Facial Recognition: Police Use

John Whittingdale Excerpts

Wednesday 13th November 2024 Westminster Hall

[Dame Siobhain McDonagh (in the Chair)]

Before I call Sir John Whittingdale to move the motion, I would like to inform Members that the parliamentary digital communication team will be conducting secondary filming during this debate.

[Sir John Whittingdale (Maldon) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered police use of live facial recognition technology.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Siobhain. I am grateful for this opportunity to debate the police’s use of live facial recognition technology. I have to say that this debate is somewhat overdue.

Any fan of Hollywood movies would think that the use of facial recognition technology is widespread, as in “The Bourne Ultimatum” and “Spooks”, and that it is commonplace for MI5 and the CIA to tap into CCTV cameras across London. I do not believe that is correct— I hope it is not—but police forces are using facial recognition technology more and more. It was first used in 2017, and it is now commonly used by the Metropolitan police, South Wales police and now my own police force in Essex, which purchased two vans in August and use it regularly.

On 4 October, I accompanied police officers on a deployment in Chelmsford High Street, who were hugely helpful in explaining to me exactly how they use the technology and, importantly, what controls are in place. They told me that they had a watch list of 639 individuals who had been approved by the superintendent and were wanted for questioning in relation to offences such as violence against the person. They included people with outstanding warrants, suspects linked to county lines, suspected shoplifters in that particular part of the county, and those with a sexual harm prevention order.

In the course of the 30 minutes or so that I spent with those officers, they recorded 1,500 faces of people who passed by. The officers assured me that those images were matched against the watch list to see whether they registered a positive, and if they did not they were deleted in less than half a second. During the time I was there, there were approximately 10 positives, which led to a conversation: a police officer would go and have a polite exchange to find out why the person had registered positive, and they were checked against the Police National Computer or Athena. That morning, that led to two arrests.

The chief constable of Essex has written to me and colleagues to emphasise the effectiveness of the technology and its importance to that force. He told me that they had so far had 25 deployments across Essex, resulting in 26 arrests and 26 other positive disposals. He said:

“This cutting-edge technology has enabled us to keep the public safe, and can save time and effort of our front-line, allowing them to do other work to protect and support the community.”

[Kim Johnson (Liverpool Riverside) (Lab)]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for securing this important debate. There are suggestions that this technology disproportionately misidentifies black people and people from other communities. Does he agree that the Government must give us more assurances and ensure that more black people are not criminalised? We know that black communities are over-policed and underserved.

[Sir John Whittingdale]

I certainly agree that more assurances need to be given. That is actually one of the purposes behind requesting this debate. The hon. Lady is right that concerns have been expressed—

[David Davis (Goole and Pocklington) (Con)]

I agree with the hon. Member for Liverpool Riverside (Kim Johnson), but it goes deeper than that. There are at least three conditions that ought to apply, and I would be interested to hear from my right hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Sir John Whittingdale) whether Essex met them. First, these things always ought to be under judicial oversight; it should not simply be a police decision. Secondly, as he said, only the records of presumed guilty or actively sought people should be kept and, thirdly, that innocent people’s records should be destroyed straightaway. That should not be left to a guideline; it should be under legislative control and properly treated in that way.

[Sir John Whittingdale]

I agree with my right hon. Friend. The problem at the moment is that we do not even have national guidelines. There is a complete absence, which I will come to later. I will give way to the shadow Home Secretary.

[Chris Philp (Croydon South) (Con)]

I am extremely grateful to my right hon. Friend for giving way. I would like to add some context to the question of racial bias. There were allegations of racial bias a few years ago. The system was tested by the national physical laboratory about two years ago and, at the settings used by the police, no racial bias was found. That was one of the conditions set in the Bridges litigation about four years ago, and I hope that gives my right hon. Friend and other hon. Members some reassurance on the question of racial bias. It has been tested by the national physical laboratory.

[Sir John Whittingdale]

As I understand it, the number of false positives recorded depends to some extent on the threshold at which the technology is set.

[Dawn Butler (Brent East) (Lab)]

The report by the national physical laboratory said that it had to be set at 0.6 for it to have fewer misidentifications, but there is no such thing as no misidentifications or people not being wrongly identified. It is also easy for a police service to lower that number. Because we have no judicial oversight, it is very problematic.

[Sir John Whittingdale]

The hon. Lady is completely right. I think the police are generally being responsible in its use and setting the threshold as recommended, but that is another example where there is no requirement on them to do so, and they could lower it. Regarding deployment in Essex, the chief constable told me there was just one false positive.

I attended a meeting with Baroness Chakrabarti, along with my right hon. Friend the Member for Goole and Pocklington, where Shaun Thompson, an anti-knife community worker, spoke to us. He had been held by the police for 30 minutes and forced to provide all sorts of identity documents, as a result of a false positive. On the extent to which it is occurring and whether racial bias is involved, there is some evidence that that is the case. That makes it all the more important that we provide assurances.

We have heard from several campaign organisations that are concerned about the use. They vary in the extent to which they believe it is a legitimate technology. Big Brother Watch has described live facial recognition technology as

“constant generalised surveillance”

and has said that it is

“indiscriminately subjecting members of the public to mass identity checks”

which undermines the presumption of innocence.

Liberty has gone further, saying:

“Creating law to govern police and private company use…will not solve the human rights concerns or the tech’s inbuilt discrimination…The only solution is to ban it.”

I do not agree with that, because I think there is clear evidence that it has a real benefit in helping the police apprehend people who are wanted for serious offences, but one of my major concerns is the lack of any clarity in law about how it should be used.

I am grateful to the Library, which has provided advice on that point. It says:

“There is no dedicated legislation in the UK on the use of facial recognition technologies.”

Instead, its use is governed by common law and by an interpretation of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, although that Act does not mention live facial recognition technology, and some case law, such as the Bridges case. Even in the Bridges case, the Court of Appeal found that

“The current policies do not sufficiently set out the terms on which discretionary powers can be exercised by the police and for that reason do not have the necessary quality of law.”

[David Davis]

On precisely that point, some police forces in the UK take the view that GDPR has reach in this area. Does my right hon. Friend have a view on that?

[Sir John Whittingdale]

My right hon. Friend has anticipated my next point extremely effectively. I was Minister at the time of the passage of the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill, which did not cover live facial recognition technology. At the same time, my right hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), who is the shadow Home Secretary, was the Minister for Policing and he made a speech about how valuable live facial recognition technology was. I therefore sought advice about how that fitted in with GDPR.

The advice that came back following consultation with the Information Commissioner’s Office was that there is no blanket approval by the ICO for the use of LFR technology. Essentially, it should be judged on a case-by-case basis, but the ICO had expectations that data protection and privacy should be respected. It went on to say that the use of LFR can be highly intrusive and future uses of the technology may require updates, but that the ICO is monitoring it closely. That is only partially reassuring. Essentially, the ICO recognises that breaches of data protection could be possible, and is monitoring it, but there is no clear guideline to assist the police or anybody else with precisely how it should be used.

I am grateful to legal consultants Handley Gill, who wrote to me yesterday and who are involved in advising a number of people about the legality of the technology. They said that

“it is undesirable for individual Chief Officers and PCCs to have to engage in the wide ranging review and preparation of the necessary documentation, and that a move toward a common national approach (and choice of technology provider) would secure efficiencies and also enable closer monitoring…to ensure their efficacy and lawfulness.”

Although we are no longer bound by European Union law, the EU has brought in much more stringent controls than exist here.

[Douglas McAllister (West Dunbartonshire) (Lab)]

Scotland’s chief constable said in September that it would be “an abdication” of her duty not to assess whether this AI tool could be used and that the force was “very much alive” to it, describing it as a crucial tool to “take violent perpetrators” off the streets. In my view, it is an exercise in balancing the need to tackle crime and keep people safe with the impact the tool may have on human rights and civil liberties. I believe the right hon. Gentleman wishes to introduce stringent restrictions on the use of such surveillance. If so, what are they, and is he seeking to follow similar European states’ legislation akin to the EU Artificial Intelligence Act?

[Sir John Whittingdale]

The EU’s AIA lays down very strong controls—it almost goes too far—in that it restricts the categories of individual who can be sought under the watch list to quite a small number. The House of Commons Library points out that

“the AIA 2024 prohibits the use of ‘real-time remote biometric identification systems’ (such as LFR) in publicly accessible spaces for the purposes of law enforcement, unless such use is ‘strictly necessary’ for one of the following objectives”.

The list it provides includes the search for specific victims of abduction or trafficking; missing persons; the prevention of a substantial and imminent threat to life; the prevention of a genuine threat of a terrorist attack; or the localisation of a person suspected of having committed a criminal offence.

In Europe, the controls are strong, but in this country it is left largely to police officers to interpret the law and be reasonably confident. However, legal challenges are under way. Shaun Thompson, whom I met, is seeking judicial review of the police’s actions and the campaign organisations are also looking at legal challenges. There is a real need for clarity. Certainly, the sergeant of Essex police who is in charge of deployment told me that, in his view, it would be really helpful for the police to have clear guidelines. They would then not have to make those difficult decisions and could potentially satisfy a court that the use was proportionate and justified.

As far as I am aware, this matter has not been debated by Parliament before, and it should have been because there is a real need to seek clarity in the law. This may sound like science fiction, but ultimately there is a risk that it becomes possible for every CCTV camera in the country to be linked up, and there could be a watchlist of not 600 but millions of people. Concerns have been expressed by organisations such as Big Brother Watch—in this particular instance, that organisation could be well named—and I do not think any Member would wish to go down that route. I think most people recognise that there is some value in the technology, but there is a need for clarity. I am grateful to the shadow Home Secretary and particularly the Minister for Policing for coming to contribute, and I look forward to what they have to say.

[Dame Siobhain McDonagh (in the Chair)]

I remind Members that they should bob if they wish to be called in the debate, and it seems that everybody does.

Draft Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Investigative Powers of Prosecutors: Code of Practice) Order 2024 Draft Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Search, Recovery of Crypto Assets and Investigations: Codes of Practice) Regulations 2024 Draft Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and Terrorism Act 2000 (Certain Information Orders: Code of Practice) Regulations 2024 Draft Terrorism Act 2000 (Code of Practice for Authorised Officers) Orders 2024

John Whittingdale Excerpts

Tuesday 16th April 2024 General Committees

[Sir John Whittingdale (Maldon) (Con)]

I shall be extremely brief, Dr Huq. In no way do I question the purpose behind the instruments, but I am interested to hear from my hon. Friend the Minister on this question. As I understand it, one of the reasons that crypto assets are particularly attractive to those engaged in terrorist or criminal activities is that it is very difficult to discover them, and even harder then to establish who owns them. Although I do not wish the Minister to give away any confidential information, I am interested to get his assurance and whatever information he can provide on the extent to which law enforcement authorities can trace crypto assets and the people who sit behind them.

Oral Answers to Questions

John Whittingdale Excerpts

Monday 15th April 2024 Commons Chamber

[Tom Pursglove]

What I cannot do on the Floor of the House is make commitments about specific hotels, but I would be very happy to meet the hon. Gentleman to discuss this. What he could do to help me with this particular challenge is to get behind the work that the Government are doing to reduce the flow of people coming to the UK, which fundamentally and crucially would help us to be able to close hotels such as the one in his constituency.

[Sir John Whittingdale (Maldon) (Con)]

T1. If he will make a statement on his departmental responsibilities.

[The Secretary of State for the Home Department (James Cleverly)]

We have increased the volume of asylum cases processed. We successfully met a ministerial commitment to close over 50 asylum-seeker hotels by January 2024, and we had closed over 100 by the end of March.

Last year, I brought forward measures to make legal migration fairer and to radically reduce the numbers; 300,000 people who came to the UK last year would not now be eligible to do so. Anyone who wants to bring a family from abroad must be able comfortably to support them financially.

In the Budget, the Government put forward £75 million to roll out violence reduction units and hotspot policing across England and Wales, and £230 million for technology that will save the police time and money and make sure that police officers are on the frontline doing the job that they were recruited to do.

[Sir John Whittingdale]

May I add my condolences, Mr Speaker?

My right hon. Friend will be aware that police numbers in Essex are at record levels and that overall crime is down. However, there has been a rise in vehicle thefts. Will he therefore welcome the efforts of our excellent police, fire and crime commissioner, Roger Hirst, in establishing a stolen vehicle intelligence unit that has so far recovered £14 million-worth of vehicles? Will he look at what further support can be given to Roger Hirst to tackle this crime?

[James Cleverly]

My right hon. Friend is right to highlight the fantastic work of Roger Hirst and the stolen vehicle intelligence unit. A number of large-scale seizures have been made against attempted vehicle exports. The Government have reduced vehicle-related crime by 39% since 2010, and we seek to go further through the Criminal Justice Bill. We want to see more innovative approaches like the one taken by Roger Hirst, which is why I am very proud to campaign alongside him. He has done fantastic work to protect the people of Essex.

Security Threat to UK-Based Journalists

John Whittingdale Excerpts

Monday 20th February 2023 Commons Chamber

[Tom Tugendhat]

I thank the hon. Member for the tone in which she has approached this. She is absolutely right, of course, that anybody in the United Kingdom—whether they are in Gloucester or in Glasgow—should be absolutely as safe as any UK citizen. She is right that, sadly, some are being targeted. While I hear her words on proscription, it is worth noting that the National Security Bill we have brought in does allow us to exercise almost all the powers of proscription against state threats, which will be enormously helpful. I know that she has in the past been very supportive of various elements of that, so I hope we will be able to continue enjoying the support of her and her party.

The hon. Member raises the question of visas, and she is absolutely right to do so. I will not comment on individual cases for obvious reasons, but as she knows, the UK Government and the British people have been exceptionally generous to those in need of sanctuary in the United Kingdom, and I am absolutely certain that that policy will continue.

[Sir John Whittingdale]

My right hon. Friend will be aware that Iran has one of the worst media freedom records in the world. When the Government press the Government of Iran over the outrageous threats made against Iran International, will they also raise the question of the continuing persecution of family members of BBC Persian service staff who are still living in Iran? Does my right hon. Friend also agree that the threats against Iran International in this country are a further demonstration of the need for the cross-Government National Committee for the Safety of Journalists, and will he continue to give that committee every support to ensure that media freedom in the UK is fully protected?

[Tom Tugendhat]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his comments. When he was Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, he was exemplary in supporting media freedom around the world. I completely agree with his comments on BBC Persian, which offers an extraordinary window—not just for the Persian but for the Iranian people—into the truth that is quite rightly highlighted by their broadcasts, and allows those of us who are lucky enough to watch BBC Persian here in the UK to understand what is going on in Tehran and across Iran. I absolutely agree with my right hon. Friend and I give that same commitment.

Migration and Economic Development

John Whittingdale Excerpts

Monday 19th December 2022 Commons Chamber

[Suella Braverman]

We have been very clear that families are not subject to the Rwandan policy, but the broader point is this. The hon. Member’s reading of the judgment is different from mine. There has been an extensive and exhaustive analysis of the legal claims brought against the Government, and the Court has been pretty emphatic on the legality of the policy. It concluded that the scheme is compliant with our ECHR and refugee obligations.

[Sir John Whittingdale (Maldon) (Con)]

Two months ago, I visited the Hope hostel in Kigali. Not only was the accommodation of a high standard, but the Rwandans I spoke to expressed hope that those coming would, in due course, obtain jobs and move out to their own homes, thus allowing more refugees to come and take their place. Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that this policy is not just lawful, but humane in that it offers refugees real hope?

[Suella Braverman]

Absolutely. My right hon. Friend reiterates a point dealt with extensively in the body of the judgment. I refer right hon. and hon. Members to that judgment, in which there is a complete analysis of the exact support that people will receive when they are in Rwanda, the monitoring that will go on to ensure that their welfare is safeguarded, and the track record that Rwanda has demonstrated in supporting refugees from the region in previous instances.

Automated Facial Recognition Surveillance

John Whittingdale Excerpts

Monday 27th January 2020 Commons Chamber

[Kit Malthouse]

I do. It is worth repeating what I said at the beginning about how the system works. If an individual passes in front of a camera and there is no match, the information that that individual is there is instantly deleted; if there is a match, the information will be retained for 31 days and then deleted; and even if there is a match, it is for the police officer on the scene at the time to decide, on viewing the evidence, whether to stop the individual. We will see how this goes over the next few months and years, but we hope and believe it will be of enormous benefit in fighting crime.

[Mr John Whittingdale (Maldon) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend not accept the view of the surveillance camera commissioner, who has said that the guidelines are insufficient at present and there is no transparency? Do the Government plan to update the guidelines to take account of developments in technology?

[Kit Malthouse]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for his question, which points to the heart of the matter. As he knows, there is a facial recognition and biometrics board, which is soon to have a new chair. As part of that renewal of leadership, we will review the board’s terms of reference and its mission, especially in the light of technological developments. What emanates from that, and whether it is a change in the terms of the code, we will have to wait and see, but as I said at the start, I am very aware of the duty we have in this House to strike the right balance between security and liberty.

Prevent Programme

John Whittingdale Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd January 2020 Commons Chamber

[Brandon Lewis]

To give some context, Counter Terrorism Policing creates a range of guidance documents for use across the whole of policing, not just by counter-terrorism officers or Prevent practitioners. It produces these documents to help frontline officers and other colleagues make informed decisions, including about protecting crowded places at times of protest—something that Figen Murray has done amazing work on.

The signs and symbols document that became the subject of the Guardian article was produced to help the police and close partners identify and understand signs and symbols that they may come across in their day-to-day working lives, so that they know the difference between the symbols for the many groups they may come across. But these things have to be done correctly and in the right context. The police themselves have recognised that this was an error of judgment, and they have withdrawn the document and are reviewing it.

[Mr John Whittingdale (Maldon) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend appreciate the enormous distress and offence that this has caused across Ukraine? Does he share my view that this symbol needs to be removed from the police guidance? Will he also take this opportunity to reiterate that this country remains a very strong friend and supporter of Ukraine?

[Brandon Lewis]

My right hon. Friend makes a very good point. My right hon. Friend the Minister for Europe and the Americas has spoken to his opposite number in Ukraine today. I am likely to see one of my opposite numbers in Zagreb over the next couple of days, and I will express the huge regret felt by the Government about the fact that this happened. We have a very valuable and positive relationship with our friends and partners in Ukraine. We look to see that continue and strengthen as we look outward as a global country while we leave the European Union.

Police Surveillance of Journalists

John Whittingdale Excerpts

Wednesday 17th July 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hurd]

I am sure the hon. Gentleman will want to make it clear on behalf of the Opposition that they entirely support the police having the ability to get on with their work and identify the leaker. The police certainly have our full support on that, because those leaks should not have happened and they have been damaging. I am sure everyone wants to see the leaker identified.

The hon. Gentleman will also I am sure, having done his homework, be aware of what the Official Secrets Act 1989 says, in particular section 5, and that is how the law stands at the moment, but what is critical—I am delighted to come to the House again to make this clear—is that in going about their business on our behalf, the security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies need to jump through some very significant hoops and go through very robust processes, including, as I have stated, when they seek a targeted communications data authorisation approval by a judicial commissioner before it can take effect. We are satisfied—but this must always be open to challenge—that those processes, safeguards and checks and balances are robust.

We operate in a vibrant democracy, and we in this place always in my experience have vigorous debates about these balances and the need for safeguards. We have debates about pushing back the powers of our law enforcement agencies—whereas in other countries those debates do not take place—and that is a symbol and sign of the health of our democracy. I am sure that at the end of this UQ, we and the watching public will be in no doubt about this House’s commitment to the freedom of the press.

[Mr John Whittingdale (Maldon) (Con)]

I commend the Government on the organisation of last week’s excellent global media freedom conference, but does the Minister agree that the UK needs to do a lot more to improve on our present ranking of 33 in the world press freedom index? Does he also recognise that the concerns expressed by my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) make that harder to achieve and that these concerns risk being exploited by other countries who do not protect media freedom and are only too keen to lock up journalists?

[Mr Hurd]

I accept all that, coming from the authority of a highly distinguished former Secretary of State. I am entirely sincere, as are my colleagues, in taking this opportunity to reassert the importance of the freedom of the press and the protection of media freedoms, but we cannot in that process allow any sense that there is a blanket protection for legitimate investigation simply because of someone’s chosen profession. The processes need to be robust and open to criticism and debate, but the primacy of the free press and freedom of expression in this country is absolutely central to our democratic processes.

Far-right Violence and Online Extremism

John Whittingdale Excerpts

Monday 18th March 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

The hon. and learned Lady makes some good points. On her point about Islamophobia, I have publicly spoken out for many years about the fact that Islamophobia exists. It exists across our communities, in all our political parties and in the communities we represent; it exists throughout Europe, not just in the UK, and we have to tackle it.

If you want a good lesson on how to tackle intolerance, Mr Speaker, I should say that one of the early successful policies of the SNP was on dealing with anti-sectarianism. The SNP recognised in Scotland that this starts with sectarianism and it grows into violent extremism. I have to commend the SNP for what it did all those years ago on that, taking strong steps, certainly among the football community, to stamp it out. That is why, in the end, we have to focus upstream. We must focus in the communities and say what is not acceptable. We must embrace policies such as Prevent to make sure that everyone realises that this is ultimately about safeguarding.

On the issue relating to the community trust, the hon. and learned Lady is right. We will direct our funds as the threat changes, and we are completely open to learning every day from the attacks and plots we see, either here or abroad. We shall direct this in that way. My colleagues in government regularly speak to a range of Muslim communities, and many of us in this House will speak to our own communities in our own constituencies.

We will sense the fear that there currently is in some of those communities as a response to the attack in New Zealand and that there was even before that, given the growing rise of Islamophobia, spread through the evils of some of these chatrooms on the internet. We must, all of us, say that that is not acceptable, and neither is intolerance aimed at other people in other discourse around the world, be it in respect of Unionism and nationalism, or Brexit and remain. Intolerance is where this starts as a small seed, and it grows into hate.

[Mr John Whittingdale (Maldon) (Con)]

I welcome my right hon. Friend’s statement, and I strongly agree that the tech companies need to do more to stop the spread of hate and incitement to violence. However, does he also recognise that the internet is a force for good and that many authoritarian countries—China and, now, particularly Russia—are attempting to impose censorship on it for their own repressive political purposes? Does he therefore agree that any measures we take need to be proportionate and targeted, and must not allow other countries, such as Russia, to claim somehow that they are acting for reasons similar to ours?

[Mr Wallace]

It is tempting to say that my right hon. Friend is asking the wrong person. As Security Minister, I see daily how paedophiles, organised crime, groomers and terrorist recruiters use the internet as not a force for good. As we speak, the internet is being used to undermine our own democracy.

My right hon. Friend makes a valid point that, in places where there is no democracy and no rule of law, the internet is sometimes people’s only hope to engage with free thought and the outside world. We have to be very careful about how we balance that but, nevertheless, we know these companies can remove extremist content very quickly when they put their minds to it.

There are certain areas on which we all agree. I cannot find anyone in the world who would support allowing child sexual exploitation images to exist on our internet. Violent extremism, beheading videos and bullying online cannot be acceptable in any society. We can all agree that a number of activities should not be allowed or available on the internet without someone taking responsibility for preventing the broadcast or spreading of it. All of us in this House have to try to navigate that fine line, and we will debate it when the online White Paper comes before us.

Draft Investigatory Powers (Codes of Practice and miscellaneous amendments) order 2018

John Whittingdale Excerpts

Monday 16th July 2018 General Committees

[Mr John Whittingdale (Maldon) (Con)]

I do not want to detain the Committee; I just have one question for the Minister and one area in which I seek reassurance. My question refers to the explanatory note, which says that one of the purposes of this instrument is to

“reflect changes to strengthen protection for juvenile covert human intelligence sources”.

To me, that sounds like under-age spies. Could the Minister say in what circumstances we might be using juvenile covert human intelligence sources, unless my interpretation is wrong?

Like many in my party—including the Minister, I am sure—I regard the restriction on civil liberties represented by investigatory powers or electronic surveillance as necessary when it comes to national security matters and organised crime. As we have seen in the past, however, the list of agencies with access to those powers is considerable. It is difficult to imagine why the General Pharmaceutical Council, for example, might need them. The double lock provision offers some reassurance, but I would like the Minister to assure me that agencies not obviously in the frontline of the battle against terrorism or organised crime, such as some of those listed, are likely to use these powers only on extremely limited occasions.