand that a well-designed, balanced intellectual property system offers confidence for business investors and consumers to contribute to growing our economy.

Turning finally to Amendment 97 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, I recognise the continued threat posed to the UK by ransomware criminals. Following public consultation last year, this Government are already taking forward work through the Home Office to break the business model of ransomware and provide law enforcement with the information it needs to understand, investigate and disrupt ransomware activity. This includes proposals for a targeted ban on ransomware payments and mandatory reporting for businesses above a certain size. Taken together, the Government consider that the objectives of these amendments are already addressed through the existing framework and work that is under way and do not believe that further statutory requirements are needed. With that in mind, I ask noble Lords not to press their amendments.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

Before the Minister sits down, can I ask for a potential timeframe on when the noble Lord expects to see progress on that work in the Home Office?

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

Again, if the noble Baroness will accept it, I will write to her on that. I do not know the timetable offhand.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, the online platforms know exactly what they have to do to stop online fraud; they are just choosing not to do it. The Government say that the answer will come from Ofcom, but that has certainly not worried the platforms one iota. The platforms will take notice only when they have to pay out to reimburse people who have been victims of those fraud scams. That is why Amendment 17 matters, and that is why I am going to test the opinion of the House.

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Moved by

[Lord Pitt-Watson]

18: Schedule 2, page 78, leave out lines 27 to 30
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would remove a subsection which duplicates section 131Z19 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (inserted by paragraph 18 of Schedule 2).

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Moved by

[Lord Pitt-Watson]

21: Schedule 2, page 83, line 5, leave out “131Z12, 131Z13 or 131Z14” and insert “131Z13, 131Z14 or 131Z15”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would correct a cross-reference.

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Moved by

[Lord Pitt-Watson]

22: Schedule 2, page 85, line 13, at end insert “, and
(ii) in its application as a secondary objective, the objective set out in section 30J(1) of the Bank of England Act 1998 (payment systems etc: innovation).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in the name of Lord Pitt-Watson that inserts a new clause after clause 22 relating to the Bank of England’s functions relating to payment systems and service providers.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

In moving my Amendment 22, I will also speak to government Amendments 58 and 59. Amendment 22 is developed from our discussions in Committee.

Payment systems are essential national infrastructure. They allow households to pay bills, businesses to trade and financial institutions to transfer funds securely. As technology changes how we pay, those systems must continue to evolve, becoming more efficient and capable of supporting new services while remaining trusted and resilient. The Bank of England has a critical responsibility to protect and enhance UK financial stability. The Bank is also working with the Government and other authorities to support safe innovation in payments and digital finance. The Bank has welcomed this measure and will reinforce that work while preserving the primacy of financial stability.

Amendment 58 places the Bank’s role in facilitating innovation on a clear statutory footing. When exercising certain key functions for recognised payment systems, recognised digital settlement asset service providers, and in-scope service providers, the Bank must, so far as is reasonably possible, facilitate innovation with a view to improving the quality, functionality and economy of those systems and related services. The objective is expressly secondary and does not require the Bank to facilitate innovation where doing so would undermine its primary financial stability objective. This change will also bring the regulation of systemic payment systems and digital settlement assets into closer alignment with the Bank’s supervision of other financial market infrastructure. The Bank already has a secondary innovation objective for central counterparties and central securities depositories. Providing a comparable objective for payment systems and digital settlement assets provides the Bank with a clear and consistent statutory framework.

Amendment 58 also ensures that the Bank can be held accountable under its new objective. It enables the Treasury to make recommendations about aspects of the Government’s economic policy for the Bank to have regard to when considering how to advance its financial stability and secondary innovation objective in relation to payment systems. Those recommendations must be published and laid before Parliament. The Bank must explain the action it has taken, or its reasons for not acting, and provide updates where required. The Bank’s annual reports must now also explain how it has advanced the secondary innovation objective and engaged with interested stakeholders.

Amendment 59 reinforces that accountability by requiring the Bank to publish a stand-alone annual report on both secondary innovation objectives. The report must explain how objectives have been embedded in the Bank’s operations, processes and decisions, and how it has advanced them with respect to relevant functions. This will give Parliament and industry clear sight of how the objectives operate in practice.

Amendment 22 is consequential. It ensures that the mechanism already in the Bill for co-ordination between the Financial Conduct Authority, the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Bank with respect to relevant payment functions makes appropriate reference to regulator objectives, which would now include the Bank’s secondary innovation objective.

In summary, these amendments together place the Bank’s role in facilitating safe innovation on a clear statutory footing, while preserving financial stability as its primary objective. They also provide stronger and more transparent accountability for how the Bank applies the objectives in practice. I hope that noble Lords will join me in supporting these amendments.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I have a couple of very brief comments. I am comfortable with the amendments that the Minister has just described, but I have one note of caution. The drive for innovation, which we all think is a good thing, in many ways also increasingly exposes the UK to a loss of monetary sovereignty, particularly where that innovation has to be brought in from overseas, and gives overseas companies far greater control of the payments systems in the UK. That is one of the ongoing fears that we have had. Scott Bessent has been quite open in saying tariffs are very old-fashioned in controlling western economies’ and that stablecoin is the way to do it.

I am therefore cautious when I hear this drive for innovation without some counter-warning and counter-consideration of the monetary sovereignty impacts. I never hear those words used, nor are they captured in any way in anything that I hear around regulation. So often, the move into digital assets—which is, in essence, what this is all about—is about plumbing and pipelines; it does not recognise the political implications. We have seen this in many other areas, such as where we have given away food security and energy security. We need to be very careful that we do not give away security in the financial services and payments sector.

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Moved by

[Lord Pitt-Watson]

23: Schedule 2, page 93, line 6, at end insert—
“(aa) in paragraph 2(3), omit“, (ca)”;”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would remove a cross-reference to the paragraph omitted by paragraph 58(a) of Schedule 2.

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[Lord Altrincham (Con)]

My Lords, these amendments reflect a number of important concerns about the proposed transfer of anti-money laundering supervision to the FCA. We do not believe that each of these points requires legislative commitment. However, we have also been made aware of serious concerns from industry about how this transition is being communicated and how the new regime will work in practice.

These concerns include the governance arrangements following the transfer of the timetable and the transitional process, the maintenance of professional standards, proportionality, and the extent to which the FCA will retain specialist expertise needed to supervise highly technical sectors such as accountancy, legal services and trust and company service provision. There are also legitimate questions about the practical support available to firms, the likely cost of the new regime and whether smaller firms in particular will face disproportionate burdens.

This is why our Amendment 93, in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe, covers a transfer of AML supervision. Parliamentary and entire industry oversight of these changes will be vital in making sure that this new architecture works in the way the Minister wants.

The common thread running through our amendment and the other amendments in this group is therefore a sensible one. If the Government are going to centralise this responsibility within the FCA, they must demonstrate that the FCA is genuinely equipped to undertake it, and provide clarity to industry about how this process is going to be practically achieved. That means not simply having the formal regulatory powers, but having the right people, the right sectoral knowledge, appropriate transitional arrangements and a clear understanding of how supervision will operate across the country.

Industry is concerned about these questions, and those concerns should be taken seriously. I therefore hope the Minister can make a firm commitment today to provide considerably greater clarity about how this transfer will be implemented, how professional expertise, standards and proportionality will be maintained, and what firms should expect during transition.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, for tabling these amendments concerning the implementation of the reform of the UK’s anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing supervisory regime. The points everyone is raising about the implementation of this needing to be well done are extremely important, as is the comment made by the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, about parliamentary oversight of what is taking place here.

Amendments 26 and 27 concern support for firms and implementation planning. Amendment 26 would require the Treasury to publish and lay an assessment before Parliament, including a comparison between the education, guidance and compliance assistance currently available to firms and the support that will be provided by the FCA. The Government recognise the concern that professional services firms should continue to receive clear guidance, appropriate support and access to sector-specific expertise following the transition to the FCA.

Existing provisions in the money laundering regulations, which require supervisors to provide information about money laundering risks to supervised populations, will apply to the FCA in relation to its expanded responsibilities. The FCA already has significant experience of providing AML/CTF information and guidance to a large and diverse supervised population. For these reasons, the Government do not believe that a statutory assessment is necessary.

Amendment 27 would require the Treasury to publish a statutory timetable for implementation. While we do not believe such a requirement is necessary, the FCA has provided some additional clarity on the expected implementation timetables. The current expectation is that the first businesses will begin to be supervised by the FCA before the end of 2028. Further onboarding will take place in phases, with the broad aim that all firms within scope will be supervised by the FCA by mid-2030.

Implementation should proceed only when the necessary preparations are complete. This includes ensuring that appropriate systems and effective information-sharing arrangements are in place, supervisory staff are adequately trained, and sufficient clarity is provided to firms about the future regime. Retaining flexibility will allow the Government and the FCA to respond to stakeholder feedback and lessons arising during the transition.

Existing supervisors will continue to supervise firms, taking enforcement action where necessary and maintaining standards until the FCA assumes its new responsibility. The Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision, OPBAS, will continue to oversee the existing professional body supervisors during that period. The FCA is already engaging with professional body supervisors and HMRC on information-sharing and data-sharing arrangements.

Amendment 28 concerns professional expertise. The Government fully recognise that effective supervision depends on supervisors understanding the sectors they regulate. Legal services providers, accountancy firms and trust and company service providers have different business models, risks and regulatory arrangements.

Of course, the FCA already supervises a large and diverse population, including many smaller firms, and has extensive experience applying a proportionate, risk-based approach across different business models and firm sizes. The FCA’s independent Smaller Business Practitioner Panel also provides direct insight into the perspectives and challenges facing smaller regulated firms.

This reform is not about applying a banking-style or one-size-fits-all supervisory model to professional services firms. The future regime will be proportionate and risk-based and establish a more consistent and effective framework, while recognising the different characteristics and risks of those sectors.

Amendment 29 is on supervisory fees. All businesses, particularly smaller firms and sole traders, want assurance that the future regime will remain proportionate and that firms will not be required to pay excessive supervisory fees. The FCA will consult on the design of its future fee model before assuming responsibility for these sectors. The Government expect fees to be proportionate and consistent with the FCA’s wider fee framework, where smaller firms generally face lower costs than larger firms. The detailed fee structure will depend on the final supervisory model and is therefore better developed through consultation.

Finally, Amendment 30—

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I apologise for interrupting. The Minister has not answered the question of what assessment the Government have made of the cost impact on firms of moving from a single supervisor to dealing with two, particularly for small firms.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

I am not aware of an individual calculation that has been done for that. I do not think that there will be a materially greater cost once the move is made. The key issue that we are trying to address here is that, right now, we have 23 regulators of AML, and that job needs to be done in a more co-ordinated and consistent fashion. If I have information on that, I would be delighted to write to the noble Lord on those costs.

Finally, Amendment 30 addresses the FCA’s capacity to undertake effective AML/CTF supervision across all parts of the United Kingdom. Amendment 30 would require the FCA to report on its capacity to supervise firms throughout the UK. The FCA already operates across the United Kingdom through its offices in London, Leeds and Edinburgh and anticipates having a significant presence for the new AML regime outside London. This provides a strong foundation for maintaining regional coverage, preserving local knowledge and ensuring that jurisdiction-specific issues continue to inform supervision and implementation planning. This will also help with ensuring that regional risks and jurisdiction-specific considerations are understood and addressed, while maintaining a consistent approach across the United Kingdom.

I recognise the objectives behind these amendments: careful implementation, appropriate support, maintenance of expertise, proportionate fees and sufficient FCA capacity. The Government understand why these assurances are being sought. However, additional statutory reports, assessments and fixed requirements are not necessary. These matters are being addressed through implementation planning, capability building, stakeholder engagement, consultation and parliamentary scrutiny of the necessary secondary legislation. The Government will continue to work closely with Parliament, industry, existing supervisors and the FCA. Our aim is to deliver a more consistent, effective and co-ordinated AML/CTF supervisory framework, while ensuring that firms receive proportionate supervision and appropriate support. I therefore ask the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I withdraw the amendment.

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Moved by

[Lord Pitt-Watson]

31: Clause 16, page 18, line 38, at end insert—
“(ba) the competitiveness and growth objective (see section 1EB), and”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would clarify that the strategic priorities set out by the FCA in a long-term strategy under new section 1JZA of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 must include strategic priorities in relation to the competitiveness and growth objective.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, growth is the top priority for the Government, and the financial services sector is key to delivering this. As my noble friend Lord Stockwood set out in Committee, the Government always intended that the FCA’s long-term strategy would set out its priorities for advancing its international competitiveness and growth objectives. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, rightly questioned if our legislative drafting was clear and, after further consideration, the Government have tabled this amendment to ensure that the law is clear on this point. I thank the noble Baroness for bringing this matter to our attention.

I turn to Amendments 32 and 33 which would place detailed statutory requirements on the content of the FCA’s and PRA’s long-term strategies, including requiring descriptions of future regulatory initiatives, indicative timelines and assessments of potential trade-offs. The Government agree that this is an important part of Parliament’s role in scrutinising the work of the regulators. I welcome the commitments made by Nikhil Rathi, the CEO of the FCA, in a letter he sent to me on 2 September, which has been shared with the Lords Financial Services Regulation Committee, the Opposition Front Bench and interested Peers. The letter made a commitment to pro-actively engage relevant parliamentary committees on their priorities before settling future strategies. Katharine Braddick, the new CEO of the PRA, also made commitments in her letter of 3 September to engage its stakeholders and Parliament in the development of its strategy. As I committed to earlier in today’s debate, I am placing these letters in the Library.

Much of the information that the noble Baroness seeks is, or should be, already available through existing channels, including the Regulatory Initiatives Grid, which is updated regularly and is specifically designed to provide firms and stakeholders with forward-looking information on forthcoming regulatory activity. The FCA also publishes and will continue to publish an annual work programme that details what it will deliver in the coming year against the strategic priorities in its current strategy.

The purpose of the long-term strategy is different. It is intended to set out the regulator’s strategic direction and priorities over a five-year period, rather than to operate as a detailed business plan. As the FCA sets out in its letter, the strategy is intended to provide greater clarity and predictability about its priorities, and to provide a strong basis on which Parliament and others can hold it to account for its performance against those priorities. The Government therefore do not consider that these additional statutory requirements are necessary.

I now turn to Amendment 68, which seeks to create new statutory offices for regulatory evaluation within the FCA and the Bank of England. I recognise the concerns expressed during Committee about ensuring that Parliament has access to meaningful information about the performance of the financial regulators. It is a point well made. This amendment would go further than this. It would establish permanent statutory bodies with dedicated directors, governance arrangements and reporting requirements, introducing additional costs on the regulators. As we discussed in Committee, there already exists a range of mechanisms to provide this information. This proposal could potentially duplicate these arrangements, and the Government do not agree that more institutional machinery will necessarily lead to better scrutiny.

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[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by paying tribute to my noble friend Lady Noakes, to the Financial Services Regulation Committee, including the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and to my noble friend Lord Bridges of Headley for their persistent pursuit of a very simple but important principle. As regulators gain more power and their remit expands, so too should the scope and effectiveness of the oversight to which they are subject.

My noble friend Lady Noakes powerfully articulated the concern that the FSMA model has been stretched too far and that even our expert parliamentary committees are struggling with the volume and complexity of oversight. We need stronger, not weaker, democratic accountability, which is why we saw value in the office of regulatory evaluation and/or my noble friend Lord Bridges’s original model tabled in Committee. We also share his concern about the dismantling of the Bank of England’s IEO.

This is an area where the Opposition will continue to develop our thinking for future legislation and would welcome engagement. We are not comfortable with a system whose reaction seems to be to delegate every new or persistent problem to our regulators. We are very pleased that my noble friend Lady Noakes will continue to work with the Treasury and the regulators on improving parliamentary oversight through the relevant committees, and we look forward to working with her and others across the House, including the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. What she has proposed represents a practical compromise that would allow us to move on. However, a positive response to Amendment 93 on first use of the new powers would also be important.

One practical way in which the accountability gap could be narrowed a little—and, indeed, trust in the FCA improved—would be to strengthen the remit of the cost-benefit analysis panels, which already sit within the regulators. Their remit could extend beyond rule changes to include guidance and enforcement activity. They could be given the ability to request an assessment of changes that the regulator has judged to be immaterial. This would strengthen internal challenge, improve confidence in the regulatory process and provide Parliament with more useful and more independent information. I have not brought back yet another amendment on this proposal, but I hope the Minister can commit to looking seriously at it as a follow-up to this useful debate.

I welcome the Government’s amendment on competitiveness and growth. I am only sorry that the name of the Financial Services Regulation Committee does not seem to have made its way into the statute.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, I will not take up too much time because I responded to many of the points at the beginning of the debate. On the Independent Evaluation Office at the Bank of England, the Bank is committed to independent evaluation. It is strengthening the independence of the reviews that it commissions by moving to a model where it commissions external independent experts to lead the reviews.

I echo the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, in thanking the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes—and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, I should add—because we have a commitment from the FCA. If you want to be cynical about it, it may not be as fulsome a commitment as we might want, but it says that accountability, scrutiny and proportionality are central and it wants to support effective parliamentary scrutiny, which I think is where we are all coming from. I thank the noble Baroness and her committee for picking up the baton on this because we must all—Parliament and regulators, with the help of the Government where we can help—work together to have a regulatory environment that is effective and proportionate.

With that in mind, the Government do not think that at this stage further legislative amendments are helpful. I beg to move Amendment 31.

Amendment 31 agreed.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Pitt-Watson Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 9th September 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, we have a lot to cover today, so I will be brief.

We do not believe that imposing additional reporting duties, transition plan requirements and regulatory processes on financial services firms is the right way to address the concerns that have been addressed in these amendments this evening. One of the merits of the Bill is the way it cuts out needless and repetitive operational requirements on financial services firms and regulators and instead introduces a more effective approach based on five-year strategies. As we heard on Monday, stakeholders’ views will be sought in the course of establishing those strategies. Of course, climate change and environmental objectives already remain an important statutory regulatory principle, intended to contribute to the UK’s net-zero target under the Climate Change Act and to the environmental targets established under the Environment Act.

However, requiring banks, other financial institutions and the regulators themselves to fill in forms, tick boxes and produce more and more reports about climate change will not have a meaningful effect on global temperatures; it will simply add costs. We need a regulatory environment which supports growth, enterprise and investment. That means cutting down on the red tape and extra requirements that are putting our international competitiveness at risk. These amendments would add a further layer of process and obligation without a sufficiently clear demonstration that the burdens would advance the environmental objectives being pursued.

This is a time when we should be seeking to streamline regulations and be careful about new requirements, however well-intentioned, because of the need to get the economic growth that we lack. These amendments risk taking us a step backwards, so we cannot support them and will be voting against them if noble Lords press them to a vote.

[The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Lord Pitt-Watson) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baronesses for these amendments and for the wider debate on sustainable finance and adapting to climate change. These amendments address a number of important issues: climate transition planning, tackling deforestation, how the regulators consider climate risk and the products commonly known as green mortgages. As several noble Lords have argued today, both climate-related and nature-related risks can have significant implications for the economy, for financial markets and their ability to deliver for customers, and for long-term prosperity.

As many noble Lords may know, it is a topic close to my heart, including through my past chairing of the United Nations Environment Programme’s Finance Initiative at the Paris climate talks. UNEPFI is a voluntary organisation of more than 500 financial organisations from the North and the South, with funds of more than £100 trillion under management. It has established some of the world’s foremost sustainability frameworks for finance, including involvement with the REDD+ project, reducing emissions from deforestation in degradation, which I believe is now preserving many millions of square miles of forest.

I share the underlying objectives behind these amendments. The question before us is, therefore, not whether action is needed but how best to deliver that action in a way that is effective, proportionate and aligned with the wider framework we are putting in place.

Let me come to Amendments 34 and 55, which raise important points regarding how the regulators consider and report on climate and environment-related issues. I have spoken to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, and members of Peers for the Planet throughout the week on this important issue. I also hosted a drop-in session for Peers with the FCA. During that session, I heard a number of concerns about the absence of climate and environmental targets have-regard operating at a day-to-day level, and I have, of course, heard the issues raised in this debate today.

While I still believe that there is significant value in streamlining the regulators’ have-regards, I appreciate that it is important that the regulators continue to focus on the vital issue of the sector’s contribution to climate change at a day-to-day level, and I appreciate the importance of regular reporting on this issue to aid parliamentary scrutiny. While I cannot do anything today, I am prepared to return to this issue at Third Reading and would be prepared and undertake to table amendments to Clause 17 that would require the PRA and FCA to continue to consider their existing climate change and environmental targets have-regard at a day-to-day level and to maintain appropriate notification and reporting requirements.

Amendments 34 and 55 introduce a new have-regard and reporting requirement on climate-related financial stability issues. I therefore ask the noble Baronesses, Lady Northover and Lady Hayman, not to press Amendments 34 and 55 on that basis, and I will return at Third Reading with the amendments I have described.

Amendment 65 concerns transition plan requirements. The Government remain committed to this area. We consulted in 2025 on options for implementing transition plan requirements and are considering responses alongside wider work on sustainability and corporate reporting reform. In February, we finalised the UK sustainability reporting standards for voluntary use. The FCA has also consulted on aligning listed company disclosure requirements with these standards. The FCA aims to publish final rules this autumn with requirements expected to take effect from January 2027. This amendment would place a statutory timetable on an area where policy development remains under active consideration across government. We believe in the importance of finalising this work before imposing an arbitrary road map.

On Amendments 90 and 97A, I recognise the strength of feeling on deforestation and agree that urgent action is needed. I am therefore pleased to report that this work is moving forward. As the noble Baroness, Lady Young, said, Defra has confirmed that they will consult later this year on Great Britain’s approach to tackling deforestation in domestic supply chains and the next steps for the forest risk commodities regime. My officials have spoken to Defra, which has confirmed that it plans to consult during the autumn and that legislation will be delivered in 2027. The responsibility for enforcing the regime will be determined by Defra when it designs the regulations.

We share the objective of progress being made as quickly as possible. However, a six-month statutory deadline risks prioritising speed over effectiveness. The Government believe the better approach is to ensure that any resulting regime is robust, proportionate and capable of decoupling supply chains from global deforestation. The Government have already committed, through the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023, to review the regulatory framework for tackling deforestation-linked finance within nine months of Defra’s legislation on domestic supply chains. Furthermore, the principle that I committed to reapply today to day-to-day activities also explicitly covers consideration of environmental targets in the Environment Act 2021, so this will remain part of the regulators’ day-to-day work.

On Amendment 91, the Government support high-quality green mortgage products that can help households to finance energy efficiency improvements and improve resilience to climate-related risks. However, the amendment risks duplicating efforts by regulators, departments and existing frameworks. FCA rules already require clear disclosure and the FCA is considering disclosure further through its mortgage rule review. The Green Home Finance Strategic Partnership also has a dedicated working group focused on consumer protection and standards. With over 90 green mortgage products now available compared with fewer than 10 in 2019, the Government consider that imposing a statutory timetable would be premature while policy and the market continue to develop. The current approach provides the flexibility to develop clear, proportionate standards while maintaining consumer protections.

In conclusion, the Government support the objectives that sit behind these amendments. We have listened to the House and will, at Third Reading, table amendments to Clause 17 requiring the PRA and FCA to continue to consider that their existing climate change and environmental targets have regard at a day-to-day level and to maintain appropriate notification and reporting requirements. More broadly, we support credible transition planning. We support action to address deforestation and forest risk commodities, and we support the development of high-quality green mortgages. The Government are already taking forward substantial work in these areas and will continue to do so in a co-ordinated and proportionate way. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, we welcome the Government’s decision to retain proportionality as an express statutory consideration for both the FCA and the PRA when they exercise their general functions. This responds to productive discussions in and outside Committee, for which I thank the Minister and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Stockwood, who I am delighted to welcome back to the discussion of the Bill, and I thank him for his efforts to improve it. I also thank my noble friend Lady Noakes, the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for their constructive and flexible approach to the substantial problems on these clauses.

Time and again, one of the concerns we hear from business is that regulation can be disproportionate to the risk it is intended to address. That is particularly true for the small and medium-sized firms that we rely on so heavily for competition, innovation and economic growth, right across this country. The proportionality changes help to address this and we will not therefore be pressing our Amendment 62 on SMEs to a vote—even though it is my favourite amendment and I have the support of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, is right to focus on lending to small defence companies as well.

The requirement for the FCA and PRA to explain in their annual reports how they have taken these proportionality principles into account, alongside the requirements relating to consultation and parliamentary committees, creates an important mechanism through which Parliament can examine whether the principle is actually being applied in practice, with concrete examples, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, suggested. This is important because the ultimate test of these amendments will not simply be whether “proportionality” appears in statute. It will be whether firms see a genuine difference in the way regulation is developed and applied, particularly by the regulators. We hope that the Government’s amendments will prove to be a meaningful mechanism through which regulation can become easier to comply with, less costly and ultimately more successful in achieving the objectives that Parliament has set for the regulators—of course, the proof will be in their implementation.

The Government have listened to concerns raised during the passage of the Bill and we support the amendments that the Minister has tabled in response. This is good House of Lords practice. Like my noble friend Lady Noakes, I do not intend to pursue the other amendments today.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for this debate. I hope it demonstrates that the Government have listened carefully to the arguments made by noble Lords during Committee and recognise the strength of feeling and the logic around addressing Clause 17. In Committee, noble Lords made it clear that they had concerns with that clause, which removes the requirement to consider regulatory principles each time they exercise a general function in favour of considering them just at a strategic level. These points were made particularly strongly with regard to proportionality; in response, we have tabled Amendments 37 and 43 in my name. These amendments will ensure that the two proportionality regulatory principles will continue to apply to the regulators’ day-to-day actions.

There was also a rich debate in Committee about the different facets of proportionality and the factors that regulators should consider. Here, again, the Government have listened. Amendment 44 makes changes to the existing principles to explicitly include that the regulators should recognise the differing abilities of firms to engage and comply with regulation owing to their size—a point raised by both the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. This means that regulators will need to consider the specific impact of their proposals on SMEs.

It was also clear that a number of noble Lords had concerns about the possible effects of Clause 17 on Parliament’s ability to effectively scrutinise the regulators. In response, Amendments 40 and 46 to 50 will ensure that existing reporting requirements on the proportionality regulatory principles will remain in place, including as part of the consultation on annual reports. The Government are therefore retaining the majority of existing transparency and reporting requirements, including through panel reports, consultation requirements and annual reports.

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Moved by

[Lord Pitt-Watson]

37: Clause 17, page 21, line 34, leave out “omit subsection (5)(a)” and insert “in subsection (5) for paragraph (a) substitute—
“(a) the proportionality regulatory principles (see section 3B(1A)), and””Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would require the FCA to have regard to the proportionality regulatory principles (as defined in the amendment in the name of Lord Pitt-Watson to clause 17 at page 22, line 3) when discharging its general functions.

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Moved by

[Lord Pitt-Watson]

40: Clause 17, page 21, line 35, leave out subsection (3)
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would require the publication of draft FCA rules to be accompanied by an explanation of the FCA's reasons for believing that making the proposed rules would be compatible with its duty to have regard to the proportionality regulatory principles when discharging its general functions (which would be inserted by the amendment in the name of Lord Pitt-Watson to clause 17 at page 22, line 3).

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Moved by

[Lord Pitt-Watson]

43: Clause 17, page 21, line 40, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b) and insert—
“(a) in the heading, after “regard to” insert “proportionality”;(b) in subsection (2), for “the regulatory principles in section 3B” substitute “the proportionality regulatory principles (see section 3B(1A))”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would require the PRA to have regard to the proportionality regulatory principles (as defined in the amendment in the name of Lord Pitt-Watson to clause 17 at page 22, line 3) when discharging its general functions.

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Moved by

[Lord Pitt-Watson]

46: Clause 17, page 22, line 6, leave out subsection (7)
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in the name of Lord Pitt-Watson to clause 17 at page 21, line 35.

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Moved by

[Lord Pitt-Watson]

58: After Clause 22, insert the following new Clause—
“Bank of England functions: payment systems and service providers(1) In the Bank of England Act 1998, after Part 3B insert—“Part 3CPayment systems and service providers30J Exercise of functions relating to payment systems and service providers(1) In exercising its relevant payment systems functions in a way that advances the Financial Stability Objective the Bank must, so far as reasonably possible, act in a way which, as a secondary objective, facilitates innovation in—(a) the operation of recognised payment systems,(b) the provision of services by recognised DSA service providers, and(c) the provision of services by service providers in relation to such systems or such DSA service providers,with a view to improving the quality, functionality and economy of the systems and services. (2) For the purposes of this Part the Bank’s “relevant payment systems functions” are—(a) its function of publishing principles under section 188 of the Banking Act 2009,(b) its function of publishing codes of practice under section 189 of that Act, and(c) its function of determining the general policy and principles by reference to which it performs particular functions under Part 5 of that Act (payment systems and service providers).(3) In this Part—“operation” , in relation to a recognised payment system, is to be construed in accordance with Part 5 of the Banking Act 2009 (see section 183 of that Act);“recognised DSA service provider” is to be construed in accordance with Part 5 of that Act (see section 184A of that Act);“recognised payment system” is to be construed in accordance with Part 5 of that Act (see section 184 of that Act).(4) In subsection (1)(c)—(a) the reference to service providers in relation to recognised payment systems is to be construed in accordance with Part 5 of the Banking Act 2009 (see section 206A(2) of that Act);(b) the reference to service providers in relation to recognised DSA service providers is to be construed in accordance with Part 5 of that Act (see section 206A(2A) and (2B) of that Act);(c) the reference to the provision of services by service providers in relation to recognised payment systems or recognised DSA service providers includes a reference to the services and arrangements mentioned in section 183(k)(i) and (ii) of that Act (interpretation).30K Recommendations by Treasury(1) The Treasury may at any time by notice in writing to the Bank make recommendations about aspects of the economic policy of His Majesty’s Government to which the Bank should have regard when considering how to advance the Financial Stability Objective and the secondary objective under section 30J(1) (payment systems etc: innovation).(2) The Treasury must make recommendations under subsection (1) at least once in each Parliament.(3) The Treasury must—(a) publish in such manner as they think fit any notice given under subsection (1), and(b) lay a copy of it before Parliament.(4) The Bank must respond to each recommendation made under subsection (1) by notifying the Treasury in writing of—(a) action that the Bank has taken or intends to take in accordance with the recommendation, or(b) the reasons why the Bank has not acted or does not intend to act in accordance with the recommendation.(5) The notice under subsection (4) must be given before the end of 12 months beginning with the date the notice containing the recommendation was given under subsection (1).(6) Where the Bank has given notice under subsection (4) in relation to a recommendation, it must by notice in writing update the Treasury on the matters mentioned in subsection (4)(a) and (b) before the end of each subsequent period of 12 months.(7) Subsection (6) does not apply if the Treasury have notified the Bank in writing that no update (or further update) is required. (8) The Bank is not required under subsection (4) or (6) to provide any information whose publication would in the opinion of the Bank be against the public interest.”(2) In section 203B of the Banking Act 2009 (payment systems and service providers: annual report)—(a) in subsection (1)—(i) in paragraph (b), for “met” substitute “advanced”;(ii) omit the “and” after paragraph (b);(iii) after that paragraph insert—“(ba) the extent to which, in its opinion, in discharging its relevant payment systems functions, its innovation objective, in its application as a secondary objective, has been advanced,(bb) the efforts it has made to engage with persons, other than persons within subsection (4), appearing to the Bank to have an interest in the discharge of its functions under this Part,(bc) the results of that engagement, and”;(b) after subsection (3) insert—“(4) The following persons are within this subsection—(a) operators of recognised payment systems;(b) recognised DSA service providers;(c) service providers in relation to recognised payment systems or recognised DSA service providers.(5) In this section—“innovation objective” means the objective set out in section 30J(1) of the Bank of England Act 1998 (payment systems etc: innovation);“relevant payment systems functions” has the same meaning as in Part 3C of the Bank of England Act 1998 (see section 30J(2) of that Act).”(3) In section 204(1A) of the Banking Act 2009 (information)—(a) the words “its financial stability objective” become paragraph (a);(b) after that paragraph insert“, or(b) in its application as a secondary objective, its objective set out in section 30J(1) of the Bank of England Act 1998 (payment systems etc: innovation).””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would insert provisions relating to the exercise of the Bank’s payment systems functions under the Banking Act 2009; including a secondary objective to exercise functions in a way that facilitates innovation in payment systems and related services with a view to improving their quality, functionality and economy.

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[Lord Altrincham (Con)]

I thank the Minister for hosting this second day of Report with such grace. I will focus my remarks on Amendment 64, to which I added my name. I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, for bringing this important issue before the House again.

“Section 166 review” is the name given to FCA investigations. These investigations were originally quite rare, but dozens are now launched every year and they are paid for by the target firms. These investigations are expensive and time-consuming. They can have a rather arbitrary regulatory purpose and are somewhat unconstrained. This regulatory power can be exercised without a statutory threshold requiring the regulator first to demonstrate that the matter is sufficiently serious and that using this particular tool is proportionate.

We hear consistently from firms that Section 166 reviews are increasingly becoming the norm rather than the exception. Without a degree of restraint or oversight, these powers may create regulatory uncertainty. Our amendment would not prevent the regulators acting where there is a serious problem, nor would it remove Section 166 from their toolkit. It would simply mean that such a costly and burdensome power is used proportionately where it is genuinely warranted. I very much hope that the Minister will accept the amendment, but if the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, decides to test the opinion of the House as she has indicated, we will support her.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, this group raises two important but distinct questions: how the prudential framework should treat lending that supports employee ownership, co-operatives and mutuals; and when regulators should use skilled person reviews under Section 166 of FSMA. The Government have carefully considered the case made for each amendment, but do not believe that these changes should be made through legislation.

Amendments 63 and 66 seek to create a bespoke prudential framework for lending to co-operatives and mutuals, including through lower risk weights. The Government recognise the valuable contribution that co-operatives and mutuals make to the UK economy and are undertaking a multiyear programme of work to support the growth of the sector. This includes making amendments to the Building Societies Act 1986, which we debated last week, to align it with company law and give societies greater funding flexibility.

However, prudential capital requirements should reflect the underlying risk of a lending activity rather than the ownership structure of the lender. Prudential requirements are generally set by the Prudential Regulation Authority through its rules, rather than being prescribed in legislation. This allows the framework to respond to evolving risks and market developments, while operating within a statutory framework established by Parliament. The Prudential Regulation Authority has clear statutory objectives and is accountable to Parliament for the exercise of its functions. It is therefore the appropriate body to assess risk characteristics and determine the appropriate prudential treatment of different exposures. The Government therefore do not consider it appropriate to prescribe preferential prudential treatment for particular business models through legislation. Such decisions should remain matters for the independent Prudential Regulation Authority. For these reasons, I am unable to support these amendments.

Turning to Amendment 64 concerning Section 166 skilled person reviews, I agree that these reviews should be commissioned only where appropriate and proportionate. However, the Government are not persuaded that a further statutory threshold is necessary. As we discussed in Committee, regulators already consider the circumstances of the firm, the costs involved and the availability of alternative supervisory tools before commissioning a skilled person review. The FCA and the PRA have established supervisory processes for doing so. Requiring the regulators to satisfy an additional statutory test could delay supervisory action and make it harder to intervene before problems occur that could damage the interests of consumers or affect the functioning of markets.

I know that a concern has been raised about there being more and more Section 166 reviews. I reassure noble Lords that the FCA’s use of skilled person reviews has been broadly consistent over the past 10 years. In 2025-26, only 31 were commissioned, which is the second-lowest usage since 2016. I am happy to send the figures to Members if they are interested.

In their letters to me, which have been shared with interested Members and laid in the Library, both regulators set out details of their approach to delivering proportionality, with the FCA explaining how its approach to supervision is proportionate, risk based and targeted. They also commit to ongoing engagement with parliamentary committees on their approach. I hope that this reassures the noble Baroness about the process and proportionality of Section 166 reviews and therefore ask her not to press her amendments.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, for supporting my Section 166 amendment. With regard to my Amendments 63 and 66, the Government have interpreted this exactly as I said it was not: I said that it is not telling the PRA what to do, but to consider a prudential distinction. I did not tell it what to do with it. Of course, it has that power anyway, and the purpose of the amendment was to draw attention to a very important sector. I will take the measure up with the PRA directly. For now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, this is an important and forward-looking group of amendments, covering open finance, digital market infrastructure and the future of digital assets. I am very grateful to my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond for his amendments, and for explaining the scale of the digital tide and the AI wave and the lack of specific signals in the Bill on these opportunities.

I will focus my remarks on Amendment 88, standing in my name and those of my noble friend Lord Altrincham and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, who I thank for her support. We debated these issues in Committee, but the central concern remains. Digital assets are becoming an accelerating part of our financial and economic landscape, yet policy is still developing too often issue by issue, product by product and regulator by regulator.

What is missing is a comprehensive strategy. This matters. Industry is telling us that the most basic building blocks of a comprehensive regulatory regime, such as legal definitions, do not exist. This uncertainty is translating into a lack of confidence, which is driving wealth creators away.

Amendment 88 asks the Treasury to step back and set out a coherent strategy for the regulation and development of digital assets and related financial market infrastructure in the UK. It asks the Treasury to establish its objectives, consult properly with industry and other interested parties, and explain how the different strands of policy fit together. This can build on the work of the Bank of England and of Chris Woolard, the new Wholesale Digital Markets Champion at the Treasury. We are most grateful for yesterday’s briefing, at which Chris set out his forthcoming plans for another report due to be published next year.

The opportunity for the UK is considerable. We have the legal system, deep capital markets and an extensive professional services ecosystem, but firms need to know which regulator is responsible for which part of the system, what rules will apply, how different regimes will interact, and how quickly decisions will be made. We are seeing the effects of current ambiguity in reports of firms wishing to offer digital asset products being debanked, a point to which my amendment refers.

Other financial centres are moving rapidly to establish their own frameworks for digital assets and tokenised markets, as my noble friend Lord Ranger explained from his position of great expertise. If businesses conclude that another jurisdiction offers greater regulatory certainty or a clearer strategic direction, they can quickly go elsewhere.

Amendment 88 therefore offers the Government an opportunity to bring those different strands together. The work of Chris Woolard is welcome, but our amendment encompasses a wider range of concerns raised with us. I hope the Government will engage with the amendment, but if I am not satisfied with the Minister’s response I will seek to test the opinion of the House.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lady Kramer, and the noble Lords, Lord Altrincham and Lord Holmes, for their amendments relating to the adoption of technology in the financial services sector and for their contributions to this debate. Technological change is already having a significant impact on the sector and there are huge opportunities for the UK alongside risks to be managed.

Amendment 71 seeks to require the FCA to create and maintain a framework for open finance. However, the Government already have powers to create a framework for open finance under the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025. Parliament has therefore already legislated here, and that legislation includes the power to require the FCA to regulate for open finance and includes appropriate safeguards and scrutiny. The Treasury also confirmed at Mansion House in July 2026 its commitment to open finance and said it will consult on open finance next year.

Amendments 88 and 89 are both focused on digitalisation. Amendment 88 seeks to support the UK’s approach to digital assets by requiring the Government to publish a digital assets strategy. It sets out a number of important issues that such a strategy should consider. Amendment 89 similarly seeks to support digitalisation by requiring the Government to make regulations establishing an issuer digitalisation council, composed of representatives from issuers, intermediaries, the FCA, the PRA, the Bank of England and the Treasury.

As noted in the debate in Committee, the Government strongly support digital assets and see them as a key strategic priority. As such, the Government have been very active on this agenda and have a comprehensive strategy to drive forward the digitalisation of wholesale markets through the wholesale financial markets digital strategy published in July 2025. The Government have been taking forward the actions of the strategy at speed. There has been progress even since this issue was debated in Committee.

Chris Woolard CBE published his first report as the Government’s Wholesale Digital Markets Champion in July, setting out a comprehensive cross-sector approach to digital assets. The Economic Secretary to the Treasury and I hosted a drop-in session with Mr Woolard here in Parliament just yesterday so that Members of your Lordships’ House could hear more about his agenda. I think those noble Lords who were there would agree that we should be impressed by the scope and comprehensiveness of the work he is doing.

Mr Woolard outlined not one workstream but nine taskforce action groups that are taking forward the industry road map, including an action group focused on the primary issuance of digital securities, and with an initial focus on delivering an end-to-end use case. These groups and the overarching orchestration group represent a huge amount of work, expertise and industry input that Chris is leading. They include the industry, a strategy and 50 companies, to be joined by the head of Europe from BlackRock and the London Stock Exchange. It is absolutely great work, as the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, said.

At that meeting, Chris Woolard was asked whether there was any need for further primary legislation. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Ranger, was at the meeting and can confirm that he said that right now, he did not think there was. He could also confirm that I said that, should there be that need, I and the Economic Secretary to the Treasury would be listening to that. There will be a real threat to UK competitiveness if we fail to act in this area, and a considerable opportunity if we get it right. I hope that the opportunity to engage Mr Woolard prior to this debate gave insight into the vast amount of constructive work that is already taking place to make sure that this happens.

There are many other actions being taken to support this work, such as the Bank of England and the Financial Conduct Authority’s call for input on tokenisation, which closed in July. They intend to publish a further road map in the autumn. In noble Lords’ speeches, I heard that they want momentum and a strategy involving industry. That is what is happening right now. The Government also highlighted progress on the digital securities sandbox, the digital gilt instrument, in Committee.

The Government strongly believe in the need to digitalise financial markets, and I hope that the measures the Government are taking forward and the further updates that noble Lords received from Chris Woolard, as wholesale digital markets champion, show that the Government are working with the sector and the regulators to deliver a strategic approach to digitalisation—

[Lord Ranger of Northwood (Con)]

My Lords, forgive me for interjecting, but the Minister is quite right. We had a very progressive session with Mr Woolard yesterday. The question I raised with him was about the future strategy and where we were heading, because his focus is clearly on tokenisation. We noticed that there was a further discussion on standard-setting internationally, agentic finance and various other elements that are in development and need strategic thought. I think that the champion took on board that there was a broader vision that needed to be identified, which is what we would be looking for in a strategy.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

He did indeed take that on board, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Ranger, for making that point. He was also asked whether at this point further primary legislation was needed. He said that it was not but was invited, should that situation change, to talk to the Ministers in the Treasury. Therefore, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)]

My Lords, I thank everyone who has taken part in this debate. I thank the Minister for his answer, and I echo every word he said about the fantastic work that Chris Woolard and, indeed, Mark Austin have done in this area. For the time being, I will withdraw the amendment, but it remains to be seen whether we are building a faster horse or regulating existing products in a digital form. I suggest that there is still more thinking to be done on composability and the extraordinary opportunities that exist, but it is fantastic that we have such champions in Chris Woolard and others working in this area. I look forward to seeing how it develops. For the moment, I withdraw the amendment.

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Moved by

[Lord Pitt-Watson]

73: Clause 27, page 32, leave out lines 38 and 39
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, and the amendment in the name of Lord Pitt-Watson to clause 27 at page 33, line 1, would ensure that both clauses 27 and 36 can be commenced to amend one list in section 66A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 while preserving the final “or”.

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Moved by

[Lord Pitt-Watson]

75: Clause 29, page 34, line 32, leave out “is in force” and insert “has effect”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would make section 55AA(4) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 consistent with section 55A(3) of that Act (as amended by clause 29).

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Moved by

[Lord Pitt-Watson]

76: Clause 33, page 38, line 28, at end insert—
“(2A) In section 61 (determination of applications), in subsection (3ZA)—(a) the words from “granting it” to the end become paragraph (a);(b) after that paragraph insert“, or(b) in the case of a permitted conditional application (as defined in section 60A(5)), granting it subject only to conditions, or for a limited period, requested in the application (or both).””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would keep section 61 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 in step with other amendments to Part 5 of that Act, which treat a decision to grant an application on the terms requested like an approval of the application.

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Moved by

[Lord Pitt-Watson]

81: Clause 37, page 45, line 2, at end insert—
“(7) If the Treasury are satisfied that regulations under section 408A or 408B of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (as inserted by subsection (3)) would, if made, have substantially the same effect as existing overseas recognition provision—(a) sections 408A to 408C of that Act (as inserted by subsection (3)) apply in relation to the regulations as if—(i) section 408A(2) were omitted,(ii) in section 408B(1), the words from “if the Treasury” to the end were omitted,(iii) section 408B(2), (4) and (5) were omitted, and(iv) section 408C(1) to (4) were omitted, and(b) section 429 of that Act applies in relation to the regulations as if, in subsection (2), “408A” (as inserted by subsection (5)) were omitted.(8) In considering whether regulations would have substantially the same effect as existing overseas recognition provision, the Treasury must—(a) treat the power in section 408B to designate a country or territory for the purposes of the regulations as forming part of the regulations, and(b) disregard any difference between that power and any power to make designations under the existing overseas recognition provision.(9) In subsections (7) and (8), “existing overseas recognition provision” means—(a) provision contained in an instrument containing provision listed in the Schedule to the Financial Services (Overseas Recognition Regime Designations) Regulations 2025 (as it has effect from time to time), or(b) a designation made under such an instrument.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would allow the Treasury to consolidate existing provision relating to overseas recognition under the umbrella of the new overseas recognition regime, so long as their doing so would not substantially change the effect of the existing law.

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[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 87 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. I will speak to my Amendment 92, and I am grateful to her for adding her name to it. Amendment 92 would insert a provision in the Bill to allow life insurers to set up defined benefit pension superfunds outside of their solvency UK ring-fences, enabling them to participate in the superfund market and potentially even help the UK build its own version of Canada’s much-vaunted Maple Eight. UK insurers—with suitable ring-fencing, as set out in the amendment, to ensure separation from their insurance business—are ideally placed to run large pools of pension investments, with existing in-house expertise in areas such as investment, actuarial and legal. At present, insurance buyout is seen as the gold standard for defined benefit pension scheme endgame strategies.

Superfunds could provide a means to add billions of pounds-worth of productive capital into the UK economy and allow pension members to enjoy better benefits, rather than superfunds remaining niche players, if the current system is not changed. Insurers could bring large amounts of capital pooled into the pension scheme area and collect pension assets so that scheme members would have better upside opportunities and robust alternatives to the finality of annuity buyouts, which are generally considered 100% safe but could well not be. Buyout pushes assets into low-return, unproductive opportunities and denies members greater returns and better pensions, which could come from superfunds.

In particular, there are concerns about systemic risk with annuity buyouts. I wondered whether the Minister might agree to meet me and other interested parties to discuss the risks involved in the Government’s current perception that annuity buyout is the gold standard, 100% safe endgame strategy. I hope that he will recognise that the Financial Services Compensation Scheme may not be as secure as expected.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles and Lady Altmann, for their amendments. I will take each in turn, starting with Amendment 87.

As was noted by my predecessor, the Government recognise the role which the bespoke tax regime for transformer vehicles plays in ensuring that the UK is competitive. We also recognise, as does this amendment, the importance of robust anti-avoidance measures and clear guidance in ensuring that the regime functions effectively, provides certainty to business and safeguards the integrity of the tax system.

It is right that we preserve HMRC’s ability to effectively pursue instances where vehicles are established for the purposes of avoiding tax, and it is important that we preserve that ability and avoid creating risks for the Exchequer. However, I recognise the strength of feeling in industry over this issue. I therefore offer the Baroness a meeting with HMRC and Treasury officials to discuss it in more depth. I remain of the view that this legislation is not the appropriate place to make provision for the tax regime governing transformer vehicles—the Risk Transformation (Tax) Regulations 2017 being the specific legislation designed to govern this.

On Amendment 92, the Government recognise the important role that defined benefit pension scheme consolidation can play in improving outcomes for pension scheme members and providing additional options for schemes. The amendment seeks to place in legislation an explicit permission for PRA-authorised insurers to establish, own or operate DB superfunds and would introduce statutory requirements governing the separation of superfund and insurance activities. However, insurers are already able to establish and operate superfunds under the existing regulatory framework. The amendment therefore does not create a new route into the market. Rather, its primary effect is to place requirements relating to ring-fencing, capital treatment and the separation of activities into primary legislation. The Government’s view is that matters relating to prudential regulation, capital treatment and the supervision of regulated firms are more appropriately addressed by the relevant regulators rather than through detailed provisions in primary legislation. For those reasons, while I appreciate the intention behind the amendment, the Government do not consider it necessary.

I therefore ask the noble Baronesses to withdraw or not move their respective amendments.

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

Would the noble Lord be willing to meet to go through some of these issues?

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

If I would be the relevant person to talk to on this matter, I would be happy to meet. If not, perhaps I can direct the noble Baroness to appropriate officials.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his reply. There is nothing in my amendment that is intended to stop pursuit of things that are wrong, but the evidence is that the guidance is not understood. I welcome the opportunity to have a meeting with HMRC officials so that we can explain more clearly where the problems lie and see if a solution can be found. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I am not sure how to follow that. I have added my name to Amendment 98. Clause 50 is a very broad, catch-all Henry VIII power. Given that the Bill already has over 50 delegated powers in it, this seems entirely superfluous and it should be removed.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 98 would remove the consequential power contained in Clause 50. The Government understand the concern that delegated powers should be used appropriately and should not become a vehicle for making substantive policy changes without parliamentary scrutiny. Indeed, I think that, on Monday, in response to issues to do with Henry VIII powers, I gave some sympathy to that argument. However, the power in Clause 50 is not a power to introduce new policy, nor is it a power to revisit the policy that Parliament will have approved by passage of the Bill; it is a narrow, regulation-making power limited to dealing with matters that arise as a consequence of the provision that Parliament has already approved within the Bill.

It is common and often necessary for legislation of this scale and complexity to require consequential adjustments elsewhere on the statute book, so that provisions operate as intended. Without such a power, relatively minor or technical changes would require further primary legislation, creating unnecessary delay and complexity. For these reasons, the Government do not believe that removing this clause would improve the Bill. I would also note that this was not a point raised by the Delegated Powers Committee about the Bill.

Finally, I assure the noble Baroness that parliamentary committees will of course be able to call the Government to appear in front of them and account for the use of consequential power or, indeed, any other power in the Bill. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw this amendment.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, the fact is that Clause 50 gives Ministers a broad and potentially permanent power to amend or appeal primary legislation, including devolved legislation, without the full scrutiny afforded to a Bill. Unlike other Bills, this is a Bill with many new, unspecified powers, so I seek to test the opinion of the House.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Lord Pitt-Watson Excerpts

3rd reading
Tuesday 15th September 2026 Lords Chamber

Northern Ireland and Scottish legislative consent sought. Relevant documents: 2nd and 8th Reports from the Delegated Powers Committee.

[The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Lord Pitt-Watson) (Lab)]

My Lords, I begin by making a short statement on the position regarding legislative consent on the Bill. Legislative consent from the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Scottish Parliament is required for Clauses 49 and 51, which concern crypto assets and their seizure and recovery by UK law enforcement. These relate in part to matters that are devolved matters in respect of Scotland and transferred matters in respect of Northern Ireland. The Government have written to the Northern Ireland Executive and the Scottish Government on this matter and my expectation is that these issues will be fully addressed during the Bill’s passage in the other place. We remain committed to sustained engagement with the devolved Governments for the remainder of the Bill’s passage.

Clause 16: Requirements to have regard to the regulatory principles

Amendment 1

Moved by

[Lord Pitt-Watson]

1: Clause 16, page 21, line 17, after “principles” insert “and the climate and environment regulatory principle”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would require the FCA to have regard to the climate and environment regulatory principle (as defined in the amendment in the name of Lord Pitt-Watson to clause 16, page 21, line 39) when discharging its general functions.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 1 I will also speak to the other government amendments tabled in my name.

At Report and in Committee we discussed the fact that climate-related and nature-related risks can have significant implications for the economy, financial markets and long-term prosperity, and for the ability of the finance industry to do its job properly. We heard a number of calls to ensure that the financial services regulators continue to prioritise this agenda at a day-to-day level. However, it is important that this is done in a way that is aligned with the Government’s wider regulatory strategy and does not result in a new set of “have regards” which would further complicate the regulatory framework rather than make it simpler and more effective, as the Bill is intended to do.

The amendments tabled in my name deliver on the commitment I made last week to require the FCA and the PRA to continue to have regard to their existing climate change and environmental targets regulatory principle at a day-to-day level and to maintain appropriate notification and reporting requirements as part of that. Amendments 1 and 3 amend Clause 16, formerly Clause 17, so that the FCA and the PRA must have regard to the climate and environmental targets principle when discharging their general functions. Amendments 5 to 8 ensure that the regulators must report appropriately on their consideration of the principle, including in annual reports and consultations. Amendments 2, 4 and 9 then ensure that certain references and definitions are correct and account for these changes. Put together, these amendments will ensure that the FCA and the PRA continue to have an appropriate focus on this vital issue. I beg to move.

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[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, as this is Third Reading, I want to start by extending my warm thanks to the Minister and his team for their work on the Bill. I welcome the movement that the Government have shown on several of the issues that we have raised during the passage of this 137-page Bill, which in general we support.

Chief among them is proportionality, which will continue to apply to the regulators in the exercise of their day-to-day functions. That change reflects concerns on all sides of the House; my hope is that it will help to reduce the burden on SMEs, so I thank the Minister for this. I also welcome the movement we have seen on the important issue of financial education and look forward to engaging on that. It is becoming ever more important, whether you are a pupil, a student applying for a loan, or an adult managing your finances or thinking about retirement.

However, there remain important issues which the Government have not yet addressed sufficiently. Among them are the Henry VIII powers in Clause 3 and Clause 50 and the first use of the extensive new powers in the Bill. I understand the Government intend to reintroduce Clause 3 at a later stage in the Bill’s passage with further detail, and that is welcome, but it does not detract from the fundamental point at issue. One of Parliament’s principal functions is to scrutinise government legislation, and we simply cannot do so properly when Bills confer broad powers without setting out clearly how they are to be used.

A digital asset strategy to support faster action to stop further loss of digital entrepreneurs and less aggressive use of Section 166 are two areas where we believe the Government should go further, because we have heard consistent concerns from industry.

Turning to the amendments, I deeply regret the amendments the Government are introducing today on climate change. This represents a serious U-turn by the Government. Their original proposal was to move these considerations into five-year strategies. The existing requirements they dispensed with are largely superfluous and burdensome. There is little evidence that today’s amendments to restore them make any meaningful contribution, either to reducing climate change or to protecting the environment. At a time when businesses are already facing considerable pressure, and when our wider economic circumstances demand an unrelenting focus on growth, competitiveness and investment, imposing further needless regulatory burdens is the wrong direction of travel.

I would also suggest that, for an economy as dependent as ours on international investment, these amendments send entirely the wrong signal. We should be demonstrating to investors overseas that the UK is a predictable and attractive market. Instead, they reinforce the perception that doing business here means ever more regulation, additional cost and greater complexity for no clear practical benefit. At Second Reading, the then-Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Stockwood, who I am glad to see in his place, said that the purpose of the Bill was to

“modernise how the sector is regulated”

and

“enable it to grow”.—[Official Report, 8/6/26; col. 1146.]

These amendments seem to run directly contrary to that objective. I am deeply disappointed that the Government have abandoned that principle so quickly and with so little resistance. We on these Benches have been consistent in our opposition to this duty, which we have made clear in the House and in discussions with the Minister. I shall seek to divide the House when the amendments are called.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, I think there is wide agreement that finance is essential for the running of our economy and that we want the British finance industry to be as successful as possible. I think that few of us would think that climate finance was not one of the most important areas to which the industry needs to contribute. I think all of us would feel proud that our country, particularly London, is rated as the number one centre of green finance in the world.

I understand the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, wanting to minimise regulation and thinking that this might be superfluous, but I note that climate is everywhere in the financial world. Why? It is because you are managing other people’s money. How does a fund manager, possibly with millions of people’s savings, think about appropriate investment? If you are responsible for the stewardship of a company, what is the sensible line to take in making sure it is as profitable as it can be but without risking the sustainability of the world? If you are an investment banker and somebody is issuing a bond, is it fair for it to be a green bond? Are you thinking about the reporting on the Stock Exchange? Should you have taken into account that the carbon assets you have will need to be written off and you will need to have a fund and tell your investors about that? Are you interested in impact investment? We were talking a lot about deforestation. How is it that we manage to get private money into deforestation? The noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, talked about insurance. Even in operations, look at the sort of thing that Bloomberg has done; all its electricity is now zero carbon. There is lots of stuff, and the UK is a leader. It is a growing area, and we should be proud of that.

Does regulation make a difference to this? That is a good question. If you were to look at the UK’s regulation on this and compare it with that of the United States—London versus New York—you would be in no doubt which was the better for promoting green finance. Frankly, I do not know of many financiers who would say that the United States now has more predictable regulation than we have in the United Kingdom. You could say that the regulator is already doing enough. Although I cannot respond to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, by having a national conversation, I did organise the FCA to do a drop-in to talk to noble Lords about what it was doing in this area. Every noble Lord I talked to afterwards thought that it would be a mistake to withdraw the “have regard” and that therefore this amendment was the right thing to do.

Whether noble Lords believe in the importance of climate and environmental issues or whether they want to be sure that Britain maintains its USP in this critical area of finance, I urge them to vote for these amendments.

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Moved by

[Lord Pitt-Watson]

2: Clause 16, page 21, line 21, after “proportionality” insert “and climate and environment”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in the name of Lord Pitt-Watson to clause 16, page 21, line 23.

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Moved by

[Lord Pitt-Watson]

That the Bill do now pass.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, this Bill delivers important reforms to ensure that the UK’s financial services sector remains open, innovative and internationally competitive while maintaining high regulatory standards and protecting consumers. It strengthens the legislative framework for financial services, supports growth and investment, and ensures that our regulators have the appropriate powers and responsibilities to respond to a rapidly changing market.

The Bill has benefited considerably from noble Lords’ detailed scrutiny and expertise throughout its passage. I hope noble Lords feel that the Government have listened carefully to the arguments advanced in Committee and on Report, and that we have brought forward amendments which were appropriate in response. The Bill, of course, is broad. It touches on lots of areas, but it is united by one common theme, shared by the House: we want to create a clear set of rules which allow the financial industry to serve its customers better and to prosper by doing so.

I thank all noble Lords who contributed to our debates, perhaps in particular my noble friend Lord Stockwood, who led the early stages of the Bill. I also thank my officials, who supported the Bill throughout its passage. It was no mean task. I am also particularly grateful to the Opposition and Liberal Democrat Front Benches; to the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and other members of the Financial Services Regulation Committee; to members of Peers for the Planet; and to noble Lords across the House, including Cross-Benchers, for their constructive engagement. If I had a special thank you it would be to my Whip, my noble friend Lord Wilson, without whom I would have found this process quite impossible.

The Bill leaves this House strengthened by the scrutiny that we have given it. I beg to move.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will be brief, which has been my practice—as people may have noticed —throughout much of this Bill. I open by saying thank you to the Minister and to the Box. They have been very willing to share their time with us, brief us and listen to issues that we raised. We did not always get the response that we wanted, but it was a positive engagement that gives us some hope for making progress.

I think the Minister came to this Bill having been told that it was a minor, technical Bill. That probably could not have been more wrong. I am glad we achieved what we did, working across the Opposition Benches. I give credit to Conservative Peers—the noble Baronesses, Lady Noakes and Lady Neville-Rolfe, and others—as well as, on my side, to my noble friends Lady Bowles and Lord Sharkey in trying to deal with the issues around proportionality.

There is a great deal left in accountability that will have to be tackled in future Bills. As we see the speed-up in AI, crypto and the other rapid changes that are coming, we will have to find a new way, as a Parliament, to engage. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, for putting in an amendment that began to deal with the digital issue. I really believe that not covering that within this Bill was a miss-out. The Government will have to step up to the plate again very shortly.

I am also very grateful for the fact that we got support on the child trust fund issue, again from the Tory Benches. It is something I feel very personally, as people can probably guess. It benefits 80,000 disabled youngsters who have been unable to access money that is theirs that is sitting in trust fund accounts.

I thank my noble friend Lord Sharkey in particular for fighting the battle for the FOS—that battle is not over either. I also thank my noble friends Lady Northover and Lady Sheehan; we would have gone farther on the climate change, environment and deforestation issues, but we feel that an important step was taken by the Government in the amendments moved today.

This has been a very constructive Bill, but, frankly, it was not the maximum use that could have been made of a financial services Bill and I hope that we will see another one come along shortly. There are problems to be tackled, not least the issues of mortgage prisoners and community development financial institutions, as well as the utterly significant constitutional issue of accountability and how the regulators need to be effectively accountable to Parliament. I thank the whole House for working on a very complex set of issues, particularly as it entered this phase with the understanding that it was only going to be about minor technicalities.