Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 16th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I will talk about one specific issue in the Bill, which has been referred to by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hazarika and Lady Royall, which is the limitation period for child sexual abuse claims. Child sexual abuse is abhorrent, and unfortunately it has been shown, over the past 20 or 30 years, to be much more widespread than was once believed to be the case.

It has always been possible for the victim of child abuse to sue the perpetrator or, more commonly, the institution where the perpetrator worked or to which they were closely connected, the limitation period being three years. However, there are exceptions, the most important and relevant of which is that time does not start to run until the claimant reaches the age of 18. Even after three years, there are various ways in which to extend the limitation period. The first is when a claimant did not have the necessary knowledge or awareness of the abuse, which is quite often relied on. But the most important extension was provided by Section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980, which gave the court complete discretion to disapply the limitation period. The section sets out in detail all sorts of sensible factors that guide the exercise of the discretion, but the discretion is in fact unfettered, so that other factors not listed can be taken into account. Although it is for the claimant to persuade the court, the courts generally disapply the limitation period as it happens, unless there are particular circumstances where it would be unfair for the case to go on.

Noble Lords might think that it would never be unfair for the victim of child sexual abuse to be able to bring a claim, and I have some sympathy for that, but the reality is that the claims are not against the perpetrators—they are against institutions, educational or religious, and those run by local authorities or government, where the abuse has taken place. The law on vicarious liability was changed by the courts so that an institution could not argue that the abuse was outside the scope of employment, with the result that compensation often had to be paid, sometimes even by the taxpayer or insurers, without any fault on their part.

I should make it entirely clear that I have a relevant interest to declare. Over the years, as a barrister, I have acted for institutions that have been sued for what is known as historic child abuse. I have also acted for victims and been involved in a number of cases that have reached the higher courts on the questions of limitation.

My query to the Government is essentially this: what was wrong with the existing law in practice, and how do the relevant provisions change it? My current view is that, if these provisions become law, there is a risk of satellite litigation just at a time when the law seemed relatively settled. There are some cases where it is simply impossible for there to be any meaningful trial. For example, the claimant’s own recollection may be very hazy; the perpetrators, or alleged perpetrators, of the abuse may be dead; there may be no records of any sort; and the relevant institution may have closed and any insurance may be untraceable. The intention presumably—and the way it is framed in the Bill is something of a compromise—is to make it very difficult for the defendant to defeat a claim on grounds of limitation, but what sort of cases would now be in time that would not be under the current law?

Some other features need to be raised in Committee, some already referred to: what is the proper definition of sexual abuse, and what about other forms of abuse that may properly be described as sexual? What if there are mixed abuse claims? There will also be uncertainty as to what constitutes “settled by agreement”. Does that include prelitigation settlements? What about claims that have been discontinued or settled informally?

My current view is that the law is fair to both parties. These changes will breed uncertainty and litigation—good for lawyers, but not a beneficial advance in the law. The proposed changes are not the result of a Law Commission report, nor of a large piece of legislation such as the Limitation Act. Rather, they seem to be the result of a general recommendation from the IICSA inquiry and a rather modest consultation. That is not a good way in which to make law; it will result in uncertainty and much litigation. In a wholly natural desire to help the victims of abuse, we should be careful not to make bad law.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 289 is a probing amendment through which I am seeking the Government’s justification for the substantial prejudice provision in Clause 82. By way of background, Clause 82 removes the three-year limitation period for personal injury claims in cases relating to child sexual abuse. As such, it implements recommendation 15 of the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse chaired by Professor Jay. The inquiry found that most personal inquiry claims relating to child sexual abuse are not only modest in value, but in many cases do not result in compensation being paid. The reason for the high rate of failure is that a significant number of those claims are prevented from proceeding as a result of the limitation period on bringing forward a claim under the Limitation Act 1980. That Act permits the three-year period for claims resulting from sexual abuse as a child to begin from age 18, therefore expiring at 21, but many survivors do not feel comfortable with coming forward and telling people what happened until much later, never mind gathering the courage to bring a lawsuit against their abuser. The result is a lack of justice for those who have been abused as a child, and it is welcome, therefore, that the Government have decided to bring this forward.

However, there is possibly an issue with the drafting of Section 11ZB, which is inserted by this clause. It establishes the situations in which the court must dismiss an action for injury arising from child sexual abuse. It states that for all cases brought after the commencement of this clause, the court must dismiss the action if the defendant can prove that a fair hearing cannot take place. However, for any case that started before this new clause comes into force, the test for dismissal is set considerably lower because in this instance, the court must dismiss the claim if the defendant can prove that they would suffer substantial prejudice, and thus the proceedings are inequitable.

This goes further than was recommended by the Jay inquiry. Its report referred to

“the express protection of the right to a fair trial, with the burden falling on defendants to show that a fair trial is not possible”.

The only test the independent inquiry wanted was that the test of whether a fair trial can take place applied to all past and future cases. I know there is concern that the ability of the court to dismiss actions due to substantial prejudice placed on the defendant will create uncertainty for survivors of child sexual abuse and delay access to justice. This has the potential to undermine the purpose of the recommendation of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse and might not provide the certainty and support survivors deserve.

I reiterate that this is simply a probing amendment, and I would be grateful if the Minister could elaborate on why the Government have gone further than recommended by the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse. I beg to move.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have an amendment in this group. I repeat a declaration of interest I made at Second Reading: that I have appeared as a barrister in a number of the leading cases about limitation of the law of tort. The purpose of limitation periods is to give a claimant a fair chance to decide whether to bring a claim, but also to place some sort of time limit on claims. Limitation periods vary according to the cause of action—for example, defamation claims have to be brought within one year. Personal injury claims have always been in a special category. The normal limit is three years or, in the case of a young person, three years after attaining the age of majority. But because some personal injuries manifest themselves only some time after they have been caused, particularly those relating to disease claims, the law has responded by postponing the starting date to reflect something called the “date of knowledge”.

What constituted knowledge was difficult to encapsulate in statute and gave rise to a lot of litigation, particularly in the context of what are generally known as historic claims for child sexual abuse. But these difficulties were largely overcome by Section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980, which gave the court a complete discretion to disapply the limitation period. Although the section gave various sensible guidelines as to matters to be taken into consideration, the discretion was expressed to be entirely unfettered.

One difficulty of the law remained. In claims for deliberate acts of assault, there was a finite six-year limitation period, rather than a three-year extendable limit for claims in negligence, so some claimants did not have the advantage of Section 33. This problem was overcome by the decision of A v Hoare in 2008— I was one of the unsuccessful defendants in that case—when the House of Lords decided that, whether the claim was in negligence or in assault, there was still a discretion to disapply the limitation period.

The only question that remained was whether it would ever be too late to bring a claim in the light of Section 33. Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, a much-missed Member of your Lordships’ House, made this observation:

“If a complaint has been made and recorded, and more obviously still if the accused has been convicted of the abuse complained of, that will be one thing; if, however, a complaint comes out of the blue with no apparent support for it (other perhaps than that the alleged abuser has been accused or even convicted of similar abuse in the past), that would be quite another thing. By no means everyone who brings a late claim for damages for sexual abuse, however genuine his complaint may in fact be, can reasonably expect the court to exercise the section 33 discretion in his favour. On the contrary, a fair trial (which must surely include a fair opportunity for the defendant to investigate the allegations …) is in many cases likely to be found quite simply impossible”.


That passage was in fact referred to in the conclusions of IICSA, which decided that the three-year period should be removed, but that there should be

“express protection of the right to a fair trial, with the burden falling on defendants to show a fair trial is not possible”.

The Government responded to IICSA’s report and did not support getting rid of limitations. The Government acknowledged the importance of Section 33 and made this point:

“A limitation period also encourages disputes to be resolved timeously thus promoting finality and certainty. Both are key cornerstones of the legal system. As such, the Government’s opening position, ahead of consultation, is that it does not support this option”.


Nor did they support a special limit for claims arising from sexual abuse. I remind the Committee that, in 2017, in the case of Carroll v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police, the Court of Appeal emphasised the unfettered nature of the Section 33 discretion.

My question to the Government at Second Reading was essentially this: what cases do they envisage would now be allowed to proceed which would not have done under the current law? I do not expect an immediate answer, but the Government have now had plenty of time to consider their response. There was a consultation following the Government’s response that I referred to, but it was not particularly large and did not contain consistent answers.

Changing the law of limitation is best an exercise following the careful balancing of respective interests, perhaps by the Law Commission. What appears to have happened here is that the Government, notwithstanding the initial view that I referred to, have decided to come up with some sort of compromise. In doing so, I fear they have produced in Clause 82 a real dog’s dinner of a provision.

Clause 82 is headed:

“Removal of limitation period in child sexual abuse cases”,


but it does not do that. It specifically provides that sexual abuse is in a separate category from, for example, physical abuse, although this was precisely what the Government did not want when they responded to the original recommendations. It contains a rather unclear provision that, when a dispute has been settled, it will no longer be subject to these new provisions. It probably does not include discontinued claims or claims settled otherwise than by way of a formal agreement.

New Section 11ZB contains some very unclear provisions as to the circumstances in which the court can dismiss an action, while at the same time containing in new subsection (2) the provision:

“The court must dismiss the action if the defendant satisfies the court that it is not possible for a fair hearing to take place”.


The interrelationship of new subsections (2) and (3) is incoherent and will inevitably result in litigation. The lack of clarity on what is and is not sexual abuse, and what is and is not settlement, will, I fear, also give rise to litigation.

I agree with the Opposition Front Bench’s probing amendment that we should get rid of new Section 11ZB(3), but that would leave a repetition of what the law is anyway and would not deal with the points about what constitutes sexual abuse or settlement via agreement. My conclusion is that there is absolutely nothing wrong with the law as it is. This rather messy compromise will give rise to unnecessary litigation and I am unsure it will provide remedies where remedies are not already available.

Sexual abuse, particularly of children, is abhorrent, and we now know there has been far more of it than was originally perceived. It is, however, important to point out that claims are not usually made against individual perpetrators; one can understand why there would not be much sympathy for a claim being brought, however late, against such a perpetrator. The usual defendant is, for example, a school, religious organisation, local authority or even central government. They may or may not have any knowledge of what happened but, because of the expanded doctrine of vicarious liability, will be deemed in law to be responsible for what occurred. They may or may not be covered by insurance.

As Lord Brown pointed out, there will come a time when it is quite simply inappropriate, many years later, for claims to be brought before the court. However sympathetic one is to the victims of sexual abuse, the law currently caters adequately for the balance between the interests of claimants and defendants. If we include Clause 82 in the Bill, I fear we will make bad law. The clause should not stand part.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I have signed Amendment 289. This is the first opportunity I have had to speak in Committee because of family illness, and it is good to be back.

In a previous group of amendments last week, the Committee heard the concerns of a number of Peers worried that the Government’s proposals might not ensure a fair route to reporting child sexual abuse. This amendment is just as important, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for tabling it. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, for his helpful exposition of the legal details. I come to this as a champion for victims, rather than from the legal perspective.

Despite the many concerns about those accused of child sexual abuse being able to escape from the accountability provided by the courts, the Bill, in Clause 82, lines 3 to 11, lays out a specific route for those accused who the courts “must”—a strong word; we note that it does not say “consider”—cease action against if the defendant in question claims

“there would be substantial prejudice to the defendant”

if the proceedings were to proceed. To put it bluntly, this is a gift to any defence lawyer. Much of the evidence heard by the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse was scenario after scenario where senior people—clergy, politicians, police officers, magistrates and so on—were able to cover up what had happened because they were in a position of power over the victim, and, quite often, over potential witnesses too.

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[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)]

My Lords, before I speak to Amendment 289, I thank my noble friend Lady Royall, who is not in her place today because she is ill, and Mr Stephen Bernard, both of whom met me recently. We discussed both the impact of the limitation period on victims and survivors of child sexual abuse and their concern over the test of substantial prejudice within this clause. I was moved by what Mr Bernard told me and I thank him for his courage in telling me about what happened to him.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for moving Amendment 289. I hope both my noble friend Lady Royall and the noble Lord will be reassured that I fully understand the sentiment behind the amendment. I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Doocey, and the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Blencathra, for welcoming the general spirit of the clause and for their constructive comments. I make it clear that we absolutely do not want to add additional or unnecessary barriers to stop victims of child sexual abuse from proceeding with their civil claims. So I have asked my officials to look closely at the issues this amendment raises for further consideration, and I aim to provide a further update to your Lordships on Report.

Turning to the opposition of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, to Clause 82 standing part of the Bill, I think he is well known for being very expert in this area and I pay tribute to that. But Clause 82 implements important recommendations made by the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse. The noble Lord raised concerns during Second Reading and again during this debate that the reform is unnecessary and would lead to greater uncertainty and litigation, but, with respect, I disagree. The inquiry looked at this in great detail. It found that the limitation period for civil claims itself acted as a deterrent to victims and survivors—just the very fact that it existed. The inquiry also found that it acted as a deterrent irrespective of the existence of the discretion in Section 33, and the inquiry therefore found that Section 33 did not provide sufficient protection for victims and survivors.

The inquiry found that the regime acted as a barrier to claimants at three stages: first, solicitors’ willingness to take on claims, because it can make it really hard for them to find a lawyer to represent them; secondly, the settlement and valuation of claims, because it can lead to victims accepting lower settlements because of uncertainty about the limitation issue; and, thirdly, the hearings themselves in relation to the limitation period, the effect of which on the claimants was described as “intrusive and traumatic”.

I think the noble Lord will find that it was not this Government who said they were not in favour of these recommendations; it was actually the previous Government. This Government accepted the recommendation in February of this year and are satisfied that Clause 82 is necessary and proportionate. The courts are perfectly capable, as the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, said, of deciding when a claim is inappropriate or unfair and should not succeed. This Government and my department put victims at the heart of everything we do. This is why we believe that this reform is necessary and important for victims and survivors. On that basis, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Davies, to withdraw his amendment and I hope the Committee will join me in supporting Clause 82.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

The noble Baroness is quite right that the response to IICSA came from the previous Government. It was written by the Ministry of Justice and signed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy. While not in any way undermining his contribution to whatever was produced, I suspect that it was the work of government lawyers, approved by him. It was a careful study of the law by reference to, for example, the operation of Section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980. IICSA was not a Law Commission or law reform body, and it covered a huge area of inquisition. It had to cover so many areas that many people doubted whether it had any utility. I am not suggesting that, but it was not primarily concerned with civil claims as such. What I would like to ask the noble Baroness is this: Section 33 has been in operation since 1980. I can tell her, and I am sure she will accept from me, that it is used a great deal by many claimants represented by firms of solicitors. Very often, limitation is not even considered, because as she quite rightly says, very often somebody will delay a considerable time before bringing a claim, and quite rightly so. But why, I ask, is she satisfied, given the wideness of the discretion, that Section 33 does not work as it is?

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

My Lords, it is no answer to say that another Government considered it carefully: different Governments have different priorities. I am not sure that that is going to come as a great surprise to the noble Lord. As for Section 33, this Government are satisfied that it does not provide sufficient protection.

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[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I support the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. I need not take very long, because she has explained her very straightforward amendment impeccably. After the brilliant previous group led by the noble Baroness, Lady Bertin, and her team, perhaps there is no need to go into all the quite serious sexual contact included in Section 9 of the Sexual Offences Act that need not necessarily be tried in the Crown Court.

I support the amendment for two simple but important reasons. First, there is some very serious sexual activity with children that could be tried in the magistrates’ courts—there is not necessarily a problem with that. Secondly, there is the obvious reason of historic child abuse and victims coming forward sometimes only many years after the fact. Those are very good reasons to depart from the norm of the six-month time limit and, indeed, to have no time limits at all.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I absolutely accept much of what the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has said about the awful nature of historic child abuse and the reasons why there is often a delay before bringing forward complaints, but it is important that we do not conflate civil proceedings and criminal proceedings. The earlier group was to do with people claiming damages, where the defendant is not usually the perpetrator. There may be reasons why we have reached a stage where there cannot be a fair trial. I will leave that aside for the moment.

This amendment is concerned with criminal offences. There is not a limitation period for criminal offences generally, subject to the prosecution deciding that so much time has elapsed that it is not appropriate to bring forward a claim. The noble Baroness has experience of occasionally making those decisions in very old cases. The Minister is pointing at me and is going to give a longer and more authoritative answer than I will attempt to do now. I make the point in general terms.

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. While I entirely understand the motivation behind the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, I am not entirely sure that it is necessary. As the noble Lord said, there is no limitation for the bringing of this particular Section 9 offence.

I do not wish to get into my anecdotage, but I remember that, as a law officer, one very often had to deal with historic offences whereby a mature person, in their 50s, 60s or 70s, was being indicted or prosecuted for an offence they committed many years ago against a minor. Had the problem existed that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, envisages through her amendment, that would have been a matter we would have had to consider. As the Minister will no doubt tell us from her experience as someone who worked at a senior level in the Crown Prosecution Service, you have to consider whether there is an adequacy of evidence and whether it is in the public interest to bring that person to trial. The age of the offence might be considered by the prosecutor, but there is no time bar, as I understand it. While I may well be corrected for being out of date and ignorant, I certainly do not think that there is a need for this amendment, although it is well motivated.

I have a suspicion that I have got this entirely wrong and that the Minister is going to tell me that it would have been better if I had kept to my place, but there we are. There are plenty of things that we could do with the Bill—make it shorter, for example—but I am not sure that this amendment is one that we need to add to it.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th January 2026 Lords Chamber

Finally, we must confront the constitutional issue. The European Convention on Human Rights, as given domestic effect by the Human Rights Act, has come to operate as a break on Parliament’s ability to legislate decisively against disruptive protest. The balancing exercise required by Strasbourg jurisprudence is not neutral. It systematically favours protest activity even where it causes serious harm to others. These amendments would simply reassert Parliament’s right to draw clear boundaries in the public interest. I beg to move.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, my Amendment 382H, to which the noble Lords, Lord Godson and Lord Hogan- Howe, have added their names, covers the use in this area of the law of the defence of lawful or reasonable excuse in relation to public order offences.

As the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has said, the law is in a state of incoherence at the moment. It is important, of course, that the law in this area adequately reflects the right to protest, about which there is no issue among any of your Lordships. It also must reflect the interests of third parties significantly affected by protests. The law must be sufficiently clear for the police to be able to know what their powers are and to exercise them sensibly and lawfully. Finally, the law has to be sufficiently clear that members of the public think that it reflects the various interests reasonably involved in the whole question of what lawful protest is and its limits.

The decision in Ziegler was, I think it is broadly accepted, a wrong turning by the Supreme Court; it is accepted by people across political persuasions. I too, like the noble Lord, Lord Davies, very much praise the long and persistent work of Policy Exchange to expose the shortcomings of that decision and the uncertainty it has created in terms of the application of the law. It is never easy for a court to decide what is a reasonable or lawful excuse, but the amendment we have put down assumes that there is sufficient evidence for there to be an offence in the first place. That is a significant rider, of course, but it also provides, in proposed subsection (2), that there is no excuse for the conduct if:

“(a) it is intended to intimidate, provoke, inconvenience or otherwise harm members of the public by interrupting or disrupting their freedom to carry on a lawful activity, or (b) it is designed to influence the government or public opinion by subjecting any person, or their property, to a risk, or increased risk, of loss or damage”.

What is perhaps somewhat unusual about this amendment, as opposed to the other amendments in the group, is subsection (5) of the proposed new clause, which says:

“For the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998, this section must be treated as necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.


As the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said, the European convention and its incorporation in our law by the Human Rights Act has very much changed, or potentially changed, the analysis of all sorts of legal situations, particularly in this area. The common law provides that there are certain rights that we recognise, such as the right to free speech or freedom of association. But, as those of us who remember our legal lectures will be told, those rights exist only in so far as they are not made unlawful by some other intervention, either of the courts or of Parliament. Those rights do not trump anything but, none the less, nobody would doubt that we have freedom of speech and freedom of assembly.

One of the problems about the European convention is that it states rights, and some of the rights are absolute and some of the rights are qualified, such as—relevant to this particular area of the law—Articles 10 and Articles 11. Therefore, it does not provide an absolute trump card that you can never, as it were, contravene a law on the basis that you have an absolute right to freedom of expression under Article 10 or a right to peaceful assembly under Article 11. In fact, the European court in Strasbourg has not said that it is not open to individual countries to decide what are reasonable limits of those rights.

Where I think Ziegler went seriously wrong was, as it were, ducking the issue by simply saying that, quite apart from what Parliament has said about reasonable excuse and the like, a particular court has to decide proportionality for itself, whether that is by a judge or a jury. In particular, paragraph 59 said:

“Determination of the proportionality … with ECHR rights is a fact-specific enquiry which requires the evaluation of the circumstances in the individual case”.


With great respect, that is not very helpful for a court in deciding whether an offence has been committed or whether a defence is permitted in law.

In fact, I think it went too far because the European Court of Human Rights does not say that individual legislatures should not attempt to legislate by striking the balance, to reflect those matters that I referred to at the beginning of my remarks. For example, in the case of Laurijsen v Netherlands, in 2024, the court said that,

“physical conduct purposely obstructing traffic and the ordinary course of life in order to seriously disrupt the activities carried out by others is not at the core of that freedom as protected by Article 11 of the Convention”.

In other words, Strasbourg does not say that Parliament cannot legislate in this space if it thinks it appropriate to reflect the various matters that are so important in deciding what the limits of lawful protest are.

My amendment—and I support other amendments in this group—would make the law a great deal clearer. It says that you should not invoke some vague notion of proportionality; you simply decide whether there is a lawful excuse, in accordance with the fairly straight- forward provisions we have contained in our amendment, and you may remove from your considerations any of the vagueness of proportionality that emanates from the European court at Strasbourg. That is because we can take it that Parliament has decided that, in all the circumstances, it has taken into account all those rights—whether they be rights of common law or rights in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights—and it has satisfied itself, just as the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, satisfied himself about this Bill, that it complies with the European Convention on Human Rights. That is clarity; that is what this amendment seeks.

I imagine that the Minister may have in his notes, when responding to this group, the name of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven. By the look on his face, I am not wrong about that. I greatly respect the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, and am sure that he will come up with some extremely sensible suggestions. However, we know that the law is not in a good place at the moment and that protest is a particular feature—and why not at the moment, when there are, after all, so many things to protest about? We need the law to be clearer sooner than even the diligence of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, may produce. I therefore suggest that the Minister, who I know will be taking on board all the ideas in this space, should consider carefully whether we can remedy this wrong and make the law clearer, so that all involved in this sphere of law can know what the law is.

[The Lord Bishop of Manchester]

My Lords, the more I listen to the debate this afternoon, the more worried I am getting. It seems to me that, over recent years, we have successively tightened up regulations around protests, including quite peaceful protests, making it harder and harder for people to express publicly their deep concerns around a whole range of issues. I am not sure that we need more clarity; that is for judges and juries to determine on the details of a particular case. The whole principle of the jury system is that we are judged by our peers and that, if we have undertaken some activity which has brought us before the courts, it is for other people like us to determine on the particular instances. They can take into account the culture and context, in a way that is impossible to do by way of legislation. I am quite wary about over- specifying here. Sometimes clarity is not necessarily the best thing to achieve.

I have one final small point. A number of amendments in this group and others refer to processions. In the area I grew up in, the Whit Friday processions in Mossley and Saddleworth in Greater Manchester are a thing of beauty and a joy for ever. In whole towns and villages, many roads are closed for much of the day, clearly causing massive disruption to people who would otherwise be travelling on those through roads. I want some assurances from the Minister that there is no intention for Bill to be used to prevent traditional religious processions or other processions simply because they happen to close the road for a while.

I think of the procession in Liverpool city centre a few months ago, when that dreadful incident happened; I guess the bloke driving his car felt that his journey was being impeded. But people must have the right to hold their processions to celebrate the victories of their football teams—even in Liverpool, which, as a Mancunian, I struggle with—to have civic processions, football processions and, please, in Greater Manchester, religious processions. I would be grateful if the Minister could assure us that nothing in this Bill could be used to limit those kinds of peaceful, traditional celebrations and processions.

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[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I will confine what I say to a few points in response to some of the speakers we have heard from.

I found myself in considerable agreement with the general concerns about balance expressed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester. It seems to me that, in some of the consideration of these clauses, we have lost sight of what we agreed in Committee last week. Everybody agreed that questions for the courts and others about considering breaches of public order law—as well as the introduction of new public order provisions—do raise the question of balance between, on the one hand, the right to protest and, on the other, the rights and freedoms of others.

I will resist the temptation to respond in detail to the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, in spite of his claim that he relished the Minister’s demolition of my arguments about stress-testing this legislation for the future and not relying on the benign intentions of this Government. I have concerns about the noble Lord’s amendments; I am sure that the Minister will deal with them. They include questions about what “serious disruption” is and what should amount to “essential services” within the meaning of the Act, as well as he whole question of cumulative disruption, to which we will turn later.

Those concerns—and the Minister’s comments in the previous group on the publication of the review of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven—raise an important issue about the timing of this legislation, compared with the timing of the noble Lord’s expected report. I share the confidence that he will consider all these issues with great care, but might it not have been better had the review come first and the introduction of this legislation and its consideration in this House come second? From what the Minister said in his speech on the previous group, I take it that it is the Government’s present intention to give further consideration to public order law in the light of the noble Lord’s expected report. If that is the case—and if that attention will be given objectively and carefully, and then lead to such legislation as is necessary—that may be the best we can do with the timing that we have now. But my comments stand about the order in which this has been done stand.

I turn to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. I do not propose to give him many hours of pleasure in listening again to arguments about balance as a matter of law; however, I do repeat the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, about how confident he is that police officers, including senior police officers, always get the balance right. That is a difficult assertion to make or defend. I am not suggesting that he went as far as that, but it is very important, not only for the Government but for us as parliamentarians, to consider the possibility that police officers sometimes fail to get the balance right.

I take the point that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, made that it is often a very difficult balance to strike. We need to be very careful in commenting on how the police should strike it and not place too much confidence in the police in the future and, in particular, in the event of changes in government that, as the noble Lord recognised, might be unwelcome to many of us. Nevertheless, they could be changes of an elected Government.

That brings me to Amendment 382H, which was welcomed by the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, and elegantly presented by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. I will draw the Committee’s attention to one problem. Proposed new subsection (5) is not simply definitional; it is designed to act—and would act, in some sense—as an ouster for the purposes of domestic courts of the effect of the convention rights. It uses the language of Article 11 when it states:

“For the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998, this section must be treated as necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.


Article 11 requires that the rights that are respected

“are necessary in a democratic society … for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.

If Parliament legislates that a section must be treated as necessary, it precludes within this jurisdiction any testing of the proposition that such provisions, as interpreted, are necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. That is the province of the European Court of Human Rights to consider. It is a requirement of the Human Rights Act that domestic courts here give effect to the European convention and interpret legislation, where they can, as compatible with the convention.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

Of course, this is an amendment, so the Government will not have given the certification of compliance with the European convention. Were the Minister to accept the amendment and it to become part of the Bill, the Government could then certify that it did comply with the European convention and it would be unnecessary to put that particular provision in. But, as an amendment, it is making clear that that particular provision takes into account that there are convention rights and, notwithstanding those convention rights, the amendment is to have the effect that it does.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, that is a complicated justification of the inclusion of that subsection in the amendment. I just about understand what the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, is saying there. But were his amendment to be accepted, it would raise difficulties about the compliance or cohesion of that amendment with the European Convention on Human Rights. I leave the point there. It is for the Minister to deal with it. If he says he can accept the amendment, subject to later adjustment to take out that subsection, so be it.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I share with the noble Lord, Lord Carter, concern and admiration for our firearms officers and officers generally, who have a very difficult job. I declare an interest having acted for police forces in cases involving the use of firearms. However, I do not share his conclusions about these provisions.

I should also declare an interest as the chairman of the Independent Press Standards Organisation, which regulates the press or those bodies that choose to be regulated by it. I hope that has given me some indication of some of the challenges that journalists face, particularly in reporting court proceedings. Very often, they struggle to cover court cases because of the reduced number of journalists and the general facilities available to newspapers. Were this provision to become law, they would be faced with a presumption that changes the balance and represents, on the face of it, a challenge to our principles of open justice.

Given that there is already a discretion available to the courts on anonymity, I ask the Minister this: what is wrong with the existing law, which provides that there is such a balance to be exercised by the judge? If there is nothing wrong with the law, there is no need to change it. This is a significant change, and the Government must have some very clear thoughts as to why they are making it. What is the situation that now persists which requires a fundamental change in questions of reporting and free speech?

Supposing it is possible to persuade a judge to rebut the presumption which will now exist in these provisions, what would be a good reason for lifting the anonymity which prima facie is going to be imposed by them? It is important, before we make such a significant change in the law, that the rationale is clearly understood.

While not in any way undermining or questioning the importance of protecting officers in appropriate circumstances, I say that the balance is a very subtle one, and that balance should not be disturbed by these provisions. I do not think we even need to consider the European Court of Human Rights’ position. This is an ancient tradition of open justice, and it is one which is, I am afraid to say, threatened by these provisions.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I oppose the stand part notices and support the Government in their clauses. I have heard the proposers of the stand part notices make much of what is a relatively weak argument, suggesting that this is a constitutional outrage, when all that is happening is a change in the assumption about anonymity. Anonymity is already available; this is just about who has to prove whether it should be granted. A lot of hyperbole has been used about this. I accept that the media will make this argument; I do not deny that. I agree that the police should be held accountable; that is not the issue. It is about a very small group of people. I will try to address the point about evidence. A point was made about what evidence had been advanced; I will try to address at least two things.

First, of course, this was built on the Chris Kaba case. Frankly, I think the judge made the wrong decision about anonymity. I believe that because Mr Kaba was arrested having been connected to two shootings and linked to an organised crime gang who had access to firearms. Naming the officer put him at risk of attacks by connected people. Bear in mind that, three years later, within three hours a jury found him not guilty. It was never a very strong case, but why did the judge order the anonymity order to be lifted in those circumstances?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, as I think we all agree, this is a profoundly important issue, and one in which there is realistically no perfectly right answer. But let us start with the position that it remains one of the greatest triumphs of British policing that to this day we do not routinely have armed police officers. The image envisaged by Sir Robert Peel when he established the Metropolitan Police—that of policing by consent and the avoidance of a militarised police force, when he had the example of what he saw on continental Europe at the time—has endured. I have listened anxiously to the speeches today, which have been thoughtful and balanced. But we start, on this side, in His Majesty’s Opposition, with the view that on balance the approach of Clauses 152 to 155 is the right one. I shall say more about that in a moment.

While the vast majority of police officers in this country are unarmed, we know that, in order to protect the public, a few thousand brave officers volunteer to put themselves in harm’s way and become authorised firearms officers. The latest figures show that, as of 31 March 2025, there were 6,367 firearms officers in England and Wales. Of those, 5,753 were operationally deployable. That represented a decrease of 108—or 2%—from the previous year. There is a downward trend in the number of armed police officers, which should be a matter of concern to us all. It has to be arrested.

It is not hard to see why fewer and fewer officers are willing to take on this role. The recent prosecution of, and events surrounding, Martyn Blake demonstrate what can go wrong. Throughout, Martyn Blake was public property. He was left in limbo for two years while awaiting an IOPC investigation, a CPS decision and then a murder trial. As we have heard, he was eventually acquitted in October 2024. Despite that acquittal, the IOPC then announced that it was launching a further investigation for gross misconduct. This remains unresolved. Through all of that, he has been publicly known to everyone.

Matt Cane, the general secretary of the Metropolitan Police Federation, has criticised that in the strongest terms—with which we, on this side, broadly agree. The concern and criticisms which he raised have real-world consequences. Police officers feel that their reasonable use of force may be treated disproportionately or unreasonably after the event in a manner which does not recognise the pressures they face when they make split-second decisions.

During the trial of Martyn Blake, dozens of officers handed in their weapons. There was a serious concern that, in the event of a guilty verdict, police forces across the country would be faced with real, severe shortages of armed officers. The publicity given to all that must have been an aggravating factor for Mr Blake. We have to protect these police officers.

We have heard powerful speeches, from the proposer, my noble friend Lord Black, my noble friend Lady Cash and others, not least the noble and learned Lords, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers and Lord Garnier, either in full support of these stand part notices or asking us to look very carefully at them with a view to doing something along those lines.

There are important issues to consider: open justice; whether or not there should be special treatment for police officers; and concerns about unintended consequences. I remind the Committee of the provisions in Clause 152(3), which says that the court must, first,

“cause the following information to be withheld from the public in proceedings before the court, in each case unless satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so”;

then come the identification details. The court must also

“give a reporting direction … in respect of D”—

the defendant—

“(if one does not already have effect), unless satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so”.

This is putting in place a presumption which can be rebutted.

I feel that this is rather broad. In practice, it would be helpful for the courts and for those who have to deal with applications to act on that presumption and to lift that bar, if this was put rather more clearly, with some examples. I do not have any to put before the Committee today, but I came to that view when listening to the debate. I invite the Government to think very carefully about whether something should be done about the terms in the clause. This might go quite a way to addressing the concerns of those who are legitimately concerned about the wrong sort of special treatment being given to police officers, and about open justice more generally.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

His Majesty’s Opposition are broadly in favour of these provisions, but I ask the noble Lord: if this becomes law, how is a judge going to change his or her approach to the issue of anonymity from the position that prevailed before this change? How is it going to alter things?

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

He is going to start—assuming that the judge is a he—from the position that, unless there is an application to the contrary, the bar against publication is in force. I am asking the Government to consider, before we return on Report, whether guidance can be developed and something put into the Bill which addresses the concerns about it being too difficult and imprecise to address in practice. We can listen to and address this on Report. At the moment, we support the provisions in the Bill, but I advance certain—I would not say reservations—anxieties about how this will work in practice and whether, in fact, it would be an absolute bar. Clearly, one hopes that this is not what is intended and that these words are not there just as some sort of fig leaf.

This is not an easy position. We heard some powerful and very persuasive speeches on the other side from the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, calling for support for our officers, and from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, who, perhaps, more than any of us, knows what is truly involved for these police officers.

We support the clauses as they are. I remind the Committee that, as we stand here debating the issue of anonymity for firearms officers, outside this building, we are being protected by members of this very special group. In and around this building, they work every day—day in, day out—to keep us safe. We are able to continue with our important work of legislating only because of the safety which armed police officers provide. We owe those who protect us a real degree of protection. On the assumption that they are acting in good faith, they must be spared from the anxiety that if something goes wrong—and it will have gone wrong if they feel they have to shoot—they must not then be left exposed, as Martyn Blake was. We have seen how that went wrong. On this basis, for the time being at least, we support these clauses.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 2nd March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I supported the amendment in Committee, and I echo the thanks given by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, to the Minister for listening. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies, who tabled the original amendment. This is a really important clarification, which will help victims and prevent injustices happening in the future.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I apologise for being a little late into the Chamber; things moved much more rapidly than I think any of us anticipated. I spoke about this issue at some length, I fear, at Second Reading, in setting out what I thought were the difficulties legally in this area. In Committee, I invited the Government to give their response to my various submissions, which were effectively that the law, as it existed, provided sufficient safeguards so that claimants could bring their claims much later than the three-year limitation period that applies to a personal injuries claim, provided that they satisfied the various criteria set out in Section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980.

I agree with the Minister that the clause as originally drafted ran the risk of generating further litigation—and I declare my interest in having been involved in a great deal of this kind of litigation over the years. I thought that would be a mistake. I am glad the substantial prejudice provision has been removed from the clause, because it gives some welcome clarity and should minimise the risk of there being further unnecessary litigation in which the precise meaning of the provisions is probed inevitably by one side or another.

This is not quite where I would have liked the law to be, because I think the law is satisfactory as it is. However, I think that I, or anybody else concerned in this area, would differ with the general aim, which is to make sure that those who, for very good reasons, have delayed bringing claims are sufficiently protected by the law and can invite the courts to take into account their delay. The risk that I was concerned about, which was adverted to in the well-known case of A v Hoare, was the real risk that it would be impossible for there to a be a fair trial in certain circumstances because of the lapse of time. Perhaps witnesses have disappeared, documents have gone missing, and then there are all the other factors that can make it impossible for a fair trial to take place.

Although this is not quite the result I would have preferred, I think I look forward to the Minister’s reassurance that the Government’s position will preserve those twin aims: to preserve a claimant’s right to bring claims, albeit late, if there is a good reason, but also to protect a defendant if, because of the lapse of time, it is impossible for there to be fair trial. I hope that she can reassure me that she thinks that this definition will preserve the observations made by the House of Lords in A v Hoare that there comes a time when it is simply too late to have a fair trial. A fair trial, of course, will concern a defendant who probably was not in any way responsible for the perpetration of any sexual abuse and, because of the operation of the doctrine of vicarious liability, was deemed to be responsible—such as a school or other institution—because I do not think anybody has any sympathy for the actual perpetrators, however late a claim may be brought.

It is my observation that it is not a wholly satisfactory situation, but I am grateful to the Government for at least removing some of the ambiguity that was in the original way that the clause was framed.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 9th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I was trying to be brief—this is Report—but, with the leave of the House, I will answer, again as briefly as I can. I know that not everyone agrees and not every jurist agrees, but as far I am concerned, the margin of appreciation was always intended to be an international concept for an international court. Once you get to Strasbourg, it is quite right that a margin of appreciation applies so that Strasbourg respects the legislation and the jurisdiction of domestic legislators and judges.

I do not see it as a domestic legal principle at all, so I do not see that it is for even the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom to be operating a margin of appreciation when it applies the Human Rights Act domestically. I do not see that as the problem that the noble Lord does. The way that you put meat on the bones of human rights protections is with the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, with the detail of the public order statute book; hence I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, about having a proper defence to face concealment. That is the detailed meat on the bones, not drafting a right to protest that pretty much replicates Articles 10 and 11.

If the concern—and I would understand this—is that a future Government will come in and scrap the Human Rights Act and pull out of the ECHR, why then have colleagues piggy-backed on to Section 6 of the Human Rights Act in the way that they drafted the right to protest? That is a mistake. I do not want to give up on the Human Rights Act and the ECHR; I will defend them as long as I have breath in my body. That is the approach because it is a hostage to fortune to have free-standing replication of particular rights in particular statutes, when we have the precious protection of an overarching Human Rights Act that applies to the interpretation of all law.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, the right to protest is an interesting concept. We all agree, on all sides of the House, that there is a right to protest. But, as with most rights—the right to free speech or the right to assemble, for example—in English common law it is not part of our law but part of our common law. We have an absence of fundamental liberties; you are free to do things unless the law otherwise prevents them. So it would be slightly odd to have the right to protest, without any of these other rights, simply inserted into our law. How would it work?

The point about public order legislation is that it always has to balance various interests: the right to protest, along with the right of those affected by those protests—third parties—and of course the police, who have to enforce what is often very difficult and complex legislation. It has to respect those various rights. The European convention did not invent these rights, but they are reflected in its Articles 10 and 11, both of which are qualified rights, not absolute rights. As Strasbourg has made clear, it is perfectly acceptable for individual Governments to determine, by reference to the circumstances that obtain in their countries, what limits are reasonable to place on those rights. Strasbourg has said a number of times that it is not likely to interfere with those. So imposing on top of our public order legislation this right to protest would, I respectfully suggest, cause only confusion in our law, making it difficult for courts and the police.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 9th March 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Faulks]

377: After Clause 142, insert the following new Clause—
“Lawful or reasonable excuse defence for public order offences(1) This section applies to any offence that makes conduct unlawful unless there is an excuse for it and specifies either that the excuse must be a lawful excuse or that it must be a reasonable one.(2) A person has no excuse for the conduct if—(a) it is intended to intimidate, provoke, inconvenience or otherwise harm members of the public by interrupting or disrupting their freedom to carry on a lawful activity, or(b) it is designed to influence the government or public opinion by subjecting any person, or their property, to a risk, or increased risk, of loss or damage.(3) It is immaterial that there are or may be other excuses or reasons for the conduct or that its main purpose may be different.(4) In this section “conduct” includes any act or omission.(5) For the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998, this section must be treated as necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment clarifies when a person has a lawful or reasonable excuse to a public order offence.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, this group of amendments was due to be heard last Wednesday. We were sent away just before midnight but reassured that they would be heard first thing on Monday. Well, it is 9.30 pm; I suppose that is first thing.

Amendment 377 is an important amendment, supported by the noble Lords, Lord Godson, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Davies. It is about lawful or reasonable excuse for public order offences. It is not particularly easy for a legislature to say what could constitute a reasonable excuse. However, the law is currently in a mess. The culprit is the Ziegler case, in which the Supreme Court, by a majority, said that whatever Parliament might say, it was necessary for a court to decide for itself, using the vexed issue of proportionality as a separate assessment, it would seem. Paragraph 59 of the leading judgment describes the process of proportionality as a

“fact-specific inquiry which requires the evaluation of the circumstances in the individual case”.

There has been widespread criticism of the Ziegler case. The courts have been backing away from it—for example, the Colston statue case in the Court of Appeal and last week in two cases, R v ABJ and R v BDN. Policy Exchange, the think tank, has mounted a long-standing campaign against the incoherence that the Ziegler decision has generated. There is absolutely no reason, from Strasbourg’s point of view, why national Governments should not decide on the sensible and appropriate limits on the law in relation to protest. Many noble Lords will remember the 2023 legislation and the provisions concerning tunnelling, major obstruction to transport networks and interfering with key national infrastructure. I was always concerned that superimposing on all these very specific offences the defence of lawful or reasonable excuse without giving any definition was, in effect, simply asking courts, “Do you think that there was a reasonable excuse?” but not saying how they were to approach that issue. I tabled amendments, together with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, without success, to clarify the issue so that courts could know what questions they should ask of themselves other than whether they liked the protest.

During the debate on this provision in Committee, no noble Lord from any party seemed to agree with the Ziegler decision or seek to defend it. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, seemed to dislike the amendment on one particular ground—that it purported to oust the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. I understand his loyalty towards the European Court of Human Rights, but the amendment does not seek to do that. It seeks to confirm that, in our view—I think that it is pretty uncontroversial—this amendment complies with the European Convention on Human Rights. It respects a balance of the various rights, and the House will know only too well that Articles 10 and 11 are qualified rights. It is clearly important that the law in relation to protests should take into account not only the rights of protesters but those of all those parties whose lives could be completely upset by the exercise of those rights and, of course, the police, who have to interpret the law and administrate the law, so coherence is most important.

I then looked again at what the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, had to say in response to this group. I want to be fair to the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, who has been indefatigable in the course of this Bill, dealing with any number of amendments, and often with large groups. I do not blame him altogether for not seizing on the Ziegler point with any great detail, but I fear that his answer was simply not good enough. He merely said

“the Government are not persuaded that this amendment is needed. Public order offences have been developed to ensure that those reasonable excuse defences apply only when appropriate and respect the need to balance”,—[Official Report, Commons, 13/1/26; col. 1634.]

et cetera. It was a perfectly fair statement of what the aims of any Government are but not an answer to the inadequacy of the Ziegler case. Therefore, I ask the Minister directly—sorry, it is not going to be the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, replying, as he is getting a well-earned rest, but the noble Lord, Lord Katz—whether he says, on behalf of the Government, that the Ziegler decision was correct, or does he accept, like almost any other legal commentator, that the decision was unfortunately wrong, as other judges seem now to accept? If that is the case, the law is incoherent, and it must be changed.

I fear I must join my noble friend Lord Pannick and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, who is not currently in his place, in saying that it is simply not good enough to say that we must wait until the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, speaks on the subject—if he were to speak on the subject, because, of course, that may be some time in the future. Then there is the vexed question of legislative time.

We need to sort out the law in relation to protest. This amendment, whose drafting has not been criticised in any way, states what could or should constitute a reasonable excuse or lawful excuse. The time has come to clarify the law for everybody’s sake. I beg to move.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to my noble friend Lord Faulks’ amendment and I support it. To repeat a point I made on an earlier amendment, the police generally need simplicity, not complexity. Generally, Ziegler created complexity in what, in that case, was the simplest of offences. It was all about wilful obstruction of the highway. That used to be fairly straightforward. It was on a highway; it got obstructed and it was done wilfully: that was the offence. That is all that had to be proved. Of course, it is used not only in cases of protest, but Ziegler said that, in the case of protesters blocking the highway, that simple test could not be applied; it had to consider further issues. In fact, what it said was that the person could be convicted of obstructing the highway only if the prosecution could persuade the court that a conviction would be a proportionate interference in his or her convention rights, which, in effect, shifted it for the police to prove proportionality when someone was blocking the highway.

My point is that, although we understand the intellectual background to that, it has left the law in such a confused position that the cops do not know whether to enforce it at the moment of the crime. That is never a good position to be in. There is a secondary issue, which is that senior officers often become involved in planning for marches that are to happen in the next week or two weeks. They probably have a little bit more time to consider these issues, but frankly, the police have always used discretion. People block the highway fairly regularly; we all do. If you stop in your car, if you are walking on the highway, you can block it, so they do not arrest everybody who blocks the highway. They do not arrest every protester who is walking on the highway and clearly is obstructing it. That is what marchers do; it happens all the time. Of course, it becomes a bit tricky when a group within the protest decides to sit down in the middle of Oxford Circus and want to stay there for some time. That, I think we might all accept, is unreasonable. The police will try to persuade them. At some point, they might want to intervene and say, “Actually, I think you need to move or, alternatively, you are going to get arrested. There is a consequence to what you are doing. That’s your right, but there will be a consequence”.

I am afraid this judgment has left the police really confused. This is about obstruction of the highway, but it applies to all the different aspects of public order law. I do not think that it is fair to ask the police to start balancing human rights on the street. Of course, there is the issue of reasonableness, which is where discretion comes in—they are not going to arrest everybody and should exercise their powers only if somebody refuses to move or repeatedly causes an aggravation to the simple offence—but the danger of this judgment is that the law is confused and the police are caught in the middle. This amendment is an opportunity to clarify it. I think that is reasonable and I support it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who took part in this short but important debate, and I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Davies of Gower, for tabling these amendments which seek to narrow the existing lawful or reasonable excuse defences that may be used for public order offences.

It may be helpful to set out how a lawful excuse works in practice. A person is automatically treated as having a lawful excuse only under two specific circumstances. The first is if the defendant honestly believes that the person who is entitled to consent to the damage has given consent or would have consented if they knew of the circumstances—for example, an honest belief that the owner of a car in which a child was locked on a hot day consented, or would have consented, to the defendant smashing the window to get the child out. The second is if the defendant acts to protect their own or someone else’s property and they honestly believe both that the property needs immediate protection and that their actions are reasonable—for example, a person damages one person’s property while accessing the property of another to prevent a fire. It does not matter whether a person’s belief in those circumstances is reasonable or justified; it just needs to be honest.

Whatever the failings of, or, indeed, one’s views on, the Ziegler judgment, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said in his sagacious contribution, case law has moved on and the Supreme Court has made subsequent rulings which chart a clearer path. It is the case that the right to private property will always need to be balanced with other convention rights, such as the right to protest and freedom of expression. This will have to be judged on a case-by-case basis, but leading case law has set out the parameters, and the Court of Appeal did not say that the exercise of a person’s convention rights could never form the basis of lawful excuse for criminal damage.

While I acknowledge the concerns of noble Lords, I have a great deal of sympathy for the arguments advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. It is for the Crown Prosecution Service and the courts to decide what may constitute lawful or reasonable excuse in individual cases. Further, the current scope of the defence allows the CPS the necessary flexibility to consider the full circumstances of each case on its merits. The types of behaviour that noble Lords have suggested, such as intimidating or harming members of the public or the risk of damaging property, are unlikely to be considered a reasonable excuse. Therefore, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

I am grateful to all those who took part in this debate. I think the issues have rather narrowed between those who have taken part in it. For the first time during the course of these debates on this issue, we had some drafting points from the noble Lord, Lord Marks. They have come late, but none the less I will deal with them.

The first point is that the noble Lord did not like my proposed provision that says that it is not an excuse if you intend

“to intimidate, provoke, inconvenience or otherwise harm members of the public by interrupting or disrupting their freedom to carry on a lawful activity”.

That does not seem to be a very reasonable excuse to me, so it seems a very sensible thing to put in the amendment.

Secondly, the noble Lord did not like subsection (3), where it says that it is immaterial that there may be other purposes. If the defendant does not have a good excuse, it is no good saying, “My overall excuse, because I happen to support Just Stop Oil, is a good one”. You cannot rely on that.

In his final point, the noble Lord stuck to his argument that this was an attempt to oust the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Act 1998. I repeat the point that it is not that. Whatever the future may hold, we are still part of the European Convention on Human Rights. But the convention requires the balancing of rights, including that they have to be treated as necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This provision reflects all those factors in a perfectly appropriate balance. Therefore, it complies with the European Convention on Human Rights.

I come finally to this point. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, quite rightly said, pointing to a recent judgment of the President of the Supreme Court, that the courts are backing away from Ziegler. I am not surprised. It sits very uneasily with the jurisprudence in this area generally. The decision is almost moribund. But it is time to give it a decent burial. It is time to conclude that the law should be clear, that we can understand what it means and that the police can understand what it means, so that the whole business of putting forward spurious excuses will cease and we can have a proper and sensible law in relation to protest. I wish to test the opinion of the House.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 11th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I thoroughly welcome these sensible and proportionate amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, which he more than ably explained. I was prompted to speak on Amendment 393B having just read the Government’s Protecting What Matters action plan. I have plenty to say on that, but your Lordships will be relieved that I am not going to do so now.

In the plan, the Government readily admit that trust in institutions is in decline and that social cohesion is fraying. I am concerned that, if Clauses 168 to 171 go through unamended, it could create a problem of further distrust in policing. Despite the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, saying that there is not a huge gap between the amendment and the Government in relation to presumed anonymity for armed police officers, the Government are proposing an unprecedented rejection of the principles around open justice and, more importantly for me, press freedom. I am concerned that the clauses will limit the ability of the press to report in any meaningful way on cases involving the use of lethal force by police officers.

Replacing the presumption of anonymity should not leave officers vulnerable or unsafe, but the amendment would allow the power to grant anonymity if there are specific risks to safety or if it is in the public interest, to prevent harm. This is a blunt instrument. It would set up a privacy regime that would shut the media out from scrutinising the state’s exercise of power with guns. I cannot see how the public will not see that as covering up when the media will be denied any meaningful opportunity even to contest such anonymity, let alone to report. That is the concern. I am sure that the Minister will explain.

It is interesting that the police have recently been asking for greater freedom to release more details in relation to some investigations. This is not in terms of armed police, but police forces have recognised that suppressing information can lead to misinformation. That can turn nasty if the public feel that there has been a cover-up.

That is a move to transparency to ensure public consent and build trust, which goes in the right direction. I am just worried, although it is not their intention, the clauses will be a step back from a duty to have candour and from the state being transparent when, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, pointed out, an armed officer representing the state takes another human being’s life. We should not just grant automatic anonymity in that way. We have to at least allow the media to ask questions and scrutinise.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, my name is on the series of amendments that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has spoken to, and I will make a few brief comments in support of them. Before I do, I shall make a few observations about Amendment 394. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, has not yet spoken to it, and he may be able to answer all the points I will make.

I start by saying that I share—with all noble Lords, I think—concern and admiration for the police generally, particularly for police officers who undertake willingly the task of bearing arms on our behalf in circumstances that may conceivably lead to serious harm to them and which call for difficult judgments to be made, often on very little information and in a split second. I entirely understand the concern.

I also wonder whether all these amendments are not significantly inspired by the Chris Kaba case and the officer, Martyn Blake. As to the decision not to grant him anonymity, it is very arguable that the judge came to the wrong decision. But, of course, we must bear in mind that hard cases make bad law and that there is a danger that, from one case, we then proceed to legislate in a way that overreacts and makes a change which is not really justified.

I will deal with Amendment 394, on presumption against prosecution. I am concerned about this. The idea of a presumption against prosecution does not find its way into the criminal law very often. I was able to find only one, the much-criticised Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Act 2021, where the then Conservative Government brought in a limit to the prosecution—a legal threshold in relation to overseas acts by serving forces rather than police officers. In certain exceptional circumstances there would be a presumption against there being a prosecution after five years. That was much criticised. What I struggle with in this amendment is that, before any prosecution is brought—the Minister will know this better than anyone, really, in your Lordships’ House—there has to be a consideration of whether there is sufficient evidence to prosecute, and, secondly, whether it is in the public interest to prosecute.

The factors referred to in this amendment, for example, in proposed new subsection (5)—

“In making a decision to which this section applies, a relevant prosecutor must give particular weight to the following matters … the exceptional demands and stresses to which authorised firearms officers are subjected to in the course of their duties, and … the exceptional difficulties of making time-sensitive judgments”—


are absolutely right, but I respectfully say that those are the very considerations that would be taken into account by the prosecution in the ordinary course of affairs when deciding whether there is sufficient evidence and deciding whether it is in the public interest to prosecute. This would put into the criminal law a presumption that does not have a satisfactory precedent and place officers in a particular position. I feel we must leave it to the prosecutors to take all these matters into account in deciding whether it is appropriate to prosecute.

I should perhaps declare an interest, in that I was a barrister who acted on behalf of the police in one of those few cases where an officer did, in fact, unfortunately, kill a suspected criminal. The case went all the way to the House of Lords. It is called Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police. Ashley’s relatives were represented by Sir Keir Starmer, as he was not then, whose junior was the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hermer, as he was not then. The argument involved very much the same issues that we have discussed this evening about objective and subjective mistakes. A very junior officer, as part of the armed response unit, thought he had seen a sudden movement. He opened fire and unfortunately killed Mr Ashley. He was prosecuted for murder and acquitted, because it was a mistake. Civil proceedings followed in due course. It was difficult, but he clearly made a mistake and the jury had no difficulty in acquitting him.

That brings me to the amendment suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Carter. I understand what has been said over the years in relation to those matters, but they are very much taken into consideration by juries in any event. Self-defence would include all those matters, or the urgency of the situation. Although I will listen carefully to what the noble Baroness has to say, I am not at the moment convinced that we need to change the law.

I said that I do not like presumptions in the context of the criminal law. I do not like presumptions much anyway, which brings me to the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. What worries me about the presumption is: what rebuts that presumption? At the moment, the law provides that a judge decides in the particular circumstances whether it is appropriate to grant anonymity, and he or she will take into account all the factors, including the risk of danger to the officer if he or she is named, which is entirely proper. But this presumption would, I respectfully suggest, mean that the judge would be getting a very strong steer from Parliament that he should grant anonymity unless—and we do not really know what the “unless” is.

Granting anonymity runs contrary to the principle of open justice. Although one has considerable sympathy for any officer caught up in the situation, nobody is above the law, whether they are officers or not.

The press has a duty to report cases, particularly cases of this sort, where serious consequences have followed from the action of the state. We know that journalists are thinner on the ground than they once were and often have to cover different courts. I speak with some experience as the chairman of the press regulation body and knowing the pressures that journalists are under. They themselves often have to make representations to judges, in all sorts of circumstances, as to whether there should be an anonymity order or not. They might be faced with having to persuade a judge who has already been told that there is a presumption of anonymity. That is a hard burden to discharge for a journalist who may or may not have some legal representation. As a result, it seems to me almost inevitable that all officers will be granted anonymity.

If that is what Parliament thinks is appropriate, so be it, but let us not delude ourselves into thinking that presumption will mean anything other than automatic anonymity in these circumstances. I think this is a step that should not be taken. Although all these amendments concern a very real issue and concern, open justice and fairness to all seem to me to point to the result that the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, should be accepted and the other amendments rejected.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

Before the noble Lord sits down, could he just consider one thing? He made some very strong points. One thing that concerns the officers—although the noble Lord is quite right to identify that there have been relatively few criminal charges over the period—and the reason they are not persuaded by the CPS, or whoever is making the decision, taking into account only sufficiency of evidence and public interest, is that on every occasion the CPS has brought a criminal charge, the jury has disagreed with it. It leads you to wonder what led to that decision-making process, because all the points the noble Lord made about all that is considered do not survive the test of a jury when it arrives.

That is why there is this concern. I am with the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. Is this the perfect solution? I am not a lawyer and not in a position to judge whether it is the best solution, but it is why this question is raised so frequently—not because of the frequency of the cases but of how often they have been cleared in a very short time after all the careful consideration by very good lawyers who come to a completely different judgment from that offered by a jury.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

The prosecuting authorities have decided in these cases, for whatever reason, that they think it appropriate to bring a prosecution, to bring the matter before a court where a jury determines what is right. We trust juries—I know that it is a contentious issue at the moment as to what extent we trust them and in what circumstances—but in cases of this sort juries will remain, whatever happens to the prospective reforms. It shows that juries are perfectly capable of taking into account all the pressures that face officers in the situation the noble Lord describes and they regularly do so.

I am content to leave it for the prosecution to decide whether there is a case. Of course, if, having heard the prosecution’s evidence, the judge decides that there is not a prima facie case, the case can stop at that stage. Then the matter comes before a jury, and the common sense of 12 citizens decides—almost inevitably, it seems, reflecting all the factors we have discussed—that in very rare circumstances would it be appropriate to convict an officer. Precisely as the noble Lord has said, these are rare circumstances; often, the officer has not discharged a gun in anger before—we are not talking about Los Angeles or New York—so I am content with the situation.

[Lord Paddick (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I should declare an interest as a paid adviser to the Metropolitan Police, although I have not discussed this issue with the police.

I came this evening looking to support the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, but a couple of things that he said have caused me some concern. One is about the principle of open justice—yes, it is important to maintain public confidence, and it requires open examination of the evidence, but in police shooting cases, I am not sure that it is a requirement to identify the individual officer concerned. Exactly what happened during the incident has to be heard in open court and openly reported, but not necessarily the identity of the officer at that stage.

The noble Lord also tried to say that firearms officers did not have a unique role, but they do in the use of lethal force. They discharge their weapons on the understanding that it is highly likely that if they do, somebody will die. They aim at the largest body mass and therefore a fatality is the most likely outcome. That is something that no other police officer who is unarmed, or prison officer, as the noble Lord mentioned, would have to face. Therefore, the role of a firearms officer is unique for those reasons.