Sentencing Bill

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 12th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by paying my tribute to the late Baroness Newlove, not only for her contribution to this House but for the considerable work she did as Victims’ Commissioner. I also thank the Minister for his introduction of the Bill, and all noble Lords for the detailed, informed and sometimes diverse opinions that they have expressed.

The importance of this debate is underlined by the fact that the Bill received so little scrutiny in the other place. It was in Committee for one day. For a Bill so substantial and with such wide ramifications, that seems wholly inadequate. Indeed, it meant that many of the radical changes proposed in it were never even mentioned in the other place, let alone discussed or debated. It is essential that we have the opportunity to examine the Bill carefully and, in some respects, forensically.

I will make a number of general observations. Is this simply an attempt to tackle overcrowding in our prison estate? I certainly hope not, yet there was no mandate for these reforms in Labour’s manifesto. There was a reference to sentencing:

“Even when criminals are found guilty, the sentences they receive often do not make sense either to victims or the wider public”.


Will this Bill improve the complexity but not the comprehension of sentencing? I fear that might be the case. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, observed, the public must be able to comprehend that disposals such as community sentences are not only effective but a form of punishment. It will be important to explain that early release is in the public interest and not just a fiscal necessity. How is that to be done?

As a matter of generality, I also have a degree of concern about the clarity of the proposed reforms and powers that are to be implemented. I make particular reference to Clauses 13 to 16 and Clause 24, which introduce powers for the courts to forbid offenders to enter drinking establishments and attend sports and other public events, as well as to inhibit them from driving and even from leaving specified geographical areas. It is simply not clear in the Bill how any or all these measures would be implemented or enforced. A number of questions arise. How is that to be done? Where will the funding come from? On whose shoulders will enforcement lie? Will it be the responsibility of public houses and those in control of sporting and other public venues? Will they be required to ensure that their own customers are not under court orders? This will require meaningful and effective reform, and, in turn, it will require a meaningful and effective debate so that we can understand how these provisions will work in practice.

Then there is the role of the courts. The Bill leaves the Government’s stance on this somewhat unclear. Clauses 11 and 12 deal with rehabilitation activity requirements. They provide that probation officers, rather than the sentencing courts, will decide on, for example, the number of days of activity in a community order that someone must complete. That means that probation officers will, in effect, replace the courts in the imposition of sentences on those on community orders. That transfers a crucial power, and indeed an important role, from the courts to the Probation Service—a point to which I will return. Again, we require a degree of clarity on that.

Furthermore, the Bill appears to blur the Government’s stance on the relationship between the courts and the Executive, a point addressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, when he referred to the provision in Clause 19 for a statutory requirement for the Sentencing Council to obtain approval from the Lord Chancellor before sentencing guidelines are issued. This implies that the Government believe there should be a close relationship between the Executive and the judiciary on the issue of sentencing, and yet, when concerns were expressed about sentencing for offences such as fly-tipping, shoplifting and knife crime during a recent debate on the Crime and Policing Bill, the Government’s response was:

“sentencing in individual cases is a matter for our independent judiciary”.—[Official Report, Commons, 3/4/25; col. 211.]

Is it, and will it be, under the provisions of this Bill? More particularly, how are we to consider the provisions in Clause 18 with respect to the apparent veto? As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, again pointed out, it is somewhat opaque in its provisions.

Turning to some more specific issues, we have the end of short-term custodial sentences and the introduction or development of early release. All of these may, in principle, be attractive, but under Clauses 1 and 2, for example, there will be a presumption that custodial sentences of 12 months or less will be suspended except in limited circumstances, such as breaches of protection orders. Does that mean that, for example, where someone pleads guilty at the first opportunity and gets a remission in their sentence, someone who would have received a sentence of 18 months but is to receive a sentence of 12 months will find themselves with a suspended sentence? In other words, does this presumption apply not only in respect of custodial sentences of 12 months but those up to 18 months? I would welcome the Minister’s response on that.

It is estimated that the implementation of these provisions would mean that about 40,000 criminals would avoid prison entirely. But for what? The purpose of sentencing is not purely punitive but to protect the public from repeat and violent offenders. As many noble Lords observed, rehabilitation and community orders are essentially resource-based. The noble Lord, Lord Foster of Bath, put the matter very pithily when he said you need the means to achieve the ends. Is the Minister confident that this Bill is going to provide the means to the end? I bear in mind the way in which the Treasury often regards the Ministry of Justice and its role as one of the orphaned children of government; there is a considerable barrier for the Minister to overcome in that respect.

On early release, Clause 20 will reduce it to one-third of the original sentence. I acknowledge that, if we go back to 1967, there were similar provisions in place, albeit that the test was significantly different to the one proposed in this Bill. If we have such early release, how are we going to accommodate the police estimate that this could lead to a 6% increase in overall crime, or approximately an additional 396,000 offences per year, the vast majority of which will involve reoffending by those who have been released from prison?

We are liable to find ourselves in a cycle of release and recall unless we are very careful. The noble Lord, Lord Hastings of Scarisbrick, made clear why that cycle can be broken only by effective rehabilitation. Again, I repeat the observation of the noble Lord, Lord Foster of Bath: you need the means to achieve the ends. Where are the means? Can that be explained?

I am also concerned that the Government’s messaging may be somewhat inconsistent. The Government recently expressed outrage that criminals such as Hadush Kebatu were at large on the streets, and yet, under this Bill, offenders of his type who received a 12-month sentence would be at large on the streets. Could the Government clarify whether they are genuinely committed to including those convicted of such offences in this scheme? It seems that their position is that the community is capable of accommodating such offenders, but it can possibly accommodate them only if effective probation services are in place. Again, it is a case of requiring the means to achieve the ends.

There is also a risk that this Bill simply sends the wrong message to repeat offenders. The presumption against short custodial sentences may appear to have merit, but it removes a vital deterrent to repeat offending, particularly in low-level crimes, anti-social behaviour, theft—particularly retail theft—domestic violence and other cases of stalking and harassment. Such so-called minor crimes are very often the precursors to more serious offending. So short sentences can play an important role as an intervention and a deterrent against that sort of persistent and repeat offending. Has that been properly taken into account when considering the use of non-custodial or suspended sentences in so many of those cases?

There is a risk that we are sending the wrong message to repeat offenders. Indeed, as one noble Lord observed, we may also be sending the wrong message to very young offenders, who may believe that the future holds no risk of imprisonment if they engage in what is regarded as, or what they are persuaded to believe is, low-level criminality.

I suggest that the Bill might involve potential overreach for the Probation Service itself, and will certainly place considerable burdens on that service. Clauses 1 and 2 deal with short custodial sentences being replaced by non-custodial sentences, and Clauses 20 to 23 deal with early release, all of which will increase the burden on the Probation Service. But then Clauses 11 and 12, with respect to rehabilitation, will require probation officers to sentence offenders to the number of days they must complete. Clause 34 will enable probation officers to reduce the amount of unpaid work that an offender must complete.

I will come back to these provisions in a moment, but all these clauses require officers to manage, supervise and monitor a very large number of offenders, who will have avoided custody or have been released early under the Bill. There are, of course, provisions for the probation reset to help or assist the struggling Probation Service, but, when we look at the financial impact assessment, it could at best be described as opaque. We are told that in some instances there will be a modest increase in the cost of services and that the remainder has not been calculated. But probation officers will be expected to take on these new tasks, and a question arises as to whether they will be equipped financially, apart from anything else, to take them on.

But there is also a perhaps more fundamental constitutional issue to be considered here. If probation officers will take on these judicial-type responsibilities, which are being transferred potentially without corresponding investment in training or supervision, where will that lead us? Unlike sentencing decisions taken in open court, these apparently administrative terminations will occur without transparency, oversight or, it would appear, any form of appeal mechanism. The Government have not provided any mechanism to ensure that these decisions are monitored, audited or even transparently reported. I pick up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hastings of Scarisbrick, about there being room for very material error where you impose these obligations on staff who are potentially underresourced, undertrained and unable to determine with any certainty how they will perform these new functions, which are to be regarded as at least quasi-judicial functions. That represents a major constitutional shift in the balance of responsibility between the judiciary and the Executive. Has the Minister thought that through and considered the operational pressures that this will actually impose on the Probation Service?

Finally, and very briefly—with apologies for being over time—I acknowledge the point about IPP sentences. As a matter of principle, they cannot be maintained. The onus placed on this small cohort is placed on no other prisoner in the prison estate, and they will struggle time and again to overcome it, because we have now reduced that cohort to perhaps the least able to meet the requirements presently placed on them with regard to how they are to be dealt with when they come to seek release. I do not offer a solution to that—I am well aware that the need for a solution has dogged Government after Government—but we cannot wait another eight years to see this play out and I invite the Minister to consider seriously whether this matter should be addressed in the Bill.

Sentencing Bill

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 26th November 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

1: Clause 1, page 1, line 14, leave out “not more” and insert “less”
Member's explanatory statement
The presumption for a suspended sentence would apply to sentences of less than 12 months.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to the set of amendments in my name. I am sure that, throughout the course of this Committee, many noble Lords will debate and question precisely which offenders they think should be excluded from the numerous provisions for suspended sentences included in the Bill. The Government have made the underlying principle behind their approach quite clear: that only those who pose a serious risk of harm to a particular individual should be denied the privilege of a suspended sentence. On these Benches, we believe that the exemptions to Clause 1 should be much wider. We have tabled many amendments to that effect, and I will speak to them at several points throughout this Committee. I am sure that noble Lords will disagree with some of our suggestions, and I welcome the debate that will ensure that we scrutinise the Bill with care. The Bill received just one day of Committee in the other place. It is therefore imperative to carry out our duty to provide the Bill with the scrutiny that it requires.

These amendments do not directly relate to the specific offender types who we believe should spend their sentences in custody. Rather, this group of amendments seeks to clarify important practical and operational points of the Bill, which either the Government did not account for or appear to be in favour of. I have tabled these amendments to highlight the harmful effects that the Bill will have on communities and individuals, if it becomes law in its present form.

Amendments 1 and 12 may seem relatively minor in the grand scheme of the Bill, but, without their inclusion, a significant number of dangerous criminals will be free to roam the streets. There are many crimes for which a 12-month sentence is imposed, and these amendments seek to ensure that such offenders are past the cut-off point for suspended sentences to apply.

Just last month, a sex offender, Hadush Kebatu, was released from prison by accident. The Foreign Secretary said repeatedly that he was “livid” that such a man had been let loose and was free to roam the streets. Further, the Home Secretary called the same man a “vile sex offender”. Countless Government Ministers expressed their thoughts and sympathies for the victim and her family, and we on these Benches could not agree more with that assessment of Mr Kebatu.

Mr Kebatu was serving a 12-month sentence. He was convicted for trying to sexually assault a 14 year-old girl. A 41 year-old man convicted of a child sexual offence was allowed to roam the streets and the Government purported outrage, yet under the provisions of their own Sentencing Bill offenders such as Mr Kebatu would be at large not simply for a handful of days but for the entirety of their sentence. When questioned about this, the Minister simply explained that there were separate provisions for foreign-national offenders, but this misses the point. It does not detract from the fact that there are thousands of offenders convicted of charges similar to those of Mr Kebatu, all of whom would be let out on to the streets after their conviction for child sexual assault. Will the Minister finally accept this as being the Government’s stance with respect to these proposals?

In an ideal world, I would rather see all such offenders behind bars for the entire duration of their sentence, and I have tabled further amendments to that effect. However, Amendments 1 and 12 seek at least to close this obvious gap in justice to some degree by ensuring that only offences with sentences of less than 12 months are eligible for suspension. That way the one-year sentences imposed on men such as Mr Kebatu and other sexual offenders would be served in custody and not on our streets.

Amendments 2 and 13 similarly seek to plug apparent drafting oversights in the Bill. At present, it is not yet clear whether the presumption of a suspended sentence would apply to that sentence before or after a guilty plea is submitted. Given that in all published materials of the Government they have indicated that only short- term sentences of up to one year should be suspended, I can only guess that they intended for Clause 1 to take effect before guilty pleas were submitted. I have therefore tabled Amendments 2 and 13 to ensure that the presumption of suspended sentences should apply before any credit is given for a guilty plea.

If this is an amendment which the Government wish to oppose then I suggest they must make clear to all noble Lords, and indeed to the public, that they in fact wish to suspend sentences for all crimes up to 18 months, rather than 12 months. That is because any offender charged with a crime of 18 months has the ability to reduce it by a third by submission of an early guilty plea, which will subsequently make them eligible, apparently, for an automatic suspended sentence. I suggest that this will simply open a Pandora’s box for a whole new subset of crimes that will fall into the eligibility criteria of Clause 1.

The exclusion of an express clause negating credit for a guilty plea in this context will have unintended and dangerous implications for our justice system. It risks fundamentally undermining public confidence in justice if offenders come to recognise that by pleading guilty they can simply avoid prison altogether and serve their sentence in the community. That distorts incentives in a manner that no responsible Government should welcome. It may even encourage individuals charged with serious crimes, regardless of whether or not they committed them, to plead guilty, purely to escape a custodial sentence. That cannot be a principle on which our system of justice is based. I hope that the Minister will take this point seriously, and I look forward to hearing his response.

Amendments 3 and 14 address a further operational incoherence in Clause 1: the length of time for which a suspended sentence would be imposed. Under the Bill as drafted, there is no clarity as to whether suspended sentences imposed automatically under this presumption would be suspended for the maximum period. In many cases, an offender could therefore benefit from a dramatically reduced suspension period, serving little to no meaningful time under supervision. My amendments seek to ensure in statute that this is simply not the case. If the intention is truly to uphold the integrity of sentencing, any suspended sentence imposed as a substitute for immediate custody must be suspended for the maximum allowable period. Anything less would undermine the very concept of accountability that the public rightly expect from our justice system.

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[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Timpson) (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a great honour to have the opportunity to speak for the Government in Committee on the Sentencing Bill. As noble Lords know, I have devoted much of my life and career to criminal justice reform, in particular the question of how to reduce reoffending. Therefore, I am particularly pleased to have the opportunity to speak to the amendments on short sentences, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst. While I am grateful to noble Lords for their constructive and thoughtful input on this Bill, inside and outside the Chamber, I remain convinced that the position of the Bill is the right one. I appreciate the words from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Beith, along those lines.

Let me be clear at the outset: we are not abolishing short sentences. Judges will still have discretion to send offenders to prison where there is a significant risk of physical or psychological harm to an individual, where they have breached a court order or in exceptional circumstances. However, the evidence shows that those given a community order or suspended sentence reoffend less than similar offenders given a short prison sentence. That is a key driver behind the presumption to suspend short sentences and why it must continue to apply to sentences of 12 months or less.

We are following the evidence to reduce crime, leading to fewer victims and safer communities, and we are also following the lead of the previous Conservative Government who originally introduced this measure during the last Parliament, without the additional amendments we are debating today.

Given the clear evidence on short sentences, the Government do not agree with introducing further exemptions. To do so could increase reoffending and so create more victims. I came into this job to build a criminal justice system that leads to fewer victims, not more.

I will now turn to the specific points that noble Lords have raised in this debate. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, have both raised important points on early guilty pleas through Amendments 2 and 13. I can assure noble Lords that I have reflected on these amendments and considered them at length and with great care, but it has long been the practice of the courts to give a reduction in sentence where a defendant pleads guilty. This avoids the need for a trial, enables cases to be dealt with quickly, and shortens the gap between charge and sentence. Moreover, it can save victims and witnesses from the concern about having to give evidence. This is particularly important in traumatic cases.

Furthermore, the amendments proposed would create inconsistencies. The presumption would not apply where an early guilty plea mitigation brought the sentence down to 12 months or less, whereas it could still apply where the court applied any other mitigation that had the same effect. For these reasons, the Government do not support these amendments.

Through Amendments 3 and 14, noble Lords have also proposed requiring courts to impose suspended sentence orders with a maximum operational period of two years. This would not be appropriate for every suspended sentence order without consideration of the particular facts of the case, and would place additional burden on the Probation Service. The evidence shows that those given a community order or suspended sentence reoffend less than similar offenders given a short prison sentence. We are following the evidence to reduce crime, leading to fewer victims and safer communities.

It is absolutely clear that the last Government left our Probation Service under immense pressure. Fourteen years of austerity came alongside a botched privatisation. The scars are still there, and we are fixing it. Sentencing must always be proportionate to the offence committed, taking into account all the circumstances of each case. It is right for the judiciary to retain discretion to consider this and make the sentencing decision. This amendment would remove that discretion.

I thank the noble Lords again for their amendments and the opportunity to debate them. I hope I have sufficiently explained why our approach of following the evidence is the right one to take. With that in mind, I ask them not to press their amendments.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this part of the Committee debate, and I thank the Minister for explaining the position of the Government with regard to these proposed amendments.

On early guilty pleas, it appears to me, respectfully, that if the Government are going to maintain the position that has been set out, they should be explicit in the Bill that they are not dealing with suspension in respect of sentences of 12 months; they are dealing with suspension in respect of sentences of up to and including 18 months. That is far from clear in the Bill. Whether or not the Government accept our amendment, it is a point that has to be made clear so that public confidence can be maintained in the nature of the sentencing system that is going to be introduced.

With regard to the matter of suspension and the maximum suspension period of two years, we maintain that if these moves are going to be taken, it is only appropriate that the suspension should be for a period long enough to enable some form of rehabilitation to take place, because otherwise it is simply pointless. Again, I ask the Government to reconsider their position, but at this stage I will withdraw this amendment.

Amendment 1 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

6: Clause 1, page 3, line 10, at end insert—
“(3A) But this section does not apply if the offender—(a) has been convicted of three or more other offences in the 12 months leading to the conviction for which a suspended sentence would otherwise have been passed (the “current offence”);(b) has been convicted of 10 or more offences prior to the current offence;(c) has been convicted of the same offence as the current offence on three or more previous occasions; (d) is convicted of an offence (the current offence) with a mandatory minimum custodial sentence;(e) has previously received a suspended sentence order or a custodial sentence for the same offence as the current offence;(f) has breached a suspended sentence order or orders on three or more occasions, either by breaching community requirements or committing a further offence;(g) has a history of poor compliance with court orders, according to a written or oral statement from a probation officer;(h) at the time of the current offence, was—(i) subject to a supervision order, or(ii) on licence, or subject to supervision, under Chapter 6 of Part 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (release, licences, supervision and recall);(i) is convicted of an offence eligible for consideration under the Unduly Lenient Sentence Scheme under sections 35 and 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988; or(j) is being sentenced for three or more offences concurrently.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would prevent suspended sentences from being passed in a range of circumstances.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, these amendments touch on similar issues to those we have already addressed. They highlight what we say is a fundamental flaw in Clause 1—the blanket presumption of suspended short custodial sentences even for offenders who pose a serious and ongoing risk to the public.

Under the Bill as it is framed, there is the real possibility that individuals convicted of crimes such as robbery, grievous bodily harm, sexual assault, burglary and offences involving knives or other bladed weapons could serve the entirety of their sentences in the community. As we have just noted, that may be far less than a suspension of two years if the Government proceed as they intend. From the point of view of public safety and public confidence in the justice system, that appears to be unacceptable.

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[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord for raising the point about emergency workers: they deserve all our attention and we are very proud of what they do in often very difficult circumstances. I will take away his challenge on that.

I have met a number of people—especially women—in prison who are there for assaulting an emergency worker. While those assaults should not happen at all, often those people were in a very traumatic situation and, when the emergency services came to their aid, they reacted in the wrong way. That is something we need to bear in mind as well.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I am obliged for all the contributions from across the Committee and for the response from the Minister. Everybody appreciates that Clause 1 is not prohibiting anything. Nevertheless, a number of noble Lords, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, talked eloquently and correctly about the discretion of our judges and the trust that we should place in our judges. But that is not what Clause 1 is doing. Clause 1 is saying they must apply a presumption. They are not being trusted with it; they are being told they must apply it. That is one of the issues that we need to address.

A number of specific exceptions were tabled in the amendments, but I take on board the point made by my noble friend Lord Hailsham about it being far more straightforward to produce some generic description in this regard. Indeed, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, pointed out, it may even be something that should be left to the Sentencing Council at the end of the day. But that is another issue. I read this quotation:

“Even when criminals are found guilty, the sentences they receive often do not make sense either to victims or the wider public”.


That is from the Labour manifesto. My fear is that Clause 1 is simply going to reinforce that perception, and that is one of the concerns that we have with it.

I appreciate the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Foster, about the potential for a suspended sentence to lead to support and rehabilitation. The problem is that those facilities are simply not available at the present time and, in any event, we do not know what period of suspension might or might not be imposed by the courts. It may well be one or two years, but, as the Bill is framed, it may be much less and leave no sensible opportunity for either support or rehabilitation.

There is also the matter of statistics. The noble Lord, Lord Foster, alluded to some well-known statistics about the fact that those who are in custody for short sentences are much more likely to repeat offences when they come out of prison than those who have been given a suspended sentence. But one must bear in mind that those who have been given a suspended sentence have generally committed a far less serious offence than those who have been given a custodial sentence, and that those who are given custodial sentences for relatively minor offences are given those custodial sentences because they are repeat offenders. One must bear in mind Disraeli’s observation that there are lies, there are damned lies and there are statistics and, therefore, we have to approach them with a degree of care. I understand and appreciate that there is more generic evidence to suggest that suspended sentences, when properly applied, controlled and maintained, can have beneficial effects—nobody doubts that for a moment—but there is a very real need here to address, among other things, the whole scourge of repeat offenders.

This arises particularly in the context of Amendment 8 from my noble friend Lord Jackson, which highlights burglary as a particular offence. Burglary is an intensely intrusive crime that leaves victims traumatised, and it is inclined to attract repeat offenders. Its social damage is considerable. There are particular crimes of that nature, given their impact on society as a whole, that should attract something more than a suspended sentence, given the fear is that somebody will simply repeat them. Similar observations can be made on knife crime as well.

I fully understand that there is a need to revisit Clause 1 and its implications. We have sought to do so by identifying particular or specific exceptions to it. There is, as I indicated, and as outlined by my noble friend Lord Hailsham, potentially a better route to that conclusion. Indeed, to echo the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, there is hopefully a simpler route to that conclusion. For present purposes, however, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 6 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

30: Clause 2, page 6, line 39, at end insert—
“(2B) But a suspended order is not available in relation to that sentence if the sentence is in relation to—(a) any offence under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 which involves a child under 13;(b) any offence of grooming or inciting a child to engage in sexual activity;(c) any offence of creating, distributing or possessing indecent images of children;(d) any offence of assault occasioning grievous bodily harm (GBH) or wounding with intent; (e) any offence involving use or possession of a knife or other offensive weapon in the commission of a violent offence;(f) any offence of stalking or harassing a victim with repeated conduct;(g) any offence against a vulnerable person (including children or adults) involving serious harm or risk;(h) any domestic abuse offence where the victim is a current or former partner or family member, including controlling or coercive behaviour and any offence involving violence, threats, or psychological abuse.(2C) The changes made by this section to the power under sections 264 and 277 of the Sentencing Code must not come into force until the Secretary of State has consulted on, and ensured the necessary exclusion list under subsection (2B) is operational for, all offences considered to involve serious violence, sexual offences, offences against children or vulnerable persons and domestic abuse offences.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would disapply the ability of the court to suspend sentences to those convicted of the offences listed in the amendment, and would require the Secretary of State to consult on and ensure exclusions for those convicted of other serious violent and sexual offence categories.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, the group of amendments in my name raise important points concerning Clause 2. Our concerns here stem from the same concerns that gave effect to our proposed amendments in respect of Clause 1. Of course, we have sympathy for the current pressures on our prison system, but we must also recognise that, in essence, an undiscriminating provision to let offenders remain in the community without custodial punishment is by no means the solution. Indeed, in many ways, the present provisions create greater challenges than Clause 1 in respect of the ability for the suspension of sentences for offenders who have been sentenced for up to three years’ imprisonment.

These are not petty criminals. This provision would apply to those going to prison for crimes such as robbery, grievous bodily harm, sexual assault, organised drug dealing and possession of an offensive weapon. Amendments 30 and 32 provide a list of offences where we believe it would be unacceptable to allow such offenders to serve suspended sentences. I accept that, as my noble friend Lord Hailsham observed when we debated Clause 1, there may be scope for a generic provision here rather than a long list of specific offences, and certainly we will give consideration to that. However, we do not consider that someone convicted of, for example, sexual offences related to a child or grooming should avoid custody entirely.

Without any effective form of custodial sentence, we risk two important consequences. First, the deterrent effects that are inherent to custodial sentences cease to operate. Secondly, serious offenders will have the opportunity to reoffend, having received no effective rehabilitation, and will have continued access to their victims.

Amendments 30 and 32 similarly make provisions for offences of assault and wounding with intent involving weapons such as knives. We believe it is important that offenders convicted of these serious crimes serve their sentences in custody rather than at large in the community. Those convicted of such violent offences should have to spend some time in custody. This is not only to ensure the continued safety of the wider public, but to ensure that the public’s perception is that serious crime of this nature is punished. I again repeat that, although we recognise that prisons are under considerable strain, we cannot allow that to be the chief or principal consideration when it comes to the imposition of sentences.

Finally, Amendments 30 and 32 seek to exclude offenders who have engaged in stalking or harassment, and also those who have been guilty of domestic abuse

“where the victim is a current or former partner or family member”.

I suggest that it is self-evident why such offenders should serve their sentences in prison and not have access to their victims. I note that even in Clause 1, there is an exception in respect of “significant risk of … harm” to “a particular individual”, where the presumption will not apply. Why is there no similar provision in respect of Clause 2 when we are dealing with far more serious offences than those addressed by virtue of a sentence of 12 months?

Amendments 31 and 33 seek to highlight further operational issues with respect to the Bill, and Clause 2 specifically. The clause, in essence, leaves the door open to a multitude of issues that would never arise if a custodial sentence was going to be present. It is entirely possible that someone convicted of assault on several occasions could be handed down a sentence of less than three years under the current sentencing guidelines. This provision would operate to provide that person with the possibility of serving a suspended sentence. Without meaningful accountability, law breaking and crime will continue to proliferate.

I draw particular attention to the proposed new subsection (2B)(g) in Amendment 31, which provides that suspended sentence orders should not be imposed on those who have

“a history of poor compliance with court orders”.

I respectfully suggest that this is an obvious point to make. Those who clearly have a history of not following community orders should not be placed immediately back into society after committing a crime. Yet that is a very real possibility under the provisions of Clause 3.

It would appear that Amendment 34, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Russell, is perhaps underpinned by the same concerns that are rooted in our amendments, namely the real possibility of dangerous offenders on the streets, thereby putting the public at risk. The noble Lord’s amendment seeks to exempt specified offences of terrorism, violence and sexual offences from suspended sentences. We support the intention behind that amendment and certainly hope that the Government will take it seriously.

I have sought simply to illustrate a few of those instances where it should not be appropriate for a suspended sentence to be available. That is not only so that the crime is met with a proportionate punishment but is also required to ensure that the public can maintain confidence in the criminal justice system. I hope that the Government will take these amendments seriously, and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response. I beg to move.

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[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lords, Lord Russell and Lord Sandhurst, for sharing their views and tabling these amendments, which aim to prevent sentences for certain categories of offences from being suspended. I would be interested to hear more about the Marie Collins Foundation; I have never heard of that organisation before. If it would be helpful, I would be interested in having a meeting with the noble Lord and the foundation to learn more and see what I can gain from that.

I must be clear that it is at the discretion of the independent judiciary whether to impose a suspended sentence, taking into account all the circumstances of the offence and following the appropriate guidance set by the Sentencing Council. For example, sentencing guidelines are clear: it may not be appropriate to suspend a sentence if the offender presents a risk to any person or if appropriate punishment can be achieved only by immediate custody. If the offender breaches the order by failing to comply with any of the requirements or committing a new offence, they can be returned to court. If the breach is proven, the courts are required to activate the custodial sentence unless it would be unjust to do so. Of course, criminals serving suspended sentences also face the prospect of being sent to prison if they fail to comply with the terms of these orders. So, under this Bill, someone could receive a two-and-a-half-year sentence, suspended for three years, and with an electronically monitored curfew lasting for two years. In this scenario, if they breach their curfew or commit a further offence, they face the prospect of being sent to prison.

I would like to reassure noble Lords that there is already provision within this Bill to prohibit the use of suspended sentence orders under any circumstances in relation to sentences for offenders of particular concern and extended determinate sentences. These sentences can be imposed in relation to the specific offences listed in the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Russell, where the court is of the opinion that the offender is dangerous. Currently, if an extended determinate sentence is imposed for two years or less, it is imposed alongside a standard determinate sentence, and both can be suspended. However, the Bill will change that position so that where an extended sentence is imposed, it cannot be suspended under any circumstances, including when it is imposed alongside a standard determinate sentence.

I turn to terrorism sentences. Where a life sentence is not imposed, unless there are exceptional circumstances, a serious terrorism sentence is required if a court is of the opinion that there is a significant risk of harm to members of the public and the offence was likely to cause multiple deaths. The minimum sentence of imprisonment will then be 14 years and therefore a suspended sentence order would not be available. The noble Lords have also proposed to exempt offences with mandatory minimum sentences and those eligible for referral under the unduly lenient scheme. If the offence being sentenced has a mandatory minimum sentence and is capable of being suspended, judges still retain the discretion to impose an immediate custodial sentence when there is the appropriate outcome.

To be clear, we are not abolishing short sentences. Offences falling under the unduly lenient sentence scheme are rightly treated very seriously. I reassure noble Lords that Clause 2 does not interfere with existing mechanisms that allow for the review of sentences in these cases. We believe that these safeguards protect the public while preserving judicial discretion. Sentencing in individual cases is rightly a matter for the courts, considering the full circumstances of the case.

I turn to the amendments tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, which would prevent the court from suspending a sentence where an offender has not complied with previous court orders and to exempt offenders convicted of multiple previous offences from being suspended. I can reassure noble Lords that the sentencing guidelines are clear. Where an offender has not complied with previous court orders and the court thinks that they are unlikely to comply in the future, that may be a reason not to suspend the sentence.

Additionally, when an offender is in custody—for example, when they have breached their licence conditions by committing a further offence and have been recalled into custody as a result—the court will not suspend the sentence. Sentences are generally served concurrently when the offences arise out of the same incident, or where there is a series of offences of the same or a similar kind, especially when committed against the same person. The key point is that the court should ensure that the overall sentence imposed on the offender is just and proportionate. Noble Lords will know that this Government take prolific offending extremely seriously, and previous offending is already a statutory aggravating factor.

I must also be clear that a suspended sentence is not a soft option. The courts can impose a range of requirements on an offender, ranging from curfews to exclusion zones. This Bill includes tough new restriction zones, which will restrict offenders to a specific geographic area. These will be electronically monitored in most cases and are intended to serve as not just a punishment but an important tool to protect and reassure victims.

Reoffending is unacceptably high for victims and the public, and we must drive it down. That is why we are ramping up intensive supervision courts, targeting the prolific offenders whose criminal behaviour is often driven by addiction or other needs. The international evidence is clear: these courts cut crime, with a 33% decrease in the rate of arrest compared to offenders who receive standard sentences. That is just one way in which this Government are putting the necessary structures in place to build a sustainable justice system going forward.

Suspended sentence orders in appropriate cases give offenders a chance to stay in work, keep stable housing and access support in the community. All of this goes towards reducing repeat offending and supporting rehabilitation, and it is right that that remains the case. By targeting the causes of offending in the community, we can lower reoffending rates and in turn reduce the number of victims. I hope noble Lords are now assured of the Government’s position on this, and I therefore ask the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

I thank the Minister and other noble Lords for their contributions. These amendments are designed to ensure that dangerous or repeat offenders cannot avoid custody due to a general presumption of suspension.

I hear what the Minister said about the discretion of the independent judiciary, but it seems to me that he is attempting to go in two different directions at the same time—we have only just looked at Clause 1, where he is imposing upon the discretion of the independent judiciary a presumption that has to apply. There is no discretion there; they must abide by the presumption. So, in a sense, we go from one extreme to the other with regard to the justification for these provisions in the Bill, and it is very difficult to understand any underlying logic or principle that is being applied here. I do hope that the Government will give further consideration to Clause 2 and the proposed amendments to it, but, for present purposes, I will withdraw this amendment.

Amendment 30 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

That sounds sensible.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, Clause 3 is of course a novel sentencing tool, and it is entirely correct that the Committee should probe its design with some care. Many of the amendments before us seek reassurance that the scheme will be fair and proportionate, and indeed that it will be workable in practice. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, with her amendment, draws attention to the basic question of impact. An income reduction order must not be set at a level that undermines an offender’s ability to work, train or maintain stable housing. If these orders are to be effective, they must support rehabilitation, not jeopardise the very stability on which it depends. The noble Baroness’s amendments highlight that there is a risk here that requires very clear scrutiny.

The amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Sandhurst raise a series of questions about the architecture of the scheme. As drafted, the Bill establishes broad powers to reduce an offender’s income, yet it leaves almost all the crucial detail to regulations that we have not yet seen and that may in due course prove insufficiently robust.

Amendments 37 to 44 ask the Government to place in the Bill the essential elements that will govern how these orders operate in the real world. They begin by posing the most basic question of all: what do the Government mean by “monthly income”? Are we assessing gross or net income? How are fluctuating earnings to be treated? What of the self-employed or those on irregular or zero-hours contracts? It is very difficult to see how a fair and consistent system can be construed without clear statutory guidance on these points. If Parliament is to authorise a mechanism allowing the state to deduct a portion of a person’s income month after month, it is surely right that we also understand with precision how that income is to be defined, what thresholds will apply, how caps are to be set and which factors the court must take into account before imposing an order.

Amendment 44 goes to the heart of our concern that the Bill as currently drafted lacks the necessary clarity about the conditions under which an income reduction order may be imposed. Leaving this almost entirely to secondary legislation again risks undermining both transparency and fairness—surely qualities that are fundamental to the integrity of such a system.

These amendments illuminate the substantial gaps in the present drafting and ensure that Parliament does not sign off on a broad new power without understanding how it will work in practice and what safeguards will accompany it. I look to the Minister to provide the clarity that has so far been somewhat lacking. For our part, we do not oppose the principle of creating a more flexible and enforceable means-based penalty. But, before we take such a significant step, we must be satisfied that the framework is sound, that the protections are clear and that the consequences, particularly for those on the margins, have been fully thought through. I hope the Minister will address these concerns.

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

My Lords, one of the three guiding principles of the David Gauke Independent Sentencing Review was to expand and make greater use of punishment outside prison. We are determined to make sure that crime does not pay, which is why we introduced Clause 3, giving courts the power to impose income reduction orders on offenders who receive suspended sentence orders. From the debate we have just had and from my prior conversations, I know that noble Lords have a keen interest in how these will work in practice, and I am grateful for the opportunity to debate this at greater length today. I have been employing prisoners for over 20 years. Many are on day release and, in some cases, a proportion of their earnings goes back to victims. Income reduction orders are inspired by that principle: offenders must pay back to society for the harm they have caused.

I first turn to Amendments 37, 41, 42 and 44, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst. They seek to specify what must be contained in the regulations detailing this scheme. I assure noble Lords that we are working cross-government to develop a process for delivering income reduction orders in a way that works cohesively with the rest of the powers that sentencers have at their disposal. We have intentionally kept the legislation flexible to ensure that we can deliver this measure in that way. For example, we do not agree that it would be appropriate for income reduction orders to be mandatory in certain circumstances. This would unnecessarily curtail judicial discretion to decide whether an order should be imposed based on the full facts of an individual case.

The Sentencing Council is actively considering what updates to its guidelines are needed to account for the Bill’s reforms, including these orders. My officials are working closely with the council. I reassure noble Lords that regulations will be subject to the affirmative parliamentary procedure, so noble Lords will have the opportunity to debate and discuss these details prior to implementation.

I turn to Amendments 38 and 40 and am happy to explain the rationale behind the drafting of this Bill. Let me be clear: this measure is a penalty for high-income individuals. It will ensure that criminals who break the law, and who benefit from keeping their jobs and continue to earn a significant salary, pay back to society. I doubt that anyone in the Committee would disagree with that. The intention is to set an income threshold that would apply at an appropriately high level. But the Bill sets a baseline that the threshold for an income reduction order can never be below. The aim is to ensure that those with incomes in line with the minimum wage cannot ever receive this penalty. The minimum wage is set at an hourly rate, and 170 times that is a reasonable approximation of the hours likely to be worked over a month.

Noble Lords have also questioned why there is an upper limit. A core tenet of our criminal justice system is fairness and proportionality. So, setting a maximum percentage of an offender’s excess monthly income that can be collected protects individuals from receiving an excessively harsh penalty. We need to ensure that the punishment fits the crime. If the court determines that a higher penalty is appropriate and the offence is serious enough to carry an unlimited fine, the court will still be able to impose that, either instead of or as well as an income reduction order.

But income reduction orders must not be a disincentive to employment or amplify existing hardship. As someone who has championed the employment of ex-offenders for years, this is the last thing I would want to happen. Therefore, they will be applicable only to offenders who earn or are deemed likely to earn a significant income. We will set the minimum income threshold through secondary legislation at an appropriate level. This will ensure that low-income households are not in the scope of this measure.

As with any other financial penalty, judges will consider an offender’s means and circumstances when choosing whether to apply an income reduction order at sentencing. This can include, but is not restricted to, income, housing costs and child maintenance. Additionally, the provisions in the Bill allow the Secretary of State to set out in regulations the deductions that must be made when calculating an offender’s monthly income for the purposes of assessing whether an income reduction order can be applied.

Amendment 79, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, proposes to create a power for a sentencing court to require an offender to make periodic payments or other contributions towards the maintenance and welfare of their dependants. I must inform the noble Lord that there are existing mechanisms to deal with payments to dependants. For example, the family courts are able to make spousal maintenance payments on divorce.

This proposed new clause would require the court to inquire whether an offender has responsibility for children or other dependants. Although this is well intentioned, it risks creating practical difficulties. Inquiring whether a person holds parental responsibility, has dependent children or other dependants—and subsequently inquiring about the circumstances and reasonable needs of those dependants—may require interpretation of family court orders, birth records or informal care-giving arrangements for the purposes of verification. Imposing such a duty risks delaying sentencing.

This Government have committed to identifying and providing support for children affected by parental imprisonment. As such, the Ministry of Justice and the Department for Education are working to determine the best way to do this to ensure that children get the support they need. This builds on a range of services offered by His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service to help families and significant others, where appropriate, to build positive relationships with people in the criminal justice system. This includes social visits, letter writing, video calls, family days and prison voicemail. I hope this addresses the concerns raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Beith. I ask the noble Lords not to press their amendments.

Sentencing Bill

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 26th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[The Lord Bishop of Leeds]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 45A in the place of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, who, regrettably, is not able to be here today. It seems that in wider society there is a greater push for harsher punishment and longer sentences, and there is a tension with what the purpose of such punishment is. This amendment is designed to provide some elucidation on that. It would define in law the purposes of imprisonment and require the courts and the Secretary of State to have regard to the purposes of imprisonment.

His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service’s strategic objective is to

“carry out sentences given by the courts, in custody and the community, and rehabilitate people in our care through education and employment”.

But there is no statutory or other provision that directly addresses the fundamental purposes of imprisonment. While the Bill sets out the statutory purposes of sentencing, these do not provide guidance to judges on whether imprisonment is appropriate, nor on what should occur once an offender is incarcerated. The need to confront this, we suggest, is quite urgent. There is tension, obviously, between punishment, rehabilitation and restoration.

In the absence of a clear understanding of the purpose of imprisonment, it seems important both for prisoners and their wider families and community, as well as victims, that the expectations of what the particular punishment sets out to do are clear, rather than just handing out a prison sentence and hoping that something good will happen. I should also add that, in my own experience of prisons and talking to people engaged in prison rehabilitation, the resources to enable such rehabilitation to happen—such as education and so on—are reducing, and this cannot be good.

At present, the public express little confidence in the courts and prisons, in part as a result of the lack of clarity around the purpose and use of imprisonment. A clear parliamentary statement on this issue would serve prisoners, who would better understand why they have been imprisoned. This is about clarity. A number of jurisdictions, such as New Zealand, have legislated guidance for courts and the community more broadly regarding this issue. On behalf of those who have signed up to this amendment, I say that this is an amendment that could be taken seriously and would help the judicial system.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, we on these Benches fully support the principle that victims’ rights, safety and experiences must be considered. Included already in the statutory purposes of sentencing is the protection of the public. In practice, courts make an effort to take victims’ interests into account. The explicit addition to Clause 4 raises an interesting principle, and the amendment serves, perhaps, as a useful reminder of the centrality of victims in our justice system. We look forward to hearing the Government’s response to Amendment 45.

Amendment 45A, in the name of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, would place in statute the purposes of imprisonment and require both the courts and the Secretary of State to have regard to them. The first of these principles is

“the incapacitation of prisoners in order to restrict their ability to re-offend in the community”.

I simply observe that the purposes of Clauses 1 and 2 of the Bill are to the opposite effect. They raise presumptions in favour of the release of prisoners into the community, rather than their incapacitation to restrict their ability to reoffend. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to that.

I note that Amendment 45A would reinforce principles already central to sentencing and prison policy, which can only be good for public confidence. If it can lead to improvements in rehabilitation and public protection, then all to the good. Again, I look forward to hearing the Minister’s reflections on the four aims proposed in Amendment 45A.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Lemos) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, to the noble Lord, Lord Beith, for bringing forward Amendment 45 in his place, and for the spirit in which it has been proposed. The Government share the noble Lords’ goal and dedication to ensure that victims are properly protected within our justice system. That is why Clause 4 makes it clear that the protection of the public explicitly includes victims of crime. This is a significant and, I must stress, intentional step forward. Although I wholeheartedly share the noble Lords’ intentions and commitments, I do not believe that the additional wording proposed in the amendment would add substantive value to what is already being achieved by the changes we are making in the Bill.

Clause 4 will make it clear that courts should consider the protection of victims as part of sentencing. That is very important. This amendment would simply restate what is already made explicit by Clause 4. Of course, the Government’s commitment to protecting victims is not limited to the changes we are making in Clause 4. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, asked me to comment on the centrality of victims to the justice system. I am so happy to do that that I rewrote this speaking note this morning, with the help of the officials.

The Bill contains other important measures that will protect victims. As noble Lords know, we are introducing new restriction zones, which will limit the movements of offenders instead of the movements of victims. We are also creating a new domestic abuse flag at sentencing so that domestic abusers are more consistently identified. This will help prisons and probation services manage offenders effectively and ensure that victims are better protected.

We are taking many steps outside the Bill to protect victims. We are continuing the provision of free sentencing remarks to victims of rape and sexual offences, and we are expanding the use of specialist domestic abuse courts—a very important cause, with which I have been associated for many years—with trained staff to support victims and more co-ordinated management of perpetrators.

I turn to the amendment proposed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leeds, in the absence of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, who has made an important contribution to this debate by raising whether the purpose of imprisonment should be defined in legislation. I spent many years chairing the agency board of HMPPS, and one of my jobs was to set the strategy. We spent a long time debating precisely this point and how we should frame it, so I understand the issues the right reverend Prelates seek to address.

Although I agree wholeheartedly that our debates should be guided by principles and evidence, and not by headlines—the noble Lord, Lord Beith, said that one of the most important duties of new legislation is to win public confidence; I entirely share that sentiment— I am afraid that I respectfully disagree that a definition in statute is needed. The purposes of sentencing, including imprisonment, are already set out in statute and reflected in Sentencing Council guidelines. These principles should guide our courts every day and provide the flexibility needed to respond to changing circumstances and emerging threats. With those comments in mind, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Beith, to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames has added his name to this amendment, which would ensure that sentencing guidelines

“provide that domestic abuse is an aggravating factor”.

Clause 6 puts into statute a provision that if the court is passing a sentence and

“is of the view that the offence involved domestic abuse carried out by the offender”,

then the court must state that. This clause is a very important acknowledgement of offences involving domestic abuse. My honourable friend the Member for Eastbourne played no small part in getting this on to the statute book.

Enabling the understanding of offences involving domestic abuse is important, generally and for the victim. I assume that the court being required to state that the offence involved domestic abuse will better enable the MoJ to keep data about this. I do not know whether the Minister will be able to confirm that or, at any rate, note the point that keeping data is important. We are going at little more than a snail’s pace in recognising domestic abuse; it is quite laborious achieving each step. I doubt I need to elaborate on this to noble Lords, but it is important for the victim to have not just a general recognition, but something which is official, stated by the court, of what they have gone through and what underlies it. That is of great significance to the individual.

However, simply providing for findings of domestic abuse provoked the question: and then what? Amendment 46 is intended to provide the answer by putting the matter into sentencing guidelines as an aggravating factor. I believe that the commission of an offence in the domestic context is already an aggravating factor under the sentencing guidelines, with which I struggled over the weekend. However, domestic abuse is more than context. I think the MoJ must accept that, otherwise new Section 56A would refer to domestic context, not domestic abuse. It is important; as people say, you cannot deal with what you cannot name. I beg to move.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I speak briefly to Amendment 46 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. As I read it, the amendment seeks to treat domestic abuse as an aggravating factor when determining all sentencing. Of course domestic abuse is a serious pervasive crime and it clearly has profound long-term impacts on its victims. This amendment appears to promote some degree of clarity and consistency, and, indeed, fairness in sentencing. It would ensure that the courts can take full account of both the nature and the impact of domestic abuse when deciding on an appropriate sentence. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s views on it.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Timpson) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for drawing attention to this important topic. They, along with their colleagues in the other place, have campaigned tirelessly on this issue.

I want to reassure the noble Baroness that we believe that this will improve the quality of data. The amendment we are debating today would require sentencing guidelines to provide that domestic abuse is an aggravating factor in sentencing. I fully appreciate the intent behind the amendment, and the Government wholeheartedly agree that judges should consider domestic abuse when sentencing, but I hope I can reassure the noble Baroness that this is already the position and explain why the Government do not consider a further amendment necessary.

Domestic abuse is already treated as an aggravating factor through the Sentencing Council’s guidelines. Courts are required by law to follow this, unless it would not be in the interests of justice to do so. The Sentencing Council has looked carefully at this issue and has issued an overarching guideline on domestic abuse. That guideline makes it clear that the presence of domestic abuse can make an offence more serious. In addition, a wide range of offence-specific guidelines include

“an offence committed within a domestic abuse context”

as a specific aggregating factor.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

47: After Clause 6, insert the following new Clause—
“Parents of young offenders(1) The Secretary of State must undertake an assessment of the effectiveness and use by the courts of the following powers in the Sentencing Code—(a) sections 365 to 375 (parenting orders), and(b) sections 380 to 383 (costs, fines and other financial orders where offender aged under 18).(2) The assessment undertaken under subsection (1) must make recommendations on—(a) ways to increase use of the Sentencing Code powers to make parenting and financial orders, and(b) other potential sentencing changes to promote greater parental responsibility in respect of young offenders.(3) The Secretary of State must, within a year of the passing of this Act, lay a copy of the assessment made under this section before Parliament.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to assess the use of the courts’ existing powers to make parenting orders and financial orders to parents of young offenders.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, this amendment would require the Secretary of State to undertake a full assessment of how the courts are using their existing powers to make parenting and financial orders for young offenders. These powers are already available under the Sentencing Code but in practice are used far less than Parliament had originally intended. Indeed, the Ministry of Justice has confirmed that more than 1,000 such orders were made in 2010, yet only 27 have been made in recent years. That is a striking decline, which raises serious concerns about whether important statutory powers designed to support families and address the causes of youth offending are being neglected or overlooked.

The purpose of these orders is not to punish parents but to support them, to help restore discipline and stability in the home and, ultimately, to prevent the next crime before it happens. Through assessing their effectiveness and making recommendations to increase their use, this amendment seeks to strengthen parental responsibility and engagement in the rehabilitation of young offenders. Children are of course among the most vulnerable in our society and it is our responsibility as lawmakers, indeed as parents, and ultimately as adults, to ensure that when young people offend, there is structure, support and the necessary resources in place to prevent them reoffending. I suggest that this amendment is a measured and constructive step towards achieving that aim.

I note that the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, is not in his place, but I will just mention his Amendment 87. The amendment addresses a very different but equally important aspect of youth justice: the question of transparency in cases involving the most serious offending by those under 18 years of age. The amendment would require reporting restrictions to be lifted at the point of sentencing where a young offender received a custodial sentence of four years or more. To receive a custodial sentence of over four years is telling of the crimes committed. I appreciate that anonymity has been a protective safeguard for most children within the justice system, and of course rightly so, but where an offence of such gravity that it warrants a substantial custodial sentence has been committed, there is a strong public interest in transparency and accountability. So I would welcome the Minister’s response not only to my own amendment but to that tabled by the noble Lord.

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord and the noble Lord for raising these important issues. Obviously, the Bill focuses on the adult system, but I am pleased that we have this opportunity to debate these amendments about the youth justice system, about which all of us are concerned. However, our position is that neither of these amendments are necessary.

Amendment 47 would require the Secretary of State to assess the effectiveness of certain orders available when dealing with a child under the age of 18. This includes parenting orders, and costs, fines and other financial orders. I am very happy to acknowledge the importance of these orders, as stressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen. They are very much part of the toolkit for dealing with youth offending and youth justice and have an important role in supporting greater responsibility for a child’s offending—excuse my voice; the NHS’s work in restoring my mellifluous tones is not quite complete yet. Whether they are used in a particular case is best determined by the court with access to professional advice from the youth offending team. When we were discussing this prior to this Committee tonight, we recognised the importance of youth offending officers having a view on what would be most effective in working with parents who should be doing more.

It is right that the court retains the discretion to determine whether such interventions are well placed to support the child’s rehabilitation—so we are not opposed to that—and that it has access to information on their individual circumstances. However, as the Minister said at Second Reading, we will be reviewing the position on youth sentencing separately in light of the changes that the Bill will introduce in due course, and we will be very happy to return to these important matters then. Therefore, although we do not agree that primary legislation is necessary for a dedicated assessment of these orders, I can confirm to noble Lords that we will consider this matter.

Amendment 87 is in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, who is not in his place, but the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, has set out the issue. I thank the noble and learned Lord, but let us be clear that the most serious childhood offences which result in longer custodial sentences are dealt with in the Crown Court. Here, it is at the discretion of the independent judge whether to impose restrictions to protect the identity of a child defendant. Reporting restrictions exist to protect vulnerable child victims, witnesses and defendants. They are very important. Being named in the press can obviously have a significant negative impact on the safety, prospects and opportunities of a child. That said, in all cases, judges have discretion to lift reporting restrictions once a child has been convicted, or before, where they are considered unreasonable—for example, in the well-known case of Axel Rudakubana, who was 17 when charged with the Southport murders. The Government’s view is that our existing system strikes the right balance between the fundamental importance of open justice and proportionate safeguards for children. With that in mind, I ask the noble and learned Lord and the noble Lord not to press their amendments.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

Does the Minister acknowledge that there has been a very striking decline in the use of parenting and financial orders since 2010?

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

We are conscious of that and we discussed it in our pre-briefing this morning, and we want to find out what that is all about. The important point to make at this stage, without jumping to conclusions, is that we want this to be part of the armoury, but we want youth offending officers to have discretion about what will really work with the parents. Anyway, you have got me on one of my favourite subjects, so I should get off it.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

I am obliged to the Minister for getting on and then getting off this topic. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 47 withdrawn.

Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

48: After Clause 6, insert the following new Clause—
“Child cruelty offences: notification and offender management requirements(1) A person (“relevant offender”) is subject to the notification requirements of subsections (2) and (3) for the period set out in subsection (4) if the relevant offender is convicted of an offence listed in subsection (6).(2) A relevant offender must notify to the police within the three days of the time of their conviction or their release from custody, and annually thereafter, providing —(a) the relevant offender’s date of birth,(b) their national insurance number,(c) their name on the notification date and, where using one or more other names on that date, each of those names,(d) their place of residence on the date of notification,(e) the address of any other premises in the United Kingdom at which, at the time the notification is given, they regularly reside or stay, and(f) any information that may be prescribed in regulations by the Secretary of State.(3) A relevant offender must notify to the police, within the period of three days beginning with the event occurring, about—(a) their use of a name which has not been notified to the police under subsection (2), (b) a change to their place or residence, and(c) any other prescribed change of circumstances as defined in regulations made under this section.(4) The dates of discharge from notification requirements under this section are the same as those set out in Section 88B of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.(5) The information required by subsections (2) and (3), once received, must be—(a) monitored regularly by the police and probation service, and(b) retained for the purposes of offender management.(6) The relevant offences are—(a) causing or allowing the death of a child or vulnerable adult, or allowing them to suffer serious harm (section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004),(b) child cruelty, neglect and violence (section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933),(c) infanticide (section 1 of the Infanticide Act 1938),(d) exposing children whereby life is endangered (section 27 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861),(e) an offence under sections 4, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23 or 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1860, if the victim is under the age of 16,(f) an offence under any of the following provisions of the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003—(i) female genital mutilation (section 1),(ii) assisting a girl to mutilate her own genitalia (section 2),(iii) assisting a non-UK person to mutilate overseas a girl’s genitalia (section 3), and(g) cruelty to children (section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933).”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would create notification requirements for people convicted of child cruelty, analogous to the Sex Offenders Register. Their information and personal details would be kept on record by the police for the purposes of offender management, with the aim of reducing the risk to children from future offences.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 48 seeks to establish a notification and offender management requirement clause for criminals convicted of child cruelty offences. For convicted child sex offenders, there already exist notification requirements, whereby those who have abused vulnerable and dependent children in the worst possible way must notify the police of their home address and other relevant details following their release from prison.

I know that the sex offender register is not a perfect system and that monitoring former convicts does not mean that we can control their every action, but it does act as a safeguard. It provides the police with the oversight needed to manage offenders and reduce the risk to victims, and it means that those who commit sex offences cannot just disappear back into the community. There is evidence that it is working, with sex offender reoffending rates having decreased in the past 15 years. Given that overall sexual offences have increased nearly fourfold over that same period, a decrease in reoffences does suggest that this part of the justice system is working. It is reasonable to argue that mandating the keeping of an offender register will have had some part to play in that reduction in the case of those offences.

It is unfortunate that similar provisions do not exist for those convicted of child cruelty offences. The offence is in a sense different, but the principle is largely similar. Child cruelty, like child sexual offences, is heinous, life-altering abuse to some of the most vulnerable members of our society. The only difference at present is that, once released, those guilty of such cruelty offences are not managed once their sentence and probation is over. A person can commit these horrific crimes—causing or allowing the death of a child, neglect and violence to a child or even female genital mutilation in some cases—and, once they have served a period of imprisonment, they are free to slip back into the community unnoticed. There is no centralised way for the police to know who these people are and where they are living.

This is all the more an issue given the fact that, in the majority of child cruelty cases, the offender very often has had parental responsibility for the victim. This means that they will often have connections to the child’s current guardian and in many cases to other family members with connections to the child. There is, therefore, the very heightened risk that they will be able to secure access to a child in these situations, yet there is no means of oversight or management of these people.

Amendment 48 seeks to correct this anomaly by introducing something analogous to the sex offender register. It would require those convicted of child cruelty offences to notify the police of their details following their release. They would need to share their home address, any other places of residence and any other name that they might choose to use. It would provide the police and probation services with the necessary information to identify individuals who might continue to pose a threat within a family community. It would give child victims some additional safeguard from the risk posed by such convicted offenders. It would also act as a deterrent to these offenders, just as entry in the child sex offenders register has done.

The child protection system should exist to save children from abusive circumstances and give them a measure of safety. This simple step of introducing a register would allow some additional protection for these victims and ensure a greater public awareness of the risks that such convicted persons would pose. I beg to move.

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

My Lords, I am extremely grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, for raising this matter. I pay tribute to Helen Grant MP and her constituent, Paula Hudgell. They have campaigned tirelessly and movingly on this important issue. Earlier this week, the Deputy Prime Minister had the great honour of meeting Paula and Helen to hear the Hudgells’ story and learn more about their campaign. This Government are taking decisive action to protect our children from those who would commit abhorrent crimes against them.

Currently, under Sarah’s law, the police can and do proactively disclose information regarding offenders to members of the public when they believe that a child is at risk of serious harm. For example, if the police become aware of an adult who has ever had a conviction, caution or charge for child abuse having unsupervised access to a child, the police can and will disclose this to the person best able to protect that child—usually their parent, carer or guardian. Sarah’s law also enables members of the public to make an application to the police for this information if they are worried about child protection.

In the Crime and Policing Bill, this Government are going further. We are strengthening Sarah’s law by placing it on a statutory footing. The clauses in that Bill will mean that chief police officers will have a statutory duty to follow the Secretary of State’s guidance on Sarah’s law. In practice, this will reinforce the police’s responsibility to make disclosures whenever that is necessary to protect children. We have also committed over £2 billion to support the roll out of the families first partnership programme to improve the early identification of risks to children and to take appropriate action.

The Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill will establish multi-agency child protection teams in every area. Additionally, we are placing a new duty on safeguarding partners to include education and childcare settings in their multi-agency safeguarding arrangements. We want to ensure that every opportunity is taken to keep our children safe. We are not standing still on this issue. We are exploring the best way to close the gap that Paula has rightly identified. This is why I and Ministers in the Home Office have instructed our officials to explore options for tracking offenders and offences involving child cruelty. I ask the noble and learned Lord to withdraw this amendment.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

I thank the Minister. In the light of his undertaking that the Government are pursuing this matter—vigorously, I take it—and intending to produce something, whether they term it a register or otherwise, so that the police can not only disclose information but access information, which is a more critical element here, at this point I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 48 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

49: Clause 11, page 26, line 7, at end insert—
“(2) After paragraph 4(1) of Schedule 9 to the Sentencing Code insert—“(1A) The minimum number of days on which the offender may be instructed to participate in activities must be specified in the relevant order.”” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment replaces the maximum-days requirement with a minimum number of days for rehabilitation activity requirements, ensuring that there is a minimum threshold of activity that offenders must complete.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, repeated reference has already been made to the independence of the judiciary and to the need to allow the judiciary full discretion in the matter of sentencing, but the provisions in the Bill at Clauses 11 and 12 erode these principles and put the whole issue at risk. The requirements in these clauses will remove a degree of judicial discretion, transferring certain sentencing powers from the courts to the Probation Service, and ultimately, of course, to the Government.

We on these Benches believe that the judiciary, who are specifically trained and appointed, and not probation officers, are best equipped to make decisions on sentencing. Clause 11, as drafted, removes the requirement to specify the maximum number of activity days to be undertaken as part of a community order or a suspended sentence order. The Government’s intention appears to be to create flexibility for probation services, so that they can gauge and tailor the number of days that offenders must complete.

Of course, we appreciate that, at present, there is a discrepancy between the maximum days of activity ordered by the courts and the number completed in reality. But nowhere in the Bill does there appear to be, once the initial sentence order and length are passed, judicial oversight of the number of days that probation officers may then set; nor does there appear to be any minimum threshold or expectation of participation specified in the Bill.

Putting this conferral of sentencing power on to the Probation Service creates an obvious misalignment of, among other things, incentives. Overworked probation officers, already contending with quite unmanageable case loads, are liable to be motivated not only by what is right for rehabilitation and public safety but by what is administratively possible. The unavoidable consequence is that the number of activity days ordered will be determined by capacity pressures within the Probation Service rather than by the rehabilitation requirements of individual offenders. The clause, as currently drafted, could enable an offender to engage in little or no meaningful rehabilitative activity whatever. Such an outcome would, of course, be a betrayal of victims and simply an illusion of justice.

On the other hand, the judiciary are trained and entrusted to assess evidence, consider proportionality, and understand risk and the need to balance public protection with rehabilitations. It is in these circumstances that we give notice of our intention to oppose Clauses 11 and 12 standing part of the Bill.

Amendments 49 and 50 seek to remedy the issue of probation officers operating in a quasi-judicial capacity. Amendment 49 would ensure that the court specifies a minimum number of days required under probation activity requirement. This would mean that, rather than setting a maximum threshold, which is seldom met in practice, there would be no ambiguity for officers or offenders over the number of days that must be completed. This is a simple and practical proposal that has the effect of dealing with the impact of Clauses 11 and 12.

Amendment 50 would clarify in statute that, where activity days are to be set for offenders, the number of days must always be set by the court itself. Without these amendments, decisions relating to punishment will, effectively, be delegated from the court to the Probation Service, rather than being determined at the point of sentence by the judiciary, and we believe it is essential that it should remain in the hands of the judiciary.

I turn briefly to Amendments 125 and 126, which concern early termination of community orders and suspended sentences. These amendments would provide that a court may not terminate such orders early, unless a specified minimum proportion of rehabilitation days has actually been completed. This would prevent the unacceptable scenario in which an offender could be released from requirements without having undertaken the substance of the sentence that was originally imposed.

Again, at present, there are no checks or balances under the Bill to ensure that this is not the case. These amendments would ensure proper accountability and preserve the authority of the sentencing decisions made by the court, and they would also provide probation officers with a degree of flexibility. I hope that the Government recognise the constructive nature of these amendments.

We all recognise the intense pressure under which prisons and probation services currently operate, but the response to systemic problems cannot be to weaken judicial powers or diminish meaningful sentencing. Offenders must not be permitted to slip through the cracks in a system that is stretched to its limits. It is our duty in Parliament to reinforce judicial authority, not to erode it. It is for these reasons that I urge the Government to reconsider the implications of Clauses 11 and 12, and to recognise the importance of the amendments that have been tabled. Judicial sentencing power must remain with the courts, and I hope that the Government will listen to these concerns and engage constructively on this issue.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, has raised an interesting and very debatable question, which is what the role of the judiciary should be in allotting rehabilitation time and activity and what the role of the probation officer can reasonably be. In theory, I should be with him, because I am always anxious to protect the independence and autonomy of the judiciary, but I look at our court system, and what is feasible, and I look at the detailed work that would be necessary, which probation officers are trained and equipped for—not necessarily resources-equipped but equipped in terms of their training—and I am unconvinced that it would be a good idea to move away from what Clause 11 and 12 do towards a larger role for the judiciary.

I say that having gone, decades ago, to look at the court system in Texas, as the Minister himself has done more recently, and having seen proactive courts, with the judge handing out details of rehabilitation requirements and looking at people as individuals, and the applause ringing around the court when the judge commended the offender who had fulfilled the requirement, and the sight of one offender who had not fulfilled the requirement being taken away by the state marshal.

The whole set-up was very interesting, but very difficult to graft into our system without enlarging the judiciary substantially, giving it time to do this kind of thing. We are probably better to build on the foundation of the Probation Service, despite the fact that it went through such a terrible time with the privatisation process and is still well below the level it needs to be in terms of numbers and training. The Bill provides a more reliable route, even though my instinct is to be on the side of protecting the autonomy of the judiciary. This is a job that probation officers are probably in a better position to do than our hard-pressed judiciary.

--- Later in debate ---

With that in mind, I ask the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment. We can, however, return to this on Report if he is still not content with my response. I am also happy to talk to him before then if he would find it helpful.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

I thank the Minister for his answer and the noble Lord, Lord Beith, for his contribution. I fear that the Minister is not properly distinguishing between issues of rehabilitation and issues of sentencing. There is a matter of principle that has to be addressed in this context, and there is a risk that the Bill in its present form will turn sentencing into some form of administrative exercise performed by the Probation Service rather than by the court.

I believe we will have to return to this on Report, but I look forward to discussing the matter further with the Minister. At this time, I withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 49 withdrawn.

Sentencing Bill

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 1st December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

Amendment 60 in the name of my noble friend Lady Hamwee would make it clear that a public event attendance prohibition requirement would not be available if its enforcement was not reasonably practicable. I share the doubts of my noble friend on practicability. Indeed, the widest orders in this category—that is, prohibiting attendance at any public event rather than particular events—may generally be too wide in any case, because it is going to be very difficult to define a “public event”.

Moving to a more general point, one of the difficulties with the restrictions in this group is the difficulty not just with practicability but with enforcement, spoken to in the last group by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, foresaw difficulties in determining practicability, which he thought might be fatal to these conditions. I can see his point that there are difficulties. The question for the Committee in considering whether these conditions ought to be permitted is to see how far they would in practice be imposed if not practicable, and then to consider the question of practicability.

I suggest that the answer to the difficulties is a combination of the justification points relating to community orders, if I can put it that way, and the enforcement possibilities offered by new technology and intelligence. As far as intelligence is concerned, I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, that it is pretty easy to find out where the pubs are. But there are other difficulties of intelligence which new technology and intelligence-gathering techniques might be needed to address.

However, when I talk about justification, it is right that we should remind ourselves that the conditions are intended to augment community orders and suspended sentences, and those sentences are intended to be, in part at least, punishment, no differently from a curfew order or a residence requirement. They are in part, therefore, punitive. However, the alternative may be custody, which is a far more serious punishment, and one that with the best will in the world offers a substantially reduced chance of the offender having the opportunity to undertake any rehabilitative activity at all.

The other point is new technology and intelligence techniques. Noble Lords have mentioned electronic monitoring, as well as alcohol monitoring and other devices, but electronic monitoring using tagging is a considerable part of the answer. Although I have some sympathy with the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, on the civil liberties implications of these conditions, monitoring by tagging is no different from monitoring by curfew or by a residence requirement, which we have had for a very great deal of time, but the new technology enables a more flexible and wider approach to conditions. However, I remind the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that civil liberties are restricted at their very worst by imposing sentences of immediate imprisonment where people are in custody.

Amendment 106 in my name would allow exemptions or variations by probation officers to allow a person to attend employment, education or rehabilitation programmes, but those exemptions or variations would be exceptions to the imposition of the restriction zone condition. The amendment also requires a report on the operation of restriction zone conditions.

The purpose of this amendment in each of its sub-clauses is to enable both the courts when imposing conditions and probation professionals to weigh in the balance, on the one hand, the extra security and the protection of victims or potential victims which may be offered by the imposition of a restriction zone condition, against on the other the desirability of encouraging offenders to benefit from opportunities of employment, education or rehabilitative activity. It is a classic balancing exercise of a type that is undertaken every day by members of the public and professionals in daily life when they consider questions of risk against opportunity, and that is really what we are talking about here. The point is that our amendment does not come down exclusively on one side or the other. The idea of it is to enable the imposition of these restriction zone conditions, not to conflict with the provision of educational or other opportunities. So, the condition could still be made, but subject to those exemptions or restrictions, which will permit the desirable activity.

The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, supporting my noble friend Lady Hamwee in her amendment, said that it was unfair to oblige venues and others to police these conditions, and of course I see that. But these conditions are not perfect, they will not be perfectly enforceable, and they will not be completely practicable in the sense that they will always prevent the restricted activity. However, for the most part, in practice, offenders are likely to observe these conditions simply because they are there, and for fear of being caught and punished for their breach.

Questions of affordability were raised, and of course more resources are going to be needed to police and enforce these conditions, but those costs have to be measured against the costs of custody.

The noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, raised an interesting point with her amendment when she suggested that the Parole Board should have oversight of restriction zones. For my part, I am not quite sure how that will work—it seems an onerous obligation on the Parole Board—but I take her point that there should be some oversight of restriction zones. In a general sense, that could be undertaken by the Sentencing Council in considering sentencing guidelines to judges on how they are to be imposed, and by training of probation officers in how they are to be implemented.

On electronic monitoring, of which the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, spoke, if it is proportionate and appropriate and is subject to restrictions that are decided upon to ensure that it is, then, broadly speaking, I agree with her points.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I will begin by speaking to the probing amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough. In doing so, I am sure I will reflect the concerns already expressed in other parts of the Committee about these provisions in the Bill.

It has already been made clear that we on these Benches do not in principle oppose the idea of giving courts new tools to protect the public. These are tools that might, if properly designed and enforced, help to manage some offenders in the community rather than defaulting to custody, and we support that aim. But Clauses 14 and 15 do little more than say that courts now have these powers. The Government have provided little, if any, detail as to how these powers will be enforced. A ban that cannot be enforced is a false promise and, indeed, as a consequence, a danger to public confidence.

The Government want this House to support the expansion of suspended sentences and community-based orders. Yet to support them in this effort, they are asking us to sign off on a national regime of pub, club, concert and public event bans, without explaining how these will function on the ground. There is no credible enforcement plan. Are we seriously proposing that every pub, bar, off-licence and concert venue across the country becomes a mini probation checkpoint? Do we expect landlords, doormen, waiters and bar staff to act as de facto probation officers, verifying the identity of every customer against confidential court orders? The result would be unacceptable. If such pub bans become unenforceable and are reduced to a tick-box exercise in sentencing documents while nothing on the ground actually changes, the sanction will become meaningless. That would not be an improvement in justice.

The burden that such a regime would place on the hospitality and nightlife sector would be considerable. Pubs and nightlife venues are already under severe financial and structural pressure, as we know from various reports from the Night Time Industries Association. As a consequence of the national insurance increases, further tax pressures and red tape imposed on these venues by the Government, some 209 pubs—an average of eight a week—have closed permanently and many more continue to struggle. It is simply unrealistic, never mind unfair, to add to this burden by requiring them to police court-imposed bans on individuals under threat of legal liability.

The Government may argue that the burden of enforcement will not lie on public events or drinking establishments, but, in that case, they must lay out in detail how they plan on enforcing these orders with a Probation Service that, as everyone would accept, is already under severe strain. Simply saying that they have additional funding is not enough. We require specifics if we are to trust that the Government can cope with the pressures of managing offenders in the community. If the Government cannot explain clearly how these bans will be notified, enforced or policed, how can this House responsibly vote for this provision? We on these Benches must ask: on what basis are we expected to vote to expand suspended sentences for a broad group of offenders, if we cannot be satisfied that community supervision will actually work and without the most basic detail on banning access to pubs or events?

The amendments offer a simple test. They would require the Government, before we hand out sweeping powers to courts, to set out a clear, practical enforcement regime. They demand a reasonable amount of certainty. Who will be notified: pubs, events, promoters, the police? What will happen when an offender is banned from public events or drinking establishments? How will these bans be communicated? How will they be recorded? How will they be checked? What enforcement mechanisms will be used if an offender breaches the ban? Who will bear the cost and responsibility of monitoring: the state, the Probation Service or venues? If the Government cannot provide that clarity, these provisions risk being no more than symbolic restrictions. They will simply result in theatrical sentencing with no real-world effect, and that, in turn, will undermine public confidence and public safety.

The choice is not between doing nothing and embracing these sweeping new powers; it is between legislation grounded in operational reality and legislation built on aspiration and illusion. These amendments do not oppose the idea of community-based orders; they demand that, if we are to entrust courts and probation with greater powers, those powers must be backed by a robust, enforceable system and not simply by faith. We owe that to the victims of crime, to the public, and to the men and women who work in establishments such as pubs and other public venues.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, moved her Amendment 60, which is intended to probe the enforceability of public event attendance prohibition requirements, which points to another important question that is central to the debate on these orders. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, spoke to his Amendment 106, which would allow for exemptions to restriction zone conditions, such as to allow a person to attend employment, education or rehabilitation programmes. I would have thought that these would be included in the specified restriction zone, but I look forward to the Government’s response on these points.

On the part of the amendment that requires an annual report on the orders’ use and effectiveness, we on these Benches support the underlying sentiment. Without the requisite evidence, we cannot be sure that the provisions in the Bill are working or will work. We therefore fully support the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Jackson. We look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to these important probing amendments.

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Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

65: After Clause 14, insert the following new Clause—
“Public event attendance prohibition statistics: duty to publish(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, direct His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service to record and publish, in relation to all offenders recorded who have breached a public event attendance prohibition requirement—(a) the total number of breaches;(b) a breakdown of the prior or associated offence or offences for which those offenders were given a public event attendance prohibition requirement;(c) the number of offenders who have breached the public event attendance prohibition requirement on more than one occasion, recorded by number of repeat breaches.(2) The data recorded under subsection (1) must be compiled and published separately in respect of each of the following kinds of public event attendance prohibition requirement—(a) a requirement prohibiting attendance at a specified public event, (b) a requirement prohibiting attendance at public events of a specified description, and(c) a requirement prohibiting attendance at any public event.(3) The Secretary of State must make arrangements for the data recorded under subsection (1) to be published and laid before Parliament—(a) within 12 months of the day on which this Act is passed, and(b) annually thereafter.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would require HMPPS to publish the number of offenders who breach public attendance prohibition requirements and to log what their associated offences were.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, these amendments were tabled by me and my noble friend Lord Sandhurst.

As we have already seen, the Bill introduces new prohibition powers: prohibitions on attending public events, restrictions on entering drinking establishments, restriction zones limiting movement and electronic monitoring to enforce compliance. In principle this all sounds very sensible, but we must again ask the critical question: how will these powers work on the ground?

On the prohibitions with respect to drinking establishments, legally the offender must comply but enforcement is then shared. Probation must monitor and the police must act. In practice, this is far from straightforward. How will breaches be reliably detected? GPS or electronic monitoring may indicate proximity but cannot confirm entry. Reporting from licensees or police may be inconsistent. Once a breach is detected, how quickly can probation services respond and are resources sufficient to manage multiple offenders across wide areas? Without clarity, we cannot be confident that these powers will work.

That is precisely why Amendments 71 and 76 are tabled. They would require the Probation Service to record and publish breaches, repeat breaches and underlying offences. They also probe the reliability of electronic monitoring. Can GPS monitoring operate reliably in towns, cities and rural areas? Will probation teams receive training to know how and when to respond? As I have said before, we know that probation services are already stretched. Surely new powers that add a substantial responsibility to their workload have to be considered with care. We simply seek clarity as to how these services will be managed in these circumstances.

These amendments come from a place of reality, not of opposition. They affirm the Government’s policy while probing whether it can be delivered reliably. I look forward to the Minister’s response on how these powers will operate in practice. I beg to move.

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, for their amendments. The new community requirements in Clauses 13 to 16 are vital reforms. I am glad that I have had the opportunity to speak to them in some detail today. Amendments 65, 71 and 75 seek to require HMPPS to publish the number of offenders who breach these requirements and to log what their associated offences were. While I am sympathetic to the intent behind this, we do not agree that it is necessary. The Ministry of Justice already publishes detailed sentence outcome statistics. These include the type of disposals handed out at court and are split by detailed offences and offender characteristic. We regularly assess the effectiveness of all community requirements.

Furthermore, HMPPS publishes a range of staffing and case load data on a quarterly basis. We must be conscious of adding more work into the service. We also place great value on the independent oversight and assurance provided by HM Inspectorate of Probation. It already inspects the service and provides insight into how it is performing. Given the information that is already available, we do not agree that adding a statutory requirement to publish this information is necessary or proportionate. But I assure the noble and learned Lord that I will keep an open mind. I will continue to review regularly what data is published, what can be stopped and what can be added.

Amendments 74 and 76 probe the use of electronic monitoring to enforce restriction zones as part of a community or suspended sentence order. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for tabling these amendments. With regard to Amendment 74, I can assure him that electronic monitoring will be imposed alongside these orders in the vast majority of cases. However, electronic monitoring is not appropriate in all cases. Some offenders have no fixed abode. They may live complex and chaotic lifestyles. Imposing an electronic monitoring requirement would likely set up these individuals to fail, instead of helping them to improve outcomes for victims, the public and the offender themselves. A court will be able to impose a restriction zone without electronic monitoring when it cannot obtain the consent of someone whose co-operation is required, such as the home owner, where the appropriate local arrangements are not in place to enable electronic monitoring, or where it would be inappropriate. It is right that the decision about what requirements to include as part of the sentence sits with the judiciary hearing the individual case.

If a court does not believe that a restriction zone will be effective without electronic monitoring, it has a range of other requirements at its disposal. When a requirement is not electronically monitored, the Probation Service will monitor offenders’ behaviour for any potential breach. It will have a suite of options available to respond to breaches if it identifies that they have not complied—for example, from police intelligence or victim concerns.

I will end by briefly turning to the question of how these are to be monitored in practice and the reliability of the technology that allows the Probation Service to do so. The use of electronic monitoring to enforce these requirements will mean that we receive retrospective data that provides clear evidence of an individual’s whereabouts. This ensures that those receiving a restriction zone are robustly monitored. GPS is a reliable technology that has been part of electronic monitoring since 2018. This will allow the Probation Service to assess whether someone has breached their restriction zone. As I have said before, if this happens, probation staff have a range of enforcement options at their disposal.

I thank the noble and learned Lord for the constructive discussions on these matters and hope that I have provided sufficient reassurance on the points raised. I therefore urge him to withdraw Amendment 65.

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[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, we have already discussed why transparency, reporting and practical assurances are essential.

First, enforcement is only as good as the system that is supporting it. It is not enough to create restrictions in law if those tasked with monitoring them lack the resources and capacity to act effectively. Secondly, repeat offenders are a particular concern. If data on repeated breaches is not recorded and published, the restrictions risk being meaningless for those most likely to violate them. Thirdly, public confidence is at stake here. To create a law that cannot be implemented correctly is unwise. Restrictions that are not transparent, not measurable and not enforceable will undermine trust in the entire system.

These amendments are not intended as a challenge to the principles in the Bill. They are seeking operational clarity. Therefore, while at this time I am willing not to press them, I indicate to the Minister that we will return to them at a later stage.

Amendment 65 withdrawn.

Sentencing Bill

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 1st December 2025 Lords Chamber

I suggest that the noble and learned Lords, Lord Thomas and Lord Burnett, should be congratulated on introducing the compromise—not a compromise that I would go for but a compromise that would work—and if the clause is to stand, their wise approach should be heeded.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I must confess that as I read the provisions of this Bill, it triggered a childhood memory. The late Dr Dolittle curated a number of very strange and unusual animals, which included the pushmi-pullyu: a gazelle with two heads, which faced in opposite directions at the same time.

Why would I be prone to such a memory on reading the provisions of this Bill? Let me begin with some quotations from the Government. First,

“sentencing in individual cases is a matter for our independent judiciary”.—[Official Report, Commons, Crime and Policing Bill Committee, 3/4/25; col. 211.]

Secondly,

“it is at the discretion of the independent judiciary whether to impose a suspended sentence”.—[Official Report, 26/11/25; col. 1369.]

Thirdly,

“the decision on which requirements to include in an order is a matter for the judge sentencing the case”.—[Official Report, 26/11/25; col. 1378.]

Finally:

“It is right for the judiciary to retain discretion to consider this and make the sentencing decision”.—[Official Report, 26/11/25; col. 1344.]


Yet Clause 1, in opening the Bill, says that the judiciary must apply a presumption, other than in very narrowly prescribed circumstances, so that even if a judge wished to impose a custodial sentence of a certain length, they would be unable to do so if it did not fall under a specified exemption or exceptional circumstances.

How did the Minister endeavour to bring this together in the first day of Committee? He said that

“it is at the discretion of the independent judiciary whether to impose a suspended sentence”,—[Official Report, 26/11/25; col. 1369.]

following the “appropriate guidance” of the Sentencing Council. But this guidance is now to be in the control of the Government, by virtue of the Lord Chancellor’s veto, thereby potentially eliminating any sense of “independence”.

So I ask the Minister: in which direction is this two-headed Bill going to proceed? It cannot walk in two different and diametrically opposed directions at the same time. Is it towards the goal of judicial independence, or towards the goal of executive control? The noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, concluded by saying that these provisions were wrong-headed. I think they are even worse: they are double-headed, and that has to be resolved.

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, and the noble and learned Lords, Lord Burnett of Maldon and Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, for tabling these amendments. I am very grateful for their continued and constructive engagement on the Bill.

Amendment 80, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, proposes to abolish the Sentencing Council for England and Wales. The noble Lord’s prediction is correct: I put on record that we strongly believe that it is right to retain the council, in view of the continued importance of its work in developing sentencing guidelines. He does not look completely surprised.

Over time, the council has developed offence-specific guidelines covering hundreds of offences, alongside a series of overarching guidelines. These guidelines have helped bring greater consistency, transparency and public understanding to the sentencing process. We welcome that.

The council also holds an important constitutional position, as mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, within the firmament of our justice system. It bridges the interests and responsibilities of Parliament, the Executive and the judiciary on sentencing policy and practice, while protecting the important responsibility of judges and magistrates to make individual sentencing decisions—I think I am reflecting what the noble and learned Lord said. For these reasons, I am afraid we do not support the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson. I urge him to withdraw it.

I turn to the amendments tabled by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Burnett and Lord Thomas. They have indicated quite clearly their opposition to Clause 18 and propose an alternative approach to Clause 19. I am grateful for their careful consideration of this. Their concerns are shared by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. I know that they were experts in this field and their opinions therefore carry a great deal of weight with the Government. As the Minister made clear at Second Reading, in bringing forward these clauses we are aiming to maintain public confidence in the guidelines that the council produces, particularly in view of the sustained public scrutiny that the council has been under of late, which is partly reflected in these debates.

Events surrounding the imposition guideline, on which I do not propose to dwell but which obviously I need to reference, earlier this year highlighted an example of the issues that can arise where guidelines cover areas of policy that should properly be for Ministers and Parliament to determine. We are keen to avoid a similar scenario arising in future, and that is why Clauses 18 and 19 have been drafted to introduce approval measures that provide greater democratic and judicial oversight of the council’s work.

I recognise that noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Marks, are keen for more information about the intention of Clause 18. Put briefly, this clause will allow the Lord Chancellor to have a greater say over the guidelines that the council intends to develop across the year, ensuring that any plans are properly reflective of wider priorities across government and Parliament and with the wider public. As no noble Lord has so far mentioned this, I should stress that in preparing this clause we have had regard to similar provision that exists for comparable bodies across the justice system, such as the Law Commission.

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Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

84: After Clause 19, insert the following new Clause—
“Court transcripts of sentencing remarks(1) All transcripts of sentencing remarks made in the Crown Court must be published within two sitting days of being delivered.(2) All published sentencing remarks must be made freely available, including online.”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would require all sentencing remarks made in the Crown Court to be published and made available to all.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 84, 85 and 148A in my name. These amendments concern the publication of sentencing remarks, the collection and publication of sentencing data, and the review of the effect of this Bill on community and voluntary sectors once it comes into force.

The Government are, of course, of the opinion that the near blanket presumption of suspended sentences will lead to less crime in the long run. Reports have suggested, however, that it will increase offences by almost 400,000 per year. I certainly hope that the Government are right in their assessment because, clearly, safer streets is a goal which would unite all noble Lords.

If we are to assess whether this Bill is anything of a success, we need the data to support it. We on these Benches do not and will not simply accept reform based on blind faith. Reform has to be backed by accountability, visibility and evidence. Amendment 84 concerns sentencing remarks. We propose that all transcripts of sentencing remarks from the Crown Court be published and be made freely available online for the public to access.

Sentencing is not just a technical exercise. It is a moment of public judgment. A judge’s remarks concern the reasoning behind both why a particular sentence was imposed and why it was for a particular duration. That reasoning is essential for victims, families, communities and the public at large to understand what justice looks like in practice. Without that transparency, justice is done behind a veil, and that is liable to undermine confidence. In a sense, the Government agree with that principle—at least they did when their manifesto was written.

In their manifesto, they observed of criminals that

“the sentences they receive often do not make sense either to victims or the wider public”.

I suggest that the publication of sentencing remarks is key to rebuilding public confidence and holding the judicial system to account. It is trite that open justice is an essential foundation of our democracy. If sentencing is to become more complex and discretionary under the Bill, especially with the expanded use of suspended sentences and community orders, public understanding and scrutiny will become even more important.

Research by the International Association for Court Administration has shown a clear link between transparency in sentencing and public confidence in the justice system. Yet, even now, our current system remains opaque. Though sentencing remarks may be broadcast in a limited number of high-profile cases, many judgments remain inaccessible. Of course, transcripts are available, but only at cost and if requested. For many victims and their families, as well as third parties such as researchers, that is a prohibitive barrier. We must replace selective access with universal and consistent transparency, especially in the wake of this Bill.

Amendment 85 would require the courts to report key sentencing data and the Government to publish aggregate statistics at certain periods. That would provide the public with information on how many sentences are given for which offences, their length and offender demographics. If we are to place thousands more offenders under community supervision and expand the use of suspended sentences, we must be able to monitor the consequences: who is being sentenced, for what and with what impact on reoffending or public safety. Without such data, the Bill becomes a blind experiment, and we will not know whether it is achieving its objectives. We must not shy away from accountability or reject the principles that underpin democracy.

Amendment 148A addresses the impact of the Bill on the community and voluntary sectors. I am sure we all recognise that these organisations provide vital support to those most affected by crime, whether they are victims or offenders, and often they are the backbone of effective rehabilitation in the community. The Bill’s provisions will place new and substantial demands on those services, and without proper oversight we risk overwhelming the charities, community groups and voluntary agencies tasked with delivering critical interventions. Many of the arguments made in support of Amendments 84 and 85 apply to this amendment too. It would require the Government, within 12 months of commencement, to publish an assessment of the Bill’s impact on the sector. Again, that is not some bureaucratic nicety but a matter of transparency and fairness.

We cannot turn a blind eye to the practical realities on the ground. To accept this amendment is to place evidence and accountability at the forefront of this information. We owe that to this sector and the wider public. Therefore, I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I want to say a word about Amendment 84 on sentencing remarks. I was proposing to leave it until the Victims and Courts Bill, but this gives me an initial run at it, as it were. I am glad to have the opportunity to ask the Minister for an update on the MoJ’s work on this. At a 3 September meeting of the Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, I asked the then Lord Chancellor about progress in this area. She said:

“I do not believe we are far from having a tech solution that meets the test of accuracy … we are testing market solutions for speed and accuracy. Then we will need to take a view on operational viability and how quickly it could be rolled out”.


She said:

“It is a long process, and it has a cost attached to it”,


but went on to emphasise that

“accuracy … is the problem at the moment”.

If the Minister could update the Committee, that would be very welcome. The point in general is not only about sentencing remarks. My honourable friend for Richmond Park has been pursuing the matter of transcripts. She realises that this is important not only with sentencing remarks but with full transcripts of trials—victims, if that is a word I can use, when there has been a not guilty finding, need help to understand what has happened. As the noble Lord has said, access after the event, to go back and look to see what was said, is very important. None of us relies on our memory—we all look at Hansard, for instance. The publication within two sitting days may be overambitious, when I look at what the Lord Chancellor said—but then she has perhaps not met our Hansard writers, who do it in much less than two days.

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[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Timpson) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord and the noble and learned Lord for the opportunity to discuss these important issues. I appreciate that these amendments seek to improve transparency and public understanding of the criminal justice system, and this Government agree wholeheartedly on the importance of open justice. However, we do not consider that these amendments are necessary to achieve that aim.

I turn first to Amendment 84. I reassure noble Lords that the Government are taking action to increase the openness and transparency of the system. In certain cases of high public interest, sentencing remarks are already published online, and sentencing remarks can also be filmed by broadcasters, subject to the agreement of the judge. The sentencing of Thomas Cashman for the appalling murder of Olivia Pratt-Korbel was one such example. The Government have recently extended provision of free transcripts of sentencing remarks to victims of rape and other sexual offences whose cases are heard in the Crown Court, and it remains the case that bereaved families of victims of murder, manslaughter and fatal road offences can request judges’ sentencing remarks for free. We are also actively exploring opportunities offered by AI to reduce the costs of producing transcripts in future and to make transcripts across the system more accessible. But this amendment introducing this additional provision of court transcripts would place a significant financial burden on the courts and divert resources away from where they are needed most in the wider system.

The release of any court transcript requires judicial oversight to ensure accuracy and adherence to any reporting restrictions and to make sure that other public interest factors have been considered. This amendment would therefore have significant operational and resource implications for HMCTS and the judiciary. It would place extra demands on judicial capacity in the Crown Court and on HMCTS at a time when the system is under immense pressure, so while we agree entirely on the importance of transparency within the justice system, we cannot accept the amendment at this time. However, I reassure noble Lords that we will continue to consider this closely. In particular, I want to explore what opportunities AI presents to improve transcriptions and data. I am sure that noble Lords agree that the potential is there and that we need to find the best way to harness it. I will write to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, on the point around data and accuracy.

I turn to Amendment 85. Again, we agree with the principle of improving transparency but not with the necessity of the amendment itself. This Government are committed to improving the collection and publication of data on foreign national offenders. The Ministry of Justice has already taken action to increase transparency on the data published. Notably, in July, for the first time the offender management statistics included a breakdown of foreign national offenders in prison by sex and offence group. We are also working closely with colleagues in the Home Office to establish earlier identification of foreign national offenders. Being able to verify the nationality of offenders ahead of sentencing will facilitate more timely removals and may also provide an opportunity for enhanced data collection. We will keep this under review as part of our ongoing work to strengthen the data collection and publication system that we inherited from the previous Government.

Implementation of these measures may require a new mechanism to verify the information provided, which must be cost effective and prevent placing additional pressure on operational staff. For this reason, we cannot accept a statutory duty to publish this information before the necessary infrastructure is in place to support it. Our measured approach will continue to support the return of more foreign national offenders while ensuring maximum transparency for the public.

I am grateful to the noble Lord and the noble and learned Lord for Amendment 148A concerning measuring the impact of the Bill on the voluntary and community sectors. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Porter of Fulwood, who has championed this subject during the Bill’s passage. She made a thoughtful and impassioned contribution at Second Reading and in today’s debate. The voluntary and community sector plays a vital role in developing and delivering services to people in our care. The sector supports HMPPS and the MoJ by bridging gaps and providing continuity that reduces reoffending and drives rehabilitation through targeted specialist support. Many of the services we provide would not be possible without the vital contribution of the voluntary sector, including charities such as Women in Prison, the St Giles Trust, PACT and many others. The Independent Sentencing Review made recommendations for where the third sector can be utilised to support the Probation Service and offenders on community sentences or on licence.

We already work closely with third-sector organisations to deliver better outcomes in the criminal justice system. For example, we work in partnership with the charity Clinks through the HMPPS and MoJ infrastructure grant to engage a network of around 1,500 organisations. In collaboration with Clinks, we have convened a series of roundtables with voluntary and community sector representatives and policy colleagues to explore the review’s recommendations and how the sector can make the greatest contribution to probation capacity.

I have carefully considered Amendment 148A. However, it will not be possible to fully understand the impact within 12 months, nor based just on data from the first six months of the Act being in force. Implementation of the Bill’s provisions will be phased over time and closely linked to the outcomes of the Leveson review and its implementation. In addition, the sector’s experience will be influenced by the introduction of new commissioned rehabilitative services contracts. Measuring the impact within such a short timeframe amid these overlapping and confounding factors would be highly complex. But again, I want to explore the opportunities that AI presents to collect and use better data in future. I can assure noble Lords that we will continue to work closely with the sector to ensure that it is considered and utilised in the implementation of this Bill.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken on this group. Their contributions have underscored the wide recognition across this Committee that transparency, accountability and evidence must underpin any credible approach to sentencing reform. These amendments do not seek to frustrate the Bill in any way; they seek to ensure that its objectives can be properly understood, monitored and delivered. Regarding Amendment 84, we have heard throughout this debate the importance of public confidence in the criminal justice system, and confidence cannot exist without visibility.

On Amendment 85, I once again make the simple point that you cannot manage what you do not measure. With respect to Amendment 148A, I too acknowledge the contribution made by the noble Baroness, Lady Porter; her thoughtful and insightful contribution reflected her long-standing experience and interest in this issue. At this time, I withdraw the amendment, but I give notice to the Minister that we will return to this issue at a later point in the process of the Bill.

Amendment 84 withdrawn.

Sentencing Bill

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 3rd December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, the speeches in this debate have been comprehensive and committed, so I have little to add to them. All noble Lords who have spoken have done so passionately and persuasively about ending this scandal. I use the word “scandal”—it has been rightly called a disgrace, a stain on our system, and many other things. The passion for justice of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, shone through every sentence of his speech and has to oblige the Government to end this appalling injustice. We have been guilty, in a country dedicated, nominally at least, to ideals of justice, of the grossest of injustices in this case. It must end, and it must end now.

We have a chance to end it now, completely and for ever. We thought we had abolished IPPs in the LASPO Act when we stopped any new IPP sentences being passed. My noble friend Lord McNally, then Minister of State, and the noble Lord, Lord Clarke, Secretary of State at the time, believed that the power to reverse the burden of proof in that Act would be exercised, so that we would never have this long tail of IPP prisoners who have now served way beyond their tariffs.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, explained how unjust it was that IPP prisoners were treated unlike any other offenders. For those prisoners, we have abandoned any principle that the punishment should fit the crime, in favour of a system of preventive detention with a heavy burden placed throughout on prisoners to prove their fitness for release after their proper punishment—often very short punishment—has been completed. The principle of punishment fitting the crime has been ignored, as has been illuminated by nearly all the speeches today. That illumination has extended to the complete ineffectiveness of the action plan in the case of many IPP prisoners, however well-intentioned it was at the time. Those prisoners could end up, as the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, pointed out, imprisoned for the rest of their lives if they fail to qualify for release under the action plan.

The sensible way to end this now is to accept one or more of the amendments before the Committee in order to ensure the early release of all remaining IPP prisoners and to end their risk of recall within a reasonable time span. I do not mind which amendment is adopted. I note that after his detailed and learned analysis, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, was broadly content to endorse any of the solutions proposed by the noble Lords, Lord Woodley and Lord Moylan, the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones and Lady Fox, or the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and myself. I too am content with any of those solutions. The important thing is to persuade the Government now to accept one of them and finally to put an end to this injustice.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in what is a profoundly serious and necessary debate, and to those who have tabled the amendments before us: the noble Lords, Lord Woodley and Lord Blunkett, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, and my noble friend Lord Moylan. These amendments reflect a shared recognition across parties and across the Committee that the legacy of the IPP regime remains one of the most challenging unresolved issues within our criminal justice system and, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, observed, a “stain” on our justice system.

Under our system of criminal justice, we do not detain and imprison people because we perceive that they are probably or even certainly going to commit a crime at some indeterminate and uncertain point in the future. But that is essentially the basis upon which we detain IPP prisoners in custody after they have served the prison term of their original offence. It is, of course, worrying that many IPP prisoners may present a serious risk to the public if released. However, under the logic that flows through much of this very Bill, the Government must be prepared to advocate for society to accommodate such a risk by community supervision rather than endless detention.

As the noble Lord, Lord Woodley, observed, the Justice Committee’s 2022 report described the IPP system as “irredeemably flawed”, and he seeks to give effect to its recommendation. Whether or not Members support that specific mechanism, it is beyond dispute that thousands of IPP prisoners remain trapped in a system never intended to endure, with outcomes that the state itself acknowledges are simply wrong.

My noble friend Lord Moylan’s amendment raises another vital point: the ability for prisoners on extended licence to seek annual review after the qualifying period. Whatever one’s view of automatic termination on mandatory timelines, there is clear force in the principle that people must not be left without a meaningful hope or a clear route to progress.

The noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, spoke to his Amendments 116 and 117 on recall and automatic release. Again, many noble Lords will be uneasy that individuals can be recalled indefinitely for minor, technical breaches, long after tariff expiry. This, again, points to the need for clarity, confidence and, indeed, proportionality in the present system. It cannot be simply risk aversion that dictates outcomes.

The amendments in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, supported by others, propose a future release mechanism whereby the Parole Board can set a specified release date, subject to compliance with directions. This recognises the reality described by countless practitioners that progression can become possible only if there is a clear destination and a structure to reach it. Amendment 130 then introduces a safeguard enabling the Secretary of State, if necessary, to seek variation to protect the public.

No one in this debate has suggested that risk can be ignored. Equally, nobody advocates arbitrary release of dangerous offenders. But every proposal brought to the Committee today has an element of public protection embedded in it. Where Members may differ is only on the most responsible and principled route to resolve a system that all agree has patently failed. The point is to choose not the easiest path but the right one. The public are entitled to a system that protects them, but then IPP prisoners and their families are entitled to justice and to fairness. The rule of law should produce finality—indeed, it must produce finality.

I thank noble Lords again for the seriousness with which they have approached this debate. I look forward to continued constructive engagement as the Bill proceeds—and to the necessary outcome that justice demands, not just for IPP prisoners but for our collective conscience.

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[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

I will take the noble and learned Lord’s comments away and read that again, but that is also why our quarterly Peers’ meetings on IPP are so important in discussing all these topics.

We must do all that we can to support all IPP prisoners to reduce their risk and progress towards a release decision, but I would not be doing my job to protect the public if they were to be released without the independent Parole Board deciding it is safe to do so. My hope is that every IPP prisoner gets the opportunity to be released and have a successful life in the community, but we need to do that in a way that sets those prisoners up for success in the community. The Government’s view is that any change that removes the protection of the statutory release test is not the right way to do this.

I am aware of criticism of some parts of the IPP action plan, including those raised by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, but it remains my view that the steps we are taking through it are the best way to support this progression. It has contributed to a 10% reduction in the IPP prison population in the 12 months to 30 September 2025. The number of people who have never been released fell by around 14% in the same period. Since the publication of the first action plan in April 2022, the unreleased IPP population has fallen by 39% and is now below 1,000. The focus that I and colleagues have on the IPP action plan means that I need to do more and more work on it, to see where we can add improvements all the way.

I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Blunkett for his amendments, which seek to allow the Secretary of State to make provision for the automatic re-release of those serving an IPP or DPP sentence who are recalled to prison. My noble friend will be aware of the deep respect I have for his ongoing commitment, drive and tenacity to do all he can to support those serving the IPP sentence. I greatly value his contribution to today’s debate, as well as the thoughtful insights and individual cases he raises with me outside the House.

I appreciate that noble Lords have questioned why we are introducing fixed-term recalls for offenders serving standard determinate sentences but do not accept this change for IPP offenders. There are two crucial differences: the threshold for recall and the level of risk that the offender poses. IPP offenders can be recalled only for behaviour or breaches of their licence that are causally linked to their offending. That is a high bar, and one higher than for recalling prisoners serving standard determinate sentences. I must remind noble Lords what that means in practice: that the Probation Service no longer believes that controls available in the community are sufficient to manage that offender’s risk to keep the public safe, and that the public are therefore at risk of further sexual or violent offending.

A fixed-term recall for IPP offenders would not provide sufficient time for an individual to demonstrate that their risk had reduced, or to receive the required support to reduce their risk, before being automatically re-released. This would put victims and the public at risk. While we will return to the question of recall in more detail later in this debate, I must remind noble Lords that we have built significant safeguards into our fixed-term recall changes. These mean that many offenders who pose a similar risk to IPP offenders recalled to prison are also not eligible for a fixed-term recall.

The Victims and Prisoners Act 2024 introduced a power for the Secretary of State to release recalled IPP prisoners where it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that they should remain in prison. This is referred to operationally as release after a risk assessed recall review, or RARR. Recalled IPP offenders have already been re-released using this power, when they were due to wait for a number of months before their scheduled oral hearing before the Parole Board.

The revised IPP action plan, published on 17 July this year, now includes a commitment to enable swift re-release following a recall through RARR, where it is safe to do so. This means that HMPPS is considering all IPP offenders recalled for being out of touch, or in relation to allegations of further offences, for RARR, and is trialling an extended referral period to allow more time to consider cases for potential use of RARR before referral to the Parole Board. I respectfully suggest that this power means we already have the ability to do what the noble Lord’s amendment seeks to achieve: a quicker re-release of recalled individuals where it is safe to do so.

I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, for his amendment, for my noble friend Lord Blunkett’s reflections on it and for their ongoing interest in this important issue. The noble Lord’s amendment seeks to allow a prisoner whose licence is not terminated by the Parole Board at the end of the relevant qualifying period to make an annual application to the Parole Board for consideration of licence termination. The Victims and Prisoners Act 2024 made significant changes to the IPP licence period by reducing the qualifying period for referral to the Parole Board and introducing a provision for automatic licence termination. This automatic provision provides greater certainty to offenders than the annual referrals about when their licence will terminate, which is also important for victims. These changes have resulted in the number of people serving a sentence in the community falling by 65%.

Furthermore, at the four-year point after initial release, if supervision is not suspended or the licence is terminated by the Parole Board at the end of the three-year qualifying period, probation practitioners can further consider applying for suspension of supervision at their own discretion. We must also consider the potential effect on victims of going through an additional Parole Board review just a year after the previous one, but I acknowledge that the noble Lord’s amendment would preserve the role of the Parole Board in this process. I am happy to have further conversations with him and other noble Lords on this point in the coming weeks.

I thank noble Lords for their work on this important issue, and I hope that they are assured not only of the work that we are currently undertaking but of our absolute resolve to make further progress for those serving the IPP sentence. I will continue to work closely with noble Lords and look forward to seeing them at the upcoming round table, and to discussing the points raised between now and Report. I urge noble Lords not to press their amendments.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

Does the Minister agree that the concept of us imprisoning individuals on the grounds of a perception that they may commit a crime at some indeterminate point in the future is utterly anathema to our whole system of criminal justice?

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

Our expert probation staff who manage the risks in the community are experts in determining the risk that offenders pose, including IPP offenders. It is therefore their professional judgment and their decision whether they recall someone or not.

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Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

94: Clause 20, page 38, line 7, at end insert—
“(ab) but sections 244ZA(8)(a) and (aa) do not apply to any person convicted of—(i) rape,(ii) assault by penetration,(iii) rape of a child under 13,(iv) assault of a child under 13 by penetration,(v) inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity,(vi) paying for the sexual services of a child aged under 13,(vii) kidnapping or false imprisonment with the intention of committing a sexual offence,(viii) creating or possessing indecent photographs of children,(ix) grievous bodily harm,(x) grooming,(xi) stalking, or(xii) causing or allowing the death of a vulnerable child or adult.(ac) but sections 244ZA(8)(a) and (aa) cannot come into force until the Secretary of State has consulted on and ensured exclusions for all offences considered to be serious violence, offences against children, sexual offences and domestic abuse offences.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would disapply the clause 20 early release provisions of the Bill in relation to those convicted of the offences listed in the amendment, and would require the Secretary of State to consult on and ensure exclusions for those convicted of other serious violent and sexual offence categories.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, this amendment is tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Sandhurst. It will not surprise the Minister that I broadly support the principle underlying Clause 20 of the Bill. If prisoners can prove that they have made positive steps towards rehabilitation, we would not oppose the principle that, in those circumstances, there are arguments for releasing such offenders early.

However, regrettably, this is not the outcome that Clause 20 will give effect to. On many occasions during Second Reading and Committee, the Minister has made reference to the “earned progression model” and the Texas system. Under Clause 20 as drafted, there is no such reward for good behaviour or evidence of meaningful rehabilitative steps. The independent House of Commons Library briefing is quite clear on this point: the release point is a default automatic release date and the only way it will not apply is if a prisoner has been subject to additional days for proven misconduct before a judge. That is not earned progression; it is automatic release with a very low threshold of eligibility. There is no assessment of behaviour, remorse, work or engagement with treatment programmes. There is no review by the Parole Board. There is no evaluation of risk. There is only the clock.

The Lord Chancellor said that the public can be reassured because the “most serious offences”, as he termed them, will be excluded. However, the ministry’s own data confirms that offenders convicted of rape, child grooming and attempted murder will be eligible. If such offences are not within the Government’s definition of “serious”, I must ask the Minister to outline exactly which offences are considered serious. Every rape of a child or an adult, every victim of grooming and every life shattered by serious violence represents profound and enduring harm. On what basis are we telling victims that these crimes do not count and that they will meet their offenders at just one-third of their custodial sentence?

This is not a technical or procedural matter. It is a question of fundamental justice and of public protection. It is also a question of whether this House is prepared to legislate knowingly and deliberately to reduce prison time for such serious offenders. The Bill, as drafted, would cut custodial sentences for more than 60% of rapists and over 80% of offenders convicted of child sex offences. It would allow those convicted of stalking —an offence with one of the highest reoffending rates and a well-established connection to homicide—to be released automatically after serving only one-third of their sentence, and it would do so without assessment of risk and without any evidence of rehabilitation.

Amendment 94 would exclude from the early release provisions of Clause 20 those convicted of the most serious sexual and violent offences, including rape, child sexual abuse, stalking, grievous bodily harm and causing or allowing the death of a vulnerable child or adult. The amendment would also require the Secretary of State to consult and ensure exclusions for other serious offence categories before these drastic changes to sentencing came into force. The Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats in the other place were in rare agreement over this amendment—it was almost like a recall of a coalition concern. In that other place, I understand that 65 out of the 71 Members of the Liberal Democrat Party voted in favour of it.

We are told that the justification for these provisions is prison overcrowding, but the emergency powers that already exist to manage emergency capacity pressures have been installed and are not to be removed. The measures in this Bill will be permanent. They are not temporary; they are a long-term shift in sentencing policy that will reshape the criminal justice system for a generation. We spent much time earlier in Committee arguing against the presumption of suspended sentences, but Clause 20 deals with a far higher category of offenders: those who have been put into custody for several years but will now automatically be released at the one-third point.

The Government propose to release an estimated 43,000 offenders into the community who would previously have been imprisoned. As with many other clauses in the Bill, Clause 20 will place yet more pressure on probation services if implemented, and they already face a shortfall of 10,000 officers. The Suzy Lamplugh Trust warns that the system is already at breaking point and that releasing thousands more high-risk offenders without necessary supervision poses a serious threat to the safety of victims and to public confidence. The Domestic Abuse Commissioner has said that allowing perpetrators back into communities after only 28 days is “simply unacceptable”. The Victims’ Commissioner warned that victims will be left feeling “unnerved and bewildered”. These are not political opponents of the Bill but respected independent authorities speaking on behalf of victims and the public at large.

The Howard League warns that earned release models are undeliverable without a functioning rehabilitation infrastructure, yet prisons remain impoverished and dangerously unstable. Drugs and violence are rife. Education provision has been cut by up to 60% in some prisons, and half of prisoners receive no education or employment support at all. In that context, early release cannot be earned because there is nothing meaningful with which to earn it. Every Member of this House understands the need to reduce pressure on the prison estate, but public protection and public confidence must remain at the forefront of legislative change. The public expect that those who commit serious crime face real punishment and real consequences. More than 6,500 of the most serious criminals, including rapists, stalkers, violent attackers and even murderers, will qualify for early release.

The public do not expect Parliament to legislate to let these criminals out after one-third of their sentence. Every time a victim reads in the paper that the person who raped or attacked them has been released early, or a family sees the person responsible for the death of a child or a relative back in the community far sooner than they were told originally, that will create fissures in the rule of law. Public confidence matters because without it, the justice system loses legitimacy.

Amendment 94 is a proportionate and necessary step to ensure that early release is not granted to those whose crimes are simply too serious to justify automatic release. It represents the minimum safety measure that this House must insist on. The Government must accept that such serious offenders should not walk free after serving one-third of their sentence, and do so by default. If we take that step, we will lose sight of what our justice system is all about. I urge the Government to reconsider and to support the amendment in the interest of victims, of public protection, of public confidence, and of the integrity of our justice system. I beg to move.

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Public confidence is vital. Having no prison places is the worst situation for victims. I hope I have explained why the Government’s approach is the right one, and I urge the noble and learned Lord to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. However, he has done nothing to reassure us that Clause 20 as drafted offers an earned progression model of any kind whatever. These are not temporary changes to relieve prison overpopulation but permanent changes to our justice system. We will, I suspect, return to these on Report but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 94 withdrawn.

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[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak in support of the amendments, as they seek to turn the Government’s earned progression scheme from a superficially attractive promise into a credible and responsible model for rehabilitation and, consequently, for public safety. As drafted, with release contingent only on the absence of serious misconduct, the provision does not amount at all to earned progression; it is simply accelerated release by default.

We know from recent evidence that meaningful rehabilitation in prison, such as through education and vocational training work, is far from universal. Only this year, the Government cut the provision of education services for prisoners by 20%, and for some prisons by up to 60%. The Justice Committee’s 2025 report found that roughly half of all prisoners are not engaged in education or employment programmes, and many remain confined for 22 hours a day. In those conditions, expecting that prisoners will earn their release by default is neither realistic nor responsible.

In that light, it is not only reasonable but imperative to link early release to engagement in meaningful activity. That is what Amendment 94A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, seeks to do: it insists that a one-third release point is conditional on participation in meaningful activity. That would ensure that early release is genuinely earned and based on reform rather than simply time served.

Equally, the amendments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Carter, seek to embed an earned progression principle for both standard and extended determinate sentences, rather than treating release as an automatic milestone after half the sentence has been served. This makes the model proportionate and conditional on real change, rather than automatic and unearned.

If we accept the Bill without amendments to the supposed progression model, we will knowingly legislate to release on terms we cannot expect to support rehabilitation or protect the public. Frankly, that is not reform; that is risk. But, if we accept the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carter, we would reprioritise a system that balances the need to manage prison populations with the social imperative of reducing reoffending.

I thank all noble Lords for their submissions on these matters and for the amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Bach and Lord Carter, and I look forward to hearing from the Minister in reply.

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Bach for his amendment, which was supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor; I thank her for her kind comments about my previous work.

The amendment would allow the Secretary of State to modify the provisions of the Bill by regulations, so that no prisoner is released after serving one-third of their sentence unless they have earned release through purposeful activity. I want all prisoners to be in work or education, if they are able; however, we need to be realistic about what is possible in different types of prisons. Currently, prisoners do not have equal access to the full range of classes and employment required to meet their needs. To confirm, our education budget has been increased by 3%—but, unfortunately, that buys us less education. So, while one is up, the other is down. However, I think there are other things I can do to make improvements in that area.

We also need to be mindful that many prisoners may behave well but still struggle to engage with some activities. There are high levels of mental ill-health, trauma and neurodiversity that should be considered, and we often need to meet these needs before engagement with education and work can be productive. As noble Lords know, this is an area that I am passionate about. Positive change is necessary, but it is better achieved through gradual operational and policy improvements rather than legislative measures. I also agree that the Probation Service is vital to the ongoing support of offenders after release.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Carter, for Amendments 95 and 128, which address release points for more serious offenders. Regarding Amendment 95, I must clarify that Clause 20 already sets an automatic release point of half way for these offences. Of course, if the offender behaves badly, they could have days added to their sentence. It is essential that the progression model can be implemented quickly and effectively. The best way to do that is via a system which we know works and is legally robust: the existing adjudication system.

Through Amendment 128, the noble Lord also raised an important question about prisoners serving an EDS. It would allow the Secretary of State to refer offenders serving an EDS to the Parole Board for consideration for release at the halfway point of their custodial term. At present, offenders serving an EDS are referred to the board after serving two-thirds of the custodial term, which is a statutory requirement.

The noble Lord’s amendment is similar in effect to a recommendation of the Independent Sentencing Review that the extended determinate sentences should include a progression element that would enable the parole eligibility date to be brought forward to the halfway point. But the Government rejected that recommendation on the basis that, for an offender to receive an extended determinate sentence, the court will have decided that they are dangerous. These are offenders who have committed serious offences, such as rape, other sexual offences or violence against a person. To impose an EDS, the court will have decided that there was a risk of them doing so again in the future. This is not the case with standard determinate sentences. Having seen all the evidence, the trial judge will have imposed a custodial term that reflects the seriousness of the offence. Prison is the right place for dangerous offenders such as these. Our firm view is that they should not be able to achieve an early release through progression and should remain in prison for as long as they do now.

I turn briefly to Amendment 139C in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. I assure the noble Baroness that we monitor the performance of the adjudication system and it remains under constant review. I get regular data on prisons, but I am happy to write to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, with the answers to her question.

We have effective scrutiny structures in place through His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons and independent monitoring boards. They are able to provide valuable insight into the operations of the prisoner adjudication system. To reassure noble Lords, I ask questions about the adjudication system on every prison visit.

As noble Lords are aware, I am passionate about this area and have routinely pressed for improvements, but my view is that this is best achieved through existing monitoring and scrutiny rather than legislation. I urge my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

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[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I wish to speak to my Amendments 111 to 113. When asked by the Deputy Chairman, I said that I did not wish to do so, but that was because I did not realise that we had jumped an amendment.

These three amendments concern recall for a fixed term. The first point is the question of whether recall should be for a maximum of 56 days rather than a fixed period of 56 days. As presently structured, recall to prison is to an automatic release date 56 days after the recall occurs. The purpose of my three amendments is both to make the 56-day period a maximum period, not a fixed period, and to make automatic release subject to the exclusion in those cases where it applies—and in that it has much sympathy with the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. The process for determining the period will need to be fixed by regulations, but the intention is clear, and I am happy to discuss how substituting a flexible period for a fixed period might be implemented.

The fact is that recalls happen for a number of reasons, some of which may be relatively trivial breaches of conditions. I am concerned—as was my honourable friend Jess Brown-Fuller, the MP for Chichester, who moved similar amendments in the other place—about the effect of a blanket fixed period of recall irrespective of the seriousness or otherwise of the breach that brought about the recall, and believe it may be inappropriate.

It may be that 56 days or eight weeks, which is quite a long time, is far too long for a prisoner who faces recall for missing a probation appointment, for example. It would almost inevitably interfere with work where an offender had found work. It could interfere with housing and educational or rehabilitative programmes in the community. Community programmes are, I understand, typically held open for four weeks, so eight weeks would mean that they were closed. An eight-week recall might have a damaging effect on mental health treatments which a recently released prisoner was undertaking. Addiction programmes might be undesirably affected. A shorter recall might avoid that.

Furthermore, an unnecessarily long recall for a minor infringement of conditions would do nothing to reduce the prison capacity shortage as it continues, while a shorter recall would mitigate it. Other recalls may be much more serious. In such cases, 56 days may be too short a period. The 56-day automatic release provision in our Amendment 113 would take effect subject to the provision excluding automatic releases in serious cases, so that those who had committed more serious offences would not be automatically released at the 56-day point. That might be particularly appropriate if an offender who had been guilty of domestic abuse or stalking had been recalled for intimidating, harassing or stalking their victims. While they would presently be required to be released under the proposals as I understand them, our amendment would rectify this.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, would make the cause of an offender’s recall a necessary consideration when determining whether the offender should be released at the end of the automatic release period. This is a prudent approach. We do not want people with a record of breaking probation conditions given the chance to do so again after just 56 days. We therefore support the aim of the noble Lord’s amendment.

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

I thank noble Lords for these amendments and for providing me with the opportunity to clarify the Government’s position on recall reforms. The policy in this Bill is designed to support rehabilitation and reduce the need for future recalls, but recall remains an essential safeguard to protect the public when risk increases. The 56-day period provides more time to undertake a thorough review of an offender’s release plans and licence conditions, ensuring that needs and risks are managed. There is a specific focus on mitigating risks against known victims.

I turn first to the amendment tabled to Clause 26 by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. The existing recall test set out in operational guidance already provides a clear and robust framework for decision-making. It ensures that recall is used appropriately when risk can no longer be safely managed in the community. Legislation is a blunt and inflexible tool and would create barriers to recall where swift action was needed to protect the public. Let me give a brief illustration. An individual on licence for stalking and harassment begins to show a marked deterioration in their mental health. They commit breaches, entering an exclusion zone and making indirect contact with a victim online. None of those incidents taken alone would have met a rigid statutory test such as imminent risk or persistent non-compliance but, viewed together, they clearly indicate escalating risk.

It is important to note that the clause already includes a power for the Secretary of State to amend the recall power in Section 254 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, specifically to make provision about the circumstances in which a person may or may not be recalled. This means that there is already flexibility to adjust the recall framework in future should evidence show that further refinement is needed. For these reasons, it is not necessary to legislate to amend the recall threshold at this time, but I am keen to review what more can be done beyond the Bill to bear down on the use of recall and ensure that it is really the last resort.

The offences listed in Amendment 121, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, are extremely serious. While some of these cases would fall within the scope of the new recall model, many of the perpetrators of the offences referenced are excluded. This is because they will have received life sentences or extended determinate sentences and therefore remain subject to standard recall arrangements. This means that their re-release will be subject to approval by the Parole Board or the Secretary of State.

Sentencing Bill

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 3rd December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)]

I think that a very valid point has been made. I immediately think of the situation—

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

The noble Lord has already spoken.

[Lord Weir of Ballyholme (DUP)]

I am intervening.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

Perhaps I could just finish my second point very quickly. It is simply that, even if the public do not think there is any harm in just deporting someone who has committed a crime, I would caution Government not to rely on public opinion. It does not always stay constant, but I can be sure that, if a serious crime is committed and someone is deported without being punished, this provision will come back to haunt the Government, and I do not want that to happen.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, the principle of deportation of foreign national offenders attracts almost universal support. I say “almost” because the cohort of foreign national offenders may not entirely embrace the idea. However, if we introduce a system whereby they are deported without custody or punishment, I suspect that they will come on board with the idea as well.

It occurs to me that the Government are going to approach this with considerable and conspicuous care and take on board the very considered amendment advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, and Amendment 142 from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson. It will, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, said, come back to bite us if it is discovered by very professional criminals that you can come here, execute your robbery, contract killing or whatever else and then, when you are caught, we pay your air fare home. It does not make an awful lot of sense.

With regard to Northern Ireland, I would take Amendment 146 as a probing amendment inviting the Minister to explore the impact of the Windsor Framework on this proposal.

I note that, if a foreign national offender in Northern Ireland is offered the option of deportation or lengthy custody in Northern Ireland, he might well be inclined to the former, but that is just a practical proposal. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

I start by thanking noble Lords and the noble and learned Lord for tabling their amendments, their interest in this topic and their considered words. I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, that prisoner transfer agreements are very important. A few weeks ago, I went to Albania and met the Justice Minister and consulate colleagues to reiterate how important it is and to see what more we can do.

Our priority is to protect victims in the UK and ensure that these offenders can never again offend here. Once deported, offenders will be barred from ever returning to the UK, protecting victims and the wider public.

I will address the amendments in turn. Amendment 122A, limiting the early removal scheme to those in receipt of a sentence of less than three years, would mean a more restrictive early removal scheme than we currently operate. On the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, on foreign national offenders, there are more than 3,200 FNOs who would not be eligible for removal under Section 260 because they are serving a fixed-term sentence greater than three years. The impact on our ability to manage prison capacity would be substantial. We already transfer prisoners to serve the remainder of their sentence in their home country under prisoner transfer agreements, where they are in place.

However, these are not suitable in all cases, and it is important that we retain multiple paths for removal to reduce prison capacity and speed up removals, especially when you consider that it costs an average of £54,000 a year to house these offenders. Once removed, FNOs are barred from ever returning to the UK, keeping victims and the wider British public safe.

The early removal scheme remains a discretionary scheme that will not be suitable for all foreign national offenders, and we are reviewing the existing guidance that includes a range of reasons it can be refused.

The “stop the clock” provision means that those who re-enter the UK in breach of their deportation order, following an ERS removal, are liable to serve the remainder of their sentence here.

I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, that we are working with the Home Office to revise the policy framework that underpins the scheme and ensure that clear operational guidance is in place before the measure is commenced. I am happy to write to the noble Lord on his detailed questions. The eligibility of those who have returned after a previous removal is one consideration, as is the commitment made in the other place to consider those convicted of stalking offences.

Amendment 142, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, seeks to introduce immediate deportation for foreign nationals given sentences of at least six months. This would require the Government to make an immediate deportation order in respect of persons who have committed less serious offences. In the Bill, we are extending automatic deportation to persons given a suspended sentence of 12 months or more.

We will also increase the deportation consideration threshold to include anyone given a suspended sentence of any length. In this, the Government are going further than any previous Government in tackling foreign criminality. We have ramped up the removals of foreign criminals, with almost 5,200 deported since July 2024—an increase of 14% compared with the same 12 months previous.

However, just as we no longer transport convicts to the other side of the world for stealing a loaf of bread, we do not think it appropriate to have immediate deportation for less serious crimes in the way proposed by the noble Lord. Lowering the threshold in the way that his amendment does would result in a disproportionate duty to deport for low-level offending. It would lead to significantly more appeals being made against such decisions, arguing exceptionality. It would increase the operational burden to pursue deportation in cases where it was unlikely to be successful because the offending was relatively minor.

On Amendment 146, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, for their understanding of my lack of knowledge on the intricate details of the Windsor Framework. In fact, I think that when the Windsor Framework was going through Parliament, I was very happily running a shoe repair business.

This amendment seeks to disapply parts of the withdrawal agreement and Article 2 of the Windsor Framework in relation to the automatic deportation provisions in the UK Borders Act 2007. I think that the intention behind the amendment is to ensure that deportation decisions in Northern Ireland can be taken on the same basis as deportation decisions in the rest of the UK.

It is the Government’s view that Clause 42 is compatible with Article 2 of the Northern Ireland protocol and the Windsor Framework. Therefore, we do not agree that there is a need for this amendment. To reiterate, it is the Government’s view that the deportation of foreign national offenders is not prohibited by these provisions. It is our view that immigration is a reserved matter, and we apply the same immigration laws across the whole of the UK.

I want to reassure the noble Baronesses, Lady Hoey and Lady Lawlor, and the noble Lord, Lord Weir, that foreign national offenders, regardless of where they are in the UK, should be in no doubt that we will do everything to make sure they are not free on Britain’s streets, including removal from the UK at the earliest possible opportunity.

I note that the stated purpose of Amendment 141A as tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, is to probe the effect of Clause 42 on survivors of modern slavery, human trafficking or domestic abuse. I reassure the noble Baroness that the Government take their responsibilities towards vulnerable people very seriously. The Home Office has published guidance on how to identify and support victims of modern slavery and human trafficking. Where removal of a person would breach the UK’s obligations under the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, deportation must not proceed. Victims of domestic abuse whose relationship has broken down can apply for permission to settle in the UK permanently. Victims of domestic abuse who meet the threshold for deportation will be considered for deportation in the same way as other persons.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for the opportunity to set out the Government’s position regarding the impact of Clause 42 on people who have a reasonable claim to be a victim and survivor of modern slavery, human trafficking or domestic violence. Such a claim does not amount to immunity from deportation for people convicted of an offence, although in some circumstances temporary permission to stay may be granted to victims of human trafficking or slavery. The changes brought about by Clause 42 will not alter this.

I thank noble Lords and Baronesses for this debate and ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend said he thought I would agree. I agree.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, the Government have stated that the aim of this measure is to increase public confidence that justice is seen to be done as more individuals are diverted into the community. They claim that if individuals are seen to be giving back to their community then this will act as a deterrent against committing crime. I wonder whether there is an element of wishful thinking from the Government about this. The ability to take photos of offenders picking up litter is hardly a substitute for the prospect of time in custody.

If the Government intend to enact the substance of the Bill then perhaps any efforts to act as a deterrent are welcome, even a measure as small as this one. However, we would have to ensure that it is exercised properly and with a clear framework around it. Probation officers are already operating under extraordinary strain; they should not be required to improvise policy on a ground such as this, particularly when it has obvious implications for privacy, data protection and public confidence. There would have to be clear statutory guidance on when a photograph may be taken, the safeguards that exist against misuse and the redress that is available if things go wrong. As a number of noble Lords have mentioned, we must also guard against a drift towards humiliation or the selective publication of images in a way that would stigmatise individuals or particular communities.

If the purpose of Clause 35 is to demonstrate that unpaid work is both visible and constructive then the Government would have to ensure that the practice reflects those aims. Perhaps with proper regulation this might be possible, but without that it risks becoming another ill-defined power handed to an already overstretched Probation Service. We urge the Minister to commit to setting out clearly the safeguards and practical requirements that will clearly be required if a clause such as Clause 35 is ever implemented.

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones and Lady Bennett, and the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Beith, for tabling these amendments and raising their concerns about Clause 35. I also thank the noble Lords, Lord Foster and Lord Bach, for raising their concerns.

I am sure we can agree that people who commit crimes should show that they are giving back to society. This clause is about building public confidence in community sentences. Local communities should know that those who harm them are paying back and be able to see the positive work being done. As my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti pointed out, it is important that they can clearly see the benefits of community payback and have their say on the work undertaken by nominating projects in their area.

I understand there may be concerns about the potential impacts of this measure and I reassure noble Lords that careful consideration is being given to how it is implemented. I have listened to noble Lords’ comments and will take them away to thoroughly consider. I also reassure noble Lords that publication will not apply in all cases. Exemption criteria will be set out in secondary legislation. This will be used alongside clear operational guidance on the circumstances where publishing would not be appropriate. The criteria are to be determined but may include factors such as specific offence types or personal circumstances which present heightened risks to the offender, their families or others. Probation practitioners will use this guidance and their professional assessment to determine the right course of action. We should have confidence that they will use the power only where appropriate. I confirm to noble Lords that I have heard the points they have made and reiterate that we will reflect carefully before Report.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, these amendments may appear useful in a time where sentencing laws are revised with increasing frequency, as illustrated by this Bill. A call for transparency and data is also generally welcome. Both amendments reflect a desire to ensure that justice keeps pace with changes in law and society. I am sure that anyone can support that general intention. We would invite the Government to address constructively the concerns that lie behind these amendments.

However, it appears that there may be very real practical issues and difficulties about any such amendment to the Bill. To take one simple example, the Bill, when it becomes law in its present form, will determine that someone who is sentenced to 12 months or less should have a suspended sentence. At the point when the Bill becomes law, is everyone then serving a custodial sentence of 12 months or less going to seek review on the grounds that the sentence should now be suspended? It seems to me that there are an awful lot of practical difficulties around that possibility.

Then, of course, we are going to have people reviewing the Sentencing Council recommendations from time to time who will say, “Wait a minute: they used to recommend three years for what I did, but they are now recommending two. Could I please have a review?” While the amendments are well intentioned, it occurs that there could be an immense number of practical difficulties, putting aside even the imposition upon the courts to review sentences at regular levels.

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for these amendments, which I understand are seeking to ensure fairness in sentencing outcomes and are clearly rooted in the commitment, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, said, to ensure that justice keeps pace with society.

That said, it is important to recognise that mechanisms already exist to address perceived injustices, including criminal appeals and sentence reviews, and mandating a formal review every three years with accompanying data and recommendations therefore risks duplicating existing oversight functions and placing additional burdens on the justice system. As the noble Lord will appreciate, there are already pressures in our justice system and it is especially important that we ensure that any reforms that create additional burdens are proportionate, targeted and deliverable.

I note, however, that the recent Leveson review calls for a full review of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 to modernise how criminal records are disclosed. The Government are considering this recommendation and will update the House in due course. In addition to that, the Law Commission was invited by the Government to consider the law on criminal appeals. Its consultation closed earlier this year and the responses are currently being analysed. We can expect the Law Commission to report to the Government with recommendations next year. Given that those pieces of work are in train, I hope that gives the noble Lord some assurance that those recommendations will be carefully considered. While we are sympathetic to the principle that fairness underpins these amendments, for the reasons I set out, I ask him to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Foster of Bath (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendment 147. Noble Lords will be well aware that, in earlier debates, I have argued that what we do—whether it is for a custodial or non-custodial sentence—is of course about punishment but should also be about taking steps to reduce reoffending. I have therefore argued that either the police or the Probation Service must put in place measures to help with that, which would include things such as education, skills, and also measures to help people with drug, alcohol, and—as I have added—gambling disorders. We have had those debates already.

However, in today’s debate, I have mentioned the fact that something like 20% of people in prison are on remand, awaiting sentencing. As a result of the huge backlog in the Crown Courts, which I have also mentioned, it is a fact that many of those on remand will be in prison awaiting sentencing for quite a long time. So, it seemed to me perfectly reasonable that, while they are in prison, there should be opportunities that might help them in later life anyway, in terms of the same sorts of measures. This amendment very simply says that those who are in prison on remand should have made available to them the same level of provision that is provided for prisoners after sentencing. It is as simple as that, it seems to be common sense and I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, turning first to the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, I must say from the outset that we on these Benches cannot support it. The power to remand a person in custody for their own protection—or, in the case of a child or young person, for their own welfare—is not one that the courts use lightly. It is already tightly circumscribed and deployed only where the alternative would expose an extremely vulnerable individual to serious harm.

To remove that safeguard entirely would be a mistake. There are rare, but very real, occasions when a defendant’s personal circumstances, exploitation by criminal gangs or acute safeguarding concerns mean that the only safe option, in the immediate term, is to keep them in secure accommodation. That judgment, made by a court on evidence and subject to challenge, is not one that we believe Parliament should now deprive them of. Where children are concerned, the imperative is even stronger. The court’s paramount concern must be people’s welfare, and removing this power risks leaving young people unprotected in precisely those situations where intervention is most vital. For these reasons, we cannot support Amendment 140.

We strongly support the principle underlying Amendment 147 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Foster. Far too many people spend far too long in remand—months and, sometimes, well over a year—awaiting trial or sentence. For all practical purposes, they experience incarceration in the same way as sentenced prisoners. They are deprived of liberty, separated from their families and often held in conditions indistinguishable from the sentenced estate. Yet those in remand do not have the same access to rehabilitative programmes, education, therapy or other forms of support that are routinely offered post sentence.

That is increasingly difficult to justify, particularly given that time spent on remand is overwhelmingly treated as time served for the purposes of the ultimate custodial sentence. If we accept that remand can form a significant part of an individual’s total period in custody, it cannot be right that this is, in effect, dead time, in which they are able neither to progress their rehabilitation nor to address the issues that may have contributed to their offending behaviour.

Therefore, the amendment proposed by the noble Lord is a valuable contribution to a discussion that is long overdue. It does not prejudge the precise mechanisms or impose unworkable obligations on overstretched services, but it rightly challenges us to consider whether the current disparity is effective or conducive to reducing reoffending. The Government should engage seriously with the spirit of these proposals.

Taken together, the amendments highlight two themes that run throughout our debates on the Bill: the need to protect the vulnerable and the need to ensure that custody, whether pre or post sentence, serves a constructive purpose. I hope that the Minister will commit to further work in this area, and I look forward to his response.

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for her amendment and for taking the time to discuss her related concerns with my noble friend Lord Timpson. I also thank her for her support for the Bill and its overall intentions—that is very much appreciated coming from someone with her track record.

Amendment 140 would remove an important safeguard which, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, said, is very rarely used but remains an option for the courts as a measure of last resort and out of concern for the defendant. Eliminating this provision could leave vulnerable individuals without any viable protection, particularly where alternative care arrangements were simply unavailable or could not be implemented swiftly enough. We fear that those may be the consequences. Examples where it may be used include where it is the only option available to the court to keep someone safe, such as in cases where the defendant is a member of a gang and could be subject to repercussions if they were not protected.

I hope it will also reassure your Lordships that the Mental Health Bill, which the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, referred to, is now in the other place. It includes a reform to end the use of remand for one’s own protection under the Bail Act where the court’s sole concern is the defendant’s mental health. This reform should ensure that remand for one’s own protection is, therefore, used only as a last resort in the circumstances I have outlined.

At this stage, repeal would leave a gap in the available provision. Courts must retain the flexibility to act decisively in safeguarding individuals when no other option exists. The amendment would risk unintended consequences for vulnerable defendants and undermine the protective function of the justice system.

Amendment 147, which I thank the noble Lord, Lord Foster, for tabling, seeks to allow prisoners held on remand to access rehabilitative programmes, education, therapy and other support before the start of their sentence. The Government’s view is that the amendment is not necessary, given that remand prisoners can already access those programmes where prisons run them.

There is also an important legal distinction here that I should highlight to your Lordships. Remand prisoners are held in custody pending trial or sentencing, and some have not yet been convicted. Of course, we recognise that people are spending more time on remand; therefore, as I have said, where these services are available and in the right circumstances, they should be able to access them. However, remand prisoners are legally distinct from sentenced prisoners, and we have to reflect that in the priorities for resources.

There are already mechanisms in place to support remand prisoners, including access to healthcare. At the moment, the Government have no plans to expand all rehabilitative programmes, education, therapy and other support to remand prisoners. This would require substantial changes to prison operations and resourcing, and could divert resources from those already convicted and serving sentences. We recognise, however, some of the changes in the remand population. My noble friend the Minister and I would be very happy to continue to talk to the noble Lord, Lord Foster, about these matters but, given what I have set out, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

Sentencing Bill

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 6th January 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

1: Clause 1, page 1, line 14, after “months” insert “before any credit is given for a guilty plea”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would mean that the presumption for a suspended sentence would apply to sentences before credit is given for a guilty plea.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, my Amendments 1 and 27 concern the interaction between the presumption of suspended sentences in Clause 1 and the application of credit for a guilty plea at the first opportunity.

In Committee, I raised what I consider to be a straightforward but important point of drafting and of principle: whether the presumption for a suspended sentence is intended to apply to the sentence before or after credit is given for a guilty plea. The purpose of that amendment was to probe how widely the Government intend this presumption to operate. The Minister’s response in Committee confirmed that the presumption would apply after guilty plea credit had been awarded. That confirmation is important, as it means that the presumption of suspended sentences is not confined to offences attracting sentences of up to 12 months, as has been repeatedly suggested, but in practice extends to offences carrying a sentence of up to 18 months, which is of course beyond the sentencing provisions of the magistrates’ court and takes us into to the realm of what is generally regarded as serious crime.

The Minister opposed this amendment on the basis that it would create inconsistency. He argued that the presumption would not apply where an early guilty plea reduced a sentence to 12 months or less but could still apply where other forms of mitigation achieved the same effect. That objection, I say respectfully, misunderstands both the purpose and the effect of this amendment. The distinction between credit for a guilty plea and other forms of mitigation is deliberate and long established. Credit for a guilty plea is not mitigation in the ordinary sense. It is a structured formulaic reduction applied for a specific policy purpose: to encourage early admissions of guilt and spare victims the ordeal of trial. Indeed, Parliament and the Sentencing Council have always treated it separately.

This amendment seeks to ensure that the starting point for the court, whether an offence ordinarily attracts custody or suspension, is determined by the seriousness of the offence and not by a subsequent procedural discount. Without this amendment, Clause 1 operates in a way that the Government have never openly acknowledged. An offender facing a sentence of up to 18 months’ imprisonment can, by entering an early guilty plea, reduce that sentence by one-third and thereby bring himself within the automatic presumption of suspension. That is not a marginal effect but a substantial expansion of the scope of Clause 1. That is what I described in Committee as opening Pandora’s box.

Once the presumption is allowed to apply after a guilty plea credit, it ceases to be confined to genuinely low-level offending. Offences such as robbery, serious assault or the possession of knives—offences that Parliament and the public would reasonably expect to attract immediate custody—are surreptitiously drawn into the presumption, even though they can carry sentences of 15 months or more. If that is the Government’s intention, it should be stated plainly, but if, as Ministers have repeatedly suggested, the presumption is aimed only at genuinely short sentences of up to 12 months, this amendment is necessary to give effect to that stated policy.

We also heard a wider concern in Committee that I think was left unacknowledged: by allowing guilty plea credit to determine eligibility for suspension, the Bill risks creating perverse incentives. Offenders may come to believe that pleading guilty is not merely a matter of sentence reduction but a route to avoiding custody altogether, and that risks undermining public confidence in the justice system.

This amendment does not undermine the policy of encouraging guilty pleas, nor does it widen the scope of custody. It is a technical clarification designed to ensure that Clause 1 operates as the Government have publicly described it and not in a far broader and unintended manner. If the Minister cannot give us these assurances, I will seek to divide the House.

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[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Timpson) (Lab)]

I start by setting out my appreciation for the support that the Government have received for Clause 1. Throughout the Bill’s passage, noble Lords have highlighted evidence showing that those given a community order or a suspended sentence reoffend less than similar offenders given a short prison sentence. We are following the evidence to reduce crime, creating fewer victims and safer communities, and we are following the lead of the previous Conservative Government, who originally introduced this measure during the last Parliament without the amendment we are debating today. I am a great believer in working across the political spectrum to get the best policies that reduce reoffending. I have dedicated myself to solving this problem and creating a sustainable justice system. I strongly believe that the clause as drafted, without any further amendments, is the best policy, and I must repeat that we are not abolishing short sentences.

I can assure noble Lords that I have considered the issue of early guilty pleas, raised by Amendments 1 and 27, with great care. I have met the noble and learned Lord to discuss his concerns and I value the attention given to this issue, but it has long been the practice of the courts to give a reduction in sentence where a defendant pleads guilty. This avoids the need for a trial, enables cases to be dealt with quickly and shortens the gap between charge and sentence. The Government do not wish to disincentivise early guilty pleas, in part because of the urgent need to reduce the backlog in cases coming to court. Early guilty pleas can save victims and witnesses from concern about having to give evidence, which is particularly important in traumatic cases. These amendments risk reducing the incentive to plead guilty, potentially causing further avoidable trauma for victims, and they would create a clear and significant anomaly in sentencing.

For reasons of simplicity and coherence, it is the final sentence length given by the judge that must be relevant for the purposes of the presumption. Under these amendments, the presumption would not apply where an early guilty plea had brought the sentence down to 12 months or less, yet it could still apply where any other mitigation, such as age or being a primary carer, had the same effect. The inconsistency is stark. Two offenders receiving the same final sentence could be treated entirely differently, based solely on the type of mitigation applied. This is neither coherent nor fair.

Finally, the sunset clause proposed in Amendment 103 would introduce unnecessary instability. It would undermine public confidence and complicate operational planning for courts, prisons, probation services and local authorities. The last thing we need at the moment is instability in the justice system.

I am a firm believer in dealing with problems head-on and solving them for the long term. We inherited difficult decisions that needed to be made, but someone had to make them, because we simply cannot run out of cells. We are building 14,000 new ones, but that takes time. I came into this job to rebuild our criminal justice system to lead to fewer victims, not more. Clause 1 is a crucial means of achieving that, and undermining it through further exclusions is not the right way forward. There will be a long shadow over those who vote for amendments to put even more pressure on the prison system.

I hope that I have explained why the Government’s position is the right one and I hope for cross-party support for a truly cross-party policy. After all, this was originally a Conservative measure, reintroduced in this Bill by Labour and supported by the Liberal Democrats, Plaid Cymru and the Green Party in Committee in the Commons. I therefore kindly urge noble Lords not to support these amendments.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

I am obliged to the Minister for his observations. However, I have a number of points.

First, the apparent use of statistics comparing repeat offending by those who suffer a suspended sentence with those who are given a prison sentence is, potentially, very misleading. In general, repeat offenders will receive a sentence of imprisonment, whereas single offenders will often receive a suspended sentence. It is those who are inclined towards the repetition of criminal conduct who are imprisoned, and therefore the comparison made with these statistics is, potentially, highly misleading.

Secondly, I do not accept the reference to any other mitigation. The procedural mitigation—procedural discount, in reality—granted in respect of a guilty plea is not comparable. It was not in the past considered comparable with the other aspects of mitigation mentioned by the noble Lord.

The Government have repeatedly described this policy as targeting only genuinely short sentences. Sentences of more than 12 months are not genuinely short sentences; they are sentences that can be imposed only by the Crown Court. They are regarded as sentences applicable to serious criminal conduct; that is not the purpose of Clause 1 in its present form. The Government wrote in their own manifesto that the sentences criminals receive

“often do not make sense either to victims or the wider public”.

Allowing serious offenders to evade custody will do little to rebuild public confidence in the justice system. If the Government truly intend to suspend sentences of up to 18 months as a matter of policy, they should have plainly said so. If they do not, they should accept this amendment. In these circumstances, with some regret, I beg to test the opinion of the House.

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Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

25: Clause 1, page 3, line 10, at end insert—
“(i) the offender has been convicted of a sexual offence, within the meaning of section 3 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, or (j) the offender has been convicted of an offence which constitutes domestic abuse within the meaning of section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021.”

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, this amendment concerns an exemption to the presumption of suspended sentences for those convicted of sexual offences and domestic abuse. We listened carefully to the points raised by noble Lords in Committee. It was suggested then that our amendments were overly expansive, risked undermining the central objective of the Bill—to free up spaces in prison—and that we might constrain judicial discretion.

We have listened to, and taken into account, those concerns. The amendment before your Lordships today is far more tightly drawn. It does not seek to carve out a long list of offences, even though that might be our preferred position; nor does it attempt to undermine Clause 1’s central objective. Instead, it is narrowly focused on two categories of offending, where the case for custody, even for shorter sentences, is at its strongest: sexual offending and domestic abuse.

This amendment would preserve the presumption in favour of suspended sentences in the vast majority of cases, with exemptions only for sexual offences and domestic abuse. That seems proportionate and indeed, I would venture, necessary. Much of the debate in Committee rested on the assertion that short custodial sentences are ineffective or even counterproductive when judged solely by reoffending rates. Even if one accepts that the data paints a mixed picture, it is a mistake to treat sentencing policy as though it serves only one function. Prison is not simply about reoffending statistics; it serves other essential purposes: deterrence, public protection, the expression of society’s condemnation of serious wrongdoing, the maintenance of public confidence in the justice system and, crucially in cases such as these, the protection and reassurance of victims.

For victims of sexual assault or domestic abuse, the distinction between a custodial sentence and a suspended one is not an abstract policy question. It is the difference between knowing that their abuser has been removed from the community and knowing that they remain at liberty. This point is reinforced by the Government’s recent recognition of the scale of the problem. Violence against women and girls has been described as a national emergency, and a strategy announced to halve such violence within a decade, including the creation of specialist rape and sexual offence investigation teams in every police force by 2029. These measures, this Government note, will provide officers with the right training to understand the mindset of both abusers and victims, and ensure consistent investigation of sexual offences across the country.

Much has been made of the evidence on reoffending, but even the Government’s own publications urge caution on these. Official statistics emphasise that comparisons between custodial and non-custodial sentences do not control for differences in offender characteristics. Those receiving short custodial sentences, as I noted earlier, typically have far longer and more serious criminal histories than those given community or suspended sentences. The reality is not a simple dichotomy between bad short custodial sentences and good suspended sentences. Outcomes depend heavily on the risk posed by the offender and the need for immediate public protection. In cases of sexual offences and domestic abuse, those considerations weigh heavily in favour of custody. Nor should we overlook the deterrent effect of custody. While difficult to measure with precision, deterrence remains a central principle of sentencing. Removing custody from the toolkit for these offences was sending the wrong signal to offenders, and indeed to victims and the general public.

In Committee, it was also argued that carving out exceptions undermines judicial discretion. With respect, that argument sits uneasily with the structure of this Bill. The Bill already imposes a statutory presumption in favour of suspended sentences. This amendment simply ensures that, in the most serious and sensitive cases, Parliament does not compel courts to start from what I suggest is the wrong place. We believe this amendment is modest and targeted. It reflects a simple proposition that, for sexual offenders and domestic abusers, short custodial sentences continue to have a vital role to play. If the Minister cannot provide the appropriate assurances for this limited exception, then I will seek leave to divide the House.

[Baroness May of Maidenhead (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Keen, and I wish to echo two points. The first is that it is so important to victims of sexual violence and domestic abuse that they do not fear that their abuser, the perpetrator of those crimes, is somehow automatically going to be back in their community. The reassurance that they would get from knowing that the custodial sentence is available is important to those victims.

The second point is, as my noble and learned friend has raised, the issue of the Government’s mission to halve violence against women and girls and the strategy for violence against women and girls that is being brought forward. May I gently suggest to the Minister that, if the Government are serious about that, then they should accept this amendment? If they do not accept it, then that suggests that they are not as serious about their intentions on violence against women and girls as they are claiming.

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[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

While the Government understand the concern that underpins this amendment, we do not believe it is necessary. It was not included by the last Conservative Government when they originally introduced this measure. Let me be clear: we are not abolishing short sentences. Public protection is our main priority, and we will make sure that the most dangerous offenders are put where they belong: behind bars.

In response to the noble Baronesses, Lady May and Lady Fox, I recognise that prison sentences, even if short, can be critical to safeguarding victims of domestic abuse or VAWG. Courts will still have discretion to impose immediate custody in any case involving significant risk of physical or psychological harm to an individual—for example, to protect an at-risk domestic abuse victim. Courts will also have discretion to impose immediate custody in exceptional circumstances and where offenders breach court orders.

Through Committee stage amendments in the other place, we strengthened the wording in the Bill even further, so that there can be no doubt. Where offenders breach court orders, including VAWG-related protective orders, they can receive an immediate custodial sentence. For example, if someone breaches a domestic violence protection order—a civil breach rather than a criminal offence—and assaults their partner, the presumption would not apply and they could go straight to prison.

With thanks to the Liberal Democrats, and, importantly, the Member for Eastbourne in the other place, we are also introducing a new judicial finding of domestic abuse at sentencing, so these offenders are better identified and monitored throughout the system. This has been welcomed by the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, and, in this place, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks.

The noble and learned Lord clearly cares deeply about the experience of victims. But if this amendment were to pass, it would undermine the fundamental problem that this legislation will fix—the issue the previous Government neglected for 14 years. I urge the noble Lord and noble and learned Lord to withdraw this amendment, and to support the Government’s position.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, about fault for the issue of prison capacity, staffing and resources will bring little comfort to the victims of sexual offences and domestic abuse. His reference to offences that attract a sentence of 12 months or less omits the point that, of course, Clause 1 in its present form would apply to offences attracting a sentence of 18 months or less, albeit there is then a discount for a guilty plea because of a procedural provision.

I am obliged to my noble friend Lady May and to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for their contributions. The fact is that sexual offending and domestic abuse are uniquely serious and harmful—that has been recognised by the present Government. They are characterised by repetition, coercion and control, and they have a profound victim impact. In such cases, custody serves functions that a suspended sentence cannot: protection of victims, reassurance, deterrence and public confidence. For sexual offences and domestic abuse, immediate public protection should take precedence over other considerations, including questions of prison capacity. That includes abstract arguments on rehabilitation and what is non-conclusive data regarding reoffending rates as between suspended sentences and prison sentences.

This Government have pledged in their manifesto to halve violence against women and girls. They are hardly proposing to go in that direction with the present form of Clause 1. It is not enough that there should be exceptional circumstances; the very essence of a sexual offence and of domestic abuse is an exceptional circumstance. The public recognise that, and this Government should recognise that. I seek leave to divide the House.

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[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I acknowledge the positive contributions of all noble Lords to this debate. From these Benches we are supportive of the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe, which focus on purposeful activity in custodial sentences and on ensuring that offenders have access to suitable education and training.

On defining the purpose of imprisonment, as proposed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, we welcome the recognition of rehabilitation as one of many purposes. At the same time, we note that the Bill addresses the objectives of sentencing and imprisonment far more generally and question whether it is necessary to place a statutory definition in the Bill.

We remain opposed to the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, to remove the court’s power to remand a person in custody for their own protection or, in the case of children or young people, for their welfare. As I observed in Committee, this power is tightly circumscribed and used only in rare but very real circumstances where it may be the only safe option available to the court. Removing that safeguard would potentially leave vulnerable individuals, including children, without protection at a time when they most need it. I take issue with the suggestion from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that this very limited power involves some element of injustice.

I do not agree with the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, albeit I recognise that he may have been somewhat surprised to find himself in this group with an issue regarding legal aid. Again, I acknowledge the important contributions from all noble Lords on this issue.

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[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful for the removal of Clause 35 from the Bill. I completely appreciate the importance of unpaid work orders, and I completely appreciate that they can do a great deal of good. However, the idea that they would be the subject of what I called “naming and shaming” in Committee—whereby offenders carrying out such unpaid work would be photographed and their photographs would then be given publicity—seemed to us on these Benches to be potentially profoundly damaging to their rehabilitation and the important relationship of trust that needs to exist between probation officers and their clients. We think that for probation officers to carry out this photography and publication would be profoundly damaging. The Government have recognised the need to remove the clause, and I am very grateful that they have done so.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his engagement on the issue of whole life orders, and I acknowledge that the Government have now stepped forward with their own amendment to address the previous inconsistencies in the statutory provisions. In light of that, I will not press Amendment 62, which is rendered unnecessary by virtue of the Government’s amendment.

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[Lord Burnett of Maldon (CB)]

My Lords, your Lordships may recollect that, in Committee, I supported an amendment which would have removed Clause 18 from the Bill altogether. While also suggesting that Clause 19 would be best removed, I laid an amendment to the effect that a guideline could be prevented from being issued only if both the Lady Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor agreed that that should happen.

I am grateful to both the noble Lords, Lord Lemos and Lord Timpson, for the time and trouble they have taken in discussions, which have included me and my noble and learned friend Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. I am also particularly relieved that the noble Lord, Lord Lemos, explained in the all-Peers letter that went round—forgive me, I do not remember the precise date before Christmas—which drew attention to the fact that both the Sentencing Council and the Lady Chief Justice had been engaged in these amendments, that that should not be taken in any way as suggesting that either are happy with them or supported them.

Indeed, on 25 November, the Lady Chief Justice appeared before the Justice Committee of the House of Commons and explained that the clauses that we are concerned with do not sit easily with the independence of the Sentencing Council. She explained that there were no conceivable circumstances in which the Lady Chief Justice or Lord Chief Justice would seek to exercise the veto. She also made the important point that the mood of the Sentencing Council is “pretty bleak” because of the uncertainty hanging over its head. That was particularly important, as she explained, because the Sentencing Council is due to be very busy revising sentencing guidelines, which will be necessary as a result of the contents of this Bill, particularly because of the reduction in the use of suspended sentences. It will also be busy if the proposals that the Government have foreshadowed—to increase the sentencing powers of magistrates—come to be enacted, because, again, guidelines will have to be changed to reflect that. None the less, as I have said, the noble Lord, Lord Lemos, agreed in Committee to consider these matters further and I am particularly grateful for the care with which he and the noble Lord, Lord Timpson, have treated my concerns.

I regret that His Majesty’s Government were not able to accept the amendments that I laid in Committee, because these clauses remain unfortunate, to put it as mildly as I can. Clause 18, requiring a business plan to be approved by the Lord Chancellor, might be thought to serve no obvious purpose, save to empower the Lord Chancellor to exert some pressure on the Sentencing Council. But, as the noble Lord, Lord Lemos, just explained to the House, that pressure will have no statutory effect. That is because the Government have just now accepted that the Sentencing Council would still be obliged to carry out the positive statutory duties laid on it by statute, and to exercise the discretionary powers conferred on it by statute. But if the Lord Chancellor is to exert pressure—pressure which, in my respectful opinion, continues to be inconsistent with the independence of the Sentencing Council—he must at least do so as soon as practicable and explain himself, which are both positive steps.

Clause 19 as now proposed to be amended remains—this should not be sugar-coated—a potential executive veto. That veto too, if it is to come, must now come as soon as practicable, and the grounds on which it can be exercised have been identified. I recognise that that is an improvement, if perhaps only a slight one, on the original drafting.

As the noble Lord, Lord Lemos, explained, there is perhaps a hope—and, indeed, an expectation—within the Government that these powers will never be used in a way which brings conflict between the Government and the Sentencing Council, and between the Government and the Lady Chief Justice. But it is important, when conferring powers, to contemplate how they might be used by others who perhaps are not so benign in their attitudes as the current Government and Lord Chancellor.

It seems that the Government have laid the foundations for what could be the destruction of the Sentencing Council through executive interference. Were such interference to occur, I fear that the Sentencing Council would cease to function for the simple reason that all its members—all fiercely independent—would leave.

I concluded that there would be no purpose in relaying my amendments. I am grateful to both Ministers for the tentative steps that have been taken to ameliorate the impact of these clauses, and for that reason I support them.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, it appears that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has decided that he will make some submission.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

Well, that apparent position represents the truth.

First, I agree with—and in a sense have only very little to add to—the speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett. Your Lordships will remember that I moved in Committee that both Clauses 18 and 19 should not stand part of the Bill.

That said, I join with the noble and learned Lord in thanking the noble Lords, Lord Timpson and Lord Lemos, for their engagement with us on some compromise position. I am not sure that this represents an entire compromise of their position, because I still feel that the Bill would be better off without these clauses. However, the noble Lord, Lord Lemos, has explained that the intention is entirely benign. I share the concern of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, that other Governments may not take such a benign view, but express the hope that that will not eventuate.

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[Viscount Eccles (Con)]

My Lords, I will make a very short intervention before my Front Bench replies. I believe we should remember that Farage, in more or less a chance remark, said he thought that the council should be abolished. So, the issues raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, are very important, and I very much admire the detailed presentation he made to your Lordships’ House on these clauses.

I am grateful for what I would regard as the rescue mission on which the Government have gone to make the best of a bad job. Certainly, the hare that was run in March last year, to which the Government made their reply, was a very unfortunate hare. It was something to do with two-tier justice. It would have been better to let that hare run. Hares run in circuits: they come back to where they started and, very often, everything settles down. Instead of that, we have had to have some very careful work done to get us to where we are.

All over the House, we will be grateful that the Sentencing Council has in effect received a vote of confidence. We were looking for that and we are very grateful that it has happened. But we should not forget the rather troubled way in which the two parties that have the greatest experience of government and the implementation of policy got themselves into a tangle quite unnecessarily.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I am obliged to the Ministers for their engagement on this issue. However, we should bear in mind that our statutory provisions are designed to address powers and not intentions. It is certainly questionable whether we should be enacting provisions which we consider will never be used. They are on the statute book and they are available for use.

I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, for outlining the issues here. The language he used was indicative of the reservations we all have with regard to this course of action: “unfortunate”, “inconsistent” and “a slight improvement”. It is not a ringing endorsement of anyone’s legislation.

The Government’s stance on the relationship between the Executive and the judiciary remains demonstrably unclear and uncertain. On the one hand, they repeat that sentencing is a matter for our independent judiciary—I quote the Ministers. We did not support the original Clauses 18 and 19 as drafted, but nor do we support these amendments, as they appear to simply illustrate the Government’s internal inconsistency with regard to the Sentencing Council. These amendments simply add more confusion to the puzzled stance the Government have towards the Sentencing Council.

On Report, the Government have now implemented amendments to reduce the degree to which their own Bill reduces the Sentencing Council’s independence. But do the Government retain any idea of how independent they would like the Sentencing Council to be?

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

I am very grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions to today’s debate. It is obviously a subject on which your Lordships have thought very carefully and deeply, so I appreciate those contributions and note them all with great significance.

However, I hope all noble Lords will agree that these proposed amendments at least reflect the seriousness with which we have taken concerns raised in Committee. I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, acknowledged that. I also hope we have answered the important questions about how the provisions will operate in practice, which both the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, again acknowledged.

We recognise that there is further detail to work through around how both these approval measures will work, and I am very grateful for the ongoing discussions between officials in the Ministry of Justice and in the Sentencing Council on these important considerations.

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[Baroness Smith of Llanfaes (PC)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendment 97 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, to which I have added my name. The case for devolving prisons and probation to Wales has already been eloquently made by him, so I will confine my remarks to three points.

First, prison policy in England and Wales continues to be developed largely through an English lens, with insufficient recognition of the realities in Wales. Many of the services on which effective sentencing depends—health, housing and substance misuse support—are devolved. This creates a fragmented system, which is most sharply felt at the point of release. Release from custody is precisely where reserved and devolved responsibilities collide. The number of people released into homelessness from Welsh prisons rose by 34% in 2024-25. Probation staff themselves warn that, without major reform and investment, the ambitions of the Bill cannot be delivered. Can the Minister say how His Majesty’s Government intend to manage this persistent jagged edge between reserved and devolved responsibilities?

Secondly, Wales has no women’s prison, which means that Welsh women are routinely sent to serve short sentences in England, most for under 12 months. At the same time, Wales has one of the highest imprisonment rates in western Europe, while a significant proportion of those held in Welsh prisons are from England. Against that backdrop, plans to expand capacity at HMP Parc have been approved, despite serious concerns about safety. So, my additional question is: how do His Majesty’s Government justify expanding prison capacity in Wales without addressing the systematic issue of Welsh women being imprisoned far away from their families and support networks, or aligning responsibility for the devolved services on which it depends?

Thirdly, Welsh-speaking prisoners continue to report neglect of their language rights. Were prisons in Wales accountable to the Senedd, stronger Welsh-language duties would apply. Can the Minister explain how the current arrangements adequately protect the use of the Welsh language within prisons in Wales?

To close, with a Senedd election imminent, as already mentioned, clarity from His Majesty’s Government is essential. So, for the avoidance of doubt, can the Minister tell the House whether it is the policy of His Majesty’s Government to oppose the full devolution of prisons and probation to Wales in principle, or whether they are willing to establish a structured process with the Welsh Government to consider how the devolution could be achieved?

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly in support of Amendment 58, which introduces an annual report on prison capacity. This is an issue that we pressed in Committee and I am grateful to the Government for having listened and for bringing forward this amendment. The amendment places a clear duty on the Secretary of State to report annually to Parliament on the number of people in custody, the number of available prison places, and projected changes. That is a welcome and important step. If Parliament is being asked to legislate for significant changes to sentencing and release policy, it is only right that we are also given a regular and transparent account of the state of the prison estate that underpins those decisions.

Ideally, we would have liked this report to go further. There is a strong case for including more detailed information on the drivers between sentencing policy, probation capacity and reoffending. However, I recognise that the Government face a balancing act between the need for transparency and the administrative constraints on producing such reports, and I accept that the amendment strikes a reasonable and proportionate compromise.

On Amendment 92 and the issue of the child cruelty register, again I thank the Government for their ongoing communication on this important topic and their assurances that they would like to implement a policy in support of a child cruelty register. This is an issue for which my right honourable friend Helen Grant from the other place has campaigned tirelessly, and I pay tribute to her for the effort she has made in bringing this to the forefront of our legislative proposals. It has been requested that this amendment be reserved for a Home Office Bill rather than legislation from the Ministry of Justice, and in these circumstances, and having regard to that undertaking from the Government, I will withdraw the amendment in my name. However, I add that it will be tabled in subsequent legislation in this parliamentary Session to ensure that we do not delay in ensuring that that action is taken.

On Amendment 97 and the submissions from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, I can say only that I hesitate to intrude to the west of Offa’s Dyke.

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

I thank noble Lords for their contributions. The questions from the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, on Welsh justice will be part of our ongoing discussions on devolution. I look forward to further discussions on that. I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Foster, is sufficiently reassured about this Government’s commitment to transparency and accepts the reasons for our not accepting Amendments 59 to 61.

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[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 93 and 94. Amendment 93 is concerned with the impact of changes in the law on sentences that are currently being served under the law that was in force preceding the change. In other words, offenders were sentenced under a law that has been altered. The amendment calls for reports to be provided every three years, with a view to such changes in the law leaving defendants suffering from injustice.

Amendment 94 concerns the direct effect of such changes in the law on sentences that are currently being served or that have been imposed. Proposed new subsection (1)(a) in Amendment 94 concerns cases where the offence itself for which the sentence was imposed has been abolished, and proposed new subsection (1)(b) in Amendment 94 concerns a case where the sentence has been materially altered.

The amendment would enable a person serving a sentence for an offence that had been abolished, or where the sentence had been altered, to seek a review of the case of the sentence that is currently being served. On such a review, the sentence originally imposed could be quashed, or there could be a resentencing.

In practice, of course, Amendment 94 would come into play only where either the offence had been abolished or the available sentence had been reduced, because one cannot imagine an offender seeking a change of sentence where the available sentence had been increased.

Underlying both amendments is a concern that changes in the law would have the effect that an offender’s sentence would not have been imposed or would have been less severe had the law at the time of sentencing been the reformed law rather than the law under which the offender was sentenced, and that such changes should take effect to the benefit of the offender who would not be at such risk now.

I would suggest that it is a matter of simple justice that changes in the law which would have resulted in an offender serving a sentence less severe, or not being convicted of any offence, should have the benefit of the change in the law that pertained at the time of sentencing, so that a review would be appropriate.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Sater, has addressed what is clearly an anomaly in our sentencing policy that raises a clear issue of fairness, and we do not dissent from the principle that has been advanced with regard to that matter. Indeed, I acknowledge the thoughtful and careful way in which the matter has been addressed by all noble Lords. With regard to the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, I have nothing to say.

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

My Lords, I will begin by addressing Amendment 63. I would like to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Sater, for raising this and for her work and expertise as a member of the Youth Justice Board and as a magistrate. I also pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Ponsonby’s long-standing interest and work in this area, including from this Dispatch Box.

Youth sentencing, as I think all noble Lords who have spoken know, is largely out of scope of this Bill. But I should say—and I am very happy to put it on the record, for myself and for my noble friend the Minister—that this amendment raises an issue with which we have a great deal of sympathy.

We recognise that, when a child turns 18, that can have a significant impact on the outcome of criminal justice proceedings, and that is, in a sense, the heart of the argument that the noble Baroness is making. A child who reaches the age of 18 before their first appearance will be tried and sentenced as an adult. However, sentencing guidelines state that, in such cases, the court should take as its starting point the sentence that would have applied at the time the offence was committed. That does not quite deal with some of the points that my noble friend Lord Ponsonby was making; I acknowledge that. They also state that the offender’s maturity, along with other relevant factors, should continue to be considered.

This amendment, however, would significantly alter the youth sentencing framework, and I note the careful way in which the noble Baroness, Lady Sater, my noble friend Lord Ponsonby and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, asked for the Government’s response. If we were to accept these recommendations, the Government feel that there would be ramifications across the wider justice system. The youth sentencing framework has been specifically designed for children and there may well be unforeseen consequences, which we should think about carefully, of applying that framework to young adults. I am sure that your Lordships can appreciate that such a change requires thorough consideration beyond the confines of this Bill. So, although I urge the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment at this stage, I hope she will take what I have said as some reassurance.

I now turn to Amendments 93 and 94. I would like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling them. I am afraid I am going to disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Marks, as I probably did in Committee too, by restating that the Government already believe that existing mechanisms are sufficient to address perceived injustices.

Unduly lenient sentence reviews and criminal appeals are two routes by which cases can be reviewed. From 1 January to 8 December 2025, 933 sentences were considered by the Attorney-General’s Office as valid to be reviewed under the unduly lenient sentence scheme. The Government cannot support an amendment that puts more pressure on the justice system, which I think everyone in your Lordships’ House recognises is under considerable pressure, by requiring the courts to reconsider the sentences of those who apply. We do not believe this would be workable or sustainable, and we do not want to duplicate existing functions at a time when the system is under so much pressure.

As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, knows—we discussed this in Committee—we await the Law Commission’s report on criminal appeals, which is due later this year. Your Lordships’ House has my assurance that we will consider its findings with great care, especially those which relate to the important points made today. Once the report has been published, we will of course discuss it further. For the moment, I ask for the amendment to be withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

68: After Clause 19, insert the following new Clause—
“Court transcripts of sentencing remarks(1) Where a request is made for the sentencing remarks delivered in the Crown Court, the court must, subject to subsection (2), make those remarks available within 14 days of the request being received.(2) Sentencing remarks may be published only where a judge of the Crown Court has approved their release, having regard to—(a) the accuracy of the record, and(b) the need to comply with any reporting restrictions or other legal prohibitions.(3) Sentencing remarks made available under this section must be published free of charge and may be made available online.”

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 68 and indeed 69 concern transparency in sentencing. We listened carefully to the Government’s response in Committee and both these amendments have been revised in light of those responses. We believe that they now represent a fair and proportionate compromise between the principle of open justice and the practical constraints that may face the courts.

I will deal first with Amendment 68, with which there is particular concern, and which involves the publication of sentencing remarks within two weeks or 14 days of a request. Many of the arguments made in Committee about transparency in the justice system continue to hold true and I will not seek to repeat them. What was notable, however, was the broad consensus across the House that victims should be able to access the sentencing remarks for crimes committed against them.

In response to the original drafting, which required mandatory publication of all sentencing remarks, the Government argued that this would impose a significant financial and administrative burden. So, Amendment 68 no longer imposes a universal obligation. Instead, it requires that Crown Court sentencing remarks be provided only where a victim specifically requests them. This reflects the reality that the Crown Court handles cases concerning the most serious offences. Statistics indicate that that is about 10% of all cases.

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[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Can the noble and learned Lord clarify, at an appropriate point, subsection (2) of the proposed new clause in Amendment 68? It says:

“Sentencing remarks may be published only”


in certain circumstances. My first question is: is that meant to restrict the rights of the victim under subsection (1) of the proposed new clause to obtain the remarks, or is it concerned with further publication?

My second question relates to the proposed new subsection (2), which says:

“Sentencing remarks may be published only where a judge … has approved their release, having regard to—”


two factors, which it lists. Is it intended that those are the only factors that the sentencing judge can have regard to—that is

“the accuracy of the record and … the need to comply with any reporting restrictions”—

or is it intended, which I would hope not, that the sentencing judge would have some general discretion here?

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

I am obliged to the noble Lord. It is intended that the court should have regard only to the two elements that are referred to therein.

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

My Lords, before the Minister gets to his feet, can I rather impertinently squeeze in a request that probably has little to do with Amendment 68? I am doing it now, so there we are.

A few years ago, I, along with other people, conducted a review into the work of the Criminal Cases Review Commission. One of the problems we found is that many prisoners who were dissatisfied with the way their conviction had been arrived at, and the way in which the Court of Appeal had subsequently dealt with it, found it almost impossible to get hold of a transcript of the sentencing remarks. Following the questioning of my noble and learned friend by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, it looks as though such a convicted prisoner would not be able to make use of this amendment to get hold of the sentencing remarks my noble and learned friend is partly complaining about. Can the Government please bear in mind—not tonight obviously—that this is a real practical difficulty for people in prison who feel, for good reason, that they have been improperly convicted and wish to have the CCRC consider their case? It is much more difficult for the CCRC, and certainly for the dissatisfied defendant, to advance their cause if they cannot get hold, either because it is difficult or because it is expensive, of the sentencing remarks.

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[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, for tabling Amendments 68 and 69. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, makes a good point and I will take it back to the department.

We share the commitment to transparency across the justice system, but we do not agree that these amendments are needed. I will first address Amendment 68 and I reassure the noble and learned Lord that the Government are working to significantly improve the transparency of sentencing remarks. In certain cases of high public interest, sentencing remarks are already published online. Sentencing remarks can be and are filmed by broadcasters, subject to the agreement of the judge.

The Government have recently extended provision of free transcripts of sentencing remarks to victims of rape and other sexual offences whose cases are heard in the Crown Court. It remains the case that bereaved families of victims of murder, manslaughter and fatal road offences can request judges’ sentencing remarks for free.

However, expanding this to everyone who applies would be prohibitively expensive. The amendment would create significant operational and resource pressures on the courts and judiciary. It would also require new systems and staff to process requests and manage publication. The cost and complexity would be detrimental to the work we are doing to create an affordable and sustainable justice system.

We are, however, embracing AI and are actively exploring the opportunities it presents to reduce the cost of producing transcripts in the future and to making them far more widely available to victims. While I recognise the intent behind this amendment to promote transparency, sentencing remarks are already accessible through established transcription services.

I now turn to Amendment 69 and again assure noble Lords that this Government remain committed to improving the collection and publication of data on foreign national offenders. We have already taken action to increase transparency on the data published. As I have discussed with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, we are developing and publishing more data specific to prisons and probation in Wales. Notably, in July 2025, for the first time, the offender management statistics included a breakdown of foreign national offenders in prison by sex and offence group.

We are also working closely with colleagues in the Home Office to enable earlier identification of foreign national offenders. Currently, this is routinely done after sentence when cases are referred to the Home Office. Being able to verify the nationality of offenders ahead of sentencing would facilitate more timely removals and provide an opportunity for enhanced data collection. However, methods to verify any information provided must be cost effective and prevent placing additional pressure on operational staff. Investment in digital and AI tools can help us to collect, analyse and publish more data, but we are still building this capability.

For that reason, we cannot accept a statutory duty to publish this information before the necessary operational and technical infrastructure is in place to deliver it. If noble lords are interested in wider data specifically related to prisons, I can highly recommend the Prison Reform Trust’s Bromley Briefings Prison Factfile publication, which draws on data, including regarding foreign national offenders, from a wide range of sources. It is free and is online.

I hope I have reassured noble Lords about this Government’s commitment to transparency and explained why the Government do not support these amendments. I urge the noble and Learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 68 is modest, targeted and proportionate. It would bring much-needed consistency to our justice system. As the Minister observed, transcripts of sentencing are already provided to victims of rape and certain specified offences. There is no principled reason why victims of other serious or traumatic crimes should be treated differently. Victims of offences such as aggravated assault or aggravated burglary may be unable to attend a sentencing and should not have to pay to understand the court’s reasoning with regard to sentencing. It appears to us that Amendment 68 addresses a clear and, frankly, unfair gap in the law. In these circumstances, I seek to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 68.

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Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

74: Clause 20, page 38, line 7, at end insert—
“(4A) In section 244ZA (release on licence of certain violent or sexual offenders), at end insert—“(9) The “requisite custodial period” in subsection (8) does not apply to any person convicted of—(a) rape,(b) assault by penetration,(c) inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity,(d) paying for the sexual services of a child aged under 13,(e) kidnapping or false imprisonment with the intention of committing a sexual offence,(f) creating or possessing indecent photographs of children,(g) grievous bodily harm,(h) grooming,(i) stalking,(j) causing or allowing the death of a vulnerable child or adult, or(k) death by dangerous driving.””

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 74 and 75, in my name, concern exemptions to the Government’s so-called earned progression model. We do not oppose in principle the idea that prisoners who demonstrate genuine rehabilitation should be eligible for early release. Where offenders have taken meaningful steps to address their behaviour and reduce their risk, there is a case to be made for earned progression. However, Clause 20 does not deliver that outcome.

Throughout Second Reading and in Committee, the Minister referred to an earned progression model and to examples such as that in the Texas system, yet, as drafted, Clause 20 contains no such mechanism. As the House of Commons Library briefing makes clear, the release point is automatic rather than earned. Prisoners will be released at the one-third point of their sentence unless additional days have been imposed by a court for misconduct. That is not earned progression; it is default release. Barring significant further transgressions, release is determined by the passage of time alone.

The Lord Chancellor has sought to reassure the public by stating that the most serious offences are excluded, yet the Ministry of Justice’s own data confirms that offenders convicted of rape, grievous bodily harm and the creation of indecent images of children will be eligible for this automatic scheme. If those offences do not qualify as serious, it is difficult to understand what offences would.

This is not a technical adjustment to sentencing mechanics; it is a profound change to how the state responds to some of the gravest crimes. As drafted, the Bill would reduce custodial time for over 60% of rapists and more than 80% of child sex offenders. It would permit those convicted of stalking, an offence which we know is strongly associated with escalation into homicide, to be released automatically after serving just one-third of their sentence, without any assessment of ongoing risk.

Amendment 74 would exclude from these provisions those convicted of a range of serious offences, including offences involving the death of a vulnerable person. Amendment 75 would require consultation to ensure that other serious offence categories are appropriately excluded before these measures come into force. In the other place, a similar amendment which included an even broader list of exemptions attracted support from all parties. All 65 Liberal Democrat MPs present for the Division voted in favour of the amendment. Other parties in support of the amendment included the Green Party, the independents, Plaid Cymru, Reform and indeed some members of the Government. It is rare to have such cross-party unanimity, but Members in the other place clearly recognised the dangers that Clause 20 poses to the public.

Noble Lords may notice that Amendment 87, from the Liberal Democrats, includes the same list of offences, as well as two further categories of offences, which should, they suppose, be exempt from automatic release following fixed-term recall. I call on noble Lords to consider consistency here, as much as concern.

Clause 20 applies to a far more serious cohort of offenders than other provisions in the Bill, and clearly there is concern beyond this Chamber. The Domestic Abuse Commissioner has described the early release of perpetrators after weeks in custody as “simply unacceptable”. The Victims’ Commissioner has warned that victims will be left “unnerved and bewildered”. These are not political voices but independent authorities concerned about public safety.

Public confidence is often regarded as fragile where the justice system is concerned. When victims see those who have harmed them released automatically after a fraction of their sentence, trust is bound to be eroded. Amendment 74, in particular, would be a proportionate safeguard to ensure that early release is not applied to those whose crimes are too serious and too dangerous to justify it. If the Government are not prepared to give an assurance with regard to Amendment 74, I will seek to test the opinion of the House. I beg to move.

[Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 90 in this group, which would insert a proposed new clause on extended determinate sentence prisoners, who I will refer to as EDS prisoners.

Currently, the majority of people serving an EDS first become eligible for parole after serving two-thirds of their custodial term and every two years thereafter, with eventual automatic release at the end of the custodial term on extended licence if they are unsuccessful in gaining parole earlier. This proposed new clause would create a power for the Secretary of State to refer to the Parole Board a prisoner serving an EDS at the earlier halfway point of the sentence, instead of the two-thirds point, if the Secretary of State is of the view that there is a reasonable prospect that the board will direct release. It is therefore in line with recommendation 4.2 of the sentencing review. As that review affirmed, this measure would improve incentives for rehabilitation and enhance the effectiveness of measures to address the overcrowding crisis, without in any way changing the public protection mechanisms that currently apply to EDS prisoners.

The Minister said in Committee, at col. 1842 of Hansard, on 3 December last year, that the Government rejected the independent review’s recommendation 4.2 on the grounds that the EDS was imposed because the offender was considered dangerous. It is quite right that an EDS is a public protection sentence, but, in statute, the parts intended to fulfil its public protection function are the involvement of the Parole Board and the extended licence period. There are no public protection concerns in statute to justify referral to the Parole Board at the two-thirds point of the sentence instead of the halfway point, as is proposed for most other determinate sentence prisoners.

Under the provisions of this new clause, and in line with the recommendations of the review, the Parole Board would still engage in exactly the same careful, reasoned and deliberate decision-making process at the 50% point as it currently does at the 66% point. Moreover, the average length of an EDS is nine years, with many serving far longer than that. It is therefore a serious oversight that, for no good reason, measures to address overcrowding are ignoring EDS prisoners, who constitute 10% of people in prison. That is more than 9,000 people, who are serving an average of nearly a decade.

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[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

My Lords, this debate is about a central purpose of the Bill: to put the prison system on a sustainable footing. There is no doubt that the offences listed in Amendment 74 and referenced in Amendment 75 are serious crimes. Indeed, they are so serious that many perpetrators of these offences will receive life or extended determinate sentences.

I remind noble Lords that there are 17,000 prisoners serving those sentences, convicted of the most serious crimes. They include many serious sexual offenders. These offenders will be unaffected by the reforms we are bringing forward in this Bill. They will remain in prison as long as they do now.

Amendments 74 and 75 raise a more fundamental issue. Are we willing, as the previous Government clearly were, to leave the prison system on the brink of collapse? This did not happen overnight. It was not inevitable. It was the choice the party opposite made again and again for 14 years. They abandoned their posts and put public safety at risk by allowing prisons to reach bursting point. To cover up their failures, they covertly let out more than 10,000 prisoners early as part of their chaotic scheme. If it were not for the decisive action of this Government, the police would have been unable to make arrests and courts unable to hold trials, which would have been a breakdown of law and order unlike anything we have seen in modern times. We must continue to take decisive action to address the consequences of their mismanagement. If these amendments were to pass, they would undermine the fundamental issue that the Bill is designed to fix —the issue they neglected for 14 years.

I took this job to fix this issue and countless others that we inherited. As someone who has dedicated their working life to improving the criminal justice system, it matters to me personally. I am convinced that this Bill is the only and best way to fix this problem. I refuse to stand in front of victims of serious crimes, look them in the eye and tell them that we have no space in our prisons to lock up dangerous offenders and that their rapist or abuser cannot go to prison at all because there is no space. Let me be very clear: running out of space is the consequence if these amendments pass. I hope that all noble Lords will agree with me that we cannot, in good conscience, vote for amendments that we know will cause such great harm. Our immediate priority must be stability, and that is what our measures deliver. We are building more prison places than at any time since the Victorian era. By the end of this Parliament there will be more people in prison than ever before. I recall that the previous Government managed only 500 extra places in 14 years.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for his constructive engagement on this amendment and for raising important questions about how victims will be protected. I remind noble Lords that, once released, offenders will be subject to a period of intensive supervision supported by a significant expansion of electronic tagging. The highest-risk offenders, as assessed by probation, will continue to be actively supervised until the end of their sentence. They will continue to be subject to any licence conditions needed to manage risk and protect victims, including restriction zones where appropriate. All offenders will remain on licence with the possibility of recall to custody if they breach the terms of their licence. Of course, if an offender behaves badly in custody, they will spend even longer inside, up to the full length of their sentence.

As noble Lords know, the proposals for the progression model, which Clause 20 seeks to implement, are the result of extensive work by the Independent Sentencing Review. The review, led by David Gauke and supported by a panel of eminent experts from all parts of the criminal justice system, arrived at its recommendation after extensive research and consultation. All proposals, including the new framework for release, have been thoroughly considered. We now need to put in place an effective release framework that will support a sustainable prison estate and protect the public by ensuring that space is prioritised for the most dangerous offenders. I therefore urge the noble and learned Lord not to press Amendments 74 and 75. If he wishes to test the opinion of the House, I encourage all noble Lords to vote against this amendment and help this country end the cycle of crisis in our prisons for good.

Dangerous offenders are also the subject of Amendment 90 tabled by my friend, the noble Lord, Lord Carter. It proposes that extended determinate sentences should include a progression element that would enable the parole eligibility date to be brought forward. While I thank the noble Lord for raising this important issue, the Government’s position remains that prison is the right place for these dangerous offenders. To receive an extended determinate sentence, a specified violent, sexual or terrorism offence must have been committed. The court will also have decided that the offender is dangerous—I repeat, dangerous—and that there is a significant risk of serious harm to the public from the offender committing a further specified offence. These dangerous offenders must remain in prison for as long as they do now. I ask the noble Lord not to move his amendment.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, we do not oppose an earned progression model in principle but, as was recognised by all parties in the other place, Clause 20 does not deliver an earned progression model. Clause 20 contains no mechanism for earning release. That is not, or at least it was not until recently, a party-political point. The House of Commons Library confirmed that release occurs automatically at the one-third or halfway point for offenders. Barring serious further offences in custody, release is guaranteed.

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, talked repeatedly about the earned progression model. I do not know which one he was referring to, but it is not the one in Clause 20. That is simply a mystery. What we have is a means by which violent and dangerous individuals will be released after they have served one-third of the sentence imposed by a court. Is that supposed to imbue our justice system with public confidence? Automatic early release for serious offenders is bound to undermine that confidence.

While the Minister may make criticisms of prison capacity and what occurred during the previous 14 years of government, I remind him that two wrongs do not make a right. You do not cure one mistake by committing an even worse mistake, and that is what is being proposed here. Automatic early release is going to endanger the public. It ensures that releases apply to offenders whose crimes are serious and dangerous. It is not proportionate, it is not targeted and it is not possessed of any safeguards. I wish to test the opinion of the House.

Sentencing Bill

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 6th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I co-signed Amendment 76, from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and shall support it. The amendment from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, would achieve the same outcome. Either amendment would right this injustice. The present position is simply cruelty.

I have very little to add to the speeches, all of which have been principled and humane. Across the House, noble Lords have gone to great lengths to acknowledge and address the risk of further offending while seeking to end the appalling injustice of the continued indefinite incarceration of IPP prisoners. My noble friend Lady Ludford referred the House to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and challenged the Government to come forward with a response to the human rights case. There is none.

I simply do not understand the reasoning behind the proposition that we cannot or will not release IPP prisoners when prisoners serving determinate sentences are entitled to be released, and are released, at the end of their terms. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, pointed out, resistance to ending this injustice fails to balance the actual harm of the present regime to IPP prisoners against the possible risk of further offences by a released IPP prisoner. The Government have a duty to balance risks and harms. On this issue, the balance is between the actual harm to IPP prisoners and the theoretical but possible harm that is risked by releasing them.

As we have heard, subsection (6E) of the proposed new clause in Amendment 76 would leave the Parole Board in charge. It is more than reasonable. Justice and humanity demand that we end this.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, these amendments address the most complex and sensitive of legacies in our sentencing framework. Few issues illustrate more clearly the challenge of balancing public protection, fairness to victims, management of risk and the injustice to individuals who have already served far beyond their original tariff. The noble Lord, Lord Berkeley of Knighton, correctly pointed out that there is an issue here of proportionality; we seem to sometimes lose sight of that.

Amendment 76 does not provide for automatic or immediate release. Instead, it would require the Parole Board, where it does not direct release, to fix a future release date, subject to conditions intended to ensure public protection but also to instil some element of hope. The amendment would preserve a central role for the Parole Board, including, of course, powers to issue directions, vary release dates and reconsider decisions where public safety requires it. The inclusion of time limits seeks to balance progression with caution, though views may differ as to whether these limits are set at the right level.

These are complex judgments, and reasonable views can differ on how best to reconcile rehabilitation and public protection. These proposals represent a thoughtful attempt to impose coherence and fairness on an area of law that has become impossibly difficult, while attempting to keep public protection firmly in view. I hope that the Minister will engage constructively with the principles underlying these amendments and explain how the Government intend to address the long-term sustainability of the IPP regime. The status quo is untenable.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Timpson) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their amendments on IPP sentences and for their impassioned speeches this evening. As the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, kindly said, I share their commitment to addressing this issue with compassion, evidence and tenacity. I thank the many noble Lords who have participated in debates, meetings and discussions on this issue. I am grateful for their challenge and support, both in your Lordships’ House and at our Peers meetings, which I plan to continue in the future.

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[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, we welcome the inclusion of the additional condition proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, in Amendments 83 and 86, to ensure that, for a transitional period, an offender who has breached a licence condition or court order in relation to their victim is not automatically released. It is an important amendment for protecting victims and maintaining confidence in the justice system. We are also supportive of Amendment 87, which excludes certain serious offenders from automatic release. This aligns with our Amendment 25 and ensures that those who pose the greatest risk to the public cannot benefit from automatic release.

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lords for tabling these amendments. Although we are still convinced that the approach in the Bill is right, it is only right that it receives thorough scrutiny. In drafting these measures, we have sought to strike a balance between ensuring that offenders can be safely managed in the community and the need to achieve a sustainable prison system. Nothing would be worse for victims than running out of prison cells.

The new system has been carefully designed to achieve this and to ensure consistent and proportionate responses to risk and non-compliance across all offence types. The offence-based exemptions proposed by Amendments 79 and 87 would undermine that consistency and may not reflect an individual’s actual risk level. The Bill already contains significant safeguards so that offenders who pose a greater risk are excluded from 56-day fixed-term recall. This includes those recalled on account of being charged with a further offence and those subject to multi-agency supervision levels 2 and 3. This applies to many sexual, violent and domestic abuse offenders.

Before any recalled offender is re-released, professionally qualified probation officers will undertake a thorough review of the release plans and licence conditions. They will ensure that needs and risks are managed, with a focus on mitigating risks against known victims. Furthermore, a prisoner given a fixed-term recall can be transferred to a standard recall if certain conditions are met, including if their risk escalates and they are then managed at multi-agency supervision levels 2 and 3. Offenders will leave prison to probation supervision and can be recalled again if considered a risk.

Amendments 80 and 81 seek to allow release from fixed-term recall at an earlier point than 56 days. The Independent Sentencing Review found that the current short duration of fixed-term recalls—14 or 28 days—does not provide enough time for offenders to address their risky behaviours in custody or for further risk reduction measures to be implemented. The Government agree with this assessment. This has been carefully considered with operational colleagues, and 56 days is enough time to undertake and put in place risk-management plans. Our proposed framework already provides sufficient flexibility without any further legislative change needed.

The Bill already allows the Secretary of State to keep an offender in custody past 56 days by overriding automatic re-release and converting a fixed-term recall to a standard recall. Where this happens, release is subject to Parole Board approval or, under the existing risk-assessed recall review process, allowing offenders to be released at any point before the 56 days where it is assessed safe to do so. For example, an offender could be recalled because of an increased risk linked to substance misuse. Having received structured support in custody that can be continued in the community, probation staff assess they can now be safely managed in the community. In this situation, they can be re-released before 56 days.

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[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I shall move this amendment on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, who unfortunately cannot be present. I wish to express first his appreciation of the time the Minister has taken to speak to him about the issue raised by this amendment. I can explain it very briefly. In the independent review conducted by Mr David Gauke, he considered whether foreign national offenders should be removed to reduce pressure on capacity and ensure that punishment was served for crimes committed in the United Kingdom. Under the then existing law, foreign national offenders had to serve 50% of their sentence but could then be removed and returned to their own state, where they would get no further punishment. The review recommended that the 50% rule be reduced to 30%—this was accepted and brought in by a statutory instrument—and that those who were sentenced to three years or less could be removed without serving any part of their sentence here. Clause 32 proposes the removal of the three-year time limit, so that any offender, however serious the offence is, can be removed without serving any part of their sentence whatever.

The amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, seeks to do three things. First, it seeks to restore the position recommended by Mr David Gauke: to ensure that people who receive sentences of more than three years could not be removed without serving part of their sentence. Secondly, it would make it clear that it is inapplicable to a person who has been deported and returns. That is to stop the revolving door of committing a crime, being deported, coming back, committing a crime and going round and round. Thirdly, it would require the Secretary of State to be satisfied, in the case of serious crimes,

“that the interests of justice are not defeated by the removal, having regard to the gravity of the offence and the impact … on those affected by it”.

There is a change from the amendment put forward in Committee in one respect, in that it drops the requirement that the offender serve his term overseas.

The most important of the three points raised by this amendment is the first: restoring the recommendation of the Gauke review. As I understand it, there are about 3,000 such offenders and it costs about £61,000 a year to keep each of them in prison here. I can see no objection to sending them back if they are to serve the remainder of the term in their own country, but it is evident from the figures that only a tiny proportion would serve such a term. The Bill as it stands, therefore, will send back at our own cost a very significant number of people who have committed crimes that deserve at least three years’ imprisonment.

It seems that the Government have said that they are not prepared to accept the amendment partly because they cannot agree to anything that will effect a reduction in prison capacity. Secondly, they are determined to make sure that the public Exchequer is relieved of the burden of paying for the imprisonment of foreign national offenders.

The purpose of this amendment is to try to reverse what can only be described as the interests of short-term expediency over the principles of sentencing, because the amendment infringes three of those principles First, if a person commits a wrong that merits three years’ or more imprisonment, that person merits equivalent punishment. Being sent back to his own country at taxpayers’ expense is not a punishment. Secondly, the purpose of sentencing is to deter crime. What deterrence is there in making it clear that, if a person comes to this country to commit a crime, he will be sent home free, without punishment? Thirdly, and most importantly, proper punishment retains public confidence in the system. If, for example, someone commits a series of shoplifting offences to go to the lower end of the three-year limit or, more seriously, comes here deliberately to commit a crime, paid for, what deterrence is there if that person knows he can go back? We hope that the Government will think again on this point.

However, on the second and third points—that is to say, dealing with the revolving door problem in the first place, while requiring the Secretary of State to be satisfied that the interests of justice are not defeated by removal, having regard to the gravity of the offence and the impact on those affected by it—why can the Government not accept them? I hope the Minister will be able to say, “Well, we’ve got to have a framework to deal with those kinds of issues” and will make it clear that, among the issues to be contained in the policy framework that governs the way in which foreign national offenders are dealt with, those two points, namely the revolving door and maintaining and examining each case to ensure that the gravity of the offence and the effect of the offender will not be that which casts doubt on the integrity of the criminal justice system, will be looked at and properly included within it. I beg to move.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, we are grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, for the carefully framed amendment and to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, for the very careful way in which he presented the amendment. We agree with all the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, without qualification.

When the previous Secretary of State for Justice first intimated this policy last year, I referred to it in this Chamber as being “completely mad”. I have not deviated from that opinion, I have to confess. The idea that someone coming from a safe country in Europe will commit a series of robberies and then, when caught, will be returned to their country of origin at public expense in order to pick up a different set of identity papers or a different passport and then return yet again strikes me as quite absurd. That is the revolving door point that has been touched upon, but the other points are equally important.

Of course, they may not have come from a safe country, in which case we cannot deport them, but no accommodation has been made for that either. It is going to be optional, essentially. You may seek to argue that you have not come from a safe country and therefore you cannot be deported, so you prefer to stay in prison. It is a quite extraordinary proposal that somehow punishment lies in the fact that you have been returned to your country of origin after committing a serious offence in this country. We have a foreign national who rapes a child and flees back to his country of origin, and presumably we no longer make any efforts to extradite him because as far as this policy is concerned, he has been punished. He has gone home. What is that going to do for public confidence in the justice system? It will damage it, but I cannot see any upside. It is an impossible proposal.

David Gauke proposed, very sensibly, that there should be a minimum term of punishment, and that is necessary because it is not just punishment; it is also deterrence. Without that, we end up in the strange situation in which people commit a crime, leave for their home country at public expense and return as and when they wish to do so. We have had instances of that already. I will not go into the detailed cases at this stage in the evening, but it is not uncommon for those who have been arrested and convicted of offences to return to their country of origin and then return to these islands in due course. There have recent instances of that. We strongly support the idea that there has to be a minimum term of imprisonment in these cases, while understanding the pressure on our prisons. Does the Minister truly believe that public confidence in the justice system will be improved or even maintained as and when the full implications of this proposed policy become public?

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Lemos) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, for meeting with my noble friend Lord Timpson to discuss the amendment proposed by him and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, relating to the early removal scheme and for the spirit in which this has been debated. Considering the lateness of the hour, I shall try to be brief. A number of the points I want to make, I will make very quickly, but there are one or two points that I do not think have been adequately addressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. I will perhaps just dwell on those.

To be clear, the Government’s priority is protecting victims in the UK and ensuring that foreign national offenders can never again offend here. Once deported, they will be barred from ever returning to the UK, protecting victims and the wider public. Limiting the early removal scheme to only those in receipt of a sentence of less than three years would effectively put the brakes on sustaining the removal of foreign national offenders.