Iran (Sanctions) Regulations 2023

John Spellar Excerpts

Monday 22nd January 2024 General Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs (Leo Docherty)]

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the Iran (Sanctions) Regulations 2023 (S.I., 2023, No. 1314).

This statutory instrument contains measures to deter the Government of Iran, and groups backed by Iran, from conducting hostile activity against the UK and our partners. It was laid on 13 December 2023 under powers in the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. The measures entered into force the following day. The instrument has been considered and not reported by the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments.

The Iranian regime poses a clear threat to the UK and our partners, with hostile acts ranging from assassination plots to significant support for armed groups. The new legislation provides sanctions powers to respond to that appalling behaviour. We can now introduce sanctions designations in relation to Iran’s hostile actions in any country. This could potentially be used in response to Iranian support to Russia; destabilising conduct in the middle east; or hostile acts in a partner country. We can use these powers where acts are perpetrated by Iran or by armed groups backed by Iran. Since January 2022, the UK has identified at least 15 threats emanating from Iran towards the lives of UK-based individuals. That is of course totally unacceptable. It is not only that; Iran continues to destabilise the middle east through its development and use of weapons, along with support for groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis.

Our priority is the safety and security of the UK, the people who live here, and international partners. That is why we have taken action, using this legislation, to sanction the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force, Esmail Qaani, and other senior IRGC figures involved in Iran’s long-term support for Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

The Minister mentions individuals with the revolutionary guard, but what about the revolutionary guard itself?

[Leo Docherty]

The right hon. Gentleman and colleagues will know, I hope, that the IRGC is sanctioned as an entity. There has been recent discussion about proscription, but that is different from sanctioning. Of course the IRGC, for very good reason, is sanctioned in its entirety.

We will not stop there.

[John Spellar]

But should we not be proscribing the IRGC, as in the end we had to with Hezbollah?

[Leo Docherty]

The right hon. Gentleman will know that that is a matter for the Home Secretary. It would be improper for a Foreign Office Minister to speculate or comment on it during this statutory instrument Committee.

For as long as Iran continues—

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[John Spellar]

Will the Minister give way again?

[Leo Docherty]

I will indulge the right hon. Gentleman.

[John Spellar]

I thank the hon. Gentleman very much. Is there not an understanding that the Home Office and successive Home Secretaries have wanted to proscribe the IRGC against resistance from the Foreign Office?

[Leo Docherty]

It would be fruitless for this Foreign Office Minister to give any comment, against long-standing convention from the Dispatch Box, with regard to proscription or otherwise.

Of course, we will not stop there. For as long as Iran continues to threaten the UK, our interests and our partners, we will respond firmly and decisively. We will use this legislation as a key tool within a broader diplomatic approach aimed at deterring Iran. Sanctions are particularly effective when imposed alongside international partners and combined with other diplomatic tools. For example, following the murder of Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old Iranian woman, we sought to expose the extent of Iran’s abuses on the international stage, including at the UN Human Rights Council. That was accompanied by regular sanctions designations co-ordinated with partners including the EU, US and Canada. We delivered a clear message of international condemnation, while holding those responsible for rights abuses to account through sanctions.

I turn now to trade measures, because that is the other substantive addition made by this legislation. Iran continues to expand its drones programme and is sending drones to Russia to use against Ukraine. Using the existing Russia sanctions regime, we have already sanctioned a range of entities and individuals involved in the provision of Iranian drones to Russia. However, drones are also a feature of Iran’s hostile activity beyond Ukraine.

This legislation imposes new restrictions on the Iranian regime’s drone programme by targeting unmanned aerial vehicles and their components, which are crucial to the collaboration with Russia; and it draws on knowledge of the Iranian drones deployed in Ukraine and elsewhere. The trade restrictions strengthen our existing export controls on drone components, ensuring that no UK business or person, wherever they are in the world, can facilitate the trade of those items.

This legislation also maintains existing trade measures on goods and technology that might be used for internal repression, such as riot shields and water cannons, and on goods, technology and services that may be used for interception and monitoring. This will ensure that the UK plays no part in enabling the Iranian regime’s trampling of human rights. We vehemently support the right of the Iranian people to freedom of expression and assembly, and the legislation maintains our unwavering support for human rights in Iran.

The Iranian regime continues to treat women and human rights defenders with contempt, executing eight people in 2023 for their participation in the Woman, Life, Freedom movement. The recent death of Armita Geravand, a 17-year-old Iranian girl, after an alleged assault by the morality police, shows the brutal reality of life for women and girls in Iran.

Since October 2022, we have sanctioned 95 individuals and entities responsible for violating human rights in Iran. The Iran (Sanctions) (Human Rights) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 have been revoked, and designations made under those regulations are saved under the new regulations, allowing us to continue to hold the people and institutions responsible to account.

The new regulations demonstrate our determination to target those responsible for Iran’s malign activity, and they maintain our commitment to international human rights law, allowing us to hold to account those in Iran who fail to uphold and respect human rights. We will continue to work with like-minded partners to disrupt, deter and respond to threats from the Iranian regime, and to co-ordinate sanctions action. The regulations send a clear message to the Government of Iran and those who seek to harm the UK and our partners. I commend them to the Committee.

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[Theresa Villiers (Chipping Barnet) (Con)]

Thank you, Mr Dowd, for allowing me to take up the Committee’s time for just a few minutes to say why I believe strongly that we should back these measures. We can have a debate about the effectiveness of sanctions and the difference they make, but above all they show that we are trying to take a moral stand against the theocratic regime in Tehran. That regime is one of the cruellest and most oppressive in the world, as has been documented over and over again by campaign groups such as Amnesty and Human Rights Watch, and of course by media outlets like the BBC and AFP.

A recent Library briefing paper set out some chilling facts. Following on from the tragic death of Mahsa Amini in September 2022, we saw protests for 100 days, nearly 20,000 people detained and more than 500 protesters killed. I was alarmed to learn from the briefing paper that the average age of those arrested was just 15.

The UN has repeatedly raised concerns about children being subject to force and adult forms of legal process, and in 2021 its human rights representative said that women were still very much “second class citizens” in Iran. Wives need permission to take a job, to obtain a passport and to travel; they have very few rights in divorce cases; and, of course, they do not have the freedom to choose what they wear. Even more repulsively, the legal age of marriage for girls and women in Iran is 13, but it can be even younger with the consent of the father of the girl in question and a court.

Iran is notorious as a jurisdiction that routinely executes children, and it executes more people overall per head than almost any other country. As we have heard, very serious threats to individuals living in the United Kingdom have also been reported, including to one of my constituents. International monitors have repeatedly reported on the flagrant violation of the joint comprehensive plan of action conditions by Iran when it comes to nuclear enrichment, and evidence of its hugely malevolent involvement in conflicts throughout the region is played out on our TV screens every evening.

We should all back the regulations. In fact, I think there is a case for the Government to go further and snap back some of the sanctions that were lifted as a result of signing the Iran nuclear deal. Like others, I reiterate the appeal that I have made in this House for several years now that we should also proscribe the IRGC. I believe strongly, and hope, that one day the people of Iran will be able to choose a better future, with a secular, democratic state granting them the rights, freedoms and equality that we here all take for granted.

[John Spellar]

The right hon. Member has rightly outlined the threat that the regime poses to its own citizens and to international security. Just in the last week, it has shown that it is a real threat not just to the areas that it has traditionally operated in; it has hit bases in Iraq, and into Pakistan.

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[Leo Docherty]

I am grateful for the contributions from across the Committee and for the warm support laid out by the hon. Member for Caerphilly; we welcome the support of His Majesty’s Opposition for the regulations. The hon. Member asked very good questions about the risk of evasion and how we assess to whom the sanctions might be applicable. The answer is that we will use our active diplomacy and global intelligence networks, alongside our work with partners and friends around the world, to judge who might be subject to the new sanctions. Of course, we will continue our very close working relationship with our allies across the EU and the US, because we find great benefit in co-ordinating our approach.

We will ensure, particularly when it comes to evasion, that third countries are not exposed against their will to proper sanctions being applied. That is something that we will continue to review. I will not accept the hon. Member’s invitation to speculate or comment on the subject of IRGC proscription because that is clearly out of scope in this debate, but, as he suggests, we will continue to review our approach because all our sanctions regimes are iterative. This SI strengthens the current regime, and the sanctions must respond to new intelligence and the new geopolitical reality as it becomes clear. This is the latest iteration, but we will keep it under review and give ourselves additional tools to ensure that our sanctions regime is comprehensive and robust.

[John Spellar]

Will the Government also take into account intelligence on the international criminal aspects? There is significant involvement of Hezbollah and other parts of the Iranian nexus in organised crime, particularly in South America, Africa and other areas.

Ahmadi Muslims: Pakistan

John Spellar Excerpts

Wednesday 6th September 2023 Westminster Hall

[Elliot Colburn]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right that this issue has real implications in the UK through the importation of that hatred and rhetoric on to our shores. I will come on to that in more detail later.

As well as the ban on the publication of religious texts, cyber laws have also massively impacted the Ahmadis’ ability to learn and practise their faith, with social media sites and websites in Pakistan being banned and shut down and websites in the UK, USA and Canada being targeted via the Pakistani state in an attempt to enact Pakistan’s cyber laws.

It is not just in life that Ahmadis are targeted. Since 2021, within the last two years, more than 420 graves have been desecrated and attacked—destroyed and defaced just because they bear Koranic inscriptions. Even the grave of Pakistan’s Nobel laureate, Professor Abdus Salam, has been desecrated to remove the word “Muslim” from the epitaph, such is the state’s tacit—or at least implied—approval.

As for what the British Government have done, I want to thank the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office for its engagement with the APPG when we reach out—I am sure the chair will want to go into more detail on that. I thank the Minister for being willing to meet and listen to concerns, and for reaffirming in a recent written question the UK Government’s commitment to freedom of religion and belief. I am glad that Ministers will continue to raise the issue at the highest level. It is vital that the British Government continue that work through all possible channels—with their Pakistani counterparts as well as with international partners at national and NGO level, to press not just for the relaxation of anti-Ahmadi rhetoric and legislation but its full removal from penal codes and blasphemy laws. Only then can we hope to stave off the wave of anti-Ahmadi hatred.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

Is the right to the free exercise of religion not fundamental to the United Nations charter? Should we not therefore hold countries to account to protect against action by the state and the condoning of lack of enforcement? After all, there are refugee conventions as well. Should we not hold countries to account for that rather, rather than having their Governments fail to satisfy the needs of their people and therefore look for scapegoats, as has happened so often in history?

[Elliot Colburn]

I am grateful to the right hon. Member for that intervention, and I absolutely agree with him. I look forward to hearing more about that later in the debate. He makes the point very well indeed.

It is clear that there are still huge issues for ordinary Ahmadi Muslims. What are the Government doing and what is the FCDO doing in partnership with the Home Office, as has been mentioned, to better protect and assist Ahmadis who are fleeing persecution and violence? As I have already noted, Carshalton and Wallington is home to many Ahmadi Muslims, as is the London borough of Merton next door.

In summing up, I want to underline why I believe the Government are right to pursue recourse for the Ahmadi community. They should go much further because the Pakistani Government and the widespread anti-Ahmadi violence is giving oxygen to those in other countries far beyond Pakistan’s own borders. The authorities’ fervent discrimination encourages anti-Ahmadi sentiment elsewhere and, as has already been said in interventions, here in the United Kingdom. In 2023 alone, we have already seen anti-Ahmadi extremism take root in other countries. In January in Burkina Faso, nine Ahmadi Muslims were brutally killed one by one after being taken from a mosque near Dori and asked to renounce their faith. They were shot dead when they refused.

In March in Bangladesh, an anti-Ahmadi extremist mob attacked the Ahmadi Muslim annual convention. The fanatics torched the homes of Ahmadi Muslims in Ahmednagar. One Ahmadi, Jahid Hasan, was killed during the attack and over 70 were injured. In Algeria, too, Ahmadis are facing ongoing discrimination. They are being denied the right to practise their faith and being targeted by the authorities. There is at least one Ahmadi prisoner of conscience serving a three-year prison sentence for practising his Ahmadi beliefs.

Alarmingly, such extremism has also reached the United Kingdom. One incredibly shocking incident took place in Glasgow in March 2016 when a shopkeeper, Asad Shah, was murdered—stabbed to death—simply because of his faith. The murderer was said to be inspired by Mumtaz Qadri of Pakistan, the bodyguard who murdered Punjab governor Salmaan Taseer, who supported a review of blasphemy laws in Pakistan. As one Ahmadi human rights group notes, that is an incredibly worrisome reminder of the effect of anti-Ahmadi feelings being left unchecked across borders.

NATO Summit: Vilnius

John Spellar Excerpts

Thursday 6th July 2023 Westminster Hall

[Alec Shelbrooke]

At the transatlantic forum, which many of us with leadership positions take part in—it takes place in December, at Washington’s National Defence University—American politicians saw for the first time, at first hand, the anger that had built across many European nations about the knock-on effects that the policy might have, not least the gaps that it could lead to in defence procurement and the development of technology. All Governments will often pursue an economic policy that fits with their national agenda, and not necessarily see the impacts elsewhere. The forum is another good example of soft power, because conversations can take place and can be fed back.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

The underlying reality is that the Inflation Reduction Act in the United States is recognition that they, and the rest of the west, had allowed their industrial capacity to be hollowed out and basically subverted, particularly by China, and they are rebuilding their industry. There might be discussions to be had, but should we not also recognise that industry is vital, not only for our economy but for our security? It is time for us to catch up.

[Alec Shelbrooke]

I agree with much of what the right hon. Gentleman said. That is a very good example of the fact that the Assembly is not afraid of being critical of Government policy. It is not afraid to be critical of Governments of any colour. The committees have been in the building for a long time.

I was about to come to the reports produced. A report produced by Defence and Security Committee is about ensuring an industrial base for the manufacture of defence equipment and munitions. I do not think it is a state secret any more, particularly as it got leaked on the internet by somebody in America, that there is real concern about the ability to rearm. The right hon. Member for Warley (John Spellar) touched on the fact that industry has not created a constant supply line. My committee recognised that we must have that constant supply line, and industry must have the confidence to invest; I suspect that the Economics and Security Committee recognised the same. That is a good example of the work that has been done, and fed to leaders in advance of discussions that they must have at the Vilnius summit.

As we are all aware, we are involved in a war. It is not a war with NATO, but allies are supporting Ukraine, and doing everything we can to let it stand up for freedom and democracy, and to let the Ukrainian people choose how they live their life and who runs them. It is an important fight; it is the fight of democracy against autocracy and dictatorship. It has, however, posed real challenges. The Assembly is not afraid to highlight those challenges and ensure they are fed into discussions.

Reports become the body of the work of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. One issue reported on was the rapid evolution of Baltic security after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It has led to another very important political point. Everybody recognises article 5 of the North Atlantic treaty, which says that an attack on one is an attack on all, but it has become apparent to many—this is being discussed in our Committees—that article 5 is not an emergency call. It is not a 999 call, or a 911 call, for those in America. It is about re-enforcement—the rapid reaction force, which takes three weeks to get there.

Article 3 says that a country must be able to defend itself first. That is why countries have moved forward with a forward defence presence; for example, there is the joint expeditionary force in the Baltic sea, and the 300,000 troops being lined up along the border, so that the tripwire is not tripped. That is a fundamental difference, because until the invasion of Crimea, NATO had shifted its perspective; it went from being a cold war defence organisation to being a political organisation. It was doing exceptionally important work, as the right hon. Member for North Durham pointed out, as countries from eastern Europe joined the path of democracy. After the invasion of Crimea, there was a switch to both roles being important. It is a tribute to NATO and its leadership that it was able to adapt to the change in geopolitical circumstances so quickly.

It is not just Members of the House of Commons who are members of the Assembly; five Members from the other place also make a great deal of effort. Lord Lancaster from the other place, who is on my Committee, had his report, “Troubled waters—how Russia’s war in Ukraine changes Black sea security”, published. Security in the Black sea region has changed immensely.

I will take this opportunity to thank our allies in Türkiye for their incredible work; sometimes they do not get the credit they deserve. They are looked at in different ways. They enforced the Montreux treaty, which has stopped huge amounts of Russian maritime capital equipment making its way into the Black sea and creating an issue. They negotiated the export of grain; they are constantly patrolling the Black sea to defuse sea mines that have become dislodged; and they are very much protecting that area. Indeed, there are a lot of NATO allies around the Black sea, and they are in a tough region, as we can see from looking at their geographical neighbours. It shows the strength of the NATO alliance that we have countries from so many different parts of the world carrying out very specific roles.

I turn to the work of the Defence and Security Committee. When I took on the chairmanship, I wanted to look at maritime security. The High North is coming ever more to the fore. We recently conducted a visit to Canada, which was very much based around its naval training, because Canada is surrounded by three oceans yet has not invested in its maritime capability in the way that we would. Its Halifax-class frigates are slightly different from ours, and are being refurbed at 30 years old; that is the same age as our Type 23s, which we are retiring, yet they are being refurbed to take another 20 years at sea. There are interesting comparisons to be draw in the alliance when it comes to procurement. We might consider what we are doing with the Royal Navy, and the modernisation and the technology that can be brought forward in the realm of the NATO maritime alliance.

Russia may not be able to control the oceans in the way that the Americans can, but it is exceptionally good in the arena that it operates in. That arena is increasingly becoming the High North, for them and for the Chinese, who are mapping the area, working out where they can push up and where they can exploit, and where the mineral resources lie. They are also investing heavily.

The Assembly has been able to identify and bring more to the fore the problems the Canadians face, not least permafrost. Permafrost is retreating in the High North, which is destroying military infrastructure, such as runways that have been relied on up to this time. NORAD—the North American Aerospace Defence Command—needs updating, and there are fuel supply depots that are not being used. We talk about the UK’s procurement struggles; we need to recognise that many allies have similar struggles. That again shows the strength of the alliance: we can come together to face what will become an ever-greater threat.

Russia has recognised that it needs to shift the ball, and there is an interesting conversation about the capability of its intercontinental ballistic nuclear missiles and whether it would use them. We have the policy of counterbalance, but it now has developed the Poseidon torpedo, which could by all accounts make its way underwater for six days to the coast of North America, explode a mile offshore with a nuclear warhead and create a tsunami. That changes the counterbalance, which is why, again, this alliance is so important. It is also why it is so important that the UK renews Trident and the Dreadnought fleet, to make sure that counterbalance exists. That way, even if we do not know where the silos are, we know that there would be a response, and that would reduce the threat. If the Russians want to go down that road, let them, but they still have not got a free pass to do that, because we have the counterbalance.

More positively, NATO works on interoperability, and F-35s from the UK have been landing on Italian carriers. Such steps send out important messages to our foes—to the Russians, and to the Chinese in many ways—that NATO is not just a gathering of 31 countries with their own military equipment; it is building its interoperability. The interoperability offered by the F-35 marks a fundamental change in air support in the alliance.

I will conclude, to allow colleagues to contribute. As we approach the 75th anniversary of NATO, and talk here before the Vilnius summit, I think everyone in this Room would agree that NATO is more important than at any time. Only through these alliances and partnerships will we bring about the counterbalance needed to ensure that we can carry on living in freedom and democracy, which the people of Ukraine are fighting for with their life as we speak.

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[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Sharma. As we are dealing with defence matters, it is worth noting that your predecessor was the last serving member of the British Army to have served in this House.

I congratulate the leader of our delegation, the right hon. Member for Elmet and Rothwell (Alec Shelbrooke), on securing this debate. It has highlighted once again that, whereas in the popular mindset NATO is seen as a military alliance, it is fundamentally very much a political alliance, and was right at the beginning. It was created in response to political events.

When one reads Ernie Bevin’s justification for NATO, it is interesting to see that he stresses the extent to which they tried to secure political agreement with the Soviets for the management of Europe after the second world war, not just in Germany, Berlin or Austria, but across Europe. They were perpetually frustrated and eventually understood, particularly after all the political and military coups that took place across eastern Europe, that they needed collective security against the threat, and that they needed not only a military, but a political organisation. It is right that the Foreign Office leads the debate, because it leads in NATO. That, again, demonstrates the fundamentally political nature of the alliance. It is, of course, backed up by hard power and our nuclear deterrent, but it is underpinned by industrial and societal issues.

I have always taken an interest in manufacturing and defence industry matters—probably because of my previous incarnation as a national officer in a major industrial union—and, interestingly, that is now very much a mainstream debate inside the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and in the various capitals of NATO countries. There is a real role for Parliaments to get engaged, as hon. Members have mentioned. Countries will be looking at rebuilding their own industrial capacity but, even within the United States, there is recognition that no one country can do that alone.

Diversity of supply from secure and trusted suppliers is enormously important. That is true about fundamental materials—even this week, countries were finding China cutting off various materials to chip makers—but it runs right the way through. Sometimes, among the less well informed, the debate has focused on the high end, such as computer chips, but basic, fundamental industrial capacity in the form of foundries and drop forging is enormously important in maintaining capacity. The struggle in Ukraine has highlighted that importance.

There is a lot of catching up to do. Our Government are doing some of it but, to my mind, they are still being so slow. There is no point in criticising Joe Biden and the Administration in Washington for rebuilding their industrial capacity. We should work with them, and we should also work across Europe. There is a regrettable tendency within the EU bureaucracy to try to make this an exclusive EU function, more as a political operation than a defence and industrial one. It is hugely important that the UK, the EU, and the United States and Canada look at how we can best co-operate to ensure that we can supply our troops not only in normal times, but in times of crisis and emergency.

[Alec Shelbrooke]

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that this mindset has to be present across all Departments and all Governments at the top? There is a reason why we need warehouses full of billions of pounds’ worth of equipment, and it is not just, “Let’s get that off the accounting books.” What has been shown is just how vital it is.

[John Spellar]

I absolutely agree with the right hon. Gentleman. It is also about industrial capacity to replace that equipment. There are some real debates to be had about the associated costs and capacity, but that is much better done with proper understanding of specialisations. That should also involve our friends in Australia through the AUKUS agreement, which will be important for the UK and the role we can play with our European colleagues.

There is also the battle for hearts and minds inside Europe, which goes right the way back to the founding of NATO. Sometimes there is a misplaced focus on technology. People talk about being able to use Facebook and various parts of social media. Those skills are important, but, as Rupert Murdoch said about the entertainment industry, in the end, content is king. That is the important thing. That is where we very much need to sharpen our act, or rather recreate the capacities that we used to have. After all, in the second world war we had the Political Warfare Executive, which was probably one of the most outstanding information and disinformation operations. We seem to have moved backwards from that.

We are up against an opponent for whom politics is everything. In both Russia and China, Lenin still rules OK. Politics absolutely dominates the scene. That is where the NATO PA comes in, because we are able to bring the democratic arguments. Congressman Gerry Connolly’s work on putting the defence and advancement of democracy right at the heart of NATO was rightly referenced, but we also have to develop those capacities.

Both the EU and NATO have done some work on disinformation, but we have to up our game. We have to rediscover that. We have to create the mechanisms in Government that can co-operate with other countries in NATO, and with representatives in the NATO PA, in order to take the fight to authoritarians or their fellow travellers across the world, not to prevent the battle of machines but to win the battle of the hearts and minds. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly has a crucial role to play in that.

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[Mr Mitchell]

I will come to that in a moment, because I am conscious of time.

Although Russia is the most significant and direct threat to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, it is one of myriad evolving threats on the horizon, which is partly why the hon. Gentleman just made those comments. In response to those threats, NATO has committed to a joined-up, 360-degree approach, building on the combined strength of alliance members. We remain fully committed to supporting Sweden’s NATO accession. While we may not get it over the line in the very near future, its membership will make allies safer, NATO stronger and the Euro-Atlantic more secure.

On NATO’s eastern flank, we are working to enhance support to Moldova, Georgia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to equip them to tackle Russia’s malign interference. To the south, we are working with partners to understand and respond to evolving challenges, such as terrorism, co-operation on migration and increasing strategic competition. On both the eastern and southern flanks, NATO is reaching out to non-alliance members to enhance our co-operation in areas where it can bolster our mutual security. NATO also takes that approach to the Indo-Pacific, whose security is inextricably linked to that of the Euro-Atlantic.

I am pleased to report that the leaders of Japan, Australia, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand will join talks in Vilnius, and the UK Government will continue to champion such co-operation. We will also push NATO to engage more with international and regional organisations. A top priority is our work to ensure that NATO and the EU are leveraging their complementary tools, and working together effectively. We have certainly been encouraged by progress this year on joint NATO-EU work on the resilience of our critical infrastructure.

The NATO summit in Vilnius will be a shot in the arm for Ukraine’s defence of its territorial integrity. It will demonstrate to Russians and Ukrainians that NATO will support Ukraine in the short, medium and long term. The summit will be the culmination of years of work to ensure that NATO’s deterrence effect is fit for the threats that we face today, and those on the horizon. It will also provide impetus to NATO’s partnerships around the world, ensuring that the alliance and those who work with it are stronger together.

[John Spellar]

The Front-Bench spokesman, my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), asked about AI, and I raised the question of information warfare, which is about not just technology but generating the message and understanding the environment in which that is done.

[Mr Mitchell]

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. He will forgive me if, in the interests of time— I suspect that my right hon. Friend the Member for Elmet and Rothwell will want a word—I do not answer that now, but I will write to him and others who have attended the debate.

The UK’s commitment to NATO is ironclad and unwavering. It is evident at every level of our engagement with our allies—in Brussels and in capitals across the Euro-Atlantic, and between our Parliaments. I reiterate our gratitude to my right hon. Friend and to all delegates from both Houses, who will continue to provide UK leadership at the Parliamentary Assembly, and who help to ensure that NATO remains the most effective and powerful guardian of collective security anywhere in the world.

Oral Answers to Questions

John Spellar Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd May 2023 Commons Chamber

[James Cleverly]

We are, and my right hon. Friend the Development Minister is personally leading the conversation on behalf of the UK Government about international financial institutions’ being more active in that very field, to ensure that they look again at their risk appetite so that we can unlock the trillions of dollars of available finance to help countries to transition from hydrocarbon, high-emitting sources of energy to renewable sources. That is a conversation we have regularly, both bilaterally and multilaterally, and I am proud that the UK is one of the leading voices on that agenda.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

11. What steps his Department has taken in response to the recommendations of the Foreign Affairs Committee's third report of Session 2019-21, "Flying Home: The FCO’s consular response to the COVID-19 pandemic", HC 643, published on 28 July 2020.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs (David Rutley)]

As set out in our consular and crisis strategy 2022, we have an extensive programme of lessons learned from previous crises. We continue to improve our crisis response capability systems and structures.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

Well, it clearly did not work, did it? The Select Committee report in 2020 showed how the FCDO was well behind other countries in getting people home when covid hit, and the Sudan crisis seems to show that those lessons have still not been learned. Although our defence forces were ready to move rapidly, the Foreign Office was still dragging its feet, once again ignoring those with leave to remain in the UK, who often have crucial roles in the NHS. When will the Minister get a grip of his Department?

[David Rutley]

The safety of all British nationals in Sudan remains our utmost priority. We on the Conservative side, and many across the House, will welcome the successful evacuation of more than 2,300 passengers.

Sudan

John Spellar Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd May 2023 Commons Chamber

[Mr Mitchell]

If there is no ceasefire, the problem will be enormous. I can tell my right hon. Friend that the head of the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Martin Griffiths, is in the region and is looking at precisely those issues. I will keep my right hon. Friend and the House informed of the answer to that question as it develops.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

Earlier today, the shadow Foreign Secretary received a fairly unsatisfactory answer to his question about getting Sudanese doctors back to the UK. The Minister has just said that this situation is not like Afghanistan. However, in 2020 during the covid pandemic, there was great difficulty in getting pensioners back from the Punjab, many of whom had worked for decades in the UK, had family here and had indefinite leave to remain. Is not the crux of the problem the stubborn refusal of his Department to do anything for British residents with fully legal leave to remain? Is it not time to review that policy, to change it and to get people home?

[Mr Mitchell]

These questions rest predominantly with the Home Office rather than the Foreign Office. I think that the shadow Foreign Secretary got an outstanding answer from the Foreign Secretary earlier. I should make it clear that the Prime Minister took the decision that the NHS doctors would indeed be brought to Britain. Five eligible Sudanese NHS personnel were evacuated from Port Sudan to Larnaca, and 14 came out with the Royal Air Force from Wadi Saeedna and one by United States vessel from Port Sudan—that is 20. The other two left under their own steam. On the specific issue that was raised with the Foreign Secretary, I think I am able to satisfy the right hon. Gentleman that he has had a very good answer.

Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response: International Agreement

John Spellar Excerpts

Monday 17th April 2023 Westminster Hall

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way, and for highlighting both smallpox and polio. Is the fact of the matter not that it has been a worldwide vaccination programme that has enabled us to achieve that? Does that not demonstrate the falseness of the anti-vax campaigns?

[Nick Fletcher]

I thank the right hon. Member for his contribution. I do believe that the World Health Organisation should be proud of an awful lot of the work that it has done. More recently, the outbreak of covid has brought many questions about the WHO and I would suggest that that is one of the main reasons that we are debating how the WHO can protect our population today.

A question that I believe should always be asked of any organisation is, “How is it funded?” The WHO gets 20% of its funding from member states as assessed contributions, but 80% then comes from voluntary contributions. That is, again, from member states that wish to give more, but also from the private sector and philanthropists.

What can the WHO do at present, and what does the treaty want to achieve? Through international health regulations, the WHO is alerted to potential events, and can then give guidance to members. There is a legally binding agreement that directs nations on what they need to do in a public health crisis. International health regulations were crafted in 1969 and amended in 2005, and they outline each member’s responsibility. However, these are not really legally binding. From what I understand, the WHO has no real power. Members can choose to ignore what the WHO says. It suggests, rather than tells, a country what it should do. It has no real enforcement powers; all it can do is highlight those countries that do not follow guidance.

Through the treaty, it is now proposed that the WHO would be able to police its powers to motivate a country into doing what its officials believe is necessary. Some countries do not want this to happen, and the petitioners do not want the UK to agree to it without a referendum. Why is that the case? The petitioners believe that those sorts of powers should be sovereign. They do not like the fact that WHO officials are unelected. They do not like the fact that some members pay in more money than others, and could therefore have more influence on decisions. They also feel the same about philanthropists and pharmaceutical companies that make contributions.

Are the petitioners over-concerned? In the treaty there is a change of language from “should” to “must”, but is the WHO only doing its job of protecting our population? There appears to be nothing about lockdowns in the treaty, which that is one of the biggest concerns of the petitioners. The next question is what policing member states would look like. It would probably mean sanctions—services or resources being withheld. Would that only affect the smaller countries? Would that really bother the superpowers? Would it really bother the members that are paying in the most money? Each question leads to another.

That leads me to another part of the petition: maybe a referendum is required. I genuinely do not believe in referenda. I was elected to stand here, educate myself on the various topics that come before this House, and make decisions on my constituents’ behalf. It is a position of privilege, and involves a lot of reading, but that is an important part of the position. Our constituents have their own jobs to do, and therefore do not have the time, nor the ease of access to information, that we have in this place.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Sharma. I had intended to make only a few interventions, but when there were initially very few people in the Chamber, I decided to make a brief contribution.

Part of this argument has been about vaccination. We go back to Dr Wakefield and that appalling piece of chicanery that was the supposed impact of the measles, mumps and rubella vaccine, which has now been completely exposed and discredited. He is now Mr Wakefield and no longer a recognised doctor. Considerable damage was done not just in the UK but across the globe, with large numbers of parents worried about the MMR vaccine and then their children not having it. Suddenly, a disease that had been almost entirely eradicated decades ago—measles—started to spread, with a considerable impact on the health of many children.

We have already discussed how polio has been almost entirely eliminated, and how smallpox appears—one must always be conditional with this—to have been eliminated by vaccination. However, there is the poisonous cesspit of the right-wing conspiracy theorist ecosystem in the United States. I am a huge supporter of our alliance with the US, but within it there is an appalling subculture of those who live by conspiracy theories. The anti-vaccine campaign is one of those, with a detrimental impact on health. That obviously then fed into covid.

We already have international bodies dealing with some issues. With the influenza vaccine, when this year’s variation appears in the southern hemisphere, the international committee then gets together to understand the basic structure, and then informs the vaccine companies in the northern hemisphere. We then all produce that in order to fight it. Very occasionally, the committee gets that wrong, but most of the time it gets it right, which has a huge impact on both the health of individuals and the health service.

This is about international scientific co-operation. The covid vaccine was an exact demonstration of how international co-operation enabled us to produce a vaccine within something like 12 months instead of the normal 10 years. That is a great contribution to health and to stabilising the situation.

There is an argument for referenda on major constitutional issues. For example, it was perfectly right to put the proposal to change the voting system in this country to the public, and the public very sensibly turned that down. By the way, I do not think that anybody should try to change the voting system without a referendum. When the argument about our relationship with the EU could not be resolved here in Parliament, it was perfectly proper to have a referendum, and the people decided on that. We cannot be arguing to have one for every bloomin’ issue, every policy and every treaty. We are signatories to hundreds of treaties around the world.

[Andrew Bridgen]

Has the right hon. Gentleman read the pandemic treaty proposed by the WHO, and has he read the amendments to the international health regulations that have to be looked at alongside that very important document?

[John Spellar]

The request was for a treaty to be drawn up—it has not been finalised yet—under the previous Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Uxbridge and South Ruislip (Boris Johnson). Is that what we are talking about? This is going into fantasy land. Unfortunately, as we saw during the pandemic, the ability to get coherence across countries, even to move vaccines, is difficult and there is a need to move at speed. This was a covid pandemic, but it could equally have been an avian influenza pandemic. Indeed, there are a huge number of similarities.

[Andrew Bridgen]

The right hon. Gentleman says there is a need to move at speed. Does he agree that Pfizer moved at the speed of science, to the effect that it never even tested whether the vaccine actually stopped transmission or contraction of the virus? This House mandated people to lose their jobs for not taking a vaccine that was unproven and unsafe, and that was actually never going to stop them transmitting the virus.

[John Spellar]

It certainly was not unproven or unsafe, and it had a huge beneficial impact across the world. Unfortunately, we have some people—a very limited number, but we all get letters on this issue—who wallow in the realm of conspiracy theories. Indeed, we have just had another example.

The point I was making is that we sign trade treaties. We signed up to the World Trade Organisation, which binds us to certain forms of arbitration. We have just signed a treaty with Australia as well. All these treaties bring obligations. That is part of engaging with the world, unless we want to be North Korea and have a policy for hermits.

We have also had reference to major pharmaceutical companies. There are criticisms of them in some other areas, but the mobilisation of their intellectual power and production capacity, in producing a vaccine in record time to stem the tide of covid, was absolutely magnificent. So too was the support from one of the great villains of conspiracy theories, Bill Gates, whose foundation has done a huge amount of work in trying to eliminate tropical diseases, which is often little noticed but has a huge impact on tens of millions of people, especially children, in Africa and other areas.

What we are seeing is overreaction and hysteria, and I would argue that we should give the petition a firm rejection, as I am sure we would do if it ever came to the Floor of the House of Commons. We should support international co-operation for international health.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

--- Later in debate ---

[Danny Kruger (Devizes) (Con)]

Thank you very much indeed, Mr Sharma. I am grateful to be called, and I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Don Valley (Nick Fletcher) for introducing the debate and all the petitioners who have brought this very important matter to the House. I am pleased to see so many colleagues present, which suggests to me that we should be debating this matter on the Floor of the House. I hope we will do so in due course, as I will explain.

I also thank the organisation UsforThem, which I have been working with on this and other matters. It is the campaign group that led the calls on behalf of children and young people during the lockdowns, and it is now very concerned about what the WHO’s proposal might mean for the most vulnerable people in our society.

I acknowledge the impulse behind the treaty and the proposals that are before the World Health Organisation. I acknowledge that global threats that defy borders require global co-operation, and it is certainly true to say that this country was not sufficiently prepared for the pandemic when it broke out, but I do not believe that the lack of readiness was due to a lack of international co-operation. Indeed, the degree of international co-operation was astonishing. The lack of readiness was in the ordinary business of contingency planning by the British state—the security of supply of equipment, capacity in the health service, and our ability to support the vulnerable and the isolating. That is where we were not ready.

In fact, we could say that in a crucial respect the UK was prepared. We thought that we knew what we would do in the event of a pandemic. We would introduce targeted isolation and targeted protection of the most vulnerable—the application of personal responsibility, not mass lockdowns, which were not part of the plan—but we threw that plan aside immediately, and we went for exactly what everybody else around the world was doing. Or almost everyone—never forget plucky Sweden.

During covid-19, we had an excess of global collaboration and not enough independence—and certainly not enough parliamentary scrutiny. That is why I am concerned about the treaty and what lies beneath it. The treaty would create, via amendments to international health regulations, the infrastructure and funding to implement changes that are being planned anyway. Those amendments are of greater concern. The proposed new regulations would hardwire into international law and our domestic policy a top-down approach to pandemics and global public health. Yes, we need co-operation and strategic vision, but no, we do not need ever more centralised solutions.

In this country, the top-down approach to covid-19, from the centralised test and trace system to food parcels for the isolated, did not work. What worked best was people taking responsibility for themselves and their neighbours, local government working with civil society, medical leaders exercising their judgment, and public servants at the local level working flexibly and with initiative. What worked was not central control but subsidiarity: decisions being taken as close as possible to the people that they affected.

[John Spellar]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right about tracking and tracing people, for which there was already an established infrastructure, but surely vaccines, for example, can be done only at a national and international level.

[Danny Kruger]

I am all for international collaboration, including in the development of vaccines, but no, what we need is more independent development of medical devices and treatments. In fact, it was a race between different countries that led to the vaccine programme. We have a high degree of international collaboration at the medical level, and I am not sure that we need more.

What we now see is the World Health Organisation setting itself up as responsible not just for identifying pandemics but, crucially, for the worldwide responses to those pandemics. The proposed amendments recognise the WHO as the guiding and co-ordinating authority of international responses to public health emergencies of international concern. Of course, we know the WHO’s unaccountable nature: the director general is appointed through an opaque, non-democratic process, and international pharmaceutical companies have too much power.

The regulations propose the creation of a vast public health surveillance mechanism at public expense; if the WHO itself is anything to go by, that would be substantially funded by the pharmaceutical industry. Crucially, as my hon. Friend the Member for Don Valley said, the regulations propose that the WHO’s existing powers to make recommendations about what countries should do be upgraded from non-binding to binding. That amounts to a vast transfer of power to the WHO.

What would the new regulations enable? They would enable legally binding obligations on countries to mandate financial contributions to fund pandemic-response activities. They could require the surrender of intellectual property in technologies. They could mandate the manufacture and international sharing of vaccines. They could override national safety approval processes for vaccines, gene-based therapies, medical devices and diagnostics.

Lachin Corridor and Nagorno-Karabakh

John Spellar Excerpts

Tuesday 24th January 2023 Westminster Hall

[Tim Loughton]

I completely agree. If the Azeris are so intent on putting up this façade that there is a genuine environmental protest and nothing is amiss, why would they not want to allow independent investigators, backed by the UN or whoever, to go and ascertain that? They do not and they will not—that is the problem.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way and for his campaigning over the years on this important issue. He mentioned the United Nations, but might there not also be a role for the OSCE or indeed for the European Union in this context? The situation requires urgent international action. Even though we are obviously focused on Ukraine, we should not ignore this struggle.

[Tim Loughton]

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right and I completely support all his suggestions; in fact, such suggestions have been taken up by a declaration in the European Parliament, which I will come on to. Of course I welcome the comments of a fellow officer of the APPG for Armenia, who has also been a long-term campaigner on Armenian interests.

Moreover, this blockade deprives the people of Nagorno-Karabakh of their right to free movement. At least 1,100 citizens have been left stranded along the blocked highway for the past week, unable to return to their homes. Children have been separated from their families; 270 children had to find temporary shelter across Armenia while their parents and other relatives remain in Nagorno-Karabakh. And this is all happening at the coldest time of year—quite deliberately.

So what did the Azeris do? They cut the gas pipeline on several occasions. On 10 January, the sole high-voltage power line from Armenia was damaged and the Armenians were not allowed by the Azeris to go in and fix it. On 12 January, internet access was damaged. This process is incremental; trying to starve out and terrorise out the population. It is completely deliberate and calculated intimidation.

Only the Azeris and the Russians continue to refer to the militants blocking the Lachin corridor as independent environmentalists, but according to the authoritative global freedom scores of Freedom House, the international organisation, Azerbaijan comes ninth out of a hundred nations for its restrictions on and oppression of its population, which puts it on a part with China, Belarus and Crimea.

No Azeri civilian is allowed to enter the region normally without the official Government permit, so the demonstrators can only be there with the permission of the Azeri Government. The Azeri authorities are contradicting themselves by claiming that there is no blockade yet arguing that the blockade will only be lifted if their demands are met.

Nagorno-Karabakh has offered to allow UN environmental agencies full access to the mining activity, in order to show that it is being carried on quite normally, although the blockading of a lifeline would not be justified even if it was not being carried on quite normally. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan has refused to engage.

So, 43 days on, it is clear that this blockade is deliberately fabricated and controlled by the Azerbaijan Government. It is part of an ongoing campaign to intimidate the 120,000 Armenian population; to starve them out, freeze them out, drive them into poverty and sickness, as part of the Azeris’ disgraceful ethnic cleansing campaign, while the rest of the world looks on, and all eyes are, of course, on Ukraine.

Modern treaty-based international humanitarian law prohibits deliberate starvation and impediment of humanitarian relief, regardless of conflict classification, and Azerbaijan is in gross violation of those basic international norms. The UN report on the Yugoslav war defines ethnic cleansing as

“rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area”.

It constitutes a crime against humanity and meets the criteria under the genocide convention, including creating unbearable conditions for a group singled out in this case due to its ethnicity, and aiming to inflict harm and achieve displacement from their homeland. Those actions include subjecting the entire population to psychological terror; cutting essential supplies, such as gas, electricity and the internet; prohibiting the free movement of people, goods and medical supplies; and gradually starving the population.

All those criteria apply in this case. They are attempting genocide, if not ethnic cleansing. Azerbaijan has a state policy of hatred towards Armenians. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination singled out Azerbaijan in August 2022 for its discriminatory policies against Armenians. The blockade is a deliberate attack, an inhumane tactic exercised by the Azeri state under various leadership. Azerbaijan has form. The current blockade is the second one in the history of Nagorno-Karabakh. The first siege was carried out in 1991-92.

Armenia is in a quite parlous position. It is weakened greatly by the previous war inflicted on it by Azerbaijan. It is facing the military force of the Azeris, backed by their cousins in Turkey, with sophisticated kit from Israel. They have a Russian military base on Armenian soil. They dare not offend the Russians, because they need the Russians to be peacekeepers, though that clearly is not happening. They are between a rock and a hard place.

Why does this matter? Apart from being a moral issue that we should take an interest in, it has big implications for the geopolitics of this important but unstable region, with Turkey, Russia and Iran to the south all flexing their muscles with neo-imperial territorial ambitions. Armenia and its next-door neighbour Georgia sit in the middle of it. The people of Armenia have been persecuted for more than 100 years, and I presented a Bill to the House recognising the Armenian genocide. The west has a duty to step in and play at least honest broker, but preferably peacekeeper and security guarantor, in the absence of Russia doing anything of the sort.

In December 2022, the UN Security Council issued a statement calling on Azerbaijan to unblock the Lachin corridor, but that was derailed by the Russians. What can, or should, we in the United Kingdom do? The Minister cannot be here today, but I am delighted that his colleague from the Foreign Office will respond. However, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Leo Docherty), said that blocking the Lachin corridor and disrupting gas supplies in the winter risked severe humanitarian consequences. He called on the Armenians and Azerbaijanis to respect their ceasefire commitments and negotiate a lasting peace settlement.

More recently, Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon responded to a written question from Lord Alton on the subject:

“The UK Government continues to monitor the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and on the Armenian-Azerbaijan border. The UK Government has repeatedly urged the Armenian and Azerbaijani Governments to thoroughly investigate all allegations of war crimes and other atrocities in recent years. It is essential that allegations of mistreatment, abuse and summary killings are urgently fully investigated by the appropriate authorities.”

That is all very well but it has achieved nothing. The ceasefire breaches, the attempts at genocide, the aggression have all been pretty one-sided. Just telling the two parties involved to be nice to each other, as I fear is too often the case from the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, has achieved nothing.

I recognise the good work that the UK has done in providing some humanitarian aid in the past, as well as in financing the clearance of mines laid in previous civil wars. However, the EU Parliament—to give it its due—passed a resolution last week calling on the Azerbaijanis to open the Lachin corridor immediately and to continue to refrain from blocking transport, energy ties and communications between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. It accused Azerbaijan of violating international obligations according to the tripartite ceasefire, and it underlined the need for a comprehensive peace agreement, which must guarantee the rights and security of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian population. It also called for a fact-finding mission, which we certainly would support. The French Senate has also said some quite punchy things, and American Senators have as well, yet all we have done is say the Azerbaijanis and Armenians need to be nice to each other.

The Government really need to come off the fence. A clear perpetrator is abusing the human rights of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh and has continually intimidated the peace-loving people of Armenia, who just want to live safely and in peace. We need to be more forceful and proactive, and to come down on the right side. I urge the Government to use their leverage to facilitate the immediate opening of the Lachin corridor, to sanction the members of the Azerbaijani elite who are responsible for the humanitarian crisis, to deter Azeris from committing further atrocities with impunity in the future, to send immediate humanitarian aid to the people of Nagorno-Karabakh, to demand that Russian forces stop blocking access for international aid agencies, to support the people of Nagorno-Karabakh’s right to self-determination in order to save them from ethnic cleansing, to join the EU Parliament and other allies in threatening sanctions, and to agree to be part of the UN, OSCE or European fact-finding mission.

This cannot go on. Every day that the conflict is allowed to continue, more innocent children, families and Armenian people in Nagorno-Karabakh will lose their lives, their jobs and their livelihoods—all because of a blatant breach of a ceasefire as part of a blatant campaign of intimidation waged against the Armenian people by Azerbaijan. We need to call it out for what it is, and the Government need to do that now.

Iran

John Spellar Excerpts

Thursday 12th January 2023 Commons Chamber

[Bob Blackman]

It is fair to say that the Government have not been inactive in this regard. On 11 November, the Foreign Secretary summoned Iran’s chargé d’affaires to discuss the threats against journalists living in the UK. However, this has not deterred the Iranian security forces, so we must continue to put international pressure on the regime. It is crucial that we follow up the recent sanctions and lead our partners and allies to proscribe such an organisation.

I was pleased that, on 15 December, the UN General Assembly adopted the 69th UN resolution condemning violations of human rights in Iran.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on securing this debate. He has been present for a whole number of Foreign Office questions where, by the luck of the draw, I have been able to pose this question to the Foreign Secretary. The Government have continued not to proscribe the IRGC, as was the case with Hezbollah until finally they had to do so. Is it not now time to proscribe the IRGC, which destabilises the region through terrorist activities and front organisations, operates international gangsterism and is the absolute bedrock of support for this clerical fascist regime? Might the hon. Gentleman give way to the Minister, who could indicate the direction the Government are going in so that we do not have to rely on leaks in newspapers?

[Bob Blackman]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that intervention, but I will wait for the Minister to respond to the debate.

I am deeply concerned by reports of threats made to organisations in the UK that support the rights of protesters in Iran, including the recent petrol bombing in outer London of a location affiliated with the National Council of Resistance of Iran. Thankfully, as it was the early hours of the morning, no one was inside, but the situation could have been extremely grave with loss of life.

The mass murders by the IRGC are shocking, but perhaps not surprising. In 1988, the current President of Iran, President Raisi, was responsible for the prosecution of 30,000 political prisoners, all of whom were executed. Of those 30,000, 90% were members or supporters of Iran’s main opposition movement, the People’s Mujaheddin Organisation of Iran. That indicates that the regime has no qualms whatsoever about executing people who represent a threat. It has made clear that that is what it intends to do. The 1988 massacre holds many similarities to today’s uprising, rooted as it was in a fundamental conflict with the people of Iran, who were demanding freedom, democracy, and economic and social development after the overthrow of the Shah.

The IRGC has created, funded and armed a vast network of middle eastern terrorist groups, from Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Houthis in Yemen, all spreading war and violence around the region. Iran has supplied Hezbollah alone with some 150,000 missiles, which are regularly fired at innocent Israeli civilians. Hezbollah’s 2012 bomb attack in Bulgaria, which killed five Israeli tourists and a Bulgarian, led the EU to list the organisation’s military wing as terrorists, while leaving the political arm of the organisation untouched. In creating that artificial distinction, which even Hezbollah rejected, the EU avoided banning the group in its entirety. It consequently continues to recruit and fundraise in EU member states and the UK, which has not yet banned the group separately.

Furthermore, the IRGC and Hezbollah are at the forefront of Iran’s brutal campaign to keep the Syrian Assad regime in power. Since 2015, when Russia joined the fighting, the two regimes have partnered in despicable war crimes that have killed hundreds of thousands and left millions as refugees of war. The growing alliance with Russia has been further strengthened with the current war in Ukraine, with Iran supplying advanced drones to Russia since August.

Iran’s people have risen to defeat religious tyranny and its repression and terrorism. They have chosen to pay the price of freedom with their blood. The UK and the whole international community should rise in solidarity by helping the Iranian people realise their democratic aspirations, which the UK Government can do by taking the following necessary steps.

The Government should demand that the Iranian regime immediately halt trials, convictions and executions of protesters in Iran. The UK Government lag behind their European counterparts, who are even sponsoring individual protesters who are in prison and at high risk of execution. We could follow that lead.

We should recognise the legitimacy of the fight of the Iranian people against the evil and terrorist forces of the IRGC and officially recognise the Iranian people’s revolution to establish a republic based on democratic values.

We should recognise that the people of Iran have a democratic alternative, the goals of which are enshrined in the 10-point plan articulated by Mrs Maryam Rajavi, the president-elect of the NCRI. The Government should support that Iranian solution, as was recommended by more than 230 Members from across the parties in both the House of Commons and the House of Lords in our joint statement in December 2022.

The Government should refer the appalling dossier of the regime’s systematic violations of human rights and crimes against humanity to the United Nations Security Council for the adoption of binding deterrent measures. The regime leaders must be brought to justice to end impunity and prevent the cycle of crime and terror.

Next, we should proscribe the IRGC in its entirety to deny it the funds and resources it needs to crush the nationwide uprising and export terrorism abroad.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs (Leo Docherty)]

Colleagues will know that this portfolio lies with the noble Lord Ahmad, but, with him being in the other place, I am very pleased to stand at the Dispatch Box today to answer this very important debate.

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow East (Bob Blackman) on securing this debate, and I will seek to answer his questions. He spoke movingly of the plight and the outrageous murder of Mahsa Amini, which initiated the remarkable protests. He gave us some flavour of the scale and importance of the protests, for which we are very grateful. He asked some very direct and relevant questions about a possible proscription of the IRGC. I will come to that in a moment, and we note the calls of many other Members in that regard.

My hon. Friend spoke at great length and very interestingly about the malign activity across the region of the IRGC and Iran, especially in Lebanon and Syria, and now in Russia, with the supply of the Shahed drones, which are currently destroying Ukrainian infrastructure. He also pointed out that Iran has conducted the second highest number of executions globally after China, which is a sobering fact and reflects the cruel nature of the regime.

I wish to speak about the plight of the individual facing execution. Many Members have spoken about Mr Alireza Akbari and it is right that I seek to update the House. We have no news today. We are in touch with the family. Following the scheduling of his forthcoming execution by the Iranian regime, the Foreign Secretary did release a statement and the noble Lord Ahmad called in the Iranian chargé d’affaires to issue a very strong call for clemency and for the release of Mr Akbari. As I have said, we continue to offer support to the family. We have no news today, and it would be wrong of me to speculate on any future activities, but it is right to say that, through our ambassador in Tehran, we of course continue to make extremely strong calls for his release.

On the issue of proscription, the IRGC is, of course, sanctioned as an organisation and its individual members are sanctioned under our current legislation, but it is not proscribed as a terrorist organisation. It would be wrong of me to speculate from the Dispatch Box about the outcome of the Government’s current consideration of this issue, which is active, and it would be wrong of me to pre-empt any formal announcement or judgment by the Government. However, I can say that the calls from right across the House and the unity with which those calls have been made will be noted by the Government. This is something that we regard as extremely serious, and the Government will make the judgment as they see fit.

[John Spellar]

Many of us have been round this block before with the artificial distinction between the military and non-military wings of Hezbollah. Eventually, the Government had to give way, which was the sensible thing to do. Can the Minister not cut to the chase and follow the United States, which has already proscribed the IRGC, and actually deal with this appalling organisation, which is a threat not only to its own citizens, but to stability in the middle east and in wider north Africa as well?

[Leo Docherty]

We note the approach of the United States, and that will be taken into consideration when the Government form their view and make an announcement.

Let me turn to the contributions of other colleagues. I was very pleased that the hon. Member for Nottingham South (Lilian Greenwood) spoke eloquently of the plight of women protesters under the banner of “Zan, Zendegi, Azadi”. She spoke movingly of her constituent’s cousin. Although I cannot comment on that specific case, I am sure that the noble Lord Ahmad would be very pleased to meet her and her constituent to see what action can be taken. I think the House was moved by her reflections on that young man.

My hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Melton (Alicia Kearns), the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, illustrated very comprehensively the state-sponsored nature of the brutal misogyny and violence that protesters are suffering. She asked a specific question about the guards at Evin. I cannot comment on possible future sanctions, but, following her remarks, the Department will certainly look at whether any more ground should be covered with regard to specific individuals.

My hon. Friend spoke about a number of cases involving the death penalty. She pointed out that these were cynical uses of the death penalty by the regime and that those who are currently held are effectively political hostages held for political effect. She asked about the utility and the progress of our ambassador in Tehran, Simon Shercliff. There is utility in having him there, because he is able to deliver strong messages into the heart of the regime, and he is doing his best to deliver those messages. She spoke interestingly and expertly about the regional contacts, especially in Iraq and Syria. I can give her an assurance—speaking of the view of her Committee—that our Department believes that, absolutely, the middle east does still matter.

Oral Answers to Questions

John Spellar Excerpts

Tuesday 13th December 2022 Commons Chamber

[Anna McMorrin (Cardiff North) (Lab)]

8. What recent assessment he has made of the political situation in Iran.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

18. What steps his Department is taking to help tackle destabilising activities by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

[The Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs (James Cleverly)]

These protests in Iran are a watershed moment. After years of repression, the Iranian people have clearly had enough. They are standing up to the authoritarian regime under which they live. Sadly, the regime has responded in the only way it knows: with violence. The UK is committed to holding Iran to account, including with more than 300 sanctions—including the sanctioning of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in its entirety. We will continue to work with partners to challenge the regime’s aggression at home and its disruptive behaviour in the region.

[James Cleverly]

I personally and the UK Government have regularly condemned the abuses in Iran. Of course, I recognise that that tone is reflected right across the House. We have sanctioned the morality police; we have sanctioned the Iranian judges whom we know to be involved in those secret trials. We will continue to work with our international partners, and directly, to sanction the members of the Iranian regime who continue to abuse the human rights of the people within that country.

[John Spellar]

The Minister has rightly identified that the clerical fascist regime in Tehran is increasingly using violence and terror in trying to crush the popular protests there, while also destabilising the region through proxies, as well as further afield. He knows that a vital underpinning of this dreadful regime’s activities is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. He mentioned working with other parties; he knows that the United States has already taken action to proscribe the IRGC. Will that finally persuade him to sanction to the IRGC?

[James Cleverly]

We already sanction the IRGC in its entirety. We will continue to work closely with our friends in the international community to prevent the point that the right hon. Gentleman raises: the exporting of attack drones and other munitions to Russia, which are then being used by Vladimir Putin’s troops to attack civilians and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. We will continue to sanction individuals, and as I say, the IRGC is already sanctioned in its entirety.

Oral Answers to Questions

John Spellar Excerpts

Tuesday 8th November 2022 Commons Chamber

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

T4. In the last two Foreign Office questions sessions, I have raised the issue of the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Today, again, Members on both sides of the House have raised it, asking us to follow our allies in the United States and ban the IGRC. The IGRC are the protectors of the Iranian clerical fascist regime. Will the Minister go back to his Department and tell the officials to get on with banning the IRGC?

[David Rutley]

The right hon. Member raised his strong concerns about the Iranian regime’s disruptive activities in Yemen at last week’s important debate, for which I am grateful. The list of proscribed organisations is kept under constant review, but we do not routinely comment on whether an organisation is or is not under consideration for proscription.