Sentencing Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Wednesday 26th November 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Beith]

45: Clause 4, page 14, line 10, after “crime” insert “, with a view to protecting them”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is intended to clarify that the purposes of sentencing specifically include the protection of victims of crime.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

On behalf of my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, I beg to move Amendment 45. The purpose of this amendment, and indeed of Amendment 45A which is grouped with it, is to get the focus right. We believe the focus on the victims of crime should be clear on the face of the Bill and regularly understood.

Much of this Bill is about enabling policy change by establishing public confidence in things that we know from evidence are likely to reduce crime and keep people safer. The problem is that that is not easy. Certainly, the media treatment of crime issues tends to undermine the ability of the public in general to have confidence that the system is working for them, that it is working to keep them safe and that it is also working to assist victims and to ensure that they get what they deserve, which is proper police pursuit of criminals, an effective courts process and appropriate methods of dealing with offenders that make it less likely that other people will suffer what they have suffered. That is a frequent comment from victims, who will say “What I care about is that something like this should not have to happen to anybody else in the way that it has happened to me”. I do not need to make a long speech on the subject; the issues that we are concerned about are well understood by Ministers. We want to make sure that people can see that this is what the Bill is about.

I very much welcome Amendment 45A—on the supplementary to the Marshalled List—tabled by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester and commanding the support of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett. Amendment 45A sets out the purposes of imprisonment, which is what I was talking about a moment ago, so that the public can understand that we want to deter and prevent reoffending. Amendment 45A refers to the incapacitation of prisoners in order to restrict their ability to commit further crimes, the deterrence of prisoners, the just punishment of prisoners and the rehabilitation of prisoners. It is not our amendment, but it is closely related to what we are talking about. It sets out very clearly some of the purposes of imprisonment and I will be very interested to hear what the Minister’s reaction to it is. I beg to move.

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[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Lemos) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, to the noble Lord, Lord Beith, for bringing forward Amendment 45 in his place, and for the spirit in which it has been proposed. The Government share the noble Lords’ goal and dedication to ensure that victims are properly protected within our justice system. That is why Clause 4 makes it clear that the protection of the public explicitly includes victims of crime. This is a significant and, I must stress, intentional step forward. Although I wholeheartedly share the noble Lords’ intentions and commitments, I do not believe that the additional wording proposed in the amendment would add substantive value to what is already being achieved by the changes we are making in the Bill.

Clause 4 will make it clear that courts should consider the protection of victims as part of sentencing. That is very important. This amendment would simply restate what is already made explicit by Clause 4. Of course, the Government’s commitment to protecting victims is not limited to the changes we are making in Clause 4. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, asked me to comment on the centrality of victims to the justice system. I am so happy to do that that I rewrote this speaking note this morning, with the help of the officials.

The Bill contains other important measures that will protect victims. As noble Lords know, we are introducing new restriction zones, which will limit the movements of offenders instead of the movements of victims. We are also creating a new domestic abuse flag at sentencing so that domestic abusers are more consistently identified. This will help prisons and probation services manage offenders effectively and ensure that victims are better protected.

We are taking many steps outside the Bill to protect victims. We are continuing the provision of free sentencing remarks to victims of rape and sexual offences, and we are expanding the use of specialist domestic abuse courts—a very important cause, with which I have been associated for many years—with trained staff to support victims and more co-ordinated management of perpetrators.

I turn to the amendment proposed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leeds, in the absence of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, who has made an important contribution to this debate by raising whether the purpose of imprisonment should be defined in legislation. I spent many years chairing the agency board of HMPPS, and one of my jobs was to set the strategy. We spent a long time debating precisely this point and how we should frame it, so I understand the issues the right reverend Prelates seek to address.

Although I agree wholeheartedly that our debates should be guided by principles and evidence, and not by headlines—the noble Lord, Lord Beith, said that one of the most important duties of new legislation is to win public confidence; I entirely share that sentiment— I am afraid that I respectfully disagree that a definition in statute is needed. The purposes of sentencing, including imprisonment, are already set out in statute and reflected in Sentencing Council guidelines. These principles should guide our courts every day and provide the flexibility needed to respond to changing circumstances and emerging threats. With those comments in mind, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Beith, to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, the Minister has made a good case for his reliance on Clause 4 in its reference to victims. The wider issues raised in Amendment 45A ought still to attract the Government’s interest as we proceed with the Bill, but on the basis of what has been said in this short debate, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 45 withdrawn.

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[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, repeated reference has already been made to the independence of the judiciary and to the need to allow the judiciary full discretion in the matter of sentencing, but the provisions in the Bill at Clauses 11 and 12 erode these principles and put the whole issue at risk. The requirements in these clauses will remove a degree of judicial discretion, transferring certain sentencing powers from the courts to the Probation Service, and ultimately, of course, to the Government.

We on these Benches believe that the judiciary, who are specifically trained and appointed, and not probation officers, are best equipped to make decisions on sentencing. Clause 11, as drafted, removes the requirement to specify the maximum number of activity days to be undertaken as part of a community order or a suspended sentence order. The Government’s intention appears to be to create flexibility for probation services, so that they can gauge and tailor the number of days that offenders must complete.

Of course, we appreciate that, at present, there is a discrepancy between the maximum days of activity ordered by the courts and the number completed in reality. But nowhere in the Bill does there appear to be, once the initial sentence order and length are passed, judicial oversight of the number of days that probation officers may then set; nor does there appear to be any minimum threshold or expectation of participation specified in the Bill.

Putting this conferral of sentencing power on to the Probation Service creates an obvious misalignment of, among other things, incentives. Overworked probation officers, already contending with quite unmanageable case loads, are liable to be motivated not only by what is right for rehabilitation and public safety but by what is administratively possible. The unavoidable consequence is that the number of activity days ordered will be determined by capacity pressures within the Probation Service rather than by the rehabilitation requirements of individual offenders. The clause, as currently drafted, could enable an offender to engage in little or no meaningful rehabilitative activity whatever. Such an outcome would, of course, be a betrayal of victims and simply an illusion of justice.

On the other hand, the judiciary are trained and entrusted to assess evidence, consider proportionality, and understand risk and the need to balance public protection with rehabilitations. It is in these circumstances that we give notice of our intention to oppose Clauses 11 and 12 standing part of the Bill.

Amendments 49 and 50 seek to remedy the issue of probation officers operating in a quasi-judicial capacity. Amendment 49 would ensure that the court specifies a minimum number of days required under probation activity requirement. This would mean that, rather than setting a maximum threshold, which is seldom met in practice, there would be no ambiguity for officers or offenders over the number of days that must be completed. This is a simple and practical proposal that has the effect of dealing with the impact of Clauses 11 and 12.

Amendment 50 would clarify in statute that, where activity days are to be set for offenders, the number of days must always be set by the court itself. Without these amendments, decisions relating to punishment will, effectively, be delegated from the court to the Probation Service, rather than being determined at the point of sentence by the judiciary, and we believe it is essential that it should remain in the hands of the judiciary.

I turn briefly to Amendments 125 and 126, which concern early termination of community orders and suspended sentences. These amendments would provide that a court may not terminate such orders early, unless a specified minimum proportion of rehabilitation days has actually been completed. This would prevent the unacceptable scenario in which an offender could be released from requirements without having undertaken the substance of the sentence that was originally imposed.

Again, at present, there are no checks or balances under the Bill to ensure that this is not the case. These amendments would ensure proper accountability and preserve the authority of the sentencing decisions made by the court, and they would also provide probation officers with a degree of flexibility. I hope that the Government recognise the constructive nature of these amendments.

We all recognise the intense pressure under which prisons and probation services currently operate, but the response to systemic problems cannot be to weaken judicial powers or diminish meaningful sentencing. Offenders must not be permitted to slip through the cracks in a system that is stretched to its limits. It is our duty in Parliament to reinforce judicial authority, not to erode it. It is for these reasons that I urge the Government to reconsider the implications of Clauses 11 and 12, and to recognise the importance of the amendments that have been tabled. Judicial sentencing power must remain with the courts, and I hope that the Government will listen to these concerns and engage constructively on this issue.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, has raised an interesting and very debatable question, which is what the role of the judiciary should be in allotting rehabilitation time and activity and what the role of the probation officer can reasonably be. In theory, I should be with him, because I am always anxious to protect the independence and autonomy of the judiciary, but I look at our court system, and what is feasible, and I look at the detailed work that would be necessary, which probation officers are trained and equipped for—not necessarily resources-equipped but equipped in terms of their training—and I am unconvinced that it would be a good idea to move away from what Clause 11 and 12 do towards a larger role for the judiciary.

I say that having gone, decades ago, to look at the court system in Texas, as the Minister himself has done more recently, and having seen proactive courts, with the judge handing out details of rehabilitation requirements and looking at people as individuals, and the applause ringing around the court when the judge commended the offender who had fulfilled the requirement, and the sight of one offender who had not fulfilled the requirement being taken away by the state marshal.

The whole set-up was very interesting, but very difficult to graft into our system without enlarging the judiciary substantially, giving it time to do this kind of thing. We are probably better to build on the foundation of the Probation Service, despite the fact that it went through such a terrible time with the privatisation process and is still well below the level it needs to be in terms of numbers and training. The Bill provides a more reliable route, even though my instinct is to be on the side of protecting the autonomy of the judiciary. This is a job that probation officers are probably in a better position to do than our hard-pressed judiciary.

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

I have considered the amendments and thoughtful debate from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, on this topic. Change is needed. The process evaluation of the rehabilitative activity requirement, or, as I prefer to call it, RAR days, published in May 2025, shows that the RAR is not working effectively. Offenders often do not understand what is expected of them, and magistrates sometimes sentence it as a catch-all.

Further to this published evidence, probation practitioners from Manchester to the Isle of Wight have told me personally that the way RAR is structured restricts their ability to rehabilitate offenders. From my experience of leading organisations, the people who are on the front line often give you the wisest advice. We value and trust our probation staff enormously. Their work is often unseen, but I deeply appreciate it. This change places professional judgment back at the heart of probation. We are enabling probation practitioners to utilise their professional expertise to ensure that rehabilitation is tailored to what works.

I reassure the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, that this change does not remove the court’s sentencing powers. It is and will remain for the court to determine whether to include this requirement when making an order. But the removal of court-specified maximum days will ensure that probation resources are directed to where they will have the most impact. It brings our approach to rehabilitation activity in line with how supervision is determined. Both are led by a thorough assessment of risk and need after sentencing. This does not change the fact that offenders are required to comply with the instructions of their probation officer. If they do not comply, they could face a return to court and receive tougher penalties.

I turn to the noble and learned Lord’s Amendments 125 and 126. The community sentences incentive scheme, set out in Clauses 36 and 37, already requires offenders to complete all court-ordered requirements before the community order—or, in the case of a suspended sentence order, the supervision period—can come to an end. This will include completing all the required activities under the new probation requirement. These clauses bring a principle of progression and incentivisation into community sentences to encourage good behaviour and motivate offenders to change.

This scheme was inspired by the model in Texas, which used incentives to reduce the prison population. It will mean that the Probation Service can encourage offenders to engage early, comply with their sentence requirements and complete rehabilitation work. This will free up staff time to focus on more serious and complex offenders in order to better protect the public and reduce reoffending. Probation practitioners will be responsible for determining the amount of rehabilitation activity that must be completed under the probation requirement. The measure requires them to complete it all before the community order or supervision period can be eligible for early termination.