Iran

Lord Spellar Excerpts

Thursday 12th January 2023 Commons Chamber

[Bob Blackman]

It is fair to say that the Government have not been inactive in this regard. On 11 November, the Foreign Secretary summoned Iran’s chargé d’affaires to discuss the threats against journalists living in the UK. However, this has not deterred the Iranian security forces, so we must continue to put international pressure on the regime. It is crucial that we follow up the recent sanctions and lead our partners and allies to proscribe such an organisation.

I was pleased that, on 15 December, the UN General Assembly adopted the 69th UN resolution condemning violations of human rights in Iran.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on securing this debate. He has been present for a whole number of Foreign Office questions where, by the luck of the draw, I have been able to pose this question to the Foreign Secretary. The Government have continued not to proscribe the IRGC, as was the case with Hezbollah until finally they had to do so. Is it not now time to proscribe the IRGC, which destabilises the region through terrorist activities and front organisations, operates international gangsterism and is the absolute bedrock of support for this clerical fascist regime? Might the hon. Gentleman give way to the Minister, who could indicate the direction the Government are going in so that we do not have to rely on leaks in newspapers?

[Bob Blackman]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that intervention, but I will wait for the Minister to respond to the debate.

I am deeply concerned by reports of threats made to organisations in the UK that support the rights of protesters in Iran, including the recent petrol bombing in outer London of a location affiliated with the National Council of Resistance of Iran. Thankfully, as it was the early hours of the morning, no one was inside, but the situation could have been extremely grave with loss of life.

The mass murders by the IRGC are shocking, but perhaps not surprising. In 1988, the current President of Iran, President Raisi, was responsible for the prosecution of 30,000 political prisoners, all of whom were executed. Of those 30,000, 90% were members or supporters of Iran’s main opposition movement, the People’s Mujaheddin Organisation of Iran. That indicates that the regime has no qualms whatsoever about executing people who represent a threat. It has made clear that that is what it intends to do. The 1988 massacre holds many similarities to today’s uprising, rooted as it was in a fundamental conflict with the people of Iran, who were demanding freedom, democracy, and economic and social development after the overthrow of the Shah.

The IRGC has created, funded and armed a vast network of middle eastern terrorist groups, from Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Houthis in Yemen, all spreading war and violence around the region. Iran has supplied Hezbollah alone with some 150,000 missiles, which are regularly fired at innocent Israeli civilians. Hezbollah’s 2012 bomb attack in Bulgaria, which killed five Israeli tourists and a Bulgarian, led the EU to list the organisation’s military wing as terrorists, while leaving the political arm of the organisation untouched. In creating that artificial distinction, which even Hezbollah rejected, the EU avoided banning the group in its entirety. It consequently continues to recruit and fundraise in EU member states and the UK, which has not yet banned the group separately.

Furthermore, the IRGC and Hezbollah are at the forefront of Iran’s brutal campaign to keep the Syrian Assad regime in power. Since 2015, when Russia joined the fighting, the two regimes have partnered in despicable war crimes that have killed hundreds of thousands and left millions as refugees of war. The growing alliance with Russia has been further strengthened with the current war in Ukraine, with Iran supplying advanced drones to Russia since August.

Iran’s people have risen to defeat religious tyranny and its repression and terrorism. They have chosen to pay the price of freedom with their blood. The UK and the whole international community should rise in solidarity by helping the Iranian people realise their democratic aspirations, which the UK Government can do by taking the following necessary steps.

The Government should demand that the Iranian regime immediately halt trials, convictions and executions of protesters in Iran. The UK Government lag behind their European counterparts, who are even sponsoring individual protesters who are in prison and at high risk of execution. We could follow that lead.

We should recognise the legitimacy of the fight of the Iranian people against the evil and terrorist forces of the IRGC and officially recognise the Iranian people’s revolution to establish a republic based on democratic values.

We should recognise that the people of Iran have a democratic alternative, the goals of which are enshrined in the 10-point plan articulated by Mrs Maryam Rajavi, the president-elect of the NCRI. The Government should support that Iranian solution, as was recommended by more than 230 Members from across the parties in both the House of Commons and the House of Lords in our joint statement in December 2022.

The Government should refer the appalling dossier of the regime’s systematic violations of human rights and crimes against humanity to the United Nations Security Council for the adoption of binding deterrent measures. The regime leaders must be brought to justice to end impunity and prevent the cycle of crime and terror.

Next, we should proscribe the IRGC in its entirety to deny it the funds and resources it needs to crush the nationwide uprising and export terrorism abroad.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs (Leo Docherty)]

Colleagues will know that this portfolio lies with the noble Lord Ahmad, but, with him being in the other place, I am very pleased to stand at the Dispatch Box today to answer this very important debate.

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow East (Bob Blackman) on securing this debate, and I will seek to answer his questions. He spoke movingly of the plight and the outrageous murder of Mahsa Amini, which initiated the remarkable protests. He gave us some flavour of the scale and importance of the protests, for which we are very grateful. He asked some very direct and relevant questions about a possible proscription of the IRGC. I will come to that in a moment, and we note the calls of many other Members in that regard.

My hon. Friend spoke at great length and very interestingly about the malign activity across the region of the IRGC and Iran, especially in Lebanon and Syria, and now in Russia, with the supply of the Shahed drones, which are currently destroying Ukrainian infrastructure. He also pointed out that Iran has conducted the second highest number of executions globally after China, which is a sobering fact and reflects the cruel nature of the regime.

I wish to speak about the plight of the individual facing execution. Many Members have spoken about Mr Alireza Akbari and it is right that I seek to update the House. We have no news today. We are in touch with the family. Following the scheduling of his forthcoming execution by the Iranian regime, the Foreign Secretary did release a statement and the noble Lord Ahmad called in the Iranian chargé d’affaires to issue a very strong call for clemency and for the release of Mr Akbari. As I have said, we continue to offer support to the family. We have no news today, and it would be wrong of me to speculate on any future activities, but it is right to say that, through our ambassador in Tehran, we of course continue to make extremely strong calls for his release.

On the issue of proscription, the IRGC is, of course, sanctioned as an organisation and its individual members are sanctioned under our current legislation, but it is not proscribed as a terrorist organisation. It would be wrong of me to speculate from the Dispatch Box about the outcome of the Government’s current consideration of this issue, which is active, and it would be wrong of me to pre-empt any formal announcement or judgment by the Government. However, I can say that the calls from right across the House and the unity with which those calls have been made will be noted by the Government. This is something that we regard as extremely serious, and the Government will make the judgment as they see fit.

[John Spellar]

Many of us have been round this block before with the artificial distinction between the military and non-military wings of Hezbollah. Eventually, the Government had to give way, which was the sensible thing to do. Can the Minister not cut to the chase and follow the United States, which has already proscribed the IRGC, and actually deal with this appalling organisation, which is a threat not only to its own citizens, but to stability in the middle east and in wider north Africa as well?

[Leo Docherty]

We note the approach of the United States, and that will be taken into consideration when the Government form their view and make an announcement.

Let me turn to the contributions of other colleagues. I was very pleased that the hon. Member for Nottingham South (Lilian Greenwood) spoke eloquently of the plight of women protesters under the banner of “Zan, Zendegi, Azadi”. She spoke movingly of her constituent’s cousin. Although I cannot comment on that specific case, I am sure that the noble Lord Ahmad would be very pleased to meet her and her constituent to see what action can be taken. I think the House was moved by her reflections on that young man.

My hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Melton (Alicia Kearns), the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, illustrated very comprehensively the state-sponsored nature of the brutal misogyny and violence that protesters are suffering. She asked a specific question about the guards at Evin. I cannot comment on possible future sanctions, but, following her remarks, the Department will certainly look at whether any more ground should be covered with regard to specific individuals.

My hon. Friend spoke about a number of cases involving the death penalty. She pointed out that these were cynical uses of the death penalty by the regime and that those who are currently held are effectively political hostages held for political effect. She asked about the utility and the progress of our ambassador in Tehran, Simon Shercliff. There is utility in having him there, because he is able to deliver strong messages into the heart of the regime, and he is doing his best to deliver those messages. She spoke interestingly and expertly about the regional contacts, especially in Iraq and Syria. I can give her an assurance—speaking of the view of her Committee—that our Department believes that, absolutely, the middle east does still matter.

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Spellar Excerpts

Tuesday 13th December 2022 Commons Chamber

[Anna McMorrin (Cardiff North) (Lab)]

8. What recent assessment he has made of the political situation in Iran.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

18. What steps his Department is taking to help tackle destabilising activities by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

[The Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs (James Cleverly)]

These protests in Iran are a watershed moment. After years of repression, the Iranian people have clearly had enough. They are standing up to the authoritarian regime under which they live. Sadly, the regime has responded in the only way it knows: with violence. The UK is committed to holding Iran to account, including with more than 300 sanctions—including the sanctioning of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in its entirety. We will continue to work with partners to challenge the regime’s aggression at home and its disruptive behaviour in the region.

[James Cleverly]

I personally and the UK Government have regularly condemned the abuses in Iran. Of course, I recognise that that tone is reflected right across the House. We have sanctioned the morality police; we have sanctioned the Iranian judges whom we know to be involved in those secret trials. We will continue to work with our international partners, and directly, to sanction the members of the Iranian regime who continue to abuse the human rights of the people within that country.

[John Spellar]

The Minister has rightly identified that the clerical fascist regime in Tehran is increasingly using violence and terror in trying to crush the popular protests there, while also destabilising the region through proxies, as well as further afield. He knows that a vital underpinning of this dreadful regime’s activities is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. He mentioned working with other parties; he knows that the United States has already taken action to proscribe the IRGC. Will that finally persuade him to sanction to the IRGC?

[James Cleverly]

We already sanction the IRGC in its entirety. We will continue to work closely with our friends in the international community to prevent the point that the right hon. Gentleman raises: the exporting of attack drones and other munitions to Russia, which are then being used by Vladimir Putin’s troops to attack civilians and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. We will continue to sanction individuals, and as I say, the IRGC is already sanctioned in its entirety.

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Spellar Excerpts

Tuesday 8th November 2022 Commons Chamber

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

T4. In the last two Foreign Office questions sessions, I have raised the issue of the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Today, again, Members on both sides of the House have raised it, asking us to follow our allies in the United States and ban the IGRC. The IGRC are the protectors of the Iranian clerical fascist regime. Will the Minister go back to his Department and tell the officials to get on with banning the IRGC?

[David Rutley]

The right hon. Member raised his strong concerns about the Iranian regime’s disruptive activities in Yemen at last week’s important debate, for which I am grateful. The list of proscribed organisations is kept under constant review, but we do not routinely comment on whether an organisation is or is not under consideration for proscription.

Yemen Peace Process

Lord Spellar Excerpts

Thursday 3rd November 2022 Westminster Hall

[Mrs Flick Drummond (Meon Valley) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the peace process in Yemen.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Davies. I thank the Backbench Business Committee for granting this important and timely debate.

Just over 60 years ago, I was born in Steamer Point Hospital in Aden, and I began a long fascination with Yemen in its various guises. I was born with British citizenship as my father was serving in the British Arab army, and we left when I was three. Ever since then, I have tracked how things have changed over the years as I have written down the changing names of my country of birth. I have not been back since but I dream to, much like the right hon. Member for Walsall South (Valerie Vaz) and her brother, the former Member for Leicester East, who were also born in Yemen.

Over the last 60 years, Yemen has been divided and come back together again, and it has now become a long-forgotten war for many. Why is Yemen important to us? The UK has a historic interest in Yemen through the existence of the Aden colony from 1839 to 1967. More importantly, today we are the UN penholder. The Government must continue to play their leading role in promoting peace. I pay tribute to the UN special envoy, Hans Grundberg, and his predecessor, Martin Griffiths, for all their work.

Today I will set the scene, as I know others will want to talk about different aspects. I thought it would be good to remind people about the complexity of the war and our role. That is not to say that we should impose a western-centric, top-down structure of government for Yemen. That has been disastrous in places such as Iraq. Like other middle eastern countries, Yemen is made up of different communities, and there is currently little feeling of a whole national identity. The war is not as clear as some may wish it to be. Often, there is too much focus on Saudi Arabia and the Iranian involvement, but it is an internal civil war, not a surrogate or proxy war. Although outside countries are involved, either by backing the Houthi rebels or supporting the Yemeni Government, they do not necessarily control them politically.

Yemen has had a history of civil wars for centuries, and a continual battle along the Saudi Arabian border—a border that has cut through some of the historical Yemen. It is a country divided by tribal and religious loyalties. The Houthis are more doctrinally close to the Sunnis than the Iranian Shi’ite regime with which they are often linked by the outside world. The Houthis are also more conservative than the southern tribes in their Sunni doctrine.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

The hon. Lady seems to be implying that there are only allegations of Iranian involvement with the Houthis, whereas the Iranian regime is absolutely up to its neck in this, stimulating and providing massive amounts of material. Frankly, the Houthi attacks would not be successful without the destructive and disruptive behaviour of the Iranian regime.

[Mrs Drummond]

If the right hon. Gentlemen was listening carefully, I said that although other countries are involved, they are not politically involved. They may be supported militarily, but the Houthis are thinking for themselves rather than being dictated to by the Iranian Government. That is the point that I was trying to make.

The sectarian divide in Yemen is not clearcut, as tribal loyalties cut across religious beliefs, making it a confusing and shifting picture, particularly for those looking from the west. Unification in 1990 was to bring forward a representative Government, with elections every seven years. However, it was fragile because of the problems with power sharing that we see elsewhere, including closer to home.

The origins of the present war lie in the political and economic marginalisation of northern Yemen by the former President Saleh. Many of the 301 members of the Yemeni Parliament, who were elected under universal suffrage, felt disenfranchised and unable to effect change. That was a missed opportunity to show that democracy works, in a part of the world surrounded by authoritarian regimes.

The war is a result of decades of exclusion of different parts of the population around the country. Yemen has been run by elites who have concentrated power with their own allies and disenfranchised large parts of the population, even when elections were held. With that in mind, we need to look at how that impacts the peace process and the route to lasting peace.

On 2 April, Yemen’s warring parties began a two-month nationwide peace brokered by the UN. That was extended until October, but it has not been extended again, although the fighting has not resumed at the same intensity as before. On 7 April, President Hadi transferred his powers to a new eight-person Presidential Leadership Council, and the new President is Rashad al-Alimi, a politician with long experience and a diplomatic background.

The six-month ceasefire has been the nearest thing to a reprieve since civil war broke out eight years ago. Casualties have come down countrywide, there has been an increase in fuel deliveries, and international commercial flights to and from Sanaa have recommenced for the first time in six years. However, the latest proposal put forward by the special envoy has not been accepted by the Houthis. The proposal is wide ranging and includes the payment of civil servants’ salaries and pensions, the opening of specific roads in Taiz—the second most populous city—a commitment to release detainees urgently, and the strengthening of the de-escalation mechanism through the military co-ordination committee. The main obstacle is that the Houthis want their security forces to be included in the salary payments to civil servants, which the Government could not accept. This is really disappointing.

Taiz has been in a state of a partial siege since the beginning of the war, and life has been tough, with a war economy inflating prices and insecurity. It was not until 2021, when Hans Grundberg became the first diplomat to visit Taiz since the start of the war, that the profile of the city and its plight were raised. Improving communications with and around Taiz must be central to negotiations, and this is one of the areas where the UK Government can help by working with the special envoy to call on the Houthis to show flexibility.

The outside world must remind the Houthis that all citizens have benefitted from the peace over the past year. Any attempt to prevent oil and goods from arriving at the port of Hodeidah impacts on the already difficult humanitarian crisis. Food is becoming more expensive as it becomes even more scarce, and there is not enough equipment to keep hospitals and schools functioning. Only 48% of the aid needed through the 2022 Yemen humanitarian response plan has been funded so far. The Houthis must realise that working towards a long-term peace process will help that and is in everybody’s interest.

Politically, the Presidential Leadership Council under President al-Alimi has unified the resistance to the Houthis. The Southern Transitional Council is the most well-known group, so we should recognise the role of Mr al-Zubaidi and, just as importantly, the other members —Tareq Saleh, Abdullah al-Alimi Bawazeer, Sultan al-Arada from Marib, General al-Bahsani, Othman Majali and Abu Zara’a al-Muharrami for their contribution to leading the council. However, the situation with the PLC is delicate, and support from the international community is vital to maintain its credibility.

[John Spellar]

The hon. Lady mentioned the Southern Transitional Council. She may be about to come on to this, but what consideration should be given in the discussions to the desire for self-determination in south Yemen?

[Mrs Drummond]

I do not think it is for us to determine the future of Yemen. It is up to the people to decide what they would like to do through the negotiations, so I would not dream of putting what I think on to what they are going to decide. That is very important, as I mentioned at the beginning. We cannot apply our western-centric views to what is going on in Yemen. If the people decide that they want to divide as they used to be, that is fair enough, but I do not think we should be talking about that at the moment—

[John Spellar]

Does the hon. Lady recognise that there is considerable demand in southern Yemen for a degree of self-determination, if not independence, and that that is very much recognised by the south Yemeni diaspora here in the UK? This is not about us pressing for that as colonialists; it is very much a local demand.

[Geraint Davies (in the Chair)]

Order. When someone intervenes, the speaker needs to accept the intervention before the other person starts speaking.

Mahsa Amini

Lord Spellar Excerpts

Tuesday 11th October 2022 Commons Chamber

[Gillian Keegan]

We continue to work closely with like-minded partners to ensure that Iran and other countries are held to account, including via the Human Rights Council in Geneva and the UN General Assembly in New York. Our permanent representative in Geneva, Ambassador Simon Manley, specifically raised the death of Mahsa Amini at the 51st session of the Human Rights Council, and he called on Iran to carry out an independent transparent investigation into her death. We joined 52 other countries in a joint statement to the Human Rights Council urging restraint. Of course, we will continue to work with those partners when we see human rights abuses in other countries.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

Last month, at Foreign Office questions, I challenged the then Minister to follow our allies in the United States by proscribing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—the IRGC. In reply, I got the usual Whitehall waffle. The IRGC is crucial to the survival of Iran’s appalling clerical fascist regime. Will the latest outrages now shame the Government into proscribing the IRGC?

[Gillian Keegan]

We have been clear about our concerns about the IRGC’s continued destabilising activities throughout the region. The UK maintains a range of sanctions that work to constrain the destabilising activities of the IRGC, and the list of proscribed organisations is kept under constant review. We do not routinely comment on whether an organisation is or is not under consideration for proscription.

Jagtar Singh Johal

Lord Spellar Excerpts

Wednesday 7th September 2022 Commons Chamber

[Rehman Chishti]

On the first point about the Government’s commitment to an international rules-based system, the answer is yes, as it is for the United Kingdom Government’s commitment to open societies and human rights. I have previously given an answer on the specific point about arbitrary detention and the issue of release.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

The blunt arbitrary detention without trial of Jagtar Singh Johal would be a disgrace even if he were not being tortured and abused, especially as it seems that he is a British citizen. Will the new Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister make absolutely clear to the Indian authorities that if they think they have substantial evidence against Mr Johal, as alleged by the hon. Member for Harrow East (Bob Blackman), they should bring him to an open court straightaway for a fair trial? If, as is much more likely, they do not have such evidence, Mr Johal should be freed from prison at once, and allowed to return to his family in the United Kingdom.

[Rehman Chishti]

This case is a top priority for the United Kingdom Government, the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister, and I will ensure that everything is done to ensure that Mr Johal’s case is dealt with as quickly and swiftly as it can be.

Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Spellar Excerpts

Tuesday 6th September 2022 Commons Chamber

The Secretary of State was asked—

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

1. What steps her Department plans to take to counter Iran’s destabilising use of proxies in the middle east.

[The Minister for Asia and the Middle East (Amanda Milling)]

I am sure that the whole House will accept the apologies from the Foreign Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for South West Norfolk (Elizabeth Truss), who is otherwise engaged today.

The UK maintains a range of sanctions to constrain Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps malign activity. Maritime interdictions in January and February 2022 led to the seizure of advanced conventional weapons travelling from Iran to the Houthis in Yemen. We support the strengthening of state institutions in Iraq and Lebanon, and work to end the conflict in Yemen and Syria.

[John Spellar]

Mr Speaker, you may recall that it was against considerable Whitehall resistance—it needed pressure from this House—that we got the Government to ban Hezbollah. I hope that the Minister will be more receptive to recognising that the IRGC is at the heart of destabilising proxy wars across the middle east and further afield, and that she will show more urgency in joining our allies in the United States in proscribing the IRGC.

[Amanda Milling]

The UK maintains a range of sanctions that work to constrain the destabilising activity of the IRGC. The list of proscribed organisations is kept under constant review, but we do not routinely comment on whether an organisation is under consideration for proscription.

UK Government Recognition of Somaliland

Lord Spellar Excerpts

Tuesday 18th January 2022 Commons Chamber

[Gavin Williamson]

My hon. Friend is accurate in pinpointing the strategic importance of Somaliland. That is one of many reasons why it is so vital that not just Britain, but the United States and other NATO members lead the way in recognising Somaliland—not just because of the many brilliant things that have been done there, but because of the country’s strategic importance. The question is how we reinforce and support that Government.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

If I may pursue that point, is it not desirable for a stable state in a region that is becoming increasingly unstable to achieve that level of recognition? We talk a lot about supply chain vulnerability; this is one of the most vulnerable places we have found. Even one ship blocking the Suez canal caused ripples right the way throughout industry. We should also recognise the importance of enabling communities here and in Somaliland to move freely, have passports that are recognised, conclude international agreements, and unleash the country’s energy. Having a properly administered state in the region would enable those communities to do those things. Is it not time that we grasped the nettle and recognised Somaliland?

[Gavin Williamson]

There is a level of consensus bubbling up that is not always typical of debates in this House. It is incredibly important to demonstrate the will and feeling of the House on this important issue. The right hon. Gentleman raises an important point about supply chains. DP World already invests in the port of Berbera, and the welcome investment from British International Investment—the old Commonwealth Development Corporation—amounts to hundreds of millions of pounds. The Government recognise the importance of Somaliland, and we are willing to invest hundreds of millions of pounds there, because we realise that it opens up so much of the horn of Africa to British goods and investment. However, we still do not recognise the state of Somaliland, which is a real tragedy. It is so sad to see that so many Somalilanders have difficulty travelling to Somaliland. They cannot fly direct from the UK, but have to go via either Addis Ababa or Dubai. By taking the step of recognising Somaliland, we can make so many British citizens’ lives easier.

Russia

Lord Spellar Excerpts

Thursday 6th January 2022 Commons Chamber

[Elizabeth Truss]

I completely agree with my right hon. Friend about using all platforms available, and also about the fact that the free world needs to stand up against aggressors. The UK has played a leading role in bringing together the G7 to make a very strong statement, as well as working with our NATO allies to make clear the basis of the talks taking place next week. We are very ready and willing to use our position to make the case for severe consequences, should Russia seek to stage an incursion into Ukraine.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

The pressure on Ukraine is immediate, but it is part of a pattern of behaviour towards former Soviet satellites and Warsaw pact countries, many of which are now members of NATO or the EU—most of them are members of both. Many of these countries have post-war experience of Soviet tanks rolling in to crush protests, as we are seeing again in Kazakhstan. It is slightly concerning that, although the shadow Defence Secretary was here for this statement, I cannot see anyone from the Ministry of Defence, unless I am wrong. Will the UK not only argue for tough talk in next week’s discussions, but be prepared to provide material support to Ukraine in order to prevent an invasion or subversion?

[Elizabeth Truss]

We are working very closely with the Ministry of Defence. In fact, the Defence Secretary recently visited Ukraine. We have been providing support, including training troops, providing intelligence and security assistance, and helping Ukraine to build its naval capability.

Motor Vehicles (Compulsory Insurance) Bill

Lord Spellar Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 5th January 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Bone]

My right hon. Friend draws attention to something that I will refer to later in my speech. When she hears what I have to say, she will see why in the end that will not be the case.

The significance of this measure is seen in the Government Actuary’s estimate that the increase in premiums to extend coverage following the Vnuk judgment would be about £50 for the average motor car policyholder. The Bill will therefore save the average policyholder unnecessarily increased insurance premiums in already difficult economic times. The cost of living is rising and the Bill is an opportunity to keep pounds in people’s pockets.

You have kindly agreed that clauses 1 and 2 may be debated together, Ms Ali. Clause 1 would insert into the Road Traffic Act 1988 new section 156A, “Retained EU law relating to compulsory insurance”. Subsection (1) limits the insurance obligation under article 3 of the 2009 motor insurance directive to vehicles used on roads and other public places, and to a motor vehicle defined as a mechanically propelled vehicle intended, or adapted, for use on the roads. In effect, it removes the Vnuk interpretation as it applies to the use of vehicles in Great Britain.

Subsection (2) clarifies that the Bill does not affect the provisions requiring insurance policies to include the cover required by the law applicable in the territory where the vehicle is used, or the law applicable where it is normally based when that cover is higher. That means that the liability imposed by the Vnuk interpretation will remain in place for insurance policies covering vehicles in use in EU member states and Northern Ireland.

Subsection (3) concerns the removal of section 4 rights created in the 2008 Lewis v. Tindale case, which found that the interpretation of the 2009 directive in the Vnuk judgment could be enforced directly against the Motor Insurers’ Bureau. The Lewis decision means that the Motor Insurers’ Bureau’s liability for an insurance claim extends beyond the scope of the obligations of the Road Traffic Act and applies to accidents on private land and to vehicles not constructed for road use. Subsection (3) brings an end to the relevant section 4 right to compensation from the Motor Insurers’ Bureau except in the case of motor vehicles on roads or other public places, as defined by the Road Traffic Act.

[John Spellar (Warley) (Lab)]

What the hon. Gentleman is describing is interesting. Given, presumably, the obligation arises from an accident and therefore an injury, who becomes responsible for the injury?

[Mr Bone]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for a really important question. It is one of the issues discussed when drawing up the Bill. In many cases, such as a public event on private land, there would be insurance cover. It is not currently the case that if someone illegally rides a vehicle on private land, has an accident and causes damage, there is a requirement to be insured for that. The landowner would be liable for the damage, but they do not have to be insured for it. Extending insurance to ride-on lawnmowers or other machines on private land has also been caught by Vnuk.

[John Spellar]

I accept that there is a fundamental problem with how liability insurance works: rather than dealing with often catastrophic injuries through the health service or national insurance, they are dealt with on an insurance basis. Local councils are impacted by that and it stops a lot of activities, because insurance companies prevent them. I accept there is a deeper underlying problem, but ultimately, if there has been an injury and there is some degree of fault, who is liable for the compensation? Is it the landowner? Is it the driver of the vehicle? How can that be resolved?

[Mr Bone]

This is a really important argument. There is a liability, and in each event that will depend on who causes the injury or damage. That person will be liable for the damages. The Bill deals with a slightly different situation where we are not extending compulsory insurance to cover those events. If we did, it would increase premiums by £50 per motorist. I stressed earlier that there is nothing to stop Parliament bringing in compulsory insurance on that basis, but it would have to be done through an Act of this sovereign Parliament that wanted to make that change. The Bill brings things back to where we thought we were, but it does not stop that debate and people can still make that argument. However, it is not really relevant to the Bill, because Parliament never thought that the Road Traffic Act and compulsory third-party insurance applied in the circumstances just described.

Proposed new section 156A(4) similarly provides for the removal of all further case law retained under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 that could undermine the positions set out in subsections (1) and (3). Any other EU law that we do not know about would not apply if the Bill is passed. Subsection (5) defines the terms used in clause 1, including the 2009 motor insurance directive, relevant section 4 rights, retained case law, and section 4 rights.

--- Later in debate ---

[Theresa Villiers]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Ali. I support this Bill and I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough on getting it this far. The prospects for a presentation Bill making progress are normally minimal, so it has taken real determination on his part to get it this far. I very much hope we will see it on the statute book before too long.

As we have heard, it is clear that the Vnuk judgment in the ECJ has led to a big extension in the type of claim that can be made against the Motor Insurers’ Bureau fund for uninsured road traffic accidents. That extension is manifestly different from the scope and purpose of the scheme in operation under the Road Traffic Act 1988, which focuses on vehicles that are permitted to be used on roads.

In my view, the UK scheme for compensation in relation to collisions caused by uninsured drivers has worked well for decades. I understand that it has been there in one form or another since the 1930s, the earliest point of the extension of private ownership of the car. The combined effect of Vnuk and the later case of Lewis v. Tindle, which concluded that Vnuk had direct effect, and the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, means that potentially significant costs are being loaded on to the UK scheme—costs for a scheme that was never designed for them and to which this Parliament did not consent. As we have heard, motorists will be asked to fund this via their insurance premiums unless this Bill reaches the statute book.

I agree with previous comments that we can have a legitimate debate about the potential extension of compulsory insurance and compensation schemes to new scenarios, but I feel quite strongly that we cannot justify leaving drivers to shoulder the whole cost of this potentially big bill by artificially forcing these new liabilities into our long-standing motor insurance scheme. That is a separate decision that should be taken separately by this Parliament.

As we all know, we face significant pressure on the cost of living at the moment, largely as a result of the global increase in gas prices. In Parliament, we should all strive to do what we can to relieve pressure on household bills, which is another reason to back the clauses in this Bill.

I note the analysis of the costs, which was produced by the Government Actuary’s Department. It is always hard to quantify these things, although the £50 claim is certainly credible. It is particularly worrying that this new liability for the MIB fund is potentially open to significant amounts of fraud. Therefore, the actual impact of Vnuk, if left on the statute book, could be very great. It is hard to quantify in advance. Another reason for my support for the Bill is the potential abuse of the fund we could see if the Bill does not get on to the statue book. In a column in The Telegraph in 2017, the Prime Minister described Vnuk as a

“pointless and expensive burden on millions of people.”

The Bill provides us with an important opportunity to remove that burden and prevent this addition to household bills.

[John Spellar]

Was that article in The Telegraph before or after the one in which the Prime Minister said that Brexit would enable us to do away with VAT on fuel bills?

[Theresa Villiers]

I am not going to comment on the question of VAT on fuel bills, since that is not the subject of today’s debate. I believe the debates on VAT on fuel bills date back some years, probably before that article.

It is disappointing that the Bill does not cover Northern Ireland, but I hope that it would adopt similar legislation, as my hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough has suggested that it might. It is good to hear that there is nothing in the protocol that prevents it from doing so. It seems clear that this is not a single market-type rule, which would be covered by the protocol. There should be no constitutional or legal barrier to the Assembly passing a similar piece of legislation, and I certainly hope that it will choose to do so.

The Bill is the first piece of primary legislation to repeal retained EU law. I am certainly not aware of any other piece of primary legislation that does that. There are aspects of EU rules and programmes that have already been dismantled. Most notably, many of the fundamentals of the common agricultural policy have already gone, thankfully. However, it may well be the case that that was achieved without primary legislation. It is very clear that this will be the first time we have used primary legislation to disapply a judgment in the European Court of Justice. It could undoubtedly be described as a historic moment. The controversy around Vnuk shows that we need a faster way to remove or update EU laws that no longer work for us, most of which arrived on the statute book via secondary legislation in the first place. To have to deal with all of those modernisations, updates and amendments via primary legislation is a significant flaw in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 that needs to be looked at again.

I very much support the Bill. I hope it is the first of a long series of repeals and reforms that will take place as we use our Brexit freedoms to create better regulation that is more targeted to our domestic circumstances and that enables us to compete in the big high-tech growth sectors of the future. Only when we have done that and seized the opportunity provided by Brexit will we truly be able to say that we have got Brexit done.