Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 29th June 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

If I might talk on this point, I have huge sympathy with the overall direction of where people want to go on this. Climate risk is clearly relevant for any financial manager managing the assets—the cash—of any ordinary citizen, be they a vicar of the Church of England or simply a worker setting money aside, and that needs to be taken into account.

Even if you do not buy that argument, there are financial risks that go with climate that need to be recognised—for example, assets that will become stranded if we responded to the climate crisis, which should not be recognised as being valuable today. By the way, if I were to find an institution that is a mile ahead of the regulation in trying to make this take place, the Church of England pension fund is exemplary of what it is that we want to do.

As I look at this, I find it rather ironic that we are focusing on the FCA. In the past five years, if there is a financial regulator that has taken steps forward on this, it is the FCA rather than the others. I think—I have tried to check on the internet—the UK now has the highest number of transition plans by companies, and the highest standard of transition plans by companies, of any country in the world. I want to celebrate the companies doing that and the senior appointments that the FCA put in place to make these sorts of things happen.

It might be a good idea for us to scratch our heads about those regulators that, even where there are clear rules on reporting on financially material matters, are finding it difficult to see them enforced. We might want to raise those sorts of issues as well as additional reporting. If it is additional reporting, as the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, said, let us be sure that we know that the extra reporting is bringing about some good.

In Amendment 80, and perhaps in some other amendments, there is a question about parliamentary oversight. Does the Minister consider that parliamentary oversight might be kept under review so that we know that we have a financial services industry that is properly responding to the risk of climate change, and might perhaps do some other things as well?

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I shall be exceedingly brief because the position of my party has been so well-voiced by my noble friends Lady Northover and Lady Sheehan, and there is a great deal more to say in the clause stand part debate in today’s fourth group. My party has made it very clear that it has a deep commitment to the climate, nature and sustainability agenda. I am conscious that it has become quite fashionable in financial circles to say that this agenda should not be the concern of the Bank of England or of any of the regulators. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Pitt-Watson, can indicate to me where in the five-year strategy of the FCA he can find any reference to it, because I cannot.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

For five years, there has been a director of ESG at the Financial Conduct Authority who has specifically taken responsibility for ensuring that, where relevant, it is embedded in what the FCA is doing. Most of the feedback I get from the FCA and financial practitioners suggests that he is called Sacha Sadan, and that he had a senior role in financial services beforehand and has had considerable success in being able to do that. Is it perfect? No, I am sure it is absolutely not perfect. We have a long way to go, but I want to do something that says, “Let us celebrate some success when we have it”.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I always join in celebrating success but, from our perspective, this is a pivot moment away from what has been the practice and emphasis over the past several years. Indeed, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, said, there was consensus across the parties, with perhaps different strategies, but this appears to be a time when much of this has changed, or is about to change or is changing. I have to say that it makes absolutely no sense. Climate risk is so obviously a financial and economic stability risk, as indeed is the loss of nature and the issue of sustainable growth; surely “sustainable” belongs in growth programmes that we put in front of us.

I am also very conscious that the City and others, which have tended to have very short-term perspectives—typically the next quarter’s results—have voiced opposition to the inclusion of climate and nature in the financial regulators’ remit and that it should have the significance it has had to date, and I am very afraid that the Government are now responding to that particular set of views. Moving these regulatory principles from the Bill—from primary legislation—into a “have regard” for the five-year strategy strikes me as an acquiescence with those voices we are hearing from the City. To me, there is some confirmation in not finding a firm strand in the FCA’s own five-year strategy; that is its forward look, not its historic look backwards.

In a few minutes the Conservative Party will speak, and it will make its own position clear, but I understand that Kemi Badenoch has now said that her party, if in government, would scrap the Climate Change Act. That is a very significant change. I know it is motivated by fear of Reform, but it really has an impact on the overall discourse and the cross-party commitment we have had up to this point.

I agree with the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester—I think it was him, although I may have attributed this to the wrong person—that this is a very strange week in which to downgrade the significance of climate change. I happened to be in conversation with my daughter in the midst of last week’s heat. When I described what we were doing, she said, “I guess the universe has heard the intention and it’s decided to bite back”. I think it must have been the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, who made the remark; I am so sorry not to have recognised that.

I think that both Labour and the Conservatives hope that by Third Reading, we will have forgotten the extreme heat and they can reassert a much more convenient and easy agenda of pretending that climate change is no longer an issue of urgency. It has now dropped down the scale and there are other issues of much greater urgency on which we must focus, and this one can be largely set aside. But I and my party continue to look at it as a series of risks that will cause extraordinary pain to ordinary people in Britain, both relentlessly and increasingly—and not just to people in the UK but to far more vulnerable countries across the globe.

The Bank of England and the financial sector have crucial and powerful tools in their hands. Those tools are vital if we are to redesign our world to limit nature loss and climate change, and to ensure that we grow sustainably in the future. As the Bill is now structured, it takes away from those tools and will encourage their being regarded as secondary or tertiary instruments, to be used only when it does not irritate certain voices in the City of London. That is not appropriate for the legislation we pass today.

--- Later in debate ---

Amendment 103 would further require the PRA and the FCA to report on their work in implementing the principles in Amendment 80. The regulators already report on all their objectives and principles through their annual reports. In addition, they must respond to HM Treasury’s remit letter once a year to set out what actions they have taken. As I have said, the Government have ensured that that remit letter asks them to support the transition to a climate-resilient, nature-positive and net-zero economy.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

Let me ask a direct question of the Minister. He referred to the actions that he expects from the FCA. I take it at its word, with its five-year strategy, but I cannot find any reference to anything to do with the climate, nature or even sustainability anywhere in there. Have I missed a page? It is a bit difficult to do that when there are only 20 pages, with very little written language, but it seems to me that, if this matter were of any significance, it would have been somewhere in that document. Is the FCA just anticipating what it believes to be the direction that it is getting from the Government, as reflected in the actions that are being taken in the Bill?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ashcombe (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as an employee of Marsh, the insurance broker regulated by the FCA. A number of amendments in this group discuss the downgrading of the “have regard to” requirement for proportionality, which would be a backward step. At a time of intense global competition, the Bill should strengthen proportionality, not weaken it. These amendments do that by replacing Clause 17’s downgrading provisions with a clearer, more robust and more meaningful principle, based on the distinction between wholesale and retail markets.

There remains a clear need for a better balance between these two sectors. Evidence supports this. A survey of chief risk officers conducted by the City of London Corporation identified simplification of regulation as the single most important step that regulators could take to foster growth and innovation. Similarly, a recent Prudential Regulation Authority survey showed that fewer than 60% of respondents believe that its current approach to proportionality makes the UK a more attractive place to do business, with most of the remainder expressing neutrality. That is hardly a vote of confidence.

In practice, the current one-size-fits-all approach is flawed. London’s world-leading wholesale insurance market is increasingly subject to rules designed for retail consumers. These regimes impose additional compliance burdens and costs, yet offer little meaningful benefit to sophisticated corporate clients, who require flexibility to negotiate bespoke arrangements tailored to their risks. This is what I have spent my working career doing, and I have never dealt with retail consumers, other than being an insurance buyer myself. There is a massive difference between the companies I advise and seek insurance for and the consumers such as me. Indeed, their premiums are often significantly larger than what I am trying to insure. The two entities should not be regulated by a one-size-fits-all regime.

The Financial Services Regulation Committee has highlighted this issue, noting that failure to distinguish between wholesale and retail drives bureaucracy and costs. Evidence from the London Market Group revealed that one UK broker, for example, employs far more compliance staff domestically—almost four times more—than in the EU on a proportional basis. Stronger proportionality would not weaken consumer protection; it would enhance it, allowing regulators to focus on where risks are greatest. In short, we should seize this opportunity not to weaken proportionality but to make it work properly for growth, innovation and the effective protection of consumers.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I very much support the two amendments of my noble friend Lady Bowles. There is often an assumption that those of us who feel that regulation plays an important role have no instinct or desire to see proportionality in place, which could not be more untrue. My history is as a commercial banker, back in the days when we used to participate intensively in writing the loan documents and creating the covenants associated with our lending, whether to small companies or to some of the largest on the globe. Frankly, covenants that were off the shelf were completely inappropriate for providing the protection we needed in many cases. They were just useless exercises in paperwork for the companies involved. We used to reshape the loan agreements on that basis and, frankly, it worked exceedingly well.

When I look at the amendments, I am glad that proportionality is being recovered from the scrapheap that would result from Clause 17. That is important, and the way that my noble friend Lady Bowles, framed it is particularly significant. Both for the PRA and the SRA, the focus is proportionate to the benefits expected to result from the imposition of the burden or restriction, recognising the difference in size, nature and objectives. I agree with her that this really needs to be considered through the lens of genuinely sustainable—as in durable as well as environmental—growth. That is a very important addition to the discussion.

I am disturbed by Amendment 81. I am not disturbed by most of it, but when I read

“proportionate to that level of risk and whether the burden or restriction enhances UK international competitiveness”,

I begin to get somewhat queasy, because the lowest common denominator is not where we should be headed. We need to genuinely assess risk—the cost of dealing with and understanding it—in a very direct way. I have always thought that a distortion was introduced by the competitiveness objective, and I am afraid that it is reflected in Amendment 81, in my reading at least.

I hope that the Minister understands that proportionality is not something for five-year strategies. It is central to the work, culture and behaviour of a regulator; as such, it clearly belongs in principles that sit on the face of the Bill.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Holmes and other noble Lords for bringing forward their amendments in this group.

I was glad to hear that the Minister will meet the Financial Services Regulation Committee to discuss this part of the Bill. I am sure he will be as disturbed as I was to hear about the widespread fear of regulated businesses in expressing any criticism of the regulators—the most important regulators in the land, to quote my noble friend Lady Noakes. We certainly rely on financial services and good regulators for growth in this country.

The central theme of this group is the proportionality of regulation. That is an absolutely fundamental requirement for all regulation; it is particularly so when we are talking about small and medium-sized enterprises, which are less able to afford the costs of regulation—in terms of diversion of time, regulatory fees and legal fees—and are the most held back by excess regulation.

There were 5.6 million small businesses in the UK at the start of 2025. They account for three-fifths of employment and around half of turnover in the UK private sector. Total employment in SMEs was 16.9 million—60% of the total—with turnover estimated at £2.8 trillion, or 51% of the total. Having financial services that operate with proportionality and common sense is important to them; indeed, almost every single one of these firms will access and use financial services through the course of their operations. It is even more important to the thousands of SMEs that operate in financial services, whose remit is of course being extended by the Bill, and the thousands more SMEs in the legal and professional firms that advise on financial services.

In practice, regulation often falls most heavily on precisely those smaller firms least able to absorb it. The reasons are obvious: SMEs do not have large compliance departments or in-house legal teams; and they do not have armies of advisers whose job is to interpret regulatory requirements. In many smaller firms, people wear many hats, as I know well. This means that a regulatory requirement that may be manageable for a large institution can be a serious burden for a smaller firm. Above all, regulation should be designed in such a way that it protects consumers and supports market integrity without imposing unnecessary burdens.

Amendments 83 and 84 in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes, to which I have added my name, go to this underlying point by seeking to elevate proportionality in the FCA and PRA frameworks; it is pleasing to have the support of my noble friend Lord Ashcombe and the Liberal Democrat Front Bench in this. Proportionality should not be a box that regulators tick after the main decisions have already been made; it should be central to how they think about regulation from the outset.

The amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, raise an important point about tailoring regulation to the size, nature and objectives of different firms. The regulatory framework should recognise that a mutual does not have the same objectives as a major bank, and that different business models can present very different risks; the noble Baroness explained all that eloquently.

I would also like to comment on Amendment 86 in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes. As she said, the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 requires regulators to act in a way that is transparent, accountable, proportionate, consistent and targeted, ensuring that regulation is effective without being unnecessarily burdensome. Those are fundamental points and likewise need to be protected as guiding principles.

In closing, I would be grateful if the Minister could assure us: first, that proportionality will be genuinely embedded in regulatory decision-making, ideally by amending the Bill on the lines of Amendment 83. We hope he will look at this issue very seriously. Secondly, can he assure us that the FCA and PRA will in future be expected to take account of the particular position of SMEs, mutuals and smaller firms when designing and applying rules? A proportionality duty would go a long way to fixing the problem and would seem to fit in well with government policy to support small business promoted by his other department, the DBT.

--- Later in debate ---

However, there is a more general problem. I conclude by just pointing out that in fact there is a responsibility on the Government to ensure that all sectors of society can obtain a minimum desirable level of protection, including those on low incomes, that will enable them to remain financially resilient to shocks, and unexpected shocks, which would typically be insured.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly in general across this set of amendments and specifically to Amendment 141 in my name, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann.

In the general remarks, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, that I am excited and thrilled by his amendments in this group and I support every one of them—I would even open champagne; I am that pleased. I say to my noble friend Lady Tyler that I totally support the amendments that she has introduced here. I share with both of them the perception that financial inclusion is absolutely at the core of the requirement that we must place on our financial services sector and on the regulators that deal with it.

To pick up on a point that my noble friend Lady Tyler made, the consumer duty does not deal with financial inclusion, and that is exactly right. The consumer duty is very much a protection against mis-selling. It is not a duty of care, which could indeed have required that gaps left in the market are filled and the regulator take steps to fill them; the regulator was absolutely determined not to have that responsibility when this House attempted to make it address the issue, and the Government of the day were also very determined that the regulator should not play that role. We cannot look to the regulator to be a key player in financial inclusion.

In the five-year strategy of the FCA—I really have read that document—there is reference to financial inclusion; in fact, it is in big, black, bold letters. The problem is that what it anticipates as the role that it will play is to try to address how low financial capability holds people back from accessing financial services and how it could support them in managing their financial life. That is important and it matters, but the reality is that for many people who are excluded, the way to give them support is not to try to get them digital—it would be brilliant if you could but that is not the reality—but to deal with those people as they are in the world that they live in. There is absolutely no reference in this five-year strategy that you could in any way interpret as related to what has become the Richard Lloyd review—to things such as banking hubs. It is focused solely on the individual, whereas issues that we have addressed in previous groups have also been about the financial exclusion of small businesses from financial services. There is no reference to any of that.

I have had so many conversations with the FCA over the years, and it has said things like, “Yes, if we had a set of community banks, that would be absolutely brilliant; CDFIs are absolutely wonderful—not our job. If they appear, we will make sure that we regulate them appropriately, but it is not our job to fill that gap and we resolutely hold to that position”. That clarity needs to be here in this debate. I will not repeat what has been said because it was so well said by the three previous speakers, but I very much hope that the Minister will pay serious attention to this issue. From things that he has said in the past, I hope that he takes it to heart. It very much belongs in a very central way in primary legislation.

The issue I am raising is perhaps not an obvious one to raise in the context of this Bill, but it is in scope. It is dear to my heart, but I think it is widely supported. I am using this opportunity to deal with an issue that, frankly, the Government should have dealt with without any problem. It is child trust funds and the ability of young adults with learning difficulties to access those funds that sit in in their name. My party leader, Ed Davey, who, as I think all in this Committee know, has a son with very severe learning difficulties, has written of his eight-month battle to access the child trust fund put in place and invested in for the benefit of his severely disabled son, who is now 18. The fund should be easily accessible when a child turns 18, but, as the Davey family found out the hard way, this is not true for children with learning or other disabilities who lack the capacity to fill in the forms themselves.

The process of applying to the Court of Protection for a deputyship order is Kafkaesque, consumes endless time and places such a burden and cost that many parents give up altogether. The many steps, and my goodness there are many, include obtaining written permission from three different relatives to demonstrate that you are unlikely to abuse the funds that you will access, and obtaining various doctors’ assessments—well, perhaps that is fair—but then the courts kick in. The Court of Protection charges £412 for a deputyship order. It requires you to obtain insurance against misuse, and the Davey family found that that cost £48. Then comes the Office of the Public Guardian, which charges £100 for its assessment, and it then levies an annual supervision charge of £320. If you add this up, it basically becomes £1,000 to be able to access a child trust fund for your severely disabled child.

What is really extraordinary is that most child trust funds do not have a lot of money in them. I think the average amount is £2,000. You would have to spend 50% of it to be able to access that fund for your child. The people accessing it are parents whom the DWP already relies on to deal with a variety of much more significant pots of money to support that child. I use the Davey family not to ask for any kind of sympathy, but here is an MP whose wife is a lawyer, and they cannot work their way through this maze. How are people without those kinds of expertise going to work their way through this system?

Unfortunately, there is a new legal offering from specialists who will, for a significant sum, offer to negotiate the way through for you. That is a practice that none of us wants to encourage. There are a few child trust fund managers who handle the process a bit better and have been helping some of the people whose funds they manage to minimise the process, but it is a lottery in terms of finding that you have taken out your child trust fund with an entity that takes that approach. Charities estimate that 80,000 to 123,000 young adults are essentially locked out of their child trust funds.

I tried to look for what response the Government have been making to the overtures of the charities and other civic society groups that have been out there trying to speak for these youngsters. Two things came to my attention. The only response I could find from the Department of Justice was that it has now digitised the application form and provided a guide.

My amendment would force the FCA to simplify the whole process for CTFs paying out under £5,000 in any one year. It is formulated around an amendment put before the House in 2021—I am pretty sure that is the correct year—by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, who is really skilled in developing, designing and presenting the appropriate amendments. In speaking to that amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, who was the Minister when child trust funds were put in place, made it very clear that no one had thought of this particular set of problems and that that was why the system was designed in a way that set up this obstacle course. It was not intentional or planned; it was simply a failure to recognise what could happen and has in fact happened.

I say this to the Minister: all the arguments we hear in support of the Bill are about deregulation; here is a piece of deregulation that I think no one could argue with, and which I would definitely and clearly support, as would my party and, I suspect, many others. If the Minister cannot control this himself, could he please go away and berate his colleagues? These youngsters need to be able to access their funds. We are talking about small pots. Simply digitising the 106 sections of the application form is not the answer.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, if I might add to this debate, I begin by noting the huge cross-party agreement we have on lots of the issues the Bill raises, most particularly on this issue of ensuring access to financial services for everyone. That is what is behind so many of the amendments here. It is also the issue that was raised in the debate about affordable credit by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester, and at Second Reading by the noble Baroness, Lady Hyde, and the noble Lord, Lord Kamall. We all, from all parties, want to know that such services are available to everyone. The question is simply how we can make sure that that takes place and that the industry that has to be there to deliver it buys in to making sure that those services take place. We need to be sure that our actions as rule-makers are helpful in that regard.

At Second Reading, I heard a number of speeches about excessive regulation, all doubtless intending to encourage financial services to do their job better. But there is an issue with regulation and how much of it there is. If there is any concern about this amendment, that is absolutely not its objective. Critically, we need financial services to be available to everyone; the question is whether, by regulating them, that gets us to where we want to be. Maybe it will, but we might argue that, unless we have persuaded those whom we wish to influence that they will strive to improve performance in this regard, the danger is that it might just be another regulation. Whatever we ask the FCA to report, we need to first take a step back and think through how this will affect performance on the ground. It is the finance industry that has to deliver this, and we need to be working in partnership with it—with the industry, customers, potential customers, the Government and regulators, moving ahead together. There are also initiatives, some of which might work, and which, if they had real momentum, with everyone behind them, might start to deliver the sort of things we want.

As many noble Lords know, I have done quite a lot of work with the financial services industry in Scotland. Its industry body, Scottish Financial Enterprise, has laid out as its objective that it intends to

“have a financial services system that allows every citizen and business of Scotland to connect and access appropriate services”.

Wow. Is that not exactly what we are trying to get to happen? But who is following up to make sure that that statement, that vision is realised? It feels to me that we need a new settlement, and institutions to see that such a settlement is delivered.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Bi (Lab)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as chair of Norton Rose Fulbright. Some of my firm’s clients are regulated by the FCA and the PRA. I am not a member of the Financial Services Regulation Committee, which is why I am probably breaking what I have heard as unanimity by speaking in favour of Clause 17 remaining part of the Bill.

I note that the current accountability framework, including the role of the committee, was created only three years ago, pursuant to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 following Brexit. Before that, we have to remember that we were content with what was probably pretty limited oversight by the European Parliament, so hearing about the importance of very detailed parliamentary oversight when it comes to looking at every proposal that the regulators might have is a relatively new innovation for us.

I do not think it unreasonable for the Government now to consider how well that post-Brexit system has been working and to propose changes to a regime that the committee itself has criticised as overly complex and difficult to navigate. I note that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, commented at Second Reading how difficult it had been to hold the regulators to account under the current system. I am therefore curious about why noble Lords are keen to preserve a status quo that is far from ideal.

There has been significant opposition to Clause 17 and concern about the effect it could have on parliamentary oversight, but I am not convinced that that reaction is warranted. I do not think Clause 17 is a retreat from scrutiny, but it is looking to make it more targeted and effective by merely removing the obligation on the regulators to consider every step they take by reference to the eight FSMA regulatory principles for every day-to-day function. The obligation to notify all those processes to the parliamentary committee does not always lead to the kind of analysis or response and targeted feedback that we have been discussing. That volume of information that the regulators are producing has not led to a better system.

The result is that that documentation requirement has become a burdensome compliance exercise and not truly analytical. The Government’s consultation confirmed that the information produced is too granular to support effectively an overall assessment of regulatory performance, and nearly three-quarters of those who responded to that consultation were supportive of or broadly sympathetic to the approach the Government are proposing, and these are the customers, the regulated body, of the people that the FCA and the PRA are supposed to protect.

We should also acknowledge that Clause 17 does not abolish the Section 3B regulatory principles. The FCA and the PRA will continue to be bound to have regard to those principles when they are preparing or revising their five-year strategy plans, for which they will be held accountable not just by the parliamentary committee but by society as a whole. Those strategies will be subject to consultation and will create a public benchmark against which the regulators’ subsequent rule-making can be assessed and progress against the stated strategy can be monitored, in their annual reports if nothing else. I am not referring just to the glossy brochure that we have heard about.

It is also important to note that Clause 17 does not alter the requirement for the regulators to consider and document to the committee how they are pursuing their statutory objectives. In the case of the FCA, so much of the focus is on the competitiveness and growth objectives. That gives the committee a powerful accountability tool. There is nothing to stop the committee calling them in whenever it likes to talk to them about how they are meeting those objectives in line with the principles.

The requirement of the regulators to present their analysis to the committee on each of the eight regulatory principles in relation to each consultation is disproportionate. Its removal does not reflect a material dilution of the regulators’ obligations because the substantive matters of concern continue to bind the regulators in any event. Is it necessary for the committee to be involved in all the detailed work that the regulators need to do in order to exercise proper parliamentary oversight in what we all accept is a fast-changing financial services market in a post-Brexit regulatory environment where the FCA and the PRA now bear responsibility for significantly more rules than was contemplated when Section 3B of the original FSMA 2000 was drafted?

As a common law legal system, it is right that the Government ask the regulators to comply with broad principles and hold them accountable for the outcome without requiring parliamentary oversight of all operational steps and without expecting the regulators actively to consider and document their analysis of how they have complied with each principle every time they exercise their general functions, however routine they are. I know that there is a discussion about the system being modified and improved through this Bill, but that is not what we have at the moment.

The committee’s mandate is to scrutinise whether the UK’s regulatory framework and regulators operate effectively. That requires the committee to have access to meaningful information and a coherent standard against which to test the regulators’ conduct. The long-term strategy provides that broad standard, and the committee will still receive consultations and examine how individual proposals advance the strategy that the regulator has publicly committed to. Its constitutional role could therefore be strengthened rather than rendered ineffective. Clause 17 keeps the Financial Services Regulation Committee’s oversight where it should be: on the substance of regulatory performance, the delivery of publicly stated strategies and the real-world impact of regulation. It also frees the regulators from unnecessary procedural burden, so that they can focus on regulating well. The mechanism does not have to be the same as before, and keeping Clause 17 could materially improve it.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I did not intend to speak in this debate because the case has been put so well. However, having heard the noble Baroness, Lady Bi, I want to join the conversation because I think she has a very different perception of the role of Parliament from that of many others here. We have a responsibility as Parliament collectively—we are not the elected House but the appointed House—directly to the people of this country. The regulators are servants of that responsibility, not masters of it.

What the noble Baroness described is the ability for Parliament to intervene only at the very highest level in a very limited way and to pass huge authority over the financial sector, our financial stability and the economy to the regulators and then walk away. If we were to do that, we would be absenting ourselves from the very requirements that are at the core of a parliamentary system. She dismissed the pretty five-year strategy plan that we have from the FCA for 2025 to 2030, but it is exactly what is envisaged in this legislation: fairly high-level, simplistic comments of the kind that were probably developed by the public relations department.

The committee we put in place in 2023 was put in place not at the proposal of the Government or the regulators but by a Parliament utterly frustrated in not being able to carry out the responsibilities that it has as a Parliament. I have to say that the Labour Party was in a completely different place in 2023—it has now switched; I do not know why it has made such a volte-face. The Government of the day, the regulators and the financial sector were determined to narrow the capacity to scrutinise, to have a parliamentary view and to allow this Parliament to live up to its responsibilities. If we cannot have an expert committee able to look in detail at factors that so fundamentally affect the economy and well-being of the UK, we are, frankly, derelict in our duties. That is why this is a huge constitutional issue. If we were to repeat this in the area—

[Baroness Bi (Lab)]

I am not sure that we disagree very much on what the purpose of Parliament is and its relationship with the people of Britain, but the FCA asked for a risk metric from Parliament and did not get one. I have heard a lot about the obligations to the people but, if Parliament is so crucial to what the regulators need to do, why was no guidance given to the regulators about the extent of risk they should take in their operations?

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I am not on the committee, so I cannot answer that particular question—I am sure others would be able to consider this issue. However, if the noble Baroness thinks that, because Parliament did not, in her words, provide political cover for activity that the regulators wanted to carry out, Parliament should then be removed so that the regulators would somehow be exposed, who would they be exposed to? They would not be exposed to a committee. The public does not have the ability. I do not see the regulators going around the country talking to ordinary people in regular communities about what they are doing; they do not engage at that level. Many APPGs in this House have asked the regulators to come and talk to them. They are nearly always refused or somebody junior is sent, so it is only through a limited committee structure that this Parliament has been able to hold the regulators to account at all.

I give huge credit to the committee that sits under the chairmanship of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, which was created against the resistance of the regulators and the Government. This, now, is their attempt to try to unravel what is turning out to be a very effective committee that is raising really important issues, creating a requirement for proper answers and initiating real investigation. That is what lies at the heart of this: an attempt to negate the effectiveness of a committee that has been making its mark, and which leaves the regulator feeling uncomfortable because it has to answer questions.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

Is the Minister suggesting that, in dealing with the long-term strategy, there will be the same level of detail as is normally provided in guidance? I am somewhat confused when he explains that one is a substitute for the other.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

Could you repeat the question?

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

If I understood the Minister correctly—do correct me if I am wrong—the FCA or the PRA will have the opportunity to provide guidance if they deem it necessary. But if they choose not to, that should not be worrying, because the equivalent statement will occur either in the five-year strategy or in a report on how the FCA is achieving its five-year strategy. Is he suggesting that that will be at the same level of detail as the guidance that is required today? That is what I am trying to understand.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

I believe that they still have to publish the full guidance, but let me come back with a written response on that.

Turning to Amendments 90 and 92, the Government recognise the impact that changes in rules and guidance can have on firms, particularly smaller firms and regulated persons trying to understand what is expected of them. The government reforms are intended to avoid imposing full consultation and cost-benefit analysis requirements where proposals are genuinely minor or low impact, while preserving the wider consultation framework for substantive changes. Minor changes to rules include corrections, clarifications or minor technical updates, and it will be for the regulators themselves to determine whether a rule change meets this definition, as they are best placed to assess the impact of such changes. For example, last year, the FCA consulted on reducing late filing charges from £250 to £100. Under this provision, the FCA would not be obliged to consult and could make these changes faster.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

What if the change had been in the other direction and had added an additional £100 pounds? Would the FCA have been in a position to decide that that was not material for consultation?

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

I think there is a broad principle: we are trying to give the FCA the power to make those small changes in both directions.