(6 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberNo, I have it absolutely right. I know that that is precisely what it is. I have said that on previous occasions. But, with respect, it was the couple of speeches that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, made earlier on that moved me in the Government’s direction.
My Lords, I am obliged for all the contributions at this stage of the debate. I appreciate, as do other Members of the House, that when I move the government amendment to Clause 11, we will embrace a debate about the consequences of that amended clause and the significant change it makes to the way in which we are going to deal with, among other things, devolved competences. But as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, observed, his amendments are consequential in a sense on what is going to happen with regard to Clause 11. In that context, I point out that we had already indicated our intention to move the amendment to Clause 11 and then withdraw it, in order that the consequences for the schedules to the Bill can be addressed more properly when we reach Report. However, there is a more fundamental issue underlying this, which has been highlighted by the use of the terms “consult” and “consent”. It is really rather fundamental. Because these are probing amendments, I will just outline the Government’s thinking with regard to this area of the Bill and how it will work. I am sorry if I am going to appear somewhat repetitive about some matters of history that have been touched upon already, but perhaps your Lordships could bear with me, if but for a moment.
In 1972, the UK Parliament of course transferred certain competences to the EU. Having done so, it limited its competence to legislate for the United Kingdom. When it came to the Scotland Act 1998 and the Government of Wales Act 2006, that Brussels competence, as I will term it, had already gone. When it came to considering the scope of the divorce settlement, the matter of the powers held by the European Union in Brussels was not in scope for consideration as part of devolution. They had gone, by virtue of an international treaty implemented in domestic law pursuant to the ECA 1972. The devolved settlement was determined by reference to the competence that remained in Westminster in 1998 and in 2006.
I am going to elaborate on what happens to the competences in Europe. I wonder whether the noble Baroness will bear with me just for a moment.
But I wanted to challenge what the Minister just said. The competences were not actually removed from us. We agreed to operate within the framework, but the idea that we actually gave up those competences in the way described would perhaps not be accepted, as such. We agreed that the EU had rights to make laws in certain areas, but that is not the same as saying, “This is no longer our responsibility”.
With respect, pursuant to our international treaty obligations, we bound ourselves at the level of international law to allow the EU to exercise competence in areas where previously the UK Parliament would have exercised it. That was then implemented in domestic law by virtue of the 1972 Act. Of course a sovereign Parliament is always able to repeal the 1972 Act, as it is now doing, but so long as it remained in place, and so long as we remained party to the relevant treaty—which became treaties—we were bound in that context. I do not entirely agree with the analysis, but I do not believe it is material for the present purposes, if I may respectfully say so.
Once Brussels had certain competences, it then exercised them. It was important that Brussels should exercise them in one area in particular, which was the development of the EU single market, as no one else could have exercised jurisdiction over a single market in the EU. The idea that 12—now 28—individual jurisdictions could have maintained the single market is self-evidently untenable, so Brussels exercised that jurisdiction, for very good reason. When we leave the EU, we will find ourselves in the position where we want to maintain an internal single market in the United Kingdom; the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, referred to that, while the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, said we are looking forward to the internal market in the United Kingdom. We have to bear that in mind. What Parliament is in a position to legislate for a UK single market? The answer to that is the Parliament that has jurisdiction for the whole United Kingdom. I will come on to the issue of devolved competence in a moment, but generally speaking if you are going to maintain a single market you need a legislative power that is able to do that for the single market.
Lest anyone interrupt just yet, I add that of course by their very nature the devolved Administrations, parliaments and assemblies have responsibility for devolved powers in their respective nations. We respect that, of course, but there is an issue here that has not yet been mentioned. We identified, on the basis of analysis that was carried out with the devolved Administrations, that there were some 153 areas of competence where—
Before the Minister moves on to the detail of those competences, I want to challenge the analysis that he has given about the comparison between the UK single market and the EU single market. No one would have suggested at any time in the last 26 years that the relationship between the United Kingdom and the EU single market, and the decision-making around the EU single market, would have been such that the decision-making on the EU single market would have been left solely to the European Parliament and the European Commission. It was not. The decision-making around the EU single market was done primarily by the Council of Ministers, and in the Council of Ministers some aspects of that single market were determined by absolute consent, where the UK had a veto, while some areas were determined by qualified majority voting. We cannot replicate that arrangement with one that leaves the sole decision-making power after consultation, without consent, with the UK Parliament and the UK Government in relation to areas where currently the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly or the Northern Ireland Assembly would have legislative competence.
I do not entirely agree with the noble Lord’s analysis but for the present purposes I am not sure that it is particularly relevant. What is relevant is this, if I can continue: we have identified about 153 areas in which, upon our leaving the EU, competences will return and touch upon areas of devolved competence. These are areas that the devolved parliaments and assemblies previously had no engagement with because they lay in Brussels, but they are coming back and touching upon these areas of devolved competence and we recognise that.
However, some of these areas of competence are critical to the maintenance of a single market in the United Kingdom, as I will illustrate in a moment. Those therefore had to be addressed. We did that by engaging with the devolved Administrations and assemblies in the context of the Joint Ministerial Committee negotiations. I take the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter: there may be criticisms of that process but I respectfully suggest that that is not for this Bill. It is important to notice the achievements made by that committee in this context. In particular, noble Lords may have received a copy of the communiqué of 16 October 2017 from the Joint Ministerial Committee, which was attended by Mark Drakeford, a Cabinet Secretary in Wales, and Mr Russell, a Minister from the Scottish Government, among others, including senior civil servants from Northern Ireland in the absence of their Executive. I shall quote briefly from it, although some aspects are referred to in some of the proposed amendments:
“Ministers noted the positive progress being made on consideration of common frameworks and agreed the principles that will underpin that work”.
The definition of those principles includes the line:
“A framework will set out a common UK, or GB, approach and how it will be operated and governed”.
Then there is a list of principles:
“Common frameworks will be established where they are necessary in order to … enable the functioning of the UK internal market”—
for example, to,
“ensure compliance with international obligations; ensure the UK can negotiate, enter into and implement new trade agreements and international treaties; enable the management of common resources; administer and provide access to justice in cases with a cross-border element; safeguard the security of the”,
United Kingdom.
No, perhaps I can finish this point. I am just trying to explain why in these 24 areas it has been identified as very material that we should retain and then develop frameworks.
I just wanted to intervene on this very point about pesticides. The Minister will be aware that the Welsh Government did in fact legislate on the question of genetically modified crops, and it was forecast that the roof would fall in. It did not; it was quite possible to have a different regime in Wales from that in England. As he addresses the rest of the points that have been raised, will he tell us how the regime will be allowed or not allowed to work in the context of agricultural support? Sheep farmers may well want and be entitled to get support from the Welsh Government. The Welsh Government may want to give them that support but, if it is argued that that distorts the UK market, they would not be able to do so. That is the sort of issue that causes concern.
As regards agricultural support, that is another subspecies of agriculture. I am dealing with those matters that fall within the 24 identified areas where we find it necessary to retain and operate the single internal market. Not all areas within those 24 competencies are going to have to be retained for the purposes of that market. There are areas which we will devolve.
The Minister is making a very strong case for how a single market can operate effectively. Does he not believe that the United Kingdom could operate under a frictionless trading or regulatory arrangement with managed divergence across the four nations?
That is not what is in contemplation, and that is why I am trying to explain the Government’s thinking with regard to maintaining effectively a single market, not frictionless borders between nations within the United Kingdom, which is a different issue altogether and one that does arise in a different context.
I will not take this opportunity to contest some of the points that have been made about, for example, fertilisers, although I think there is a debate to be had about the way in which the Government describe that issue. It is not helpful to the heat generated around this debate when the examples the Government give for the need to retain the power imply that decisions that would be made in Scotland or Wales would be stupid. The Government need to think hard about the fact that when they describe the need for these single market frameworks in the UK, they should do so in a positive way in terms of the UK having regulations that work together.
On the substantive point about the frameworks, the issue is not the list of 24, but how they will be agreed and who will have the ultimate decision-making power. It is not about what is or is not on the list. That is a matter for negotiation and determination within the existing settlements. The issue here is who agrees the frameworks, how they are agreed and who ultimately has the power to veto them or otherwise. That is the substantive issue I would ask the Minister to address.
I wholly reject the implication that we are suggesting that any of the devolved Administrations are going to proceed to legislate, with any of the competencies returned to them, in a way that would be regarded as stupid or unacceptable. That is a most unfortunate gloss to put on the matter. It is, however, very helpful that the noble Lord, Lord McConnell of Glenscorrodale, has raised the question of how we are going to deal with the issue in this context. The framework agreements have been the subject of ongoing negotiation among all of the Administrations, but in order to achieve that it is necessary to retain competencies in those areas so that there is not the prospect of legislation within the devolved areas which impacts upon areas outwith their competence. To give a simple example in that context, the Scottish Government are entitled to exercise devolved competence and powers within Scotland for the Scottish people, but if we allow all of the additional competencies to go back to the Scottish Government and they legislate in an area such as food labelling, that impacts on the people not only of Scotland but of England, Wales and Northern Ireland. There is therefore, in a sense, a veto over proposals for the internal market, with one devolved Administration saying, “No, we don’t like your proposals on food labelling. We know everybody else likes them but we’ve decided we don’t like them, we’re not going to consent to them, so you can’t have them.” That is the problem that we want to ensure does not arise.
Coming more particularly to the point that was made about how this is decided, we do ring-fence, as it were, the 24 competencies—or elements of them—that have been identified following the consultation process with the devolved Administrations and which are reflected in the principles that I quoted from the Joint Ministerial Committee on 16 October last year. Then, we have to formulate framework agreements, essentially, in each of these areas for the United Kingdom.
Taking up the noble Lord’s point on how we are going to implement those, we will do so by way of primary legislation. And where do we find ourselves? Back in the relevant devolved legislation, which says that we will not normally legislate in respect of these devolved areas except with the agreement of the relevant devolved Government. So the relevant safeguard is exactly the same as the one that exists at the present time. What we propose will not intrude on the devolved competence in Scotland, Wales or indeed Northern Ireland. It retains 24 areas that are coming back from the European Union in order that we can work out what is required for the purposes of maintaining a single UK market. However, what would alter the devolved competencies quite fundamentally would be a provision that said that we could retain those areas of competence only with the consent of each of the devolved Administrations. That would give them a veto over matters that went beyond their present devolved competence and a veto over matters that impacted on England, Wales, Northern Ireland or Scotland, depending upon who was doing it. That is why we have set out matters in the way that we have. When we come on to the amendment to Clause 11 in due course, I hope that, having essentially flipped Clause 11, we can reflect on the great progress that we have made to date in these areas. It is in that context that I simply invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.
We will return to these matters under reference to the government amendments but I wanted to set out, I hope with a reasonable degree of clarity, the Government’s thinking in this area. This is not, with respect, a power grab—on the contrary: if we consult, if we agree and if we achieve this, there is no question of a power grab. It is certainly not a derogation from devolved competence. A great deal of competence will be laid on the devolved Administrations, because so many of these competencies coming back from the EU, and under the amended Clause 11, are going straight to the devolved Parliaments and Assemblies.
Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, may I just tempt him? He has given a very clear exposition of the Government’s position and why it is in the interests of the devolved Administrations and the United Kingdom as a whole to proceed in the manner that the Government describe. He has also talked about the great efforts that have been made by the officials and the work that has been done. Why, then, do we have such opposition, in particular from the Scottish Administration?
I am not going to rehearse the rhetoric that has been used by some members of the Scottish Government to feed populism. Terms such as “power grab” may have their place, but they do not have a place in the context of our looking at this legislation. Of course, it has been asserted that consultation is not enough—even though it may lead to agreement—and that there has to be consent and only consent. But if it is consent, that is, let us remember, a very material change to the devolved settlements. That will result in the devolved Parliaments and Governments being able effectively to veto matters that impact upon those outwith their area of devolved competence.
The Minister used a phrase—which is used also either in the Explanatory Note or in a letter, I cannot remember which—about the retention of this for the purpose of the internal market. It might be helpful if that wording appeared on the face of the Bill.
I note that comment. The noble Baroness will appreciate that the amendment to Clause 11, which I will move in due course, seeks to ring-fence these powers to ensure that they are limited. Indeed, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, has also tabled an amendment regarding a sunset clause in that context. It is perfectly clear from the proposed amendment to Clause 11 that they are meant to have a very limited function—but I note what the noble Baroness said and I will take it forward.
Does the Minister not realise that the Labour Government in Cardiff feel as strongly as the SNP Government in Scotland about this matter? This is not a matter of party politics; it is a question of where power lies. That is why the term “power grab” has arisen. When he says how outrageous it would be if Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland had a veto, does he not realise that the structure that he is advocating gives England a veto? It gives Westminster a veto; that is what is causing so much trouble.
One moment. I am terribly sorry, Archbishop, but I must reply to that. This does not give England a veto. Essentially, England has no voice. This is the United Kingdom Parliament: it legislates for the United Kingdom.
The point I was going to make is exactly the same. As I have listened to the debate, it seems to me that the issue is probably what the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, tried to address. When we leave the EU, the state of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland will still be the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland. Therefore, there are areas that are for all four nations and others that are just for one nation. Devolution was a good thing, but it does not mean that powers that affect other nations can simply be devolved. I have listened again and again, and I think the point is that, of all the powers that are coming back, 23 have been identified which, if they were simply handed over without clear legislation, would leave us in a real mess. There would be no coherence, no sense that this would be the United Kingdom; it would be something else. So may I plead with those who come from nations with devolved Governments to realise that, for the benefit of the whole of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, there are some areas that affect all of us together, not separately, and that those need to be retained? Of course there could be negotiations and conversations—but I get a little concerned that the message is not getting through. This is not grabbing power: some areas are returning to the United Kingdom and we must sort out which bits really need to go straight to the devolved Administrations. The 23 areas that we have heard about require very careful consideration; otherwise some might think that leaving the EU equals independence for them.
I am not going to indulge in party politics at this stage; I do not think that that is necessary. We all know the ultimate objective of the Scottish National Party. It is not to have a United Kingdom; it is to break up the United Kingdom and have an independent Scotland. Although Scottish nationalists talk about all these powers coming back from the EU, let us remember that they do not want them. If they get them, they want to give them back to Brussels, because they want Scotland, as an independent country, to remain in the EU—and, if it leaves, they want it to join EFTA and the single market. Therefore they will return all the powers they are talking about if they get their ultimate aim.
The noble and learned Lord has distinguished between “consult” and “consent”, and has described consent as a veto. Does he not accept that over the years the normal use of “consent” by both the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly has been exercised responsibly, and that there is no basis for that fear? How would he define the word “consult”? What does it mean?
Consultation has been going on in the Joint Ministerial Committees on a regular basis since October of last year. As regards respecting the constitutional settlement on devolution, I entirely agree with the noble and learned Lord—with one qualification. A convention has arisen out of the memorandum of understanding between the Scottish Government and the UK Government about how we ensure that legislation put before the Scottish Parliament is competent. That convention has operated since 1999 and involves an exchange of a note of competence. Prior to a Bill being introduced to the Scottish Parliament, a copy is passed to my office—the Office of the Advocate-General for Scotland. That is always done.
I then confer with the Lord Advocate and his officials—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, will be familiar with this—and we iron out any differences and come to a view on what is competent and what is not, and consequently these matters are resolved. For the first time in nearly 20 years, that convention was departed from by the Scottish Government in respect of their EU Continuity Bill, which I first heard about after it was introduced to the Scottish Parliament. They did, however, give it to the Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament in time for him to take legal advice. Therefore, while I accept the generality of the point the noble and learned Lord made, particular exceptions have arisen very recently.
I was the Minister who negotiated the memorandum of understanding. I think I am the only Minister involved in the negotiation at the time who serves in your Lordships’ House. I agree that the Sewel convention and the arrangements for considering the competence of legislation have worked very well. That concerns the point I made earlier—two debates ago, I think—about the clarity of the legislation and of the memorandum of understanding, which have worked well over many years. I am encouraged by the Minister’s comment that these frameworks would all be subject to the Sewel convention. It would certainly be very helpful for the debate that we are about to have on Clause 11 for the Minister to say that, if these 24 areas are indeed the final 24 areas that are agreed for common frameworks, in each of the 24 areas the establishment of the common frameworks would be subject to the Sewel convention, as I think he hinted at a few minutes ago.
In so far as they are carried forward by primary legislation—and I rather anticipate that that will be the case—they would engage not only the Sewel convention but the provisions of DGN 10, the devolved guidance note, because there may be areas where these matters impact on the competence of Scottish Ministers. That is what is anticipated and I have no difficulty with that.
I keep trying to answer a question raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, about what happens with regard to the transition period. Clearly, that will have to be addressed in the context of the withdrawal agreement Bill—and that, as has been indicated before, may result in some amendment to the existing provisions of this exit Bill.
As I understand what the Minister is saying, ultimately everything has to be settled by primary legislation, so there will be a single market in the United Kingdom that is settled by primary legislation—for which legislative consent will be sought and no doubt given. What we are talking about is an interim period when Ministers take powers to themselves. Over a temporary period they will in effect dictate what the framework agreement will be until there is a final agreement in a number of years—that is what I understand the Minister to say.
With great respect, I do not think the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, has understood what I said. It is not a case of us dictating anything to the devolved Administrations; it is a case of ring-fencing these limited competences until we have reached agreement with the devolved Administrations as to what the framework agreements will be. They will then be put forward for the purpose of legislative consideration in the usual way. But it is not suggested that we are going to start regulating agriculture in Scotland in the meantime—that is not what is comprehended by this at all. I do not know whether I asked this earlier, but will the noble and learned Lord withdraw his amendment so that I can sit down again?
Before the Minister does, how long will this ring-fence last? I believe the Barnett formula was temporary; how long does the Minister envisage the ring-fence will last before there is a proper legislative framework?
It will last until we have managed to implement all of the framework agreement. That will be a finite period—there is no question about that. Indeed, if the noble Lord looks at the proposed amendment to Clause 11, he will see that there are various checks and balances, including the requirement that Ministers report to Parliament if they retain the powers for any longer. So that is already addressed.
My Lords, this debate has ranged a good deal wider than was necessary for the Minister to deal with my points on this group of amendments. With respect to him, he has not given me the kind of reassurance that the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, gave me on earlier groups. My point is that this very disparate group contains a number of points that I raised with regard to Schedules 2 and 8, which need to be reconsidered in the light of the reformed Clause 11. A simple example is on page 56, where there is a reference to a fetter on the power to,
“make, confirm or approve subordinate legislation”,
which extends to the wording of Section 57(4) of the Scotland Act as in the Bill. However, that section is reworded by the proposed new Clause 11.
I just remind the noble and learned Lord that I said that when we come to Clause 11, we will move and withdraw the amendment. We appreciate that although we want Clause 11 in its present form, to put it forward in a form that covers all these matters we will have to address the impact it has on Schedule 2 in these contexts.
I am grateful for that. Not every one of my amendments is a Clause 11 point—there are other points of detail which need to be looked at. If the Minister would be kind enough just to say that these will be looked at, I will be happy to withdraw my amendment. Can he give me that assurance?
I am content to indicate that we will look at these points.
On that basis, I am happy to beg leave to withdraw Amendment 274.
My Lords, I will respond briefly, without repeating what I said on the immediately preceding group, but this raises essentially the same issue. On these provisions, the circumstances in which consent applies to the powers—which are the obverse of some of the others—are those where the devolved Ministers could use powers in ways that have implications outside of their devolved jurisdiction, for example when making provision regarding the World Trade Organization obligations. That is why we have framed it in this way, but it raises the wider point made by the noble and learned Lord and I appreciate that that might be addressed in more detail when we come to Clause 11 and the government amendments. I wonder if, in these circumstances, the noble and learned Lord will, at this stage, withdraw his amendments.
I am glad we have not provoked a longer debate on this group of amendments. There is a reason for being concerned about this; the provision I am concerned about deals specifically with something within competence—in other words, it deals with regulations made for the purpose of preventing or remedying any breach of the WTO agreement. It does not deal with the WTO agreement itself; it simply exercises the power given under paragraph 7(2)(b) of Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act 1998 to deal with these matters domestically. Since it is within competence under the Scotland Act, it is hard to see why the position should be regulated in the way proposed. However, I have listened to what the Minister has said and—on the understanding that we can look at all this again when we get to the revised formula for Clause 11—I am happy to withdraw this amendment.