Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Kate Green Excerpts

Tuesday 24th April 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Djanogly]

My right hon. Friend finds the right moment to ask about something not subject to the amendment. It is an important point, however. My right hon. and learned Friend has written to him about onward appeals in immigration cases. The Department will conduct a review of the impacts of withdrawing legal aid in such cases once we have sufficient data and after implementation of the reforms. I envisage allowing about a year for the reforms to take effect before starting such a review.

Lords amendment 2 was passed in the other place yesterday by the extremely narrow margin of three votes. Unusually for this topic, no one spoke other than the mover and my right hon. Friend Lord McNally. That indicates how far we have moved. I remind the House of the main points. First, and crucially, legal aid to obtain the full range of injunctions and orders to protect against domestic violence will remain exactly as at present. There is no evidential gateway for legal aid for these remedies, and those who need legal aid to protect themselves can get it, regardless of their means.

Secondly, although we have removed most of private family law from the scope of legal aid in favour of funding mediation and less adversarial proceedings, we have made an extremely important exception for victims of domestic violence. That is so that they can take or defend proceedings about child contact or maintenance, or about the division of property, without being intimidated by their abuser during the proceedings.

We have made significant changes to the detail of this exception in response to concerns expressed in both Houses. We have accepted in full the Association of Chief Police Officers’ definition of domestic violence. We have also significantly widened the list of evidence that we will accept as demonstrating domestic violence for the purposes of the exception. That list will now include undertakings, police cautions, evidence of admission to a refuge, evidence from social services and evidence from GPs and other medical professionals. That is in addition to the range of evidence that had already been confirmed, including the fact of an injunction or order to protect against domestic violence having been made, a criminal conviction or ongoing criminal proceedings for domestic violence, a referral to a multi-agency risk assessment conference and a finding of fact by the courts that there has been domestic violence. We have also doubled the previously announced time limit for evidence for this exception from 12 months to two years.

[Kate Green (Stretford and Urmston) (Lab)]

We all noted the Lord Chancellor’s commitment in the Chamber last week to extending the time limit to two years. Will the Minister clarify whether that will also apply in cases of child abuse, which seem to be encompassed by the definition of domestic violence that now applies in the Bill? Clarification would be welcome on that, as there are clearly instances in which proceedings might be brought in relation to child abuse after more than 12 months, including in care proceedings, in which it would be entirely appropriate to grant legal aid.

[Mr Djanogly]

Yes, I am pleased to be able to confirm to the hon. Lady that that is the case.

We think that we have struck the right balance, although some will disagree. However, such disagreement misses the fact that there are two important safeguards to our system, which will provide genuine victims with a route into legal aid even if they do not have the headline forms of evidence. First, when a court has to consider whether domestic violence is a factor in a private family case, it may consider any relevant evidence, including police call-outs or evidence from domestic violence support services, or other types of evidence that have not even been suggested by the Opposition. This is also relevant in regard to the time limits. When a case involves older incidents of domestic violence and a court considers that the matter is still relevant and makes a finding of fact, legal aid funding could still be triggered. There is also the more generic safeguard of the exceptional funding regime.

We continue to believe that the evidential requirements should not be in the Bill. The level of detail required means that those requirements will be much better left to regulations, subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, rather than to primary legislation. Given how far we have moved on this topic, and the safeguards that I have outlined today, I invite the House to disagree with Lords amendments 2B and 196B.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Kate Green Excerpts

Tuesday 17th April 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Clarke]

Let me begin with the domestic violence gateway. The ACPO definition is what the Labour Front-Bench team was originally concentrating on. We have to have a definition because we are talking about qualifying for the public funding of legal aid in certain cases. We have moved a lot on domestic violence and we are moving again in response to the Lords’ debate, as I shall explain in a moment. First, though, let me make it clear, because I do not think it has always been clear to people in either House, exactly what we are talking about. It was never in doubt that there would be legal aid for the protection of victims of domestic violence. Domestic violence is an issue that this Government, like any Government, including the previous one, take extremely seriously. As now, it was always intended that legal aid would remain available for victims of domestic violence who were trying, for example, to obtain protective injunctions to defend themselves in such cases. In domestic violence cases there is no means test so even the super-rich can obtain legal aid if they are seeking an injunction for reasons of domestic violence, although I hope that not too many of them will.



We are doing quite a lot of other things. The Home Office is for the first time providing more than £28 million of stable funding until 2015 for specialist local domestic and sexual violence support services, and £900,000 each year to support national domestic violence helplines and a stalking helpline. Our Department is now contributing towards the funding of independent advisers attached to specialist domestic violence courts. We are giving a total of £9 million for that purpose up to the end of 2012-13. We are allocating £3 million a year to 65 rape crisis centres and opening new ones. Domestic violence protection orders are being piloted in three police force areas.  We have announced a one-year pilot which will take place from this summer to test out a domestic violence disclosure scheme, known as Clare’s law.

I mention those things so that we can have a debate which, with great respect to their lordships, is not on the same basis as the part of the Lords debate that I listened to—that people did not realise the seriousness of domestic violence as a social issue in our society. We all do. The Bill never challenged that. It is all part of a pattern of services being provided by this Government, through which we think we are strengthening the support for victims of domestic violence.

What we are discussing here is the special provision that we are also making to provide legal aid to people who have been recent victims of domestic violence, so that when they are dealing with their abuser in court on other issues—ownership of the former matrimonial home, maintenance, access to property—they have access to legal aid. In such cases, particularly the private family law cases and the children’s cases, we are trying to shift away from so much adversarial litigation. Having lawyers on both sides arguing about custody and access to children does not always lighten the tensions or resolve the dispute, as most Members of Parliament are only too well aware from their constituency surgeries, so we are moving towards mediation, which is cheaper. That is why some of the lobbyists do not like it, with the result that in cases where it does not work, they are arguing for legal aid to continue to be available.

We have conceded the case that after a recent episode of domestic violence, the victim on her own may not want to deal, even through mediation, with her abuser. How do we define domestic violence for that purpose? That is an important but secondary purpose, as the case will not be about domestic violence. In such a case, what definition of domestic violence should be used for the person to qualify for legal aid? That is what the argument about the definition in both Houses has been about all the way through.

[Kate Green (Stretford and Urmston) (Lab)]

The Lord Chancellor mentioned that it will still be possible to obtain legal aid to get an injunction when there is domestic violence. Will this not be a cost-accumulating measure, as women will first go to get an injunction in order to have evidence to be legally aided for the case of domestic violence?

[Mr Clarke]

Such women will not get an injunction if it turns out that there is no reasonable ground for giving it and they are not in imminent fear of domestic violence. We will give them legal aid because we think it is important that these issues are tested in cases where legal advice is available. If women do not get the injunction, they will not get the legal aid later.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Djanogly]

As I said, this is a question of what lawyers get paid. I am in no way assessing the vulnerability of the individuals whom the hon. Gentleman mentioned.

I point out to the hon. Gentleman that significant steps have been taken in recent years to lower the barriers to bringing compensation claims for these disastrous diseases. A fast-track procedure for mesothelioma cases has been introduced in the High Court. Over the past few years, various legal changes, including primary legislation such as the Compensation Act 2006 and judgments of the Supreme Court, have removed many of the hurdles for sufferers of respiratory diseases in bringing claims.

The legal climate in which such cases are brought has been transformed in recent years. Judgments of the Supreme Court have removed many hurdles, and a judgment only last month means that victims of this dreadful disease who are able to trace an insurer will now be paid and not miss out on compensation. As I said, a fast-track procedure has been introduced to ensure that claims are dealt with as quickly as possible.

A key outstanding barrier is identifying the employer’s liability insurer when an employer no longer exists, and the Department for Work and Pensions continues to work with stakeholders to see what more can be done to address that. Overall, however, cases are much less difficult to undertake than in the past, and there is no reason to believe that legal firms will stop bringing them, even under the new arrangements, or that they will be particularly expensive.

[Kate Green]

Does the Minister not accept, though, that some cases will now simply go unrepresented and unpursued, and that victims will instead have to rely on the Government’s own compensation scheme, in which the average payment is £16,000? This change will be an expensive choice for the Government, because it will lock people out of access through the courts.

[Mr Djanogly]

Decisions are made about such cases now, and even under the existing system, if there are large sums involved, ATE insurance companies want to know the likelihood of losing. A lawyer also has to make such an assessment. As things stand, the balance is not right, and we want to rebalance the situation.

Partly as a consequence of what I have said, I do not believe we should accept the view that critics sometimes advance that our reforms will leave victims of this terrible disease out of pocket. It is true that under our plans individuals will pay legal costs out of their general damages. Crucially, though, damages for future care and losses are protected, and general damages are being increased by 10% to offset a success fee capped at 25%. It is of course entirely up to the lawyer whether any success fee is taken from a claimant’s damages at all.

Oral Answers to Questions

Kate Green Excerpts

Tuesday 13th March 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Djanogly]

Again, the Government were disappointed by the position taken by the Lords and will return to the matter when the Bill comes back to the Commons. We are very concerned about the victims of domestic violence. Indeed, it was because we are removing legal aid for private family law that we realised there will be certain categories, such as domestic violence, that will not be suitable for mediation, which is why we are concentrating on that area.

[Kate Green (Stretford and Urmston) (Lab)]

It is widely recognised that specialist domestic violence courts have been very successful, but 23 of them are due to close. Will the Minister assure me that the expertise and multi-agency working that have been a feature of their success will continue in this changed landscape?

[Mr Djanogly]

It is important to point out that those specialist domestic violence courts are closing not because of what they do, but because the courts in which they are based are closing. I am pleased to say that those specialist courts will be moving to other courts, so no specialist domestic violence courts will be lost.

Legal Aid (Women and Families)

Kate Green Excerpts

Tuesday 24th January 2012 Westminster Hall

[Mr Virendra Sharma]

The hon. Gentleman is a lawyer who has practised in the past. I will respond to his point later.

The Government know that many legal aid practitioners provide support in the way that I have described. That is why the Cabinet Office has taken over this Minister’s mess and is trying to ensure the long-term viability of the advice sector. Legal aid support, particularly early intervention, demonstrates effective value for money for the taxpayer. According to cost-benefit analysis by Citizens Advice, for every £1 of legal expenditure on housing, debt, benefit and employment advice savings are made, although I will not give all the figures, which I am sure are available to hon. Members. As a result, it is clear that the savings made by cutting the legal aid budget will be dwarfed by increased costs elsewhere to the public purse. That is why cuts to advisory services, particularly to welfare advice, are both short-sighted and short-termist.

There is also a human cost. In any given year, legal problems such as divorce, eviction or debt will be experienced by one in every four people, but by one in three people with long-term sickness or disabled people, half of unemployed people and half of lone parents. People with one unresolved problem often accumulate other problems rapidly. If you cannot resolve early-stage problems, more problems will often accumulate and end up in a vicious circle. These cycles can result in people losing their jobs and income, suffering stress-related illnesses and experiencing relationship and/or family breakdown.

[Kate Green (Stretford and Urmston) (Lab)]

I, too, congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this important debate. Does he agree that if we do not deal with the whole cluster of problems, we might allow problems to get worse? If people’s employment and debt problems are related, and we resolve the debt problem but not the employment one, we are merely postponing the problem and it will come back again.

[Mr Sharma]

I thank my hon. Friend for her important intervention. I agree with every word that she said. I will come back to this matter and develop it later in my speech.

Such problems are closely related to social exclusion, poor outcomes for children and levels of crime and antisocial behaviour, all of which represent significant costs to public services. Children whose families are experiencing civil and social problems are more likely to become involved in truancy, exclusion, and offending.

For the past 40 years, local law centres have been providing legal advice and support to the most vulnerable and needy in their communities. In the late 1970s and early ’80s I worked as an advice worker in a law centre and have experience in that field. I dealt with communities that suffered due to unemployment and other reasons. Law centres are an essential part of community life and are the first port of call for many people experiencing social and civil legal problems.

Law centres must be protected because of their experience. They have been working for 40 years with local communities, building a relationship with the public, landlords, organisations, local authorities and projects. They have local access; they are well established in communities; they are easily accessible; and they are trusted by communities. The brand power of law centres, like citizens advice bureaux, lies in their having gained public trust and confidence. They provide face-to-face advisory services and build trust and stronger relationships with clients. Services provided by the 52 law centres in England and Wales can be divided into three strands, namely individual casework, education and prevention, and developing policy. All three strands of services provided by law centres and CABs demonstrate the important strategic role played by these organisations in their local communities.

Oral Answers to Questions

Kate Green Excerpts

Tuesday 13th December 2011 Commons Chamber

[Kate Green (Stretford and Urmston) (Lab)]

18. What assessment his Department has made of the potential effects on women of planned changes to legal aid.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Mr Jonathan Djanogly)]

The Government published an equality impact assessment alongside our response to consultation, which laid out the best assessment of the effects on women of planned changes to legal aid. That recognised the potential for the reforms to impact on a greater proportion of women, alongside others featuring protected characteristics.

[Mr Djanogly]

As the hon. Gentleman says, there is to be a consultation on domestic violence, although I believe that it will be undertaken by the Home Office rather than the Deputy Prime Minister. We will look carefully at the results of the consultation, but the definition of abuse in the Bill is broad and comprehensive, and includes mental as well as physical abuse.

[Kate Green]

What steps is the Minister taking to protect women who are victims of domestic violence from the risk of aggressive and unfair questioning in the courts by abusive partners, given the likelihood of an increase in the number of litigants appearing in person as a result of the legal aid cuts?

[Mr Djanogly]

I believe that some 50% of respondents are currently not represented through legal aid. As a consequence, the circumstances that the hon. Lady describes are common in our courts, and our judiciary are expert and accustomed to dealing with them when they arise.

Oral Answers to Questions

Kate Green Excerpts

Tuesday 8th November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Nick Herbert]

I agree with my hon. Friend about the value of that work, which can both provide enhanced victim satisfaction—victims are otherwise too often an afterthought in the process—and reduce reoffending rates. That was why the coalition agreement committed us to introducing neighbourhood resolution panels, which we intend to take forward. We have invited expressions of interest and had good interest in them, and we will set up pilots in the new year.

[Kate Green (Stretford and Urmston) (Lab)]

What steps will the Minister take to support restorative justice programmes in prisons, such as that offered by the Prison Fellowship’s “Sycamore Tree” programme?

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Kate Green Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Lloyd (Eastbourne) (LD)]

I rise to speak on new clause 17. I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Makerfield (Yvonne Fovargue), who was the chair of the all-party parliamentary group on Citizens Advice before I took over. I endorse what my right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake) said. Originally we wanted to speak to amendment 149 under the social welfare grouping on Monday night and it was disappointing that that group was not reached. Consequently, although I do not agree entirely with new clause 17, I am minded to support it, particularly given how it relates to Citizens Advice.

Some of my points have been made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington. I reiterate that at a time when we are making radical changes to the welfare system by introducing universal credit, replacing disability living allowance and making substantial changes to employment and support allowance, it is unwise to withdraw the support for people who are challenging bad decisions. As we all know, in the process of reform, mistakes can be made. As I am sure the House is aware, the introduction of ESA has generated a significant volume of appeals and 39% of ESA appeals are still being found in favour of the appellant. The position of the Department for Work and Pensions is that welfare advice should not be funded on issues of benefit entitlement because advice is available through DWP agencies such as Jobcentre Plus. However, I strongly believe that the solution is not to take welfare advice out of the scope of legal aid altogether, but to make appropriate distinctions over whether problems involve issues of complexity.

[Kate Green (Stretford and Urmston) (Lab)]

I support a great deal of what the hon. Gentleman is saying. Does he agree that it is inappropriate for people to rely only on advice from Jobcentre Plus when they may need advice because they wish to challenge the decisions of that agency?

[Stephen Lloyd]

I agree with the hon. Lady. It is good to see her taking part in the debate, because she sat on the Work and Pensions Committee with me before she was promoted to her very high place. She makes a strong point that emphasises that the solution is not to take welfare advice out of the scope of legal aid altogether, but to make appropriate distinctions, as it states in new clause 17, over whether problems involve issues of complexity. The issues that end up before tribunals are often extremely complex and involve the interpretation of statutes and case law precedent. It is wholly unrealistic to expect somebody without specialist knowledge to undertake that. Legal advice is essential, in my view, to the fairness of the appeals process.

--- Later in debate ---

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that observation, and I agree with him.

I shall conclude my remarks, because I know that we want to get on to the next piece of business. My fundamental plea is this: please do not take away the right to legal advice at a police station.

[Kate Green]

I want to ask the Minister two questions about social welfare law. I also feel obliged, even at this late stage in the debate, to speak briefly to the three amendments standing in my name—amendments 69, 70 and 71—which have not yet been debated.

My first question for the Minister follows the sensible remarks of the hon. Member for Eastbourne (Stephen Lloyd) earlier about how the Government are making significant legislative changes to a number of areas in social welfare law. They include some that he mentioned, such as the introduction of the universal credit and the changes to disability living allowance. I would add to that the substantial changes to housing, child maintenance and the immigration system, where I can already report a shortage of supply in my constituency when it comes to accessing good advice. If legal aid is not to be available to take people through what will be a period of incredible complexity and confusion, what discussions has the Minister had with ministerial colleagues in other Departments to ensure adequate provision and funding for people to receive advice, at least in this transitional period? Failing to put that funding in place will cost the Government more rather than less.

My second question for the Minister relates to the additional £20 million of funding that has been made available to support advice agencies—or really, to cope with the loss of legal aid coverage in certain categories of law. That is particularly important in my constituency, because Trafford law centre stands to lose almost all its funding, given that it is currently funded by an immigration contract and an employment contract, both of which will go. It also receives Equality and Human Rights Commission funding, which is due to end, with a small and diminishing proportion of its funding coming from the local authority. Can the Minister tell us a bit more about the £20 million fund, which my law centre is understandably interested in, but which it rather suspects has already been earmarked to support agencies elsewhere? Is it a one-off fund or will it be available in future years? What is the process for deciding how the money will be disbursed?

Finally, my amendments 69, 70 and 71 deal with the transfer of Legal Services Commission staff to the civil service, which the Minister spoke about in his opening remarks this afternoon. My understanding is that the Bill is proceeding on the assumption that TUPE will not apply to the transfer. Of course, only the courts can finally determine whether that is the case, but in any event, the Bill should proceed on the basis that transferring employees will have at least the same protection that would apply if TUPE applied. In any event, what should apply is the Cabinet Office statement of practice on staff transfers in the public sector, paragraph 19 of which says that

“transfers at the instigation and under the control of Central Government will usually be effected through legislation,”—

as is true in this case—

“in particular those involving Officeholders. Provision can then be made for staff to transfer on TUPE terms irrespective of whether the transfer is excluded from the scope of the Directive implemented by TUPE. Departments must therefore ensure that legislation effecting transfers of functions between public sector bodies makes provision for staff to transfer and on a basis that follows the principles of TUPE along with appropriate arrangements to protect occupational pension, redundancy and severance terms.”

I was grateful for the assurances that the Minister offered this afternoon on some of those points, and I understand that transferring employees will be offered membership of the premium section of the principal civil service pension scheme. I accept that that is at least as favourable as the Legal Services Commission’s own pension arrangements. The terms on which members of the LSC scheme can transfer their accrued rights to the civil service pension scheme will no doubt be set out in the transfer scheme contemplated in schedule 4. Will the Minister confirm that my understanding of the position is correct?

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Kate Green Excerpts

Tuesday 1st November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Philip Davies]

I have a lot of sympathy with what the shadow Secretary of State says. The point is that, at the moment, these people are released only when they are deemed safe to be released. Under a determinate sentence—irrespective of whether or not people are safe to be released, whether or not they have gone through the programmes they need to go through to address their offending behaviour and whether or not they have behaved well in prison—they will be released back out to the public. That is an absolute disgrace, as is debating this issue in just 73 minutes, with 30 minutes for speeches by Back Benchers. I will give up at that point to make room for other people, but the Secretary of State should be ashamed of himself as this will measure create further unnecessary victims of crime.

[Kate Green (Stretford and Urmston) (Lab)]

I apologise for diverting the House to a rather different part of the debate, but my new clause 3, which I am pleased has support from Members across the House, is extremely important to a group of victims and their families—those for whom disability has been the motivation for murder or other violent crimes against disabled people. My new clause would apply the same minimum tariff in cases of murder in which disability has been a motivating factor as currently applies in similar cases with a sexual, racial or religious motivation. It would also shift the application of the aggravating feature of disability from being a matter of the victim being seen as vulnerable to a matter of the victim being at greater risk of harm, thereby firmly placing the obligation on the perpetrator.

[Paul Maynard (Blackpool North and Cleveleys) (Con)]

I am delighted to support this new clause. Does the hon. Lady agree that although this might seem like an obtuse issue to hon. Members in the Chamber it is attracting great attention outside within the disabled community? Does she also agree that there will be utter incomprehension if we fail to make progress on this issue, which should be a simple matter of human dignity and equality?

[Kate Green]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right and he has raised this issue in the House and with the Lord Chancellor before. Many disability organisations and the families of victims of such crimes have contacted him and me to express their very deep concerns. I am particularly indebted to the Disability Hate Crime network, to Katherine Quarmby, an independent journalist, and to the Royal Association for Disability Rights. I am also especially indebted to Christine Oliver, the sister of Keith Philpott, who was a learning disabled victim of murder, for taking the time to talk to me about her family’s experience in relation to my bringing the new clause before the House.

[Mr Kenneth Clarke]

I am sorry to intervene but, for the benefit of the debate on the other subject, may I assure the hon. Lady on behalf of the Government that we agree with her and my hon. Friend the Member for Blackpool North and Cleveleys (Paul Maynard)? I am advised that the new clause is defective in its drafting—I can tell her why—and I can assure her that we will table amendments in the other House to give effect to what she is asking for. We also propose to cover the transgender issue. I think that will help us to get on with the debate.

[Kate Green]

I am extremely grateful to the Lord Chancellor, as will be the many disabled people and their families who have been in contact with me. I am delighted that a Government amendment will be brought forward in the other place and I shall not detain the House further.

[Sir Alan Beith]

The hon. Member for Stretford and Urmston (Kate Green) must be delighted that so brief and concise a speech has produced so immediate, thorough and satisfactory a response. I welcome what the Government are doing about this.

I want to be brief so I shall resist the temptation to go into the extraordinary intellectual journey that the right hon. Member for Tooting (Sadiq Khan) seems to have undertaken. I shall also resist the temptation to go into the habit of the previous Government of releasing people from prison at any moment when the jails seemed to be rather full without any reference to sentence planning or, for that matter, to the annual criminal justice Bill to which new clauses were always added on Report as far as I can recall—a practice I rather deplore because, as in this case, it denies us the opportunity to give new clauses proper scrutiny. I want to make it quite clear that the continuance of what I regard as a blot on the system—the use of indeterminate sentences—is something that I do not support. I therefore welcome the Lord Chancellor’s action to remove such sentences from our system, and I believe that view is widely shared in the criminal justice system.

People are concerned about the possibility of serious criminals re-entering society and committing other very serious offences, but how can they conclude that the best thing to do with such people is to put them in prison without our having any idea how long they might stay there? Surely, it is better to have a much clearer idea that they will be in prison for a long time and that if they are ever released, it will be under licence for life. I do not see why it should be preferable for the public to be told, “Well, we’ve put the chap in prison, but we’re not really sure when he’ll come out and a board that you know very little about will decide whether it’s safe.” I think most members of the public would be quite suspicious of that and would rather hear that there was a clear and long sentence. I am suspicious of mandatory sentences, but as a means of giving reassurance on how the courts might be expected to behave in the sort of cases we are discussing, the mandatory sentence we are discussing can be justified, especially as it is very carefully worded with appropriate provision for justice.

However, all this is only part of the story. None of it is any use unless we have proper sentence planning and proper offender management. Proper sentence planning is virtually impossible under the indeterminate sentences for public protection system, especially for those on shorter terms. People have not been completing the courses that they need to have completed to satisfy the Parole Board that they could be released. That system is untenable. We need effective sentence planning—and more determinate sentences are a better way of achieving that. We need proper offender management for offenders who are eventually going to leave prison. The Justice Committee has regularly stressed that the concept of offender management needs to include proper control. It should not be a system in which people are handed from one agency to another without a continuous process of supervision.

The trouble with the procedure in the new clause is that we do not have the opportunity to probe the details by tabling a probing amendment. I asked the Lord Chancellor earlier about new clause 34. I think that it is well intentioned in that it is an attempt to deal with existing indeterminate public protection prisoners, but I am bound to question it because it gives to the Executive the power to direct the Parole Board on what should be done with an individual. That is a direction to a court—there have been court cases that have ruled that the Parole Board must be regarded as a court. So it is an odd way of proceeding and one that we might have amended in Committee had we been able to consider the measure. If there is an opportunity, I hope that I can hear a little more about why the measure has been introduced as a new clause tonight.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Djanogly]

The reason is that criminalisation would be too blunt an instrument. If we take the example of the straight payment of a fee for a referral, I can see how straight criminalisation would work, but we should appreciate that when that was last banned in 2004 it was a weak provision through which a coach and horses could be driven. What if an insurance company provides insurance to a solicitor in payment for referrals, rather than a straight fee? What if a trade union gives its cheap work to a firm of solicitors in consideration for the solicitors getting its better work? What if a claims management company provides a variety of services to a solicitor in payment for a referral? The point I am making is that the circumstances could be very varied and complex and the straight criminal option would not be appropriate. It would be the principle that counts and it would have to be a regulator that looks to the principle.

We are primarily concerned with removing incentives under the current system with regard to personal injury claims, which is why we are banning referral fees in that area. However, the Lord Chancellor may in future extend by regulation the prohibition on referral fees to other types of claim and legal services and other providers of legal services should the need arise and if the case is made for such an extension.

[Kate Green]

Is the Minister not concerned that that might introduce an element of uncertainty? Although I note what he says about the possibility of extending the provisions to other structures in future, is he not aware that alternative business structures will now be set up by large companies to get around the provisions? How will he address that?

[Mr Djanogly]

Alternative business structures will be set up by the Solicitors Regulation Authority, probably before or just after the end of this year, so the hon. Lady makes an important point. At that stage, claims management companies will be able to purchase solicitors, and vice versa, which means that it would indeed be possible, as we discussed in the Transport Committee, for a claims management company to own a solicitor and effectively act as the advertising arm of a firm of solicitors. However, the important difference is that the claims management companies will then be regulated by the SRA, which will give consumers a significant amount of comfort.

Referral fees are one of the symptoms of the compensation culture in this country. The Government are determined to put an end to them while at the same time addressing the underlying cause of recoverability of no win, no fee success fees.

--- Later in debate ---

[Bob Blackman]

As I said, I hope to get clarity at the conclusion of the debate, because this is clearly a problem. I would like these illicit text messages and such like to be criminalised, because they are clearly an abuse of the law. Indeed, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith) said, they should be criminalised already under the Data Protection Act, because they constitute an abuse of personal data.

I seek clarity on a third issue: the effect on claims management companies of banning referral fees. I sought advice from Accident Advice Helpline, which is based in my constituency. It informs me that only one in six of its 36,000 cases last year were referred to solicitors, with the rest being screened out. Of those, 70% led to a settlement, with 15% dropped owing to “no involvement”. I could go through all the details of the data, but the reality is that Accident Advice Helpline screens the cases, which costs money. If Accident Advice Helpline does not do that, other solicitors will have to do it, at a cost to themselves. I would therefore like some clarity on what the effect will be and how it is proposed that those companies will be funded so that they do not fall foul of the regulations.

[Kate Green]

I, too, am keen to ask the Minister some questions, similar to those put by the hon. Member for Harrow East (Bob Blackman).

I completely share other hon. Members’ concerns about securing much better protection for the consumer, but given that the amendments have been introduced rather hastily I hope that the Minister will assure us that there will be a level playing field for different business types and, in particular, that access to independent legal advice from independent solicitors will be protected for claimants.

I therefore seek a fuller explanation from the Minister of how it is intended that referral fees will be defined. Specifically, to what extent does he see marketing activity by solicitors and others as covered—or not covered—by the provisions? For example, as has already been suggested, if a high street solicitor takes on some work, but realises that he or she does not have the expertise to pursue the case and therefore refers it to another solicitor and arranges some form of fee sharing, how is it intended that this should be treated under the provisions? Some solicitors have grouped together to pool their marketing budgets. Is the intention of the Minister’s amendments to outlaw pooled marketing completely or to cover it in regulation? It would be useful to have some clarification on that.

I welcome what the Minister said in answer to my earlier intervention about alternative business structures, but I am curious to know what his assessment is of the possibility that more and more large claims management companies will seek to handle all such business in-house and will stop using the services of other legal firms or legal experts. Has he made any assessment of the possibility of the provision of such services being concentrated in a way that reduces consumer choice and independent advice, and will he say what steps he might take to address that?

[Mr Kevan Jones]

I welcome the banning of referral fees, and I congratulate the Minister and the Government on doing it. The scandal is that, frankly, it should have been done years ago. My hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw (John Mann) and I campaigned hard to expose the scandal surrounding the miners compensation scheme, which created a feeding frenzy not just for solicitors but for claims management companies. As I have said before—and to answer the hon. Member for Harrow East (Bob Blackman)—I frankly do not care if they all go bust, because they are not needed in this process. If people need legal advice, they go to a solicitor. Claims management companies have acted like parasites on the access to justice model that we have had in this country for many years.

I find it ironic that my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) said that I was referring to Blackburn as a middle-England constituency, because I was not. The fact of the matter is that my hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw and I, along with one or two other Members, argued hard about the scandal surrounding the miners compensation scheme. One of the key points was referral fees and the amount of money received not only by solicitors but by unscrupulous trade unions and unscrupulous claims handling companies. The issue was regulated in 2004, with referral fees being made legal. However, in the case of the miners compensation scheme it was quite obvious that referral fees were being paid and that the Law Society was turning a blind eye—I always refer to the Law Society as the best trade union in the world, because it does such a good job of protecting its self-interest.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Kate Green Excerpts

Monday 31st October 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Djanogly]

My right hon. Friend makes an important point. I can tell him and other hon. Members that it has become clear to me, from my many meetings over the last year and a half with mediators and lobby groups such as those already mentioned, that in the vast majority of cases the parties are better off sorting out their problems together with the help of the mediator. For the most part, mediation is empowering. In most cases, the best way forward is for people to be able to sort out their own futures and those of their children without being told what to do by a judge, and that is what the Government support.

[Kate Green (Stretford and Urmston) (Lab)]

I want to ask the Minister about cases where domestic abuse or violence per se is not present, but where conflict between the parents none the less makes it simply impossible for mediation to work effectively. In the interests of children, will the Minister consider extending legal aid in those circumstances, so that where a mediator knows that mediation simply could not work, the parents will still receive advice?

[Mr Djanogly]

The Government have changed the law through a pre-action protocol. The position from this April has been that where a divorce application is made, the parties have to see whether mediation is appropriate, as has been the case with publicly funded divorce cases. That does not, I hasten to add, mean that the parties have to go to mediation; however, they have to be assessed to see whether mediation is appropriate. I can tell the hon. Lady that the initial findings are very positive indeed. We have adequate mediators, with more than 1,000 mediation units around the country, and all are reporting a significant upturn in business, which is a positive outcome.

[Kate Green]

I agree with the Minister about the desirability of mediation wherever it can work best for all the parties. We would all like appropriate mediation to be used as much as possible in such cases, but will he clarify what he just said? Where a couple is found unsuitable for mediation because of the conflict between them, but where violence or abuse is absent, will they be able to access legal aid?

[Mr Djanogly]

I am afraid that the hon. Lady misunderstands the nature of mediation. In normal circumstances, it is not for the mediator to sit in judgment on the individuals who turn up for mediation. That happens in the assessment. The mediator should explain to the individuals the purpose of mediation and it is for the individuals themselves to decide whether mediation is appropriate. If violence was involved, the mediator might suggest that, in those circumstances, mediation is not appropriate. If domestic violence is involved, the Government believe that legal aid should be provided.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Djanogly]

I shall make a little more progress first.

The forms of evidence that will be accepted for this purpose are not set out in the Bill. Instead, they will be set out in regulations under clause 10. We believe it is appropriate to set out these detailed provisions in secondary, rather than primary, legislation as it can be amended to respond to particular issues that may arise during the operation of the scheme.

In the consultation, we suggested what might be the forms of evidence of domestic violence, and we listened to the views expressed on that in response. As a result, we have widened the range of forms of evidence, and, furthermore, only one of the forms of evidence would be needed. Legal aid will be available for victims of domestic violence in private family law cases where one of the following criteria is met: where a non-molestation order, occupation order, forced marriage protection order or other protective injunction against the other party is in place or has been made in the last 12 months; there is a criminal conviction for a domestic violence offence committed by the other party against the applicant for funding, unless the conviction is spent; there are ongoing criminal proceedings against the other party for a domestic violence offence by that party against the applicant for funding; the applicant for funding has been referred to a multi-agency risk assessment conference as a high-risk victim of domestic violence, and a plan has been put in place to protect them from violence by the other party; there has been a finding of fact in the family courts of domestic violence by the other party, giving rise to a risk of harm to the victim.

[Kate Green]

Will the fact that there is, for example, a non-molestation order be taken as evidence of suitability for legal aid in family proceedings, and will legal aid be available to enable a victim of domestic violence to get such an order?

[Mr Djanogly]

Yes, it will be. The hon. Lady makes a very important point, which has come up in consultation and has often been misconstrued. For such individuals, legal aid will be provided for the application for a non-molestation order, for example.

It might be helpful if I give an idea of the prevalence of these forms of evidence. About 24,100 domestic violence orders were made in 2010, about 74,000 domestic violence crimes were prosecuted in 2009-10 and there were 53,000 domestic violence convictions. Further, about 43,000 victims of domestic violence were referred to multi-agency risk assessment conferences in the 12 months to June 2010.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Slaughter]

We all have similar cases in our constituencies, and I am sure that the Minister must have, too. Those are the people to whom he should be listening.

[Kate Green]

Does my hon. Friend agree that women who are particularly fearful will not go to formal sources of support such as the police, and that, when they do pluck up the courage to go for advice, they are much more likely to go to a women’s agency or a domestic violence specialist? Does he agree that it is regrettable that the Minister is not prepared to take evidence from such bodies?

--- Later in debate ---

[Caroline Lucas]

I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention, which raised a really important point. It underlines the fact that we need from the Government a fuller explanation of exactly how they are going to consider the first half of amendment 113.

Let me finish by saying that the people I have particularly in mind are victims of domestic abuse who are not necessarily probationary partners. They might be a partner of someone with limited leave or of a person exercising European free movement rights. Although they do not fall within the domestic violence immigration rule, they might well face the very same problems as those who do. I look forward to hearing more from the Minister about how he intends to take forward the concerns raised in amendment 113 and that have been mentioned by other Opposition Members tonight. I very much hope that he can offer some serious reassurance for the future.

[Kate Green]

I speak in support of amendment 74 and endorse many of the comments made by the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) about her amendments. I shall add a couple of points about the definition of domestic violence and abuse and say a little more about the appropriate role of mediation.

We are all at a loss to understand exactly what distinction the Minister is drawing between the definition given by the Association of Chief Police Officers and the definition in the Bill. He variously says that there are differences and that different standards are required in cases where an investigation is taking place rather than action in court. Then he says that there is not much difference and he described the definitions earlier as broadly similar. Frankly, I think this definition is simply all over the place. That matters significantly, because it will put extra uncertainty and pressure on victims of domestic violence and abuse at precisely the time when they do not need to be uncertain. They have become brave enough to speak up and pursue their case, but it is not clear whether they will be covered by the scope of legal aid.

I am particularly concerned that the Minister seems to be putting in an extra hurdle for women who are victims of domestic violence but who are nevertheless able to make a case that they should be in receipt of legal aid. They can make an application saying that theirs is an exceptional case. They will presumably have to go to the new decision-making authority set up in the Bill, but we have no understanding of how that will be done, how much delay it might cause or what sort of evidence will be required to get access to exceptional funding to bring a case. All that is left unclear and simply adds further pressure and difficulty for victims of domestic abuse.

Amendment 74 is designed to be more precise about some of the evidential factors that should be considered. I would like to respond to the important point raised by the hon. Member for Ipswich (Ben Gummer) when he asked my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter) whether it would be helpful to have some sort of national register of agencies, from which such evidence could be received. I am sure that that will not be of any great attraction to the Minister, but the UK Border Agency is already well placed to accept evidence from such voluntary sector and third sector agencies. That provides a model that could apply here.

[Mr Slaughter]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right and made the point better than I did. Of course, the UK Border Agency accepts evidence from GPs, which the Minister appeared to pooh-pooh in his earlier comments.

[Kate Green]

Indeed, the Minister was more concerned to avoid the number of false allegations that he seems to regard as the major difficulty with domestic abuse cases. Opposition Members are far more concerned about the protection of vulnerable victims and believe that that should be the first and overarching priority. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”]

Finally, I want to say a little more than I was able to raise in interventions about the use of mediation. Of course we all want to see mediation used wherever it is appropriate and possible for separating couples to reach agreement through that route. We also know, however, that one thing that is particularly damaging to children is conflict. If there is a high degree of conflict, it is unlikely, even if domestic violence or abuse is absent, that mediation is going to be effective or can possibly work.

We are therefore again a bit puzzled about the Minister’s intentions on the use of mediation. I think he said earlier that the requirement was not to undertake mediation but to go through a process whereby it would be determined whether mediation was suitable for a separating couple. Then he said that there would be no compulsion on people to accept mediation. Well, that is certainly true, but if there is no other form of help or assistance available, it is very much a Hobson’s choice.

Can the Minister see any scope for extending access to legal aid to those small number of cases where there is a high degree of conflict and perhaps no abuse or violence as such, but where the conflict would certainly be damaging to the well-being of children? What assessment has he made of that? What does he consider might be the extent of such cases? Has he any idea or any calculation? What consideration has he given to the impact on children and will he look at ways to offer particular protection to children from the very harmful effects of conflict, which we all know to be the case?

[Sheila Gilmore]

I have an interest to declare, as I have worked as a family lawyer and predominantly in legal aid over many years. I have been involved in many cases, some of which involved domestic violence and some not. The Minister seems obsessed with the notion that people might make false claims to get legal aid.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Djanogly]

First, let me confirm to my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland) and other hon. Members that I have listened carefully to the debate, which has been informed and varied. A significant number of general and more specific issues have come up in our deliberations. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich (Ben Gummer) that the debate has, in some ways, become too polarised given the significant agreement and consensus among all hon. Members about the need to counter domestic violence.

Given the number of issues to address, it is hard to know where to start, but I shall begin with the definition of abuse, which was mentioned by the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Mr Llwyd) and the hon. Members for Stretford and Urmston (Kate Green), for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) and for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman). The accusation is that the definition of abuse in the Bill narrows the scope of legal aid in comparison with ACPO’s definition. The right hon. Gentleman said that the Bill weakened the definition of abuse. I can confirm to the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion that the definition in the Bill does not require physical abuse. Both the ACPO definition and the Bill definition are very broad and embrace abuse that is not physical, and it is difficult to see what description of behaviour in the ACPO definition would not be covered by the broad description of physical or mental abuse used in the Bill.

The right hon. Gentleman suggested that I said in Committee that to widen the definition of domestic violence would induce self-reporting. As I think my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich was heading towards saying, that confuses the definition of abuse, which determines scope, and the criteria for an individual to qualify. The definition of abuse in the Bill is broad and it is difficult to see how it does not cover that which is covered by the ACPO definition. Neither definition says anything about how abuse is to be evidenced.

My hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon injected a sense of balance into the debate and I noted his condemnation of archaic and unacceptable language. I think we can all agree on that.

The right hon. Gentleman spoke about the Bill and ACPO definitions of domestic violence. To put an end to this issue, let me say that if any right hon. or hon. Member can write to me with a specific, concrete example of abuse that would be covered by the ACPO definition but not by the definition in the Bill I will give the issue serious consideration.

[Kate Green]

I am not going to give the Minister an example of that. If he is so sure that there is such an overlap, why not use the ACPO definition?

[Mr Djanogly]

I look forward to the hon. Lady providing her reasons why that should be the case.

The right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd made a significant number of points for his significant number of amendments, most of which I covered in my preliminary remarks, and I do not intend to go over them all again. However, he mentioned two particular points that I did not cover, so if he does not mind I will concentrate on those.

It is not clear that amendments 92 or 93 would widen the category of services described in paragraph 10 significantly or at all. The definition of abuse used in the Bill is intentionally broad and not limited to physical violence, but it embraces physical or mental abuse. Abuse is stated to include sexual abuse and abuse in the form of violence, neglect, maltreatment and exploitation, but it is not limited to those examples. Therefore, we believe that it is sufficiently flexible to cover cases of genuine abuse, as is the intention. Both amendments refer to physical and mental abuse, which are already explicitly referred to in the Bill’s definition. Additionally, they refer to threatening behaviour, violence and emotional abuse, which are clearly within the scope of physical and mental abuse and so are unnecessary and add nothing to the breadth of the category.

Further reference is made to financial abuse. It is not entirely clear what that would cover outside the context of serious cases where the treatment of one party by the other in relation to the family finances amounts to physical or, in particular, mental abuse, which would include neglect, maltreatment and exploitation in the Bill’s definition, where it is clearly within the definition of abuse in the Bill. Where the financial abuse does not amount to or form part of physical or mental abuse, it could be argued that the amendment would widen the gateway beyond what might be ordinarily understood as abusive behaviour, but in a way where the effect is unclear. For instance, there is no special reference to financial abuse in the provisions of the Family Law Act 1996 to protect against domestic violence or in case law, in contrast to emotional or psychological abuse, so it is questionable what it would add in this regard.

However, the amendment also stipulates that any incident of abuse would suffice to come within the category. On one construction, that would make no difference since the existing definition does not require a course of conduct, but on another construction it might be argued that the explicit reference to any incident could be read as a fetter on the power to define what would be accepted as sufficient evidence of abuse through secondary legislation. That is because the type of evidence acceptable will reflect a certain degree of seriousness. For instance, a family court will not generally make orders relating to minor, one-off incidents, although it will do so in appropriate circumstances, such as a course of conduct of trivial incidents adding up to something more serious.

It is not clear that any challenge to secondary legislation requiring forms of evidence that in themselves are unlikely to arise from minor, single incidents would have any prospect of success, but the risk cannot be entirely ruled out. Were it impossible to prescribe the forms of evidence proposed to date, we estimate that the consequent opening up of eligibility would at the very least double the cost of the domestic violence gateway to £130 million per annum.

The part of amendment 23 that refers to violence or abuse

“between adults who are or have been intimate partners or family members, regardless of gender or sexuality”

is superfluous, since it duplicates the effect of paragraph 10(7), which sets out that for the purposes of the paragraph there is a family relationship between two people if they are associated with each other. That “associated” has the same meaning as set out in part 4 of the 1996 Act, where it is defined very widely and covers a range of relationships no less wide, and in some instances wider, than the ACPO definition.

Amendment 93 would widen the domestic violence gateway so that legal aid would be available for the potential victim in private family law cases where there has been an as yet unproven allegation of abuse, or of the risk of abuse. It would make the gateway extremely wide and, in effect, would mean that self-reporting would have to be accepted as sufficient evidence of domestic violence, making any other evidentiary requirements redundant. It would be difficult to limit very far the forms of evidence of an allegation of abuse, or of the risk of abuse, that would be accepted. We estimate that that would at the very least double the cost of the domestic violence gateway to £130 million per annum.

The amendment refers to allegations that person B has been abused by person A. In paragraph 10 of schedule 1, it is person A who is the victim, and person B who is the abuser—the other way around. However, the amendment does not change the opening proposition, which is that the services are provided to person A. This appears to have the perverse consequence that if the proven abuser, person B, alleges that the proven victim, person A, was the abuser, person A would qualify more easily for legal aid as they would then have to give as evidence only an allegation by person B of abuse or the risk of abuse. That is almost certainly a drafting error, but if it is not, and the intention is instead to ensure that legal aid would be available where either party might be the victim of abuse, that would be unnecessary.

In relation to amendment 97, the intended effect is unnecessary because section 37 proceedings are public law matters and it would be possible, in private law proceedings, for a court that is considering a section 37 order to adjourn so that the parents, if they are not already represented, may have access to legal aid and representation under the public law heading. The actual effect is rather wider. However, the amendment would bring the whole of family proceedings, such as proceedings for residence and contact with children, into scope where the court considers making a section 37 direction, rather than simply consideration of that point. Again, this may be a matter of defective drafting, but if so the entire amendment would be superfluous.

The right hon. Gentleman also asked whether an adjournment would introduce a delay in protecting a child. We would expect a court to adjourn a hearing only if it considered it safe to do so. The only way to avoid the potential of being a section 37 direction being made at a hearing involving unrepresented parents would be by providing legal aid for all private law children cases, which we believe would be a disproportionate response. There is already the potential for section 37 directions to be made in cases involving litigants in person under the present system, but as I have said, legal aid is available and will be in future to challenge such a direction.

A significant number of comments were made in relation to amendment 74. The hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter) indicated that he will want to press it to a Division, so I will spend some time on it. I agree that it is an important matter. He said that he understands our intent. Does he understand that we need to have savings in legal aid? I am not sure what he meant when he said that he understands our intent—[Interruption.] He says that he will address that in a later debate, but I think that it is quite an important issue. In contrast to what he said, his right hon. Friend the shadow Secretary of State recognised in an article published only this morning that

“cuts need to be made”.

Looking at the amendments tabled by Opposition Members, I cannot see where those cuts will be made. We have had a little look at what they are proposing. The estimated costs of the Opposition amendments are: £20 million in debt matters, £5 million in employment matters, £15 million in housing matters, £25 million in welfare benefits matters, £10 million in clinical negligence matters and £170 million in family law matters. The total is £245 million. The taxpayer deserves to know where the money for that will come from.

Let me address the actual effect of amendment 74. To set out in the Bill the circumstances as specified in the amendment that should be accepted as evidence of domestic violence for the purposes of legal aid for the victim in a private family law case would mean that those circumstances, but not those that the Government intend to accept as evidence of domestic violence, would be set out in primary legislation. The Government would therefore have no power at all to amend those circumstances through secondary legislation. They would be in addition to any circumstances set out in secondary legislation for providing appropriate evidence of abuse. We expect that significantly more cases would receive funding if the circumstances set out in either amendment were accepted as evidence. The hon. Member for Edinburgh East (Sheila Gilmore) and others mentioned their concern about the issue of incentives for false allegations of domestic violence, but we received a significant number of responses to the consultation that expressed concern that there might be a rise in unfounded allegations of domestic violence, and the respondents expressing such concerns included the Law Society and the Bar Council.

Oral Answers to Questions

Kate Green Excerpts

Tuesday 13th September 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Blunt]

Again, my hon. Friend is right. Remand prisoners pose a particular challenge, in the youth estate as well as the adult estate, because of the speed with which they tend to turn over in those institutions. That makes getting work for them more difficult, but there needs to be a proper focus on programmes for all people in custody following a proper assessment of their rehabilitative requirements.

[Kate Green (Stretford and Urmston) (Lab)]

The Minister will be aware that women in prison are often under-occupied. Will he tell us what special attention he is giving to creating working opportunities for women who are serving custodial sentences?

[Mr Blunt]

This agenda has to apply to women as well as to men. The sad fact is that, overall, too many of our prisoners are under-occupied, whether women or men, and the same attention must be paid to the women’s estate as to the men’s estate.