Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Clement-Jones

Report stage
Wednesday 18th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I express from these Benches our very strong support for these comprehensive amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, which she has characteristically introduced so well and to which so many noble Lords have spoken so eloquently in support. I also want to express our concerns regarding the Government’s proposed alternative, Amendment 429B.

In this group, we confront digital harm that is not incidental but engineered by design. AI chatbots are no longer a futuristic curiosity but deeply embedded the lives of our children. They are designed not merely as tools but as confidantes, mentors, companions and, in some cases, explicit romantic partners. Their anthropomorphic features create dangerous emotional dependency. Without statutory safeguards, these bots can provide explicit information on how to self-harm. This is not a flaw but a design feature that drives engagement, and we cannot allow the generative power of AI to become a generator of despair.

We are not debating theoretical risks, as many noble Lords have said today. We are debating the forces that led to the tragic deaths of Sewell Setzer III, mentioned by a number of noble Lords, and Adam Raine, in the United States. Their families are pursuing legal action in the US on the basis that deceptively designed, inadequately safeguarded chatbots can be treated as defective products, and that developers should bear full legal liability when systems encourage, facilitate or fail to interrupt a user’s path to suicide.

I welcome the Government’s admission that a legal loophole exists in the UK. However, their proposed remedy, Amendment 429B, gives us a choice between the clarity of primary legislation through the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and the convenience of the Executive. In contrast, the noble Baroness’s amendments provide clarity and embed safety duties in the Bill. Like my noble friend, I highlight Amendment 433, which deals with targeting the engineered features that keep children hooked. We know that bots guilt-trip users who try to end conversations. For a child, this is not a user interface quirk; it is emotional manipulation. These amendments would prohibit such coercive engagement techniques and, crucially, require bots to signpost users to help when asked about health, suicide or self-harm.

The primary legislation route offered by these amendments is the only fully viable and responsible path. If the noble Baroness wants to test the opinion of the House, we will support her in the Lobby. Should we be unable to secure her amendments, we would need to take a view on Amendment 429B. Four specific binding assurances would be required before we could consider supporting it; without them, it is nothing but a dangerous blank cheque. As changing these sections effectively rewrites the criminal threshold of the Online Safety Act, the Government must commit to the equivalent of the super-affirmative procedure for all significant policy choices, including amendments to core definitions or the expansion of duties beyond priority legal content. Standard procedures will not give this House the scrutiny needed.

Regarding mandatory supply chain transparency, we need a firm commitment that regulations will include a statutory mandate for providers to document and share their technical blueprints with Ofcom. Without this, the regulator cannot do its job. The Minister must confirm that the power will be used to tackle the issues raised by subsections (6) and (7) of Section 192 of the Online Safety Act, ensuring that chatbots cannot evade regulation simply because they lack a human mens rea. A bot does not intend harm, but it can be designed to cause it. The Minister must commit that any new regulations will explicitly disapply the requirement to prove human intent for AI-generated content. Regulations must define control across the entire AI supply chain so that accountability is not lost in a black box.

Finally, we would require a clear assurance that this power will not be used to alter the legal position of services that are not AI services. The scope of Amendment 429B must not drift beyond its stated purpose. If the Government are serious when they say that no platform gets a free pass, that must apply equally to generative AI models that, as we speak, are reshaping the childhoods of so many of our citizens. Safety by design must be the price of entry into the UK market, not an aspiration deferred to secondary legislation.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, both the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and the Government are trying to solve the same problem, but with different solutions. I have to say that I find both solutions wanting. I feel that the position I see solidifying in the House is that we must accept either the Government’s amendment or the noble Baroness’s amendment, that something must be done and that this is binary, and I am not sure that I can accept that. I commend the aims of the noble Baroness’s campaign and I hope that we can find some common ground, but I have a number of questions about her amendments.

The approach that the noble Baroness has taken in her Amendments 422D and 433 is to create criminal offences for a person to create or even supply an AI chatbot that produces a selection of prohibited content. That would place criminal penalties on individuals who are involved in the creation of such a chatbot. The Online Safety Act applies civil penalties when companies violate the regulations: the companies are fined by Ofcom if they allow prohibited content to be published on their platform. These amendments would apply criminal sanctions punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment, but who is liable for these criminal penalties? Is it the software engineer who developed the chatbot? Is it the employee who presses the “publish” button that brings the AI online? Is it the senior management team who oversaw it, or the investors who commissioned it? Is it the CEO of the whole company? It is not clear to me, and it would be useful if the noble Baroness could clear that up.

The offence of supplying such a chatbot might also be problematic. If an AI chatbot app is listed on the App Store, and the AI could in some way be used by a person in the manner described, should Apple be criminally liable for that? Similarly, I have a few concerns about the risk assessment that the amendment would require AI providers to undertake. For example, proposed new subsection (5)(e) would require that a provider

“assesses the risks to equality of treatment of individuals”.

I question whether it is the Government’s role to mandate the target audience of a business product. It is worrying enough to believe that it is meritocratic to mandate quotas within organisations, but it is quite another stance to say that the very reason for a business’s existence, its output, should be directed by legislation.

As I have made clear, we do not oppose the noble Baroness’s objective of addressing the harms of AI with this amendment, but simply saying that there is a problem and that doing anything is better than doing nothing, irrespective of the problems with that something, is not a proper way to legislate. It is a recipe, I suggest, for bad law. However, I understand that the noble Baroness is trying to make the Government take action. It is up to the Government to come to Parliament with a sufficient solution. The Minister may try to say that the Government do have a sufficient solution in government Amendment 429B, but that would be wholly incorrect. I am quite shocked that the Minister has even considered bringing this amendment to the House, and I can only imagine what he might have said about it if he were standing where I am now.

Amendment 429B grants the Secretary of State sweeping Henry VIII powers to amend the entire Online Safety Act for the purpose of mitigating harms presented by AI-generated content. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, would be delighted to hear me say that this is an egregious attempt by an overreaching Government to exploit a serious issue to centralise power in the hands of the Secretary of State. It is almost unprecedented to grant a Minister the ability to amend an entire Act of Parliament. With this amendment, the Government are doing away with every bit of lip service they have paid to the importance of parliamentary scrutiny or their democratic mandate. The amendment would give not only this Government, who have made it clear that they are very happy running a centralised state with digital IDs, but every future Government the ability to amend online regulations and curtail the freedoms of providers. Indeed, a future Reform Government might go in the opposite direction and remove all regulations on AI. The noble Lord should reflect on that, too.

I ask the Minister to imagine that the glove was on the other hand: that he was standing at this Dispatch Box and I was the Minister proposing to give my Government these powers. There is no way that he would support such sweeping powers to amend an Act of Parliament by ministerial fiat. This is the Henry VIII power to end all Henry VIII powers. It cannot be allowed to make its way into the Bill and, when it is called, I will take pleasure in opposing it in the Lobbies.

Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Clement-Jones

Report stage
Wednesday 11th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to this group of amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. With the finishing post in sight, I will be extremely brief.

These amendments correctly identify a crisis at the heart of our police service. There is a consensus that our police are currently drowning in a sea of unnecessary paperwork, and my noble friend Lady Doocey’s policy paper, Policing Fit for the Future, makes the case with devastating clarity. It records the testimony of chief constables, who warn that low morale and heavy workloads are being compounded by

“archaic IT systems—some over 50 years old”

that force highly trained officers to spend more time as data entry clerks than as crime fighters. The Government’s own White Paper, From Local to National: A New Model for Policing, acknowledges this failure. It rightly sets out a mission to “strip away the barriers” that prevent officers focusing on the public’s priorities. We on these Benches welcome the ambition to automate manual processes and deliver millions of hours back to the front line.

I am not going to go into detail on the amendments, but we cannot support them as drafted. They risk micromanaging the police through the statute book and could become relics of a different era within a few short years. However, I urge the Minister to take the spirit of these proposals to heart and ensure that they are reflected in the new national policing model.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for bringing forward this group of amendments. Together, they address a theme that will be familiar to many across the House: the need to ensure that police officers are able to focus their time on policing rather than bureaucracy.

Amendment 409D concerns the publication of enforcement data for a number of offences that have become a source of considerable public concern, including shoplifting, offences involving blades, phone theft and fare evasion. We lend our strong support to the amendment. Greater transparency around enforcement activity can only help to strengthen public confidence and provide a clearer picture of how policing resources are being deployed.

Amendment 409E addresses the volume of paperwork that officers are required to complete. In Committee, it was rightly observed that administrative burdens can too often draw officers away from the front line. A review of the scale of those requirements and how they might be simplified would therefore be a sensible and constructive step.

Finally, Amendment 409F raises the question of data sharing and the efficiency of the systems that underpin case preparation and charging decisions. As many noble Lords will know, delays and inefficiencies in the exchange of information between the police and the Crown Prosecution Service can slow down the progress of cases and place additional strain on already stretched resources.

There is a significant amount of work that goes into the redaction of police documents before they are sent to the CPS, often for the documents simply to be sent back because they are overredacted. Furthermore, many of the cases the police redact may not end up being prosecuted. It is clear that this is a significant waste of police time and money, and my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe is right: it would make more sense for the CPS to take charge of the redaction of documents that may enter the public domain, given that it would have a far smaller number of documents to trawl through.

Taken together, these amendments all speak to a wider objective: ensuring that the system surrounding policing work is as efficient as possible, allowing officers to focus on preventing crime, catching offenders and protecting the public. The police should be spending as much time on the front line as possible, rather than being encumbered by unnecessary paperwork. I hope that the Minister will give them careful consideration and, as always, I look forward to his response.

Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Clement-Jones

Report stage
Monday 2nd March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I welcome the Government’s technical amendments. We spent some time in Committee debating the definition of a “thing” used to generate horrific CSA images. I am pleased that the Government have tabled Amendment 201 to clarify that a “thing” explicitly includes a service.

Modern AI is not just a program sitting on a hard drive but an ephemeral, cloud-based service. By adopting this broader language, we ensure that those who provide the underlying infrastructure for CSA image generation cannot evade responsibility through technical loopholes. These may appear to be technical drafting changes, but they provide the necessary teeth for the primary offences in Clauses 65 to 67.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, the government amendments in this group are largely consequential and minor drafting changes. They relate to the important topic of child sexual abuse image generators. I have little to say to this group other than that the topic which they address is one of serious and urgent concern.

The rapid emergence of generative AI has presented new and troubling challenges. The recent Grok AI scandal, in which an AI model generated harmful sexual content publicly, some of which involved children, highlighted the potential for mainstream tools to be misused in ways that normalise or distribute abusive material. That episode underlines why robust legal safeguards are essential as technology evolves.

The Government have continued to delay passing legislation regarding AI regulation, which was alluded to as far back as 2024. I thank the Minister for his assurances that the Government will continue to monitor developments in this area and work with industry to protect children from abuse and exploitation.

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[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, from these Benches, I strongly support Amendment 209, which was so convincingly spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. I was very pleased to have signed it, alongside the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes.

This amendment is a vital safeguard against the “innovation first, safety later” culture of big tech. Although the Bill will rightly prohibit the creation of models specifically designed to generate CSA images, it remains silent on general-purpose models that can be easily manipulated or jailbroken to produce the same horrific results. As the unacceptable use of tools such as Grok—referred to by my noble friend Lady Benjamin in her powerful speech—has recently illustrated, we cannot leave the safety of our children to chance. We face a technological and moral emergency. The Internet Watch Foundation, represented at the meeting today which the noble Lord, Lord Russell, and my noble friend mentioned, has warned of a staggering 380% increase in confirmed cases of AI-generated child exploitation imagery. The noble Lord, Lord Russell, is right that the extent of this abuse is sickening beyond imagination.

The amendment would mandate a safety-by-design intervention, requiring providers to proactively risk-assess their services and report identified risks to Ofcom within 48 hours. In Committee, the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, pushed back against this proposal, arguing that it

“would place unmanageable and unnecessary operational burdens on … the National Crime Agency and Ofcom”.—[Official Report, 27/11/25; col. 1533.]

He further claimed that these measures risk creating “legal uncertainty” by “duplicating” the Online Safety Act. Both assertions need rebutting. First, protecting children from an industrial-scale explosion of AI-generated abuse is not an unnecessary burden; it is the primary duty of our law enforcement and regulatory bodies. Secondly, we cannot rely on the theoretical protections of an Online Safety Act designed for a world before generative AI. Ofcom itself has maintained what might be called a tactical ambiguity about how the Act applies to stand-alone AI chatbots and large language models.

Alongside the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, who we will support if she puts the amendment to a vote, we ask for an ex ante duty: providers must check whether their models can be used to generate CSAM before they are released to the public. Voluntary commitments and retrospective enforcement are simply not enough. The Government have already committed to this principle; it is time to put that commitment into statute. I urge the Minister to accept Amendment 209 and ensure that we move away from ex post measures that address harm only after a child has been victimised.

The current definitions of “search” and “user-to-user” services do not neatly or comprehensively capture these new generative technologies. We cannot allow a situation where tech developers release highly capable models to the public without first explicitly checking whether they can be used to generate CSAM. Voluntary commitments and retrospective civil enforcement are simply not enough. We need this explicit statutory duty in the Bill today and I urge the Minister to accept Amendment 209.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 209, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, would require providers of relevant online services to assess and address the risks that their platforms may be used for the creation, sharing or facilitation of child sexual abuse material, placing a strengthened duty on them to take preventive action. More than anyone in this Chamber, I fully recognise the intention behind strengthening preventive mechanisms and ensuring that providers properly assess and mitigate risks to children. Requiring companies to examine how their services may facilitate abuse is, in principle, entirely sensible. The scale and evolving nature of online exploitation means that proactive duties are essential.

However, I have some concerns about the proposed mechanism, on which I hope the Minister may also be able to provide some input. The amendment appears to rely on providers conducting their own risk assessments. That immediately raises several practical questions, such as what objective standard those assessments would be measured against, whether there would be statutory guidance setting out minimum criteria, and how consistency would be ensured across companies of vastly different sizes and capabilities. There also remains the crucial question of what enforcement mechanisms would apply if an assessment was superficial or inadequate. Without clear parameters and oversight, there is a danger that such a system could become uneven in practice.

I would welcome reassurance from the Minister as to how the Government intend to ensure that risk-based duties in this space are transparent and robust for the purposes of child protection. The question is not whether we act, but how. We all share the same objective of reducing the prevalence of child sexual abuse material and protecting children from exploitation. The challenge is ensuring that the mechanisms we legislate for are clear and enforceable in practice. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

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[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the wise words of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson. Let me say from the outset that, in principle, on these Benches we conditionally support Amendment 239A, which has been spoken to so powerfully by the noble Lord, Lord Nash.

The noble Lord very clearly set out the urgent issues involved, as did my noble friend Lady Benjamin and the noble Lord, Lord Russell, and all of us who were there in the same meeting which we have referred to before. We are at a technological and moral crisis point, as we have debated in a previous group regarding child sexual abuse material online. We face a children’s mental health catastrophe, and the ubiquity of child sexual abuse material is a central driver of that catastrophe.

The noble Lord, Lord Nash, has explained that his amendment would mandate that manufacturers and importers of smartphones and tablets ensure their devices satisfy a CSAM requirement to prevent the creation, viewing, and sharing of such material.

The question, however, clearly arises as to whether this would undermine encryption or privacy. We recognise that the noble Lord, Lord Nash, in his revised Amendment 239A, does indeed include a duty of privacy in his regulations. In my view, the thing to avoid is the chance that a technological fix of this kind could involve some degree of surveillance. I do agree with the noble Lord, Lord Russell, that, at first sight, the technology looks extremely promising, as the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, mentioned, but, before taking this further, we need to be absolutely sure about the robustness of this technology and its impact on privacy.

By requiring software to be preloaded at the system level, we would move away from the model of parental controls and platform responsibility, and we would place the duty on the manufacturers who profit from these devices. Quite apart from that, we do, of course, also need to ensure that the platforms take action.

The Minister may promise further consultation, but we do not need much more consultation to know that the status quo is failing; we need to find a solution now rather than playing an endless game of digital catch-up. As other others have urged, I hope that the Government will take a look at this proposal urgently, closely and seriously.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this group of amendments addresses one of the gravest and most distressing areas of criminality: the sexual exploitation of children and the creation and circulation of child sexual abuse material. There will be no disagreement among noble Lords about the objective behind these amendments. The scale of this crime is deeply alarming and becoming increasingly technologically sophisticated. The question before us is not whether we act but how.

I turn to the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Nash. Once again, I entirely understand and support the underlying aim. The goal of ensuring that devices supplied in the UK have highly effective, tamper-proof system software capable of preventing the transmission or viewing of CSAM is a commendable one. Preventing abuse at source is always preferable to prosecuting it after the harm has occurred.

I recognise that Amendment 239A includes express provisions intended to safeguard user privacy, requiring that any such software must operate in a way that does not collect, retain, copy or transmit data outside the device, nor determine the identity of the user. It also provides for affirmative parliamentary approval of the regulations.

However, it is still hard to overlook the practical challenges that may arise from this amendment. Determined offenders frequently exploit encrypted platforms and modify operating systems, often using overseas-hosted services. A requirement limited to devices supplied for use in the UK could be circumvented by overseas purchases or software alterations. Even with privacy safeguards written into the regulation-making power, this amendment may still raise complex issues relating to encryption, cyber security, technical feasibility and enforcement. Mandating tamper-proof software across all relevant devices would represent a significant expansion of the regulatory framework established under the Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Act 2022.

While I strongly support the objective of forestalling child sexual exploitation and disrupting the circulation of abuse material, I am not yet persuaded that this amendment provides a workable legislative solution. I look forward to hearing from the Minister how the Government are strengthening preventative technology and ensuring that industry plays a meaningful role in protecting children, while maintaining a framework that is technically feasible and legally robust.

Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Clement-Jones

Report stage
Wednesday 25th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I am not sure whether I am in order. I am looking at the noble Lord, Lord Katz, who is nodding, which is good news. I thank him; it is much appreciated. There is nothing worse than writing a speech and being unable to deliver it.

I welcome the government amendments in this group, brought forward by the Minister, concerning the remote sale and delivery of knives and bladed articles. As I noted in Committee, we on these Benches fully support the intent behind the Government’s measures in this area. We must strengthen accountability for businesses and sellers in tackling online knife sales. We welcome the robust two-step age-verification checks being implemented. It is entirely right that we ensure a consistent UK-wide approach by extending these provisions, including those relating to crossbows, to Scotland and Northern Ireland. It is vital that the law across the home nations is exactly on the same footing, so that criminals cannot exploit cross-border differences to acquire lethal weapons.

I also welcome the amendments that clarify the rules around identity documents. The requirement for a physical identity document to be shown upon the delivery of a bladed product provides a necessary safeguard. Furthermore, we acknowledge the provisions allowing the Secretary of State to prescribe alternative age-verification steps such as digital ID.

As I made clear to the Minister previously, there is no Bench more strongly against compulsory digital ID than the Liberal Democrats’, so we remain highly supportive of the assurance that analogue physical forms of identity will continue to be accepted alongside any new digital alternatives. Embedded among these amendments, however, is our Amendment 177, referred to by the Minister, on the remote sale of knives. This amendment requires that regulations mandate the reporting of bulk knife sales to the police

“in real time, or as soon as is reasonably practicable”.

In Committee, the Minister stated that he was sympathetic to the overall aim of this amendment but argued that the current duty in Clause 36 was sufficient and that exact timeframes would be handled later in regulations, following consultation. Sympathy does not intervene in a crime. We have seen cases where young people effectively act as arms traders, buying huge numbers of illegal weapons online for community distribution. If the police are to effectively track and intercept these bulk purchases, they need that intelligence immediately, not days or weeks later when the weapons are already on the streets. Amendment 177 would ensure that operational effectiveness is guaranteed in the Bill, turning bureaucratic compliance into actionable, life-saving intelligence.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, in Committee, I asked the Government to withdraw their amendments that permitted them to require by regulations the use of digital ID for age verification for the online sale of knives and crossbows. My concern was that permitting this would be the first legislative step towards mandating digital IDs. Since then, of course, the Government have conceded that digital IDs will not be made mandatory and, while I still harbour some reservations, I am now content for the amendments to be made to the Bill.

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[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I warmly welcome the Government’s amendments in this group, which deliver on the commitments made by the Minister during our debate in Committee. As I noted at the time, townies such as myself were being educated during the passage of the Bill on what these items were. However, the logic of this measure was immediately clear when the noble Lord, Lord Brady of Altrincham, introduced his amendments, and we were very pleased to support them when he first championed the cause. We are delighted that the Government have accepted his amendments.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I too thank the Minister for bringing forward these amendments. These measures were rightly pressed for in Committee by my noble friend Lord Brady of Altrincham, so I am glad the Government have taken his points on board and are now implementing them. These amendments will remove an administrative burden currently placed on the police—something we all support—and will pose no threat to the public. They are wholly reasonable, and we support them.

Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Clement-Jones

Committee stage
Thursday 5th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 464 I will speak to Amendments 467, 468 and 503, in my name. These amendments collectively address the governance of Clauses 192 to 194, which grant the Secretary of State broad powers to make regulations giving effect to international law enforcement information-sharing agreements. Following the recent passage of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025, we are now operating in a new legal landscape, where the statutory threshold for protecting data transferred overseas has been lowered. These amendments are not just desirable; they are essential safety mechanisms to fill that gap.

Amendment 464 would be a safeguard of, so to speak, look before you leap. It stipulates that, before regulations are made under Clause 192 to implement a new international agreement, the authority must publish a comprehensive privacy impact assessment. The necessity of this assessment has intensified following the enactment of the Data (Use and Access) Act. The UK’s new test for onward transfers of data has lowered the bar. It no longer requires foreign protections to be essentially equivalent to ours, but merely not materially lower. This creates a dangerous new risk profile. The European Data Protection Board has explicitly noted that this new test omits key safeguards against foreign government access and removes redress mechanisms for individuals. If the general statutory floor has been lowered, Amendment 464 becomes the essential safety net. We must assess these specific risks via a privacy impact assessment before we open the digital borders, to ensure that we are not exposing UK citizens to jurisdictions where they have no legal remedy.

This brings me to Amendment 467, which addresses the nature of the data being shared. Where regulations authorise the transfer of highly sensitive personal data, such as biometrics, genetics or political opinions, this amendment would require enhanced protective measures. All this highlights the illusion of data protection when transferring data to high-risk jurisdictions that lack the rule of law. We know that in authoritarian states domestic intelligence laws will always override the standard contractual clauses usually relied on for data transfers. Because the Data (Use and Access) Act has removed the requirement for foreign safeguards to be essentially equivalent, we cannot rely on the general law to protect highly sensitive biometric or health data. My amendment would restore the requirement that transfers of such sensitive data must be demonstrated to be strictly necessary and proportionate. We cannot allow efficiency of data sharing to deny the reality that, in some jurisdictions, once data arrives, the state will have unrestricted access. Transparency must follow these powers.

Amendment 468 would mandate the production of an annual report on international law enforcement information sharing. This is vital because we are entering a period of divergence. The European Commission, at the urging of the European Data Protection Board, will be monitoring the practical implementation of the UK’s revised data transfer regime. If the EU will be monitoring how our data laws operate, surely Parliament should be doing the same. We need an annual report to track whether these law enforcement transfers are inadvertently exposing UK citizens to jurisdictions where they have no effective legal redress. Without this feedback loop, Parliament is legislating in the dark.

Finally, Amendment 503 would ensure that regulations made under Clause 192 are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. Given that the primary legislation governing data transfers has been loosened, it is constitutionally inappropriate for these specific law enforcement agreements to slip through via the negative procedure. Amendment 503 would ensure that these regulations, which may involve the transfer of our citizens’ most sensitive biometric data to foreign powers, must be actively debated and approved by both Houses of Parliament.

We support international co-operation in fighting crime, but it must not come at the cost of lowering our standards. These amendments would restore the safeguards that recent legislation have eroded. I beg to move.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, we thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for his amendments and the importance that he has obviously placed on the right to privacy of the general public.

I support the principle behind Amendment 464. Sharing information often carries a risk with it, particularly when it is for the purposes of law enforcement, and especially when this is done internationally. Law enforcement data contains information that is far more personal to the individual or case in question than the norm. Any data of this sort must be handled with the highest discretion. Ensuring that the sharing of this data respects the right to privacy carries no unintended consequences and, most importantly, is necessary and should be the benchmark from which regulations are made.

If this amendment is accepted, I do not see the additional need for Amendment 468. At the very least, the privacy impact assessment under Amendment 464 should form the basis of any annual report that Amendment 468 would mandate. Less is more when it comes to admin and reports, so I am hesitant to support a new report that is not necessarily needed.

I think Amendment 467 is sensible. In general, internationally shared data should not include information prejudicial to any individual, let alone domestic citizens. This particularly extends to the sharing of biometric data for the purpose of unique identification or genetic identification.

These categories of data are obviously vital for the purposes of law enforcement, but law enforcement extra territorially risks placing this data in the wrong hands. This and similar data should therefore be particularly protected, which is the aim of the noble Lord’s amendment. I hope that the Minister can outline what the Government intend to do to ensure that the international sharing of personal data is undertaken in the most discreet and protected manner.

Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Clement-Jones

Committee stage
Thursday 15th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, this grouping deals with the complex landscape of remotely stored electronic data, or what is commonly known as cloud access. Government amendments in this group, such as Amendments 393, 394 and 441, significantly expand the ability of the state to inspect online accounts through seized devices, including the interception of authentication codes. We acknowledge that, as evidence shifts from hardware to the cloud, the law must evolve. However, we remain deeply concerned by the widened scope for investigation, which carries an inherent risk of excessive prying.

These powers go beyond merely searching a phone. They allow law enforcement to walk through the digital doors of a person’s entire life—their private communications, financial history and medical records. As the Minister said, under Clause 169 these intrusive inspections can now be included as conditions of a youth diversion order. While the Government maintain that these are necessary to identify harmful online activity early, we must ensure that they are used only when strictly necessary and proportionate to protect the public from serious harm.

I ask the Minister to clarify the oversight mechanisms for these powers. We cannot allow the inspection of a child’s entire digital history to rest on a subjective belief, rather than a rigorous, objective assessment of risk. The digital ecosystem must not be a safe haven for perpetrators, but neither can it become a borderless opportunity for state surveillance.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I thank the Minister for tabling, and setting out the rationale behind, this group of government amendments. Amendments 393 and 394 authorise the interception of certain communications in order to access online accounts. These amendments represent an additional measure to youth diversion orders on top of the existing powers provided to the authorities under the current drafting of the Bill.

Public safety is and should be the first priority of any Government. Youth diversion orders exist in order to curb and prevent young people from engaging in terrorist activity or associating with those affiliated to terrorist groups that seek to radicalise children. We are supportive of the measures in the Bill to increase the scope and applicability of youth diversion orders, such as Clause 167, which enables chief officers of police with the power to apply for a youth diversion order. These are necessary and proportionate measures that should be implemented in order to mitigate terrorist risk.

We on these Benches are equally supportive of the amendments in this group that are aimed at ensuring that, when youth diversion orders are made, they contain the necessary provisions to enable authorities to carry out their operations as effectively as possible. There is no point in making a youth diversion order if the provisions of that order do not sufficiently provide police with the ability to execute its objective. Terrorists and extremist groups are increasingly turning to online forums and communities in order to identify individuals for radicalisation and to spread misinformation. Therefore, where the courts deem it necessary to issue a youth diversion order, it is right that a provision of such an order can contain the inspection of any online account. Not only will that ensure that young people are kept safe from dangerous and hateful rhetoric, but it will enable authorities to understand who is targeting children and their methods of radicalisation.

It is also important that the imperative to keep the public safe is counterbalanced with appropriate regard for individual liberty. Youth diversion orders contain a number of provisions which impact on people’s daily lives, so it is right that they are sanctioned only where it is considered strictly necessary. I therefore seek assurances from the Minister that these amendments, and youth diversion orders more generally, are accompanied by having the appropriate safeguards in place to mitigate state overreach and the unnecessary deprivation of people’s freedoms and, of course, their right to privacy.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I am afraid that noble Lords are going to get the full set today. I support my noble friend’s Amendment 396, which is the meat of this group of amendments. It was proposed by my noble friend Lady Doocey and signed by me, and it addresses the profound privacy implications of Clause 138. While the Government describe the clause as a technical clarification of access to DVLA records, we on these Benches and groups such as Big Brother Watch see it as the foundation for a vast national facial recognition database. It is also a massive pre-emption, in our view, of the consultation on live facial recognition which is currently being conducted by the Government.

This amendment provides a specific and essential statutory bar. Authorised persons may not use DVLA information for biometric searches using facial recognition technology. Members of the public applying for driving licences do so to drive cars, not to be placed in a permanent digital lineup without their consent—and we know that facial recognition technology is demonstrably biased, as we discussed earlier today. Expanding its use to a database of tens of millions of law-abiding citizens would be a grossly disproportionate interference with the right to privacy under Article 8 of the ECHR. The Government claim that this is not their intention, yet they have not put that promise in the Bill.

If the Minister is sincere that this power will not be used for mass biometric surveillance, he should have no objection to this amendment. We cannot allow the end of anonymity in public spaces to be achieved through a legislative back door. We are being asked to buy into a massive extension of police access to biometric information. The technology represents a monumental shift in the relationship between the citizen and the state. Such a shift must be governed by Parliament, not by secret police watch lists. As my noble friend Lady Doocey said, this can only lead to further erosion of public trust in the police unless these safeguards are installed.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this group of amendments raises important questions about the use of data, modern policing techniques and the appropriate safeguards that must accompany them. We are sympathetic to the principle that underpins government Amendment 394A. It respects the devolution settlement in Northern Ireland and the constitutional and operational sensitivities around policing. There is a careful balance that must be struck between maintaining consistency across the United Kingdom, respecting the powers of devolved Administrations and ensuring that law enforcement agencies have the tools they need to keep the public safe.

There is also a parallel balance that must be struck between safeguarding individual liberties and being robust in tackling crime. While we recognise the intent behind the amendment, we also acknowledge that the Government must retain sufficient flexibility to ensure effective and coherent law enforcement arrangements across all parts of the UK. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response in addressing both these issues.

Amendment 396 would prohibit the use of the DVLA database for searches using live facial recognition technology. It will probably come as no surprise that we are firmly opposed to that restriction, as it would undermine one of the key inputs on which the success of live facial recognition hinges. Live facial recognition is an important and increasingly effective tool in modern policing. Used lawfully and proportionately, it has already demonstrated its value in identifying serious offenders, locating wanted individuals and preventing violent crime before it occurs. It is particularly effective in high-crime environments and transport hubs, where the risk of serious harm is elevated and where rapid identification can make a decisive difference.

Equally, across the DVLA, using driver licensing data for law enforcement purposes is not new: nor is it unregulated. Clause 138 ensures that the use of this is accompanied by safeguards, regulation-making powers to the Secretary of State, consultation requirements, a statutory code of practice and annual reporting to Parliament. These measures are designed to ensure proportionality and accountability. To carve out facial recognition from this framework would unnecessarily impede law enforcement’s ability to use the technology effectively. It would also deny the police the ability to use accurate and targeted technology to identify individuals suspected of serious criminality, even where strong safeguards are in place.

I therefore welcome the opportunity for the Minister to expand on how facial recognition fits within this framework and on the safeguards that will ensure that its use is proportionate and effective. But we should be clear that this technology, which can save lives, disrupt violent crime and protect the public, should not be ruled out by default.

Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Clement-Jones

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, we strongly support Amendment 358 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Vaux, Lord Young of Cookham and Lord Holmes of Richmond, and the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, who have made the case extremely well today. I pay tribute to the Fraud Act committee chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, and I shall quote from it extensively in the next group.

This amendment would rightly ensure that the definition of a specified article included devices capable of using virtual subscriber identity modules, not just physical SIM cards. As we have heard, the criminal landscape evolves rapidly. If we legislate only for plastic SIMs, criminals will simply pivot to readily available virtual SIM technology. By incorporating virtual SIMs into the definition now, we will help to future-proof these provisions and make them genuinely effective against highly scalable, technology-enabled fraud.

Clauses 112 to 117 quite rightly seek to address the serious and growing problem of SIM farms being used at scale to perpetrate fraud and other abuses—it was very interesting to hear the quotes of the noble Lord, Lord Young, from the Select Committee’s report, which demonstrates that the problem has been with us for several years now—but, as drafted, Clause 114 risks being a technological step behind the criminals. As we have heard, it refers to devices capable of using physical SIM cards, but the market is already rapidly moving towards virtual or embedded SIMs. Indeed, I have an iPad in my hand that has a virtual SIM inside it—no physical SIM card at all. If the Bill focuses only on the plastic card and not the underlying functionality, it will leave an obvious loophole that organised criminals will quickly exploit.

The noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, spoke of “entrepreneurial” but not in a good way. We know that fraudsters are highly adaptive. As mobile operators deploy more robust controls on physical SIMs—I suspect not enough for the noble Lord, Lord Vaux—and as handsets and routers increasingly use eSIMs or other virtual identities, those intent on running industrial-scale smishing and scam operations will migrate to those platforms. If we legislate today for yesterday’s technology, we will simply displace the problem from one category of device to another and be back here in a few years’ time having the same debate. I hope the Minister will be able either to accept the amendment or to confirm that the Government will bring forward their own wording—there is always a bit of “not invented here” with these things. Without that assurance, there is a real risk that this part of the Bill will be lacking in force from the day it comes into effect.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, for speaking to this group. On his Amendment 358, I agree that the Government should look to make provisions that account for all forms of SIM cards used in SIM farms. As the noble Lord stated, the current drafting of Clause 114 does not encompass eSIM cards in the devices used for SIM farming. Given the number of mobile phones that now use eSIMs, this really should be amended.

This speaks to the larger issue of defining provisions ahead of legislation coming into force. When changes are being made to the legality of certain products, suppliers and consumers should be made aware well in advance; behaviours will have to change with reform. This is a case of not just courtesy but constitutional propriety. That is the reasoning behind my Amendments 358A and 538A.

Legislating for the criminalisation of specific devices and software related to fraud should not be done on a whim. Individuals should not wake up one day and possess an illegal device or software that was considered legal a day before, with no warning of the coming change. Some notice must be given. Currently, the Bill simply permits Ministers to specify a device whenever they wish. There is no requirement for those regulations to come into force before the new offences of possession and supply come into force. My amendments would ensure, in the interests of fairness and the rule of law, that the new offences could not come into force until at least three months had passed from the making of the regulations defining the articles.

I believe that a period of three months before the possession and supply of certain articles becomes illegal is sufficient for people to change their habits and businesses to change their models. We in this House would be doing the public a disservice if we did not provide them with the necessary time to adapt. I hope the Minister agrees with this reasoning. I hope he will consider the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, and, as always, I look forward very much to hearing his reply.

Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Clement-Jones

Committee stage
Monday 15th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I follow my noble friend Lady Doocey in this small but perfectly formed group of amendments. My Amendment 335 would mandate a statutory consultation on the guidance to accompany the new encouraging or assisting serious self-harm offences contained in Clauses 102 and 103.

On these Benches we welcome the underlying intention of Clauses 102 and 103 to implement the Law Commission’s recommendations for a broader offence covering encouragement or assistance of serious self-harm, expanding beyond digital communication to include direct assistance. However, offences that involve encouraging self-harm must be handled with the utmost care, given the vulnerabilities inherent in such cases. The critical issue here is the risk of inadvertently criminalising legitimate support services, which has been raised with us by a number of support organisations.

The offence requires a specific intention to encourage or assist serious self-harm. This is intended to ensure that charitable organisations and mental health professionals who advise sufferers on how to moderate or manage self-harming behaviour are not criminalised. My amendment addresses this directly by requiring the Secretary of State to produce guidance and consult extensively with representatives of self-harm support charities and organisations; mental health professionals, including those providing trauma-informed care; and legal experts—prosecutors and defence practitioners—regarding the application of the specific intent requirement. This mandatory consultation is essential, in our view, to ensure that the statutory guidance clearly differentiates between criminal encouragement and legitimate therapeutic activity. Without ensuring that this guidance is informed by experts and laid before Parliament, we risk confusion among front-line practitioners and the inadvertent penalisation of those working hardest to help vulnerable people. I hope the Government will give serious consideration to this amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I fully appreciate the general principle behind these proposals. This is an incredibly serious subject, and I appreciate the sincerity with which the noble Baronesses have approached the debate.

On the amendment in the name of the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Blower, everyone wants to reach a scenario where all possibilities are accounted for, and there are no loopholes through which those who either encourage or abet self-harm can jump. It is for that reason that I cannot offer my support for proposed subsection (6) in the noble Baronesses’ amendment. First, I am sceptical of the need for more aggravating factors. The general offences that fall under loosely defined so-called honour-based abuse are crimes themselves, so I am unsure why there is a need to create an aggravating offence when a criminal will already be able to be tried for those offences individually.

Primarily, though, I do not think this is the right time to be incorporating new definitions into our legal framework. There is guidance for Crown prosecutors as to what might fall under honour-based abuse and examples as to how that might look, but it is yet to be enshrined in law and it is a rather broad and non-exclusive term within our law. That is not to say that it is not easy to spot—it often is—but it should have its own delineated legal definition before it is made an aggravating factor. I agree with the noble Baroness that honour-based abuse is an increasing issue that we must tackle head on, but that cannot be done with a single amendment. However, I offer my support to the principle behind proposed subsection (6)(b).

I welcome the sentiment behind Amendment 335 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. Policy rooted in pragmatism is crucial, and consultation and guidance are one of the primary ways to achieve that. The Government should base all the policy that they bring forward on the testimonies of people who dedicate their lives to the subjects that we legislate on, and that it is especially important for a policy in such a sensitive area as this. I hope the Minister agrees, and I look forward to her response.

Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Clement-Jones

Committee stage
Wednesday 19th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, the education of townies such as myself continues. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Brady of Altrincham, for his Amendments 214A and 438, which aim to deregulate sound moderators, muzzle brakes and flash hiders. It had not occurred to me that they would be caught by the legislation, so this measure, explicitly designed to alleviate the administrative burden on police firearms licensing departments without increasing risk or danger to the public, seems eminently sensible. Police resources are already stretched, and we are demanding an increased focus on neighbourhood visibility—we have talked about this during the passage of the Bill—so we support sensible deregulation that removes unnecessary bureaucracy without compromising public safety. We support these amendments.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this is a group of relatively straightforward and common-sense amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Brady of Altrincham. It tends to carry out the Government’s own consultation results in a careful and measured way.

Amendment 214A, moved by my noble friend Lord Brady, is a simple procedural measure that implements the Government’s own recommendations. As my noble friend set out, this amendment would not impact, let alone endanger, the public. Sound moderators are inert objects that contain no moving parts. They do not enhance the ability of a firearm, nor is there significant evidence of them being used in crime. The Government have themselves concluded that removing regulation of them will not pose any risk to public safety. I understand the original logic of including them in many firearms regulations, but, in practice, it means that police firearms officers must now obtain a certificate. It is an administrative burden that is not necessary.

Amendment 438 acts much in the same vein. It would require a review of the administrative burdens that noise and flash accessories place upon the police. The Government’s own previous consultation on the latter demonstrated that there is scope here for reform; to expand that to cover other accessories seems a very logical step.

We should aim to remove bureaucratic and administrative hurdles wherever they appear. This is particularly the case for the police, as our forces are under strain. This measure is evidently a small reform among many that should be made and is based on the right principle.

Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Clement-Jones

Committee stage
Monday 10th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I knew there was a reason why I was so nice about the earlier amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. I am afraid we do not agree with Amendment 26. The amendment focuses on the power to issue closure notices, a measure which deals directly with the security of the home, which we believe is a fundamental right in our society. A closure notice is an extreme measure, and any power enabling the exclusion of a person from their residence must be subject to the highest legal scrutiny and strict proportionality, and we do not support the amendment.

Social justice groups consistently caution that new powers risk disadvantaging tenants and vulnerable groups. We must remember that, where these orders relate to social housing, they have the potential to render entire families homeless. We believe that the amendment would exacerbate that.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for his Amendment 26 to Schedule 2 to the Bill, which permits a registered social housing provider to issue a closure notice in respect of premises they own or manage, under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. As my noble friend and other noble Lords have stated, a closure notice under Section 76 of that Act is a notice which prohibits a person from accessing specific premises. Currently, such a notice can be issued only by the police or the local authority, but Schedule 2 permits an RSH to also issue such notices.

My noble friend’s amendment would ensure that the RSH provider is able to issue a closure notice for an individual flat in the premises it is responsible for. Given that paragraph (2)(b) of Schedule 2 does not specify that fact, I look forward to the Minister’s answer and hope he might clarify that point.

Non-Consensual Sexually Explicit Images and Videos (Offences) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Clement-Jones

3rd reading
Friday 7th February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, please allow me to express His Majesty’s Official Opposition’s strong support for this crucial Bill and to congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Owen of Alderley Edge, on her determined leadership on this subject. This Bill represents a vital step forward in safeguarding dignity, decency and the fundamental rights of individuals in our society. This Bill will champion the right to privacy and change the law for the better, safeguarding women from exploitation.

Non-consensual sharing of sexually explicit images and videos is a modern technology-driven disease that has shattered lives and ruined reputations. It represents a grave affront to personal dignity and a betrayal of the trust that is often central to intimate relationships. The speed and reach of digital communication is truly frightening and has only exacerbated this harm, making it more urgent for Parliament to act decisively.

The Bill rightly strengthens our legal framework by ensuring that those who engage in this entirely unacceptable behaviour face the full force of the law. It makes it clear that consent matters and that, without it, the distribution or threat of sharing explicit material is a crime. We must also ensure that the criminal justice system provides meaningful support for victims.

Many individuals who have endured this type of abuse have spoken of the profound psychological and emotional toll that it takes. Please let us ensure that we do more than just criminalise this behaviour. Let us stand by the victims with the resources and support that they must be given to rebuild their lives. His Majesty’s Official Opposition believe in a society where people can live freely, safely and with dignity. The Bill furthers that vision. It ensures that our legal framework evolves, as it must, to meet modern challenges, while reaffirming the timeless principles of justice, accountability and respect for the individual.

Finally, I commend the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, and everyone involved, both inside and outside the Palace of Westminster, in bringing the Bill forward. We urge the House to support it wholeheartedly.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, it is an absolute pleasure to take part in the Third Reading of this Bill. I give many congratulations to the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, on this rare and much-deserved victory with the contents of a Private Member’s Bill. She made a very generous comment about the Minister, and I failed to do so the other day. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, paid tribute to the Minister. Even though he could not quite get over the line, at least some of the substance of the offence is there. I very much hope that that will remain in the Bill and that the noble Lord’s Commons colleagues will make sure of that. As we have heard in the debates on the Data (Use and Access) Bill, this is part of a wider battle against misogyny, and the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, has landed a really important blow in that battle.