Public Office (Accountability) Bill (Carry-over)

Jess Brown-Fuller Excerpts

Carry-over motion
Monday 27th April 2026 Commons Chamber

[Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)]

First, I want to set out that the Liberal Democrats are supportive of the Hillsborough law. We have only ever sought to strengthen the legislation, not to undermine it, and we will be supporting the carry-over motion this evening. But it is frustrating for everyone involved that we have reached this stage of having to carry over the Bill, because this is landmark legislation that will transform the relationship between public bodies and the victims of horrendous tragedies, and, as the Minister said, we hope it will restore some of trust in the state among people across the UK that they will not be the victims of cover-ups after tragedies.

A duty of candour provides a basic but essential level of transparency and fairness, and a duty for public officials to act with openness when dealing with public investigations—vital steps that are supported by the Liberal Democrats and Members from across the House. I commend in particular the hon. Member for Liverpool West Derby (Ian Byrne), who has been campaigning for years, as well as other hon. Members in the Chamber this evening. This Government and this Prime Minister rightly committed to the full implementation of the legislation in the Labour manifesto, yet we find ourselves here today because broken promises, quiet media briefings and a lack of transparency have totally mired the process and the progress of the Bill.

Report and Third Reading were scheduled for 19 January, but the unacceptable carve-out for the security services brought that process to a halt. It is essential that the legislation includes clear, binding provisions to ensure that the security services are subject to the duty of candour. That is what the campaigners from Hillsborough Law Now expect, it is what the families of the many victims whose lives have been upended by tragedies and scandals expect, and it is what the Government promised.

The campaigners and Liberal Democrat Members will not tolerate or accept backsliding, but we are still in the dark. Yes, there have been media reports of a compromise with the security services, but we are yet to see either those amendments on the amendment paper or whether they are acceptable to the campaigners who have fought so tirelessly for the legislation. The reports also contained details of additional inclusions within the scope of the Bill, including counter-terrorism police, the National Crime Agency and national intelligence. Again, this House has yet to debate the merits of those proposed inclusions, and has only heard about them in the media.

Any outcome must be acceptable to the families. They have worked tirelessly, for too long, to see a half measure come to fruition. It is clear that the Government will not proceed without them onside anyway, so I encourage the Government, who I know are as keen to get this over the line as any of us, to come to a swift resolution. As the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Bromborough (Justin Madders) said, I hope that the legislation returns to the House shortly after the King’s Speech, because we will be in the summer recess before we know it, then it will be the conference recess. The families have waited far too long for the legislation. They cannot afford to be approaching another Christmas without seeing the Bill finally enacted. We all owe it to all the countless victims of Hillsborough, the Post Office scandal, infected blood, Grenfell, nuclear weapons testing, pelvic mesh, LGBT veterans and the many other scandals to finally get this done.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Ninth sitting)

Jess Brown-Fuller Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 23rd April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South and Walkden) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Huq. I will speak to amendments 64 to 66, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central.

We have had a discussion about this provision. The amendments seek to give a right to renew an application for permission to appeal orally, and to allow grounds for appeal to raise issues of procedure and fact arising in the trial, as well as issues of law. Clause 7 currently suggests that a person can only appeal in writing on matters of law, which means that a person is going to have to construct a proper legal argument. The problem with that is that the majority of people in the magistrates court are unrepresented.

It is wrong to say that this is comparable with Crown court cases going to the Court of Appeal, or the higher courts having to deal with the issue of leave to appeal—for example, as in judicial review. Magistrates courts tend to have some very “minor” offences leading to some quite serious repercussions. When I say “minor”, I am talking only in terms of sentencing, because we must remember that offences that we call minor can have a significant impact on a defendant’s life—for example, even drink driving, which does normally not carry a custodial sentence, certainly carries a disqualification.

That is also often a mandatory disqualification so that no discretion is given to the magistrates as to whether they should disqualify somebody. If someone is the sole breadwinner, or has care of a disabled person, and they feel that this conviction was wrong, they will not have the right to appeal—because very rarely will somebody charged with those matters will be getting legal aid.

However, in the Crown court, most people will have legal aid or be using legal advice at some point, because the trial will normally be conducted by solicitors or lawyers. Therefore, they are already being paid and if there is an appeal against either conviction or sentence, they already know what they are talking about and what they need to quote—the legal jurisprudence that they need to refer to, to prove their case—along with the issues with examining the witnesses or the evidence that has been given. They are then able to say, for example, that a particular witnesses’ evidence was not credible or that a witness said contradictory things or different things in their statement to the police compared with during the trial. They can do that because they have conducted the trial and they can forensically examine what happened—not only what legal direction the judge gave, but the factual evidence that came out during the trial. In the magistrates court, most people are not represented, so they cannot argue all those things.

To take away the automatic right to appeal is, therefore, a change to the fundamental basic rights of an individual. Let us remember that the state has all the might and all the resources, and that professionals will be prosecuting—whether they are lay prosecutors, Crown prosecutors or independent lawyers. On the one side, there will be the state represented by legal professionals; on the other, there will be the lone individual coming up by themselves to be subject to trial. If they are then not satisfied with the conviction or the sentence, they must then think how to legally write an appeal. That is putting a lot of pressure on them.

As Members of Parliament, many of us will have met many constituents who are quite reluctant to even write to us. I often say to constituents, “Please can you drop us an email?” and they say, “Well, I don’t know how to use a computer, and I don’t have the internet at home.” We then make a face-to-face appointment so that they can explain themselves. That is not unusual because a lot of people are not able to write very well and would not be in a position to construct a coherent legal argument as to why they should have their appeal in the Crown court.

Sometimes, when we are talking about possible efficiencies and saving money, we forget about individuals. People who come before the criminal justice system tend to be from poorer backgrounds and are often less well educated. Some of them may well be unemployed. A lot of them have other issues going on in their lives. Therefore, the fact that they can appeal to the Crown court automatically in the current system is an immense safeguard for them.

[Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)]

The hon. Member is making an important point that we have not really discussed on the Committee. It is estimated that half the prison population have a reading age of less than 11; that is to say, they are counted as functionally illiterate. We have seen a decline in prison education. How does she expect all these prison inmates to be able to negotiate or navigate an appeals process?

[Yasmin Qureshi]

That is exactly the point I am trying to make. I think we sometimes forget, sitting in our rarefied environment, that a lot of the people out there—our citizens—are not well educated or able to write a proper paragraph or construct an argument. Sometimes they can just about get two or three simple sentences together. As they often do not have legal representation, allowing them to automatically appeal against a sentence or conviction is a really important safeguard for them. The Crown court and Court of Appeal criminal division is not the right comparison, because in most Crown court cases people have full legal representation who will be able to advise on this.

The other thing we found is that apparently 40% of appeals are successful. Think about that: four out of 10 appeals are successful. If people do not have a right to appeal, they have to find a way to make a legal argument on matters of law, which they know very little about. Asking them to do that is basically letting four out of 10 people be convicted or receive a sentence that could have an impact on their lives.

On sentences, when a conviction happens, even if it is in the magistrates court, it fundamentally affects people’s lives. It could mean that they are not able to get a job again or are dismissed from the job they have. If someone’s job involves driving and they are disqualified because of drink driving, that will be an extra burden on them, but it is not just that. Even if someone gets a suspended sentence or community service order for what we call smaller offences, a lot of people are not able to do that. Taking away their right to appeal is, with respect, very harsh.

Legal aid has already been reduced considerably over the years. I have to put the blame for that on the Conservatives, because they massively cut legal aid while in government. They also massively restricted the rights of judicial review. In that respect, I have to hold the Conservatives a bit responsible for what they did in 14 years in power. I am very grateful that the Labour Government have put money into legal aid—that is great—but I ask them to please give that to the magistrates court as well.

I have travelled in different parts of the world where the justice system is perhaps a bit haphazard or where there is not much trust in the state’s justice system, for whatever reason. It does not necessarily have to do with the wealth of a country; there are very wealthy countries where the state is much more authoritarian and the institutions are almost stacked against the individual. The one thing that people really love about the UK, apart from our beautiful country and everything else, is our judicial system. I am not just saying that; it is the most respected system in the world, especially our criminal justice system, because people feel that they have protection at the point that their liberties are being taken away.

Think about a conviction for shoplifting: people say, “Oh, shoplifting,” but even if someone takes a bottle of milk out of a shop, they may get a conviction and there will be hundreds of jobs that they can never apply for. For a lot of people who rely on shop work or other manual jobs where they may come across money, it means that they are never going to get a job. If they get a conviction in the magistrates court for theft, that is devastating for them. The Theft Act refers to the “intention of permanently depriving”. That is quite important, because people make mistakes, but intention has to be proved, because the Theft Act requires it. It is not just taking the thing; it is the intention to permanently deprive. How do we define “permanently deprive”? A layperson would not know how to construct that argument, but a lawyer would.

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I will not press the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central. However, it is important to bring to the Government’s attention the real-life situation of ordinary, working people—our constituents, who we see on a daily basis. We all know how they are. Most of them are quite nervous; a lot are quite scared. Sometimes they are even frightened and nervous about meeting their Member of Parliament. Those vulnerable people are the ones most likely to end up in the criminal justice system. Let us look after our vulnerable people and reconsider this provision.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Dr Huq.

Clause 7 and schedule 2 will restrict the right to appeal the decision of a magistrates court to the Crown court, and will change the process that those appeals go through. Currently, a defendant has an automatic right of appeal from the magistrates court to the Crown court against either conviction or sentence; in either case, the appeal is a hearing before a judge and two magistrates. The Bill will instead introduce a requirement for an application for permission to appeal based on written grounds. A Crown court judge will decide whether to grant permission, and the appeal hearing would be heard by a single judge. Instead of a rehearing, the appeal would be only on the issues on which permission is granted. If the appeal is against conviction, the judge must allow the appeal if the conviction is unsafe. If so, the judge may order a retrial in the magistrates court.

It is not unreasonable to have a conversation about the appeals process, especially as there is a small amount of evidence of the system being abused by a very small minority of defendants who believe that the appeal will be successful on the grounds that the victim or witnesses will refuse to go through the experience again. I absolutely recognise that, and we need to put essential safeguards into the criminal justice system to provide greater protection for those victims. We will be getting to the crux of that issue over the next days in Committee.

However, clause 7 and schedule 2 are blunt instruments that will harm access to justice. We cannot ignore the fact that although a very small number of cases from the magistrates—less than 1%—go to appeal, more than 40% of those are successful at appeal. Given that the magistrates court will be hearing more complex cases that carry higher sentences, the measures will increase the risk of miscarriages of justice. Touching the appeals process at this point is unnecessary when it is currently sparingly used. The Criminal Bar Association has argued:

“Access to justice will be harmed. Who is going to find the lawyers who have time to review transcripts of evidence and prepare grounds of appeal? Who is going to pay them for that work? What about the defendants who were ineligible for Legal Aid, because of the lower cut off for eligibility?”

We discussed the eligibility cut-off in the previous clause.

JUSTICE has raised similar concerns, stating that replacing the automatic right of appeal with a multi-stage permission system

“is complicated and highly likely to be inefficient”,

and will fail defendants who cannot navigate these processes, as laid out articulately and clearly by the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden.

The current process means that appeals are heard by a judge and two magistrates. The opportunity for magistrates to sit with a Crown court judge to hear appeals is an important one, as it helps with the training of magistrates and drives up standards. Under the Bill, there are no circumstances in which lay justices would sit with professional judges. We are debating a number of amendments, some of which seek to restore the conditions we have right now—retaining the automatic right to appeal—and some that go further, although I think the shadow Minister suggested that he would not press them all to a vote.

I would appreciate the Minister’s explaining whether she thinks the processes being put in place by clause 7 and schedule 2 are compatible with the principles of access to justice that she has laid out previously in Committee. I remain gravely concerned that the measures will have a huge impact on the most vulnerable in society.

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

I am happy to have you back in the Chair today, Dr Huq. I wish to oppose the clause and the schedule. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden for pointing out so clearly that the restrictions on appeals will push down hardest on the least advantaged people and will compound injustices in wider society, as well as the injustices put in place by other clauses.

I will not reiterate in detail the evidence we heard, or the speeches I made previously, about the risks of more errors due to the speedier but rougher and readier justice of the magistrates courts being applied to more cases, or the risks arising from higher sentences. However, clause 7 adds yet more risk to the potential harm from reducing the right to select a jury trial in clause 1 and the restrictions put in place by other clauses. This is counterproductive for the overall courts workload, too.

As others have pointed out, the clause will introduce a multi-step process. We heard in oral evidence from Emma Torr of Appeal that the

“multi-step process…will only increase the workload of both the magistrates and Crown courts. To give a very brief outline of how it works at the moment, the defendant or the solicitor can fill out a very simple form, which results in a quick rehearing at the Crown court. It takes a couple of hours at most and even less for sentence appeals.”

She also pointed out that the Law Commission had carefully considered the matter last year in a consultation paper that ran to 700 pages. She said:

“Its independent analysis was that the removal of the automatic right to appeal will increase the workload of the magistrates court and the Crown court.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 83, Q174.]

In our oral evidence sessions, we heard clear views about the lack of legal aid in magistrates courts for people without representation to meet fairly the test set for appeals. Fiona Rutherford of JUSTICE told us:

“Without a lawyer being present, and of course without there even being the right to appeal directly, you are leaving a whole load of defendants, who may well be wrongly convicted or may get the wrong sentence for the crime they have committed, floundering…I simply don’t know who will inform these people about how they will put grounds of appeal together, what grounds of appeal even are, how you formulate those, what key points you need to make in them to persuade a Crown court judge sitting alone in a room with just some evidence papers and how to put your best case forward.” ––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 86, Q184.]

These are serious matters of injustice. I do not know how the least advantaged defendants will be able to do anything to use the application to the High Court for judicial review, which seems to be the only remedy that the Minister has put forward to us today. I do not know how many miscarriages of justice are acceptable to the Minister, but I believe that these measures must not form part of the Bill, because of the impact that they will have on the right to justice for too many people.

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[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I beg to move amendment 17, in schedule 2, page 52, line 5, leave out “on payment of a fee” and insert—

“to victims of criminal offence without a fee within 14 days of a request”.

This amendment would make magistrates’ court transcripts free for victims and requires that such transcripts are provided within 14 days of a request.

I first acknowledge that the Government have made steps to improve access to court transcripts after robust negotiations in both Houses and on various Bills, most recently the Sentencing Act 2026, the Victims and Court Bill and now this Bill.

I also put on record the exemplary effort made by my hon. Friend the Member for Richmond Park (Sarah Olney), who has been campaigning to ensure that court transcripts are made available for free for victims of crime, after her constituent was quoted thousands of pounds to access the transcript of her own court case. Nobody should be priced out of seeing their own story.

Why are transcripts important? For many victims, they choose not to attend the entirety of a hearing or trial. Even if they do, there is so much to take in. Being able to process the events of the court case provides a valuable opportunity to better understand why decisions were made and hopefully enables them to move on with their lives.

The Committee had the privilege of listening to the testimony of Charlotte Meijer, alongside other victims, Jade Blue McCrossen-Nethercott and Morwenna Loughman. I would like to remind Members of a few of the things that Charlotte said. She said:

“For me, having transparency really changes things. We talk about justice and the system being closed, so if we have more recording and transcripts, it will really help people. There is something that is not in the Bill that I would love to see; I have fought for the last three years for sentencing remarks to be made free, which we did earlier this year, but I believe that is not going to extend to magistrates courts. If they are now being recorded, my belief is that they should also be free in that way.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 25, Q49.]

Charlotte spoke about her experience. She did not feel that she could listen to the trial after she had given her evidence, because it was a very small bench and the defendant’s family and friends were sat there. She did not feel like she could go and sit and listen, so she left, but she had indicated that she would like to be there for the sentencing or the hearing. However, she just got a call from her independent sexual violence adviser telling her that he had been found not guilty. She was not given the opportunity to hear that. Charlotte continued:

“For my healing, and for me to be able to move on, I just needed to understand what was said in court, so I went to ask for the transcripts, of which of course in the magistrates courts there are none.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 26, Q51.]

It is important for victims of crime and victims who see their perpetrators found not guilty to have the opportunity to process that by seeing what happened, whether they were in the room or outside it. The transcript can also be a tool for those who choose to apply to the unduly lenient sentences scheme, which I am pleased that the Government have agreed to improve significantly, after working alongside Baroness Brinton in the other place.

I recognise the concerns raised by the Government, particularly about the cost of producing transcripts and the processing time for redaction, which is all currently contracted out. I am pleased that they have agreed to a proactive trial of AI in courtrooms to improve transcripts, and to a move to record all magistrate hearings. I know that that approach has cross-party support; I have been in the Chamber with many Labour MPs and MPs of other parties who have made exactly the same arguments that I am making now, that providing free court transcripts is a key step towards transparency.

The Minister knows that we have worked collaboratively on reducing the scope in other Bills and have called on the Government to provide judicial summings-up and the route to verdict, including for those whose defendants are acquitted, because there is still a process that they need to go through. I am keen to work with the Government on this. I hope that as the Bill progresses through the House, we can continue the good work that has started on court transcripts.

[Dr Mullan]

I rise to speak in support of amendment 17, which stands in the name of the hon. Member for Chichester. I acknowledge the progress that we have made on the issue; it has not been as fast or as good as personally I would like, but it has absolutely been progress. The hon. Member has laid out some of the important points.

The idea that we will record these proceedings and that the transcripts will exist, but that the victim cannot have them, is obviously not sustainable. If they do not exist at all and nobody has them, that is one thing, but when they are available and some people might be accessing them—defendants, for example—it is really not reasonable that victims cannot, for all the reasons that we have discussed in relation to the Crown court. The existence of recordings will make that less of an excuse. Again, the interaction of different elements of the Bill, with longer sentences, restricted appeals and more serious cases being heard, builds an even stronger case for victims to have access to the transcripts.

The hon. Member for Chichester mentioned the unduly lenient sentence scheme. As we talked about in the context of Crown court appeals and the current use of the scheme, it is pretty hard to appeal an unduly lenient sentence if we do not even have access to the route to sentencing that the judge laid out to explain why they gave the sentence that they did. In my understanding, we have a later amendment that asks for an expansion in the use of the scheme in order for it to be meaningful. We talk about the unduly lenient sentence scheme, but people cannot access it in the magistrates court, even though we are about to put more serious cases into that court. At the minute, people are able to access the scheme when a case is heard in the Crown court. For those reasons, we enthusiastically support the hon. Member’s amendment.

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[Sarah Sackman]

It is context specific, which is exactly why we have a study: to test the level of accuracy. Accuracy is really important; we do not want a lot of judicial time to be taken up reviewing the accuracy of transcripts before they can be put out. That would not be a good use of judge time, which should be spent running trials and getting them concluded. In some contexts, most obviously in family law, redaction is really important.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

On the shadow Minister’s point, does the Minister agree that, especially for victims of serious crime, there can often be things in court transcripts that might, without giving addresses, clearly describe the location where something happened? Although the shadow Minister is right to say that anybody can attend a trial, that could be used subsequently to retraumatise somebody, because they would be aware of exactly where something happened. It could also identify someone’s address, for example if it refers to the corner shop at the end of their road: even if the address may be redacted, the detail is not always. Does the Minister agree that redaction plays a really important part in protecting vulnerable witnesses and victims?

[Sarah Sackman]

Yes, I do. This is why we have to get this right. As I say, we are firmly committed to improving transparency across the system and making a success of it, but those changes have to be balanced against the operational realities and the financial realities in which our court system operates.

Proposed new section 108S of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, to be inserted by schedule 2 to the Bill, will already provide the power for the rules of court to provide free transcripts to any person the Secretary of State directs. The amendment is therefore not required, as the intended effect will already be achieved under the current drafting.

We have taken significant steps to strengthen transparency, including expanding transcript provision, so that all victims who want them will be able to request free transcripts of Crown court sentencing remarks directly relevant to their case from as early as spring 2027. That is a meaningful step forward for victims. In cases of public interest, Crown court sentencing remarks are already published online, and broadcasters are able to film sentencing remarks in the Crown court with the agreement of the judge.

We are focused on driving improvement for the longer term, exploring how technology, including AI, can reduce the cost of transcript production in future and make it more widely available. That is why we are undertaking a study into the use of AI transcription in court hearings. All this work will provide this Parliament and future Parliaments with an evidence base for future decisions about how transcript provision could be expanded in a way that is operationally sustainable and delivers real-world benefits for victims, including in the magistrates court, over time, as recording capability expands.

[Sarah Sackman]

The hon. Lady raises a valid point. All sorts of work needs to be undertaken about the use of social media in courtrooms, whether by juries or other participants, and where that is and is not appropriate, particularly in the context of reporting restrictions that are put in place for a good reason. But on this point, we think that the amendment is not needed. We can continue to make progress informed by an evidence base. For those reasons, although we are in real consensus on the principle of this, I urge the hon. Member for Chichester to withdraw her amendment.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I appreciate the Minister’s constructive collaboration on this issue, but as it is my job to hold the Government’s feet to the fire, I will press amendment 17 to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting)

Jess Brown-Fuller Excerpts

Thursday 23rd April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)]

Rape Crisis has pointed out that current practice ignores the fact that women are often subjected to multiple instances of sexual violence in their lives. Survivors have told Rape Crisis that they feel disbelieved, blamed and retraumatised when they simply try to seek justice. SafeLives and End Violence Against Women are both in favour of the reforms in clause 10. It is worth pointing out that black and minoritised women are disproportionately harmed in the criminal justice system by misuse of bad character evidence.

Office for National Statistics data shows that one in two adult survivors of rape have been raped more than once. The National Police Chiefs’ Council strategic risk assessment 2023 identified that 25% of victim survivors were repeat victims of violence against women and girls. The drafting of clause 10 reflects calls from a coalition of women’s rights groups for section 100 to be amended in this way. It was drafted and supported by the Centre for Women’s Justice, and the Liberal Democrats are pleased to support it.

[Sarah Sackman]

I welcome the support from Members across the Committee for clause 10. A proper evidential basis is defined in the Bill as ensuring that there is material before the court that shows both that the complainant made the previous allegation and that the previous allegation was false. I do not want to elaborate on the test, and thereby in any way tie the hands of the judge hearing the evidence in the case. The tests and the clear structure set out in the Bill will enable and empower the judge to test whether there is an evidential basis for the claim and whether it has probative value and relevance to the issues at hand. The judge will then be able to take a view on whether it can be included and put to a witness.

There will always be cases where the evidence is relevant to the proceedings, both for the prosecution and for the defence. There is certainly no hard rule excluding it altogether.

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[Dr Mullan]

Clause 12 addresses an important aspect of protection: the use of screens in the courtroom. We must start from the position that special measures are not a luxury or optional administrative add-on; they are often essential to ensuring that the justice system remains capable of hearing evidence properly. We want to enable people to give evidence in the proper way, and victims and vulnerable witnesses must be able to give their best evidence—we always want people to be able to give their best evidence in court—without avoidable distress, intimidation or re-traumatisation.

For many, the prospect of being in the same physical space as the person who harmed them is a primary barrier to their participating in the justice system at all. Clause 12 will strengthen and clarify current provisions by creating a clearer statutory footing for the use of screens. Specifically, when a witness is providing testimony via live link or through a pre-recorded cross-examination, the clause will require the court to consider whether a screen should be provided. Crucially, the clause clarifies that that protection should operate in both directions: not just preventing the witness from seeing the accused, but shielding the witness from the accused’s gaze as well. That increased clarity is intended to support consistency in practice across the country.

For many victims, particularly those of sexual violence or domestic abuse, the physical presence of the accused is a source of profound distress that can affect their memory and the clarity of their evidence. The current application of these measures can be inconsistent, leading to what practitioners describe as a postcode lottery. By establishing a presumption in favour of screens unless it would be contrary to the interests of justice, the law recognises the practical reality. However, we must ensure that that presumption is not merely a tick-box exercise, but achieved effectively through things such as either-way screens.

We must recognise, as we have at several points in Committee, the challenge presented by the fabric of some of our courtroom buildings and their facilities. Evidence provided to the Committee—this is also highlighted by Sir Brian Leveson—suggests that malfunctioning equipment and poor infrastructure continue to create problems, specifically in relation to using special measures. A stronger use of screens can be mandated but, if the physical layout of the court and its facilities are insufficient, that will hamper the clause’s benefit.

What survey or review have the Government undertaken, or do they plan to undertake, to ensure that there are no physical barriers to the use of screens in this way? I suspect that, on a physical basis, it is easier to have screens just in one direction rather than two, and it probably involves different equipment and facilities. It would be good to get the Minister’s view on any barriers that might practically limit the intention of this measure.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

Clause 12 stipulates that when a direction allows evidence by live link or pre-recorded cross examination, screens must also be provided unless that would be contrary to the interests of justice, such as due to preventing the adequate testing of evidence. It also clarifies under a special measure direction that a screen may be used to prevent either the witness from seeing the accused or the accused from seeing the witness. The Liberal Democrats welcome the clause.

Vulnerable and intimidated witnesses are entitled to a number of additional measures to protect them from defendants. When the Law Commission conducted a review of these measures in relation to sexual offences cases, it came up with a number of recommendations, although the Government have chosen not to take forward some of them, such as introducing automatic entitlement for sexual offence complainants or providing complainants with independent legal advice on their entitlement to special measures.

It would be helpful to understand from the Minister why the Government chose not to introduce those recommendations, which would have turned special measures into almost standard measures. The blanket introduction of these measures would save administrative time and cost. I recognise that this is anecdotal, but the judges I have spoken to have said that if they get a request for special measures, they never refuse it.

Surely by reversing the onus and introducing the special measures as standard, we would still provide an opportunity for victims to opt out of those measures if they have a particular desire to see, or to look into the eyes of, their defendant, but if they did not wish to do so, they would be, at the very minimum, provided with protections. If this was the standard approach, it would also give more women—this affects mostly women—the confidence to come forward knowing that their court experience is going to protect them.

On a recent visit to Chichester Crown court—I thank the Minister for committing to reopening that court fully—His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service talked about creating videos for those who are coming to give evidence, with the opportunity to have a virtual walk-through of the court. If vulnerable witnesses and victims were able to watch a walk-through to see exactly what measures could be put in place as standard to protect them, I imagine that would provide much more reassurance than saying, “This is what you are seeing, but there are also additional special measures that you can apply for.”

Introducing these measures as standard would also take away the stigma of being associated as a vulnerable witness. We talk a lot about victims. Some victims do not want to be described as victims; they want to be described as survivors. We talk about vulnerability. If we had these measures as standard, we would be acknowledging that vulnerability is expected, but that there is no stigma around it and that the courts have mitigated it, without being asked to do so.

The measures are backed by various victims groups, such as Women Against Rape, and by the Victims’ Commissioner. It would be helpful if the Minister could highlight whether the Government plan to go further and make these special measures standard.

[Sarah Sackman]

I thank the hon. Member for Chichester for the points she raised. In many respects, they are well made, and they consider people’s choice architecture—for want of a better phrase—their understanding of what they might be entitled to request, and whether we should default to providing all the special measures or maintaining, as we say we should, a tailored case-by-case assessment of the needs of the witness or the complainant. It is a tricky one.

We want to make sure that, where there is a proper basis for it, special measures can be provided to those who need them and where the judge agrees that they are needed. The hon. Member is right that in the vast majority of cases, the request for special measures or to give evidence by video link is approved— it is almost always approved—but there might be cases when, for reasons of trial fairness, that is not the case. The tailored approach is one that we regard as proportionate.

This also relates to the points made by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle about court layout and some of the physical constraints that exist within some of our Crown courts. We do not want a postcode lottery. We want consistency, which is what so much of the Bill is designed to achieve. However, we also have to acknowledge that in some of our Crown court centres, the physical constraints are real. That does not necessarily relate to screens, but it might relate to the entrance and exit. For example, there are limitations on the ideal situation of a complainant being able to avoid having to pass a defendant, which might be undesirable for all sorts of reasons. There are some courtrooms in which that simply is not possible without huge capital investment to change the physical structure.

Hon. Members have raised legitimate points and I understand the thinking behind them. We think that in the circumstances, and given that victims have a wide range of needs, a tailored approach, based on a detailed needs assessment, is the most effective approach, but we will continue to consider the situation.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 12 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 13

Witness to be accompanied while giving evidence

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Sackman]

I understand the point. In the circumstances, I would prefer to take officials’ advice and check that the legislation is doing what it intends to—providing a consistent practice of professional witness support, while maintaining trial fairness. I do not want to misdirect myself or the Committee.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

My understanding of the legislation is that an independent supporter would be a recognised professional, but that does not exclude someone who may have a relationship outside their recognised profession with the person they are independently supporting. I wonder if clarification could be introduced—similar to what I think amendment 70 tried to achieve—to ensure that any relationship outside the professional role would have to be declared in front of the court. That would make it clear that, ideally, the only relationship between a witness and the independent supporter should be a professional one, and that any other one would have to be declared.

[Sarah Sackman]

I think all of that is right, but I would prefer to take the matter back to the Department and check that we have a common understanding. I do not want to do this on the hoof if I do not have the full information before me. I think that is the intention—the presumption is that it applies only to professional supporters. I suppose it is ultimately up to the court if a family member sits with the person, if that is deemed necessary in the interests of justice.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Mullan]

As the Minister points out, this clause interacts with the issue of transparency in the justice system. I recognise that the Minister thinks it attempts to strike a balance by clarifying the categories of people who may not be excluded, such as representatives of news organisations, witness supporters and approved researchers. The aim is to ensure that, while a witness may be shielded, the trial remains professional and legitimate.

However, we do not want the measure to have the unintended effect of narrowing public scrutiny, including by ordinary members of the public, who the Minister will accept are not necessarily there to intimidate or have any impact on the witness—they might not be even connected to the case. It should be assumed that people in this country can just turn up to a courthouse and watch a case, as they currently can, and as I have in the past.

Sad to say, but we have seen recently that practical transparency can be very difficult to achieve. We had the whole debacle with the Courtsdesk archive, which hugely assisted transparency in our legal system. The Opposition certainly do not feel that the Government’s initial response to that demonstrated that they were as committed to transparency in the justice system as they should be. It was only the effort of Opposition Members and media campaigners that secured a U-turn. We must ensure that these powers are used only when the interests of witnesses genuinely outweigh the public’s right to witness proceedings—although I note that the clause does not create an automatic entitlement for persons to be excluded.

We have discussed the availability of transcripts, and it would not be unreasonable to link the two issues. If people are excluded, I do not see why that could not become a trigger for making available those elements of the evidence that the public are for that reason unable to hear at first hand. I do not think the Minister is suggesting that the people in the gallery cannot hear the evidence; it is just about the impact on the witness of them being there. If that is happening and we accept that that is a break from the norm, it would be reasonable to say that transcripts of the elements that were not open to public scrutiny should be more widely available.

If the powers are enacted, it is important that the Government monitor their use going forward. They should have a clear position that they would be open to reforming or even removing the powers if they think they are not operating as intended.

We will not oppose these measures, but the Lords will want to look at them and ensure that we are excluding as little as possible. I accept the Minister’s point that, at the minute, nobody is getting excluded because of worries about how the provision operates, but that does not mean that we should just accept a new way of doing things when it could be better refined. If the Minister could clarify the point about transcript availability, it would demonstrate some good faith by ensuring that people can see for sure that we are not attempting to stop people from hearing what is going on in a courtroom.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I seek clarification from the Minister about the reference in clause 14 to

“representatives of news gathering or reporting organisations”.

Earlier, the hon. Member for Reigate raised the practice of live tweeting from court proceedings. I would appreciate it if the Minister set out her understanding of who would come under “a representative of a news gathering or reporting organisation”. With the rise of social media, and with more people getting their news online on things like X, we can have lots of news organisations with self-professed journalists or online commentators who are acting in the interests of providing online journalism, but who do not hold any form of accreditation or any official role as a journalist. It would be helpful if the Minister could explain who legitimate members of the press will be under this measure. Will they have to be recognised journalists? Will they have to have a press pass? Or can they say, “I’m here, in the interest of journalism, to live tweet the events because I am a self-employed journalist”?

[Sarah Sackman]

I am grateful for those questions and comments, because, through clause 14, we are seeking to strike a balance. At the moment, in the instance that I gave an example of, the balance is all one way. Of course we want open justice, but that is not the same, as can be the case, as having essentially a mob of people in the gallery whose mere presence is almost certainly intended to intimidate witnesses. Empowering the court to exercise discretion, while retaining the presence of at least one person connected to the defendant and protecting those representatives of newsgathering or reporting organisations, strikes the right balance.

On the question about everyone being a citizen journalist now, subsection (4)(b) refers to

“representatives of news gathering or reporting organisations”.

It refers to those who carry accreditation because they are a member of an organisation, not those who are self-appointed. I am happy to come back to the hon. Member for Chichester with clarification about that. When we talk about reporting restrictions and how they operate, they generally operate in connection with qualified journalists who are subject to the codes of conduct that go with that job. Indeed, that is something that arose with some of the issues in relation to Courtsdesk, because those who make use of that facility and that information, as opposed to the material that the public are entitled to see, are investigative journalists. I am happy to come back to the hon. Member with clarification, and if we think the legislation needs tightening up for the reasons she has outlined, then that can be looked at in the future.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 15

Editing of video recorded cross-examination and re-examination

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I beg to move amendment 14, in clause 17, page 30, line 10, at end insert—

“(3) The Lord Chancellor must, within six months of the commencement of this section, lay before both Houses of Parliament a report on the resources required to give full effect to the repeal of subsection 2A in Section 1 of the Children Act 1989.—

‘(1) The report under subsection (3) must include—

(a) an assessment of the level of legal aid provision necessary to ensure that parties in child arrangements proceedings are able to obtain timely and effective—

(i) advice, and

(ii) representation

particularly where allegations of domestic abuse or safeguarding concerns are raised;

(b) an evaluation of the capacity of the family courts, including—

(i) the number of judges,

(ii) court staff, and

(iii) available hearing time,

to undertake robust risk assessment and fact-finding processes in line with Practice Direction 12J;

(c) plans to address any shortfalls in judicial training, including—

(i) training relating to coercive control,

(ii) domestic abuse dynamics, and

(iii) child safeguarding.

(d) proposals for investment in the family court estate and technology to ensure—

(i) the repeal operates effectively, and

(ii) decisions are consistently grounded in the welfare and safety of the child.’”

This amendment requires the Government to set out how the family courts and legal aid system will be resourced to give full effect to the repeal of the presumption of parental involvement.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

New clause 16—Protective relocation and presumption of reasonableness—

“(1) This section applies to family proceedings in which—

(a) a parent (‘the relocating parent’) has relocated, or proposes to relocate, with a child; and

(b) it is alleged that such relocation has adversely affected, or is intended to affect, the child’s relationship with another party.

(2) Where the relocating parent demonstrates that the decision to relocate was made in consequence of domestic abuse, and this is supported by documented advice from a relevant authority or support service, there is a presumption that the relocation was reasonable and in the best interests of the child.

(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), ‘documented advice’ includes advice, guidance, or referral from—

(a) a police force;

(b) a local authority exercising social services functions;

(c) a Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference (MARAC); or

(d) an Independent Domestic Violence Adviser (IDVA) or equivalent specialist support service.

(4) The presumption in subsection (2) can be rebutted if the other party demonstrates, on the balance of probabilities, that the relocation is not reasonable or not in the best interests of the child.

(5) In determining whether the presumption has been rebutted, the court must have regard to—

(a) the nature and impact of the domestic abuse;

(b) the circumstances in which the advice or referral was given; and

(c) the welfare of the child as the court’s paramount consideration.

(6) The court may disapply the presumption in subsection (2) where it is satisfied that—

(a) the evidential basis for the documented advice is insufficient; or

(b) it is otherwise necessary to do so in order to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child.

(7) In this section—

(a) ‘domestic abuse’ has the same meaning as in section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021;

(b) ‘child’ means a person under the age of 18;

(c) ‘family proceedings’ has the same meaning as in section 75(3) of the Courts Act 2003.”

This new clause introduces a rebuttable presumption that a parent’s relocation with a child, undertaken in reliance on documented advice from authorities or support services in the context of domestic abuse, is reasonable and in the child’s best interests, unless the contrary is shown.

New clause 20—Determination of domestic abuse allegations and related presumptions—

“This section applies in family proceedings in which—

(a) party A alleges that party B has perpetrated domestic abuse, and

(b) the court is invited to consider whether a party A has engaged in conduct intended, or having the effect of, undermining a child’s relationship with another party.

(1) Where this section applies, the court must determine, as a preliminary issue, any allegation of domestic abuse before considering any allegation falling within subsection (1)(b).

(2) The court must treat the determination of allegations of domestic abuse as a matter of priority and, so much as reasonably practicable, must not proceed to determine any issue relating to the child’s relationship with either party until such allegations have been determined.

(3) Where the court finds, on the balance of probabilities, that party B has perpetrated domestic abuse against another party or the child—

(a) there shall be a rebuttable presumption that any reluctance or refusal by the child to spend time with party B constitutes a reasonable and justified response to the domestic abuse; and

(b) the court must not consider any allegation that party A has engaged in conduct falling within subsection (1)(b) unless satisfied that the presumption in paragraph (a) has been rebutted.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (4)(b), the presumption may be rebutted only where party B demonstrates, on the balance of probabilities, that the child’s reluctance or refusal cannot be reasonably attributed to the domestic abuse.

(5) Subsections (2) to (5) apply only where the allegation of domestic abuse meets such minimum evidential threshold as may be prescribed by rules of court.

(6) Notwithstanding the above, the court may disapply the presumption in subsection (4)(a), or the requirement in subsection (2), where it is satisfied that to do so is necessary to secure the welfare of the child as its paramount consideration.

(7) In this section—

(a) ‘domestic abuse’ has the same meaning as in section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021;

(b) references to a child are to a person under the age of 18;

(c) references to ‘family proceedings’ have the same meaning as in section 75(3) of the Courts Act 2003.”

This new clause requires courts to determine domestic abuse allegations before considering claims of parental alienation. If abuse is proven, a child’s reluctance to see the abusive parent is presumed a justified response. This presumption must be rebutted before the court can entertain allegations of alienating behaviour against the protective parent.

New clause 31—Determination of domestic abuse allegations and related presumptions—

“(1) There is a rebuttable presumption that any reluctance or refusal by a child to spend time with a party against whom the child, or a party representing the child, has made allegations of domestic abuse constitutes a reasonable and justified response to the domestic abuse.

(2) The presumption in subsection (1) may be rebutted only where the accused party demonstrates, on the balance of probabilities, that the child’s reluctance or refusal cannot be reasonably attributed to the domestic abuse.”

This new clause provides that, in family court, where a child refuses or is reluctant to spend time with one party as a result of an allegation against that party of domestic abuse against the child, the court must presume the reluctance or refusal is reasonable.

I remind hon. Members that any Divisions on new clauses will come later.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

Amendment 14 would require the Government to set out how the family courts and legal aid system will be resourced to give full effect to the repeal of the presumption of parental involvement. It would necessitate a report being laid by the Government on the impact of repealing the presumption of parental responsibility. We are in favour of clause 17, but the amendment focuses on the impact of the provisions on legal aid and the capacity of family courts, judicial training and investment in the family court estate. Repealing the presumption of parental responsibility will lead to a need for more legal advice, as well as changes in hearings and court practices. It is important that the Government report on those changes to the House. We hope that they accept the need for a report.

Clause 17 will repeal the presumption of parental involvement in the Children Act 1989. The presumption was originally introduced to ensure that both parents could maintain a relationship with their children after separation. However, there have been long-standing campaigns to repeal the presumption, with evidence emerging—I say emerging, but it is long-standing evidence—that children could be left at risk of harm. The change will mean that the courts will no longer start from the assumption that parental involvement is always in the child’s best interests.

A key campaigner for this change, working with Women’s Aid, is Claire Throssell, who the Committee had the opportunity to hear from during the evidence session. Claire’s children, Jack and Paul, were killed by their father, who locked them in the attic and set fire to the house. If there was any moment that we all will remember for a very long time, it was Claire holding the images of her children before the incident and afterwards. I commend her for her bravery and for the way that she was able to speak so clearly not just for herself, but for all the families who have experienced devastating bereavement in that way—fighting for the children who will come after.

A family court judge, guided by the presumption, decided to allow Claire’s ex-husband unsupervised access to their children, despite evidence that he had threatened to harm both her and them. Since Women’s Aid first reported on the issue in 2004, 67 children have been killed by perpetrators of domestic abuse through contact arrangements, with 19 further child deaths documented in the decade to September 2024 alone.

The Lib Dems are in favour of the shift in law away from the presumption of parental involvement. Although the Bill seeks to repeal the presumption, there is a pro-contact culture in the family courts, as described by Farah Nazeer of Women’s Aid, who we also heard from in the evidence session. Will the Minister lay out what will be done to support the cultural reform of the family courts to ensure that this is a pivotal moment for victims of domestic abuse, who for so long have had their concerns around their children’s safety dismissed?

Claire spoke to that point in the evidence session. When I asked her what she believed the next steps should be, she said:

“What I would like to see moving forward is an understanding of what it looks like without presumption of contact; what good practice looks like; understanding trauma; understanding what coercive control is; understanding emotional abuse. We all understand physical abuse—it is there; we see it. What we do not understand is the emotional abuse and the scars that we carry. We must always look from the position of actually seeing a child, hearing a child, believing a child, protecting a child, and we must go from this basis.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 58, Q110.]

New clause 16, which I also tabled, is a probing amendment that I will not press to a vote, but I wish to discuss it further. It would introduce a rebuttal presumption that a parent’s relocation with a child in the context of domestic abuse, undertaken in reliance on and with documented advice from authorities or support services, is reasonable and in the child’s best interests, unless the contrary is known.

New clause 16 would allow a parent to relocate with a child if they have evidence or advice from a domestic abuse support service or authority. It would require the court to assume that the move is reasonable and place the burden on the other parent to prove that the move is not in the child’s best interest.

The new clause is aimed at making it easier for victims of domestic abuse to leave their situations safely, and to prevent them from being forced to remain near their abusive ex-partners. Currently, the legal framework does not adequately distinguish between a parent who removes a child to protect them and a parent who removes a child to punish the other party. Our new clause would not remove safeguards in respect of alienation, but would instead shift the dial towards believing and protecting victims of domestic abuse.

The new clause is supported by Fair Hearing, which shared multiple examples of its work with courts that failed to give proper weight to the relevance of domestic abuse in relocation decisions. In one such case, a mother who had experienced severe physical, sexual and psychological abuse had been forced by her partner, during the relationship, to move with their children to an isolated rural area. After leaving him, she sought permission to return to her home town, where she had family support and greater safety. The court none the less required her to remain in an isolated cottage near her abuser, failing to give proper weight to the impact of the abuse, or to her need for safety and support. Cases of that kind illustrate the consequences of a framework that, in its operation, too often treats a survivor seeking to relocate for safety no differently from any other parent seeking to move for lifestyle or preference reasons.

I make the point to the Minister that this could happen to any of us. So often, abuse does not start on day one, when the partner suggests that we move somewhere lovely and will be really happy there. I am a very long way removed from the version of myself who made the decision to follow a boy three hours away from my family in my early 20s. He turned out not to be the great guy I thought he was when I made that decision. I escaped from that situation, but had I stayed and ended up having children, the idea that I would have been trapped in a city that was not mine, away from my family, who were my support network, is too scary to bear. I remind the Minister that it could happen to literally any one of us.

Wider campaigns from Women’s Aid, SafeLives and Refuge have focused on ensuring that survivors can relocate to escape abuse. As subsection 2 of the new clause outlines:

“Where the relocating parent demonstrates that the decision to relocate was made in consequence of domestic abuse, and this is supported by documented advice from a relevant authority or support service, there is a presumption that the relocation was reasonable and in the best interests of the child.”

Under the new clause, the documented advice would include evidence from a police force, social services, a multi-agency risk assessment conference or an independent domestic violence adviser. We look to work closely with the Government on this issue, and I hope they recognise the need to go further, but I will not push new clause 16 to a vote.

I will speak briefly to new clause 20, also tabled in my name, which would introduce a statutory presumption that where domestic abuse is alleged, the court must make findings on the allegations before considering any claim that a parent has sought to undermine the child’s relationship with the other party. If one parent alleges domestic abuse and the other alleges alienating behaviour—that is, influencing the child against them—the court must decide the domestic abuse allegations first. The court cannot move on to contact issues until that is decided. If the court finds domestic abuse, a child’s reluctance to see that parent is presumed to be justified. That presumption can be overturned only with evidence. If abuse is proven, courts cannot consider claims of alienation until the alleged abusive parent proves the child’s resistance is not due to abuse.

Campaigners have long argued that the family courts have been used by abusers to retraumatise victims and have over-prioritised contact between parents and children. It is estimated that around 60% to 90% of child arrangement cases in the family court feature allegations of domestic abuse. In 2020, the report entitled “Assessing Risk of Harm to Children and Parents in Private Law Children Cases” highlighted serious issues with how the family court system addresses domestic abuse in child arrangement cases. It said that those issues were underpinned by a pro-contact culture, silo working, an adversarial system and resource constraints.

A 2023 report by the Domestic Abuse Commissioner stated:

“Victims and survivors and their advisors reported concerns that raising domestic abuse as an issue often risked the retaliatory use of so-called ‘parental’ alienation narratives by parties against whom domestic abuse had been alleged as a counter-claim, leading to worse outcomes for adult and child victims and survivors.”

Five years on from the harm report, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner found that despite overwhelming evidence of domestic abuse in most cases, a pro-contact culture and a failure to recognise abuse still contribute to decisions that may put children in harm’s way.

This can be considered a probing amendment; I will not press new clause 20 to a vote. We will be looking to work closely with the Government to make progress in this area. The new clause would tilt the dial slightly towards victims of domestic abuse by ensuring that courts properly examined cases before considering issues of alienation. It would prioritise the safety of victims of domestic abuse, whether partners or children, by requiring these allegations to be addressed first.

It is also sometimes argued that children resist contact with certain parents because of manipulation. Our proposal would ensure that courts did not assume that manipulation first, but it would also have safeguards. It would not allow domestic abuse organisations to submit evidence; instead, it would be the authorities, social services and an independent domestic violence adviser who would do that. A minimum evidential threshold would also have to be met.

[Dr Mullan]

I want to begin by acknowledging the gravity of what we heard in evidence in Committee. As the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester, pointed to, the evidence from Claire in relation to her children will stay with all of us. It was so moving and so upsetting for anyone thinking about how they would feel in that scenario. There was also the testimony of other parents who have lost children, and survivors of domestic abuse, who felt let down by a system that prioritised contact over their safety. That testimony matters. The Committee has a duty to take it incredibly seriously and give it the maximum possible weight.

We also have a duty to legislate carefully, however, and when it comes to legislating I do not think there are many areas of human frailty and human complexity that are more complicated than this. As anyone with any experience of the family court—and of life generally and the interactions between families who split up—will agree, all these things are incredibly complicated. When we seek to be prescriptive about how exactly a court should or should not seek to do things, that is fraught with risk and potential unintended consequences, just as today we are discussing the unintended consequences of a measure that may have been brought in for good reasons.

We must think very carefully, therefore, when it comes to the repeal of section 1(2A) of the Children Act 1989, and particularly about whether we think that will achieve what it promises. I make no apologies for saying that I want to consider this in some detail and that we will want to follow the discussions on it in some detail as the Bill progresses. Although we are not seeking to oppose the repeal at this stage, it is certainly not something—as opposed to some other measures—that is without the need for further scrutiny.

I want to say plainly that the courts, social services and CAFCASS have made serious mistakes in the past—importantly, both before that provision was inserted in 2014 and since—and those serious mistakes have cost children their lives. However, the question before us today is whether repealing the presumption will fix the mistakes or whether it might distract from the need for much deeper reforms and more complex and difficult work than can be achieved by a simple measure in a Bill.

Let me deal with the most important point: the presumption introduced in 2014 does not give any parent an automatic right to contact. It is important that we recognise that. It does not override the paramount principle in the law. I think we probably all remember the evidence given by one of the barristers in Committee, who was clear that while they thought the presumption could be repealed, the law as it stands does not allow the desire for a parent to have contact to override the welfare of a child. It also does not override the welfare checklist, or require courts to make an order that places children at risk.

The presumption establishes a starting point that, where it is safe to do so, children should generally benefit from the involvement of both parents. That starting point can be rebutted, but it expressly does not apply where a parent’s involvement would put the child at risk. In its written evidence, Both Parents Matter describe it as a “statutory benchmark”, not a straitjacket.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rebecca Paul]

No, I’m okay.

I would gently say to the hon. Member for North West Leicestershire that I hope she has heard—and even seen—enough from me to know that I am here to protect children. Of course I am horrified by any loss of a child, but my point is that I am trying to step back, be objective and say, “What is the reason that those children lost their lives?”. I am not convinced that it was the parental presumption—I am not saying that I am right on that; I am just open-minded to it.

I have seen a particular case quite closely—I should declare that I am a serving county councillor in Surrey—and that is the case of Sara Sharif. I have gone through the safeguarding reviews in a huge amount of detail; it affected all of us councillors in Surrey greatly. It was an absolutely awful case. So many things went wrong throughout her life. From the family courts to social services, her GP and the school, there was just a barrage of failure that led to that poor little girl being murdered, and that absolutely could have been prevented.

People might argue, “Well, if we had removed the parental presumption, that would have saved her.” Having gone through all that, I can tell the hon. Member that, in that case, it would not have done anything. It was safeguarding failures. People just made mistakes. They got things wrong. They were too worried about offending people to take the right actions.

What I am saying today is just that it is really important, when we look at these things, that we diagnose what went wrong. We have to do that quite objectively. That is difficult when we are hearing from lots of different people who have gone through awful things, but our job is to try to not be emotional—I say that having got emotional myself—and to look at it logically. At the end of the day, we all just want to deliver the outcome that protects children. That is what all of us on this Committee want to do. But it is important that we can talk about that without the hon. Member suggesting that I somehow do not care about children, because what I am trying to do is to have that objectivity, because it matters to me so much that we do protect those children that I want us to have that proper debate and to say, “Is this really the right way or are there other things we can be doing? Do we need to do multiple things? Maybe this isn’t enough.” I am not saying that we should not do it; I am saying that we just need to make sure that we have thought this through.

I will be really keen to hear from the Minister; I know this really matters to her as well, and she will have done that thinking, so I look forward to hearing her thoughts on the challenges I have brought up today. But, as I say, I keep an open mind, and we all share the same objectives.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

Am I right in thinking that the hon. Member agrees with me that, when we are trying to legislate for what the most complex part of our justice system—families—that is an incredibly hard job? We all know from personal experience that the one thing that binds us all is that we have a family; we might disagree on whether they are good ones or bad ones, and whether we get on with them or not, but we all came from somewhere, and they are complicated things.

Across the House, we all share the desire to ensure that we recognise the complexity of family relationships and protect those most vulnerable in our society by making sure that people do not have the right to still have contact with their children when they have done things that mean that they absolutely should not. However, we also recognise that systems are abused, and we see that in all directions; people will always find ways of getting around systems, or of using the criminal justice system to retraumatise or to hold on to some form of control. Does the hon. Member therefore agree with me that, while what we are trying to do here is really complex, we are all doing it for the right reasons?

[Rebecca Paul]

I completely agree with the hon. Member. I appreciate the fact that she has tabled these amendments and that she recognises that it is not easy to strike this balance, particularly when we are trying to address abuse and alienation cases and it is sometimes hard to know what situation we are dealing with.

We are trying to come up with a system that protects as many people as we possibly can, but I think we also have to acknowledge that it will never be perfect. If anyone thinks that we can change one bit of law and then all of a sudden nothing horrible will ever happen again, I am afraid to say that these awful things will always happen, and things will always go wrong. It is about trying our best to have a framework that gets the balance right.

I will stop there—I have probably made my point. This has been a really good debate, and I look forward to hearing from the Minister about some of the points I have raised.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I recognise that the amendment is limited in scope because the Bill is limited in scope, especially when it comes to the family court. Perhaps rather cheekily, I was trying to get a report on the general health of the family court system because so many organisations tell Members across the House that they are really concerned about a lot of the systems sitting in the family court, not just the parental responsibility piece. I remain hopeful that we will see family court legislation introduced, as the Minister will be aware that I have requested in multiple oral questions in the Chamber.

I am aware that the report required by the amendment would be specifically about the repeal, but we need a health check of our family court system because a lot of people are sounding the alarm about the concerns they have with that system.

[Sarah Sackman]

The family justice strategy, which will be forthcoming in July, will address a lot of what the hon. Member asks for. It will set out where the Government think reform is needed, and it will bring together what we are already doing with our child-focused courts programme, which is accompanied by a £17 million investment. We believe in that model, which we think has huge merit. It will be available to people regardless of where in the country they live.

More generally, we are introducing the funding that the Lord Chancellor has allocated to sitting days for family hearings, the targeted recruitment of more judges, more fee-paid judges, the greater use of virtual hearings—which can be a supportive measure for people giving evidence, not just an efficiency measure—and training.

The hon. Member for Chichester will know that the Domestic Abuse Commissioner has also undertaken detailed work in this area through her “Everyday business” report, which talks to some of the resourcing constraints faced by the family court. That work forms part of the commissioner’s report on a family court reporting mechanism, which is designed to provide ongoing evidence-based scrutiny of the family court’s response to domestic abuse in particular, and to highlight where systemic improvements are needed, so we have other accountability measures shining that light. If the hon. Member for Chichester awaits the strategy—she will no doubt want to take a look and critique parts of it—I think a lot of it will address some of the concerns she raises.

As I said, before proposing the repeal of the presumption, we carefully assessed the impact it would have. We do not overstate it, but it is important because the change affects the judicial process, not the underlying reasons why families come to court. Because we do not expect it to increase case volumes, case length or demand for legal aid, we think that the current arrangements can meet it, but there are so many other improvements that we want to drive.

--- Later in debate ---

We always say that the loss of one life is one too many. If any of these changes saves one life, they will have been worth making. With that in mind, I commend clause 17 to the Committee.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

This has been a robust and important debate, and there are strong feelings on both sides of the argument. As I said earlier, we are legislating in a complex area. I think the shared opinion is that the intention is correct. Some of the questions that have been asked are legitimate, but I know the Minister is keen to work collaboratively. I will not press my two new clauses to a vote—they are probing amendments to open up the conversation—but amendment 14, which would require a report as a health check for the family courts, is important, so I will press it to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting)

Jess Brown-Fuller Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 23rd April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)]

Rape Crisis has pointed out that current practice ignores the fact that women are often subjected to multiple instances of sexual violence in their lives. Survivors have told Rape Crisis that they feel disbelieved, blamed and retraumatised when they simply try to seek justice. SafeLives and End Violence Against Women are both in favour of the reforms in clause 10. It is worth pointing out that black and minoritised women are disproportionately harmed in the criminal justice system by misuse of bad character evidence.

Office for National Statistics data shows that one in two adult survivors of rape have been raped more than once. The National Police Chiefs’ Council strategic risk assessment 2023 identified that 25% of victim survivors were repeat victims of violence against women and girls. The drafting of clause 10 reflects calls from a coalition of women’s rights groups for section 100 to be amended in this way. It was drafted and supported by the Centre for Women’s Justice, and the Liberal Democrats are pleased to support it.

[Sarah Sackman]

I welcome the support from Members across the Committee for clause 10. A proper evidential basis is defined in the Bill as ensuring that there is material before the court that shows both that the complainant made the previous allegation and that the previous allegation was false. I do not want to elaborate on the test, and thereby in any way tie the hands of the judge hearing the evidence in the case. The tests and the clear structure set out in the Bill will enable and empower the judge to test whether there is an evidential basis for the claim and whether it has probative value and relevance to the issues at hand. The judge will then be able to take a view on whether it can be included and put to a witness.

There will always be cases where the evidence is relevant to the proceedings, both for the prosecution and for the defence. There is certainly no hard rule excluding it altogether.

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[Dr Mullan]

Clause 12 addresses an important aspect of protection: the use of screens in the courtroom. We must start from the position that special measures are not a luxury or optional administrative add-on; they are often essential to ensuring that the justice system remains capable of hearing evidence properly. We want to enable people to give evidence in the proper way, and victims and vulnerable witnesses must be able to give their best evidence—we always want people to be able to give their best evidence in court—without avoidable distress, intimidation or re-traumatisation.

For many, the prospect of being in the same physical space as the person who harmed them is a primary barrier to their participating in the justice system at all. Clause 12 will strengthen and clarify current provisions by creating a clearer statutory footing for the use of screens. Specifically, when a witness is providing testimony via live link or through a pre-recorded cross-examination, the clause will require the court to consider whether a screen should be provided. Crucially, the clause clarifies that that protection should operate in both directions: not just preventing the witness from seeing the accused, but shielding the witness from the accused’s gaze as well. That increased clarity is intended to support consistency in practice across the country.

For many victims, particularly those of sexual violence or domestic abuse, the physical presence of the accused is a source of profound distress that can affect their memory and the clarity of their evidence. The current application of these measures can be inconsistent, leading to what practitioners describe as a postcode lottery. By establishing a presumption in favour of screens unless it would be contrary to the interests of justice, the law recognises the practical reality. However, we must ensure that that presumption is not merely a tick-box exercise, but achieved effectively through things such as either-way screens.

We must recognise, as we have at several points in Committee, the challenge presented by the fabric of some of our courtroom buildings and their facilities. Evidence provided to the Committee—this is also highlighted by Sir Brian Leveson—suggests that malfunctioning equipment and poor infrastructure continue to create problems, specifically in relation to using special measures. A stronger use of screens can be mandated but, if the physical layout of the court and its facilities are insufficient, that will hamper the clause’s benefit.

What survey or review have the Government undertaken, or do they plan to undertake, to ensure that there are no physical barriers to the use of screens in this way? I suspect that, on a physical basis, it is easier to have screens just in one direction rather than two, and it probably involves different equipment and facilities. It would be good to get the Minister’s view on any barriers that might practically limit the intention of this measure.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

Clause 12 stipulates that when a direction allows evidence by live link or pre-recorded cross examination, screens must also be provided unless that would be contrary to the interests of justice, such as due to preventing the adequate testing of evidence. It also clarifies under a special measure direction that a screen may be used to prevent either the witness from seeing the accused or the accused from seeing the witness. The Liberal Democrats welcome the clause.

Vulnerable and intimidated witnesses are entitled to a number of additional measures to protect them from defendants. When the Law Commission conducted a review of these measures in relation to sexual offences cases, it came up with a number of recommendations, although the Government have chosen not to take forward some of them, such as introducing automatic entitlement for sexual offence complainants or providing complainants with independent legal advice on their entitlement to special measures.

It would be helpful to understand from the Minister why the Government chose not to introduce those recommendations, which would have turned special measures into almost standard measures. The blanket introduction of these measures would save administrative time and cost. I recognise that this is anecdotal, but the judges I have spoken to have said that if they get a request for special measures, they never refuse it.

Surely by reversing the onus and introducing the special measures as standard, we would still provide an opportunity for victims to opt out of those measures if they have a particular desire to see, or to look into the eyes of, their defendant, but if they did not wish to do so, they would be, at the very minimum, provided with protections. If this was the standard approach, it would also give more women—this affects mostly women—the confidence to come forward knowing that their court experience is going to protect them.

On a recent visit to Chichester Crown court—I thank the Minister for committing to reopening that court fully—His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service talked about creating videos for those who are coming to give evidence, with the opportunity to have a virtual walk-through of the court. If vulnerable witnesses and victims were able to watch a walk-through to see exactly what measures could be put in place as standard to protect them, I imagine that would provide much more reassurance than saying, “This is what you are seeing, but there are also additional special measures that you can apply for.”

Introducing these measures as standard would also take away the stigma of being associated as a vulnerable witness. We talk a lot about victims. Some victims do not want to be described as victims; they want to be described as survivors. We talk about vulnerability. If we had these measures as standard, we would be acknowledging that vulnerability is expected, but that there is no stigma around it and that the courts have mitigated it, without being asked to do so.

The measures are backed by various victims groups, such as Women Against Rape, and by the Victims’ Commissioner. It would be helpful if the Minister could highlight whether the Government plan to go further and make these special measures standard.

[Sarah Sackman]

I thank the hon. Member for Chichester for the points she raised. In many respects, they are well made, and they consider people’s choice architecture—for want of a better phrase—their understanding of what they might be entitled to request, and whether we should default to providing all the special measures or maintaining, as we say we should, a tailored case-by-case assessment of the needs of the witness or the complainant. It is a tricky one.

We want to make sure that, where there is a proper basis for it, special measures can be provided to those who need them and where the judge agrees that they are needed. The hon. Member is right that in the vast majority of cases, the request for special measures or to give evidence by video link is approved— it is almost always approved—but there might be cases when, for reasons of trial fairness, that is not the case. The tailored approach is one that we regard as proportionate.

This also relates to the points made by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle about court layout and some of the physical constraints that exist within some of our Crown courts. We do not want a postcode lottery. We want consistency, which is what so much of the Bill is designed to achieve. However, we also have to acknowledge that in some of our Crown court centres, the physical constraints are real. That does not necessarily relate to screens, but it might relate to the entrance and exit. For example, there are limitations on the ideal situation of a complainant being able to avoid having to pass a defendant, which might be undesirable for all sorts of reasons. There are some courtrooms in which that simply is not possible without huge capital investment to change the physical structure.

Hon. Members have raised legitimate points and I understand the thinking behind them. We think that in the circumstances, and given that victims have a wide range of needs, a tailored approach, based on a detailed needs assessment, is the most effective approach, but we will continue to consider the situation.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 12 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 13

Witness to be accompanied while giving evidence

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[Sarah Sackman]

I understand the point. In the circumstances, I would prefer to take officials’ advice and check that the legislation is doing what it intends to—providing a consistent practice of professional witness support, while maintaining trial fairness. I do not want to misdirect myself or the Committee.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

My understanding of the legislation is that an independent supporter would be a recognised professional, but that does not exclude someone who may have a relationship outside their recognised profession with the person they are independently supporting. I wonder if clarification could be introduced—similar to what I think amendment 70 tried to achieve—to ensure that any relationship outside the professional role would have to be declared in front of the court. That would make it clear that, ideally, the only relationship between a witness and the independent supporter should be a professional one, and that any other one would have to be declared.

[Sarah Sackman]

I think all of that is right, but I would prefer to take the matter back to the Department and check that we have a common understanding. I do not want to do this on the hoof if I do not have the full information before me. I think that is the intention—the presumption is that it applies only to professional supporters. I suppose it is ultimately up to the court if a family member sits with the person, if that is deemed necessary in the interests of justice.

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[Dr Mullan]

As the Minister points out, this clause interacts with the issue of transparency in the justice system. I recognise that the Minister thinks it attempts to strike a balance by clarifying the categories of people who may not be excluded, such as representatives of news organisations, witness supporters and approved researchers. The aim is to ensure that, while a witness may be shielded, the trial remains professional and legitimate.

However, we do not want the measure to have the unintended effect of narrowing public scrutiny, including by ordinary members of the public, who the Minister will accept are not necessarily there to intimidate or have any impact on the witness—they might not be even connected to the case. It should be assumed that people in this country can just turn up to a courthouse and watch a case, as they currently can, and as I have in the past.

Sad to say, but we have seen recently that practical transparency can be very difficult to achieve. We had the whole debacle with the Courtsdesk archive, which hugely assisted transparency in our legal system. The Opposition certainly do not feel that the Government’s initial response to that demonstrated that they were as committed to transparency in the justice system as they should be. It was only the effort of Opposition Members and media campaigners that secured a U-turn. We must ensure that these powers are used only when the interests of witnesses genuinely outweigh the public’s right to witness proceedings—although I note that the clause does not create an automatic entitlement for persons to be excluded.

We have discussed the availability of transcripts, and it would not be unreasonable to link the two issues. If people are excluded, I do not see why that could not become a trigger for making available those elements of the evidence that the public are for that reason unable to hear at first hand. I do not think the Minister is suggesting that the people in the gallery cannot hear the evidence; it is just about the impact on the witness of them being there. If that is happening and we accept that that is a break from the norm, it would be reasonable to say that transcripts of the elements that were not open to public scrutiny should be more widely available.

If the powers are enacted, it is important that the Government monitor their use going forward. They should have a clear position that they would be open to reforming or even removing the powers if they think they are not operating as intended.

We will not oppose these measures, but the Lords will want to look at them and ensure that we are excluding as little as possible. I accept the Minister’s point that, at the minute, nobody is getting excluded because of worries about how the provision operates, but that does not mean that we should just accept a new way of doing things when it could be better refined. If the Minister could clarify the point about transcript availability, it would demonstrate some good faith by ensuring that people can see for sure that we are not attempting to stop people from hearing what is going on in a courtroom.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I seek clarification from the Minister about the reference in clause 14 to

“representatives of news gathering or reporting organisations”.

Earlier, the hon. Member for Reigate raised the practice of live tweeting from court proceedings. I would appreciate it if the Minister set out her understanding of who would come under “a representative of a news gathering or reporting organisation”. With the rise of social media, and with more people getting their news online on things like X, we can have lots of news organisations with self-professed journalists or online commentators who are acting in the interests of providing online journalism, but who do not hold any form of accreditation or any official role as a journalist. It would be helpful if the Minister could explain who legitimate members of the press will be under this measure. Will they have to be recognised journalists? Will they have to have a press pass? Or can they say, “I’m here, in the interest of journalism, to live tweet the events because I am a self-employed journalist”?

[Sarah Sackman]

I am grateful for those questions and comments, because, through clause 14, we are seeking to strike a balance. At the moment, in the instance that I gave an example of, the balance is all one way. Of course we want open justice, but that is not the same, as can be the case, as having essentially a mob of people in the gallery whose mere presence is almost certainly intended to intimidate witnesses. Empowering the court to exercise discretion, while retaining the presence of at least one person connected to the defendant and protecting those representatives of newsgathering or reporting organisations, strikes the right balance.

On the question about everyone being a citizen journalist now, subsection (4)(b) refers to

“representatives of news gathering or reporting organisations”.

It refers to those who carry accreditation because they are a member of an organisation, not those who are self-appointed. I am happy to come back to the hon. Member for Chichester with clarification about that. When we talk about reporting restrictions and how they operate, they generally operate in connection with qualified journalists who are subject to the codes of conduct that go with that job. Indeed, that is something that arose with some of the issues in relation to Courtsdesk, because those who make use of that facility and that information, as opposed to the material that the public are entitled to see, are investigative journalists. I am happy to come back to the hon. Member with clarification, and if we think the legislation needs tightening up for the reasons she has outlined, then that can be looked at in the future.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 15

Editing of video recorded cross-examination and re-examination

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I beg to move amendment 14, in clause 17, page 30, line 10, at end insert—

“(3) The Lord Chancellor must, within six months of the commencement of this section, lay before both Houses of Parliament a report on the resources required to give full effect to the repeal of subsection 2A in Section 1 of the Children Act 1989.—

‘(1) The report under subsection (3) must include—

(a) an assessment of the level of legal aid provision necessary to ensure that parties in child arrangements proceedings are able to obtain timely and effective—

(i) advice, and

(ii) representation

particularly where allegations of domestic abuse or safeguarding concerns are raised;

(b) an evaluation of the capacity of the family courts, including—

(i) the number of judges,

(ii) court staff, and

(iii) available hearing time,

to undertake robust risk assessment and fact-finding processes in line with Practice Direction 12J;

(c) plans to address any shortfalls in judicial training, including—

(i) training relating to coercive control,

(ii) domestic abuse dynamics, and

(iii) child safeguarding.

(d) proposals for investment in the family court estate and technology to ensure—

(i) the repeal operates effectively, and

(ii) decisions are consistently grounded in the welfare and safety of the child.’”

This amendment requires the Government to set out how the family courts and legal aid system will be resourced to give full effect to the repeal of the presumption of parental involvement.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

New clause 16—Protective relocation and presumption of reasonableness—

“(1) This section applies to family proceedings in which—

(a) a parent (‘the relocating parent’) has relocated, or proposes to relocate, with a child; and

(b) it is alleged that such relocation has adversely affected, or is intended to affect, the child’s relationship with another party.

(2) Where the relocating parent demonstrates that the decision to relocate was made in consequence of domestic abuse, and this is supported by documented advice from a relevant authority or support service, there is a presumption that the relocation was reasonable and in the best interests of the child.

(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), ‘documented advice’ includes advice, guidance, or referral from—

(a) a police force;

(b) a local authority exercising social services functions;

(c) a Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference (MARAC); or

(d) an Independent Domestic Violence Adviser (IDVA) or equivalent specialist support service.

(4) The presumption in subsection (2) can be rebutted if the other party demonstrates, on the balance of probabilities, that the relocation is not reasonable or not in the best interests of the child.

(5) In determining whether the presumption has been rebutted, the court must have regard to—

(a) the nature and impact of the domestic abuse;

(b) the circumstances in which the advice or referral was given; and

(c) the welfare of the child as the court’s paramount consideration.

(6) The court may disapply the presumption in subsection (2) where it is satisfied that—

(a) the evidential basis for the documented advice is insufficient; or

(b) it is otherwise necessary to do so in order to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child.

(7) In this section—

(a) ‘domestic abuse’ has the same meaning as in section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021;

(b) ‘child’ means a person under the age of 18;

(c) ‘family proceedings’ has the same meaning as in section 75(3) of the Courts Act 2003.”

This new clause introduces a rebuttable presumption that a parent’s relocation with a child, undertaken in reliance on documented advice from authorities or support services in the context of domestic abuse, is reasonable and in the child’s best interests, unless the contrary is shown.

New clause 20—Determination of domestic abuse allegations and related presumptions—

“This section applies in family proceedings in which—

(a) party A alleges that party B has perpetrated domestic abuse, and

(b) the court is invited to consider whether a party A has engaged in conduct intended, or having the effect of, undermining a child’s relationship with another party.

(1) Where this section applies, the court must determine, as a preliminary issue, any allegation of domestic abuse before considering any allegation falling within subsection (1)(b).

(2) The court must treat the determination of allegations of domestic abuse as a matter of priority and, so much as reasonably practicable, must not proceed to determine any issue relating to the child’s relationship with either party until such allegations have been determined.

(3) Where the court finds, on the balance of probabilities, that party B has perpetrated domestic abuse against another party or the child—

(a) there shall be a rebuttable presumption that any reluctance or refusal by the child to spend time with party B constitutes a reasonable and justified response to the domestic abuse; and

(b) the court must not consider any allegation that party A has engaged in conduct falling within subsection (1)(b) unless satisfied that the presumption in paragraph (a) has been rebutted.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (4)(b), the presumption may be rebutted only where party B demonstrates, on the balance of probabilities, that the child’s reluctance or refusal cannot be reasonably attributed to the domestic abuse.

(5) Subsections (2) to (5) apply only where the allegation of domestic abuse meets such minimum evidential threshold as may be prescribed by rules of court.

(6) Notwithstanding the above, the court may disapply the presumption in subsection (4)(a), or the requirement in subsection (2), where it is satisfied that to do so is necessary to secure the welfare of the child as its paramount consideration.

(7) In this section—

(a) ‘domestic abuse’ has the same meaning as in section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021;

(b) references to a child are to a person under the age of 18;

(c) references to ‘family proceedings’ have the same meaning as in section 75(3) of the Courts Act 2003.”

This new clause requires courts to determine domestic abuse allegations before considering claims of parental alienation. If abuse is proven, a child’s reluctance to see the abusive parent is presumed a justified response. This presumption must be rebutted before the court can entertain allegations of alienating behaviour against the protective parent.

New clause 31—Determination of domestic abuse allegations and related presumptions—

“(1) There is a rebuttable presumption that any reluctance or refusal by a child to spend time with a party against whom the child, or a party representing the child, has made allegations of domestic abuse constitutes a reasonable and justified response to the domestic abuse.

(2) The presumption in subsection (1) may be rebutted only where the accused party demonstrates, on the balance of probabilities, that the child’s reluctance or refusal cannot be reasonably attributed to the domestic abuse.”

This new clause provides that, in family court, where a child refuses or is reluctant to spend time with one party as a result of an allegation against that party of domestic abuse against the child, the court must presume the reluctance or refusal is reasonable.

I remind hon. Members that any Divisions on new clauses will come later.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

Amendment 14 would require the Government to set out how the family courts and legal aid system will be resourced to give full effect to the repeal of the presumption of parental involvement. It would necessitate a report being laid by the Government on the impact of repealing the presumption of parental responsibility. We are in favour of clause 17, but the amendment focuses on the impact of the provisions on legal aid and the capacity of family courts, judicial training and investment in the family court estate. Repealing the presumption of parental responsibility will lead to a need for more legal advice, as well as changes in hearings and court practices. It is important that the Government report on those changes to the House. We hope that they accept the need for a report.

Clause 17 will repeal the presumption of parental involvement in the Children Act 1989. The presumption was originally introduced to ensure that both parents could maintain a relationship with their children after separation. However, there have been long-standing campaigns to repeal the presumption, with evidence emerging—I say emerging, but it is long-standing evidence—that children could be left at risk of harm. The change will mean that the courts will no longer start from the assumption that parental involvement is always in the child’s best interests.

A key campaigner for this change, working with Women’s Aid, is Claire Throssell, who the Committee had the opportunity to hear from during the evidence session. Claire’s children, Jack and Paul, were killed by their father, who locked them in the attic and set fire to the house. If there was any moment that we all will remember for a very long time, it was Claire holding the images of her children before the incident and afterwards. I commend her for her bravery and for the way that she was able to speak so clearly not just for herself, but for all the families who have experienced devastating bereavement in that way—fighting for the children who will come after.

A family court judge, guided by the presumption, decided to allow Claire’s ex-husband unsupervised access to their children, despite evidence that he had threatened to harm both her and them. Since Women’s Aid first reported on the issue in 2004, 67 children have been killed by perpetrators of domestic abuse through contact arrangements, with 19 further child deaths documented in the decade to September 2024 alone.

The Lib Dems are in favour of the shift in law away from the presumption of parental involvement. Although the Bill seeks to repeal the presumption, there is a pro-contact culture in the family courts, as described by Farah Nazeer of Women’s Aid, who we also heard from in the evidence session. Will the Minister lay out what will be done to support the cultural reform of the family courts to ensure that this is a pivotal moment for victims of domestic abuse, who for so long have had their concerns around their children’s safety dismissed?

Claire spoke to that point in the evidence session. When I asked her what she believed the next steps should be, she said:

“What I would like to see moving forward is an understanding of what it looks like without presumption of contact; what good practice looks like; understanding trauma; understanding what coercive control is; understanding emotional abuse. We all understand physical abuse—it is there; we see it. What we do not understand is the emotional abuse and the scars that we carry. We must always look from the position of actually seeing a child, hearing a child, believing a child, protecting a child, and we must go from this basis.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 58, Q110.]

New clause 16, which I also tabled, is a probing amendment that I will not press to a vote, but I wish to discuss it further. It would introduce a rebuttal presumption that a parent’s relocation with a child in the context of domestic abuse, undertaken in reliance on and with documented advice from authorities or support services, is reasonable and in the child’s best interests, unless the contrary is known.

New clause 16 would allow a parent to relocate with a child if they have evidence or advice from a domestic abuse support service or authority. It would require the court to assume that the move is reasonable and place the burden on the other parent to prove that the move is not in the child’s best interest.

The new clause is aimed at making it easier for victims of domestic abuse to leave their situations safely, and to prevent them from being forced to remain near their abusive ex-partners. Currently, the legal framework does not adequately distinguish between a parent who removes a child to protect them and a parent who removes a child to punish the other party. Our new clause would not remove safeguards in respect of alienation, but would instead shift the dial towards believing and protecting victims of domestic abuse.

The new clause is supported by Fair Hearing, which shared multiple examples of its work with courts that failed to give proper weight to the relevance of domestic abuse in relocation decisions. In one such case, a mother who had experienced severe physical, sexual and psychological abuse had been forced by her partner, during the relationship, to move with their children to an isolated rural area. After leaving him, she sought permission to return to her home town, where she had family support and greater safety. The court none the less required her to remain in an isolated cottage near her abuser, failing to give proper weight to the impact of the abuse, or to her need for safety and support. Cases of that kind illustrate the consequences of a framework that, in its operation, too often treats a survivor seeking to relocate for safety no differently from any other parent seeking to move for lifestyle or preference reasons.

I make the point to the Minister that this could happen to any of us. So often, abuse does not start on day one, when the partner suggests that we move somewhere lovely and will be really happy there. I am a very long way removed from the version of myself who made the decision to follow a boy three hours away from my family in my early 20s. He turned out not to be the great guy I thought he was when I made that decision. I escaped from that situation, but had I stayed and ended up having children, the idea that I would have been trapped in a city that was not mine, away from my family, who were my support network, is too scary to bear. I remind the Minister that it could happen to literally any one of us.

Wider campaigns from Women’s Aid, SafeLives and Refuge have focused on ensuring that survivors can relocate to escape abuse. As subsection 2 of the new clause outlines:

“Where the relocating parent demonstrates that the decision to relocate was made in consequence of domestic abuse, and this is supported by documented advice from a relevant authority or support service, there is a presumption that the relocation was reasonable and in the best interests of the child.”

Under the new clause, the documented advice would include evidence from a police force, social services, a multi-agency risk assessment conference or an independent domestic violence adviser. We look to work closely with the Government on this issue, and I hope they recognise the need to go further, but I will not push new clause 16 to a vote.

I will speak briefly to new clause 20, also tabled in my name, which would introduce a statutory presumption that where domestic abuse is alleged, the court must make findings on the allegations before considering any claim that a parent has sought to undermine the child’s relationship with the other party. If one parent alleges domestic abuse and the other alleges alienating behaviour—that is, influencing the child against them—the court must decide the domestic abuse allegations first. The court cannot move on to contact issues until that is decided. If the court finds domestic abuse, a child’s reluctance to see that parent is presumed to be justified. That presumption can be overturned only with evidence. If abuse is proven, courts cannot consider claims of alienation until the alleged abusive parent proves the child’s resistance is not due to abuse.

Campaigners have long argued that the family courts have been used by abusers to retraumatise victims and have over-prioritised contact between parents and children. It is estimated that around 60% to 90% of child arrangement cases in the family court feature allegations of domestic abuse. In 2020, the report entitled “Assessing Risk of Harm to Children and Parents in Private Law Children Cases” highlighted serious issues with how the family court system addresses domestic abuse in child arrangement cases. It said that those issues were underpinned by a pro-contact culture, silo working, an adversarial system and resource constraints.

A 2023 report by the Domestic Abuse Commissioner stated:

“Victims and survivors and their advisors reported concerns that raising domestic abuse as an issue often risked the retaliatory use of so-called ‘parental’ alienation narratives by parties against whom domestic abuse had been alleged as a counter-claim, leading to worse outcomes for adult and child victims and survivors.”

Five years on from the harm report, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner found that despite overwhelming evidence of domestic abuse in most cases, a pro-contact culture and a failure to recognise abuse still contribute to decisions that may put children in harm’s way.

This can be considered a probing amendment; I will not press new clause 20 to a vote. We will be looking to work closely with the Government to make progress in this area. The new clause would tilt the dial slightly towards victims of domestic abuse by ensuring that courts properly examined cases before considering issues of alienation. It would prioritise the safety of victims of domestic abuse, whether partners or children, by requiring these allegations to be addressed first.

It is also sometimes argued that children resist contact with certain parents because of manipulation. Our proposal would ensure that courts did not assume that manipulation first, but it would also have safeguards. It would not allow domestic abuse organisations to submit evidence; instead, it would be the authorities, social services and an independent domestic violence adviser who would do that. A minimum evidential threshold would also have to be met.

[Dr Mullan]

I want to begin by acknowledging the gravity of what we heard in evidence in Committee. As the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester, pointed to, the evidence from Claire in relation to her children will stay with all of us. It was so moving and so upsetting for anyone thinking about how they would feel in that scenario. There was also the testimony of other parents who have lost children, and survivors of domestic abuse, who felt let down by a system that prioritised contact over their safety. That testimony matters. The Committee has a duty to take it incredibly seriously and give it the maximum possible weight.

We also have a duty to legislate carefully, however, and when it comes to legislating I do not think there are many areas of human frailty and human complexity that are more complicated than this. As anyone with any experience of the family court—and of life generally and the interactions between families who split up—will agree, all these things are incredibly complicated. When we seek to be prescriptive about how exactly a court should or should not seek to do things, that is fraught with risk and potential unintended consequences, just as today we are discussing the unintended consequences of a measure that may have been brought in for good reasons.

We must think very carefully, therefore, when it comes to the repeal of section 1(2A) of the Children Act 1989, and particularly about whether we think that will achieve what it promises. I make no apologies for saying that I want to consider this in some detail and that we will want to follow the discussions on it in some detail as the Bill progresses. Although we are not seeking to oppose the repeal at this stage, it is certainly not something—as opposed to some other measures—that is without the need for further scrutiny.

I want to say plainly that the courts, social services and CAFCASS have made serious mistakes in the past—importantly, both before that provision was inserted in 2014 and since—and those serious mistakes have cost children their lives. However, the question before us today is whether repealing the presumption will fix the mistakes or whether it might distract from the need for much deeper reforms and more complex and difficult work than can be achieved by a simple measure in a Bill.

Let me deal with the most important point: the presumption introduced in 2014 does not give any parent an automatic right to contact. It is important that we recognise that. It does not override the paramount principle in the law. I think we probably all remember the evidence given by one of the barristers in Committee, who was clear that while they thought the presumption could be repealed, the law as it stands does not allow the desire for a parent to have contact to override the welfare of a child. It also does not override the welfare checklist, or require courts to make an order that places children at risk.

The presumption establishes a starting point that, where it is safe to do so, children should generally benefit from the involvement of both parents. That starting point can be rebutted, but it expressly does not apply where a parent’s involvement would put the child at risk. In its written evidence, Both Parents Matter describe it as a “statutory benchmark”, not a straitjacket.

--- Later in debate ---

[Rebecca Paul]

No, I’m okay.

I would gently say to the hon. Member for North West Leicestershire that I hope she has heard—and even seen—enough from me to know that I am here to protect children. Of course I am horrified by any loss of a child, but my point is that I am trying to step back, be objective and say, “What is the reason that those children lost their lives?”. I am not convinced that it was the parental presumption—I am not saying that I am right on that; I am just open-minded to it.

I have seen a particular case quite closely—I should declare that I am a serving county councillor in Surrey—and that is the case of Sara Sharif. I have gone through the safeguarding reviews in a huge amount of detail; it affected all of us councillors in Surrey greatly. It was an absolutely awful case. So many things went wrong throughout her life. From the family courts to social services, her GP and the school, there was just a barrage of failure that led to that poor little girl being murdered, and that absolutely could have been prevented.

People might argue, “Well, if we had removed the parental presumption, that would have saved her.” Having gone through all that, I can tell the hon. Member that, in that case, it would not have done anything. It was safeguarding failures. People just made mistakes. They got things wrong. They were too worried about offending people to take the right actions.

What I am saying today is just that it is really important, when we look at these things, that we diagnose what went wrong. We have to do that quite objectively. That is difficult when we are hearing from lots of different people who have gone through awful things, but our job is to try to not be emotional—I say that having got emotional myself—and to look at it logically. At the end of the day, we all just want to deliver the outcome that protects children. That is what all of us on this Committee want to do. But it is important that we can talk about that without the hon. Member suggesting that I somehow do not care about children, because what I am trying to do is to have that objectivity, because it matters to me so much that we do protect those children that I want us to have that proper debate and to say, “Is this really the right way or are there other things we can be doing? Do we need to do multiple things? Maybe this isn’t enough.” I am not saying that we should not do it; I am saying that we just need to make sure that we have thought this through.

I will be really keen to hear from the Minister; I know this really matters to her as well, and she will have done that thinking, so I look forward to hearing her thoughts on the challenges I have brought up today. But, as I say, I keep an open mind, and we all share the same objectives.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

Am I right in thinking that the hon. Member agrees with me that, when we are trying to legislate for what the most complex part of our justice system—families—that is an incredibly hard job? We all know from personal experience that the one thing that binds us all is that we have a family; we might disagree on whether they are good ones or bad ones, and whether we get on with them or not, but we all came from somewhere, and they are complicated things.

Across the House, we all share the desire to ensure that we recognise the complexity of family relationships and protect those most vulnerable in our society by making sure that people do not have the right to still have contact with their children when they have done things that mean that they absolutely should not. However, we also recognise that systems are abused, and we see that in all directions; people will always find ways of getting around systems, or of using the criminal justice system to retraumatise or to hold on to some form of control. Does the hon. Member therefore agree with me that, while what we are trying to do here is really complex, we are all doing it for the right reasons?

[Rebecca Paul]

I completely agree with the hon. Member. I appreciate the fact that she has tabled these amendments and that she recognises that it is not easy to strike this balance, particularly when we are trying to address abuse and alienation cases and it is sometimes hard to know what situation we are dealing with.

We are trying to come up with a system that protects as many people as we possibly can, but I think we also have to acknowledge that it will never be perfect. If anyone thinks that we can change one bit of law and then all of a sudden nothing horrible will ever happen again, I am afraid to say that these awful things will always happen, and things will always go wrong. It is about trying our best to have a framework that gets the balance right.

I will stop there—I have probably made my point. This has been a really good debate, and I look forward to hearing from the Minister about some of the points I have raised.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I recognise that the amendment is limited in scope because the Bill is limited in scope, especially when it comes to the family court. Perhaps rather cheekily, I was trying to get a report on the general health of the family court system because so many organisations tell Members across the House that they are really concerned about a lot of the systems sitting in the family court, not just the parental responsibility piece. I remain hopeful that we will see family court legislation introduced, as the Minister will be aware that I have requested in multiple oral questions in the Chamber.

I am aware that the report required by the amendment would be specifically about the repeal, but we need a health check of our family court system because a lot of people are sounding the alarm about the concerns they have with that system.

[Sarah Sackman]

The family justice strategy, which will be forthcoming in July, will address a lot of what the hon. Member asks for. It will set out where the Government think reform is needed, and it will bring together what we are already doing with our child-focused courts programme, which is accompanied by a £17 million investment. We believe in that model, which we think has huge merit. It will be available to people regardless of where in the country they live.

More generally, we are introducing the funding that the Lord Chancellor has allocated to sitting days for family hearings, the targeted recruitment of more judges, more fee-paid judges, the greater use of virtual hearings—which can be a supportive measure for people giving evidence, not just an efficiency measure—and training.

The hon. Member for Chichester will know that the Domestic Abuse Commissioner has also undertaken detailed work in this area through her “Everyday business” report, which talks to some of the resourcing constraints faced by the family court. That work forms part of the commissioner’s report on a family court reporting mechanism, which is designed to provide ongoing evidence-based scrutiny of the family court’s response to domestic abuse in particular, and to highlight where systemic improvements are needed, so we have other accountability measures shining that light. If the hon. Member for Chichester awaits the strategy—she will no doubt want to take a look and critique parts of it—I think a lot of it will address some of the concerns she raises.

As I said, before proposing the repeal of the presumption, we carefully assessed the impact it would have. We do not overstate it, but it is important because the change affects the judicial process, not the underlying reasons why families come to court. Because we do not expect it to increase case volumes, case length or demand for legal aid, we think that the current arrangements can meet it, but there are so many other improvements that we want to drive.

--- Later in debate ---

We always say that the loss of one life is one too many. If any of these changes saves one life, they will have been worth making. With that in mind, I commend clause 17 to the Committee.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

This has been a robust and important debate, and there are strong feelings on both sides of the argument. As I said earlier, we are legislating in a complex area. I think the shared opinion is that the intention is correct. Some of the questions that have been asked are legitimate, but I know the Minister is keen to work collaboratively. I will not press my two new clauses to a vote—they are probing amendments to open up the conversation—but amendment 14, which would require a report as a health check for the family courts, is important, so I will press it to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Seventh sitting)

Jess Brown-Fuller Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)]

Clause 3 and its various parts outline how trials can take place without juries. The Liberal Democrats have always fundamentally opposed the move to remove the right to a trial in front of one’s peers and the introduction of single-judge trials. To be clear, we do not accept the status quo and neither does anyone who I have spoken to in the legal profession or courts. The backlogs are totally unacceptable and they are failing victims, defendants and the people working in the criminal justice system. But no one in that system thinks that the fault lies with the jury trial system. In fact, Sir Brian stated that in our recent evidence session.

The decision is being made without any decisive modelling that would demonstrate that it would have the intended effect. There is also a timing issue with the proposal to restrict the use of a jury. Nationally, we have seen an intense displeasure with our democracy, and faith in politics and our political system is at an all-time low. It is fractured and deeply distrustful. When we have mistrust in our political system, it seeps into our justice system. Around six in 10 people express a fair amount or a great deal of confidence in juries delivering the right verdict compared with around four in 10 for courts and judges more generally.

Clause 3 proposes something that will risk a great deal without the evidence that shows it will actually work. That is why it is so strongly opposed. The Government instead should be implementing evidence-based reforms to target inefficiencies, including but not limited to negotiating the failed prisoner escort contract, introducing victim-led intensive case management across the regions, and investing in rehabilitation to reduce reoffending. They could also explore reducing the court backlog by running two trials in a day in select courtrooms instead of one, making more efficient use of time by nearly doubling the hearing time per sitting day and accelerating the throughput of cases. They could also develop and implement a more ambitious strategy to reduce delays in rape and serious sexual offences cases, or implement their own manifesto pledge to introduce speciality RASSO courts, which we will no doubt debate at a later stage of the Bill.

I am confident that the Minister will say, as she did in the evidence session, “Why is the backlog not coming down if we can make the system work better?” She put that question to Caroline Goodwin KC, Claire Davies KC and Samantha Hillas KC, saying,

“I have not seen any evidence that it can be reduced absent reform from the circuits.”

Caroline Goodwin came back with:

“The reality is that we have not been able to do this. Because there has been a consistent cap on sitting days, judges have not been able to open up court days. They have not been able to run blitz days where they can really take hold of a case and shake it and say, ‘Right, what is going on?’ We have not had any great directives to the CPS to say, ‘When you’re charging these cases, you need to review these very thoroughly.’ Throughout this entire time, the criminal Bar and the entire justice system has been brought to its knees. So if you are saying, ‘Is there any empirical evidence that this doesn’t work on your circuit, Ms Goodwin?’, we have not been able to do it.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 48, Q94.]

Why do we believe that we need to protect the safeguard of a jury trial while still reforming the criminal courts in other ways? The Lammy review in 2017 found that black and Chinese women were convicted at higher rates than white women in magistrate courts but not by juries. The Criminal Bar Association commissioned an independent study of criminal barristers; of the 2,029 who responded, 94% raised concerns about the lack of diversity in the Crown court bench division and 88% were against the introduction of a Crown court bench division altogether.

If we take the figures in the impact assessment that the Government have provided at face value, the proposal will save 5,000 sitting days per annum. That is around 3.5% of the Crown court workload. That means that rape complainants or victims who are currently waiting years for their own trial to be heard might see their cases brought forward by about a week. On the Government’s own estimates, the changes will not start taking effect until after the next general election. It is not providing a solution to the current crisis. Indeed, the impact assessment was based on a premise that it compared “do nothing” with the effects of all of the Government’s measures proposed in the Bill, but nobody is proposing “do nothing”. Radical investment and reform is already taking place and is welcomed. The Government were right to introduce removing the cap on sitting days and encourage blitz courts in a number of courts in the different regions. That has cross-party support and will bring down the backlog by more direct means.

I would also like to briefly highlight the perversity in the cut-off of three years. Let us take the case of a 20-year-old student charged with unlawful wounding, where someone’s face was gashed by a glass thrown in a bar. Under the sentencing guidelines, if they were of good character they would face imprisonment of between two and three years. That conviction would be life changing and that young defendant would not qualify for trial by jury under these proposals. Let us take exactly the same case, but involving a 40-year-old defendant with a long criminal record who has been to prison before. Because of their record, the likely sentence for the same offence would exceed three years and they would get trial by jury, whereas a young man with no convictions would not. I ask the Committee to reflect on the perversity created by changing the threshold.

I conclude by reiterating that clause 3, which sets out how the Crown court should allocate a case for trial without a jury and the procedure, should not be included in the Bill, and I shall vote against its inclusion.

[Paulette Hamilton (Birmingham Erdington) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Jardine. I rise to speak to the new clause that is tabled in my name, which I do not intend to push to a vote. It would require the Lord Chancellor to conduct and lay before Parliament a review of the impact of clause 3 after 12 months, and again after no later than 36 months. At its heart, the new clause is both modest and reasonable. It does not seek to block the Government’s proposals outright, nor does it attempt to rewrite the substance of the Bill. It simply asks that we understand the impact of the changes we are making and that we are accountable for them.

As Members across the House know, clause 3 introduces significant changes to the operation of the courts, particularly through the insertion of the new provisions into the Senior Courts Act 1981. Those provisions mark a clear shift in how justice is delivered. When we make changes of this scale, we have a duty not only to legislate, but to reflect on their impact and remain accountable for the consequences.

The Law Society of England and Wales has raised concerns that reforms to court processes must be carefully monitored to ensure they do not inadvertently undermine access to justice, particularly for those who already face barriers in navigating the legal system. These concerns are drawn from the experience of legal practitioners working day to day in the courts, particularly in cases involving litigants in person who often are trying to navigate complex procedures without legal representation. It has also emphasised the importance of evaluating how such changes operate in practice, including their impact on vulnerable and disadvantaged groups and on the capacity of the courts to deliver justice effectively.

The society has made it clear that such changes can have unintended consequences that are often felt most by the people who already struggle to access justice. That goes directly to public confidence in the justice system. Surely, trust and perception in the justice system are just as important as the legal framework itself. Concerns have also been raised by the Family Services Foundation, which highlights how procedural changes can disproportionately affect vulnerable individuals and families already facing complex challenges. That reflects its work with the families involved in the court system, where even small procedural changes can have a significant impact on people who are already dealing with instability, stress or crisis situations.

New clause 29 would ensure that Parliament receives clear evidence-based assessments of how the provisions are working in practice. Crucially, it would require that the assessments consider the impact on two groups: people from ethnic minority backgrounds and white British individuals living in lower-income households. As highlighted in earlier stages of the scrutiny of the Bill, there is a lack of clear statutory review built into the provisions, in particular in clause 3.

Some may ask, why specify those groups? The answer is simple—because justice is not experienced equally by all. We know all too well through evidence, lived experience and countless testimonies that people from ethnic minority communities often have lower levels of trust in the criminal justice system. That shapes how justice is perceived and whether it is seen as legitimate. For ethnic minority communities, this is fundamentally about trust in the justice system and perception of fairness.

Equally, we must recognise that socioeconomic disadvantage can profoundly affect a person’s experience of the courts. White British individuals from lower-income households are also more likely to feel marginalised by systems that appear distant, complex or unresponsive to their circumstances. If this House is serious about fairness, we must be serious about understanding how reforms affect those who are most at risk of being left behind.

New clause 29 does not assume the outcome. It does not claim that the provisions of clause 3 will necessarily have a negative impact, but it does recognise that without proper review, we simply will not know. That in itself would be a failure of our responsibility as legislators. The timeline set out in the new clause—a review after 12 months and a further review no later than after 36 months—strikes a careful balance. The reviews allow for early identification of any emerging issues, while also ensuring that long-term effects are properly understood. Importantly, the reviews would be laid before Parliament, ensuring transparency and enabling this House to scrutinise the findings. If the changes are working well, a review would demonstrate that; if they are not, a review would give us the opportunity to put things right.

I urge Members across the House to support new clause 29, not as a challenge to the Bill, but as a practical step towards fairness, transparency and accountability in our justice system. This House should be confident in reforms, but it should also be confident in knowing when to pause, assess and reflect. That is all that the new clause asks for.

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[Yasmin Qureshi]

The Institute for Government also said that juries do not take up that much time—they save more time. The point is that, without too much difficulty, we could get the courts up and running and working for extra sitting days. Essentially, if we had more court sitting days, we would not have the backlog; it is not the juries that are causing the backlog.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

Does the hon. Lady recognise that the 2025 Criminal Bar Association study noted that one in five barristers are considering leaving the criminal Bar, not because of the ineffectiveness of jury trials but because they have to work in crumbling buildings, because there is a significant administrative burden associated with passing on information to the CPS and because of the number of ineffective cases that then do not go ahead? Does she agree that if we tackle the inefficiencies in courts, we are more likely to improve our retention of criminal barristers and encourage some of them to come back into the profession because the system will work better?

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I entirely agree. The state of some of the courts in this country is sad. They are completely neglected, which creates a lot of challenges.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Eighth sitting)

Jess Brown-Fuller Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Mullan]

I want to pick up on the point made by the hon. Member for Amber Valley. She has engaged sincerely throughout this debate, so I do not think her comment was a deliberate. We are not saying that someone has to be charged with everything to be eligible; we are saying that anything that they are charged for on that basis that excludes them from a jury trial should only be those offences. We are saying that if someone is charged for insider dealing and the judge decides that the case is complex or lengthy, under the legislation they will get a single-judge trial. The proposed legislation says that if they were also charged with grievous bodily harm, then that case, which would ordinarily continue to have a jury trial, would be seen without a jury. That would mean that just because someone happens to be charged with one of those offences alongside another one, they lose their access to a jury trial on both offences.

[Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)]

The point that the shadow Minister is making is that the clause is a substantial expansion of what we understand the legislation to be doing in terms of a judge-only trial. Somebody could be charged with 10 offences. One of those could be related to a lengthy fraud case, but the rest of the offences would mean that they would still get a judge-only trial, which is a significant expansion of what we believe this Bill is trying to do.

[Dr Mullan]

Absolutely, and there is not even anything in the Bill about proportionality. There is nothing. If someone is charged with one of the offences and the trial will be complex and lengthy—which is different to it being serious—that is it. Whatever else someone is charged with, they have already lost their right to a jury trial. That is a huge expansion.

I intervened to ask the Minister to explain why they have chosen to exclude sexual assaults. If someone is charged with GBH, then they lose their right to a jury trial, but if they are charged with a sexual assault, which in the sentencing guidelines may lead to them having an even lower sentence than a serious GBH, they will continue to have a jury trial, and a fraud offence would continue to be seen by a jury instead of a judge. It is completely contradictory. There is no logic behind the Government’s position. If they had a throughline as to why sexual assault, which is an absolutely terrible offence, is being set to one side, but something as serious as GBH, which can carry a sentence of many years and is also terrible for victims, then there would be more logic to it. But the Government have crafted an approach that is simply unfair and, as the Lib Dem spokeswoman pointed out, represents a massive expansion in all the different types of offences and sentence lengths that could potentially lose access to a jury trial, just because they also happen to be charged with an ancillary offence related to complex fraud. I am afraid there is no rational basis to that at all.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

In the last couple of weeks, there have been press reports about a particular case that was charged in 2019. I will not go into that because it is going to reopen, but clause 4 would mean, for example, that somebody who has been abusing and defrauding the elderly—perhaps many different elderly people—over many years and has caused significant harm not of a sexual nature, and who is therefore charged with multiple offences, gets a judge-only trial and is not tried by a jury. If there was a sexual offence, they would get a jury, but if they had been harming multiple people and defrauding them, they would be tried by a judge alone. Does he agree that that feels quite perverse?

[Dr Mullan]

It is another example of what we have talked about: the move away from what we would consider to be natural justice. The scenario the hon. Member points to is not bizarre; there are offenders who target elderly women, for example, and will use all sorts of different methods to abuse them, from financial to sexual. I have seen cases of that nature. We see people who, at the same time as physically and sexually abusing a family member, were taking money from their bank account and falsely representing them to claim benefits, which again would be covered by the clause. It covers a whole range of offences, in all sorts of patterns. The Government call our amendment too rigid when, actually, the rigidity is quite clearly in the charging and allocation decisions; it is all on the Government’s side. They are being entirely rigid. If someone is subject to one of these cases and the judge thinks it is complex or lengthy, they will lose the right to a jury trial, end of story. I do not think that is a position that the Minister should feel comfortable advocating, and it is why we intend to press our amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Yasmin Qureshi]

Amendment 29 would insert into subsection (3) an additional ground for a lengthy or complex case to be tried without a jury in England or Wales, to require agreement by the defence and the prosecution that the trial is likely to exceed five months. Amendment 30 is almost self-explanatory: it would provide a right of appeal against a judge’s decision to prevent a case from going to a jury trial. We seek to give a right of appeal to the defence—and the prosecution—if the judge decides that the case fits the category of a complex case such as a fraud case. Amendments 31 to 33 would add additional offences to the list of offences that will be excluded from the provisions of clause 4. Offences such as homicide, including under road traffic legislation, will be excluded, and amendments 31 to 33 would extend that list.

I want to speak both to clause 4 and to clause 5, which, as I understand it, will enable clause 4. Unlike the provisions in clauses 1 to 3, clauses 4 and 5 at least provide that the defence and the prosecution may make representations before a judge directs a trial without a jury. I acknowledge that that is a meaningful procedural difference, but the principle remains deeply troubling, and I want to explain why. It is a further restriction on the right to trial by jury; more cases could be caught by this provision, which means that people will not be able to have a trial by jury.

The central argument for clauses 4 and 5 is that certain cases—fraud cases, multi-handed cases or those involving extensive financial or digital evidence—are simply too complex or long for a jury to follow. I have to say directly that I find that argument unfair to ordinary members of the public. Trial by jury is not simply a procedural mechanism; it is a fundamental expression of the relationship between the citizen and the state. It says that, when the state seeks to deprive a person of their liberty, that judgment will not be made by the state alone but by 12 of that person’s fellow citizens. That is important, because it is embedded in our legal tradition.

Let me speak from direct experience: in my years of criminal practice, I never once saw a jury that looked confused, overwhelmed or unable to follow the case before them. One of the last cases I conducted at the Bar was a seven-handed trial at the central criminal court. It went on for a number of weeks and involved serious allegations, multiple defendants, CCTV evidence and complex factual issues. Some of the defendants were charged with murder and manslaughter, there were issues such as joinder—agreement by different groups of people about whether they were committing crimes or not—and all sorts of legal directives had to be given. As it happened, the jury followed the evidence, assessed it and reached its verdicts. That has been my experience across many cases, including complex fraud, multi-defendant drug conspiracies and cases involving technical or sensitive evidence.

One of the jobs I had as a prosecutor was as a specialist casework lawyer for London CPS, which meant dealing with some of the most complex cases. When I was in the CPS, I also worked on proceeds of crime cases. In fact, I was what they call a POCA—Proceeds of Crime Act 2002—specialist for my branch. We were looking at financial auditing and asset recovery, deciding what kind of charges to go by, dealing with the issues of undercover operations, surveillance evidence, what we call the RIPA—Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 —rules, and cases involving public officials. Across all of that experience, the issue was never whether the jury could follow the evidence; the issue was whether the case was properly presented.

Given the way trials work, what a prosecutor presents to a jury is exactly what they would present to a judge. They explain the evidence, they connect the facts and the dots, and they build a case. The process does not change, but the audience does. If the evidence is presented clearly, a jury can follow it. If it is not, that is a failure of advocacy, not a failure of the jury, and the judge will get as confused as anybody else.

For example, if a prosecutor is trying to prove certain things, they will say, “If you look at exhibit 25 on page 1,000 of the jury bundle, you will see that this phone belongs to the defendant,” and create a link. Then they will say that another page shows the evidence extracted from the phone and explain how that is linked. They would do that for a judge as well, because judges want the prosecution to explain things to them, too. They must do that and follow the continuity of the evidence.

At the end of the day, whether the case involves insider dealing or financial accounting, people can see if the information is presented to them properly. The prosecutor might show them a document that says there was x amount of money in one account, but it went missing and has now been found in another person’s account. It is about making sure that all the dots are connected, and they would have to do that with a judge as well. The judge will not just flick through the papers and say, “Ms Prosecutor, you can just sit down and I’ll go through it.” The prosecutor, through their witnesses or their physical evidence or their section 9 statements or section 10 admissions, will have to prove each and every aspect of the case and the role each defendant played in it.

Although a number of people may be charged with one offence, we know that under our criminal law the sentence they can get if convicted varies depending on the role they played in the crime. Issues include who counselled it, procured it, aided and abetted it—who played what role—and people will be sentenced accordingly. Again, that is a matter on which a prosecutor or defence counsel would show everyone evidence and say, “This is what happened.” Therefore, it really makes no difference whether the case is being presented to jurors or a judge.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

Does the hon. Lady agree with His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC, who argued that jury trials could actually impose discipline in complex fraud cases, whereas in a judge-only trial there is no incentive to get on and hear all the evidence? He also said that in such cases, juries decide issues of dishonesty and facts that are not necessarily technical, meaning that 12 jurors are in a much better position to reach a decision based on dishonesty.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I thank the hon. Lady for that intervention. I could go on and on explaining how evidence is presented, but all I will say from my years of experience—not just in the CPS, but in the independent Bar as well—is that I have gone through thousands of pages of documents, and juries have reacted to that and been able to deal with the cases unfazed. The issue is how well the evidence is presented, and counsel would have the same duty to do that in front of a judge.

In some respects, a jury trial is better when legal issues or the admissibility of evidence have to be determined during a trial. In a jury trial, the judge can send the jury out and listen to everyone’s representations about whether something should be admitted or not, and then make a decision. That is helpful because juries then never know about all the debates that have taken place. Sometimes there is evidence that a party wants to be admitted that is inadmissible or would be prejudicial.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Mullan]

I rise to speak in support of Opposition amendment 46, which is in my name, as we debate elements of the Government’s proposals to remove jury trials and make use of the new Crown court bench division in relation to potentially complex and lengthy trials.

To make sense of this debate, we must consider how the measures will apply. As we touched on earlier, the Government’s stated aim is to reduce the time taken to hear particularly lengthy and complex cases by permitting judge-alone trials and therefore—they say—freeing up additional Crown court capacity. The cases must involve at least one fraud or related financial offence listed in proposed new schedule 3ZA, which includes fraud by false representation, cheating the public revenue, money laundering and other offences, and would not involve an indictable-only homicide offence or sexual offence, including attempts or conspiracies to commit such offences.

We can already see, when considering the written evidence we have received, why there are rightly many questions about how the provisions will operate. In amendment 46, we therefore propose a requirement to ensure that defendants have a route in the law back to a jury trial. I draw the Committee’s attention to the evidence of Dr Natalie Hodgson, from the University of New South Wales, and Dr Matt Thomason, from the University of Nottingham, which was particularly helpful. They point out:

“Currently, the proposed s.42A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 does not define what is meant by “lengthy” or “complex”...Similarly, the proposed legislation provides no detail as to what judges can and should consider in determining whether ‘it is in the public interest’ for the trial to be conducted by judge alone. The Explanatory Note makes clear that ‘the court will retain full discretion’ as to whether it is appropriate to order a trial by judge alone.”

That is giving judges enormous power over these decisions.

Dr Thomason and Dr Hodgson also say:

“In contrast, we note that in New Zealand—which has a similar provision permitting judge-alone trials in cases ‘likely to be long and complex’—the relevant legislation sets out with greater specificity what a judge should consider in determining whether a case is likely to be long and complex…In particular, the New Zealand legislation specifies that a Court must not order a judge-alone trial unless all reasonable measures and arrangements have been taken to shorten the length of the trial, but the ‘duration of the trial still seems likely to exceed 20 sitting days.’”

So New Zealand was capable, in its legislation, of drawing a line in the sand as to what it considered to be a lengthy trial, but we do not seem to be doing the same.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

The hon. Member is making a really interesting point about what we perceive to be lengthy or complex, as the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden tried to do with her amendment. Amendment 29 seeks to define a lengthy trial as one going beyond the five-month point, but Geoffrey Rivlin KC collected data over six years from Southwark Crown court—the primary venue for complex financial crime trials—which showed that the vast majority of fraud cases lasted less than three months, with only one or two typically lasting more than that, and only two cases in total lasting over six months. Does the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle agree that it would be helpful for the Minister to clarify what she believes “lengthy” or “complex” to be? The judiciary will also be asking that.

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[Sarah Sackman]

I will make a bit of progress.

We also need to be mindful of the burden that lengthy trials place on jurors. In this country, between January 2024 and December 2025, almost 3,000 jurors sat in trials that lasted more than six weeks. We should be mindful that trials for fraud and serious financial crime, which are within the purview of this clause, are some of the longest and most demanding in the Crown courts. We also have to be mindful of our argument on the time savings of having judge-only trials for such cases.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

Has the Ministry of Justice done any modelling on the benefits of introducing Maxwell hours for all lengthy fraud cases? Doing so would benefit jurors, as they would only be committed to sitting from 8 am until midday and could go on to fulfil their caring responsibilities and such. The same goes for judges when dealing with complex fraud cases.

[Sarah Sackman]

I do not have any modelling to hand, but I can certainly take that away. If that work has been done, I will let the hon. Lady have it, but I do not have it to hand so I simply do not know.

I do not want to go over old ground, but we heard in oral evidence, particularly from the panel of experienced judges, about the time savings related to judge-only trials. Reference was made to other jurisdictions, and the data from New South Wales, which is a comparable common law jurisdiction, shows that when it introduced judge-only trials in complex cases, it saw a 29% reduction in the length of trials, so the Government are confident that clause 4 will result in material time savings.

Amendment 29 would make parties’ agreement that a trial is likely to last more than five months a condition of judge-only trials under clause 4. Of course, I agree that five months is an exceptionally long time to expect any member of the public to serve on a jury, but we cannot ignore the fact that considerably shorter trials can be equally as disruptive to jurors’ lives, particularly if they are self-employed or have caring responsibilities.

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[Rebecca Paul]

I agree with my hon. Friend, as I normally do.

Finally, there is the obvious practical point that there are better answers available. The Law Society says that reform and investment must be strategic, not piecemeal, and warns against stand-alone measures such as changing from jury trials to judge-only trials without convincing evidence that they will significantly reduce the backlog. It says that Parliament should insist on “detailed modelling” and on understanding the Government’s intentions across the whole package of reform, not just on this isolated measure. The existence of pressure in the system does not prove that every proposed constitutional shortcut is justified. The question is whether the shortcut is necessary. With clause 4, the answer is plainly no. For all those reasons, I oppose clause 4 and schedule 1, and I support amendment 51.

Clause 4 offers a constitutionally serious reduction in jury trials for a tiny claimed benefit of 200 sitting days. The evidence does not show that juries are the cause of delay, collapse or miscarriage in these cases. Fraud cases are not too technical for juries. The key issue is dishonesty, and ordinary citizens are uniquely well placed to judge that. The removal of juries in these cases would damage open justice and public confidence. Schedule 1 gives effect to that flawed principle and then goes further by creating a route to ministerial expansion. Amendment 51 is therefore a sensible and necessary safeguard, but in truth, the better course is simpler still: clause 4 and schedule 1 should not be included in the Bill at all.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I will speak against the inclusion of clause 4. It inserts part 6A in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which will allow complex or lengthy cases to be tried without a jury. My main opposition to the clause is that it is a pointless exercise by the Government that will in no way affect the backlog. The Government’s own impact assessment suggests that the savings will amount to just 200 sitting days per year, which is a tiny fraction—0.18% of the current sitting days. The Government argue that these cases can continue for many months, thereby wasting jurors’ time or putting additional pressure on those called for jury service. However, data from Southwark Crown court, where the majority of fraud and other such cases are heard, shows that only one or two cases per year exceed three months, and only two between 2018 and 2024 went beyond six months.

His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC has argued that jury trials impose discipline, which helps to reduce the length of fraud trials. Without that incentive, judge-alone trials may be as long as or even longer than jury trials. I alluded to this earlier, but jurors decide on issues of dishonesty and fact in these cases, which are not necessarily technical. Twelve jurors are therefore in a much better position to reach a decision.

I also have grave concerns about the terminology of “complex” and “lengthy”. I know the Minister has said that the meaning of complex and lengthy are well understood in the judiciary. I would argue that a lot of people in the legal profession are pushing back against that assertion, and that the Bill does not provide clarity on what they should determine to be complex or lengthy.

[Joe Robertson]

The hon. Member is making a very good speech, but she is almost being generous. The wording in the Bill is not “complex”; it is “complexity”, which is a description, not even a value. The Bill is even vaguer than what the hon. Member is suggesting in her well-made point.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I thank the hon. Member for his point; he characterises me very well as being generous.

I would also argue that the scope is expanded significantly if one of the offences that a defendant is charged with is fraud, money laundering or any of the offences that sit in that category. There can be 10 charges against a defendant, and if one of them is fraud, money laundering or terrorism funding, that entire case could be heard in a judge-alone trial.

The Minister spoke very clearly about recognising the burden on jurors. She made a legitimate point, and it is certainly reflected in reality. Especially when jury trials do not run as we would expect them to run, the impact on jurors can be huge, especially for those who are self-employed or have caring responsibilities. As I mentioned earlier, I ask the Minister to go away and look at the Maxwell hours, which have been successful for longer cases. For a morning session, it means that those who are self-employed are able to commit to working in the afternoons. In some cases, it means that those with caring responsibilities know that they are going to get home at a reasonable hour. The Maxwell hours are used in lots of different areas, and could be the answer to retaining the key principle of jury trials in fraud cases, while still ensuring a better experience for jurors.

Amendment 51 would prevent

“the Lord Chancellor adding further offences to the list in Schedule 1 by regulations.”

The concern is that it would give unconstrained power over the list of offences that may be heard without a jury on the basis that cases are considered complex or burdensome for jurors. That rationale could easily be extended to lengthy murder, rape, or drug trials.

As the shadow Minister mentioned, if the wording in schedule 1 specified fraud or that particular type of case, it would be a different matter. However, it does not; it just says “complex or lengthy”. The Minister makes the point that this is a complex area, and criminal offences are added all the time, but she also referred to the specific types of fraud cases. If she can include the provision of fraud in clause 1, that would provide a reassurance that there would not be additionality of scope. That is not to suggest that the current Lord Chancellor would be inclined to increase the scope, but a future Lord Chancellor may be able to extend the provision far beyond the huge change that the Government are already proposing.

Trials for things like terrorism, murder, rape and drug offences can last many months. They can be as complex as fraud cases, and they can involve multiple defendants and expert evidence. On that basis, the arguments that the Minister has made do not stand. That is why I will be voting against clause 4.

[Joe Robertson]

How long is a piece of string? The unanswerable question. I could ask another question: is a 2-metre piece of string a long piece of string? If I asked you that question, Ms Butler, you would have a lot of questions for me before you gave your answer, yet the Minister thinks it is easy to answer the question, “Is a two-week trial a long trial?”. She thinks it is obvious and that a judge will be able to make a decision. She is not willing to put a definition on that, because she says it is evident in the way that the Bill is drafted.

I look at the words in the Bill—which is all that a judge will have to make that decision. On length, it says that the judge will have to decide if the

“likely length of the trial…makes it appropriate for the trial to be conducted without a jury.”

On complexity, they will have to decide whether

“the likely complexity of the trial”

is

“appropriate for the trial to be conducted without a jury.”

It is even hard to decipher from that whether it means complex is good or bad for a jury. Complexity is just a description; it is not a value. This is incredibly unusual, novel and, I would say, badly worded legislation. Ordinarily, a provision of this sort would say something along the lines of: “If the court is satisfied that the length of trial is so long that it would make it unreasonable for a jury”. That would be more normal wording.

The principle of reasonableness, while giving discretion and, some might argue, a vague term in the English language, is a well-tested word in criminal law and the English legal system. We know what reasonableness means; it is an objective test—“What would an ordinary person think is reasonable?” What about appropriateness? Does that mean appropriate to that judge on that day? Does it mean appropriate to a particular, theoretical juror? There is absolutely no guidance in Bill about how this novel word, “appropriate”, should be interpreted. Even when there are words in legislation such as “reasonableness”, which are backed by decades or even centuries of case law, the judge is very often given guidance in the legislation as to what is and is not reasonable.

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[Yasmin Qureshi]

Amendments 34 and 71 are probing amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central (Abtisam Mohamed). I will not be asking for them to be put to a vote.

Amendment 34 concerns magistrates’ sentencing powers. The amendment would remove the word “regulations” and insert

“made by the affirmative resolution procedure”

to prevent significant changes from being made to the sentencing powers of magistrates courts without a proper debate and vote in Parliament. If such changes are to be made, Parliament should fully discuss their impacts. Amendment 71 is consequential on amendment 34.

Clause 6 increases magistrates’ sentencing powers to 24 months. In my opinion, and in the opinion of many people, that represents a restriction on appeals. If sentencing powers are increased while access to appeals is reduced, which is what is being done in clause 7, the risks to fairness in the system are significantly heightened, particularly for those without legal representation, given that the rules for legal aid in the magistrates court are very different from those in the Crown court.

For those reasons, the Bill raises fundamental questions about fairness, trust and the proper functioning of the justice system. The solution to delay is not to remove our historical safeguards, but to fix the system. I ask the Minister to consider whether it is right to give the magistrates court the power to impose sentences of 24 months, which is a considerable period. If that is being contemplated, there should be a proper debate and a vote in Parliament; it should not be put through on the nod.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

Amendment 13, which was tabled in my name, provides that magistrates’ sentencing powers cannot be increased beyond 12 months, which would keep the Bill in line with Leveson’s suggestions. The Government have failed to take into account the impact that increasing magistrates’ sentencing powers will have. Magistrates’ backlogs are increasing, and magistrates courts are not set up to take on more complex cases.

The Government are also making some bold assumptions about the speed at which magistrates can clear these cases. They have their own backlog to face, which stands at 379,000 cases and increasing. That is a 17% increase on the previous year, which comes alongside a major cut to the number of magistrates over the past decade or so, from 28,000 to just over 14,000. Removing the power of defendants to elect, plus the changes in sentencing powers, will increase the workload of magistrates courts, and the system will struggle to absorb that. Magistrates will be required to deal with more complex cases despite the summary nature of their jurisdiction. Either they will be unable to handle those cases and will send them to the Crown court, or they will risk delivering poor-quality justice, which would let down victims and defendants alike.

The cohort affected by this change consists by definition of defendants expected to receive a prison sentence of between one and two years. The impact assessment shows that the Government assume that each of these trials in the magistrates courts will be completed within just four hours. The impact assessment also assumes that cases involving a guilty plea will take just 30 minutes. Either the impact assessment is incorrect or these cases will not receive the scrutiny they deserve.

Our other amendment, amendment 21, would make changing the general limit on custodial sentences for either-way offences in the magistrates court possible by affirmative resolution only. It is very similar to amendment 34, which the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden spoke to on behalf of her hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central. The amendment would ensure that any changes to magistrates’ sentencing powers—if amendment 13, to limit their powers, is not passed—is subject to the affirmative procedure. It would give greater parliamentary oversight, as all changes would have to pass through a Delegated Legislation Committee. Leaving that to the discretion of the Lord Chancellor is not a strong enough condition; it does not provide enough scrutiny or protection against rogue actors. The measure was also recommended by the Law Society of England and Wales. It would provide just that protection, and would ensure that Parliament would have and maintain its say in matters.

[Siân Berry]

I will speak as quickly as I can. I support the amendments tabled in this group by the Liberal Democrats, which would limit any increase in the sentencing powers of magistrates beyond 12 months; amendment 34, which was moved by the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden; and the Liberal Democrat and Conservative amendments that would ensure that, if that limit is not accepted, any further changes are made by the affirmative resolution procedure.

I am sure we will all remind the Minister that Sir Brian Leveson specifically made his reforms to jury trials contingent on not increasing the sentencing powers of magistrates. He stated that specifically in paragraph 71 of his report. He also stated:

“My strong recommendation is that the maximum should remain at 12 months.”

That followed, in paragraph 70, another important caveat that the Government seem to have overlooked:

“While removing the right to elect for certain offences may streamline the judicial process and alleviate the burden on the higher courts, it raises concerns about balancing the right of the defendant with the broader interests of justice.”

We have to admit that the Government are taking a risk with the moves they are making. The magnitude and volume of that risk increase with the number of extra cases that are pushed to the magistrates courts through other provisions in the Bill, while the consequences of that risk increase with the higher sentences made possible under clause 6. This is not a step we should take alongside those other steps. They increase the risks to justice.

In oral evidence, we heard from Claire Davies, the leader of the south eastern circuit, who said of magistrates courts:

“There are errors and mistakes made, but if the length of sentence is extended, it will potentially increase that risk.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 51, Q99.]

We also heard from Emma Torr, from APPEAL, who described

“swift and speedy justice in the magistrates court. It is often rough and ready; we are talking about cases being tried by lay justices, some of whom may be experienced but some may not be, and we are also talking about less experienced judges. You often find in the lower court, the magistrates court, that advocates are more inexperienced and tend to be at the start of their career.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 86-87, Q185.]

This point was also emphasised by Fiona Rutherford, the chief executive of JUSTICE, who said:

“There is a question mark about the accuracy of the way in which magistrates are making decisions.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 82, Q174.]

These are the risks we are talking about compared with having a judge and jury.

Risks also come from the surrounding bureaucratic situation, which could lead to more defendants being unrepresented. When the shift is made, we will be leaving them without legal aid, because of the changes in the income requirements. We heard from Fiona Rutherford of JUSTICE that without this representation there could be additional risks to victims.

The Minister needs to admit that this part of the Bill goes too far. On top of the other things she is doing, she is adding more consequence, not just more volume, to the risk equation. That is a poor step to take. Clause 6 should not stand part, and I support all the amendments.

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[Sarah Sackman]

Amendment 10 is a technical amendment concerning magistrates court sentencing powers when imposing consecutive sentences for multiple summary offences.

The Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 introduced a power to vary the general limit on magistrates court sentencing powers for a single triable either-way offence between a maximum of six months or a maximum of 12 months. Clause 6(1) of the Bill amends that power so that the limit for a single triable either-way offence can be set at 18 months or 24 months, in addition to six months and 12 months.

As part of the changes in 2022, a consequential amendment was made to section 133 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, which makes provision in relation to consecutive terms of imprisonment imposed by a magistrates court. As a result, the maximum aggregate term of imprisonment that can be imposed for multiple summary-only offences cannot exceed the longest term that could be imposed for any one of those offences.

Therefore, where the highest maximum sentence for the individual offences is less than six months, the magistrates court cannot impose more than that maximum when imposing consecutive terms of imprisonment for multiple summary-only offences. For example, low-value criminal damage has a maximum sentence of three months’ custody. Therefore, in sentencing someone for two or more criminal damage offences, the magistrates court can impose only up to three months to be served consecutively, rather than six months.

As a result of this amendment, magistrates courts will be able to impose a maximum of six months’ custody consecutively for two or more summary only offences. That will ensure that magistrates courts can impose sentences that adequately reflect the overall offending behaviour, as consecutive sentences enable courts to proportionately reflect the overall criminality when multiple offences have been committed. Importantly, this amendment does not alter the statutory maximum penalties available for existing individual offences.

Amendment 10 agreed to.

Amendment made: 11, in clause 6, page 16, line 13, leave out “paragraph” and insert “paragraphs 16(a) and”.—(Sarah Sackman.)

This amendment is consequential on amendment 10.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I beg to move amendment 22, in clause 6, page 17, line 11, at end insert—

“(9) After section 15 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, insert—

‘15A Entitlement to Crown Court funding levels in certain proceedings in the Magistrates’ Court

(1) This section applies to criminal proceedings in a magistrates’ court where—

(a) an individual is charged with an either-way offence; and

(b) the court, having regard to the sentencing guidelines, considers it likely that a sentence of imprisonment exceeding 12 months will be imposed upon conviction.

(2) Where this section applies, any relevant representation order shall provide for remuneration at the same rates and under the same conditions as would apply if the proceedings were determined in the Crown Court.’”

This amendment links legal aid funding to the potential severity of the sentence rather than the venue of the trial. It ensures that defendants facing more than 12 months' imprisonment receive Crown Court level funding, regardless of which court the case is heard in.

The amendment would link legal aid funding to the potential severity of the sentence rather than the venue of the trial. It would ensure that defendants facing more than 12 months’ imprisonment received Crown court-level legal aid funding, regardless of which court the case was heard in.

The context of this is that the Bill’s equality statement acknowledges that

“if more cases are dealt with in the magistrates’ courts, it is likely that an increased proportion of these defendants may be ineligible for legal aid when they would otherwise have been eligible if their case had been heard at the Crown Court.”

That is because the eligibility threshold for receiving representation from a publicly funded lawyer in the magistrates court is an annual income of below £22,325—significantly lower than the Crown court threshold of £37,500. As a result, individuals in full-time minimum wage employment may not qualify for legal aid in the magistrates court.

Without that being addressed, it is clear that we will face an increase in the number of defendants attending court without legal representation, which undermines fairness for all those involved. Complainants, victims and witnesses may be cross-examined by the alleged perpetrator of the crime; it could slow proceedings down; it risks unfairness to the accused; and it means that the outcome of the cases will depend on whether the defendant can afford expensive lawyers, not on the true justice of the case. That concern is compounded by the fact that clause 6 provides magistrates with greater sentencing powers, meaning that defendants will be facing more serious cases. It will also prolong hearings, which will reduce the savings the Government claim they will make by shifting cases into the magistrates court.

Our amendment would ensure that, if the Government’s plans are implemented, which we oppose, legal aid would be linked to the sentence length, ensuring that those who face longer sentences in the magistrates court received the funding they would expect in the Crown court. There is a lower threshold for legal aid in the magistrates court because it is assumed that cases will be shorter and simpler. That will no longer be the case, with more serious cases taking place that could take days to complete. Our amendment would avoid concerns about two-tier justice and an increase in the number of defendants appearing in court without legal representation.

[Siân Berry]

It is very good to see you in the Chair this evening, Ms Jardine; thank you for looking after us. I will speak very briefly in support of the amendment, to which I have added my name. I have spoken already about the many risks piling up with the Bill, and this amendment is one essential mitigation for some of those risks. If the Government press ahead, they cannot ignore it.

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[Sarah Sackman]

I thank the hon. Member for Chichester for tabling the amendment, because the issue and importance of legal aid is something that I think we both care deeply about. Access to justice is a fundamental principle within our justice system; it is fundamental to the fairness of processing criminal cases through our courts. But if I am vociferous, I think it is entirely justified. We are a Government stretching every sinew to put our legal aid sector back on a sustainable footing.

That, by the way, is not simply a matter of increased fees, although we have done that and are continuing to do so. The inheritance we received—I say this not just as the Courts Minister responsible for the legal aid system—regarding the whole infrastructure of legal aid and the IT systems on which that was built, was wholly inadequate. It is no surprise, then, that the minute there is a cyber-attack, the whole thing keels over.

One of the difficulties with these fees is actually implementing them. We cannot implement them overnight because of the lack of investment, as well as the cutting of fees, that took place over 14 years. What we have done, as one of our first steps, is make significant uplifts to criminal legal aid fees for criminal solicitors, focusing on duty solicitors and prison lawyers—precisely the people we need to deliver this court transformation. That has already been implemented; we have an additional £116 million a year once in steady state. And we have announced the funding that is to come as part of these reforms, with £34 million for criminal legal aid advocates, alongside a commitment to match-fund criminal barrister pupillages to open up the pipeline to people from all backgrounds and to build our workforce.

So that is pragmatism, principle, social mobility and investment. No one could doubt the passion and commitment, as well as the investment, in transforming the infrastructure so badly needed to implement these criminal legal aid fees, and indeed the civil legal aid fees, which, by the way, we are also uplifting. This investment reflects the valuable and tough decisions that we have had to take, and the valuable and tough work undertaken by those who work in the criminal justice system. It will help them to ensure that justice is served.

Turning to the specifics of amendment 22, under the current financial eligibility rules, the Government are confident that the majority of defendants charged with either-way offences are expected to be eligible for legal aid at the magistrates court. For individuals who do not qualify for legal aid, there are already measures in place in the magistrates court to provide some support. The hardship review mechanism can provide support to those who fail or who do not meet the means test for legal aid but face higher than usual outgoings or expenses associated with their case. In addition, unrepresented defendants may also receive support via the free duty solicitor scheme, which we are investing in and that can provide representation at a first hearing if required.

In terms of remuneration for legal aid lawyers, legal aid fee schemes are specific to the court where the case is heard and are designed to reflect the differing processes and nature of work in the magistrates court and Crown court. The magistrates court fee scheme is designed to be simpler to administer and use for providers, reflecting the greater speed and volume of cases going through that court. Providers appreciate the greater simplicity. A non-standard fee route exists for exceptional cases to ensure that work on more complex cases is appropriately remunerated. Fees and financial eligibility conditions at magistrates courts can already provide representation for defendants facing potentially longer sentences if convicted of an either-way offence.

We remain committed to the provision of legal aid and recognise the vital role that it plays in underpinning access to justice. We will keep our approach to the rules that govern financial eligibility across legal aid under review, including by carefully assessing the impact of all the recommendations made by the independent review of the criminal courts and the final formation of the Bill before taking further decisions. In the light of that explanation, I hope the hon. Member for Chichester will agree to withdraw her amendment.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I thank the hon. Members for Bexhill and Battle and for Bolton South and Walkden for their contributions to the discussion on amendment 22.

I recognise that thresholds exist for a reason, but people earning £22,325 are not making a different consideration from somebody earning £23,325. They are lucky if they get to the end of the month with any money left in their bank account, let alone being able to consider paying for an hour’s legal advice. Even the concept of contacting a law firm and asking for simple, early-stage advice is going to feel totally alien to these people, because they do not have the funds to be able to do that. So thresholds exist for a reason, but the Government need to do a piece of work on where those thresholds land, because with the cost of living crisis, it is really hard in this country for people to afford to exist, let alone to afford the additional pressures that a case being heard in a magistrates court would put upon them.

The Minister said that access to justice is a fundamental principle. I agree entirely, and I know how strongly she feels about making sure that legal aid is fit for purpose. We have had many conversations about that, and I am confident that we will continue to do so. I know she will vote against the amendment, but that does not mean that I will not push it to a vote, because it is important to get how important legal aid provision is on the record. This conversation is not over, and I am sure the Minister will agree to carry it on.

[Sarah Sackman]

indicated assent.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Dr Mullan]

I oppose clause 6, which, as we have discussed, grants the Lord Chancellor the power to increase the maximum sentencing limit in magistrates courts from the current 12 months to 18 or even 24 months. While the Government present that as a necessary measure to relieve the backlog in the Crown court, we must look closely at what is being sacrificed in the name of speed.

This proposal is not a minor adjustment; it is a fundamental shift in the nature of summary justice. It would allow magistrates—volunteers who have to sit only 13 days a year and who on average sit 17 to 23 days—to deprive a citizen of their liberty for up to two years. That expansion of power comes at a time when the system is already under immense strain in the magistrates courts, and it is the view of the Criminal Bar Association, JUSTICE, the Bar Council and others that this move is unnecessary and potentially unsafe for the integrity of our legal system.

The central concern shared by legal professionals is that magistrates courts are simply not designed to handle the complexity of cases that may, at some point, carry two-year sentences. As the Criminal Bar Association pointed out in its evidence, the “practices and procedures” of those courts are “necessarily ‘summary’ in nature.” They were built for the swift disposal of what some consider to be minor offences, not for the intricate legal and factual disputes that characterise more serious crimes. The Criminal Bar Association has been blunt in its assessment, calling the extension of summary justice to cases carrying two-year terms a “recipe for rough justice”. That concern is backed by the Government’s own impact assessment, which assumes that magistrates will complete those more serious trials in just a few hours. As the CBA notes, that assumption is

“clearly naïve in the extreme”.

Either the cases will not receive the scrutiny they deserve, or the predicted time savings will never materialise.

One of the most troubling aspects of increasing sentencing powers is the legal aid gap. Given that we were unsuccessful with amendment 53, it is important to reiterate the impact of that gap when considering the clause as a whole. At present, the income threshold to qualify for a publicly funded lawyer is significantly lower in the magistrates courts, at £22,305, than in the Crown court, at £37,500.

JUSTICE has highlighted the severe unfairness that this creates. Individuals in full-time, minimum-wage employment, who would be eligible for legal aid in the Crown court, will find themselves ineligible in the magistrates courts. We face a reality where a defendant could be facing a two-year prison sentence while being forced to represent themselves, because they cannot afford a lawyer and do not qualify for state support. As JUSTICE warns, unrepresented defendants are often observed to receive harsher sentences, as they do not know how to mitigate. We cannot call a system just if it increases the stakes of a trial, while simultaneously stripping away the means for a professional defence.

We must also confront the impact of these changes on minority communities. The Bar Council and JUSTICE both point to the findings of the 2017 Lammy review, as it is referred to in shorthand, which identified juries as a

“success story of our justice system”,

because they do not appear to discriminate between different ethnic groups when returning verdicts. However, the review found that the positive story of jury equity was not matched in magistrates courts. The Minister has previously spoken about the lack of disparity in sentencing outcomes, for example, but specific statistical analysis showed that black, Asian and mixed ethnic women were more likely to be convicted—conviction is the question we are considering here—in magistrates courts than white women.

We have discussed before how that may not necessarily be a direct causal relationship, as it could just be correlation. However, as the Lammy review points out, it is incumbent on Governments of any colour—Conservative, Labour or whatever they might be—to justify and explain those disparities. As we have discussed previously, we have not managed to justify and explain them, yet we are introducing measures that could potentially exacerbate them.

Beyond ethnicity, the Lammy review noted a great cultural gulf between predominantly white, middle-class judges and magistrates and the defendants appearing before them. By forcing more serious cases into the magistrates court, and removing the right of defendants to elect a jury trial, the Government are moving cases away from the most trusted and equitable part of our justice system into one where public trust, at least for some communities, is already fragile. JUSTICE notes that any reform that reduces choice risks deepening existing disparities and exacerbating distrust for minoritised communities.

The Government’s primary justification is efficiency, but the Bar Council argues that these reforms will likely consume resources without bringing down the backlog. As we have said, there is also a challenge with the backlog in the magistrates courts, which are currently facing their own record high of 370,000 cases. The system is also facing a critical shortage of magistrates and legal advisers. The loss of sitting days due to the absence of legal advisers, who are often trainees, even for better-paid work, is a persistent problem. Some estimates suggest that there are more than 20,000 sitting days-worth of work from professional judges in the Crown court. Expecting that to be absorbed into an overstretched and shrinking cohort of volunteers in the magistrates courts would, as the CBA describes,

“transfer the burden from one over-stretched part of the system to another.”

Finally, we must look at how the clause interacts with the rest of the Bill. While clause 6 increases power at the lower level, clause 7 restricts the ability to challenge those decisions by removing the automatic right of appeal and replacing it with a permission-based model. The Bar Council describes this combination as

“a comprehensive rolling back of safeguards.”

At present, around 40% of appeals against conviction from magistrates courts are successful, and 47% of appeals against sentence are upheld, demonstrating that the lower courts frequently make meaningful errors. Doubling their sentencing powers, while simultaneously making it harder for a defendant to correct a wrong conviction, is a dangerous path to take.

It is also worth noting that the Bill departs from the recommendations of the very review that it claims to implement. Sir Brian Leveson recommended that the current 12-month maximum should be made permanent. I draw attention to a previous response from the Minister, when she again raised the possibility that the review invited the Government to go further. We have discussed that this might be a relevant argument to make if, for example, we were talking about a recommendation on which the review did not clearly oppose the Government going further.

If I was Brian Leveson, I would feel a bit like I was being mugged off by the Government, because they are saying, “We agree with what you want to do, but we’re going ignore you on the position that you are fundamentally clear on. Indeed, we’re not only ignoring your specific recommendation, we’re ignoring what you said about the other recommendations being contingent on the Government doing this thing around controlling the sentencing”. It is doubly insulting to Sir Brian to then suggest, as the Minister did, that he would be relaxed about this, and that he invited them to go further. Certainly, no reasonable person would interpret his suggestion in that way.

There is also a question about the numbers. We know Sir Brian’s central recommendation is that we reach 130,000 sitting days. That is the number that he arrived at. We must assume that he has arrived at that number contingent on the Government sticking to his advice that we do not increase the maximum sentencing powers of the magistrates. If the Government are claiming that that will be a further 8,000 sitting days, there must be some juggling with the figures. If the Government are seeking to achieve 130,000, and Sir Brian thinks that is the right number, and the Government’s plan has got an additional 8,000 that Sir Brian never envisioned, does that mean we have 8,000 to play with in some other regard that Sir Brian did not understand? Can the Minister explain how we have ended up with the same figures and the same goal, but in a completely different way, with a further 8,000 that Sir Brian never anticipated or wanted?

We also heard the argument that this is fine because the youth courts do it. We had that argument in an earlier sitting, and I made it clear that there are some fundamental differences. It really undermines the concept of having a specialist court if what goes on in that specialist court is then used to support an argument of general application. That goes against the whole point of a specialist court—we have gone out of our way in that case, because we recognise that the circumstances are special. For example, the types of custody, the implications for criminal records and the style in which cross-examination happens are all different in the youth court and the adult estate. We must therefore recognise that we are in a completely different position.

The Minister also talked about how the negative resolution procedure is already used in this area. The crucial difference is that we are taking a leap to 24 months, in terms of the impact of these decisions. What might have arguably been permissible at the lower end of the threshold does not automatically translate into an assumption that it is therefore appropriate at the higher end of the threshold. It is because the measure will apply towards the higher end of threshold that we think it is inappropriate. We failed to persuade the Government, and as a result this clause remains concerning.

In summary, the proposal to increase magistrates’ sentencing powers to 24 months is a move towards cheaper, faster justice that is likely to be neither cheap nor fast, and it will certainly not be just. It risks creating a surge of unrepresented defendants, exacerbating racial disproportionality and displacing the backlog into a court jurisdiction that is structurally ill-equipped to handle it. We should not trade away fundamental procedural protections for a marginal gain in court sitting days.

If we want to solve the backlog, we should focus on the low-hanging fruit identified by the Bar Council and others: open all existing courtrooms, more than 10% of which are closed today and were closed yesterday; fix prisoner transport, an issue that costs us thousands of days every year; and properly resource the legal profession. We must reject the 24-month limit and maintain the 12-month cap to ensure that serious custodial decisions remain subject to the full rigour and safeguards of our Crown courts.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

Clause 6 expands the Secretary of State’s regulation-making power to change the general limit on the custodial sentence that a magistrates court may impose. It replaces the current list of possible maximum terms—six or 12 months—with a new list of six, 12, 18 or 24 months. That will allow the Secretary of State, by regulation, to change the general limit within these set terms.

The sentencing powers of the magistrates court were increased in 2022 from six months to 12 months. This clause would allow the Lord Chancellor to further increase the maximum by statutory instrument to either 18 or 24 months. The result will be more triable either-way cases being heard in the magistrates court. The practical reason we oppose the clause is that magistrates courts are facing their own increasing list—Members can decide whether they want to call it a backlog or a list. I recognise the Minister’s comments that we should not describe the 379,000 cases waiting in the magistrates courts as a backlog and I agree with her assessment that we need a certain number of cases in order for the magistrates court to function.

Victims and Courts Bill

Jess Brown-Fuller Excerpts

Consideration of Lords message
Monday 20th April 2026 Commons Chamber

[Lorraine Beavers (Blackpool North and Fleetwood) (Lab)]

I stand here today proud of my constituent Katie Brett, who joins us in the Gallery. These changes to the unduly lenient sentence scheme are being brought forward because of her campaigning, following the most traumatic ordeal for her and her family, and I am proud to welcome the fact that this Labour Government have listened and acted.

For too long, victims and bereaved families felt that the justice system was not on their side. Measures to force offenders to attend sentencing hearings are right. Families should not be denied the chance to see justice simply because an offender refuses to face up to what they have done. The stronger protections for children, especially in cases of sexual violence, are also badly needed, but I want specifically to welcome the changes that the Government are proposing to the unduly lenient sentence scheme.

Katie’s little sister, Sasha Marsden, was just 16 years old when she was brutally murdered, raped and set on fire. It was a crime as horrific and evil as it is possible to imagine, and the pain her family have lived with ever since is something most of us cannot even imagine. After everything they had already been through, Katie and her family then faced another injustice: they had only 28 days to challenge the sentence, and they were not even told that they had the right to do so. That was so very wrong. A trial like that would be deeply traumatic for any family. In Sasha’s case, her family heard all the awful details of what she had endured in the final moments of her young and precious life, and no one in that position is ready, within a matter of days, to get to grips with a complex legal process and start to fight again.

Twenty-eight days is not long enough. It is not a real right for any family; it is a barrier. That is why Katie has shown extraordinary courage. Through her campaign for Sasha’s law, she has spoken not only for her own family, but for many others who felt shut out by the system. Katie’s campaign was clear: more time for bereaved families and victims to challenge sentences that they believe are unduly lenient, and clear information so they know that that right exists in the first place.

I am pleased that this Labour Government have heard the arguments and are acting to put things right. They have listened to campaigners and to families. I thank the Minister for her constructive engagement to ensure that the Government get the change right, and for ensuring that victims have been listened to at every stage of the process. This change will make a real difference to people at the worst moment of their lives. Crucially, the injustice that Katie suffered would not have happened had these changes been in place. It shows what the Government can do when we put victims first, and when we believe that justice must be matched by decency and compassion. The justice system should reflect the reality of trauma, grief and loss.

Finally, I want to place on the record how proud I am that I played a small part in helping Katie make today happen, and to thank the Government for listening. Twenty-eight days was not enough. Victims and bereaved families must be properly informed, and a better system is being brought forward as a result. For Katie Brett, for Sasha Marsden, and for so many other families, the changes will not remove the grief, but they will make the system fairer, more humane and more just. There is of course always work to do on the criminal justice system, but victims should not have fewer rights than perpetrators. These changes go some way to correct that injustice, and I will be proud to vote for them today.

[Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)]

I begin by thanking Members from across both Chambers for their work in getting this legislation to where it is today. I especially thank the Government for their engagement with me and my colleagues in the Lords, in particular the Minister, who I have met multiple times to discuss various issues in the Bill.

A key cornerstone of our justice system must be the support and protection of victims and survivors, ensuring that those who have suffered at the hands of others can go on to live a life without fear and not be defined by the actions of those who harmed them. That will happen only by putting their voices at the heart of the justice system, ensuring that justice is served quickly, with properly funded support, protection from perpetrators and rehabilitation of offenders to reduce reoffending. There are countless examples of that failing to happen, which is why the Liberal Democrats have welcomed the intention of and many of the measures in the Bill.

We are pleased with the Government’s commitment to undertake a study into the use of AI transcription in criminal courts in order to explore whether that can reduce both the costs and time involved in the provision of transcripts to victims. My colleague Baroness Brinton in the other place and I have both tabled amendments to the Bill aimed at expanding the provision of transcripts for victims at various stages, in part inspired by the tireless work of my hon. Friend the Member for Richmond Park (Sarah Olney), who I thank once again.

It should never be the case that victims, many of whom might not have even been in the court room to hear the sentence handed down, are asked to pay thousands of pounds to access their transcript. The opposing argument to our amendments is about the costs of redaction in producing the transcripts, but it is clear that there are technological solutions in today’s age and we therefore welcome the Government’s recognition that more action is needed. We will continue to push for greater provision of free transcripts in the Courts and Tribunals Bill, which is currently in Committee.

I thank the Government for their commitment to review the provision of service to families whose relatives have been murdered abroad. That follows an exemplary amendment first tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Maidenhead (Mr Reynolds) due to issues faced by one of his constituents. The provision of supporting information for families going through those horrific circumstances clearly has some issues, but the commitment in the other place to a joint review into those provisions between the Ministry of Justice and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office is welcome. We look forward to the result of that review, at which point we will consult with victims’ groups in ensuring that the provisions work satisfactorily.

I will take the opportunity to mention to the Minister again that, as she will be aware, the Murdered Abroad annual conference is on 13 June and I know that the organisers—

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I will be attending.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I am pleased to hear that the Minister will be attending because I know that the organisers were keen to engage with her so that they can continue to see progress.

I turn now to Lords amendments 5B, 5C, 5D, 5E, 5F, 6B and 6C, all of which impact the unduly lenient scheme. Again, I thank Baroness Brinton in the other place for her tireless work on these amendments with the Government, and the late Helen Newlove, the Victims’ Commissioner, and the Victims’ Commissioner for London. I also want to specifically pay tribute to the bravery of Tracey Hanson and Katie Brett, whose campaigns on these issues, in the light of their own families’ experiences, have no doubt played a pivotal part in the Government’s commitment to these amendments.

Tracey going through the trial of the murder of her own son, Josh, with no knowledge of the unduly lenient scheme, is exactly the example that I hope these amendments will address and are testament to her tireless efforts and the memory of her son. As the hon. Member for Blackpool North and Fleetwood (Lorraine Beavers) so eloquently expressed, Katie’s tireless campaigning for her sister, Sasha, is an extraordinary example of someone fighting an injustice not for themselves, but for others in the future who may suffer a similar loss. In particular, amendments 5B, 5C, 5D, 5E and 5F allow out-of-time applications to be made up to six months after sentencing. That is vital for families who are unaware of the scheme who did not submit an application prior to the 28-day limit and will benefit many who experience the same heartache and pain as Tracey.

The Government’s provision in amendments 6B and 6C of a statutory duty for victims to be informed of the unduly lenient scheme is vital, and should provide victims with a clearer picture of the options that they are entitled to following sentencing. The Minister was right to say that many of the campaigners have not just asked for an extension; it is about victims knowing what is available to them and ensuring that there is a mandatory commitment that they are told that the scheme is an option available to them after sentencing. I am grateful to the Minister for meeting me recently and then coming forward with these amendments, and we are pleased to support them.

Finally, I turn to Lords amendments 4B and 4C regarding private prosecutions. I am sure many across the House will agree that the ability for criminal prosecutions to be brought forward outside of the regular processes of the authorities, providing an alternative method for charities and commercial organisations, is essential in delivering justice for many victims whose cases have not been taken on by the state. That is especially pertinent against the backdrop of stretched resources facing the police and the Crown Prosecution Service.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting)

Jess Brown-Fuller Excerpts

Thursday 16th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Jardine. I rise to speak in support of amendment 43, tabled in my name, and to amendments 25 and 12. Again, on this issue the Opposition and the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden have alighted on the same challenge or issue—the same thing we think is unfair. We have gone about our amendments in different ways, but we recognise the same issue. As we heard, the amendments address the retrospectivity built into the Government’s approach.

The Bill makes it clear that the new allocation regime will apply not only to future cases, but to existing Crown court cases that are due to begin on or after the specified day on which the measures are implemented. In other words, cases that are already in the system, in which defendants may have made decisions on the basis that they expect a jury trial, could be reallocated to a judge-only trial. Our amendment 43 would prevent that by ensuring that the new regime applies only to cases in which the first magistrates court hearing takes place after the change, and not to cases already in the pipeline.

The Government say the change is merely procedural and can therefore be applied to ongoing cases, but that understates what is happening. To change the allocation part-way through proceedings would not simply be technical; it would alter the ground beneath the defendant’s feet. In written evidence, JUSTICE shared our concerns, saying:

“The retrospective application of the provisions is contrary to the rule of law.”

It pointed to the House of Lords Constitution Committee’s legislative standards, which state:

“Retrospective legislation is unacceptable other than in very exceptional circumstances”

and

“must have the strongest possible justification”.

It is worth considering that legislative guidance, which states, first, that enacting legislation with retrospective effect should be avoided. Secondly, provisions that have retrospective effect should be drafted as narrowly as possible. Thirdly, individuals should not be punished or penalised for contravening what was, at the time, a valid legal requirement. Fourthly, laws should not retrospectively interfere with obligations when the liberty or criminal liability of the citizen is at stake. Fifthly, laws should not deprive someone of the benefit of a judgment already obtained. Sixthly, laws should not prevent a court from deciding pending litigation according to its merits on the basis of the law in force at the time when proceedings were commenced. Seventhly, retrospective legislation should be used only when there is a compelling reason to do so. Eighthly, a legislative power to make a provision that has retrospective effect should be justified on the basis of necessity and not desirability.

Having heard those points, we can immediately see the issues. On the principle that laws should not retrospectively interfere with obligations when the liberty or criminal liability of the citizen is at stake, it is clear that that liberty is absolutely at stake in these matters.

On necessity, we have repeated throughout the debate that the Government, in our eyes, have completely failed to make the case successfully that the measures in the Bill are the only way to drive down the backlogs. This morning, we debated the fall in backlogs in some areas seen in the latest published data; that happened without the measures in the Bill, and without other measures that we all think are necessary to help to drive down the backlogs. To our eyes, the retrospective element clearly does not meet the test of exceptional circumstances or necessity.

JUSTICE says that, given that the curtailment of jury trials will have a marginal effect on the backlog, it cannot see how retrospective applications can be justified, and I agree. It argues that it is deeply unfair for defendants who elected for a Crown court trial in expectation of a jury to have their cases heard by a judge alone under a process that did not even exist when they made that choice. Defendants who have opted for a jury trial may be incarcerated on remand awaiting trial by jury. Had they known that this would never materialise, they may well have opted for a magistrates trial and already been released.

There is, then, a risk that the reallocation of cases that are already in the Crown court caseload to the bench division will be subjected to judicial review. There is clearly no ouster clause in the provisions. How do we know whether many of those affected might decide that they should challenge the decision in the courts? JUSTICE suggests that it could happen with each and every case in the backlog that is allocated to trial without jury. This would require additional hearings and the preparation of representatives for every affected case already in the backlog, creating further delays and placing unnecessary burdens on the defendants and the prosecution who, as we have all accepted, are already under significant pressure.

What did the Prime Minister say about retrospective measures? We have already covered what the Prime Minister previously thought about the importance of jury trials, which he seems to have forgotten, but what did he say about retrospective measures? He said that

“they are usually a very bad idea”.

That is a direct quote from our Prime Minister. He said they were usually a very bad idea, yet here is his own Government enacting one.

Of course, we know what the Deputy Prime Minister thought about this issue. He appeared before the Justice Committee on Tuesday 16 December last year. He was asked about this issue by my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley (Dr Shastri-Hurst), who said:

“There are currently in the region of 17,500 prisoners on remand in this country. Will these reforms apply retrospectively?”

What did the Deputy Prime Minister say? He said: “No.” The Committee must have to assume that that was his view of the right thing to do at the time. Why else would he have said no? It is reasonable for us to ask the Minister to explain why the Deputy Prime Minister has changed his mind.

Of course, the Minister herself has already been asked about this in the Justice Committee. My hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater (Sir Ashley Fox) pointed out that a defendant committed to trial in the Crown court will expect a jury trial. He said,

“you will relook at cases that have been committed for trial at the Crown court and push some of them through the swift court—that is what you are telling me.”

The Minister replied:

“I think that is something we have to look at.”

My hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater said to her:

“So when the Lord Chancellor said it will not be retrospective, that was not a wholly accurate answer.”

The Minister replied:

“I think the answer he was giving was in the context of a question around the impact on remand hearings; I think that was the context in which he may have addressed that.”

My hon. Friend replied:

“No, he said the changes would not be retrospective, and now you are giving me a slightly different answer. If someone elects to go to the Crown court at the moment, it is on the assumption that there will be a trial by jury. What you are saying is that it might not be; they might be diverted to the swift court.”

The Minister agreed with that, saying: “That is right, yes.” That can be interpreted only as a suggestion that there was no difference with or without a jury as they are still in the Crown court—an extraordinary response.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater said:

“Minister, if you have been committed to trial in the Crown court at the moment, you are expecting to have a jury trial, and what you are telling me is that once these changes take effect, you will divert those people committed but whose trial has not started into the swift court.”

The Minister agreed, saying: “Yes”. My hon. Friend said to her:

“That is not what the Lord Chancellor said before Christmas.”

The exchange concluded with the Minister making this point:

“It is a change in relation to the procedure that applies to those cases. They are still getting a Crown court trial under the new proposals.”

We are back to an argument that we have revisited a number of times. When the Minister is pressed on a disadvantage in one form or another of having a trial without a jury, she insists that it does not make much of a difference as they will still get a trial that, in her view, has all the merits of a trial with a jury, to some extent. We made some progress on that earlier today, when the Minister acknowledged that there is something special about a jury trial. If there is something special about it, she must surely accept that those people who do not get one are missing something special and are therefore in some way disadvantaged.

JUSTICE is not alone in its criticism of the retrospective element of the proposals. As I have said previously, Mr Robertson, the founder of the chambers that the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Attorney General all practised at—someone they surely give some weight and credibility to—is critical about this. He writes:

“Those charged by police with offences currently carrying a right to elect a jury trial will go through newly devised ‘allocation proceedings’ where they will lose that right if it appears to the court to be more suitable to have a non-jury trial or if it appears to the court that the value of the property involved exceeds a sum to be set by the government.”

By that, I think he means in relation to the severity of the case.

Mr Robertson goes on:

“This means, for all 80,000 cases in the backlog, more time—days perhaps—will have to be set aside for novel pre-trial proceedings featuring arguments about suitability and value of stolen property. There will be legal challenges to the government’s proposal that such legislation should apply to defendants who have already been charged or are awaiting trial. Applying these changes retrospectively amounts to a fundamental injustice, undermining legal certainty and the long-standing principle that individuals should be tried according to the rules in place at the time of the alleged offence.”

He is right, is he not?

Mr Robertson is not alone. The Bar Council says:

“The application of this proposal retrospectively inevitably will face a constitutional challenge. The Criminal Bar Association estimates that up to 30,000 cases will be affected. Not only is this extraordinarily unfair to those who have already elected the Crown Court, understanding that it is a jury trial, it interferes with legal certainty and runs the risk of tying the courts up in appeals, further increasing the backlogs.”

I hope that the Minister can reflect, as always, on those clear views, as well as the views of thousands of other legal professionals, academics and former judges, that provisions in the Bill are not necessary to bring the backlog down, and therefore should not be enacted retrospectively. They are fundamentally unfair, unconstitutional and against the usual practices of this place when it comes to retrospective legislation. I hope the Minister will support our amendment to make sure that the measures are not applied retrospectively.

[Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)]

Although I have proposed the removal of clause 3 in its entirety—we will come to the arguments for that later in proceedings—I will speak to amendment 12, tabled in my name, which seeks to remove subsections (2) to (4) of the clause. Those subsections provide that cases can be assigned to be heard by a judge alone, even if the case has already been assigned to be heard in front of a jury.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Mullan]

I rise to speak in support of amendment 40 in my name and to consider other related amendments. At this point, we are considering in more detail the allocation decisions, how they work in practice and the likely legal risks and pitfalls inherent in the new process.

I will begin by laying out the process that will exist. The Bill will introduce a Crown court bench division where cases are tried by a judge alone. To ensure that jury trials remain in place for certain crimes, only triable either-way cases that are assessed as likely to receive a custodial sentence of three years or less will be allocated for trial in a bench division. Indictable-only offences cannot be tried there.

To determine whether a triable either-way case should be allocated for trial in a Crown court bench division, a Crown court judge will assess whether the offence or offences to be tried are likely to attract a custodial sentence of three years or less. That decision will be taken at the first opportunity for the defendant to enter a plea in the Crown court using a plea and trial preparation hearing. If cases involve multiple defendants, judges must assess eligibility based on the highest likely sentence of any one defendant. Offences to which defendants have pled guilty are not included in the assessment of a likely sentence, and youth defendants are not exempt from the bench division.

The bench division will operate as a lower tier in the existing Crown court—that is important. The Bill will not create a separate jurisdiction or intermediate court. The usual Crown court procedures will apply in the bench division, including the appeal route from the Crown court to the Court of Appeal. Judges sitting in the bench division will also retain the full sentencing powers of the Crown court and may impose sentences of more than three years where appropriate, even if the allocation was initially based on the likelihood that they would not do that.

The Bill and explanatory notes are clear that no new appeal route is created for decisions to allocate a case to the bench division. It is important to set out the distinctions between different types of allocation decisions both now and in the future, if these proposals are passed. There are some elements of allocation decisions at present that we would all agree are not subjective, but based on offence classifications. I may be wrong, but I do not imagine there remains much debate about allocation decisions in those scenarios. Summary and indictable-only offences will be heard in the magistrates court or the Crown court based on that classification, though there are some exceptions that I will ask the Minister to clarify later.

Under the Government’s proposed reforms, there are similar black and white scenarios, with summary-only remaining with the magistrates and indictable-only going before a judge and jury. However, we will continue to have decisions on either-way offences, which consider the subjective—the not black and white—consideration of what the likely sentence length is. The consequences for defendants are entirely new territory for criminal defendants for the offences concerned.

Of course, defendants may disagree with allocation decisions at present, and may want to stay in the magistrates court, but the court may decide that they must be heard in the Crown court. However, importantly, as I understand it, a defendant cannot actually legally challenge that decision through judicial review. I am not a legal expert, and if the Minister receives advice that that is wrong, I would welcome that clarification, but as I said, my understanding is that judicial review would not be possible in that scenario. I also understand that it would not be the case in relation to the Crown court where the allocation would take place. Importantly, as I pointed out at the start, this will be taken in the Crown court, not some new or different court, so we should read across the rights and procedures that already exist in the Crown court.

As I understand it, triable either-way offences, if heard in the Crown court, are then in legal terms considered to be a trial on indictment. If a triable either-way offence is tried in the Crown court, it becomes a trial on indictment as if it were an indictable offence as per the other offences that are always indictable. Again, I am happy for the Minister to say whether that is the case, but that is my understanding of it.

Why is it important? Because there are constraints on the use of judicial review in relation to a Crown court trial on indictment. Under sections 28 and 29(3) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, no appeal by way of case stated or judicial review is possible in respect of matters relating to trial on indictment, so it will not be available with regard to any decision relating to the conduct of a Crown court trial on indictment. These measures, in this important way, are specifically taking away an existing legal right: the right to challenge an allocation decision. That cannot be right, fair or reasonable, and I am not even confident, as it is not mentioned, that I have seen in any of the Government publications related to this that it is something the Government have recognised they are doing.

It is also potentially a mistake in another way: in relation to the efficiency and smooth running of the courts that the Minister is seeking to achieve. At conviction, the defendant can apply for leave to appeal in the Crown court. At that stage, is the proposal that the defendant will be prevented from appealing the allocation by the judge, so a defendant might argue that a judge could act unlawfully on allocation with no appeal safeguard?

I have not had my attention drawn to an ouster clause. More generally, there is the provision that there is no specific appeal to the decision in isolation, but not an ouster clause in terms of the appeals that are allowed in the Crown court. I am confident that there will be legal arguments about that, at least to start with, until common law settles the matter. It would be extraordinary for the Government to introduce such a clause. We might find examples where a judge in the Crown court has completely incorrectly and legally unjustifiably allocated a case, and when that is brought up as part of the appeal at the point of conviction, be told that that is not a matter on which the court can have an opinion. I think that would be extraordinary.

Does the Minister think it would be right, if it forms the basis of an appeal against allocation happening after conviction, for the Court of Appeal to be constrained from having the power to return the case for trial by jury if it agrees the allocation decision was unlawful? I cannot believe that she would think that was right. Therefore, we create the exact opposite effect of what we are seeking to do—to make the best possible use of Crown court time—particularly in relation to barristers and other people working across the courts, by not allowing an earlier appeal. That is with regard to both appeals that take place and, more importantly, where a whole new trial may have to be ordered before a jury because it is found that the initial allocation decision was wrong.

Consider the scale on which that may happen—hundreds of cases may suddenly have to be retried. If, for example, the measures are in place for seven, eight or nine months, there is no onus or expectation regarding at what point a defendant—a convicted criminal at that point—might seek legal advice and then successfully choose to challenge an allocation decision. That would then be heard by a court, and then that court of appeal will make a ruling as to whether the circumstances under which that person was allocated were unlawful and a retrial with a jury is required.

If any other case has been allocated under those same circumstances that the appeal court determines are unlawful, every single one of those who had been convicted would have the right to say that the precedent has been set that the way they were allocated was unlawful and has to be retried. That could happen six months, a year or two years in. We are talking about a huge potential reallocation and retrial of all cases if the Minister insists that there should not be an appeal on the right of the allocation decision.

A separate initial safeguard—an appeal against allocation at the stage that it happens—is not only the right thing to do to ensure that an existing right is not eroded, but the more efficient way to approach these things. The amendment is sensible, rational and will provide greater confidence in the new court that the Minister is insisting on creating, and its processes.

I ask the Minister to clarify an important matter of law in relation to the allocation decisions in the first place—just the sort of thing that might be appealed if it is not clarified by the Minister during the passage of the Bill or through amendments to the legislation. We are clear about the idea of summary offences that go to the magistrates court. Indictable-only offences will have a trial with a judge and jury. In a number of cases, however, the offence is triable either way, but provisions that this House has introduced mean that in particular circumstances it can be tried only on indictment.

Some examples of that are three-strikes class-A drug trafficking offences, three-strikes dwelling burglary offences, dwelling burglaries involving violence or threats of violence, and the minimum mandatory sentences for firearms offences. Those were decisions taken by Parliament to say that, while the offence more generally could be tried either way, these cases in those circumstances are too serious to be heard by a magistrates court; they must be heard by a judge and a jury.

What are the consequences of the Bill on those scenarios? Will the Government respect the will of Parliament in relation to considering those cases to be more serious, as the Government accept for those cases that retain a jury trial, and that they should therefore remain with a jury trial? It is important that we have clarity on this issue specifically because, as I said, it is something that would almost certainly be subject to appeal if clarity is not provided.

I finish by reiterating the point that, if the Government refuse to accept our amendment, they will be actively legislating away a right to appeal allocation decisions that currently exists in our system. They will be actively choosing to do that if they are unable to insert a similar right through other means, such as through our amendment or an amendment at a future stage. I think it is important that the Committee reflects on that, and I hope the Minister can agree.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I will speak to amendment 18, tabled in my name, which seeks to ensure that a defendant has the right to appeal against a judge’s decision to allocate a case for trial by judge alone, whether because of the likely sentence length or because the case is assessed to be complex or lengthy. I will also be supporting amendment 40, tabled in the name of the shadow Minister, and amendment 28, tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden.

As stated, triable either-way offences, with potential sentences of up to three years, could be tried in the new Crown court bench division swift court. I argue that cases where a defendant may receive a sentence of up to three years are not minor offences; we are talking about life-changing sentences. Often in this category, we are talking about possession with intent to supply, actual bodily harm, death by careless driving, or section 20 unlawful wounding or grievous bodily harm, including where there is a grave injury. We must safeguard those sorts of cases against rough justice—an issue that much of the legal profession has warned could arise. It is vital that the Government provide an appeal system against decisions on whether to allocate a case for trial in front of a judge or jury.

I would like some clarification from the Minister: when we talk about summary offences, indictable offences and then triable either-way offences, are the measures being introduced in this Bill removing the concept of triable either-way offences? Are we then moving all those categories of offences into what are described as summary offences—these offences that carry long, life-changing sentences?

Briefly, amendment 28 would add a procedural requirement, but it is an important one because it would mean that the court could not simply decide, on the papers, to move a case to a judge-only trial; both parties would have to have first been given the opportunity to argue the point at a hearing, and only if both sides expressly gave up that right could the court proceed without one.

That goes back to the point that I raised earlier about the Canadian model, which I know the Government have been exploring and have spent time in Canada looking at. There, people have the right to elect a judge-only trial, so there is still an element of choosing what that looks like. That is not what this Government are proposing; they are proposing that there be no choice in the system, and that there be no legal precedent for it. I would appreciate the Minister’s answer to that.

[Yasmin Qureshi]

I will speak to amendment 28, regarding page 9, line 20 of the Bill. Essentially, the amendment states that, if the prosecution and defence waive their right to a hearing, the court can then make a determination under proposed new section 74AB of the Senior Courts Act 1981. That proposed new section, which will be introduced by clause 3, contains provisions regarding what the court must look at when determining allocation, such as whether a jury trial is to be declined. It is a fairly self-explanatory amendment, but a vital safeguard.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I accept that it might be a mischaracterisation to describe it as rough justice, but does the Minister agree that in this case it will be summary justice, which by its very definition is rougher around the edges, because it is summary?

[Sarah Sackman]

I am happy to sit down with the hon. Member again to clarify what she means by summary. There is no curtailment of the trial. All the elements of the trial happen in exactly the same way: the prosecution presents its evidence; the defence presents its evidence; witnesses are cross-examined; the evidence is tested. It is not summary in that sense—but if she wants to come back on that, I am happy to give way.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I appreciate the opportunity to come back on that. That poses another question: if judge-only trials are going to take the exact same amount of time, how will this speed up the court backlog?

[Sarah Sackman]

As we have heard extensively in evidence, whether from Sir Brian Leveson, the three experienced judges or our international comparators, including the Attorney General for Ontario, it does save time in a number of ways. The most compelling characterisation I heard was from Clement Goldstone, the recorder of many years’ experience from Liverpool. He said:

“in my experience it is wrong to confine the savings, or the assessment of the savings, to empanelling and swearing in a jury. That is where it begins.

Every sex case, I suspect probably nationally, now comes before the court with a direction that there will be no witnesses before 2.15 pm on the first day or, if the case is starting at 2.15 pm, until 10.30 the following morning. If there is no jury, there is no bar to the evidence starting within 10 or 15 minutes... Half a day, at least, will be saved on every sex case that is heard in the Crown court. That is before you start with time lost as a result of jury sickness, or a juror being delayed”.

He went on to say—and we heard this from the Canadian witness as well—that

“It is also easier to call a witness out of order if you are not trying to take a jury through in the order in which the evidence would otherwise be called.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Bill Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 76, Q161.]

He said, in terms, “I do not accept that there will not be a significant amount of time saved.”

It is not right to call a judge-only trial summary. It is not right to call it rough justice, and it is also not right to say that time will not be saved. Substantial time will be saved.

--- Later in debate ---

Division 6

Question accordingly negatived.

Ayes: 4

---

Conservative: 3
Green Party: 1

Noes: 9

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Labour: 9

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I beg to move amendment 19, in clause 3, page 6, line 25, at end insert—

“(4A) A trial conducted without a jury will be heard by one judge and two magistrates.”

This amendment implements the recommendation of the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts to have cases heard in the Crown Court Bench Division by a judge and two magistrates.

Sir Brian Leveson and the Minister, on the many occasions on which we have discussed this issue, have been very clear that the proposals set out in the independent review of the criminal courts were not to be treated as a pick and mix. Sir Brian was clear that it was meant to be a package of reforms, alongside stating that juries are not the cause of the backlog; I want to make sure that that is on the record.

But the Government have indeed chosen to pick and mix from Sir Brian’s recommendations, because he never proposed a judge sitting alone in the Crown court bench division. He proposed including a lay element, with two magistrates sitting with the judge; the magistrates would have equal decision-making authority on matters of fact, evidence and sentencing, while the judge would retain responsibility on rulings of law. The purpose of having two was to enable them to outvote the judge on matters of fact and, importantly, to maintain public participation and legitimacy in the absence of a jury.

Sir Brian referred to that in part 1 of his review. He said:

“In a similar vein, the inclusion of two magistrates in the composition of the bench would also ensure that the CCBD would satisfy the expectation of”

being judged by “one’s peers.” He continued:

“I...will not revisit those arguments here. I do, however want to acknowledge the diversity of the current magistracy, which I believe goes some way to satisfying this expectation and would help ensure a fair and balanced representation in the CCBD.”

The magistracy has done an excellent job of improving its diversity, although one could argue that there is still more work to do. A former Lord Chief Justice, Lord Burnett of Maldon, has said:

“It seems to me that if one is going to reduce the involvement of the general public, as members of a jury, in the relatively low-level cases that go to the Crown court, maintaining public involvement through the magistracy is a good course to follow. It also has the great advantage of simply replicating a constitution and jurisdiction that exists in the Crown court at the moment. When there is an appeal from the magistrates court against conviction or sentence, including an appeal against conviction in an either-way case, it is heard in the Crown court by a judge and two magistrates.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 75, Q159.]

The Government cannot shirk their commitment to fair justice free from bias. If these changes are to be implemented, they should include the safeguard of two magistrates in the Crown court bench division. I would appreciate the Minister’s outlining why the Government have departed from Leveson on the point. Is it because there is a concern about finding enough magistrates to fill the roles? Is it because the magistracy will already be overwhelmed by the additional cases given to it as a result of the new sentencing powers outlined in this Bill? Or is it because the Government believe that having the lay element provides no additional safeguard in the interests of fair justice? Through the amendment, we seek to implement the recommendation of Brian Leveson’s review of the criminal courts.

[Joe Robertson]

The hon. Member for Chichester has set out the reasoning behind her amendment very well. If the amendment were agreed to, it would not go anywhere near restoring jury trials, but it would plainly be an improvement. The leading argument in its favour is that it is what Sir Brian Leveson recommended. The Government have repeatedly cited Brian Leveson’s review, and rightly so—that is what the Bill flows out of—but as the hon. Member for Chichester says, it cannot be a pick and mix. The Government cannot cite Leveson on the one hand and ignore him on the other.

Quite aside from the fact that the opinion expressed in the independent review has been ignored here, there are objectively good reasons why a trial heard by a judge and two magistrates is preferable to a trial heard by a judge alone. For a start, there would be three decision makers rather than one; with a jury there are 12, but clearly three is better than one. But it is not just a matter of numbers. Magistrates could be viewed, and certainly have been viewed, as a hybrid of jurors and judges. They are not judges, and they are not legally qualified people. They bring the quality that jurors bring—varied life experience—to the decision-making process. Of course, in a magistrates court, they are guided in the law by a legally qualified clerk.

It is fairly obvious that magistrates as a group are less diverse than the population of the United Kingdom, from which jurors are drawn, but at least they represent a greater diversity and variety of experience than judges. Judges all share one thing: they went to law school, they are legally qualified and they have had a career that is privileged—that is not a criticism, but I do not think it is an unfair word to describe a judge’s career. Magistrates have a greater variety of life experience. To bring magistrates into the decision making alongside a judge, as Sir Brian Leveson envisaged, would be to bring at least some element of a jury trial: the quality of being unjaded by a career in law and being unencumbered by the experience of being a well-paid legal professional.

I struggle to support the amendment, because it does not go anywhere near maintaining the system that we have today, but it would at least be a small improvement. It is an obvious point, but judges sit alongside magistrates today; it is a tried, tested and understood approach, not an obscure or novel one. Indeed, appeals are often heard in that way, as I understand it, because there is added rigour in having a magistrate sitting alongside a judge.

Of course, having a judge sitting alongside magistrates is an improvement on having magistrates alone, because judges bring professionalism from their legal training and experience of the law as part of the judiciary. There is a benefit there, although of course the benefit is already delivered by the Government’s own amendment, notwithstanding that it is worse than what we have today.

I commend, or at least understand, what the hon. Member for Chichester is trying to achieve. It comes from a good place, but unfortunately—this is not her fault, but the Government’s—it does not go anywhere near maintaining the status quo, which in my view is plainly greatly preferable both to her amendment and to the Government’s approach.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Sackman]

As ever, my hon. Friend raises a very good point. Overall in the country, 14% of our magistrates are drawn from black and minority ethnic communities. The picture is not bad in the midlands, which my hon. Friend takes a particular interest in. The reality is that we are not in a position to pay our magistrates, but it touches on another consideration in this context. As I have said, I fully accept that magistrates would add a community element to the Crown court bench division, but it is also true to say that in relation to longer and more complex matters, which necessarily are what we are talking about when we are talking about the Crown court bench division, the type of magistrate who can give up their time for the length of time needed to hear longer trials—for weeks at a time—is, I would suggest, inevitably skewing towards the less diverse end of the magistracy.

The other point to make, in addition to the practical one, which I have been transparent about throughout, is the normative one. If I can put it colloquially, the Government make this policy choice because we believe our judges can do it. We believe they can do it for the reasons that I have reiterated in earlier parts of the discussion: their integrity, impartiality and ability to manage the court efficiently. And we see parallels—international comparators. I will again draw on Canada, where this is done to good effect while maintaining the fairness and integrity of the trials.

Introducing a requirement for magistrates to sit alongside judges would risk delaying the implementation of these reforms and, with that, delaying the benefits to victims, defendants, complainants, witnesses and the wider justice system. The Government’s view is that in that time the backlog would continue to grow and remain unresolved, and we cannot have that. I therefore urge the hon. Member for Chichester to withdraw her amendment.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I recognise the comments made by the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East. I agree that the amendment would not go towards restoring jury trials, and I will continue to push for jury trials to remain at their current thresholds. However, in the absence of the Government budging on that issue, I will continue to table amendments as we go through this process, and I know that the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle echoed those points.

The Minister rightly talked of the pressure in the system that must be met. We all feel that deeply across the House; no party represented on the Committee thinks the status quo is acceptable, or that a good version of justice is being served for anyone who is sitting in that backlog, or who is being told that their case will not be heard until 2029. However, the Minister also recognised that the lay element is really important, which surely strengthens the argument that she would not be doing this if she had capacity in the magistracy. If the magistracy was running at full volume, or at its numbers from 15 years ago, she would be including that lay element in the Crown court bench division.

There is a balance to be struck, and the balance should not see our fundamental justice system reduced or degraded in any way. It is something that we should be proud of in this country, and we should protect its core principles. I will push the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Sackman]

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden, who is no longer in her place, and the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle for their amendments.

I will begin with amendment 26. The defendant’s interests are already embedded into decision making on mode of trial reallocation. Parties are given the opportunity to make representations on reallocation, meaning the defence can draw the court’s attention to how the factors in the Bill intersect with a defendant’s interests, including the impact of delays to proceedings. Parties are also able to override a judge’s decision to reallocate to a jury trial if they both consent to remain in front of the Crown court bench division judge-alone, allowing, for example, a consensus for swifter justice to prevail.

At the same time, clause 3 requires the court itself to have regard to the interest of complainants—victims—when deciding whether reallocation would be appropriate. Those interests would be properly weighed by the court alongside the other factors set out in the Bill.

Finally, an additional “interests of justice” factor would be superfluous, not least because many of the factors that already fall under an “interests of justice” test, such as delays to proceedings and the impact on witnesses, are already taken account of. Introducing such a broad and undefined factor would risk undermining the structured and calibrated framework that Parliament is being asked to approve. It would also reintroduce uncertainty into the decision making that the clause is designed to make clear and workable in practice—not just the clause, but any accompanying criminal procedure rules. I have faith in our judiciary to make informed and robust decisions on the mode of trial reallocation. As such, I urge my hon. Friend to withdraw her amendment.

Turning to amendment 44, where an indictable-only offence is added to a bench division case, it will always be reallocated to jury trial. Where a jury trial has started, it can never be reallocated to the bench division. The principles of natural justice encompass the right to a fair trial, the rule against bias and the duty to act fairly. All of those elements are preserved in these reforms. The amendment would not add any substantive protection beyond those safeguards already in place.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

On a point of clarification, in the instance where a jury trial may begin but the case is adjourned for any reason, could it be reallocated to the Crown court bench division at a later date when it is rescheduled, or would it continue to have a jury trial?

[Sarah Sackman]

Under the provisions, where a jury trial has started, it cannot be reallocated to the CCBD.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I am just trying to get some clarification about when a jury trial “has started”. If a jury trial is listed on a day but the case is adjourned, it does not go ahead. Cases can be adjourned for many different reasons—the defence or the prosecution could not be ready. In that instance, where the case is adjourned to be relisted on a different day, would the defendant maintain their right to a jury trial or could it be reallocated to the bench division?

[Sarah Sackman]

What circumstances does the hon. Member envisage would trigger that reallocation? The allocation has been made—it has been allocated to a jury trial. She is right that it has not yet commenced, which is the point I was dealing with, but the circumstances we are dealing with here fall into two broad categories: first, where the nature of the offences in question changes; or secondly, where new evidence comes into play mid-trial, which is so material as to lead to an application to reallocate, or even to a judge of their own volition deciding that the seriousness necessitates reallocation. I cannot see, where it has been allocated already but has not yet commenced, why that would be triggered. But maybe I have missed something.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fifth sitting)

Jess Brown-Fuller Excerpts

Thursday 16th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)]

It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Huq.

I speak in support of amendments 23, 39 and 24 which, taken together, would do something simple but important: they would build a measure of flexibility back into the clause, so that jury trial is still available where the cause of justice requires it. The Minister should think carefully. As drafted, the clause creates a very blunt regime: unless the court predicts a sentence of more than three years, the trial is to be conducted without a jury. The amendments would go a small way towards softening that rigidity and making the system less arbitrary, more proportionate and hence more just.

With the amendments, two different Committee members take two different approaches to delivering the same outcome of additional flexibility in the clause. Amendment 39, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle, is broad in nature, setting out an additional condition for jury trial when needed to ensure natural justice, whereas the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden takes a more granular approach to the problem by listing the specific circumstances that might warrant the need for jury trial, again to ensure fairness. Both approaches seek to achieve the same thing.

I will speak to each amendment in a little more detail, starting with amendment 23. Clause 3 is currently built on one single condition for preserving jury trial in relevant cases: whether the defendant is likely to receive a sentence of more than three years if convicted. Amendment 23 would change the wording from “the condition” to

“one or more of the conditions”.

This is the gateway to allow amendment 24, which lists various conditions, to work.

The amendment matters because it opens the door to a more sensible approach, in which sentence is not the only thing that counts. That is exactly the right approach. When we deal with a constitutional safeguard as important as jury trial, the Committee should be wary of a system that turns entirely on a single mechanistic threshold. Human beings and criminal cases are not that neat, and Parliament should not pretend that they are. The amendment is therefore modest, tidy, entirely sensible and the necessary first step to add judgment, flexibility and common sense to a clause that has far too little of all three.

On amendment 24 and its list of conditions, the Government’s model under the clause is to ask the court at an early stage to forecast the sentence that would likely be imposed if the defendant were convicted. If the forecast is more than three years, there is a jury; if it is not, there is none. That is far too crude a test to bear the full constitutional weight that the Government want to place on it. The Bill itself exposes the weakness in the logic, because although the allocation decision turns on a prediction about a sentence above or below three years, the Bill also expressly states that nothing prevents a court sitting without a jury from later imposing a sentence of more than three years. In other words, even the Bill recognises that the initial prediction may not tell the whole story; if that is so, why should that prediction be the sole basis on which a person loses the right to jury trial?

Amendment 24 is so worth while because it states that in deciding whether a defendant should still have a jury, the court should not only look at the likely sentence but be able to consider whether: the defendant is of good character; they have previously been convicted of an imprisonable offence; they are treated as rehabilitated; conviction would cause significant reputational or professional harm; the gravity or complexity of the case might increase; and other exceptional circumstances. That does not strike me as radical. It is simply an attempt to make the law reflect reality and be less prescriptive. Additional flexibility makes for better outcomes.

One of the strongest parts of amendment 24 is the recognition it gives to good character and to those who have not previously been convicted of an imprisonable offence. I raise this because the Government’s crude threshold risks producing perverse results. The people who may be hit hardest by clause 3 are precisely those who are newer to the justice system, those of previous good character and those for whom a conviction would be utterly life-changing.

The Bar Council illustrated the point starkly in written evidence with the example of a 19-year-old student charged with possession with intent to supply after a small amount of Spice was found in their room—I am sure Members will remember my reciting that specific example in Committee on Tuesday. Because they are of good character, the likely sentence under the guidelines may be low enough that they lose jury trial altogether, even though the charge could destroy their future. Meanwhile, someone with previous convictions may be more likely to cross the sentencing threshold and so keep the right to a jury. That is exactly the sort of absurdity that amendment 24 tries to avoid.

That is wholly consistent with the broader critique of the Bill. Conservative Members have repeatedly argued that the Government are treating this as an administrative exercise, when in fact people’s lives are at stake. The shadow Justice Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for West Suffolk (Nick Timothy), put it clearly on Second Reading when he said that the Government were proposing to remove fundamental rights

“without a mandate, without a case and without any evidence”.—[Official Report, 10 March 2026; Vol. 782, c. 207.]

The Opposition also challenged Ministers on taking away jury trial for offences that cost defendants their jobs, their homes and their families. Amendment 24 responds precisely to that point.

I note the inclusion in amendment 24 of cases in which the defendant would likely suffer significant reputational damage or have their employment or professional qualifications adversely affected. That is important because the seriousness of a case cannot be measured by custody alone. A sentence of under three years can still destroy a person’s livelihood, strip them of professional standing, end a career built over decades and permanently alter family life. The Government keep speaking as though anything beneath their threshold is somehow low level. The Opposition have rightly made the point that even where a sentence is below three years, the consequences can be catastrophic. Amendment 24 simply recognises that reality.

There is an obvious point of fairness here, too. If the state wishes to prosecute a person in circumstances where conviction may ruin their livelihood or reputation for life, it is hardly excessive to say that jury trials should at least remain available. That is an ancient constitutional right and the Government should, even now, think very hard before removing it.

I also support paragraph (f) in amendment 24, which deals with cases where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the gravity or complexity might increase. Again, this is simply common sense. Criminal cases often evolve, evidence changes, witnesses come forward, and issues that initially looked straightforward become anything but in the crucible that is the courtroom.

[Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)]

The hon. Lady is making an excellent point about the complexity of cases changing throughout. A legal professional recently shared with me the story of what was an assault case, but the victim passed away during the trial, so they are now dealing with hearing evidence of potential brain trauma injury. Does the hon. Lady agree that that case deserves the complexity of a full Crown court trial because the case has changed as the trail has developed?

[Rebecca Paul]

I completely agree with the hon. Lady. She has set out a good example of the type of things that happen in reality. Life is not tidy, and unexpected things happen. As we look at the Bill and whether a sentence is over or under three years, it is easy to think in simple terms but, in reality, people who work in the justice system—I have not done so, but I have spoken to people who do—understand the movement and flexibility that is required. That is why amendment 24 works really well by taking that into account. The hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden, who drafted it, clearly has real-world experience of what actually happens in a courtroom.

The Bill already recognises elsewhere that there can be a relevant change of circumstances requiring the court to revisit allocation, so the Government’s own drafting accepts that these matters are dynamic rather than static. If that is so, why would we not want to build in a bit more foresight at the front end as well? Paragraph (f) in amendment 24 is not some wild departure from the structure of the Bill; it sits comfortably with the Government’s own recognition that allocation decisions can become unsound as a case develops. It is simply a more prudent and realistic approach to cases in which the true seriousness may emerge only over time.

Finally, the reference in amendment 24 to “other exceptional circumstances” is extremely important. No statute, however carefully drafted, can predict every factual scenario. That is especially true in criminal justice, where the facts and human consequences of a case can vary enormously. A residual exceptional circumstances test is therefore not a weakness; it is a mark of maturity in the law. It recognises that Parliament should not force judges into injustice. If the Government truly believe in justice rather than mere throughput, they should have no objection to preserving a narrow, exceptional route to jury trial where justice plainly demands it.

Amendment 39, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle, deals with the alternative, broader approach to building flexibility into clause 3. It is an especially important amendment because it puts the issue in the clearest possible terms: those of natural justice. The amendment says that a trial should still be conducted with a jury where the defendant demonstrates that to be tried without one

“would amount to a breach of the principles of natural justice.”

That is an extremely modest safeguard. It would not wreck the clause; it would merely build in additional protection through allowing an element of judgment to decide the mode of trial. It would not restore the right to a jury trial in every either-way case; it simply says that where the injustice is plain, a jury trial must remain available. I struggle to see how any Government serious about fairness could object to that.

This is an issue of paramount importance on our side, and I hope on the Government’s side too. My hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle tabled amendment 39, as well as amendments elsewhere in the Bill—in relation to clause 1, in relation to reallocation under clause 3, and in relation to clause 4—to seek to protect natural justice. We will keep making these points. If Ministers insist on creating judge-only routes, they must at the very least accept a residual safeguard based on natural justice.

For all the reasons I have outlined, I support amendments 23, 39 and 24. They would deliver the additional safeguards needed, so I urge the Government to adopt either the Opposition’s amendment or the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sarah Sackman]

I think there is some consensus here. We are all extolling the virtues of our system. As the Minister with responsibility not just for courts, but for legal services more generally, promoting our legal services and courts around the world, I am very proud of that. Being proud of our system in England and Wales, however, does not mean that there are not things that we can learn from other jurisdictions, particularly where they are producing better outcomes in timeliness or in the treatment of minorities, women, rape and serious sexual offences. It is why I went to Canada to learn from practitioners and judges there. We will take the lessons from wherever we find them. I will pick up later on the point about regional differences, because we must always learn lessons, whether internationally or closer to home.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

We heard oral evidence from Doug Downey, who talked about the Canadian system. He also talked about how the right to elect is a protected characteristic of their justice system. The difference is that they have the right to elect a judge-alone trial. Did the Minister explore the option of maintaining the right to elect, but allowing defendants to choose whether they would like to have their case heard in a Crown court bench division with a judge alone?

[Sarah Sackman]

The hon. Member asks a typically great question. We did think about it. I am well aware that the right to elect exists, once a defendant is in the superior court in Canada. We considered whether the right to elect to go before the Crown court bench division should be included as part of the reforms. The reason we did not, and the reason why these reforms are predicated on the consistent principle that it is for the court to determine mode of trial, is partly about the balance we wanted to achieve within the system between defendant rights and the rights of other participants—I am wary of using the word victim—or complainants within the system.

We received representations from many complainants and people who have been victims of crime, and those who represent their interests, such as the independent Victims’ Commissioner and London Victims’ Commissioner. Many felt that it was so often the defendant’s choice and right to insist on choice that was driving the process and was part of an imbalance in the process. There is both a pragmatic element to our choice, because we think that by introducing a new Crown court bench division we will save time and speed up the processing of trials, and a normative principle behind it, which is about who is in the driving seat in these decisions. We think it should be the court and not always the defendant.

Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fourth sitting)

Jess Brown-Fuller Excerpts

Tuesday 14th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Sarah Sackman]

Absolutely; the comment from my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington was really important. In fairness, the hon. Member for Reigate also made the point about the equality impacts. The way that the measures in the Bill, and indeed our current justice system, impact on different communities in differential ways rightly concerns the Government. It is precisely why we committed to an independent statutory review, and it is why too I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington for tabling her amendment, so that the Committee will have an opportunity to discuss those important issues on a cross-party basis.

We need to ensure not only that we have the right safeguards, monitoring and data collection, but that the reforms in the Bill do not entrench a status quo that has sometimes fallen short of our collective aspirations for justice and equality, so that they can command the confidence of all communities as we implement, monitor and refine them in future, if needed.

[Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)]

The Minister is making an impassioned plea for trying to equalise the system. Does she not share my concern about the Government’s proposals? Person A could be accused of sexual assault on the tube, and have never been in any criminal justice situation, while person B could have had a string of offences that they have been charged with and ended up serving prison time for. They would get a jury trial because of their past offences, but somebody of previous good character would not, under the Minister’s proposals.

[Sarah Sackman]

It would depend on the facts of the case. First, I do not entirely understand the rancour behind the examples. If someone has committed a serious crime that could attract a six, seven or eight-year sentence, those are indictable-only offences. I think we all agree that we would want them to have a jury trial, which they would under the proposals in the Bill, because anything likely to get a sentence of three years or more will receive a jury trial.

In the scenario the hon. Lady described in respect of the person of good character, it is right that at the plea and trial preparation hearing—the mode of trial allocation phase—the likely sentence depending on the seriousness will be looked at. In that process, the likely sentence would no doubt take into account—albeit it is a high-level assessment, in line with the sort of assessment that magistrates courts make every day—the mitigating factors, which might include the person’s good character. In bringing forward the reforms, I believe that that person will get a fair trial wherever they get it: in a magistrates court, in the Crown court bench division or, indeed, at a full jury trial if the crime is likely to get a sentence of three years or more. It is not about the person who has done the more serious crime enjoying greater rights. It is because it is a more serious crime that it gets a jury trial. That is a proportionate use of the resources in our system.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

The Minister may have misunderstood my point. If person A and person B have committed the exact same offence—they might have done it a day apart, in the same place, in the same circumstances—but person B has previous record, they are more likely to be heard in front of a jury trial. With person A, who is of good character, the offence remains the same, but the fact that person B has had previous offences means they are charged with a higher offence. The case and the evidence might be exactly the same, but they would end up with a different type of trial. Does the Minister think that is fair?

[Sarah Sackman]

We have an obligation to guarantee a fair trial. I believe that wherever cases are heard in this system, they will be heard fairly. It will be a different mode of trial, but it will be heard fairly. Ultimately, it comes back to a fundamental difference between us. The view has been taken by those on the Opposition Benches that, somehow, what one gets in a magistrates court—where 90% of our trials are heard—is less fair. That is in front of not just lay magistrates but district judges hearing cases. Some of the most serious civil matters such as the decisions around care proceedings—to remove children from their parents’ care—are determined by single judges. I believe that a single judge can determine cases fairly and impartially. That is the system that exists in different jurisdictions, including our own, and it works well and fairly. It is not unfair for somebody to be allocated a trial type based on the seriousness of the offence they are alleged to have committed.

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[Jess Brown-Fuller]

Does the shadow Minister agree that to try to compare the CPS with, for example, the Criminal Bar Association is nonsense because the CPS is a non-ministerial Department? As the hon. Member has pointed out, the policy position is to agree with structural reform because they know that the system is broken. None of us is disagreeing with that today or disagreeing that there is a problem in the system that needs fixing. Of course, the CPS would say that we absolutely need to do something. However, it is not its role as a non-ministerial Department to say that it thinks that the Minister has got it wrong. What it is saying in broadbrush terms is that it agrees that something needs to be done. In contrast, the Criminal Bar Association actually surveyed all its members, because it is an independent organisation, and 88% of them came back and said that they were opposed to the reforms. They are two totally different things.

[Dr Mullan]

I did raise an eyebrow at the level of evidence that the individual from the CPS chose to give in relation to commenting on Government policy in that way. I have spoken to previous Justice Ministers, and that was unprecedented. Again, if we want to give validity to its views, can Government Members point to a single time that the CPS has got up and directly opposed the policy of the Government of the day? It does not do that. It is all very well and good to champion it when it agrees with this particular point, but it is nonsense if it has never disagreed with Government policy because it is a non-departmental Government body. Again, the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford is perfectly entitled to raise it, but to try to give it the weight and character of the other organisations that are lobbying, campaigning and representing does not hold up to much scrutiny—as we have seen.

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[Dr Mullan]

I thank the Minister for explaining the measures as she understands them. I do not mind admitting that some of the explanations in the explanatory notes and the information from the Library have left us with questions about how the measure will operate. The clause refers to written indication of guilty plea, and the explanatory notes refer to this as being available to those who are pleading guilty. I do not mind admitting that the Minister is much more directly experienced with the legal system than I am, as are other members of the Committee, but I do not quite understand the idea of someone choosing the mode of trial after they have pleaded guilty. If they have indicated at the outset that they are going to plead guilty, will the hearing not be about sentencing, rather than trial? My remarks will be focused on that.

The obvious thing to ask is this. If this measure is purely about sentencing, why would anyone who has pleaded guilty ever elect to have a sentencing hearing in the Crown court, where they know there could be a higher sentence, rather than in the magistrates court, where they know there will be a cap on what sentence can be passed? Our arguments have been about the process of the trial itself, and I have touched on some of the elements other than sentencing. That is not to say that there may not be perfectly reasonable grounds for someone to object if they think the decision made was wrong. Again, these are people who have admitted guilt, so we can clearly say they are criminals. Some of them may have spurious reasons for wanting to approach the system in that way, by seeking not to go to the Crown court, but they may also legitimately think that the decision was wrong or not fair. They may well have legal advice that the decision was not consistent with the sentencing guidelines, and that they would have been expected to have stayed in the magistrates court. As we discussed this morning, a significant number of the appeals in the magistrates court are successful, although I accept that those who seek an appeal are in the minority. We all accept that the magistrates courts make mistakes.

It is important that we understand how this measure will work in practice. Can the Minister tell us how many people are objecting and using the mechanism at the moment? That is also confusing, because the explanatory note says that these provisions are not yet in place, but what is her projection of the difference this will make? What will be its material impact? The provisions have not been commenced, but the Government and civil servants must have a view about how objections would have operated and what they would have achieved, versus the right to make representations. What is the difference between those two mechanisms? A guilty person cannot insist on being sentenced in a magistrates court. If the magistrates think that someone is going to hit a higher tariff and should go to Crown court, the person can, in theory, object, as I understand it, but they cannot stop it. Before we vote on the clause, I want the Minister to explain in detail exactly how this will be different from what the Government envisioned was going to happen.

Is there a risk in theory that more things will go to the Crown court? If the Government are saying, “You can’t object,” they must think that at the minute, in theory—if the provisions were to be commenced—some people would be kept in the magistrates court inappropriately. The Government must want more of those people to go the Crown court. If they thought everyone was just going to stick in the magistrates court anyway, why would they be doing it?

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

The shadow Minister is clearly articulating his confusion, which I share. I believe that clause 2 is at odds with the rest of clauses 1 to 8, because it does the opposite of what those other clauses are trying to achieve. Let us say that, on the advice of legal counsel, Person A has been told that, if they plead guilty, they will most likely receive a suspended sentence. They are keen to move on with their life and therefore they are willing to enter a guilty plea, but they are then told by the magistrates that they would like their case to be heard in the Crown court, which could carry a higher tariff. At the moment, they have the right to object to their case being taken over to the Crown court, because the conditions in which they pleaded guilty have changed. By removing that right, we are making sure that people do not get to say whether they want their case heard in the Crown court, which could push more cases into the Crown court. That makes clause 2 feel at odds with the rest of the clauses, which are trying to remove things from the Crown court. Does the shadow Minister agree?

[Dr Mullan]

I do. In the other direction, the Institute for Government highlights that

“only around 30% of sentences of 6-12 months were handed out by magistrates”

since their sentencing powers increased from six months to 12 months. That indicates a hesitation in the magistrates courts to award higher sentences. If the Government have the objective of sending these cases to the Crown court, but there is evidence to suggest that magistrates hesitate when it comes to higher sentences, ultimately this measure will not change that.

I want to be clear, because I think that there is some confusion about what is written in the Bill and the explanatory notes. The explanatory notes say:

“The amendments remove the ability of the defendant or the prosecutor to object to the case being sent to the Crown Court for sentence”.

We are talking about sentencing, but that is not exactly what the Minister said or what the Bill seems to say. Before we are asked to vote in support of the clause, the Government need to clear this up, so that we can all understand what exactly this change will achieve that is different in theory from what was going to happen.

I appreciate that this is challenging because we are discussing changes that have never been put into operation, but that is not really an excuse. The Government should have a view of how things were going to operate, and therefore must have formed a view about how they want them to operate differently as a result of this change.

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[Joe Robertson]

I am very happy to say that I agree with all the things the Minister said. I also agree with learning from other systems. Plainly, the English legal system, like the English language, has been successful in its ability to adapt and evolve. Without going back to the beginning of my speech, started just a few minutes ago, for the reasons I have set out, I believe that this is an evolution—or arguably a revolution. [Interruption.] Was that another intervention? I think these measures are a stage too far.

[Jess Brown-Fuller]

I would like to briefly refer the Committee to some remarks that Sir Brian Leveson made during the evidence session we had before the recess. He said:

“We need people to confront what they have done. I do not want anybody to plead guilty who is not guilty and has seen the evidence. I am not asking to change the guilty plea rate, but in the early days, you pleaded guilty on the first or the second occasion you appeared at the Crown court—now there are many examples of that happening on the fifth or the sixth occasion you are in the Crown court. Each one of those takes a considerable amount of time. That is what is sucking up part of the time.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 8, Q9.]

Sir Brian tried to explain that a lot of people look at the evidence and say, “Yes, I will plead guilty, but I will do so after Christmas”—that was his example. He said that now, because of the Crown court backlogs, people know that their case will not be heard until 2028.

The point that Sir Brian was trying to make is that we need to incentivise those who look at the evidence of their case, and recognise that a guilty verdict is probably going to be arrived at, to put in a guilty plea. Does clause 2 not risk having the reverse effect? People will see that if they put in a guilty plea, the one opportunity they have to argue whether the case should be heard in a magistrates court or a Crown court—although I imagine the majority of them would argue that it should be heard in the magistrates court in this specific example—is taken away from them. Are we not then disincentivising people to put in a guilty plea at an early stage, when we want to see the Crown court backlog come down?