Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 7th September 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Kramer]

17: After Clause 13, insert the following new Clause—
“Reimbursement of fraud: liability of technology companies(1) The FCA must make rules providing that, where a person is to be reimbursed in respect of losses arising from an authorised push payment fraud, the cost of that reimbursement is to be borne, in whole or in part, by any relevant technology company on whose service the fraud was initiated, facilitated or communicated.(2) Rules under subsection (1) must provide for—(a) the apportionment of the cost of reimbursement between relevant technology companies and payment service providers, by reference to the extent to which each contributed to the fraud occurring,(b) a process by which a payment service provider that has reimbursed a victim may recover the apportioned cost from a relevant technology company, and(c) the information that a relevant technology company must provide to the FCA and to payment service providers for the purposes of the rules.(3) In making rules under this section, the FCA must have regard to the principle that the cost of reimbursing victims of fraud should fall, so far as is reasonable, on the persons best able to prevent the fraud.(4) In this section—“authorised push payment fraud” means a transfer of funds executed by a payment service provider on the instruction of a payer, where the payer was deceived into giving that instruction;“relevant technology company” means a person who provides— (a) a user-to-user service or a search service within the meaning of the Online Safety Act 2023,(b) an electronic communications service, or(c) any other online service by means of which an authorised push payment fraud may be initiated, facilitated or communicated.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause would require the FCA to make rules placing liability for the cost of reimbursing victims of authorised push payment fraud, in whole or in part, on the technology companies on whose platforms the fraud originates, rather than solely on payment service providers, and to apportion that cost according to who is best able to prevent the fraud.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, let me address Amendment 17 in my name, which is also signed by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, which I very much appreciate. It addresses authorised push payment fraud and would require the tech companies whose platforms are host to this fraud to share in the reimbursement of losses to the victims of such fraud.

At present, victims of APP fraud are reimbursed up to £85,000, half by the bank sending the payment and half by the bank receiving the payment. This is under rules set by the Payment Systems Regulator. The rules and the cost of reimbursement have had a positive effect, in that banks have set up a much more effective regime to alert people to the possibility of fraud. Many of us have seen that in transactions that we do and the warnings that we receive. However, APP fraud continues to grow relentlessly and, on the most recent figures, is up by 19% in the last year, reaching £576 million in the UK. Payment fraud altogether in the UK has reached £1.3 billion a year. It is essentially 40% of all serious crime.

Some 66% of these scams—that is what they are—originate on online tech platforms. These platforms made £430 million in revenue last year from advertising these scams. I find that outrageous. Surely these platforms should be picking up at least part of the cost of reimbursement, instead of the cost falling wholly on the banks while the tech companies pocket the advertising revenue. I do not think that the tech companies will ever stop scams and take them seriously until it starts costing them money.

I cannot understand why the Government are rejecting my amendment. Are they so afraid of the tech companies and Trump that they cannot provide this protection to ordinary consumers who are being defrauded on such a scale? But I also had a eureka moment in understanding why the FCA has not acted. It came from an absolutely chance conversation. Neither the FCA nor Ofcom is apparently sure which one of them should take the initiative in trying to deal with tech companies and this form of fraud.

Regulatory courtesy has led to inaction. Frankly, when I look at the number of victims and the size of the losses, this is completely unacceptable. This amendment breaks that conundrum, and I would expect the Government to attempt to break that conundrum and ensure that action takes place.

On other amendments in this group, I support Amendments 19 and 20. I know they will be spoken to eloquently, but I admit to not fully understanding the issues in Amendments 95 and 97. But I will listen carefully.

I beg to move.

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[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

Again, if the noble Baroness will accept it, I will write to her on that. I do not know the timetable offhand.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, the online platforms know exactly what they have to do to stop online fraud; they are just choosing not to do it. The Government say that the answer will come from Ofcom, but that has certainly not worried the platforms one iota. The platforms will take notice only when they have to pay out to reimburse people who have been victims of those fraud scams. That is why Amendment 17 matters, and that is why I am going to test the opinion of the House.

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[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

In moving my Amendment 22, I will also speak to government Amendments 58 and 59. Amendment 22 is developed from our discussions in Committee.

Payment systems are essential national infrastructure. They allow households to pay bills, businesses to trade and financial institutions to transfer funds securely. As technology changes how we pay, those systems must continue to evolve, becoming more efficient and capable of supporting new services while remaining trusted and resilient. The Bank of England has a critical responsibility to protect and enhance UK financial stability. The Bank is also working with the Government and other authorities to support safe innovation in payments and digital finance. The Bank has welcomed this measure and will reinforce that work while preserving the primacy of financial stability.

Amendment 58 places the Bank’s role in facilitating innovation on a clear statutory footing. When exercising certain key functions for recognised payment systems, recognised digital settlement asset service providers, and in-scope service providers, the Bank must, so far as is reasonably possible, facilitate innovation with a view to improving the quality, functionality and economy of those systems and related services. The objective is expressly secondary and does not require the Bank to facilitate innovation where doing so would undermine its primary financial stability objective. This change will also bring the regulation of systemic payment systems and digital settlement assets into closer alignment with the Bank’s supervision of other financial market infrastructure. The Bank already has a secondary innovation objective for central counterparties and central securities depositories. Providing a comparable objective for payment systems and digital settlement assets provides the Bank with a clear and consistent statutory framework.

Amendment 58 also ensures that the Bank can be held accountable under its new objective. It enables the Treasury to make recommendations about aspects of the Government’s economic policy for the Bank to have regard to when considering how to advance its financial stability and secondary innovation objective in relation to payment systems. Those recommendations must be published and laid before Parliament. The Bank must explain the action it has taken, or its reasons for not acting, and provide updates where required. The Bank’s annual reports must now also explain how it has advanced the secondary innovation objective and engaged with interested stakeholders.

Amendment 59 reinforces that accountability by requiring the Bank to publish a stand-alone annual report on both secondary innovation objectives. The report must explain how objectives have been embedded in the Bank’s operations, processes and decisions, and how it has advanced them with respect to relevant functions. This will give Parliament and industry clear sight of how the objectives operate in practice.

Amendment 22 is consequential. It ensures that the mechanism already in the Bill for co-ordination between the Financial Conduct Authority, the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Bank with respect to relevant payment functions makes appropriate reference to regulator objectives, which would now include the Bank’s secondary innovation objective.

In summary, these amendments together place the Bank’s role in facilitating safe innovation on a clear statutory footing, while preserving financial stability as its primary objective. They also provide stronger and more transparent accountability for how the Bank applies the objectives in practice. I hope that noble Lords will join me in supporting these amendments.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I have a couple of very brief comments. I am comfortable with the amendments that the Minister has just described, but I have one note of caution. The drive for innovation, which we all think is a good thing, in many ways also increasingly exposes the UK to a loss of monetary sovereignty, particularly where that innovation has to be brought in from overseas, and gives overseas companies far greater control of the payments systems in the UK. That is one of the ongoing fears that we have had. Scott Bessent has been quite open in saying tariffs are very old-fashioned in controlling western economies’ and that stablecoin is the way to do it.

I am therefore cautious when I hear this drive for innovation without some counter-warning and counter-consideration of the monetary sovereignty impacts. I never hear those words used, nor are they captured in any way in anything that I hear around regulation. So often, the move into digital assets—which is, in essence, what this is all about—is about plumbing and pipelines; it does not recognise the political implications. We have seen this in many other areas, such as where we have given away food security and energy security. We need to be very careful that we do not give away security in the financial services and payments sector.

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Moved by

[Baroness Kramer]

26: After Clause 14, insert the following new Clause—
“Anti-money laundering: provision of support to professional services firms(1) Within three months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Treasury must publish an assessment of the arrangements that will be made to provide education, guidance and compliance support to professional services firms subject to anti-money laundering supervision by the FCA.(2) The assessment must include a comparison between—(a) the education, guidance and compliance support currently provided by professional body supervisors, and(b) the support that will be provided by the FCA.(3) The Treasury must lay the assessment before Parliament.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to require the Government to explain how education, guidance and bespoke compliance support currently provided by professional body supervisors will be maintained following the transfer of anti-money laundering supervisory functions to the FCA.

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[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I am afraid that all the amendments in this group are mine. Amendment 29 has also been signed by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for which I am most grateful. I will be brief as the hour is late.

In this Bill, the Government will transfer all supervision of professional service firms in respect of anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing from the current professional bodies to the FCA. Members of this House have received representation from a wide range of professional groups which are, frankly, utterly dismayed. They recognise that the FCA is trying to respond to their needs and issues, but it seems to have very little idea how to fund or resource the complex guidance and education required as part of that supervisory and monitoring process. It seems, as far as I can understand, that the FCA now says that it would like the professional bodies themselves to continue to provide all that work but, in essence, on an unpaid basis. That is not realistic.

The FCA has produced a high-level road map, but I hear universally that it is very short of information and low on timing details. I can agree that the current system has historically suffered from fragmentation, but I am not sure that we needed a remedy on the scale of the changes that are in the Bill. The fragmentation issue was being dealt with reasonably effectively by OPBAS—the Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision—that had been created to sit above the professional bodies to provide co-ordination standards and make them effective. Where OPBAS had a weakness was in its communication with enforcement agencies, but this issue could have been remedied without the radical change on the scale represented in the Bill.

My amendments require an assessment of this transition process, particularly on issues such as education guidance and compliance support, timetables, regional coverage and supervisory fees. There is real concern now that with an additional layer of supervision brought into the picture, fees are going to increase very significantly. My amendment would also require the FCA to have regard to having the appropriate expertise on hand to provide that support and guidance—that is significant expertise ranging from accounting to taxation. It has not really taken on these issues historically.

I will not be pressing this issue because the FCA is trying to find ways to make this system work. I honestly do not think that the FCA would have wished this upon itself; nor would the professional bodies have wished it upon themselves. It really is important that the Government understand that they need to think much more carefully when they introduce radical change when, frankly, much more modest and targeted change would have served the purpose better.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I support the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, on her Amendment 29, to which I have added my name. The noble Baroness has already explained with her usual clarity the concerns that lie behind this group of amendments so I will try not to repeat what she said.

The changes proposed by the Bill to the AML supervisory regime will move the AML elements of supervision from the relevant professional body to the FCA. This means that firms will now have to deal with two separate regulators rather than one: the FCA for AML and the professional body for everything else. It seems inevitable that this will have cost impacts for those firms even if, as the FCA argues, the regulatory rules themselves will not change. That is likely to be especially true for smaller firms.

The impact assessment that accompanies the Bill on this section is, frankly, almost laughably poor, relying almost entirely on the statement that the AML rules themselves will not change. It does not address, in any meaningful way, the question of moving from one supervisor to two. It must, therefore, be sensible to carry out an assessment of what the impact of the changes will be on firms and to ensure that the costs remain proportionate to the benefits that the FCA and the Government argue will accrue, before going ahead with the changes. That is what Amendment 29 is looking to achieve.

The Government are commendably keen to reduce the regulatory burden on businesses, so I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say on this. Does he agree that there is likely to be an increase in costs to firms from having to deal with two supervisors rather than one? How will he ensure that that is proportionate to any benefits that will arise?

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[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

I am not aware of an individual calculation that has been done for that. I do not think that there will be a materially greater cost once the move is made. The key issue that we are trying to address here is that, right now, we have 23 regulators of AML, and that job needs to be done in a more co-ordinated and consistent fashion. If I have information on that, I would be delighted to write to the noble Lord on those costs.

Finally, Amendment 30 addresses the FCA’s capacity to undertake effective AML/CTF supervision across all parts of the United Kingdom. Amendment 30 would require the FCA to report on its capacity to supervise firms throughout the UK. The FCA already operates across the United Kingdom through its offices in London, Leeds and Edinburgh and anticipates having a significant presence for the new AML regime outside London. This provides a strong foundation for maintaining regional coverage, preserving local knowledge and ensuring that jurisdiction-specific issues continue to inform supervision and implementation planning. This will also help with ensuring that regional risks and jurisdiction-specific considerations are understood and addressed, while maintaining a consistent approach across the United Kingdom.

I recognise the objectives behind these amendments: careful implementation, appropriate support, maintenance of expertise, proportionate fees and sufficient FCA capacity. The Government understand why these assurances are being sought. However, additional statutory reports, assessments and fixed requirements are not necessary. These matters are being addressed through implementation planning, capability building, stakeholder engagement, consultation and parliamentary scrutiny of the necessary secondary legislation. The Government will continue to work closely with Parliament, industry, existing supervisors and the FCA. Our aim is to deliver a more consistent, effective and co-ordinated AML/CTF supervisory framework, while ensuring that firms receive proportionate supervision and appropriate support. I therefore ask the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 26 withdrawn.