European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 21st February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

It would have no great effect either way, to be honest. I would like to think that it would have a greater effect on getting an agreement, but I do not think that it will. Other factors will have greater sway. However, no doubt the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, will have an opportunity to make his usual spirited contribution to the debate.

It is a running sore that these government amendments to Clause 11 have not been tabled. I say to the Minister that we in this House—I hope that the whole House will agree with me on this; I certainly know that the Official Opposition agree with it—should not debate Clause 11 not just until the amendments have been tabled but until the amendments that have been tabled have been considered by the devolved Administrations. It would be entirely wrong for us to discuss Clause 11 without having the views of the devolved Administrations about the amendments that the Government will table. I hope that we will get an assurance from the Minister that we will not have a debate in Committee on the amendments until they have been considered by the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Irish Assembly, if it is up and running by then.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

As it happens, I have an amendment directed to Clause 11. I would have thought that there was an advantage in debating in Committee so that we can at least engage with the Minister and explain the points that lie behind the amendment. Otherwise, if the amendment is simply not pursued in Committee, we cannot come back to it until Report. Therefore, I hope that the noble Lord will forgive me if in due course I move my amendment, which is intended to be helpful. At the end of the day, I hope that the amendment that the noble Lord is pursuing today will become completely academic because the differences between the devolved institutions and Westminster will be resolved. That surely must be the aim, not to keep this sense of tension until the Bill is passed.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

My Lords, I have great respect for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and he is right on this. I will now rethink what I just said. As long as we have not deliberated finally on Report, we need on Report to have the result of the deliberations and the views of the devolved Parliament and Assemblies. The noble and learned Lord has made a good point, which I accept, and I hope that he is right that it will make my amendment ultimately redundant. No one would be happier than me if that were the case. The Sewel convention is that the UK Parliament will not normally legislate—

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 26th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith]

The noble and learned Lord knows that I took Article 1 as an example only because it is the very first article in the charter. I have respectfully invited noble Lords to look at the Joint Committee on Human Rights report, where the committee goes through each of the articles and through what the Government have said in relation to them, and identifies where they find place already in existing, enforceable UK law, and where they do not. It is where they do not that we are concerned with, and where they do not that there will be the very gap that the Prime Minister has said should not exist.

There is the further problem that, even if the rights survive, they will survive without the enhanced status and protection that they currently have. They have an enhanced status at the moment because of the 1972 Act and because of EU membership, but from the date of this Act they will only survive in a delegated form and be amendable by delegated legislation. They are not protected from being amended or removed by delegated legislation.

Compare the position in relation to the ECHR and the Human Rights Act. The Bill says in three places—in Clauses 7(7)(e), 8(3)(d) and 9(3)(d)—that the Human Rights Act is protected from amendment or revocation. The classic civil and political rights, but no more, which are, rightly, protected by the HRA, are protected from being amended other than by primary legislation to which this House and the other place have specifically agreed after proper scrutiny. However, none of the rights underlying the charter will be protected in that way, unless they find themselves within the ECHR, which is only some of them. That is unacceptable for many people.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I find this very difficult to understand. If you look at the charter, you find reference to the Union in item after item. It begins with a series of rights, but as soon as you penetrate further you find that it is closely related to membership of the Union and things that are guaranteed by its law. If I understood the noble and learned Lord correctly, he wants the charter to be brought in and protected against that kind of amendment in the same way as the Convention on Human Rights. This charter will have to be largely rewritten if we introduce it into our law, but it is not designed for the kind of situation we are facing after Brexit. It is designed for use within the Union and to be interpreted by the CJEU. I simply do not understand how the system is intended to work if it were brought into our law in the way the noble and learned Lord is suggesting.

[Lord Goldsmith]

The noble and learned Lord will recall that, whenever he opposed me with that argument from his position in the House of Lords or Supreme Court, I did my best to try to explain why there is an error in his thinking. With respect, I do the same here. If one takes, for example, one of the rights in the charter which does derive from Union law, is it to be said that although it is going to be transposed into our law as an EU retained law, it will no longer be subject to any of the protections that it has at the moment through being subject to the charter? It does not mean, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, suggested, that all UK law will be subject to this protection. It does mean that that law which is currently subject to that protection will continue to be so unless and until it is amended. That is the way that one gives effect to the intention that the law should be the same the day after Brexit as the day before.

I want to underline that we are talking about the extent of substantive protections; other protections and their extent; and the lack of enhancement of rights. These are all distinct points. I will also refer to the loss of the effect of charter principles. Noble Lords who have studied the charter will know that as well as rights there are principles. The principles are more aspirational, but they guide the legislator and that is a useful thing to have. Even leaving that aside, the other items I identified—the substantive protections, their nature and their enhancement or lack of it—are all things which mean we will not have the same protections after exit day as we have at the moment.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 7th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

I think that is meant to be an intervention, because I have not quite finished. The situation is that the British courts, the Supreme Court in particular, have discretion to look at any judgment that they wish, and to raise any question they wish in these judgments. There is nothing in the present Bill that impedes that, except in respect of questions of European law, because the courts themselves, and the members of the Supreme Court, have been anxious that if they paid too much attention to the European court after Brexit, they might be accused of being involved in politics. They have sought a direction from Parliament on this matter, and that has been attempted, and I hope it is successful.

I personally do not share the animosity that exists in some quarters towards the European Court of Justice. It is over 30 years now since I often appeared before them, and I have nothing but praise for the way in which they do things. They do things very differently to us. There are far fewer oral hearings—at least, there were when I did it, which was a long time ago. There is much less oral pleading than there is in our courts. Actually, our courts have moved slightly in that direction in recent years, since I was last involved with them—and in some cases quite far in that direction.

The respect I have for the European Court is of the highest order, but I do think there is a difficulty because, after Brexit, no judges or advocates-general of the British Bar will be members of the court or advocates-general in the court. That is an important factor to be taken into account in the arrangements. I am not part of the negotiations—I have nothing to do with them—but I do believe that that point has to be taken into account. There is a usual rule that the people administering justice are the people who are in accordance with the arrangements between states. International courts, for example, may not have representatives from all the states that appear before them, but there is a question to be considered in that connection, because the Court of Justice referred to in the amendment will not be the Court of Justice as it is now.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I would like to intervene, following what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, has said, and referring to the amendment that was moved by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock. One of the problems I have faced since looking at this Bill, is trying to find hard examples of situations in which the Supreme Court would wish to refer a matter to the European Court of Justice.

There is a very good example reported in Monday’s Times of a case called SM (Algeria) (Appellant) v Entry Clearance Officer. I will take a moment to explain what the case is about, because it is a good example of citizens’ rights. SM was a little girl, who was placed into the legal guardianship of EU citizens, who happened to be in Algeria. The question concerned her position in coming to the United Kingdom as a member of that family under the Immigration (European Economic Area Regulations) 2006. Merely referring to those regulations reminds us that they would become, as I understand the position, retained EU law under Clause 2 of the Bill.

The problem arose because the court saw that the regulation had been transposing wording from a directive, which is the normal way in which these things work, but the transposition was inaccurate. This is a situation I have encountered before—it happens from time to time. The question is how to deal with the inaccuracy. The inaccuracy was that while our regulation talked about “family member”—somebody who was put into the legal guardianship of a couple, would normally be regarded as a member of the family—the directive was talking about “direct descendants”, and she was not a direct descendant, because she was not actually related, in that sense, to the people who had become her guardians. In order to resolve that problem, the court found it necessary to refer the matter to the European Court of Justice—which it did on Monday. That was under the existing position.

In resolving the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, it may help to ask how that matter would be handled after exit day. I may be wrong, but my understanding is that it would be for the Supreme Court to resolve the issue itself. The directive would come into EU retained law under Clause 3, so we would have both pieces of legislation to look at. I think that the court, having regard particularly to the way in which we had translated the directive, would give great weight to our own language and regard this little girl as part of the family and therefore entitled to take the benefit of the regulation.

In explaining the situation, I hope I have not made it too complicated, but it is a good example of citizens’ rights, accorded by our own regulations, giving effect to EU law. There must be very many in the corpus of regulations which forms part of EU law. It comes back to the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. The Supreme Court looks very carefully at the interests of children and would accord every weight to the normal rules about the priority given to the interests of the child in construing the regulation in a sense that fits with our own language. I should have thought that, after exit day, the question of referring the matter to the European Court of Justice simply would not arise because the court would be capable of resolving the issue itself without being bound by the problem of having to refer something which was not that clear. If I may use the English expression, it was not crystal clear; therefore they were bound to refer. Under the situation after exit day, any superior court will be fully able to resolve the problems of interpretation that arise. Will the Minister confirm that, in this situation, there would be no need for a reference because our courts would be able to deal with it perfectly properly, looking at the language of our own regulations, despite the problem that might have arisen in translating them from the directive into English?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord. The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, in moving this amendment— I referred to it myself—was that, as part of the agreement that was struck between the United Kingdom and the European institutions in December, provision was made to,

“establish a mechanism enabling UK courts or tribunals to decide, having had due regard to whether relevant case-law exists, to ask the CJEU questions of interpretation of those rights where they consider that a CJEU ruling on the question is necessary for the UK court or tribunal to be able to give judgment in a case before it”.

So it is not a case of questioning the ability of the Supreme Court. We have entered into an agreement which says that there must be an opportunity or a mechanism to refer to the Court of Justice of the European Union. How does the noble and learned Lord see the mechanism for giving effect to what the United Kingdom Government have agreed?

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I have listened with great care to what the noble and learned Lord has said but I cannot look into the future. I do not know what is going to happen as a result. We just have to look at the present situation. There are two factors to bear in mind. As far as the UK is concerned, for people looking to come here, an immense amount of citizens’ rights are guaranteed already under the regulations which implement directives. We ought not to lose sight of that. Secondly, problems of interpretation because of conflicts between the wording of the directive and our transposition of it, give rise to some doubt. Under the existing position, there is an obligation to refer which will not be present after exit day. This is a different situation with which I believe our courts will be able to cope perfectly well.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, in summary, was he saying that the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, is completely unnecessary?

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

With great respect, I would not put it in that way. It has given me an opportunity to bring forward an example which I am hoping the Minister will be able to comment on. The noble Lord has raised an important point. We all care about citizens’ rights. I hope I have drawn attention to the context in which one looks at the amendment. It is a well-crafted amendment to which the Minister may have an answer along the lines I have suggested.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I hesitate to follow the very careful analysis of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, but perhaps I can add a few words. We are all trying to find the best way of expressing in clear and simple language, in statutory form, the guidance that the courts and tribunals will need about the interpretation of retained EU law. In particular, Clause 3 is about direct EU legislation which we will be receiving in the language of the directives and regulations to which this clause refers.

The position is fairly clear about judgments or decisions of the CJEU before exit day. That is retained EU case law which is referred to in Clause 6(3) and we are not in any difficulty on that; rather, it is what to do about the future. Had it not been for the concerns expressed by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, about the risk of being criticised for being drawn into areas of policy, I would have been content to see Clause 6(2) deleted and to rely simply on the normal, traditional way in which comparative law is applied by courts up and down the country. I have been doing this ever since I started sitting as a judge. Of course, there are examples outside the particular area we are dealing with here of conventions to which we are a party and which need to be interpreted. One looks at other jurisdictions to see how the language of a convention is interpreted and applied. This is a normal part of our jurisprudence and it would have been enough. However, I recognise the force of the points made in their evidence to the Constitution Committee and today by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, and I think that we have to do something to give the guidance for which they are looking.

One should also bear in mind that it will be some time before the Supreme Court handles cases of this kind. We are talking about tribunals as well as courts at every level. I am sure that when the Supreme Court gets hold of the thing, it will be astute enough to give the kind of guidance that one normally gets from the higher courts, but we have to look at the beginning of the process.

On the table at the moment we have Clause 6(2) as it stands and Amendment 56 from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I hope that the noble Lord will forgive me when I say that I think his amendment is like the curate’s egg. There are bits of it which I rather like and bits which I would prefer to drop, and the same goes for Clause 6(2). I suggest an amalgamation of the best bits of the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the best bits of Clause 6(2).

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

Cherry-picking.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

Not at all. It is curing the curate’s egg and producing an acceptable piece of guidance which has the best bits of both, which is what we need to look for. I am not cherry-picking; I am analysing.

[Viscount Hailsham]

Having your cake and eating it.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

No, this is analysis. Let me explain what I would like to do.

I quite like the words of Clause 6(2) as it stands:

“A court or tribunal need not have regard to”,


a judgment or decision given by the European Court on or after the exit day because that fits very well with the way we are looking at the position before exit day. It is certainly true that it is a negative way of putting it, but I regard it as a helpful transition to the new situation. However, I do not like the remainder of Clause 6(2) for the very reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, explained. That is where I would like to bring in the passages from the latter part of his formula, which are that a court or tribunal may have regard to such judgments or decisions where it considers them relevant for the proper interpretation of retained EU law.

I would take out “appropriate” from Clause 6(2), for reasons that have been referred to already, and would leave out the early part of proposed new subsection (2A) in Amendment 56 where “must” is used. I would prefer “may” to “must”, leaving it to the court to make its own decision regarding whether the matter is relevant.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

Would Amendment 55 tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Adonis not deal with the noble and learned Lord’s points?

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord and I apologise for not having paid due regard to that formula because the wording is exactly what I am looking for, but I am trying to fit it into the opening words of Clause 6(2). However, it is certainly right; I respectfully suggest that “may” is the right word to use. It is better to add in the bit about,

“where it considers it relevant”,

which is what comes from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. So one is putting together bits and pieces of thought from various attempts to produce a formula.

Perhaps I may read out again for Hansard’s benefit how I suggest the provision might run: “A court or tribunal need not have regard to a judgment or decision given by the European Court on or after exit day, but it may have regard to it where it considers this relevant for the proper interpretation of retained EU law”. If “may” is used—although the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will correct me—proposed new subsection (2C) in Amendment 56 will no longer be relevant. I say nothing about subsection (2B) which may have force and value if the court requires guidance as to what to do with the agreement between the United Kingdom and the EU.

I hope that that contribution will give the Minister something else to think about. I think that we all hope that on Report he may be able to come back with a formula which we can all endorse.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, perhaps I may add a few words, simply because of the devoted affection in the Bill for the word “appropriate”. It is larded through the document. Its inappropriateness in this particular context needs to be underlined—I shall come back to it at a later stage under different clauses. It is terribly simple: if something is relevant to a court’s decision, it is likely to be appropriate that the court should look at it. If something is irrelevant to the court’s decision, it cannot possibly be appropriate for the court to look at it. So the term “appropriate” should go.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

My Lords, I rather agree that “appropriate” is not particularly desirable. I wonder whether putting “helpful” in Clause 6(2) would more accurately reflect the way that courts generally consider law from other jurisdictions in developing the law—one always invites courts if they find a particular decision to be helpful—whereas I understand that “appropriate” is considered perhaps to have too much of a political charge. However, I do not wholly understand why the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, finds the initial words of Clause 6(2) rather offensive, where it says:

“A court or tribunal need not have regard”.


All that is saying is that they are not obliged to have regard—I do not think it says any more. I personally read no particular charge in it, and I think that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, would agree.

There is something of an irony about these amendments, in that the only way to have real certainty would be to tell the court either to disregard it or to follow it. In a sense, we are dealing with an imperfect situation. We are trying, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, said, to craft something which helps judges by reducing any political element in their decision-making but which—I am sorry to use a political expression—allows our courts to take back control. In order to take back control, I am happy that they should have a great deal of freedom to do so without in any sense involving them in a political decision.

Amendment 56 from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and others is of course much longer than the original wording, with three subsections as opposed to one. Respectfully, I say that using words such as “relevant” is only quite helpful, because in any event a court will ignore matters that are irrelevant. I feel similarly about the word “significance”: a court will itself have to decide significance. That of course may offend the political element but, if something is insignificant, the court will disregard it in any event. Although I understand what lies behind this amendment, I am not sure that it really does the trick.

It is not just out of nominative loyalty that I turn to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, but because he may be on to something. I agree with the use of “may”, which was endorsed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. I am not quite so sure about “persuasive”, but I will listen to what the noble and learned Lord says. However, I like the succinct nature of the amendment and it seems to me to allow our courts the freedom that we have, as it were, granted them by the decision that the country has made in the referendum, but nevertheless not to compromise them.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

Does the noble Lord have any reaction to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about the reference to,

“another EU entity or the EU”,

in Clause 6(2) as it stands? Section 3(1) of the European Communities Act 1972 does not mention these and refers only to the European Court of Justice, so it may be that there is no need to refer to these entities and we can confine it to the European Court of Justice.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, if the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, is wondering why the word “appropriate” does not fit into the context of trying to limit judicial discretion, he should look at how many times it is used in this and other Bills to give Ministers the opportunity to decide one way or the other, in what are quite clearly different kinds of decisions from those you would expect judges to make.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, with respect to the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick said in reply is in my experience absolutely right. To a judge, the word “relevant” requires him to look at the issues that need to be decided. It is a much tighter word than “appropriate”, and is used frequently. In case law, one searches for the point that is directly relevant to the point at issue. It may be that legal terminology is best adopted because that is what judges understand. It is a different kind of word from “appropriate”, which judges do not normally use. Therefore, I suggest it is a better word to use in this context.

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, given the time, it may be relevant, appropriate or even helpful to try to wind up this particular debate, although not in such a way that undermines the very real importance of the amendment.

I want to underline two aspects. The first aspect is legal certainty, which was referred to by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. It is very important, for example, that in considering cases where retained EU law is in question, people and businesses are able to recognise that if there are decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union that are relevant, then it is likely—though not an obligation—that the courts will take them into account. They can order their affairs on that basis, and that is a critical part of legal certainty. It seems right, therefore, that this amendment, to which I have added my name, gives direction or guidance that where such decisions are relevant to the interpretation of retained EU law they should be paid regard.

The second principle is the independence of our judiciary. It is right in this context to refer to the shocking instance of the attack on our judiciary that took place at the time of the Article 50 decision. It was shocking not just that our judiciary was referred to in such terms by a popular newspaper but that it was not immediately defended and the accusation rejected by the Government, including Ministers whose job it was to do so. In dealing with this particular amendment we have to be alive to the risk that if after exit day a judge chooses—because he or she believes it right or relevant to do so; whatever word you want to use—to make reference to a decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union, that judge is not then subjected to a barrage of criticism and the accusation, “How dare you take refuge in decisions of this hated institution, one which we have left, in making decisions on this law?” It is important that we should look at this carefully and make sure that judges are protected.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Committee: 6th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 12th March 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

90: Clause 7, page 6, line 25, at end insert—
“( ) modify the Scotland Act 1998 without the consent of the Scottish Parliament, or( ) modify the Government of Wales Act 2006 without the consent of the National Assembly for Wales.”

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, three amendments in this group are in my name: Amendment 90, which relates to Clause 7; Amendment 130, which relates to Clause 8; and Amendment 148, which relates to Clause 9. They all raise the same point about the extent of the delegated powers given to Ministers of the Crown by these three clauses. The context is the way in which exercise of these powers may affect the devolution settlements for Scotland, under the Scotland Act 1998, and for Wales, under the Government of Wales Act 2006 and the Wales Act 2017. I am obliged to the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, for her amendments introducing the position of Northern Ireland in exactly the same terms as my amendments.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and Wales Office (Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth) (Con)]

Before the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, proceeds, it may be of benefit to the House if I now confirm that the Government will bring forward amendments on Report to apply the same protection for the Scotland Act and the Government of Wales Act to the Clause 7 correcting power that applies to the Northern Ireland Act. I will speak about that more at the end of the debate. It may also benefit the House to note that the Government have tabled an amendment to Clause 11 —as I am sure noble Lords are aware—that reflects the significant offer we have made on that issue to ensure that the House can debate the offer when we reach that clause, just as we promised to do in the other place.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth]

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has not yet moved the amendment so he needs to do that first.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I am very grateful to the Minister for his intervention and for the indication that he has given. My amendments extend to Clauses 8 and 9; what he has said is an indication of the way the Government are minded to go on Clause 7, but I must introduce my amendments in relation to Clauses 8 and 9 as well.

The provision relating to Northern Ireland, to which the Minister referred, is what we find in Clause 7(7)(f), which indicates that,

“regulations under subsection (1) may not … amend or repeal the Northern Ireland Act 1998”.

That provision is then substantially qualified in a way one can only understand by reading through the schedules. I am not clear whether the Minister is proposing that the Scotland Act and the Government of Wales Act should be qualified in the same way, but if he intends to qualify them, my amendments are unqualified. It is therefore appropriate for me to explain why my amendments are in the terms they are. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, will appreciate why I need to set this matter out in a little bit of detail and explain why I have brought the amendments forward.

As we have seen, these three clauses confer a very wide power on a Minister of the Crown to make provisions by regulations. That includes a provision to which attention has not been drawn until now, but which is certainly relevant to the amendments in this group: a Minister of the Crown may make a regulation of the same kind that could be made by an Act of Parliament. We find that in Clause 7(5), Clause 8(2) and Clause 9(2). I need not go over what these clauses deal with but, broadly speaking, in Clause 7 the power is to enable a Minister to deal with,

“any other deficiency in retained EU law, arising from the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU”.

In Clause 8, the power is to enable a Minister to,

“prevent or remedy any breach, arising from the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU, of the international obligations of the United Kingdom”.

In Clause 9, it is a wider power to enable the Minister to,

“make such provision as the Minister considers appropriate for the purposes of implementing the withdrawal agreement if the Minister considers that such provision should be in force on or before exit day”.

Each of these clauses is limited in some respects by saying that regulations made under them may not do certain things. The Committee has heard about that in earlier debates today, such as in relation to sentencing, the creation of criminal offences and so on. These amendments seek to add two further limitations. One is that the power under these three clauses may not be used to modify the Scotland Acts and the government of Wales Acts without the consent of the Scottish Parliament or the National Assembly for Wales, as the case may be. As I mentioned earlier, the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, is seeking to make similar provision in relation to Northern Ireland. Amendment 148 goes a little further than that: it builds in an additional provision relating to the Ministers of the devolved institutions. These are the subject of the group after next, which we will come to later this evening. I will not develop that aspect until we get to that group.

The scale of the transfer of legislative competence to Ministers of the Crown, provided for by these clauses, raises concerns of a fundamental nature. This is not only about the balance of power between Parliament and the Executive, as the Constitution Committee pointed out in paragraph 158 of its report, it also raises concerns about the balance of power within the union and the future of the devolution settlements themselves, referred to in the same report at paragraph 243. Some of what I will be saying in a moment will be directed only to the Scotland Act, but it should be understood as applying equally to the Government of Wales Act and the Wales Act, which are referred to in my amendments.

As I understand the wording of these clauses, if they are left as they are the powers could be used to change the constitutional balance of powers between the UK Government and the devolved institutions which the relevant devolution statutes set out. An aspect worth stressing is the width given to the meaning of the word “deficiencies” in Clause 7. We see it set out at length in subsection (2), supplemented by subsection (3). It is extremely wide and can be widened still, as we can see, given the power in subsection (3). The provisions in Clause 7(6) are about the transfer of functions from EU entities or public authorities in member states to public authorities in the United Kingdom, which would, of course, include public authorities in the devolved areas of Scotland and Wales.

The Committee needs to bear in mind the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Dinton, in his speech last Wednesday morning about the width of Clause 7; the meaning to be given to the expression “Minister of the Crown”; and the numbers of people who could be embraced by that expression. The point which was of particular concern to me in the amendments in this group is that the power includes a power to make any provision that can be made by an Act of Parliament. I appreciate that the provision in Clause 7 is time limited. This is also true in the case of Clause 8. In Clause 9, the power is not exercisable after exit day. Nevertheless, as these clauses stand, and while they continue to have effect, it would be open to a Minister of the Crown to modify the Scotland Acts and government of Wales Acts in a way that, as I mentioned earlier, could shift the constitutional balance, and to do so without even consulting the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales, let alone obtaining their consent.

A particular part of the Scotland Act which is quite vulnerable to an inadvertent amendment without that process of obtaining consent is the detailed wording of Schedule 5. I was involved, as was the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, in considering the Bill which gave rise to the Scotland Act 1998. We sat until late in the night—indeed, early in the morning—dealing with that Bill and went over Schedule 5 in some detail. It has survived very well over the years since devolution, but it contains considerable detail which could be adjusted a little. That would alter the balance between the UK Government and the Scottish Government in a way that should not be done without the consent of the Scottish Government.

I appreciate that Ministers may say that it is not their intention to modify the Acts in this way, but it is well known that there is a high degree of mistrust between the devolved institutions and the UK Government about where this legislation is going. Personally, I regret that but, from a Scottish point of view, the reason is not hard to find. As one reads through these clauses, and looks at them from the approach of a Scottish Minister, or the Scottish Parliament or, indeed, a lawyer who has dealt with the devolution system since it first came in, it is striking that—apart from Northern Ireland—there is simply no mention in these three clauses of the fact that there are devolved Governments in Wales and Scotland that need to be considered. That aspect causes one some alarm as soon as one begins to read through the Act. It would be desirable to do something about it, if one possibly can. That is why I welcome what the Minister said when I began my speech.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Empey (UUP)]

My Lords, before we whip ourselves into a lather of outrage at the prospect of doing something without the consent of the devolved Administrations, perhaps I may remind the House that we have a short memory. The devolution settlement in Northern Ireland represented by the 1998 Act was butchered—a term I used some weeks ago—by this Parliament without a by your leave, without the consent of the Northern Ireland Assembly and without the consent of the parties that negotiated the agreement. That was done in the Northern Ireland (St Andrews Agreement) Act 2006, where dramatic changes were made to the methods we had negotiated with the noble Lord, Lord Trimble, and others over many years. So this Parliament can do what it likes, when it likes. That is the nature of having a devolved institution versus a sovereign Parliament. There is a hierarchy.

The Good Friday agreement, for which the noble Lord, Lord Judd—who is not in his place—and others indicated strong support, which I welcome, was dramatically changed without a by your leave. It was done as a result of a back-stairs deal and this Parliament implemented it. There was no requirement for the Northern Ireland Assembly to agree—it was just done. So let us look back at the actions that have already been taken.

In these challenging circumstances, and from what was said by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, among others, in his forensic examination of the amendments that he introduced, I understand that there is genuine reason to be concerned. But we have to keep this in proportion. When powers are repatriated to the United Kingdom, the European Union deals with the member state—that is the way in which it works—so the only place it can come to is the member state. The question then is: what happens when it gets there? That is of significant concern to Members. But I am not as concerned as some because I believe that it is perfectly possible to arrive at an appropriate accommodation.

The word “balance” has been used, and that is an important point. But let us look at legislative consent. I have to say to noble Lords that we have got to be extremely careful about what we are doing here. If there is a Northern Ireland Assembly, do we know what legislative consent means? It means that Sinn Fein will decide whether there is legislative consent. If we build that into an Act of this Parliament dealing with such an important matter as the consequences of the EU decision, we will be handing a veto to that single party. Under our devolution settlement, it will be about Sinn Fein’s consent as a party. Whether it has a majority or a minority in the Assembly is irrelevant; it has sufficient power to block consent. What are we doing in considering that?

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I am most grateful to the noble Lord. In Clause 7(7), which deals with Northern Ireland, there is no mention of the need for consent at all. It states simply that the power to amend or repeal the Northern Ireland Act by statutory instrument is excluded. I can see the sense in that. Does the noble Lord agree that that is a sensible way of dealing with the matter, and that perhaps the same provision should be made for Scotland and Wales?

[Lord Empey]

I think that we have to be careful because this is complicated. It is obvious that the devolution settlements are not uniform; they are at different levels. My concern with the whole point of having consent is that, while it is obviously highly desirable to have it, although we are talking about the institutions, in practice we are talking about the people who at any point in time are controlling those institutions. In our particular case, there is a veto. I take the point made by the noble and learned Lord, but in the Scottish case a similar situation arises because there is a political party which has a particular objective in mind. It is not simply about the institutions but about those who are controlling them at a point in time when these matters come forward. In fact the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, said in his passionate contribution—I know that he is a lifelong devolutionary —that devolution, once granted, cannot be taken away. That is a contradiction in terms, because by definition devolution is something that is given—and of course our experience is that what has been given can be taken away. That is the danger in all of this.

Obviously we are waiting to see what the Government’s proposals will be. I do not believe that what the Minister indicated at the start of this debate will be the only contribution they will be making on these clauses, because it is clear that other matters need to be dealt with in Clauses 8 and 9, and I am sure that we will hear more from the Government. But I would urge colleagues to be careful about what this may mean in practice—because it is not as straightforward as it seems.

--- Later in debate ---

Amendment 91 (to Amendment 90) withdrawn.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I moved my amendment some time ago—at least I believe I did. I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in the debate and to the Minister for his very constructive response.

To sum up briefly, it seems that a theme ran through various contributions, which I want to bring to a point. I picked up from the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, the point that the Government have not really carried the people with them in the way they have responded to devolution, at least in Wales. Then, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, said that devolution had yet to be taken seriously. Then, the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, said that the atmosphere is becoming increasingly negative. These are very unfortunate phrases to be using in a situation where we seek agreement. However, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, said that accepting these amendments would be a step forward and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, said—if I understood him correctly—that accepting the amendments would not cause the Government much trouble, given what they have been saying about their intentions for the use of the powers that will be given to Ministers of State by these three clauses.

If the Minister searches his conscience very thoroughly, it does not look as though the Government have much to lose, if anything, in accepting these amendments. At the same time, there is a lot to be gained because they would help to change the atmosphere, which is so negative at the moment. He has made a step forward in Clause 7, which I appreciate, but he has done so because he says that he does not need to bother with the Scotland Act because he will have it all there on Report. I applaud that, but surely he might take the same step with Clauses 8 and 9. He may say that there is no question of amending the Scotland Act or the Government of Wales Act under those clauses—if so, why not just say so? Why not put these measures in the Bill and get this all over with, as a background to when we come to the real difficulty of Clause 11? There is that to take away from the debate.

I want to mention one other point. If we put a provision of this kind in Clause 7, people will look at Clauses 8 and 9 and say, “Oh, it’s not there. The situation is different as far as Clauses 8 and 9 are concerned”. There is a Latin phrase for this: inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, which means that putting one thing in excludes the other. We need to look rather carefully at the wisdom of adding a very sensible amendment to Clause 7 but not reproducing it in Clauses 8 and 9 as well.

I hope we can take these thoughts into the discussions which I would like to have with the Minister if we can find time. I look forward to Report when he will bring forward his other amendments. That is as far as we can take the matter this evening. We will come back to it on Report, but for the time being I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 90 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

102: Clause 7, page 6, line 25, at end insert—
“( ) The consent of the Scottish Ministers is required before any provision is made in regulations under this section so far as the provision would be within the devolved competence of the Scottish Ministers within the meaning given to those words by paragraph 18 of Schedule 2.( ) The consent of the Welsh Ministers is required before any provision is made in regulations under this section so far as the provision would be within the devolved competence of the Welsh Ministers within the meaning given to those words by paragraph 19 of Schedule 2.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I am afraid that I have to introduce this group, and I hope to be able to do so fairly concisely. There are two amendments in this group in my name. Amendment 102 relates to Clause 7 and Amendment 124 to Clause 8. They seek to qualify the extent of the power given to Ministers of the Crown to make provision by regulations to deal with the matters to which these clauses refer, asking that these powers be not exercised without the consent of the Scottish or Welsh Ministers, so far as the provision that is sought to be made would be within “devolved competence” within the meaning given to that expression in paragraph 18 of Schedule 2.

Once again, at the heart of these amendments is the need to respect the constitutional importance and integrity of the devolution settlements. How the areas of government within devolved competence should be administered is seen—certainly in Cardiff and Edinburgh—as the responsibility of the devolved authorities. They have that responsibility by virtue of the democratic vote under which Members of these legislatures were elected. Their quite correct position is that it should not be for UK Ministers to enter into the area that is devolved to them without their consent, especially in the exercise of the power, to which I referred in the previous group, to make any provision under these two clauses that could be made by an Act of Parliament. I mention the Sewel convention in that connection. In practice, the Sewel principle has been operated for a considerable time in the way that the devolution system has been working since the two fundamental statutes were passed in 1998. The problem is that these clauses fail to give effect to that practice, and that needs to be corrected.

To set this point in its statutory context, so far as Ministers are concerned, Section 53(1) of the Scotland Act 1998 sets out the basic rule that, in so far as they are exercisable within devolved competence, they are to be exercisable by the Scottish Ministers instead of by a Minister of the Crown. That section expresses the devolutionary principle, but the rule is qualified by Section 57(1) in the case of functions in relation to observing and implementing obligations under EU law. A member of the Scottish Government has no power to make any subordinate legislation, or to do any other act, which is incompatible with EU law. Section 57(1) provides that any function of a Minister of the Crown in relation to such matters shall continue to be exercisable by him in relation to Scotland for the purposes set out in Section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972. No mention is made in the statute of any need to consult with, or obtain consent from, the Scottish Ministers before that power is exercised in relation to EU law.

Coming on to the way that the matter is worked out in practice, these provisions are operated in practice under successive memoranda of understanding on devolution between the UK Government and the devolved Administrations. I think they have operated almost since the start of devolution. One must recall that, to begin with, the Government in Edinburgh and the Government in Westminster were of the same persuasion: Labour Government here, Labour Government there. That, of course, assisted very much in the setting up of memoranda and a common understanding of how these matters were to be operated. The latest of these memoranda was published in October 2013. In a concordat on the co-ordination of EU policy issues, the memorandum states that the UK Government wishes to involve the devolved Administrations,

“as directly and fully as possible in decision making on EU matters which touch on devolved areas”.

It then sets out a series of underlying principles with which I think all those who are responsible for implementing EU obligations in devolved areas will be familiar. Among other things, they state that,

“it is for the devolved administrations to consider, in … consultation with the lead Whitehall Department”,

how the EU obligations should be implemented and enforced, including whether they should be implemented by the devolved Administrations themselves separately or by the UK in UK legislation. As I understand it from those I have spoken to, ever since devolution, this has been a matter of routine intergovernmental working between Scotland and Whitehall ever since the institutions were set up. This is important as it enables the Scottish Government to fulfil the responsibilities that have been devolved to them without their being cut across by measures taken in Whitehall without their agreement. That is where we are now. It is important to say that this system has worked remarkably well, with co-operation particularly between the civil servants on both sides of the border and, initially at least, with political agreement, as I indicated, on both sides of the border too.

The context in which the powers are given to a Minister of the Crown by Clauses 7 and 8 are, of course, different because we are leaving the EU behind, and this Bill is all about the withdrawal process. In the Bill as it stands, Section 57(1) of the Scotland Act is to be omitted: that is the provision that deals with UK Ministers dealing with EU obligations. Section 57(2) is to be amended by removing the reference to EU law and putting in provisions which are to be found in paragraph 1 of Schedule 3. Their effect is that the power of the Scottish Ministers will be under a restriction in relation to retained EU law which is similar to that in relation to EU law at present. However, when we look at Clauses 7, 8 and 9, we see that the Ministers of the Crown will have power under those provisions to modify retained EU law in areas of policy which are within devolved competence without any prior notice to the devolved Governments, let alone their consent. Therefore, the amendments I am putting forward in this group seek to deal with a problem which runs right through the Bill.

Provisions in Schedules 2, 3 and 8 to the Bill provide that retained EU law is to be treated in the same way as EU law as regards devolved competence, and I have later amendments which seek to deal with that. However, the problem is that they fail to recognise that much of what will become retained EU law will relate to matters within the devolved competence of the Scottish and Welsh Governments. To deprive them of their primacy, which is established under the memoranda of understanding to which I referred, would be very unfortunate and would create a situation which in both Cardiff and Holyrood is regarded as quite unacceptable. It would mean that while policy areas within devolved competence which raise no issues of retained EU law at all would be for the devolved Administrations to deal with themselves under the ordinary rule, you have policy areas within the same devolved areas which are subject to the provisions in the Bill without the need to obtain the consent of the devolved Governments.

The point I am really trying to make, as briefly as I can, is that there is here a recipe for confusion and mismanagement which would be in nobody’s best interests, and which we should, if possible, try to avoid. The remarks I have been making are directed largely to the Clause 7 situation, about which the Minister may wish to say something more, but they apply also to Clause 8, without elaborating further on the point I drew out of Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act and paragraph 7. My point is therefore common to these two clauses, and seeks to try to avoid the risk of confusion and mismanagement, which at present is avoided by the common understanding in the memoranda, which works so well.

I hope that the Minister might be willing to accept these amendments. I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, is seeking to intervene. So that we can get into discussion, I beg to move.

Amendment 103 (to Amendment 102)

Moved by

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

Does the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, think that it would be possible to deal with his point by amending the memorandum of understanding so that it meets a new situation?

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I can see the force of that, but I do not know whether that option is available in the present climate. As regards reassuring the parties in Cardiff and Edinburgh, something in the Bill is looked for. Again, it is a matter of trying to find a way to soften the atmosphere, which is highly unfortunate at the moment. I deliberately have not discussed Clause 11, because that is quite a different debate. However, the more we can do to clear the air by getting these points out of the way before we get into Clause 11, the better, and that is the basis on which I have moved this amendment.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, late at night on 21 July 1998, I was sitting where the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, is sitting at the moment, when Lord Sewel responded to an amendment moved by Lord Mackay of Drumadoon to this effect during the passage of the Scotland Act:

“This Act does not affect the power of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to make laws for Scotland, which may not be amended or repealed by the Scottish parliament”.


In resisting that amendment, Lord Sewel said:

“Clause 27 makes it clear that the devolution of legislative competence to the Scottish parliament does not affect the ability of Westminster to legislate for Scotland even in relation to devolved matters. Indeed, as paragraph 4.4 of the White Paper explained, we envisage that there could be instances where it would be more convenient for legislation on devolved matters to be passed by the United Kingdom Parliament. However, as happened in Northern Ireland earlier in the century, we would expect a convention to be established that Westminster would not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters in Scotland without the consent of the Scottish parliament.


If problems do arise the solution is for the Scottish executive and the United Kingdom Government to resolve the matter through political dialogue. That is what differences between mature parliaments and executives will be concerned with. That is what happens in other political systems. I cannot believe that it is beyond our wit to develop such a convention”.—[Official Report, 21/9/98; cols. 790-91.]


So the use of the word “normally” was off the cuff, and I imagine that Lord Sewel would be as surprised as I am to find that it has become subject to such intense examination in subsequent years.

--- Later in debate ---

Amendment 103 (to Amendment 102) withdrawn.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, since that amendment has been withdrawn I am now in a position to withdraw Amendment 102 but I wish to make a few remarks. First, I must thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this rather briefer debate, and particularly the Minister for his helpful response to it.

I have to apologise to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, for my lapse of memory as to the nature of the Government at the beginning of devolution. He was of course absolutely right on that. I reject the criticism of the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, that I am being naïve. I believe that my amendment had cross-party support in Edinburgh and, as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said, it is really all about a question of trust.

If I understood the Minister correctly, we are really in the same position on Clause 7 as we were on the previous group. In effect, he will say that the Clause 7 problem is going to be exhausted. There is therefore nothing to be lost by putting in the same thing that he is prepared to put in about the Parliament; he might as well put in something about the Ministers, too. There is a serious issue with Clause 8, which would benefit from further discussion, but perhaps that is for another day. On the basis that we can still talk about it, the proper thing for me to do is to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 102 withdrawn.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Committee: 7th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 14th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharkey]

My Lords, I declare an interest as chair of the Hansard Society, whose work on delegated legislation will be known to many noble Lords. I will be brief in dealing with what is essentially a simple procedural proposal.

The issue is delegated legislation. This has already been the focus of a lot of debate, much of which has consisted of expressions of anxiety about the likely number of instruments; about the range of the powers that they confer; about timing; and about Parliament’s ability to conduct proper scrutiny. There are varying estimates of the number of SIs that the Bill will produce. The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, said in his letter of 20 February that it will be between 800 and 1,000. Our own EU Justice Sub-Committee thinks it may be 5,000, as the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, noted on Monday. What is clear is that the number will be very large. The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, estimates that 20% to 30% of those SIs will trigger the affirmative procedure. That estimate is no doubt based on the rules for categorisation set out in the Bill, and will certainly prove to be an underestimate once the sifting committees get to work.

As has been noted, the SIs will give the Government an extraordinary and quite unprecedented range of powers. They will enable the creation of criminal offences without primary legislation, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has explained to us; they will allow law-making by tertiary legislation; and they will allow Ministers and, apparently, 109 others largely unfettered discretion to range across the statute book. All this presents a formidable challenge to Parliament when it comes to effective scrutiny. The Government seem to recognise—a bit—that the situation is unprecedented and requires special care. They have written some constraints into the SI-generating clauses, but not enough and not wide enough. These constraints do not, in any case, address the problem of sufficient and effective scrutiny.

We will come to proposals for dealing with the scrutiny problem when we reach the group beginning with Amendment 237 on Monday. These amendments will enable the House to debate how it might adapt our current SI scrutiny system so that we may deal effectively with the avalanche of SIs coming our way. There are at least three schemes for us to consider. But whatever system of scrutiny the House finally settles on, it should apply to all SIs generated by this Bill. The same system, whatever it turns out to be, should also apply to all other SIs, whatever their parent Act, if they are to be used for the purposes of maintaining a coherent and functioning statute book on withdrawal from the EU. It would be quite wrong, for example, to have a rigorous system of scrutiny of SIs generated by this Bill and a less rigorous system for SIs used for withdrawal purposes generated by existing Acts.

This is not a theoretical concern. We know that the Government intend to use SIs generated by existing Acts when they consider that to be appropriate, or perhaps even necessary. The Solicitor-General made it clear in his speech on day 2 of Committee in the House of Commons that that is what the Government would do. In response to that, Amendment 200 sets out to create a common minimum standard of scrutiny. It simply requires that, no matter their provenance, all SIs with the same withdrawal purposes should be subject to the scrutiny procedures we finally agree on SIs generated by this Bill. It does this by making the appropriate amendment to the Statutory Instruments Act 1946, and by specifying in language taken directly from this Bill what “withdrawal purposes” means.

In a brief conversation about this amendment with the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, and his officials, they reminded me that this amendment could not bind future Acts. That had occurred to us. Any future Act could, of course, write its own rules for withdrawal SI scrutiny, or indeed for anything else. But, if that happened, the Government would have to explain to Parliament why one type of scrutiny was appropriate for SIs generated by the withdrawal Bill, with another for SIs with the same purpose generated by subsequent Bills. We should have one minimum standard of scrutiny for any withdrawal-purposed SI, and this amendment is aimed at doing exactly that. Whatever scrutiny standards we eventually adopt for SIs arising out of this Bill, they should be the minimum standard applying across all similarly purposed SIs, wherever they come from, and whatever their parent Act. I beg to move.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

There is a good deal to be said for the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, when one bears in mind the power given in each of Clauses 7, 8 and 9 to make any provision that could be made by an Act of Parliament under regulations made under these clauses. Of course, one can look back to an existing Act, which could be amended by the exercise of this power, for a purpose related to the Brexit arrangements. If one takes an existing Act—one can visualise all sorts of situations when that might arise—it would seem right that the same procedure should apply if the amendment is made for the purposes which one sees in Clauses 7, 8 and 9.

For future Acts I can see there is a problem, because one cannot control a future Parliament, but as far as the past is concerned I respectfully suggest that there is a lot to be said for the amendment.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I am sorry I missed the beginning of the speech of my noble friend Lord Sharkey as a result of unaccustomed speed breaking out on the Bill’s proceedings while I was having a cup of tea. Whether this will be repeated, I do not know.

I had discussions before with my noble friend to properly understand his amendment and its main aim, which is to embrace, within scrutiny procedures used for withdrawal Bill statutory instruments, all those statutory instruments for the same purpose that derive from other previous statutes. That is an interesting idea. When it comes to referring back to the Statutory Instruments Act 1946, it is worth recalling that the Act was surrounded by generous commitments, promises that prayers against negative instruments would always have time for debate on the Floor of the House and all sorts of undertakings that were completely unfulfilled in practice.

Whether the amendment can be made to work in precisely this form I am not quite sure, but I think that the purpose of ensuring that nothing is slipped through by anything less than at least the procedure of triage and scrutiny that we seek for statutory instruments under this Bill—if it becomes an Act—is extended to anything that does the same thing. We certainly would not want to create a perverse incentive for a Government to use the wrong legislation, or a different piece of legislation, for the statutory instrument simply because they could evade a form of scrutiny by doing so.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Humphreys]

I do not think so, because this new group has just been formed in the last couple of months or perhaps a little longer.

This group bypasses traditional media outlets because they know that these are increasingly irrelevant to young people, who only access the news items that interest them via social media. Their media posting today uses cartoons to combine a serious message with humour and it is aimed at the Labour leader this time. Entitled “Dear Jeremy Corbyn”, it reminds him that “the young people have supported you, they need you to support them”. This non-politically aligned group has realised that the co-operation of all people who hold the same opinions as they do is essential.

As ever, matters to do with the European Union come down to the personal and emotional. For the last 25 years, I and my compatriots have been proud to call ourselves Welsh, British and European. Our EU citizenship has given us the right to travel unhindered throughout Europe and has seen us accepted in every European country we visited. In Europe, we are citizens of everywhere, and we resent the fact that this right is being taken away from us and that future generations will not have the benefits of EU citizenship that we have enjoyed.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, the noble Lord should be rather careful about drawing comparisons between the EU as a place to travel and to work in, and Australia and Canada. My son studied in Canada, where there is a strict visa system for students: you have to leave as soon as you have finished your course, and he had to be very careful to get himself out of the country before his permission ran out. You need a visa even to visit Australia, and I suspect that it also has rules for visas if you have to work there. Of course people go there, and that visa system is comparatively relaxed, but it is not the same as the freedom we have in the EU.

[Lord Adonis]

My Lords, if I may take over from where the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, left off, of course even the access we have to Australia is hugely facilitated by the fact that it is a former colony which has the same language and so many practices which are familiar to Brits, and is therefore a comparatively easy and familiar place to travel. It does not at all make the argument that somehow divorcing ourselves from the continent will enlarge opportunities for young people. However, I am a natural optimist—indeed, one could hardly be otherwise in the hours we are all investing in seeking to improve the Bill. Some good things are coming out of the Brexit process; actually, the whole thing might stop as a result of them.

The noble Baroness is completely right that one thing that is happening is the massive engagement by young people in politics and the political process. That did not take place before. We had all bought into the idea that the young were not voting or taking an interest in the future, and that politics was decided by the elderly. We had the triple lock on pensions at the same time as we were trebling tuition fees. Those two policies, more than anything else, symbolise the political centre of gravity in the last 10 years—students were expected to pay more and more of the burden of university education while the retired got a better and better deal. That is all changing now. The young are voting and are engaged as never before. They voted in the last general election in numbers which we have not seen for a generation. It is very clear to me that if we move, as I think is increasingly likely, towards a referendum on the Prime Minister’s Brexit deal, then either in that referendum or whenever a general election comes we will see very high levels of engagement by the young. I think it is now very likely that that will include votes for 16 and 17 year-olds—there is probably a majority in the House of Commons for that now. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Robathan, who is a natural conservative, will be fiercely opposed to that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Judd]

My Lords, I would like to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, for that speech—not just for the speech but because it was the voice of compassionate, socially engaged conservatism, which I have always respected. May that tradition in the Conservative Party reassert itself. It is desperately needed at this juncture in our history. What the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said about the legal situation was also a powerful argument, which the Government must answer. Are we going to strip what have been legal rights away?

In the context of this Bill, we debate from time to time what sort of Britain we want to be, and the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, was absolutely right. I share completely her view about the sort of Britain we should be. I want us to be a Britain in which the world sees “Compassion” in capital letters in all our approach to public affairs. We seem to have lost that and I want to see it reasserted. I thank my noble friend Lord Dubs for having moved this amendment. His consistent and tireless work on this issue challenges us all. If we talk about family and its importance in society, this is an issue which we can no longer prevaricate about.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I believe that the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, was absolutely right to say that respect for family life lies at the heart of this matter. That in particular was the basis for the regulation we are looking at, Dublin III, and this provision, which is talking about those unaccompanied adults and children from outside who wish to join a family member who is already here in order to make the application. It is about respect for family life as well as seeking to give the benefit of the asylum application under the convention, to which we are, after all, already parties. So without elaborating and with great respect to what has been said by everyone who has spoken so far, I too support the amendment.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

My Lords, it is a great shame that there is not more of a consensus between the two—or three—parties on the issue of refugees. We have debated it much over the years. Recently, we have got to what I would loosely call an uneasy peace, which is essentially based on my noble friend Lord Dubs’s Section 67 and Dublin III. That has produced modest numbers, but there are very real numbers of people meeting very real problems.

The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, put her finger on it. The rights individuals have as a result of Dublin III must be maintained. I hope the Minister will be able to assure us that the Government will either accept these amendments or make a very firm commitment to assure us that, one way or another, the effect of Dublin III will be maintained after Brexit.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Committee: 8th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 19th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

No, for one very simple reason. As the noble Lord knows, we cannot impose on the devolved Administrations by this mechanism. I am afraid that that is a simple statement of where the law and the devolution settlement rest.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, there is another way of approaching this, and that is to ask whether the provision in the treaty on which my noble friend Lord Warner has based his amendment is part of retained EU law. If it is, then it has a place in the statute and will be applied by the courts if necessary. Is the noble Lord able to answer that? Is it part of retained EU law?

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

In this instance, it is not part of EU retained law, but that is not the point. We are saying that the powers that already rest in the Secretary of State’s hands are equal to the powers that would come through this amendment.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Committee: 9th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 21st March 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

266: Schedule 2, page 17, line 32, at end insert—
“( ) Sub-paragraph (4)(b) does not apply to regulations made under this Part by the Scottish Ministers or by the Welsh Ministers with regard to matters that are within their devolved competence.”

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, Amendment 266, which is in my name, is in a series of groups dealing with devolution. It is in the first of five groups dealing with rather technical points arising out of Schedules 2 and 8. They precede a lot of government amendments which are in the group following my groups. I suggest that the main discussion about devolution and its consequences is best reserved for the government amendments which are focused on Clause 11 and other clauses. I am afraid my groups are rather boring, because I am dealing with a whole series of little technical points which need adjustment to some extent in the light of progress that is being made in discussions with the devolved authorities, among other points.

The theme that runs through all my amendments is the need to respect the devolution settlements in Scotland and Wales. I am confident that the Government share that sentiment. It is all a question of how the matter is worked out in points of detail. The basic rule following our withdrawal from the EU, I suggest, is that returned EU competencies in the devolved areas should be distributed among the devolved authorities in accordance with the devolution statutes. That means that what falls within devolved competence should be treated as devolved, with all that that means, and what falls within reserved matters should be treated as reserved, with all that that means.

The statutes that form the foundation for the devolution settlements—the Scotland Act 1998 and Government of Wales Acts, the latest of which was in 2017—were all built on the foundation of our membership of the EU. In each of these statutes, it was taken as accepted that it would not be within the competence of the devolved Administrations to legislate on matters relating to EU law or indeed to take executive action in relation to these matters either.

What we have in the Bill, in place of EU law, is a new creature called “retained” EU law, which is the law that comes back to us either because it is already present in the United Kingdom or is direct EU law that is coming back to us and is not yet built into our laws but requires being built in using the mechanisms described in the Bill. In the original drafting of the Bill, retained EU law is treated as simply a mirror image of EU law, so that in that original drafting—which can be seen in Clauses 11(1) and (2)—the same restriction on competence which applied in relation to EU law is applied to retained EU law. I am delighted to see that, in developing their thinking on this matter, the Government recognise that this really is not acceptable within the devolved arrangements. A much more nuanced approach to that topic can be seen in the government amendments that we will come to later this afternoon.

What I seek to do in the preliminary groups is to draw attention to various other passages in the Bill that need to be corrected in order to be compatible with the devolution settlements. In some of the groups—but not in the first—it is already clear from the government amendments that they are in almost the same position as I am as to what needs to be done.

I turn to Amendment 266, in the first of these groups, and also mention amendments 278 and 292, which raise exactly the same point in relation to different parts of the Bill. Amendment 266 deals with the power to deal by regulation with deficiencies arising from the withdrawal from the EU, which is the subject of Clause 7. It appears in Part 1 of Schedule 2 in the form that is appropriate for the activities of the devolved institutions in carrying out the exercise to which Clause 7 refers.

Amendment 278 deals with the power by regulation to prevent breaches of international obligations, which is the subject of Clause 8. The devolution mechanism for this is dealt with in paragraph 13 of Schedule 2. Amendment 292 relates to the power by regulation to implement the withdrawal agreement and the mechanism for the devolved Administrations is set out in paragraph 21 of Schedule 2.

The point to which these three amendments draw attention is a qualification that is to be found in each of these contexts on the power of the devolved authority to make provision by regulations regarding these three matters. The particular provision that I am concerned about is found in paragraph 1(4) of Schedule 2:

“Regulations under this Part, so far as made by a devolved authority … (b) may not confer a power to legislate (other than a power to make rules of procedure for a court or tribunal)”.


At first sight that qualification cuts across the concept of devolution, the effect of which is that if a matter is within devolved competence, it is for the devolved authority to take its own decisions as to how to deal with that matter, in whatever way it regards as appropriate. Under the devolution statutes, the qualification that we find in this provision and its equivalents in paragraphs 13 and 21 is new: in my experience it has not been encountered before. To an extent, therefore, these three amendments are probing, to enable the Minister to explain why this qualification has been inserted in these paragraphs and, if no reasonable explanation is given, to suggest to her that maybe the qualification should be removed, on the ground that when it comes to exercising powers within the devolved area, it should not be there.

It is right to add that Part 1 of Schedule 2, for perfectly understandable reasons, contains qualifications. For example, paragraph 2 states that:

“No regulations may be made under this Part by a devolved authority unless every provision of them is within the devolved competence of the devolved authority”.


That is a perfectly sensible provision, and consistent with the devolution scheme. What troubles me is why the qualification that I have mentioned should be there. My question is: should it be there at all? And if it should not be there, should it not be taken out? I beg to move.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)]

My Lords, the Committee is indebted to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, for his detailed analysis of the Bill as it originally stood, and the points arising. My name is on the amendment, but I would be happy to deal with the important issues of principle that prompted me to sign some of these amendments, in an attempt to honour the spirit of the original devolution settlement, when we deal with the group containing the government amendments. Obviously, however, I support the amendment that the noble and learned Lord has moved.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Goldie]

I accept the distinction drawn by the noble and learned Lord. I am trying to address the amendments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, in the context of what the provisions do and his concern that they appear to cut off what he considers an entitlement of the devolved Administrations. I have tried to explain why, inevitably, these aspects are interlinked with the wider debate we will have on Clause 11.

The Government are prepared to listen to what has been said. I have indicated that we are prepared to look again at these provisions. I thank the noble and learned Lord for bringing forward his amendment, but in the circumstances I urge him to withdraw it.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her remarks. The use of the expression “sub-delegation” gives some insight into the thinking of the Government. As was pointed out, “delegation” is not an appropriate word to use where matters have already been devolved—by the statutes to which I referred earlier—to both Wales and Scotland. “Sub-delegation” is a very odd word to use. We are talking about a power within the devolved competencies for the devolved authorities to legislate, or confer a power to legislate, by whatever means they think appropriate. So I am encouraged by the fact that the Minister is prepared to look at this again. I think that she will agree with me that much of what we will be discussing in this little group of amendments is work in progress, as we try to work through the detail of the scheme that the Bill sets out. I am encouraged by her reply.

I also thank all those who have contributed to this brief debate. On the word “adjustment”, I refer to what the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, was saying. The Minister will remember, from her early days in the law in Scotland, that the word “adjustment” is sometimes used to take things out as well as to put things in. It is a word that came naturally to me as a means of dealing with bits in the statute that require to be trimmed, perhaps by removal, as well as by refining the language. I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield, for their emphasis that we are dealing with matters of great significance and importance. When I said that these were just technical points, I did not mean to suggest otherwise; rather, I was suggesting that the main thrust of our argument will be reserved for when we come to look at the Government’s amendments.

Lastly, on the contribution of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, I join in her tribute to the efforts that the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, is making to discuss matters with us and to reach as much common ground as possible. I, too, have had useful meetings with him and I am grateful to him and to his team for the attention they have given to the points I have been raising. As I have said, this is work in progress; I am encouraged by what the Minister said and, in the light of that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 266 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

268: Schedule 2, page 18, line 39, at end insert—
“( ) This paragraph does not apply to regulations made under this Part by the Scottish Ministers or by the Welsh Ministers with regard to matters that are within their devolved competence.”

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, this is the first of another group of amendments, all of which are in my name. Amendment 268 refers to a provision in paragraph 4 of Part 1 of the schedule, which states that no regulations made under that part by a devolved authority prevent it from conferring functions that correspond to functions under EU tertiary legislation. Amendment 296 relates to the same restriction which we find in paragraph 24. Amendments 280 and 294 deal with another restriction—that no regulations may be made under that part by a devolved authority which modify any retained direct EU legislation or anything which is retained law by virtue of Clause 4.

These are rather complicated matters to explain, but they are all examples of restrictions on the power of the devolved authorities to do what they are supposed to do under Part 1 of the schedule in the two respects mentioned in these passages. The whole point is the same one I mentioned before in regard to the previous group—that these are restrictions on actions which otherwise would be taken within devolved competence. The fact that there are restrictions at all is contrary to the philosophy on which the devolution system has been based. It is a given—as we have seen already in the passage I read out earlier—that, if the powers are exercised, they can be exercised only within the devolved area. There is no question of their moving into the reserved areas as that is not within their competence; if the matter is within their competence, the argument is that they should not be inhibited from doing what they consider to be right.

Tertiary legislation is an animal that has not been referred to much in our debates in this Committee. A fairly lengthy definition of it is to be found on page 10 of the Bill, but it is not obvious to me why the devolved authorities should not be able to deal with tertiary EU legislation in the same way as any other EU retained legislation. So, with that rather brief introduction, directed particularly to Amendment 268, I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her very helpful reply. Perhaps this is an example of another kind of adjustment—to return to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, picking up my use of that word. Rather than taking out or adding in, it is a case of refinement. I appreciate exactly what the noble Baroness meant in her reference to frameworks. In regard to tertiary legislation, it might be that a slightly less blanket provision could be used; that is, replacing the blanket restriction on competence with something more targeted to the particular needs to create and preserve the internal market that we are all looking forward to within the UK. What I take from what the Minister has said is that she will look carefully at this and consider to what extent she can come back on Report with something which meets the points that I have been making.

The noble Lords, Lord Thomas and Lord McConnell, referred to the reasoning behind the reference to EU law in the original statutes. EU law shared something in common with rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. In both cases, when the Scotland Act was being designed, it was appreciated that the obligations which gave rise to convention rights and rights and obligations under EU law were based on treaties. So far as those treaties were concerned, in the framing of the Scotland Act and the Wales Act it was thought necessary to preserve the obligations that the United Kingdom had under the treaties and make sure that they were protected in the way that we found in the statute as originally framed; in other words, there was no competence to deal with matters which were the subject of those important treaties. The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, was that once we leave the EU, that treaty fetter disappears completely; what we have is retained EU law, which is a completely different creature from EU law as we know it today. That is why it is important to appreciate that retained EU law is not a mirror image of EU law, although the subject matter and the detail are no doubt exactly the same.

I shall come back to that in the next group of amendments, to which I shall speak in a moment, because they raise the same issue. For the time being, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 268 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

274: Schedule 2, page 21, line 29, leave out “and retained EU law”

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, this is the first amendment in a very much larger group, not all of which is composed of amendments in my name. Although the matter is lengthy and rather complicated, I can deal with it comparatively briefly and, I hope, in a way that is intelligible to your Lordships and in particular to the Minister.

Amendments 274 and 275 are related to paragraphs 9 and 10 in part 1 of Schedule 2, the former dealing with Scotland and the latter with Wales. I am concerned about the provision which states:

“A provision is within the devolved competence of the Scottish Ministers for the purposes of this Part if … (a) it would be within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament if it were contained in an Act of that Parliament (ignoring section 29(2)(d) of the Scotland Act 1998 so far as relating to EU law and retained EU law)”.


As I understand that provision, it excludes from competence provisions relating to retained EU law. That is a theme that runs through most of the amendments in this group. It is exactly the same point as we have been discussing in the earlier groups, the question being whether it can possibly be right that the devolved institutions should be prohibited from dealing with retained EU law when they work through the exercises with which part 1 of Schedule 2 is concerned. All the amendments in this group that are in my name raise that issue, except Amendment 363, which I will come back to in a moment. Some of them will require to be superseded in light of the Government’s amended version of Clause 11. I would have thought it was a fairly simple exercise for the Minister and her team to go through these various amendments, which I need not enumerate, just to be sure that the various passages to which I have drawn attention are corrected in light of the revised version of Clause 11.

Amendment 363 relates to the right of the Advocate-General to take part as a party in criminal proceedings so far as they relate to an issue as to whether legislation or an act of a Scottish Minister is incompatible with convention rights or EU law. Of course, the interest of the Advocate-General, if he wishes to enter the proceedings, is to ensure that the devolved institutions act within their competence in relation to these matters. What we have in paragraph 18 is a simple substitution of a reference to “retained EU law” for the reference that is in the statute at the moment to “EU law”. The competence restriction on EU law will of course be removed when we leave the EU, but once again I make the point that simply to substitute a reference to “retained EU law” is not the right thing to do: it is not a mirror image of EU law. Indeed, the fetter that applied to EU law should not apply to retained EU law. The amendment is simply designed to delete from the relevant section of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, which would no longer have any relevance. I leave that point with the Minister to look at along with all the others.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab)]

I have been listening very carefully. Can the noble and learned Lord explain again, in simple terms, why retained EU law on a particular area, such as agricultural support, is different from current EU law? I do not understand why he says it is different.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

In a sense, retained EU law is simply repeating what is to be found in EU law. The point is that the treatment of it, from the point of view of the competence of the Parliament and the Ministers, is different. Under the Scotland Act as it is, Ministers have no power to legislate or deal with EU law, because that is subject to the restriction in Section 29 of the Scotland Act, and also in Section 53, so far as Ministers are concerned. My point is that that restriction disappears because we are no longer bound by the treaty arrangements that gave rise to the restriction in the first place. I think the noble Lord is pointing out that much of retained EU law is already part of our law because it has already been built in to our legal system. The point is that I am suggesting that the Parliament and the Ministers should be able to deal with retained EU law in the same way as they can deal with any other domestic law, as long as it is not reserved.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

I understand that—these debates are very useful. However, I am getting worried: as the noble and learned Lord knows, I am a strong devolutionist and a former Member of the Scottish Parliament, but in the last hour I have come to understand and sympathise with what the UK Government are arguing, which is a bit worrying.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

No, it is a serious matter. Surely there are areas that are dealt with now by the European Union because we have all thought that it was right to have standards for the European Union Common Market. Are the UK Government not arguing that if we have a UK common market—which we will in certain areas—it is sensible to have the same standards throughout the United Kingdom? Is that not a valid argument?

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

If the noble Lord will forgive me, I was suggesting that we deal with that issue when we look at Clause 11 and the government amendments. The noble Lord raises a very important point, but it does not really relate to my amendments. I think it is much more fundamental and we will need to discuss it in light of the discussion of the reform of Clause 11. I hope I have answered the noble Lord’s question. There is a basic difference between the competence arrangements relating to EU law, which does not apply once we leave the Union, and retained EU law, either domestic or direct, as it comes in under Clauses 2 or 3.

Having digressed somewhat in my reply, I again thank the Minister for her helpful reply. I will be happy to withdraw the amendment in due course; however, there are others in the group that others may wish to speak to.

[Lord Wigley]

My Lords, I will strike a different note as I put forward what are perhaps the substantive arguments—as we see them—in relation to these issues.

Amendment 304 has for some reason been grouped with these amendments, which does not make an awful lot of sense. It stands in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Hain, and is based on one of the key amendments drafted by the Welsh and Scottish Governments ahead of the Bill’s passage through the other place. That amendment is also covered by part of Amendment 303, which surprisingly will not arise until very late tonight. None the less, Amendment 304 goes to the heart of the widespread criticism of Clause 11 as it currently stands—I am aware that amendments may come forward later—and lifts the restriction it places on the devolved parliaments in relation to EU retained law.

My fear—and that of all parties in the National Assembly—is that giving UK Ministers control in the EU withdrawal Bill over areas of retained EU law relating to matters which fall under devolved competences will, in effect, tend to normalise direct rule from Westminster in these areas. Given the powers under this and other recent legislation which enable Ministers at Westminster to amend devolved legislation by order, this will, in effect, undermine Welsh sovereignty in areas which are devolved to Wales and blur the responsibility of the National Assembly. Furthermore, there is a fear that this will set a precedent for this and future UK Governments, who may well be tempted when a devolved Government act in a way with which they disagree, to find a justification to intervene. This would be particularly galling if it were on issues where Welsh interests were seen to be in conflict with England’s perceived interests—perhaps validly so. The Prime Minister has, of course, pledged never again to “devolve and forget”. That can be interpreted in more than one way, and in this context it has generated quite a few ripples of unease.

In order to persuade the devolved parliaments to agree to legislative consent orders—which are currently not forthcoming from either the Scottish Parliament or Welsh Assembly—the UK Government have tabled a set of amendments to Clause 11 which we will consider later. The Government’s proposals would provide a power to make regulations in certain devolved areas currently subject to EU law, and would prevent the devolved legislatures from taking action in the areas covered by those regulations. Whether noble Lords in this Chamber like it or not, this is regarded by members of all parties in the National Assembly as reflecting a growing approach by the UK Government—namely, in areas where devolution may be a nuisance or a hindrance to the UK Government’s agenda—to roll back devolution, or at the very least to attenuate it, and to centralise certain powers in London. The Welsh and Scottish Governments share this fear. That is why, in the Senedd—thanks largely to the lead of my inspirational colleague Steffan Lewis AM—the Welsh Government have introduced a continuity Bill to safeguard Welsh devolution. That Bill is currently progressing through its legislative steps with all-party support. Assembly Members are taking such a step not as a threat but as a safeguard: they still hope that there may be a meeting of minds between them and Westminster, and I understand they have even drafted a sunset clause which could be triggered if such an agreement were achieved. They look to this Chamber today to take a stand in facilitating that meeting of minds and to ensure that the centralist direction to which they feel they are being subject is brought to an end.

Alongside the amendments which the UK Government have tabled, they have published a list of 158 areas of intersection of devolved competences with EU law, noting that they envisage regulations temporarily restricting devolved legislatures’ competence—in advance of more substantive arrangements in primary legislation —in up to 24 of those areas. Taking such steps is, rightly or wrongly, widely perceived as a power grab. These 24 areas, all of which apply to both Wales and Scotland, cover a significant part of devolved responsibilities, including agricultural support, fisheries management, environmental policy, public procurement and food standards. These areas are vital for industries and businesses in Wales, and for the Welsh economy. The amendments would allow the UK Government to make regulations in any or all of these devolved areas.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It will last until we have managed to implement all of the framework agreement. That will be a finite period—there is no question about that. Indeed, if the noble Lord looks at the proposed amendment to Clause 11, he will see that there are various checks and balances, including the requirement that Ministers report to Parliament if they retain the powers for any longer. So that is already addressed.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, this debate has ranged a good deal wider than was necessary for the Minister to deal with my points on this group of amendments. With respect to him, he has not given me the kind of reassurance that the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, gave me on earlier groups. My point is that this very disparate group contains a number of points that I raised with regard to Schedules 2 and 8, which need to be reconsidered in the light of the reformed Clause 11. A simple example is on page 56, where there is a reference to a fetter on the power to,

“make, confirm or approve subordinate legislation”,

which extends to the wording of Section 57(4) of the Scotland Act as in the Bill. However, that section is reworded by the proposed new Clause 11.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I just remind the noble and learned Lord that I said that when we come to Clause 11, we will move and withdraw the amendment. We appreciate that although we want Clause 11 in its present form, to put it forward in a form that covers all these matters we will have to address the impact it has on Schedule 2 in these contexts.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I am grateful for that. Not every one of my amendments is a Clause 11 point—there are other points of detail which need to be looked at. If the Minister would be kind enough just to say that these will be looked at, I will be happy to withdraw my amendment. Can he give me that assurance?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am content to indicate that we will look at these points.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

On that basis, I am happy to beg leave to withdraw Amendment 274.

Amendment 274 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

282: Schedule 2, page 25, line 15, at end insert—
“( ) This paragraph does not apply to regulations made under this Part by the Scottish Ministers or by the Welsh Ministers with regard to matters that are within their devolved competence.”

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, this is the last of my little groups of amendments. I will also speak to Amendments 284, 298 and 300 in this group, which all relate to what one finds in Schedule 2. This point goes back to what we discussed a little earlier about the difference between “consent” and “consult”. In the existing provisions in paragraph 16 in Part 2 and paragraph 25 in Part 3, which deal with the power of devolved authorities to make provision,

“for the purpose of preventing or remedying any breach of the WTO Agreement”,

that power may be exercised only with the consent of a Minister. The simple point I make in my amendment is—I am sorry: it is rather important that the Minister hears what I am going to say. I will be happy to wait for a moment, if the noble Lords would like to confer. Would it help? I can wait for a second.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach (Con)]

Please continue. We have said all that we need to say.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

Thank you very much.

I want to explain to the Minister that the point is a very simple one about the difference between “consent” and “consult”, which we have already been discussing. I do not need to elaborate on the point that each of these amendments seeks to substitute in a revised formula a consent mechanism in place of the provision in the Bill, which is all about consultation. In a sense it is a probing amendment because I do not see why, for the moment, the existing situation where these things are done with consent should not operate in these contexts too. I moved the amendment so that the Minister can explain the position—I hope quite briefly—so that we can move on to what we are all looking forward to: his amendments on Clause 11. I beg to move.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I will respond briefly, without repeating what I said on the immediately preceding group, but this raises essentially the same issue. On these provisions, the circumstances in which consent applies to the powers—which are the obverse of some of the others—are those where the devolved Ministers could use powers in ways that have implications outside of their devolved jurisdiction, for example when making provision regarding the World Trade Organization obligations. That is why we have framed it in this way, but it raises the wider point made by the noble and learned Lord and I appreciate that that might be addressed in more detail when we come to Clause 11 and the government amendments. I wonder if, in these circumstances, the noble and learned Lord will, at this stage, withdraw his amendments.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I am glad we have not provoked a longer debate on this group of amendments. There is a reason for being concerned about this; the provision I am concerned about deals specifically with something within competence—in other words, it deals with regulations made for the purpose of preventing or remedying any breach of the WTO agreement. It does not deal with the WTO agreement itself; it simply exercises the power given under paragraph 7(2)(b) of Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act 1998 to deal with these matters domestically. Since it is within competence under the Scotland Act, it is hard to see why the position should be regulated in the way proposed. However, I have listened to what the Minister has said and—on the understanding that we can look at all this again when we get to the revised formula for Clause 11—I am happy to withdraw this amendment.

Amendment 282 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

My point is that we are all here. We have been taking part in a debate. Everyone who wants to take part in the next group is here and it seems sensible to continue. I do not understand.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

The Chief Whip did not discuss the matter with me but I support the position he is taking because it is very obvious that, once we get into Clause 11, we will be discussing it for some considerable time. I would have thought that the sensible thing would be to break now and to come back and deal with it in one go, rather than break up the debate, which we will be forced to do otherwise.

[Lord Wigley]

My Lords, as a party of one, I do not expect to be consulted on these matters—I realise that there are limitations. However, on Monday night we sat here until after 1 am, and I spoke after 1 am. Earlier we had a break of 20 minutes for food. Why on earth, when there is time available now, can we not carry on with the Bill, certainly if the implications are that we might go on until late again tonight?

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Committee: 9th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 21st March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem (LD)]

I shall speak briefly to the amendment proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. I do not do so because I once enjoyed the privilege of being one of his deputies when he was Lord Advocate for Scotland—as did the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope and Lord Cullen, both of whom are in their places this evening. I do so without detracting in any way from the amendment in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness. What attracts me to the amendment proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, is its simplicity and practicality. It is easily understood, and coming, as it were, from a Scottish source, it pays due regard to economy. For those reasons it is well worthy of consideration. Its simplicity makes it easily capable of being understood not just by those who will have responsibilities under it, but by members of the public.

It is for those reasons that I am, with due deference, rather doubtful about the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley. The problem with it is that, apart from the reference to the Supreme Court turning into some kind of court of arbitration, and I know of no process or procedure that would allow for that—

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

Will the noble Lord allow me to take the opportunity to say that, as he will remember, there is provision in the Scotland Act and in the Government of Wales Act for a reference to the Supreme Court on issues of law—about the competence of legislation and whether something is within the competence of the legislatures? The problem with the situation that we are contemplating now is that the issues that remain in debate are not really issues of law, and I do not see how the Supreme Court could possibly deal with them. In fact, it is very anxious not to get involved in politics. There was a germ of good sense in the scheme suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, but it breaks down at that point. I am sorry to intervene, but it is worth mentioning that issue.

[Lord Campbell of Pittenweem]

The noble and learned Lord’s intervention is most helpful. Of course, the language of proposed subsection (17), in Amendment 318AA, to,

“refer any question to the Supreme Court”,

supports the view that the use of the Supreme Court in such circumstances would be, to put it mildly, doubtful.

My difficulty with the proposal of the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, is that it is bound to encourage delay. His amendment says:

“The Panel may call witnesses or take legal advice”.


If witnesses are called they may have to be cross-examined, and if there is to be cross-examination there may have to be representation by counsel, or something of that kind. It is not difficult to imagine what is proposed in the amendment turning into something of a full-blown hearing, rather like, for example, industrial tribunals.

Under suggested subsection (15)(a), regard must be had to whether something,

“is reasonable, in all the circumstances”.

As soon as the concept of reasonableness appears in a statute, it opens up the possibility of judicial review. Even if it were not to be granted, none the less an application for judicial review could obviously, and unfortunately, delay the outcome of a decision that might be of considerable economic as well as political importance. For those reasons, however well intentioned the noble Lord’s proposal is, I do not think it stands any proper comparison with that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay. I therefore urge the Government to give serious consideration to that, for the reasons the noble and learned Lord set out, which I have tried to follow.

--- Later in debate ---

I The fundamental weakness of the Government’s proposals as they now stand—and which undoubtedly need changing—is that there is nothing in the Government’s amendments to limit the exercise of this power to the areas where frameworks are agreed as being needed. Neither is there a timetable put on such powers. The Government have made progress and I welcome it. But a great deal more needs to be done before we can get the assent of the Welsh Government.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I do not want to detain the Committee for very long; I will make just one or two points. First, I congratulate the Government on the steps they have taken to amend the original structure of the Bill so that it fits better with the architecture of the devolved statutes. If you look at the list of amendments, there are not just one but 22. That gives an idea of the scale of the exercise that has gone into preparing what we are discussing this evening. I congratulate the team that has been working behind the scenes to put this together. There are one or two loose ends, as I mentioned earlier this afternoon, but this has gone a very long way and—apart from on the one issue of consent, about which perhaps enough has been said—I support entirely the structure and wording of these amendments.

As far as the solution put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, is concerned, one feature that is worth noting is paragraph 11, which is the requirement that, if there is disagreement—a failure to reach unanimous agreement—reasons must be given. I have sat for a long time in court where, if you want to dissent, you have to explain yourself, and it is quite extraordinary; once you start writing these things out, you begin to wonder whether the dissent was justified. It is an extremely good discipline, when somebody is in disagreement, to force them to sit round a table and express themselves in writing as to what the nature of the disagreement is. The disagreement may remain, but at least it focuses the mind and makes it easier for the dispute to be resolved by the final body that has the responsibility of resolving the issue.

Regarding the three solutions offered as to how we might deal with this, there are three different solutions for resolving the issue. I have already suggested that the solution put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, would not work because the Supreme Court could not deal with that kind of issue. As for the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, I believe that the panel he is talking about has four members, three of whom are from the devolved institutions and one from the United Kingdom. It is a simple majority decision and the United Kingdom would be in the minority—and I am not sure that that is an entirely satisfactory solution to have arrived at. So I am brought back to the solution offered by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, which, at the end of the day, is to refer to the United Kingdom Parliament. I am not quite sure what procedure would be adopted, but it seems to offer a fairer and better solution than the other two. Broadly speaking, I endorse the thinking behind what the noble and learned Lord suggested.

We have made a great deal of progress. My final point is to comment on the fact that the Government have undertaken to withdraw the amendments. I was arguing for that some days ago, because it seemed to me that if we had to vote on it tonight that would give a rather different flavour to the debate. It is a way of enabling us to talk around the subject and the way in which we on the Back Benches have to operate all the time. It may be unusual but it is part of the constructive way in which the Government are approaching this issue and I commend it.

[Baroness Randerson (LD)]

My Lords, we sit here week after week and, wherever we started our careers, we cannot help but look at them now from the Westminster and London perspective—the UK perspective. As I have been sitting here this evening, I have done a head count. More than 10 of us in the Chamber during this debate have been Members of the devolved legislatures as well as here. We have First Ministers, Deputy First Ministers—a huge band of people here who have experience of seeing these things from the devolved perspective. It is important to bear in mind—and I say this to the noble Lord, Lord Lang, who said that there had been much too much emphasis on the importance of legislative consent in these debates—that legislative consent is the firm foundation on which confidence in the devolved system lies, in the absence of a full federal system, which of course we do not have in this country. I am a fierce unionist, but demonising the SNP does not help to bind the UK together. I assure noble Lords that there is a firm cross-party determination in Wales to insist on significant improvements to this Bill. The Government’s amendment is extremely welcome—but, so far, it is too little. It is a great pity that it is so late, because it means that people have not been able to give the full attention to it that it deserves. But I am sure that it is a good foundation upon which to build.

As noble Lords may remember, nearly two hours ago the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, intervened to ask the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, why the devolved legislatures and Administrations had been content to accept EU power but were not content to accept the UK Government’s power on these issues. I can assure the noble Lord that I went to a number of JMCs and, sitting as a Minister in the UK Government, there was never a time when I felt for one minute that the devolved Administrations did not question the need for more power to go to them. They have persistently and determinedly asked for greater powers and a greater say in negotiations with the EU. This is not something that has come out of nowhere; it is a persistent requirement from the devolved Administrations and legislatures that they should have a stronger voice. As the noble Lord, Lord Hain, said, devolved Ministers could go to those meetings—and, indeed, often go to meetings of the European Council. I give way.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Committee: 10th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 26th March 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

314: After Clause 11, insert the following new Clause—
“UK-wide frameworks
(1) A Minister of the Crown must lay before each House of Parliament proposals for replacing European frameworks with UK ones.(2) UK frameworks may be proposed only if they are necessary to—(a) enable the functioning of the UK internal market,(b) ensure compliance with international obligations,(c) ensure that the UK can negotiate, enter into and implement new trade agreements and international treaties,(d) enable the management of common resources,(e) administer and provide access to justice in cases with a cross-border element, or(f) safeguard the security of the UK.(3) Ministers of the Crown may create UK-wide frameworks only if they have consulted with, and secured the agreement of, the affected devolved administrations.”

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, although we have left Clause 11, this amendment is closely related to the topics we discussed in the two previous groups. It seeks, first, to require a Minister of the Crown to lay before each House of Parliament proposals for replacing the European frameworks with UK frameworks, and it lists the particular items which are thought to be the subject matter of the frameworks that are needed. More importantly, proposed subsection (3) in the amendment seeks to provide that:

“Ministers of the Crown may create UK-wide frameworks only if they have consulted with, and secured the agreement of, the affected devolved administrations”.


So the issue of consent, perhaps more narrowly focused than in the previous discussion, is raised by this amendment as well.

The amendment was drafted some considerable time ago, when what was on offer in Clause 11 referred to the creation of these measures by Order in Council and made no mention of either consent or consultation. What we had before us, until it was withdrawn, was an amendment which reformed the machinery that Clause 11 is to provide by referring to the need to lay a draft of a statutory instrument containing the regulations under the section after consultation with the Scottish and Welsh Ministers. That is certainly a step forward, but what is sought by the amendment is one step further, which is the need for consultation.

In the discussion on Amendment 305, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, made the point that the safest way to deal with UK-wide frameworks is by primary legislation. I find it quite hard to understand how a UK-wide framework can be created by using the Section 30 power in the Scotland Act or the Section 109 power in the Government of Wales Act. Those are powers that are designed for dealing with the devolved Administrations separately, whereas the UK-wide framework of course involves the entirety of the United Kingdom, and I entirely agree with the noble and learned Lord that primary legislation would seem to be the proper way to go about it. Of course, if we are presented with primary legislation, the Sewel convention will apply and my point about consent will be satisfied simply by the machinery that has been used to create these frameworks.

We are of course dealing with something that is work in progress and we do not know quite what further discussions are going on in darkened rooms up and down the country where these matters are being debated. However, if by any chance the decision is that that has to be done by statutory instrument—I take it that this is not by Section 30 powers or Section 109 powers but by a UK statutory instrument—then the issue of consent is again raised, because the Sewel convention does not apply. I would like an assurance from the Minister that the principle behind Sewel will apply whichever mechanism is created. Of course, as I said a moment ago, the primary legislation will bring Sewel with it, but it would seem very odd if, by resorting to delegated legislation, the Government can bypass the Sewel convention. I do not believe that that is really what the Government want to do. I hope they will be prepared to say that they will be looking for consent as the mechanism which would precede the framing of any delegated legislation if it is decided to go down that road. But I stress that I agree entirely with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, that the proper way to create a UK-wide framework, which is what my amendment is talking about, is by primary legislation, in which case the issue of consent does not arise. I beg to move.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I am a cosignatory to Amendment 314 and I associate myself with the eloquent comments made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, in moving it, and, in turn, the comments made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay. In the debate at the conclusion of business last Wednesday, a number of us put this specific point to the Minister, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, which could have ended the concern that certainly I still have that we should proceed, for the reasons given, by primary legislation and that it would be inappropriate to proceed by delegated legislation.

I would also like to raise the timing of the framework agreements. In summing up the debate on Wednesday, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, said:

“It is the table that identifies 24 areas where it is considered there will have to be some temporary ring-fencing so that we can establish the next stage of the process for the single market—the framework agreements that will then form the basis for that single market”.—[Official Report, 21/3/18; col. 403.]


It has been very firmly expressed by the Law Society of Scotland and others that there should be a timeframe for how long this arrangement will last. I pray in aid farm policy, which I understand is one of the 24 areas that have yet to be agreed, and point out that 85% of Scottish land currently has “less favoured area” status and attracts specific European grants accordingly. I also understand that Wales receives 10% of the farm funds. There is a concern that once we come back to having only a UK single market, both Scotland and Wales will receive less in farm support. My understanding is that Scotland would like to see a framework created and the powers devolved immediately, whereas the Government wish to take control to create the framework and then devolve it subsequently. So there are very real issues in specific policy areas over the timing and content of these framework agreements.

That brings me to this question of consent that keeps coming up. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, said:

“Can we just remove that dichotomy of consultation or consent?”.—[Official Report, 21/3/18; col. 404.]


The problem we face is that the devolved Administrations clearly feel that currently they have consent at three levels. One is through the Sewel convention. The second is that when EU policy is agreed at the level of the Council of Ministers normally it is the Farming Minister who attends, accompanied by the Ministers of the devolved Administrations. The third level is when the devolved Administrations, in their own devolved legislation, implement the directives in the form they think most suitable.

We are very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, for setting this out so clearly. It appears so straightforward that our starting point is that in future the UK Parliament legislates for all matters relating to the single market of the United Kingdom. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, said on Wednesday, it would be best for this to be implemented by agreement wherever possible. We seem to be edging towards that. In response to the earlier debate, the noble Baroness responded that there is not yet agreement but we are getting close to one.

When we take our oath and are introduced here, we swear allegiance and we are told that we have a voice. My concern regarding this amendment and Amendment 318, which was debated earlier, is that the voice of the devolved legislatures will simply not be heard in that interim between the framework agreements being agreed and subsequently devolved. That is why I support this little amendment and would like to hear more about why we could not proceed along the lines that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has set out in Amendment 314.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

Yes, that is the intention. We will move forward with this through primary legislation in each of the common framework areas. On that basis, I hope that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I am extremely grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to the debate and to the Minister for his few words in his response. Of course, legislation may contain enabling powers but we do not know yet what the legislation he is promising will look like. If it is simply a Bill with a lot of Henry VIII powers in the area concerned, it will not advance the argument at all.

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, for enlarging on the points he made last week. I am glad that my amendment has given him the opportunity to emphasise again the points he has made and his valuable contribution to our debate. He said that if his approach is correct then my amendment ceases to have any purpose. Of course, he is right, because my amendment does not look at primary legislation; it looks at the procedure that would be followed if the mechanism to be used is to be by delegated legislation, in which case we are talking about the consent not of the legislatures but of the Administrations—that is, of Ministers. At the moment, we have in the amendment that was before us last week—the amended form of Clause 11—a promise of consultation. Many noble Lords who have spoken in support of my amendment have emphasised the importance of consent, which is the crucial matter. As the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, said after his careful analysis of what we are really talking about: consent is fundamental. That is the background to what I am submitting.

There are one or two scattered points which I might mention. On the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, was absolutely right. Proposed subsection (2) of my amendment is based on an agreement reached in October last year at the Joint Ministerial Committee on EU Negotiations. The wording is exactly as it was framed in the agreements, and that is the point from which we are moving forward. One could debate the language, but I think that the time for doing so has passed.

I thought that the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, about the attitude of the sheep farmers was very helpful, and we have heard similar remarks about the position as regards fishing. I do not think that the position of the hill farmer in Scotland is very different from that which was described by the noble Lord. However, there could well be differences in the way that sheep are managed in England and the way that they are bred and moved south in Scotland and east in Wales—they are moved across the United Kingdom before being exported somewhere else. I can see, therefore, that there could be detailed disputes about what the Welsh, Scots and English would want in framing a UK-wide market for the handling of sheep stock. To attempt to create uniformity in areas as sensitive as this may be a mistake, and it may be that that is where the sticking points are in the discussions. I hope very much that one can get to the point where these matters can be agreed without resorting to dispute resolution.

As the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, also pointed out, in a few years’ time, when we move beyond the Clause 11 procedure and the time limit has disappeared, we do not want to have to start these arguments all over again. We want to resolve this at the beginning in the creation of the market.

It is difficult to take the point further because we do not really know the detail of the disagreements before us. However, I suggest to the Minister that it would be a great help if, before Report, a letter could be passed to those who have taken part in the debate explaining the procedure that the Government intend to use in the creation of these frameworks. I would be very pleased if they were to adopt what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, has suggested, and it would be very helpful to know that that is what they propose before we start looking at this again on Report. If they do not propose to do that, we need to know what the alternative is and how consent is to be built into it. In the light of the very helpful response from the Minister, and of what I have said so far, I will leave the matter there for the time being. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 314 withdrawn.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Committee: 11th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Smith of Newnham]

My Lords, I rise in the absence of my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness, who has also put his name to this amendment. I want to raise a point that he has already raised with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and a couple of my own.

First, my noble and learned friend asked how EU law will take effect, given that under Clause 1, the European Communities Act 1972 will be repealed. It may be that ensuring Clause 6 has effect only after the transition period gets around that, but there is a real question about the United Kingdom implementing EU law from the day we leave—30 March next year—through to the end of December 2020. During that period, we will be subject to the European Court of Justice but, in principle, will have no representation—that is the point the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, made in passing: we will not have a judge. The noble Baroness the Leader of the House was asked whether the United Kingdom will still have a judge on the Monday. We assume it will not, but is that the case? Have the Government discussed it? In addition, will we have an Advocate-General? My understanding is that the current Advocate-General believes she is in an ad-hominem position.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, who pressed this point. The answer we received was that this would be a matter for negotiation, the suggestion being that we would somehow negotiate the presence of a UK judge on the court. Rather like the point about nationality, having looked at the treaties, I think it is almost impossible to see how this could be arranged. I think we have to accept that we will not have any representation on the court because we will have no Members of the European Parliament.

[Baroness Smith of Newnham]

I am most grateful to the noble and learned Lord. In a sense, that puts us in an even more difficult position. Surely, one idea was that by taking back control we would be able to legislate and use our own courts. We will have 21 months in which we do what the European Union requests without having a say. What are the Government doing to ensure we have at least some sort of seat at the table?

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 23rd April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I will make one or two observations, having raised this matter at Second Reading. I am very grateful to the Minister for his amendment, which certainly brings about clarity and certainty. But, having discussed the matter with others, I want to make sure that the certainty and consequences are clearly understood.

The draftsmanship is elegant, because although under subsection (2) a court may have regard to decisions made by the European Court of Justice after exit so far as they are relevant to any matter before the court, making that provision subject to subsections (3) to (6) means that a court could do so only to clarify the meaning or effect of retained EU law as at the date of exit. It therefore has the effect of confirming what I describe as the ossification of retained EU law as at the date of exit. Only the Supreme Court is permitted to depart from any retained EU case law under the test set out in subsection (5).

Although certainty is therefore brought about, it is at the price of ossification, other than by appeal to the Supreme Court. Ossification is a principle alien to the common law, which, while it has always sought certainty, has also always allowed a significant degree of flexibility to enable the law to develop and adapt to changing times. The principles of common law development are thus denied in the application of retained EU law to any court other than the Supreme Court.

A further feature of the clause is that the Supreme Court is given no guidance as to how it may exercise its right to depart from decisions of the European Court of Justice, save by reference to the 1966 practice statement and the subsequent case law. I think it right therefore to remind the House that it is giving the Supreme Court a very considerable degree of untrammelled power, subject, of course, to the right to reverse any such decision. I am very grateful to the Minister for the assurance he has given that if, in the exercise of that power, decisions are made they will be fully defended, but it is a considerable power.

I will make two further observations. First, a consequence of confining the power to depart from European Court decisions to the Supreme Court may well mean a significant increase in the case load of the Supreme Court. As we know, it has much else to do. I therefore ask the Minister if he would reconsider amending subsection (5) to permit the Courts of Appeal of England and Wales and of Northern Ireland, and the Inner House in Scotland, to be given a similar power. Not only would that alleviate the burden on the Supreme Court, but the experience of many sitting in the Supreme Court has shown that it is generally greatly assisted if it has a prior judgment of the Court of Appeal or Inner House on the question before it.

The final observation I will make echoes what the Minister said. As was often said in Committee, the Bill seeks to provide for a functioning statute book on exit in the event that there is no agreement with the EU. It has also been said there will have to be significant amendment by at least one further Bill in the event of agreement. If, for example, it is agreed that certain fields of our law or regulation must remain aligned for the purposes of non-tariff barriers, it will be necessary to ensure that the courts can take this into account in interpreting retained EU law and therefore have regard to subsequent European Court decisions to ensure that the law or regulations remain completely aligned. It is therefore, I regret to say, a matter that, in the event of an agreement, we shall have to return to at a subsequent stage. Again, I emphasise my thanks to the Minister for the discussions he has had and the certainty and clarity he has brought about.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, we have the luxury of having three different formulations for a possible amendment to Clause 6(2) thanks to the ingenuity of the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Faulks, and the Minister. For my part, I prefer the Minister’s version, which seems to be, in a subtle way, a little more generous than the formulation of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, which is:

“A court … may have regard to anything done … after exit day … where it considers it relevant to the proper interpretation of retained EU law”.


The government amendment says,

“relevant to any matter before the court or tribunal”.

I suspect that most of these issues will be issues of interpretation, but it is perhaps wiser to have the broader formulation just in case the formula in the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is too tight to include something else.

As for “relevant and helpful” from the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, one can regard something as relevant and unhelpful as well as helpful. Therefore, I am not sure that it really adds very much. Obviously, a court would not do anything with it if it is unhelpful. I suspect that those words are surplus to what one is really talking about.

I have two other points. So far as Amendment 23 is concerned, the additional words:

“Subject to this and subsections (3) to (6)”,


are necessary because of the change from the prohibition in the original formula—that is,

“need not have regard to”—

to the new formula, “may”. When you use “may” it is as well to have the cautionary words just to make it clear. There is another view: that the amendment is unnecessary because the court will, of course, look at the entire section in understanding what it is supposed to do, but it does no harm to put those words in. In the interests of clarification, it is helpful to have them there.

Finally, I add a word of support to the point the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, made about allowing the Court of Appeal and the Inner House, as well as the Supreme Court, to consider themselves not bound by retained EU case law. One has to bear in mind that the only way these issues will reach the Supreme Court under the formula in the Bill is by means of an appeal. It is not suggested that there would be a direct reference to the court. I am sure the court would not want that, because it would wish to have the issues properly focused by proceedings in the lower court.

I may be corrected if I am wrong, but I suppose that use can be made of the “leapfrog” procedure: if something comes up at first instance, it is possible to leap over the Court of Appeal direct to the Supreme Court. That may be a useful avenue in urgent cases. Usually, the Supreme Court is helped by the decision of the lower court. If the argument is focused at the lower court, it may not agree with it but it will at least have flushed out points that need not trouble the Supreme Court when dealing with the issue at the later stage. There is therefore something to be said for allowing the appeal courts to take up the same position as the Supreme Court in this field.

I simply endorse what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said as something that the Government might like to consider. I do not know whether they are considering discussing the matter with the President of the Supreme Court to get her view, but there might be something to be said for that as well.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 25th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I shall speak in support of Amendment 40, to which I have attached my name, and will also be speaking to my Amendment 41A.

The two amendments are complementary. Amendment 40 addresses some of the objections raised by the Minister in Committee and helps to bridge a gap in the current law and in the law that the Government may wish to see in their future Bill—a Bill that seems to be receding further and further into the future. Amendment 40 helps us to move towards the ideal but Amendment 41A follows up as a backstop to ensure that at least we do not lose what is already there. The Government cannot say that Amendment 40 goes too far and that Amendment 41A does not go far enough. In the absence of their own Goldilocks amendment which sits happily in the middle, we believe that it is incumbent on them to introduce an animal welfare Bill as soon as possible, and definitely before Brexit day.

In Committee, the Minister responded to my amendment by saying that,

“the purpose of this Bill is to provide continuity by addressing any deficiencies in law as we leave the EU. It is not about improving EU laws that the Government think could be better”.—[Official Report, 5/3/18; col. 880.]

I completely agree, and that is entirely the purpose of my amendment. It is specific and limited: it does no more and no less than is required to achieve the continuity of this Bill.

I was surprised in Committee to see that the only Member of this House to speak against the amendment was the Minister. He said that the Government want to bring forward an animal sentience Bill which goes further than Article 13, which is what we are trying to retain. I am very glad that the Government want to do better. I too want them to do better—much, much better—but I am afraid that at the moment they are absolutely failing. They are failing to hear what is being said in this House and they are failing to hear what people outside this House want. People do not want a lessening of animal welfare. That would be totally against any British feeling about animals and how they are handled.

I ask the Minister whether the next steps for the animal sentience Bill have been published. I do not believe that they have. If not, what does the Minister think can be done in place of that Bill? I believe that the only thing that can be done is to agree to this amendment.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I am very much in favour of the idea that lies behind the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Trees, and Amendment 41A, which the noble Baroness has just addressed us to. However, I have a technical problem with the amendment. In making this point, I wish to make it absolutely clear that I am not in any way criticising subsection (1) of the proposed new clause in Amendment 40 or the idea that lies behind it. My point is directed at proposed new subsections (4), (5) and (6), which, as I think the noble Lord hinted at, are designed to exclude judicial review as a means of holding Ministers to account. As the amendment is worded, it is for the Parliament,

“exclusively in the exercise of absolute discretion, to hold”,

Ministers to account. I think that the word “exclusively” is there to make it clear that there is to be no other remedy except to raise the matter before Parliament.

I recall arguments about 15 or 20 years ago when there was a real risk that the Government of the day would put provisions into Bills excluding the possibility of judicial review. There were occasions when the judges made their position clear and they were very unpopular as a result. There was a real risk of the Government taking that measure, and I think that that risk was diminished through various representations made through the Lord Chancellor and others. Eventually it was established as a convention that the Government would not seek to exclude judicial review. They might limit it in some respects, as they have done, by the length of time that can elapse before a petition is brought, and there have been other ways in which the opportunity for judicial review has been narrowed, but they have never excluded judicial review, because it is one of the essential protections of individuals against the state.

We are talking here not about people but about animals, and I can quite see that there is room for some difference, but I respectfully suggest that it would set an unfortunate precedent for us to pass a measure that excluded judicial review. If that were to be picked up later by a Government in areas where individual rights were involved, I think that we would greatly regret it.

I am sorry to raise that technical objection. I wish that we were not on Report but in Committee, where this matter could be sorted out. However, I feel it necessary to make that point clear at this stage.

[Lord Wigley (PC)]

My Lords, I intervene briefly in support of the amendment moved by the noble Lord on the question of animal sentience. I should declare an interest. I am an honorary associate of the BVA and I want to underline the representations that it has made—I think that a number of noble Lords will have received them at various times. It feels very strongly that steps need to be taken prior to Brexit to include provisions for animal sentience in UK law. When representations of this sort come from such a respected body as the BVA, I think that we are duty-bound to take good notice of it, and I hope that noble Lords on all sides of the House will act accordingly tonight.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Report: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 2nd May 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

89DAA: Clause 11, in subsection (2), in inserted section 30A(1), leave out “in regulations made by a Minister of the Crown” and insert “by Her Majesty by Order in Council”

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, before I introduce the series of amendments in my name, perhaps I can express my thanks to the noble and learned Lord the Minister for the very helpful way in which he has introduced his Amendment 89DA, and also pay tribute to the work that he and his Bill team have done since we began these discussions way back at the beginning of Committee. The Bill has changed very substantially since its original form. In many respects, I was concerned about the way in which it failed to recognise the structure of the Scotland Act. Considerable advances have been made to bring this Bill into line with the recognised approach to devolution in that Act.

There are 10 amendments in my name, grouped from Amendment 89DAA to Amendment 89DAE, then with Amendments 89DAG and 89DAH and two important amendments, Amendments 92BAA and 92BBA. These amendments come from a list of proposed amendments attached to a letter sent to the Lord Speaker by the First Minister of Scotland at the end of last week; in fact, I think that it arrived last Thursday. It is against the background of that letter that I have introduced these amendments for debate this evening. I shall quote short passages from the First Minister’s letter, because they set the scene for what she sought to achieve in writing to the Lord Speaker. Commenting on the amendments that the noble and learned Lord has introduced, she says:

“The amendments represent a considerable advance on the original position of the Bill, in its introduction to the Commons”.


She goes on to say:

“What is not acceptable to the Scottish Government is that these amendments would bind the Scottish Parliament in law in these areas, whereas the commitment on the part of UK Government is binding in political terms only”.


When she says “these areas”, she refers to the common frameworks to which the noble and learned Lord referred in his introduction. Near the end of her letter she says:

“Annexed to this letter are further amendments (with explanatory notes) which, if made, would resolve the concerns set out in this letter, and give the Scottish Parliament its proper place in the constitutional arrangements of the UK, during the challenging but necessary task of preparing our laws for EU withdrawal”.


For the First Minister to write to the Lord Speaker in this way is a very odd way to proceed, but it was probably unavoidable, due to the refusal of the Scottish National Party to nominate anyone for membership of this House. Before I develop a point on that issue, one ought to recognise the fact that the amendment introduced this evening has been awaited for a very long time indeed. Various Members in the House of Commons were pressing for an amendment before the Bill left the Commons. I am not attributing any blame whatever to the Government for the fact that they have only now come forward with these amendments. The fact is that it has taken a great deal of work and much careful negotiation and planning to achieve what the noble and learned Lord has achieved in the amendment which we see before us this evening. It is a long way from what was being thought about in the House of Commons, and it is just a misfortune of timing that we are facing the position that the amendment comes so late in the process of taking the Bill through Parliament.

That being said, I very much regret the absence of at least one member of the Scottish National Party in this House who could represent the views of the Scottish Government. There is no shortage of suitable candidates, I believe. Their position is all about ideology and their view of the principle of democracy; they refuse to have anything to do with an unelected Chamber. We are not short of people—I look particularly to my right, towards the Liberal Democrat Benches—who believe that this House should be an elected Chamber, but they take the view that, while the present system exists, it must be made to work, and they are content to sit here recognising that that is how Parliament as a whole works today. In a way, it is rather like a bicycle, which has two wheels to it; you cannot really get anywhere unless both wheels are attached. That is how this Parliament works. The House of Commons works in tandem, to use another analogy, with the upper House, and we all know that this House performs a valuable function—much valued by the Government, I may say, on behalf of the whole country—as a revising Chamber. We also know that the House of Commons always has the last word, and we never assert ourselves to the extent of insisting on our view when the Commons has made its view, if it contradicts us, absolutely plain. So it is a real shame that the Scottish National Party cannot accept how this place works. If it is to participate fully in what this Parliament does, it needs to make use of the whole machinery, as it is an essential part of the legislative process.

One could say that, for much of the period when the SNP has had large numbers of Members in the other place, their absence from this Chamber has not mattered very much, but we are entering a time when it is going to matter a great deal, and this evening’s debate is one example. Much of the delegated legislation that we are anticipating, which is going to come through the mechanism to which the noble and learned Lord referred, will refer to Scotland, and many other bits of delegated legislation will come through Clause 7, and probably Clause 9, which will affect Scotland too. Who, then, is to represent the views of the Scottish Government? Are we to have a succession of letters by the First Minister to the Lord Speaker, which somebody might possibly pick up, to achieve what she seeks to do? It is very sad that the ideology is so deeply rooted that there is no real prospect of its being changed. The public should know that Scotland is not being very well served by adhering to it as precisely as we see being done today.

Despite all that, it is important that we should look at and debate at least some of the amendments that the First Minister attached to her letter. There were two sets. The first set took a more radical view of the amendments that we are considering this evening than the second. It invited the Government in effect to remove the entire system, which Clause 11 is really designed to set up, by placing restrictions on the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament for a temporary period. It is far too late to engage in a debate fundamentally altering what we set out in the amendment before us, particularly having regard to the fact that the Welsh Government have agreed to what is on offer.

The second set is the one from which I have selected my amendments. I have not included all the amendments in that set, because I do not think that it is necessary to do that to put forward the basis of the argument which the Scottish Government seek to advance. I am taking my 10 amendments from that particular group. It may be convenient to start by addressing Amendments 92BA and 92BB, which refer to something called type C, with reference to Sections 30A(1) and 57(4) of the Scotland Act 1998.

Those not familiar with the systems might wonder what type C is all about and why my amendments seek to change type C to type A. The point is that Schedule 7 to the Scotland Act 1998 contains a table listing various provisions in the Scotland Act that are subject to treatment by delegated legislation, setting out in a table various types of procedure that are to be used to subject those bits of delegated legislation to scrutiny. The type C procedure requires that the measure be approved by resolution of both Houses of Parliament; in effect, it is describing the affirmative procedure for dealing with statutory instruments, which we are very familiar with. The type A procedure has that too, but the essential difference between them is that type A requires the measure to be laid before, and approved by resolution of, the Scottish Parliament as well, so it seeks the agreement of both the devolved legislature and the United Kingdom Parliament. That is really the central point that runs right through all these amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, it is for me to say what will happen to my Amendment 89DAA, which is an amendment to Amendment 89DA, moved by the noble and learned Lord the Minister.

I want to make a few short points. First, I want to pick up on a remark made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, that he will not accept the opprobrium that was visited on the Scottish Ministers for the way they conducted themselves in these negotiations. Having had discussions with Michael Russell and the Lord Advocate—like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern—the points I put forward in my introduction to my amendment were sincerely held. Those points were not made to cause trouble. The Lord Advocate in particular gave advice on his reading of the Scotland Act; Michael Russell, for his part, was entirely genuine in his points about principle as well. That should be clearly understood.

When I was in practice at the Scottish Bar, I was junior to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. As he pointed out, if I appeared with him, I would speak first; it would then be his function, as my senior, to speak second. Quite frequently, I found that when he spoke, he refined the kind of argument that I was attempting to put forward. It took on a slightly different—rather more attractive, perhaps—appearance after he had refined it. As he pointed out in his speech, the points that I made about the construction of Section 30 and the other sections do not really apply in the situation with which we are dealing here. I was grateful for his remark that the situation is unique and not seeking in any way to undermine the devolution settlement. I am extremely grateful to the Minister for making the same point that there is no question of this being the thin end of the wedge or in any way seeking to undermine the devolution settlement, to which he wishes to adhere. These remarks should help a lot in reassuring those in Scotland on how they should approach the continuing discussions. I was glad to hear from the Minister that the door is still open; I think that the Scottish point of view still regards the door as open too.

Perhaps this debate has refined things and shown that the purist argument—that of principle—does not really apply here. This is not about trying to construct the market that we were trying to construct in 1998, which was done by separating out the bits that mattered for that market into Schedule 5 so that they were clearly identified. We are dealing with a different, rather more subtle, situation in trying, as the Minister said, to create a functioning internal market with what has come back to us from Europe. That requires a rather more subtle approach that is not really dealt with in the Scotland Act, for understandable reasons. That being so, I hope very much that the way forward will be pointed by our discussion this evening. Without any further ado, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I intervene to raise a point that I have spoken to the clerk about. Noble Lords might recollect that earlier in the evening I gave a passing imitation of a rabbit in headlights. The reason for that was that it appeared to me that the amendments in group three had been moved and agreed without me speaking to them—which is absolutely ideal, as far as I am concerned. They are highly technical amendments, but I felt I should mention that to the House, lest any noble Lord wishes me to speak to them. As I said, they have been agreed, but noble Lords did not have an opportunity to hear my dulcet tones on the subject.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wigley]

My Lords, Amendment 91 stands in my name and those of the noble Lord, Lord Steel of Aikwood, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead. It would require the consent of each of the devolved parliaments to be obtained before Clause 11 comes into effect.

Amendments 107 and 108, standing in my name only, provide that none of this Act, except for this clause, would come into force until the Prime Minister was satisfied that resolutions signifying consent have been passed by the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales and, unless direct rule is in place, the Northern Ireland Assembly. Both amendments deal in different ways with the element of consent relating to the Act. Both would enshrine the Sewel convention in law. The Sewel convention dictates that the UK Government shall not normally legislate in areas of devolved competence without consent. Consent is sought through a legislative consent Motion. Very rarely do the devolved Parliaments withhold consent. It has happened I believe—I can be corrected if I am wrong on this—only once in Scotland and once in Northern Ireland since 1999. Ironically, it has been used seven times by the National Assembly for Wales. I am not quite sure what that tells us.

The point I am underlining is that withholding legislative consent is not used lightly. It is treated with caution and respect. It is the only constitutional tool available to the devolved Parliaments to challenge the balance of power across the British Isles. However, we know from the Miller case on the Article 50 Bill that the Sewel convention is merely that: it is a convention. The UK Government are wholly within their rights to override any decision made by the devolved Parliaments in relation to this Bill or any other Bill deemed within devolved competence.

I have spoken at length on previous occasions about the need for the Sewel convention to be enshrined in law in relation to this Bill. This is the most wide-ranging constitutional Bill since the European Communities Act 1972. I have spoken at length about the need for the devolved Parliaments formally to consent to Clause 11—I shall not repeat those arguments. I will, however, point to the most recent developments whereby the Welsh Labour Government have implied consent to the Bill, having accepted the amendment to Clause 11 laid by the Government, although time will tell whether that will carry through the Assembly. Those same amendments are insufficient for the Scottish Government and every opposition party in Scotland except the Scottish Conservative Party. The main sticking point for these parties is consent.

The UK Government have tried to devise a new meaning for consent in relation to the functions of Clause 11. They seem quite deliberately to be confusing “consent” with a consent decision. There is a difference, but I think that everybody who reads about this matter in the generality may not be aware of it. The UK Government can impose restrictions on the National Assembly for Wales’s competence as long as a consent decision has been made—not that consent has been obtained. The substance or result of that consent decision is immaterial. The UK Government can steam ahead even if a consent decision is not made. This, quite frankly, is a farce. I believe that there will be a lot of public discussion about that as matters move forward.

We have reached a point in history whereby the current constitutional arrangements, the political conventions underpinning the UK’s intragovernmental relations, are under pressure and in danger of unravelling. In the way that the UK Government are handling consent, they are making it a concept whose understanding among the public is in some doubt and it is causing severe mistrust across the four nations. I urge the UK Government to act, to listen to the Scottish Government and to come to an agreement on consent and a new UK constitution.

Amendment 91 should be grasped by the House today and the Government should accept it to resolve the position in Scotland and to get out of the unholy mess in which they have landed in Wales. I beg to move.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

My Lords, I have put my name down in support of the amendment. The arguments which led me to do that are those which I set out when I was moving my amendment earlier this evening, so I need not take up the time of the House in repeating them. What I said earlier is the full explanation as to why I put my name down.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his amendments, which are pertinent given the different positions of the Scottish and Welsh Governments and the imminent timing of votes in their legislatures that will address consent.

The Government have been clear that they wish to make the positive case for consent for this Bill. We have not just talked about our commitment to making that case but have shown it. We have engaged in extensive discussions with the devolved Administrations and have now introduced the amendment to Clause 11 that we have just discussed at some length to try to meet the expectations of the devolved legislatures. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, will accept that our commitment to the legislative consent process is reflected in the agreement that we struck with the Welsh Government last week.

This is the legislative consent process in action. We have put forward policy objectives; we have worked through the differences, and we have found an appropriate compromise. As a result, the Welsh Government have recommended that the National Assembly for Wales grant legislative consent to the Bill when it votes on this matter, I believe, on 15 May. The Welsh Government agree that our amendments now strike the right balance between providing legal certainty and maximising assurances to the devolved legislatures on how we will jointly manage the process of powers returning from the EU in otherwise devolved areas. Of course we are disappointed that we have not been able to reach the same agreement with the Scottish Government, but this, I suggest, is not for want of trying. I stress again that time remains for the Scottish Government to join this agreement, so that we can all demonstrate that we have done what we consider to be the responsible thing in this context.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 16th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 9 in my name. The Bill was substantially amended on Report with regard to the devolution dimension. Among other things, what one might describe as confidence-building measures were put in to ensure that Ministers, having given certain undertakings with regard to how they would exercise their powers to make regulations, would do that and would regularly report to Parliament to ensure that it was being done in good faith.

The reports have to be done on a three-monthly basis: the first report certainly has to be done three months after the date when the Act is passed and:

“Each successive period of three months after the first reporting period is a reporting period”.


That report must explain how,

“principles …agreed between Her Majesty’s Government and any of the appropriate authorities, and … relating to implementing any arrangements which are to replace any relevant powers or retained EU law restrictions, have been taken into account during the reporting period”.

That is fair enough as far as it goes, but it does not give much colour or substance as to what these principles are.

My concern, which I raised on Report, was that there was insufficient detail as to the principles. However, I asked whether the principles referred to were those agreed at the Joint Ministerial Committee,

“back in October or November, which have certainly been discussed before. However, it is slightly odd to have reference to ‘principles’ which, as far as I can see, will not actually appear in the Bill. Because we have debated this often enough, we perhaps know what the principles are, or at least know where they can be found, but to anyone coming to this fresh it would not necessarily indicate where these principles are”.—[Official Report, 2/5/18; col. 2141.]

I asked the Minister if he would confirm that the principles were indeed those agreed in the communique of the Joint Ministerial Committee.

The noble and learned Lord the Advocate-General for Scotland said in his response:

“Noble Lords will recollect that, at the Joint Ministerial Committee in October last year, the principles to be applied were agreed by all those attending: the Welsh Government, the Scottish Government and the United Kingdom Government. I just add in response to a point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, that where he finds reference in the amendments to ‘principles’, that refers to the principles that were agreed at that stage and are carried over in the agreements”.—[Official Report, 2/5/18; col. 2164.]


I hope we have established common ground that the principles referred to are indeed those agreed and set out in the communique of 16 October 2017 from the Joint Ministerial Committee on European Negotiations. I am very grateful that the Printed Paper Office has made available copies of that communique for noble Lords to read.

I will not read it all out ad longum but it is worth noting that they are principles that relate to where common frameworks need to be established. They have to do so to,

“enable the functioning of the UK internal market, while acknowledging policy divergence … ensure compliance with international obligations … ensure the UK can negotiate, enter into and implement new trade agreements and international treaties … enable the management of common resources … administer and provide access to justice in cases with a cross-border element”,

and

“safeguard the security of the UK”.

It also says that when frameworks are to be established they,

“will respect the devolution settlements and the democratic accountability of the devolved legislatures, and will therefore … be based on established conventions and practices … maintain as a minimum, equivalent flexibility for tailoring policies to the specific needs of each territory as is afforded by current EU rules … lead to a significant increase in decision-making powers for the devolved administrations”.

In addition, and this has occupied many hours of debate in your Lordships’ House as this Bill has gone through:

“Frameworks will ensure recognition of the economic and social linkages between Northern Ireland and Ireland and that Northern Ireland will be the only part of the UK that shares a land frontier with the EU. They will also adhere to the Belfast Agreement”.


These are not insignificant principles. In fact, I think they are very important. If the Bill is going to be complete —people coming to the Bill should not necessarily have to try to work out where these principles are to be found—in the interests of having a tidy statute book these principles should at least be there by reference. I cannot readily see an objection to that, given that there is an understanding what these principles are. They are not to the exclusion of other things that might be agreed by the UK Government and the devolved Governments but at least they are a starting point. I hope the amendment will commend itself to the Government because it is entirely consistent with their policy.

In passing, I refer to the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford and wonder if that were accepted for Wales, it would help find an agreement in Scotland, if it was also applied to Scotland. I suspect it might not go as far as the Scottish Government want because it does not give them the requirement for consent. It says:

“A Minister of the Crown will not normally lay a draft,”


unless such consent had been given. Perhaps the noble and learned Lord will respond to this. Unlike Section 28(8) of the Scotland Act 1998 and the equivalent provision in the Government of Wales Act which says that Parliament will not normally legislate in primary legislation, here we are dealing with Ministers. I assume that if Ministers are laying regulations, they could be subject to judicial review in a way in which a decision of Parliament would not be. That might give further encouragement to the Scottish Parliament that its concerns have been listened to. In responding, the Minister might also just take the opportunity to indicate the Government’s position in relation to the vote of the Scottish Parliament yesterday.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, to follow what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, has just said, the Minister may remember that I raised how to deal with the Sewel convention in relation to delegated legislation on several occasions in Committee, in dealing with what is now to be found in Clauses 9 and 11 of the Bill as it is printed for this stage of the proceedings. My recollection is that my points were dealt with by assurances from Ministers that the Sewel convention principles would apply to the making of delegated legislation in the context of both Clauses 9 and 11.

I do not have down an amendment in the same terms as that proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, in relation to Wales because I can assume, I think, that the same principle would apply to the corresponding provision for Scotland earlier in the same clause, and no doubt to Northern Ireland as well. For my part, I would be content if an assurance could be given specifically in relation to the mechanism in this clause that means the Sewel convention would be respected in the way the amendment describes. That would be consistent with the assurances I have had in relation to the earlier provisions and would avoid writing the Sewel convention into the Bill, which I understand Ministers are anxious not to do because, in the case of Miller, it was described as merely a convention—important though it may be. I would be grateful if the Minister, when he comes to reply, would give an assurance in relation to both Wales—which has been sought—and Scotland, and no doubt to Northern Ireland as well, although it is not represented here today.