Yemen Peace Process

John Spellar Excerpts

Thursday 3rd November 2022 Westminster Hall

[Mrs Flick Drummond (Meon Valley) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the peace process in Yemen.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Davies. I thank the Backbench Business Committee for granting this important and timely debate.

Just over 60 years ago, I was born in Steamer Point Hospital in Aden, and I began a long fascination with Yemen in its various guises. I was born with British citizenship as my father was serving in the British Arab army, and we left when I was three. Ever since then, I have tracked how things have changed over the years as I have written down the changing names of my country of birth. I have not been back since but I dream to, much like the right hon. Member for Walsall South (Valerie Vaz) and her brother, the former Member for Leicester East, who were also born in Yemen.

Over the last 60 years, Yemen has been divided and come back together again, and it has now become a long-forgotten war for many. Why is Yemen important to us? The UK has a historic interest in Yemen through the existence of the Aden colony from 1839 to 1967. More importantly, today we are the UN penholder. The Government must continue to play their leading role in promoting peace. I pay tribute to the UN special envoy, Hans Grundberg, and his predecessor, Martin Griffiths, for all their work.

Today I will set the scene, as I know others will want to talk about different aspects. I thought it would be good to remind people about the complexity of the war and our role. That is not to say that we should impose a western-centric, top-down structure of government for Yemen. That has been disastrous in places such as Iraq. Like other middle eastern countries, Yemen is made up of different communities, and there is currently little feeling of a whole national identity. The war is not as clear as some may wish it to be. Often, there is too much focus on Saudi Arabia and the Iranian involvement, but it is an internal civil war, not a surrogate or proxy war. Although outside countries are involved, either by backing the Houthi rebels or supporting the Yemeni Government, they do not necessarily control them politically.

Yemen has had a history of civil wars for centuries, and a continual battle along the Saudi Arabian border—a border that has cut through some of the historical Yemen. It is a country divided by tribal and religious loyalties. The Houthis are more doctrinally close to the Sunnis than the Iranian Shi’ite regime with which they are often linked by the outside world. The Houthis are also more conservative than the southern tribes in their Sunni doctrine.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

The hon. Lady seems to be implying that there are only allegations of Iranian involvement with the Houthis, whereas the Iranian regime is absolutely up to its neck in this, stimulating and providing massive amounts of material. Frankly, the Houthi attacks would not be successful without the destructive and disruptive behaviour of the Iranian regime.

[Mrs Drummond]

If the right hon. Gentlemen was listening carefully, I said that although other countries are involved, they are not politically involved. They may be supported militarily, but the Houthis are thinking for themselves rather than being dictated to by the Iranian Government. That is the point that I was trying to make.

The sectarian divide in Yemen is not clearcut, as tribal loyalties cut across religious beliefs, making it a confusing and shifting picture, particularly for those looking from the west. Unification in 1990 was to bring forward a representative Government, with elections every seven years. However, it was fragile because of the problems with power sharing that we see elsewhere, including closer to home.

The origins of the present war lie in the political and economic marginalisation of northern Yemen by the former President Saleh. Many of the 301 members of the Yemeni Parliament, who were elected under universal suffrage, felt disenfranchised and unable to effect change. That was a missed opportunity to show that democracy works, in a part of the world surrounded by authoritarian regimes.

The war is a result of decades of exclusion of different parts of the population around the country. Yemen has been run by elites who have concentrated power with their own allies and disenfranchised large parts of the population, even when elections were held. With that in mind, we need to look at how that impacts the peace process and the route to lasting peace.

On 2 April, Yemen’s warring parties began a two-month nationwide peace brokered by the UN. That was extended until October, but it has not been extended again, although the fighting has not resumed at the same intensity as before. On 7 April, President Hadi transferred his powers to a new eight-person Presidential Leadership Council, and the new President is Rashad al-Alimi, a politician with long experience and a diplomatic background.

The six-month ceasefire has been the nearest thing to a reprieve since civil war broke out eight years ago. Casualties have come down countrywide, there has been an increase in fuel deliveries, and international commercial flights to and from Sanaa have recommenced for the first time in six years. However, the latest proposal put forward by the special envoy has not been accepted by the Houthis. The proposal is wide ranging and includes the payment of civil servants’ salaries and pensions, the opening of specific roads in Taiz—the second most populous city—a commitment to release detainees urgently, and the strengthening of the de-escalation mechanism through the military co-ordination committee. The main obstacle is that the Houthis want their security forces to be included in the salary payments to civil servants, which the Government could not accept. This is really disappointing.

Taiz has been in a state of a partial siege since the beginning of the war, and life has been tough, with a war economy inflating prices and insecurity. It was not until 2021, when Hans Grundberg became the first diplomat to visit Taiz since the start of the war, that the profile of the city and its plight were raised. Improving communications with and around Taiz must be central to negotiations, and this is one of the areas where the UK Government can help by working with the special envoy to call on the Houthis to show flexibility.

The outside world must remind the Houthis that all citizens have benefitted from the peace over the past year. Any attempt to prevent oil and goods from arriving at the port of Hodeidah impacts on the already difficult humanitarian crisis. Food is becoming more expensive as it becomes even more scarce, and there is not enough equipment to keep hospitals and schools functioning. Only 48% of the aid needed through the 2022 Yemen humanitarian response plan has been funded so far. The Houthis must realise that working towards a long-term peace process will help that and is in everybody’s interest.

Politically, the Presidential Leadership Council under President al-Alimi has unified the resistance to the Houthis. The Southern Transitional Council is the most well-known group, so we should recognise the role of Mr al-Zubaidi and, just as importantly, the other members —Tareq Saleh, Abdullah al-Alimi Bawazeer, Sultan al-Arada from Marib, General al-Bahsani, Othman Majali and Abu Zara’a al-Muharrami for their contribution to leading the council. However, the situation with the PLC is delicate, and support from the international community is vital to maintain its credibility.

[John Spellar]

The hon. Lady mentioned the Southern Transitional Council. She may be about to come on to this, but what consideration should be given in the discussions to the desire for self-determination in south Yemen?

[Mrs Drummond]

I do not think it is for us to determine the future of Yemen. It is up to the people to decide what they would like to do through the negotiations, so I would not dream of putting what I think on to what they are going to decide. That is very important, as I mentioned at the beginning. We cannot apply our western-centric views to what is going on in Yemen. If the people decide that they want to divide as they used to be, that is fair enough, but I do not think we should be talking about that at the moment—

[John Spellar]

Does the hon. Lady recognise that there is considerable demand in southern Yemen for a degree of self-determination, if not independence, and that that is very much recognised by the south Yemeni diaspora here in the UK? This is not about us pressing for that as colonialists; it is very much a local demand.

[Geraint Davies (in the Chair)]

Order. When someone intervenes, the speaker needs to accept the intervention before the other person starts speaking.

Mahsa Amini

John Spellar Excerpts

Tuesday 11th October 2022 Commons Chamber

[Gillian Keegan]

We continue to work closely with like-minded partners to ensure that Iran and other countries are held to account, including via the Human Rights Council in Geneva and the UN General Assembly in New York. Our permanent representative in Geneva, Ambassador Simon Manley, specifically raised the death of Mahsa Amini at the 51st session of the Human Rights Council, and he called on Iran to carry out an independent transparent investigation into her death. We joined 52 other countries in a joint statement to the Human Rights Council urging restraint. Of course, we will continue to work with those partners when we see human rights abuses in other countries.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

Last month, at Foreign Office questions, I challenged the then Minister to follow our allies in the United States by proscribing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—the IRGC. In reply, I got the usual Whitehall waffle. The IRGC is crucial to the survival of Iran’s appalling clerical fascist regime. Will the latest outrages now shame the Government into proscribing the IRGC?

[Gillian Keegan]

We have been clear about our concerns about the IRGC’s continued destabilising activities throughout the region. The UK maintains a range of sanctions that work to constrain the destabilising activities of the IRGC, and the list of proscribed organisations is kept under constant review. We do not routinely comment on whether an organisation is or is not under consideration for proscription.

Jagtar Singh Johal

John Spellar Excerpts

Wednesday 7th September 2022 Commons Chamber

[Rehman Chishti]

On the first point about the Government’s commitment to an international rules-based system, the answer is yes, as it is for the United Kingdom Government’s commitment to open societies and human rights. I have previously given an answer on the specific point about arbitrary detention and the issue of release.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

The blunt arbitrary detention without trial of Jagtar Singh Johal would be a disgrace even if he were not being tortured and abused, especially as it seems that he is a British citizen. Will the new Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister make absolutely clear to the Indian authorities that if they think they have substantial evidence against Mr Johal, as alleged by the hon. Member for Harrow East (Bob Blackman), they should bring him to an open court straightaway for a fair trial? If, as is much more likely, they do not have such evidence, Mr Johal should be freed from prison at once, and allowed to return to his family in the United Kingdom.

[Rehman Chishti]

This case is a top priority for the United Kingdom Government, the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister, and I will ensure that everything is done to ensure that Mr Johal’s case is dealt with as quickly and swiftly as it can be.

Oral Answers to Questions

John Spellar Excerpts

Tuesday 6th September 2022 Commons Chamber

The Secretary of State was asked—

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

1. What steps her Department plans to take to counter Iran’s destabilising use of proxies in the middle east.

[The Minister for Asia and the Middle East (Amanda Milling)]

I am sure that the whole House will accept the apologies from the Foreign Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for South West Norfolk (Elizabeth Truss), who is otherwise engaged today.

The UK maintains a range of sanctions to constrain Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps malign activity. Maritime interdictions in January and February 2022 led to the seizure of advanced conventional weapons travelling from Iran to the Houthis in Yemen. We support the strengthening of state institutions in Iraq and Lebanon, and work to end the conflict in Yemen and Syria.

[John Spellar]

Mr Speaker, you may recall that it was against considerable Whitehall resistance—it needed pressure from this House—that we got the Government to ban Hezbollah. I hope that the Minister will be more receptive to recognising that the IRGC is at the heart of destabilising proxy wars across the middle east and further afield, and that she will show more urgency in joining our allies in the United States in proscribing the IRGC.

[Amanda Milling]

The UK maintains a range of sanctions that work to constrain the destabilising activity of the IRGC. The list of proscribed organisations is kept under constant review, but we do not routinely comment on whether an organisation is under consideration for proscription.

UK Government Recognition of Somaliland

John Spellar Excerpts

Tuesday 18th January 2022 Commons Chamber

[Gavin Williamson]

My hon. Friend is accurate in pinpointing the strategic importance of Somaliland. That is one of many reasons why it is so vital that not just Britain, but the United States and other NATO members lead the way in recognising Somaliland—not just because of the many brilliant things that have been done there, but because of the country’s strategic importance. The question is how we reinforce and support that Government.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

If I may pursue that point, is it not desirable for a stable state in a region that is becoming increasingly unstable to achieve that level of recognition? We talk a lot about supply chain vulnerability; this is one of the most vulnerable places we have found. Even one ship blocking the Suez canal caused ripples right the way throughout industry. We should also recognise the importance of enabling communities here and in Somaliland to move freely, have passports that are recognised, conclude international agreements, and unleash the country’s energy. Having a properly administered state in the region would enable those communities to do those things. Is it not time that we grasped the nettle and recognised Somaliland?

[Gavin Williamson]

There is a level of consensus bubbling up that is not always typical of debates in this House. It is incredibly important to demonstrate the will and feeling of the House on this important issue. The right hon. Gentleman raises an important point about supply chains. DP World already invests in the port of Berbera, and the welcome investment from British International Investment—the old Commonwealth Development Corporation—amounts to hundreds of millions of pounds. The Government recognise the importance of Somaliland, and we are willing to invest hundreds of millions of pounds there, because we realise that it opens up so much of the horn of Africa to British goods and investment. However, we still do not recognise the state of Somaliland, which is a real tragedy. It is so sad to see that so many Somalilanders have difficulty travelling to Somaliland. They cannot fly direct from the UK, but have to go via either Addis Ababa or Dubai. By taking the step of recognising Somaliland, we can make so many British citizens’ lives easier.

Russia

John Spellar Excerpts

Thursday 6th January 2022 Commons Chamber

[Elizabeth Truss]

I completely agree with my right hon. Friend about using all platforms available, and also about the fact that the free world needs to stand up against aggressors. The UK has played a leading role in bringing together the G7 to make a very strong statement, as well as working with our NATO allies to make clear the basis of the talks taking place next week. We are very ready and willing to use our position to make the case for severe consequences, should Russia seek to stage an incursion into Ukraine.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

The pressure on Ukraine is immediate, but it is part of a pattern of behaviour towards former Soviet satellites and Warsaw pact countries, many of which are now members of NATO or the EU—most of them are members of both. Many of these countries have post-war experience of Soviet tanks rolling in to crush protests, as we are seeing again in Kazakhstan. It is slightly concerning that, although the shadow Defence Secretary was here for this statement, I cannot see anyone from the Ministry of Defence, unless I am wrong. Will the UK not only argue for tough talk in next week’s discussions, but be prepared to provide material support to Ukraine in order to prevent an invasion or subversion?

[Elizabeth Truss]

We are working very closely with the Ministry of Defence. In fact, the Defence Secretary recently visited Ukraine. We have been providing support, including training troops, providing intelligence and security assistance, and helping Ukraine to build its naval capability.

Motor Vehicles (Compulsory Insurance) Bill

John Spellar Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 5th January 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Bone]

My right hon. Friend draws attention to something that I will refer to later in my speech. When she hears what I have to say, she will see why in the end that will not be the case.

The significance of this measure is seen in the Government Actuary’s estimate that the increase in premiums to extend coverage following the Vnuk judgment would be about £50 for the average motor car policyholder. The Bill will therefore save the average policyholder unnecessarily increased insurance premiums in already difficult economic times. The cost of living is rising and the Bill is an opportunity to keep pounds in people’s pockets.

You have kindly agreed that clauses 1 and 2 may be debated together, Ms Ali. Clause 1 would insert into the Road Traffic Act 1988 new section 156A, “Retained EU law relating to compulsory insurance”. Subsection (1) limits the insurance obligation under article 3 of the 2009 motor insurance directive to vehicles used on roads and other public places, and to a motor vehicle defined as a mechanically propelled vehicle intended, or adapted, for use on the roads. In effect, it removes the Vnuk interpretation as it applies to the use of vehicles in Great Britain.

Subsection (2) clarifies that the Bill does not affect the provisions requiring insurance policies to include the cover required by the law applicable in the territory where the vehicle is used, or the law applicable where it is normally based when that cover is higher. That means that the liability imposed by the Vnuk interpretation will remain in place for insurance policies covering vehicles in use in EU member states and Northern Ireland.

Subsection (3) concerns the removal of section 4 rights created in the 2008 Lewis v. Tindale case, which found that the interpretation of the 2009 directive in the Vnuk judgment could be enforced directly against the Motor Insurers’ Bureau. The Lewis decision means that the Motor Insurers’ Bureau’s liability for an insurance claim extends beyond the scope of the obligations of the Road Traffic Act and applies to accidents on private land and to vehicles not constructed for road use. Subsection (3) brings an end to the relevant section 4 right to compensation from the Motor Insurers’ Bureau except in the case of motor vehicles on roads or other public places, as defined by the Road Traffic Act.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

What the hon. Gentleman is describing is interesting. Given, presumably, the obligation arises from an accident and therefore an injury, who becomes responsible for the injury?

[Mr Bone]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for a really important question. It is one of the issues discussed when drawing up the Bill. In many cases, such as a public event on private land, there would be insurance cover. It is not currently the case that if someone illegally rides a vehicle on private land, has an accident and causes damage, there is a requirement to be insured for that. The landowner would be liable for the damage, but they do not have to be insured for it. Extending insurance to ride-on lawnmowers or other machines on private land has also been caught by Vnuk.

[John Spellar]

I accept that there is a fundamental problem with how liability insurance works: rather than dealing with often catastrophic injuries through the health service or national insurance, they are dealt with on an insurance basis. Local councils are impacted by that and it stops a lot of activities, because insurance companies prevent them. I accept there is a deeper underlying problem, but ultimately, if there has been an injury and there is some degree of fault, who is liable for the compensation? Is it the landowner? Is it the driver of the vehicle? How can that be resolved?

[Mr Bone]

This is a really important argument. There is a liability, and in each event that will depend on who causes the injury or damage. That person will be liable for the damages. The Bill deals with a slightly different situation where we are not extending compulsory insurance to cover those events. If we did, it would increase premiums by £50 per motorist. I stressed earlier that there is nothing to stop Parliament bringing in compulsory insurance on that basis, but it would have to be done through an Act of this sovereign Parliament that wanted to make that change. The Bill brings things back to where we thought we were, but it does not stop that debate and people can still make that argument. However, it is not really relevant to the Bill, because Parliament never thought that the Road Traffic Act and compulsory third-party insurance applied in the circumstances just described.

Proposed new section 156A(4) similarly provides for the removal of all further case law retained under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 that could undermine the positions set out in subsections (1) and (3). Any other EU law that we do not know about would not apply if the Bill is passed. Subsection (5) defines the terms used in clause 1, including the 2009 motor insurance directive, relevant section 4 rights, retained case law, and section 4 rights.

--- Later in debate ---

[Theresa Villiers]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Ali. I support this Bill and I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough on getting it this far. The prospects for a presentation Bill making progress are normally minimal, so it has taken real determination on his part to get it this far. I very much hope we will see it on the statute book before too long.

As we have heard, it is clear that the Vnuk judgment in the ECJ has led to a big extension in the type of claim that can be made against the Motor Insurers’ Bureau fund for uninsured road traffic accidents. That extension is manifestly different from the scope and purpose of the scheme in operation under the Road Traffic Act 1988, which focuses on vehicles that are permitted to be used on roads.

In my view, the UK scheme for compensation in relation to collisions caused by uninsured drivers has worked well for decades. I understand that it has been there in one form or another since the 1930s, the earliest point of the extension of private ownership of the car. The combined effect of Vnuk and the later case of Lewis v. Tindle, which concluded that Vnuk had direct effect, and the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, means that potentially significant costs are being loaded on to the UK scheme—costs for a scheme that was never designed for them and to which this Parliament did not consent. As we have heard, motorists will be asked to fund this via their insurance premiums unless this Bill reaches the statute book.

I agree with previous comments that we can have a legitimate debate about the potential extension of compulsory insurance and compensation schemes to new scenarios, but I feel quite strongly that we cannot justify leaving drivers to shoulder the whole cost of this potentially big bill by artificially forcing these new liabilities into our long-standing motor insurance scheme. That is a separate decision that should be taken separately by this Parliament.

As we all know, we face significant pressure on the cost of living at the moment, largely as a result of the global increase in gas prices. In Parliament, we should all strive to do what we can to relieve pressure on household bills, which is another reason to back the clauses in this Bill.

I note the analysis of the costs, which was produced by the Government Actuary’s Department. It is always hard to quantify these things, although the £50 claim is certainly credible. It is particularly worrying that this new liability for the MIB fund is potentially open to significant amounts of fraud. Therefore, the actual impact of Vnuk, if left on the statute book, could be very great. It is hard to quantify in advance. Another reason for my support for the Bill is the potential abuse of the fund we could see if the Bill does not get on to the statue book. In a column in The Telegraph in 2017, the Prime Minister described Vnuk as a

“pointless and expensive burden on millions of people.”

The Bill provides us with an important opportunity to remove that burden and prevent this addition to household bills.

[John Spellar]

Was that article in The Telegraph before or after the one in which the Prime Minister said that Brexit would enable us to do away with VAT on fuel bills?

[Theresa Villiers]

I am not going to comment on the question of VAT on fuel bills, since that is not the subject of today’s debate. I believe the debates on VAT on fuel bills date back some years, probably before that article.

It is disappointing that the Bill does not cover Northern Ireland, but I hope that it would adopt similar legislation, as my hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough has suggested that it might. It is good to hear that there is nothing in the protocol that prevents it from doing so. It seems clear that this is not a single market-type rule, which would be covered by the protocol. There should be no constitutional or legal barrier to the Assembly passing a similar piece of legislation, and I certainly hope that it will choose to do so.

The Bill is the first piece of primary legislation to repeal retained EU law. I am certainly not aware of any other piece of primary legislation that does that. There are aspects of EU rules and programmes that have already been dismantled. Most notably, many of the fundamentals of the common agricultural policy have already gone, thankfully. However, it may well be the case that that was achieved without primary legislation. It is very clear that this will be the first time we have used primary legislation to disapply a judgment in the European Court of Justice. It could undoubtedly be described as a historic moment. The controversy around Vnuk shows that we need a faster way to remove or update EU laws that no longer work for us, most of which arrived on the statute book via secondary legislation in the first place. To have to deal with all of those modernisations, updates and amendments via primary legislation is a significant flaw in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 that needs to be looked at again.

I very much support the Bill. I hope it is the first of a long series of repeals and reforms that will take place as we use our Brexit freedoms to create better regulation that is more targeted to our domestic circumstances and that enables us to compete in the big high-tech growth sectors of the future. Only when we have done that and seized the opportunity provided by Brexit will we truly be able to say that we have got Brexit done.

Kurdish Political Representation and Equality in Turkey

John Spellar Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd November 2021 Westminster Hall

[Lloyd Russell-Moyle (Brighton, Kemptown) (Lab/Co-op)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered Kurdish political representation and equality in Turkey.

Thank you, Dame Angela. I thank the Backbench Business Committee for granting this debate, the title of which mirrors exactly that of the report of the all-party parliamentary group for Kurdistan in Turkey and Syria, which I chair. There are a number of members of the APPG here today. I look forward to discussing the report and to receiving some concrete responses from the Minister to the questions that the APPG has provided. I have sent most, if not all, of my questions to the Minister’s team in advance, because I recognise that this is not the Minister’s area. I hope that we will receive some concrete replies to those questions, and that other questions may be responded to through correspondence.

I will start by quickly giving some background about why the APPG settled on this topic, before I move on to the substantive issue. When I was elected in 2017, I was asked to go on a parliamentary mission to north- east Syria to meet our allies, the Kurds, and to see the state that they were building. I was the first British parliamentarian to visit Syria since the start of the civil war in 2011. I went back a year later with the hon. Members for Reigate (Crispin Blunt) and for Gravesham (Adam Holloway) to see the activities there. We found that, out of the ashes of a brutal civil war and then a conflict with ISIS, the Kurdish people and the people of the surrounding areas had built a democratic, feminist, multi-ethnic, secular confederalist society that aspired to educate its people. It was pro-LGBT rights and pro-disabled people’s rights. The Kurds were not only fighting ISIS with guns but fighting the ideology at its very core—standing against ISIS’s ideas.

Is everything perfect in north-east Syria? No. In conflict, people have to do difficult things. We must ally with those who have the best intentions and motives. We have seen in other conflicts that if we fund our enemy’s enemy, just for the sake of it, we sometimes get an even worse outcome. In the Kurds in Syria, we have not just a military ally but an alliance of minds and a modern, democratic, secular idealism.

After my two trips to Syria, we produced reports and had debates in Parliament. However, as hon. Members will know, geopolitics cannot be isolated to one country. The middle east is a tapestry of cultures, languages and identities, but years ago colonial powers divided the region, as they did much of the world, into modern nation states without a proper regard for all the people who lived there. The Kurdish people are one of the largest ethnic groups in the world without a homeland. Geographically, they are split between Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey. They have different challenges in each of those countries, and the scale of oppression has varied throughout history. We all know, of course, that Saddam Hussein murdered over 100,000 Kurds in Iraq in the 1990s, one of the darkest chapters of Kurdish history. However, today Kurds in Iraq have a relatively stable, successful regional Government, with autonomy from the Iraqi central Government, although that is not also without its challenges.

What I saw in Syria, however, was that, alongside the existential threat of Assad, Turkey had ended up taking a hostile approach to the Kurds in north-east Syria and at times was even resorting to pushing and helping jihadis along that border. To understand the motivations of Turkey—a supposed ally of ours—and why it was so hostile to a group of people who had helped to bring down ISIS, the APPG decided that it was important to return our focus to Turkey. Following a number of reports by previous Select Committees on Foreign Affairs and a parliamentary delegation observing political trials of Kurds in Turkey four years ago, it was felt that it was time to bring the focus back to the internal politics of Turkey and to see what had happened in the intervening period.

We therefore launched the inquiry almost a year ago, on 9 November 2020, and the terms of reference agreed were to ask the following questions. What are the main obstacles to Kurdish representation in Turkey? What are the relevant gender aspects to the crisis of Kurdish representation? What relationships do the Turkish Government hold with the Kurdish diaspora communities? To what extent can the UK Government influence policy on these issues, and what are the best means of support for consolidating democracy in Turkey, promoting peaceful co-existence and harmony in the region?

Those terms of reference were translated into Turkish and Kurdish, distributed widely in the UK and Turkey, and as chair of the APPG I and a number of others did interviews on Kurdish and Turkish television stations to promote the inquiry. We wrote directly to the ambassador to get his input. Although his response was short, I appreciate that he responded to our request.

As well as a call for written evidence, we held a number of oral sessions, which were roughly themed into the following categories: political representation, civil society, press, gender issues and, finally, the issue of the PKK, the currently banned Kurdistan Workers Party, which is the militant arm of the Kurdish struggle. Those are the themes around which I will structure today’s discussion, and they are also the themes on which our report, which Members will have received electronically, was structured.

The first session focused on elected officials, with MPs sitting in the Turkish Parliament giving evidence to us. One was from the HDP, the People’s Democratic Party, the majority Kurdish and progressive political party, and the other was from the CHP, the Republican People’s Party, the main opposition party in Turkey, but widely regarded as modern Turkey’s founding party.

I would like to read some of the testimony from the HDP witness. Hişyar told us:

“Over the last three weeks, I received four different, what they call, summary of proceedings”—

most of them were unfounded—which

“demanded to lift my parliamentary immunity so that I can be prosecuted. When my parliamentary mandate ends, all of those summaries will turn into court cases and I will be sentenced, or I will have to leave the country.”

There is a great deal of precedent for targeting MPs. In the past six years, the former HDP chairs were arrested for alleged connections to the PKK. Part of the Government’s case was that they had used the words “Kurds” and “Kurdistan” in public speeches in 2012. The other citation in the case was that they had been involved in the creation of the PKK. The PKK was created in 1978, when both the co-chairs were five years old. We can clearly see that this does not seem to stand up to fair and due process.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this debate and on his work in keeping a light shining on this sometimes forgotten struggle. Is not the important thing here that the HDP and other groups that may just disagree with the current regime are being denied their democratic rights and are being attacked? While we should have no truck with terrorism, should not NATO, and Britain through NATO, put pressure on the regime, as a member of NATO, to hold to democratic values? After all, that is what NATO was founded on.

[Lloyd Russell-Moyle]

I totally agree. NATO and the Council of Europe, both of which we and Turkey are members of, need to be holding Turkey to greater account. I also totally agree with my right hon. Friend that we should have no truck with terrorism. But an expansive approach including anyone who just shares the ideals of self-determination is not helpful in the fight against terrorism, because it makes a mockery of the whole system. I will come on to that in the final part of my speech.

In December 2020, the European Court of Human Rights ordered the immediate release of the chairs and other Members of Parliament and a suspension of their trials, saying that they was politically motivated. That ruling is now wilfully ignored by Turkey. In addition, the European Parliament passed, by 590 votes to 16, a motion saying that they should be released.

The testimony is supported by the “World Report 2020”, published by Human Rights Watch, which states:

“Cases against HDP politicians provide the starkest evidence that authorities bring criminal prosecution and use detention in bad faith and for political purposes.”

The 2020 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe resolution dealt with the political crackdown on political opposition, highlighting how immunity for politicians had been stripped away from 2016 onwards.

We have debated this issue previously in this place, and I commend my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield North (Feryal Clark) for securing a previous debate about political representation in Turkey and the fate of some of the HDP politicians. It is clear that this is an organised targeting of opposition MPs just for calling for autonomy or self-determination for majority Kurdish areas. Previously it had been an attack on HDP MPs, but recently and worryingly it has been extended to CHP Members of Parliament. The CHP is no Kurdish-flag-waving party. Many Kurds will say that the CHP is part of a state that helped to lay some of the foundations of difficulties. But many CHP members now choose to speak out on the moral and correct thing, which is the ability of people to partake in democratic life. And the idea of supporting Kurdish autonomy and self-determination seems to be all that is now required to trigger an accusation of terrorism or subversion. That is a dangerous precedent.

We not only heard from MPs in Turkey; we also took evidence from municipal leaders, one of whom was elected a mayor but is now in exile in Greece. The APPG heard that since the last local elections in 2019, 59 of the 65 elected municipal leaders have been replaced by Government-appointed trustees. A human rights report quoted in our report says:

“Regardless of which party or candidate they voted for, the will of…more than 4 million…voters living within the boundaries of 48 municipalities”

has been

“seized through the appointment of trustees.”

Our inquiry also took evidence on the closure of the Democratic Society Congress—the DTK—an organisation bringing together politicians and civil society that advocates not separation but confederalisation in Turkey, and that is its crime. Actions taken have included the arrest of its leaders, as well as the targeting of the Kurdish political youth organisations. One refugee is in my constituency because of the persecution he faced.

On Kurdish political representation, the APPG made nine findings. I will not read them all out, but I will mention a few. We found that trials have been increasingly conducted in closed central courts in Ankara and not the open divisional courts in the home provinces, making a defence harder for a Member of Parliament. The APPG also found that there have been routine cases against 154 MPs—154 MPs have received indictments; this is not just a few people who have done objectionable things —and that the legal proceedings are being used to tackle political disagreements, which in turn disproportionately affects Members of Parliament from Kurdish backgrounds. We also found that the human rights of municipal leaders are violated routinely by detaining them pending trial or sentencing them to prison on trumped-up charges.

Our report was 56 pages in total, with 32 recommendations for the UK Government. We received comments based on the first-hand experience of MPs, mayors, civil society and women’s organisations, and I sent the report to the Minister in July. I received a one-and-a-quarter-page reply, the substantive part of which said:

“We were concerned by recent reports of increased violence in the region and the Minister for the Middle East and North Africa tweeted on 1 September calling for de-escalation.”

Is a tweet really the maximum amount of our diplomatic effort? It would be nice to know more about what the Government have been doing. Over hundreds of hours, we collected work on the report and made concrete recommendations. I would like the Government to give some concrete responses.

Will the Minister and the Government demand the release of the HDP co-leaders, in accordance with the decision by the European Court of Human Rights in December 2020? Will she condemn the closure of the DTK and remind the Turkish Government of their previous commitment to find a peaceful solution to the ongoing conflict? Will the Government push the Turkish Government to accept the revised European charter on the participation of young people in local and regional life, which is a Council of Europe charter for young people, so that it applies to young people in Turkey? Finally, what will the Government do to press the Turkish Government to uphold the rule of law and democratic principles in Turkey?

I now turn to the issue of discrimination through language and culture. Having gone through the first section of my speech, I will now try to rattle through the other sections. The inquiry received evidence from the Education and Science Workers’ Union in Turkey, which had conducted its own report. It stated that 200,000 children in Diyarbakır alone and 6 million children in south-east Turkey were being denied an education entirely or being forced to learn exclusively in Turkish and not their mother language. This is, of course, a denial of human rights, and it also makes it impossible for children to be helped in their studies by their parents or caregivers, which puts them at an immediate disadvantage as they grow up.

The inquiry also received a report from the Kurdish Language and Culture Network, which suggests that there had been enforced and targeted discrimination against the Kurdish community, particularly where they had expressed their culture in language and other traditional practices. We found that in the last five years 57 Kurdish cultural institutions and organisations had been closed down, including theatres, just for staging plays in the Kurdish language.

Will the Government condemn the Turkish Government’s decision to close multiple institutions that uphold Kurdish cultural life? Furthermore, what steps will the Minister take to raise this issue with her Turkish counterparts? Will she discuss the support that the British Council could offer in Kurdish-English work and co-operation?

I turn now to gender-based oppression in Turkey. Historically, Turkey has retained a low representation of women in its Parliament. In 2020 the World Bank calculated that 17% of seats were held by women, which is below the global average of 25%. The HDP operates a co-chair system, whereby a man and a woman co-chair the party and many municipalities. The HDP maintains a quota of 50% female candidates and, I think almost uniquely for any political party in the world, 10% of Members must come from the LGBT+ community. That means that repression of Kurdish and Kurdish-supporting MPs has ended up disproportionately affecting women and LGBT+ people, because they are disproportionately represented—not disproportionately according to the population, but in the Turkish Parliament.

The practice of having co-chairs has even been cited by the Turkish Government as evidence of links to the PKK, which was the first to use the co-chair system. That is further evidence that the expansive practice of just sharing any similar idea or practice with the PKK will mean that an organisation is branded as terrorists. It is clearly ridiculous.

It is not just the HDP that has been targeted in a gendered way. The Free Women’s Congress and 49 other women’s organisations were closed down in the state of emergency that was declared in 2016. As a result of that declaration, the bank accounts of many of these women’s organisations were closed, making it impossible for them to continue to operate.

In the evidence submitted by the TJA—the Free Women’s Movement—the Kurdish women’s organisation, it stated that in 2020, 2,520 women reported to non-governmental organisations cases of physical and gendered violence, 775 women applied for shelter, and 113 women reported cases of sexual assault. In the 18 years that the AKP has been in power, femicide in Turkey overall has increased by 1,400%. That is a shocking amount.

Human Rights: Kashmir

John Spellar Excerpts

Thursday 23rd September 2021 Commons Chamber

[Debbie Abrahams (Oldham East and Saddleworth) (Lab) [R]]

I beg to move,

That this House notes with grave concern the escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan, two nuclear powers, following the revocation of Articles 370 and 35A from the Indian Constitution in August 2019; further notes the United Nations reports of 14 June 2018 and 8 July 2019 on human rights violations in Indian-administered Kashmir and Pakistan-administered Kashmir; and calls on the Government to work with the United Nations, Commonwealth and wider international community to help ensure that international law is upheld and human rights are protected throughout India, Kashmir and Pakistan.

It is an honour to lead this debate on human rights in Kashmir, as the chair of the all-party parliamentary group on Kashmir. I extend my thanks to the Backbench Business Committee for granting this debate. Given that my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South East (Yasmin Qureshi) and I applied for this debate back in March 2020, I wonder whether we might have reached a record for the time between something being approved and being debated. None the less, I am grateful that we can now debate an issue that is so important to many of our constituents.

The partition of India into India and Pakistan in 1947 and the cavalier manner in which the governance of Kashmiris was determined without them has led to 74 years of unrest, dozens of UN resolutions, and violence across the line of control and within Indian-administered Kashmir, or IAK, and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, or PAK.

Since I was elected chair of the APPG back in November 2018, its focus has been on the promotion of human rights in all parts of Kashmir. This followed the first ever report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on human rights in Kashmir in July 2018. The report documented human rights abuses in both IAK and PAK, and concentrated in particular on the period between 2016 and 2018, following the unprecedented protests and violence that erupted after the killing of Burhan Wani, the leader of Hizbul Mujahideen, by Indian security forces in 2016—[Interruption.] I do hope that my voice will last till the end of my speech!

The abuses that the United Nations reported in the then Jammu and Kashmir state of Indian-administered Kashmir, and what it noted as the “root causes” that were fuelling local dissent, included the reported killings of civilians by off-duty police and army personnel with impunity; the failure to independently investigate and prosecute widespread reports of sexual violence committed by security services personnel; people reported disappeared with impunity; the detention of thousands of people, including children, under the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act 1978, which, for the uninitiated, allowed the state to take a person into preventive detention without trial for up to two years; the obstruction of access to justice, through not just the 1979 Act but the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act 1990, which gives security personnel powers to investigate and arrest without warrants, as well as protecting those personnel under law; and, finally, the obstruction of access to basic medical care for civilians.

The UN report concluded:

“In responding to demonstrations that started in July 2016, Indian security forces used excessive force that led to unlawful killings and a very high number of injuries...Civil society estimates are that 130 to 145 civilians were killed by security forces between mid-July 2016 and end of March 2018, and 16 to 20 civilians killed by armed groups in the same period. One of most dangerous weapons used against protesters during the unrest in 2016 was the pellet-firing shotgun, which is a 12-gauge pump-action shotgun that fires metal pellets.”

For PAK, the UN reported that

“the human rights violations in this area are of a different calibre or magnitude and of a more structural nature.”

For example, it identified that the Pakistan Government had control over the affairs of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and of Gilgit Baltistan. It identified that the interim constitution of AJK prevents anyone criticising AJK’s accession to Pakistan in contravention of international standards on the rights to freedom of expression, opinion, assembly and association.

Local people in Gilgit Baltistan have been forcibly displaced to make way for the China-Pakistan economic corridor.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

Unfortunately, that pattern of abuse will be all too familiar not only to our constituents of Kashmiri heritage, but to those from the Punjab, where similar abuses are taking place. In Kashmir, in particular, it is a matter not only of enormous abuse of human rights but, given the security situation, of international concern because of the tensions. Should the international community not therefore intervene to try to resolve this issue?

[Debbie Abrahams]

We cannot say—this has been said on too many occasions—that this is just a bilateral issue. I will come to that point in a moment.

The last point that was raised is around the discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities. The UN report also noted that the number of armed groups that have been operating across IAK and which were also held responsible for human rights abuses, including kidnappings, killings and sexual violence. The report stated that, despite the Pakistan Government’s denial,

“experts believe that Pakistan’s military continues to support their operations across the Line of Control in Indian-Administered Kashmir.”

The human rights high commissioner made a series of recommendations to both the Indian and Pakistani Governments, and the primary one that covers both is that the rule of law and international human rights must be upheld. Both of these countries are signatories to the universal declaration and they must be upheld.

Specifically, the high commissioner recommended that India repeal the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act 1958 and ensure that the 1978 public safety Act was compliant with international law. It was recommended that Pakistan amend the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, bringing it in line with international human rights standards and safeguards as well as amend the interim constitution of AJK and other legislation that limits the rights of freedom of expression and opinion.

Let us fast forward to July 2019 when a second UN report was published. This was meant to be a progress report, but the high commissioner expressed real concerns that very little progress had been made. It noted that the political and military tensions between them, particularly as a result of the Pulwama attack in February, was having an impact on the human rights of Kashmiris on both sides of the line of control.

On 5 August 2019, as Members will know, after the Bharatiya Janata party’s general election win in India, Prime Minister Modi announced the revocation of article 370 in India’s constitution. The effect was to remove the special status afforded to Jammu and Kashmir since partition. A Bill was rapidly approved by both Houses of Parliament, splitting the state of Jammu and Kashmir into two federal territories, Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, with direct rule from Delhi. The revocation of article 370 was also extended to article 35A, which removes the rights of indigenous Kashmiris, and has the potential to alter the distinct demographic character of IAK—a direct contravention of the 2007 UN declaration on the rights of indigenous people.

Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy

John Spellar Excerpts

Tuesday 9th February 2021 Commons Chamber

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

The Chairman of the Defence Committee, with whom I am pleased to serve, mentioned the Atlantic Charter. I am very proud of the fact that that charter was brought in by the post-war Labour Government of Ernest Bevin and Clem Attlee to deal with the existential threat that this country was facing.

Looking at the current review, everyone recognises the linkages between the elements of defence, security, foreign policy and development. As US Defence Secretary Mattis said:

“If you don’t fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition ultimately”.

As a member of the Defence Committee and a previous Defence Minister, I also have to be concerned that the Defence budget is not carved up to fund the other areas, because that is what we were facing in the earlier policy review. There was a glaring need to expand cyber and intelligence capability. That was obvious, but it was all within a zero budget. Something had to give, and if there had not been cross-party uproar, it would have been the Defence budget, with a catastrophic impact on equipment, troop numbers, facilities and morale. That is still a threat, and it would be a huge mistake.

Our previous ambassador to the United States, Kim Darroch, recently gave evidence to the Defence Committee. He said:

“I would be really worried about reducing further the size of the British Army. I say that in part on the basis of my experience in Washington. I would go into the Department of Defense and occasionally to see General Mattis myself or to take people in to see him and his predecessor under the Obama Administration. One of the things that both would say consistently is, ‘You are already too small—in terms of your Army. I mean, 80,000 just isn’t good enough. You need to be above 100,000. It is a big mistake to reduce to the level you are at. For goodness’ sake, do not go down any further and expect to retain your current level of credibility in Washington.’”

Ironically, one of the outcomes of the dither and delay that we have seen on the strategic review that has been to our advantage is that we can relate to the new Biden Administration and the new policies that are rapidly reshaping internal and external policy for the United States. We must certainly work with the Biden Administration to reinforce NATO after the instability of the unlamented Trump regime, but we need to have credibility in order to do that.

That brings me to the second underpinning of our defence and security strategy, which must be resilience, not only in our service personnel, crucial as that is, but in their support, both from civilian employees and also in industry. Surely even the dinosaurs in the Treasury have learned from the covid pandemic that the cost of running down capacity is penny wise, pound foolish on an exponential scale. That is why the mood of the country has shifted, and the pressure will be on the Ministry of Defence to back British industry wherever possible—so I say to the Defence Department: get on with the support ship contract! We must also value the work and commitment of the support personnel and cut out the pernicious dogma that private provision is always best. It has a role, but as we can see from what is currently happening at Faslane, the bean counters are splitting the contracts into smaller competing packages, leading to a complexity of multiple providers and interfaces and a lack of a clear line of accountability. And that on our nuclear deterrent base—really?