Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting)

Gregory Stafford Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 17th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your leadership, Sir Desmond, especially on such a warm day. I hope that there is not too much hot air in the Committee to keep us even warmer.

Clause 22 will introduce a series of important amendments to the operation of community treatment orders under the Mental Health Act 1983. The clause has the stated aim of strengthening clinical safeguards and ensuring continuity of care between hospital and community settings. The Opposition support these goals in principle.

Let me set out the current legal position. At present, decisions to place a person on a CTO require two professional inputs: the patient’s responsible clinician and an approved mental health professional. The responsible clinician can vary, suspend, recall or revoke the order, often with no statutory obligation to consult the clinician who will be managing the patient’s care in the community. 

Clause 22 will change that. It introduces the new role of the community clinician—defined as the approved clinician who will oversee the patient’s care in the community—and requires their involvement at key decision points in the life of a CTO. Specifically, it requires a written statement from the community clinician that the CTO criteria are met, where they are not the responsible clinician. It obliges the responsible clinician to consult the community clinician before varying conditions, recalling or revoking a CTO, unless such consultation would cause unreasonable delay. It also includes the community clinician in the process of renewing a CTO, again via a written statement. 

These are not insignificant changes. They mark a shift towards multidisciplinary accountability and a greater emphasis on the continuity of care between in-patient and community settings. The Opposition strongly support both principles. However, there are several points that I would like to probe constructively, and I hope the Minister will respond in the spirit of improving what is clearly a well-intentioned clause. 

First, the term “unreasonable delay” appears multiple times in the clause as an exception to the duty to consult the community clinician, but I cannot see it defined in the Bill or in the explanatory notes. Could the Minister clarify what constitutes “unreasonable delay” in practice? Will guidance be issued to ensure consistency across trusts and clinicians? We must ensure that this exception does not swallow the rule or become a loophole in time-sensitive situations.

Secondly, what happens when clinicians disagree? The clause requires the agreement of the community clinician in writing before a CTO can be made, but it is silent on what happens when there is disagreement between the responsible clinician and the community clinician. This is not a hypothetical concern; differing clinical views are common and can be a healthy part of multidisciplinary practice. Could the Minister confirm whether there is a proposed resolution mechanism where clinicians differ? Would the decision default to a tribunal or a second opinion, or is the CTO simply not made?

Thirdly, as the Minister has mentioned, on the operational readiness to implement this clause, the new duties on community clinicians are not trivial. They are being asked to produce written statements, engage in formal consultations and be available to advise on time-sensitive decisions such as recalls and condition changes. Can the Minister reassure the Committee that a workforce impact assessment has been or will be conducted? Will there be investment in community mental health staffing and digital infrastructure to ensure that this duty is workable?

Fourthly, I want to raise the issue of handover and role clarity. The clause will introduce a new statutory role—the community clinician—but patients often transition rapidly between settings. There may be uncertainty about who holds that responsibility at a given time. Will guidance ensure that community clinicians are formally designated and that responsibilities are clearly recorded at the point of discharge?

I want to end on a constructive note. Clause 22 is a step in the right direction. It reflects many of the recommendations of the independent review of the Mental Health Act, including the emphasis on least restriction and on therapeutic benefit. I encourage the Government to consider defining or clarifying unreasonable delay in regulations or guidance, introducing a clear process for resolving professional disagreement, and committing to publish a plan detailing workforce support, guidance and digital infrastructure to ensure that this takes place.

Clause 23, which is linked to clause 22, will introduce two important amendments to the operation of community treatment orders under the Mental Health Act 1983. As things stand, section 17B(2) allows a responsible clinician to attach conditions to a CTO if they are necessary or appropriate, to ensure the patient receives treatment, to prevent risk to health or safety or to ensure engagement with services. Such conditions can include where the person lives, their attendance at appointments and even lifestyle restrictions such as abstaining from alcohol or drugs. However, we know that these conditions can be seen as coercive. Patients often feel that breaching them means automatic recall to hospital. In practice, some CTO conditions may drift toward overreach rather than clinical necessity.

The clause responds to these concerns in two ways. Subsection (1) will remove the words “or appropriate” from section 17B(2), meaning that CTO conditions must now be strictly necessary, not just advisable or convenient. The Opposition support this narrowing of the threshold. It sends a clear message that CTO conditions must be clinically justified, proportionate and tailored to the individual’s needs. However, I ask the Minister how clinicians will be guided in applying the new “necessary” test. Will the code of practice be updated with examples and scenarios? Crucially, what measures will be taken to ensure that patients are clearly informed that a breach of a CTO condition, in itself, is not automatic grounds for recall?

[Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. Taking a step back to my hon. Friend’s point about “necessary”, is he concerned, as I am, that it is not clear to those responsible what “necessary” means? We could open ourselves up to potential legal challenges and disputes, which would give lawyers lots of money but would have no benefit for the patients.

[Dr Evans]

My hon. Friend makes an incredibly important point. Some later clauses try to address a problem where a patient was consenting to a community order, but the restrictions were so tight that it worked out as deprivation of liberty. My hon. Friend is absolutely right that knowing what is necessary is important to provide a clearly defined structure for the patient. Patients worry that if they breach that protocol, they will be automatically recalled. That might prevent them from breaching the conditions in the first place, but on the other hand it is a sword of Damocles above them. In no way does that create a beneficial therapeutic environment for them.

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[Dr Chambers]

I am really looking forward to the 10-year plan and reading about how it will improve mental health. We shared Labour’s manifesto commitments to mental health practitioners in each school and mental health hubs, so we certainly support that.

The hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth made some very good points and said that this proposal should possibly not be in primary legislation. I accept that integrated care boards do not have control over how every part of the service is delivered, so I am happy not to press the new clause to a vote, but I think the second part, which says that integrated care boards should have a duty to assess and report on the resource needed to meet the demands on services every two years, is important.

[Gregory Stafford]

I rise to speak to clauses 22 and 23 and to Liberal Democrat new clause 4.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth said, the Opposition support clauses 22 and 23 generally. Clause 22 addresses the concern that community clinicians—essentially, those responsible for overseeing a patient’s care outside hospital—have historically had limited formal input into decisions about community treatment orders, even though they are central to the patient’s ongoing care. It ensures that community clinicians not only are consulted but, in some cases, must provide written agreement before key decisions are made. It aims to improve continuity of care, ensure decisions reflect the realities of community-based treatment, and reduce inappropriate and poorly co-ordinated use of CTOs.

The benefits of the clause are obvious, but they are worth restating. Clearly, it improves the continuity of care and ensures that clinicians with direct knowledge of the patient’s community care are involved in those key decisions. It enhances safeguards, adding an additional layer of professional oversight before coercive measures are imposed or suggested. It promotes collaboration by encouraging joint decision making between the hospital-based and community-based clinicians, and it reduces the risk of inappropriate CTOs by ensuring they are used only when genuinely appropriate and supported by those delivering care.

However, I ask the Minister to touch on three points. First, requiring a written agreement or consultation could delay urgent decisions if not managed efficiently, so will he explain how, under the clause, any potential delay—a disagreement or just administrative inertia—can be removed to ensure treatment is not delayed?

That moves me on to the administrative burden. Clearly, the clause adds a level of complexity and requires more documentation and co-ordination. Although I understand that that is a necessary outcome, I would again be grateful for the Minister’s thoughts on how to ensure effective and speedy implementation.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth said, the ambiguity in the roles of the two clinicians may create confusion or disputes over responsibilities if they are not clearly defined or agreed. My reading of the clause is that there is no such clear definition; will the Minister look to provide one through other agencies, or will he put something into the clause in Committee or later in the Bill’s proceedings?

Clause 23, on the conditions of community treatment orders, addresses the concerns that the threshold for imposing conditions on community treatment orders has been too low, allowing conditions that may be clinically unnecessary or overly restrictive. By removing the “appropriate” test, the clause will tighten the legal standard to ensure that only necessary conditions are imposed.

Additionally, the clause will empower tribunals to play a more active role in scrutinising CTO conditions by allowing them to recommend that clinicians review specific conditions, even if the patient is not discharged. This reflects the Bill’s broader aim of enhancing patient rights and removing unnecessary restrictions.

The clause is a welcome addition. It will ensure that CTO conditions are imposed only when strictly necessary, meaning that there are stronger safeguards, and it will enhance the role of tribunals in protecting patient rights without requiring full discharge. It will reduce clinical overreach by preventing the use of overly broad or vague conditions that may not be clinically justified.

However, as with the previous clause, I have some questions. First, the tribunal power is limited in that it can only recommend, not require, the reconsideration of conditions. Is that the intention, or will the Minister strengthen the clause at some point to ensure that the tribunal can require a reconsideration of conditions? If he will not, what issues does he see arising from there not being a reconsideration?

Secondly, as I mentioned in my intervention on my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, I have a concern about the potential ambiguity in the shift from “appropriate” to “necessary” leading to uncertainty or dispute over interpretation. As we touched on in relation to other clauses, clinicians will need additional guidance or training to apply the revised standard consistently. Where will that revised training and guidance be located, and what is the timeframe for its implementation? We need to ensure that all clinicians are fully trained and ready to use this new power.

I will briefly touch on new clause 4, tabled by the Liberal Democrats, because although I understand that the hon. Member for Winchester may not press it, somebody else might. It would place a general duty on integrated care boards to ensure that services in the community have the necessary level of resource to meet demand such that the provisions of the Bill function as intended, and to assess and report on this every two years. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth mentioned, the Opposition generally support the overall aims of the new clause, but as ever, there are some issues with the detail, so I have five questions for the hon. Member for Winchester if he responds, or for the Minister to answer in his summing up.

First, if we imposed a statutory duty on ICBs to ensure sufficient resources for the CTOs, what mechanisms would there be to monitor and enforce compliance? Secondly, what would be the consequences if an ICB failed to meet this duty? Would there be formal accountability or a sanction process? Thirdly, how would the duty interact with existing NHS budgetary constraints and competing priorities? Would it become a statutory obligation with no clear means of redress if unmet? Fourthly, could the duty set a precedent whereby Parliament mandates resource guarantees without providing additional central funding? Finally, what constitutes “sufficient” resources in the context of the CTOs? Who defines that standard, and it is defined locally or nationally?

[Stephen Kinnock]

The term “unreasonable delay” is subject to review by the courts, and further guidance will be given in the code of practice. On what happens if the responsible clinician and the community clinician disagree, the addition of a third decision maker is not about overruling the responsible clinician, who continues to have overall responsibility for the patient on the community treatment order. Including the community clinician at the point of putting someone on a community treatment order helps to ensure continuity of care for the patient. Involving the community clinician in other decisions around the community treatment order, particularly recall, revocation, renewal and discharge, means they can provide an additional insight into the patient’s status while in the community.

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Amendments 54 and 55 would alter the balance by stipulating that in all cases involving patients under 16, the nominated person must have responsibility. That would, in effect, significantly narrow the pool of eligible nominees. I understand the rationale for that: by legal definition, children under 16 are minors. Their capacity to make decisions about their healthcare is rightly subject to additional safeguards. The nominated person who has access to personal information can object to the treatment or detention and can challenge decisions. They wield serious influence.

[Gregory Stafford]

I thank my hon. Friend for his comprehensive analysis of the provisions under discussion. Does he understand amendments 54 and 55 to mean that, although there would be a narrowing of who can be chosen as the nominated person, there would still be some flexibility for the child to choose? Does he have any concerns about a situation in which a minor—someone under the age of 16—may, for whatever reason, choose somebody who the health professionals believe is not the most appropriate person, and does he have any sympathy with the idea that, given a parent has responsibility for the child in every other aspect of their life, the parent should have that same responsibility in this context?

[Dr Evans]

My hon. Friend has identified the nub of the issue, and his intervention leads me on to an example that demonstrates the problems that we are talking about. I have chosen to debate these provisions in the order shown on the selection list because I wish to understand whether the Minister believes that Government amendments 40 and 41 will deal some of the issues that I am about to raise. There clearly has to be flexibility in dealing with these situations, but it is worth exploring what could go wrong. The nub of the issue is that they may well go wrong. Let us take an example.

Say that A is 16, and she is struggling with anxiety and behavioural issues. She has had serious suicidal episodes and previous drug use. She lives at home with her loving, supportive parents, who have always acted in her best interests and want to engage constructively with her care, but A is under pressure from a 19-year-old boyfriend. He is controlling, and discourages her from speaking to her parents or professionals. When asked to nominate a trusted adult, A names him. Under the Bill as drafted, the nominated person could be accepted, provided A is deemed to be competent. That would give her boyfriend access to her care decisions and significant legal standing. Under amendments 54 and 55, that would not be possible because he does not have parental responsibility, and therefore could not be appointed.

That example illustrates why the amendments matter. Children, especially those in crisis, may be vulnerable to coercion, grooming, or misplaced trust. Loving parents, who have legal obligations to protect and care for their children in every other walk of life—as my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon pointed out—could find themselves legally sidelined.

Are there risks in amendments 54 and 55? We must consider the edge cases. Not all children under 16 live with those who are trusted and have parental responsibility. There are estranged families, kinship carers, informal fostering arrangements and situations of abuse. A strict parental responsibility requirement could exclude the very people relied on by a child. I ask the Minister whether there is flexibility in the amendments for exceptional cases in which someone without PR may be appropriate, with oversight. Do Government amendments 40 and 41 already address that point? Forgive me if I have misinterpreted, but they seem to be bridging amendments. Would guidance or a statutory code of practice provide a better mechanism to balance protection and flexibility? What assessment has been made of children in care or informal arrangements, where parental responsibility might technically lie with a local authority or estranged parent, especially under the changes proposed by Government amendments 40 and 41?

There are potential routes forward. One option might be to require PR by default but allow exceptions if the child expresses a clear competence preference, the AMHP agrees that a person is suitable and poses no safeguard risks, and a senior commissioner or legal oversight has sign-off. That is a possible way of keeping amendments 54 and 55 alive, and it would keep within the spirit of the amendments by protecting children from harmful influence without removing their voice in complex or marginal cases. We could also explore adding an explicit safeguard power to override a child’s nomination where there is concern of coercion or abuse, regardless of parental responsibility status. Again, I think that may be what Government amendments 40 and 41 are trying to do, but I would be grateful to see whether that is the case.

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[David Burton-Sampson]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Desmond. I rise to speak to clauses 24 to 28, and I will start by sharing the story of two of my constituents: Carol and her husband John.

John had been an active member of the local community before he was sadly diagnosed with dementia. As his dementia progressed, John was settled into a good care home and Carol was happy with the care that he was receiving. Due to a change in his medication, Carol was told that John had become more agitated and aggressive than usual. She was asked whether she would agree to John being assessed. Although she did not really understand what that meant, she did not see any reason to refuse.

From that point on, Carol says that she felt like she had lost control over her husband’s care. John was assessed by four strangers, and Carol was told that she could not be present. Following the assessment, Carol was told that John would need to be detained under the Mental Health Act within the next two weeks. Carol was very concerned to hear that John would be detained, but despite having power of attorney, she was not able to overrule that decision. She hoped that he would be able to get help with his medication and that he would be discharged.

In the end, Carol had only half an hour’s notice that John was going to be detained. She rushed to the care home to see her husband, who had been sat in the garden having a cup of tea with some friends, being abruptly put into a van by two men and taken away. She was not allowed to come with him, and for the first time in her life, Carol had a panic attack. She could not imagine how traumatic it was for John, who was disorientated and confused because of his dementia, to be taken by people he did not know to a strange place.

John was taken to a secure mental health ward that was very different from the familiar environment of his care home. Carol was told that she could not visit him, but she was insistent and turned up anyway. She was then allowed to meet his doctors on his first day and was reassured to hear that he would be detained for only two weeks while his medication was reviewed.

In the end, John was detained for eight months. Carol continued to visit every day, spending as much time as possible with him. She had specially adapted her home to accommodate John’s needs, but she was not able to have him discharged to either his home or a care home. Precious time was taken up with the endless fight to get John into a more appropriate environment. Sadly, John’s health significantly declined while he was detained. He lost the ability to walk and speak, and Carol felt that, in his declining state, he could not pose any danger to himself or anyone else. However, it was only after he was admitted to hospital for a catheter fitting that Carol was able to get him discharged, thanks to a doctor telling her that she could use her power of attorney to take him home—something she was told she was unable to do in the mental health facility.

She took him to a care home, where, sadly, he died two weeks later. John’s cause of death was listed as Parkinson’s, but Carol feels strongly that the anxiety and fear of his final months contributed to his death. Carol understood that her husband was dying; all she wanted was to be included in making decisions about his care. She knew very clearly what she wanted for him. She told me:

“I wanted him to die in a bed with clean sheets, with a window open and with me by his side.”

Those wishes were not taken into account.

As John’s wife and carer, Carol spent every day with him, yet she felt excluded from the decision-making process for his care. She should have been able to focus on what was important: spending time with him. The changes in clauses 24 to 28 would have helped Carol to feel more involved in representing John during his time in care. Clearly, there were failures to allow Carol, as John’s nearest relative, the rights that she was entitled to in order to support him.

With the move from “nearest relative” to “nominated person”, the new rights afforded by the Bill would have given Carol even greater engagement. Given that she had power of attorney, it is likely that she would have been appointed the nominated person by the AMHP. However, moving forward, it is important that those rights are properly afforded to the nominated person, so that we do not have another situation like John and Carol’s.

Although I welcome and fully support the changes in clauses 24 to 28, I seek an assurance from the Minister that all efforts will be made to ensure that the rights of nominated persons are fully recognised and assigned, and that nominated persons will be made fully aware of their responsibilities and powers, allowing advocacy for the patient under care.

I turn briefly to amendments 54 and 55 and Government amendments 40 and 41. I agree with the Government’s view that if a child has capacity, they should be able to have the choice to appoint their own nominated person. I appreciate the intent of the amendments from the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, but I think that the Government’s approach is more appropriate.

[Gregory Stafford]

I appreciate that the hon. Gentleman sees the potential benefit in the amendments standing in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge. However, my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth gave an example, which I do not think is entirely distanced from reality or possibility, in which a person could well choose someone who is deeply inappropriate. In that situation, the person or people—that is, the parents—who had in every other part of life had responsibility for that child would now potentially not have responsibility for the child, in what is probably the most important part of that responsibility.

Does the hon. Member for Southend West and Leigh really not have any concerns about that? If he does, does he not support at least the intentions behind those two amendments, if not the exact wording or drafting? If he does accept those intentions, would he like to see the Government table similar amendments, drafted in a way that he would find more appropriate?

[David Burton-Sampson]

I appreciate the hon. Member’s intervention. He makes the point that there may be situations in which the young person’s request might be inappropriate. However, on the flip side, there may be a situation in which it might be inappropriate for the person with parental responsibility to be the nominated person. They could have been involved in the situation that has led to that young person entering a mental health spiral—an abuse situation, for example, which has not been discovered by the authorities. That person would still have parental responsibility at that time. I think it is important that the young person can choose the person to support them in their ongoing care. I will be supporting clauses 24 to 28 and Government amendments 40 and 41.

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[Aphra Brandreth (Chester South and Eddisbury) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I rise to support amendments 54 and 55, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, but I will first briefly speak to clause 24, which is an important and long-overdue step towards modernising the Mental Health Act 1983, crucially strengthening the rights, dignity and autonomy of individuals subject to it.

The reform of the existing nearest relative provisions, replacing them with a new system that allows for the appointment of a nominated person, is an important part of ensuring that individuals get the right support, and modernises an outdated system. The current model is based on a rigid and outdated hierarchy in which the role of the “nearest relative” is determined by law, not by the wishes of the patient. This one-size-fits-all approach fails to account for the complexities and nuances of individual relationships. It can result in someone unsuitable, or even actively harmful, being placed in a central role in a person’s care and treatment journey. Indeed, the limitations of the system have been acknowledged by practitioners, patients and policymakers alike. It is too often disempowering, and the patient can lose agency at a time when they need to be empowered to feel in control of the situation as much as possible.

As the shadow Minister says, clause 24 is the cornerstone of the reforms. It is an important change to the current legislation to reaffirm the commitment to patient-centred care, to dignity and to the principle that those receiving treatment under the Mental Health Act should have a voice in decisions about their support network. The aim of the clause—to put the patient first—is important. It acknowledges that the person best placed to advocate for the patient may not be their closest relative. In some cases, family dynamics are fraught. In others, the designated relative may hold views about treatment that conflict with the patient’s wishes or medical advice. We have seen real-world examples in which the imposition of the “nearest relative” role has led to tension, distress and, ultimately, a breakdown in trust. That is not the kind of environment in which recovery is fostered.

Amendments 54 and 55 would address the specific issue of nominated persons and those with parental responsibility for children under the age of 16. It is important that we consider situations in which a young person may be in a vulnerable position and their decision on who their nominated person should be may not be in their best interests. We have a particular duty to ensure that children are safeguarded. Clause 24 as it stands will allow under-16s to choose someone who is not the parent to have significant power, including the ability to discharge the child from hospital.

We must listen to and actively try to support any young person who needs that kind of intervention—it is not that their views should not be considered. However, there is a very real risk that a vulnerable child or teenager might be coerced by or under the control of an older partner, for example, as my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth pointed out. Perhaps they might choose an older friend. We need to consider that a decision made by the nominated person, such as an older friend, may have implications for those with parental responsibility. For example, that older friend may decide to discharge a child from hospital and into the care of the parents, who would not provide advocacy or be part of that decision making.

The Minister said that safeguards will be put in place, but can he expand on that? There are some real concerns here. Let us consider a situation in which there has been a decision by a court to determine which parent has responsibility for the child. If complex family issues have already been considered by the family court, it is right that the decision be followed. I respectfully ask the Minister to reconsider this point. We must respect the fact that parents of those under 16 are best placed to advocate for, support and act for their children. This is about capacity, consent and, ultimately, safeguarding.

[Gregory Stafford]

My hon. Friend makes a powerful point. I remember the comments made by the hon. Member for Southend West and Leigh, who is chuntering from a sedentary position—I think he disagrees with my hon. Friend’s point. In his reply to my intervention, he made the point that there are situations in which things are the other way round, where those who have parental responsibility are not necessarily the appropriate persons.

Does my hon. Friend agree that, on first principles, the parent should have parental responsibility in all areas of life, including the ones that she is talking about, unless there are specific reasons, such as the court decision to which she referred, that suggest that the parent is not the correct person to have responsibility? Surely, in the balance of danger or risk, there is a far greater risk if the nominated person is not a parent than if the nominated person is a parent.

[Aphra Brandreth]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. If parents are not acting in the best interests of their children, there is a wider safeguarding issue that needs to be considered. One would question why such parents had been left in a situation in which they have responsibility for their children and are potentially harming them.

That leads me nicely to another point, which is that introducing the additional wording would bring mental health in line with physical health. For someone under the age of 16, it is their parents who have the responsibility to act in the best interests of their physical health; it seems to me that one would expect the same for mental health. I therefore urge the Committee to support amendments 54 and 55.

Let me return briefly to the overarching aims of clause 24. I underscore the point that the wider principle at stake—patient autonomy—is one that I support. The ability to make informed choices about one’s care should be a central component of our care system. In mental health, where individuals can feel particularly vulnerable, that becomes even more essential. Granting patients the power to nominate someone who will advocate for them, advise them and represent their wishes is a powerful act of empowerment. Moreover, this change enhances safeguards for patients. It ensures that the person acting on their behalf is someone they have chosen and trust. It reduces the potential for conflict and opens the door to a more collaborative and compassionate model of care.

If the Committee agrees to the amendments, which would provide the necessary safeguards for children, who I believe should be considered separately to adults, my overall view is that clause 24 represents a pragmatic, compassionate and patient-focused update to the Mental Health Act. It aligns with our modern understanding of mental healthcare and puts trust, respect and dignity at the heart of our legislative framework.

Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting)

Gregory Stafford Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 17th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

Amendment 54, in schedule 2, page 77, line 21, at end insert—

“(3) Where the patient has not attained the age of 16 years, a nominated person must have parental responsibility for the patient.”

This amendment would stipulate that the nominated person for a patient under 16 must have parental responsibility for the patient.

Amendment 55, in schedule 2, page 80, line 13, after “2(2))” insert

“, has parental responsibility for the patient (see paragraph 2(3))”.

This amendment would stipulate that the nominated person for a patient under 16 must have parental responsibility for the patient.

Government amendments 40 and 41.

Schedule 2 stand part.

Clauses 25 to 28 stand part.

[Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris. I rise to speak in support of clauses 24 to 28, schedule 2, and the vital amendments 54 and 55 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer). Together, those provisions form a crucial pillar of the Bill, which must modernise our framework for the 21st century while not forgetting one of the oldest truths in our social contract: that parents, not the state, bear the first and deepest duty to protect their children.

The Bill will reform an Act that has stood in various forms since 1983, and which was itself built on a much older legacy of how this country balances individual liberty with the need, in rare cases, to deprive someone of that liberty for the sake of that person’s safety, or the safety of others. For decades, that balancing act has been shaped by the so-called “nearest relative” rule. However well intentioned that rule was, it has often failed to serve the people it is meant to protect. Patients have found themselves legally represented by estranged parents, distant cousins or an ex-spouse with whom they have had no contact for years. In the worst cases, that has compounded trauma and undermined recovery. Clause 24 will address that problem by giving patients the power to appoint a “nominated person” of their choosing: someone whom they trust, who understands their needs, and who can speak up when they themselves cannot. That is, quite simply, the right approach for modern mental health care. It is grounded in autonomy, and respect for the individual’s right to shape their own care and safeguard their own dignity.

Good principles must be matched by good machinery. That is why schedule 2 is not a mere administrative detail, but the backbone of this reform. It sets out, step by step, how a nomination is made, who may be nominated, how conflicts are avoided, and how mistakes are corrected. Under part 1 of schedule 2, a patient must make the appointment in writing. It must be signed and witnessed by

“a health or care professional or independent mental health advocate”.

That is a safeguard against casual or coerced choices. The nominated person must themselves consent: they are not a passive bystander but an active participant. If the relationship breaks down, the patient may revoke the nomination, or the nominated person may resign. Crucially, the county court may step in to remove or bar a nominated person if that person acts unreasonably, abuses their power, or is clearly unsuitable.

Part 2 of proposed new schedule A1 to the Mental Health Act 1983, inserted by schedule 2 to the Bill, addresses an issue that we must take seriously: capacity. Not every patient will have the capacity to make the appointment at the moment it matters most. The proposed new schedule therefore provides a fall-back system. A court may appoint a nominated person on the patient’s behalf, or a default can be determined under criteria set by regulation. The court again retains ultimate oversight to resolve disputes or replace a default, if the circumstances require it. It is thoughtful, practical and rights-based lawmaking, and I commend the drafters for getting the balance broadly right.

Clauses 25 to 28 will give the nominated person real power. They are not a figurehead. Clause 25 demands that professionals consult the nominated person before applying for detention or guardianship. If the nominated person objects, the professional must provide a report showing why detention is none the less necessary, with a clear risk-based justification. The nominated person can then challenge that decision. Clause 26 shortens the duration of the bar on discharge requests from six months to three. If a nominated person believes that the person no longer needs to be detained, they can press for release sooner and more effectively than before.

[Jen Craft (Thurrock) (Lab)]

Without wanting to sound abrupt, we all have the explanatory notes and are reading them, so in the interests of brevity might the hon. Member consider getting to the point about what he would add to or take away from the Bill? We all know what the clauses aim to do; the Minister has already set that out.

[Gregory Stafford]

I thank the hon. Lady for her point, but I shall continue in the same vein unless I am told to do otherwise.

Clause 27 will ensure that when community treatment orders are considered, with all the restrictions they bring, the nominated person’s voice must be heard and an objection must be properly countered with evidence. Clause 28 addresses hospital transfers, recognising that being moved to another hospital can uproot fragile support networks and compound distress. By embedding a consultation duty here, too, the Bill will make it harder for patients to be moved arbitrarily or without explanation.

In summary, the clauses and the schedule empower patients, embed transparency and build trust, but they do so through a lens rightly focused on adults—capable, consenting adults who make choices freely. That brings me to my fundamental point: we must be absolutely certain that this approach will not inadvertently erode a bedrock of child protection: that a parent is the default legal protector for their child. For an adult, autonomy means freedom of choice, but for a child, especially one under 16, autonomy must never mean being left alone to navigate a labyrinth of legal forms and healthcare powers without the protection of a parent. That is why I strongly support amendments 54 and 55, which would ensure that for under-16s, parents remain the lawful decision makers and the first safeguard for their child’s welfare.

Let us imagine for a moment a vulnerable 14-year-old who, in the confusion and fear of a psychiatric admission, is persuaded by a well-meaning adult—or, worse, someone with a hidden agenda—to appoint them as the nominated person. That child may be separated from their parents—the very people who know the child best and have a legal duty to care for them—while an outsider gains rights to object to treatment or discharge decisions. Once that nomination is made and witnessed, it carries weight in law and could marginalise the very people who brought that child into the world and have a moral and legal duty to protect them.

This is not just theoretical. We know from real cases in family courts that unscrupulous individuals can exploit vulnerable young people. The risk that the new system could unintentionally open the door to manipulation must be taken seriously. Let us not be naive about how exploitation works: groomers, traffickers and abusers thrive in grey areas of the law; they will find loopholes and drive a coach and horses through them. If we do not make it crystal clear that no child under 16 can override parental responsibility without a court’s explicit order, we risk creating an invitation for abuse.

Can the Minister assure the Committee that no child under 16 will be permitted to override parental responsibility simply by nominating someone else without a full and proper process? Schedule 2 does include fall-back arrangements and eligibility checks, and those are welcome, but unless the law is explicit that only a court can displace a parent’s right to act for their child, those safeguards are not watertight.

Amendment 54 addresses a related area, the notification of incidents. It would require the Secretary of State to review whether the law should be strengthened so that all admissions of children and young people for mental health treatment trigger mandatory incident reporting, and whether the timeframes for that reporting are still appropriate. It would require the Secretary of State to review whether incident reporting requirements are robust enough for all under-18s in mental health settings. Are all incidents of restraint, seclusion, injury or absconding being reported promptly and comprehensively? If not, what must change?

We have seen far too many tragic cases in which harm or abuse in children’s mental health units came to light only after a scandal broke, because the system did not catch it in time. Proper oversight is not an optional extra; it is essential for the trust of families. In my view, a review alone is not enough, so I urge to the Minister to confirm that, if the review finds gaps, the Government will legislate swiftly to close them. In the meantime, what interim steps will be taken to ensure that no child is left unprotected?

Amendment 55 is the final safeguard in this suite of amendments. It would allow the Secretary of State to make consequential amendments to other laws to implement the Bill cleanly. That is good housekeeping, but it must not become a blank cheque. When it comes to parental rights or child safeguarding, no technical tweak should be done behind closed doors by negative procedure; Parliament must approve it in full daylight, on the record. Will the Minister confirm without ambiguity that any consequential amendment that touches on parental powers or child protections will come before both Houses under the affirmative procedure?

To illustrate things in the starkest terms, let me paint one more scenario for this Committee. A 15-year-old girl, already vulnerable, is detained following a self-harm incident. Her parents, distressed but committed, wish to be involved in her care plan and discharge, but in her fragile mental state the child is persuaded by an older friend—perhaps well-meaning, perhaps not—to nominate them instead. That friend, now a legally recognised nominated person, blocks discharge, disagrees with treatment and excludes the parents from updates. The clinicians are caught in a legal tangle. The child is caught in the middle, and the parents must fight in court to reclaim their rightful role. As I said before, that is not a theory; it is the sort of real-life pitfall that sloppy drafting can enable. If we see it coming and fail to stop it, we will have failed as legislators.

I wish to be clear that I support clauses 24 to 28 and schedule 2 because they modernise mental health law for adults in a way that is respectful and empowering. I support amendment 54, because it would strengthen transparency and accountability where children’s lives and safety are at stake. I support amendment 55, because it would keep our statute book coherent, but it must never be misused to erode rights by stealth. Above all, I support the amendments because they ensure that the new nominated person system does not inadvertently weaken the oldest and strongest protection we have, which is the legal responsibility of parents to care for their own child.

I urge this Committee to adopt the clauses, the schedule and amendments 54 and 55 as essential guardrails to ensure that what we pass here is not just legally sound, but morally right. Let us modernise this law and strengthen patient voice, but let us never allow a child to lose their parents’ protection by accident or bureaucratic slip. Let us be in no doubt: when the state removes or limits parental rights, it must do so under the strictest scrutiny of a court of law, with evidence tested and the child’s welfare paramount. A signed piece of paper at a bedside should never be enough. That is the dividing line between a humane, modern health system and one that risks creating new injustices in the name of progress.

I ask the Minister again: will the Government enshrine in this Bill or elsewhere that parents are the legal representatives for under-16s unless a court directs otherwise? Will he guarantee rigorous checks to prevent the manipulation of young minds at their most vulnerable? Will he commit that any necessary changes found by the incident review under amendment 54 would be acted on without delay? I commend this package of reforms to the Committee, and I trust that the Government will listen carefully to these warnings and act to make the legislation watertight.

[The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Harris, not least because I understand you have just returned from New Zealand, where you had duties as the Government’s trade envoy. I thought perhaps we should do a haka in your honour to mark it, but you might rule against that.

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[Aphra Brandreth]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. This is not a simple or straightforward addition; it would require potentially substantial training. We would not want somebody in a role that they were not adequately prepared for. With any amendment, we would need to ensure that training, and the time and expense of it, had been factored in.

Even with the best intentions, the success of any extended support role, such as that envisaged in the amendment, will ultimately rely on the availability and integration of local services. Where appropriate services are in place and are working well together, advocates can play a valuable role in signposting and supporting access. Rather than placing additional responsibilities on the IMHA, our focus should be on working with community providers to ensure that the necessary support, particularly for social and financial needs, is consistently available and is effectively joined up across the system.

Having said that, I recognise and welcome the emphasis placed by the hon. Member for Winchester on the role of carers and family members. Too often, they are overlooked in discharge planning, yet their involvement can make a critical difference to a patient’s successful transition from hospital to home. When carers feel informed, supported and prepared, it gives patients the reassurance and stability that they need to continue their recovery with confidence. The primary responsibility of the independent mental health advocate, however, must remain their responsibility to the patient. I am concerned that the drafting of the amendment could create ambiguity about who the IMHA is principally there to support.

Financial stress is undoubtedly a real and urgent concern. Mental ill health can severely affect an individual’s capacity to work, to manage their finances or even to engage with systems of support. Equally, financial instability can exacerbate mental health difficulties. Those are serious challenges that must be addressed, but I would question whether the IMHA is the right professional to take on that role directly. Instead, we should ensure that they are well placed to refer individuals to appropriate services without assuming responsibility for co-ordinating that support themselves.

[Gregory Stafford]

I do not know whether the hon. Member for Winchester will press his amendment to a vote, but if he does, would my hon. Friend support the idea of having a pilot roll-out of the system before we go the whole hog, because of all the potential problems that she has highlighted?

[Aphra Brandreth]

That is an important point. These are quite substantial changes, and we do not know the full impact that they would have on the system. We have talked about issues such as whether there is sufficient training for advocates and a joined-up approach with what is happening in the community. A pilot would provide the opportunity to see where it is working and where there might be things that need to be changed or considered. It would certainly be a sensible approach. We all want to ensure that we are supporting individuals to be discharged in a safe way that minimises the likelihood of their being readmitted, but we need to do so without overcomplicating the roles and the system that are currently in place.

I commend the hon. Member for Winchester for bringing these important issues to the attention of the Committee. His amendment raises legitimate and timely concerns around the support offered to individuals leaving hospital, as well as the wider context in which recovery takes place. I hope that I have been able to offer some reflections that will assist hon. Members in considering the matter further.

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[Stephen Kinnock]

Currently, under the Mental Health Act, a person detained for treatment can be kept in hospital initially for six months before the responsible clinician must make an assessment to decide whether to continue their detention or to discharge them. The independent review raised concerns that six months is too long. It heard evidence that patients were sometimes detained longer than necessary and were only considered for discharge when a tribunal hearing was due. It found that in up to 17% of cases referred to the mental health tribunal, discharge happened in the 48 hours before the hearing. That suggests that some patients are being detained longer than is necessary.

The review recommended reducing from six months to three months the initial detention period for people admitted for treatment, so that a patient’s detention is reviewed sooner to ensure that patients are not detained when they are no longer benefiting from treatment and can be safely discharged.

Clause 29 will mean that patients detained for treatment have their detention reviewed three times—up from twice—in the first year: at three, six and twelve months from the date of detention. The new renewal periods will not apply to part III patients, except in very specific circumstances when an unrestricted patient changes status. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Gregory Stafford]

I have some brief questions for the Minister about this important clause, which has serious implications for patient liberty and for public protection. We must ensure that decisions are clinically and legally sound. First, how will the proposed changes to initial and renewal detention periods help conditions and services and manage public risk more effectively, particularly in forensic or high-risk cases? Secondly, do longer detention periods after revocation of a community treatment order reflect a higher perceived risk, and if so, is there clear clinical evidence supporting that extension to six months? Thirdly, are we confident that the new timelines strike the right balance between protecting the public and ensuring patients are not detained longer than necessary? Finally, and as an adjunct to that, what other considerations are there in the clause or the Bill to keep the public safe and to make sure that decisions are correct in the context of clause 29?

[Dr Evans]

Clause 29 addresses the length and renewal of detention periods under the Mental Health Act. I begin by acknowledging the important step that this clause represents in shifting towards a more rights-based, patient-centred model, as enshrined in the Bill.

Clause 29 would shorten the initial period of detention for treatment under section 3 of the Mental Health Act from six months to three months. Subsequent renewal periods are, likewise, reduced from six months to three months and then from one year to six months. This is clearly informed by the principle of least restriction, as is rightly highlighted in the explanatory notes in paragraph 212.

On that basis, we welcome the direction of travel, but, while we agree with the principle of moving towards shorter, more proportionate detention periods, we have questions and concerns about implementation, consistency and safeguards, which I hope the Minister will address.

First, will shorter periods lead to better outcomes, or just more paperwork? The goal here is to ensure that detention is not allowed to drift and that patients are not held in hospital for longer than is necessary without rigorous justification. However, the clause still allows for indefinite renewal in increments, once those shorter initial periods expire. Can the Minister assure us that these changes will result in more meaningful reviews and not just more frequent rubber-stamping of detention? It would be helpful to understand whether the Government have assessed the clinical capacity, particularly among responsible clinicians and approved mental health professionals, to conduct these reviews with real rigour. If not resourced properly, we risk replacing one form of inertia with another.

Secondly, what safeguards exist against the resetting of detention periods on transfer? I am by no means a legal expert, so forgive me if I have completely misinterpreted this, and I bow to the legal expertise of the Minister, the Government and, most importantly, to able staff in the Box. However, clause 29(2) introduces into section 19 of the Mental Health Act new subsection (2A), which provides that if a guardianship patient is transferred to hospital, they will be treated as if they had been admitted on the day of transfer. In practical terms, does that not reset the detention clock?

To my eyes, this concept of resetting the detention clock appears most clearly in subsections (2) and 29(5)(d) of clause 29, where a patient who is transferred from guardianship to hospital, or who has their community treatment order revoked, is treated as if they had been newly admitted to hospital on that day. This effectively resets the start date of the detention period. Clause 29(2), which will insert proposed new section 19(2A) into the Mental Health Act, states:

“But, in the case of a patient falling within subsection (2)(d), section 20 has effect as if the patient has been admitted to hospital in pursuance of an application for admission for treatment on the day on which the patient is transferred.”

New paragraph 5B of schedule 1 to the Mental Health Act states that the modifications

“apply in relation to a patient transferred from guardianship to a hospital in pursuance of regulations made under section 19…In section 20(1)(a)…for “admitted”…there is to be substituted “transferred”.

In new paragraphs 5C and 5D of that schedule, the same resetting principle applies to patients whose CTOs are revoked, with renewal detention starting from the date of revocation, not from their original hospital admission or order.

In practice, this could mean that if a patient is placed under guardianship on 1 January and transferred to hospital on 1 April under section 19(2)(d) of the Mental Health Act, then under proposed new section 19(2A), they would be treated as if they had been newly admitted on 1 April. Therefore, even though they have been under compulsion since 1 January, the new three-month detention clock begins on 1 April. Likewise, a patient under a community treatment order that was issued on 1 February and revoked on 1 August will, under paragraph 5D, start a new in-patient detention period on 1 August, not 1 February.

On one hand, that makes sense. We do not want people whose state is fluctuating to be released, or simply to time out. On the other hand, if we are looking purely from the patient’s perspective, as the legislation asks us to do, with regard to the principles in clause 1, that could be a problem. Will the Minister clarify how many times such a reset could occur for a single individual? Is there any form of oversight, review or reporting requirement where this happens? That mechanism might be necessary in some clinical contexts, but without safeguards it could become a back door to prolonging detention, which is something that the clause seeks to reduce. Is there some kind of register or mandatory recording of these incidents to spot repeat patterns?

Thirdly, another issue that needs addressing is the creation of possible complexity. Paragraphs 218 and 219 of the explanatory notes set out a separate but equally important issue. Clause 29’s welcome shortening of detention periods—from three months to start with, then three months, then six months, then annual reviews—is not applied evenly to patient groups. Who gets the shorter periods? Most civil patients detained under part II and some patients on revoked community treatment orders. Who does not get them? Patients detained by a hospital order from a court, if their CTO is revoked within six months of the order, as in paragraph 218. And, of course, restricted patients—typically those involved in more serious offences.

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[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Mrs Harris. I rise to speak on clauses 30 to 33, which go to the core of the rights architecture that surrounds mental health law in this country—namely, the oversight and challenge mechanisms available to individuals subject to detention, supervision or conditional discharge. I think we are all aware that the 1983 Act, although fit for its time, has failed to keep pace with the evolving understanding of mental health illness and modern expectations of legal accountability or procedural fairness. The clauses, although technical in nature, seek to rectify a number of the long-standing shortcomings in the operation of the mental health tribunal system.

Clause 30 will extend and clarify the time period within which patients may apply to tribunals. Essentially, it will do two things. First, it will extend the application window for section 2 patients—those detained for assessment—from 14 to 21 days. Secondly, it will reduce the initial waiting period for section 3 patients and those under guardianship from six months to three months. Those are sensible and overdue changes, because 14 days is a narrow window for any legal action, let alone one initiated by an individual who may be experiencing acute psychological distress.

Extending the application window to 21 days provides a fairer opportunity to seek representation and prepare a meaningful application. Equally, the reduction of the initial period for section 3 and guardianship patients to three months offers an important safeguard against prolonged detention without scrutiny. It restores a measure of clarity between the gravity of the detention order and the speed with which it may be challenged.

The clause will also clarify the rights of conditionally discharged restricted patients who are subject to deprivation of liberty conditions—that is, those who are discharged from hospital but required to comply with supervisional residence requirements that are so restrictive that they cross the legal threshold for a deprivation of liberty. At present, those individuals occupy a legal grey zone: they are not formally detained, yet the liberty they enjoy is so curtailed that it raises significant questions as to their article 5 rights. Clause 30 will properly address that anomaly by creating a defined, regular route of appeal, initially between six and 12 months from the imposition of the deprivation of liberty conditions, and biannually thereafter. Those are measured and proportionate changes that enhance access to justice, improve compliance with human rights obligations and restore clarity to a field that has suffered, at times, from legal opacity.

The reforms are not without consequences. A wider cohort of eligible applicants and more frequent review periods will inevitably increase the burden on the tribunal service, on legal aid provision and on clinical teams who must prepare documents and attend hearings. That challenge is not to be dismissed lightly.

[Gregory Stafford]

Does my gallant and learned hon. Friend have any information on the current waiting times for tribunals? What does he expect the effect of the changes proposed in these clauses to be on waiting times?

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

My hon. Friend makes a pertinent point. We all know, from our casework or personal experiences outside of this place, about the pressures on the Courts and Tribunals Service. Mental health tribunals are not exempt from that pressure. Changing the timeframe on which tribunals operate, and the frequency with which reviews take place, will inevitably increase the burden on the service. Therefore, although these changes are broadly welcome, it is important that we are cognisant of their impact on the resources that will be required, the number of judges and wing members that will be needed, and of course the hard standing of the court and tribunal infrastructure that will need to be made available. Other issues, such as those around the digitalisation of the service, will also need to be addressed.

Clause 31 will recast the regime for automatic tribunal referrals, replacing the prior six-month structure with the concept of “a relevant period”. For detained patients, referrals will now occur at three months, then 12 months, and annually thereafter. For community patients, they will occur at six months, then 12 months, then annually. Most significantly, hospital managers will be under a new duty to refer a case when no review has occurred in 12 months, regardless of whether an application has been made. That is a sound reform.

The clause will introduce coherence to a previously fragmented system, and establishes a minimum standard of legal oversight. The inclusion of a backstop provision—that no individual should go more than 12 months without review—is essential. In a system in which patients may not always have the means or capacity to apply for a review themselves, it offers a critical safety net. Clause 31 will also repeal section 68A of the 1983 Act, which has become unwieldy and duplicative. By streamlining the referral process, the Bill enhances legal clarity and administrative efficiency, but I would caution that the increased complexity of the new timeframes may require significant training of those responsible for their implementation.

Clause 32 will provide for restricted patients who are subject to deprivation of liberty conditions. It goes further than clause 30 by imposing mandatory referral duties on the Secretary of State. Under the clause, a tribunal must be convened after 12 months, every two years thereafter, and at four years if no review has occurred. Crucially, the clause also codifies the tribunal’s powers. It may now vary or impose conditions, including those that constitute a deprivation of liberty, provided that they are necessary to protect the public from serious harm and are no more restrictive than hospital detention. That clause introduces a principled, proportionate framework for balancing public protection with patient liberty, and avoids vague or discretionary use of such powers.

Finally, clause 33 will apply the same principles to restricted patients not subject to deprivation of liberty orders. Such individuals, although under fewer constraints, are none the less subject to significant legal orders. The new requirement for a tribunal review at two years, and every four years thereafter, ensures that oversight is regular and non-discriminatory.

All four clauses are united by a clear objective to rationalise tribunal access, enhance procedural safeguards and bring the Mental Health Act into alignment with modern standards of fairness and proportionality. However, I will close with a caveat: rights without resourcing are hollow. If we are to place greater demand on the tribunals service, and to rely on it as the guardian of liberty for thousands of individuals, it must be adequately funded, staffed and supported. Legal representation must be accessible. Tribunal members must be properly trained. Hospital managers must be equipped to meet their new responsibilities.

With those reservations, I broadly welcome clauses 30 to 33 as a necessary recalibration of our mental health law. They reflect the dignity of the individual, the demands of public safety, and the enduring principle that no one should be deprived of liberty without fair or timely review.

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[Gregory Stafford]

Does my hon. Friend think that if there is a backlog, that could undermine patient rights or clinical progress in some way? How will the tribunal system be able to cope with that increased workload and meet its legal obligations to provide timely tribunals so that patients get the best care?

[Dr Evans]

That is a difficult balance to get right. I appreciate that the Government have said that the Bill will take 10 years to implement, but if these measures come into force from day one, we will start to see automatic referrals come through. There will be a lag as the transition happens, but my hon. Friend is absolutely right: we can foresee scenarios where patients who want to be referred into the tribunal are waiting in inappropriate care places, which may be to the detriment of their personal care and may actually make their recovery worse. He is right to highlight that question, which is why having a broad understanding of how many extra referrals are coming would be useful.

Clause 32 focuses on conditionally discharged restricted patients who are subject to deprivation of liberty conditions. It rightly ensures that those patients are brought within scope of automatic referral, first after 12 months and then every two years. Again, that is a positive step, ensuring that even those not detained in hospital will still have access to a review of their conditions. Crucially, the clause also gives the tribunals the power to vary or remove those DoL conditions.

Can the Minister say more about how that important power will be used? What criteria will the tribunals apply to assess whether a condition is genuinely necessary and proportionate? Will patients be legally represented in those hearings by default? Will another advocate be there, or will it be someone else in their place? Here, too, I would welcome some clarification from the Minister. I hope he will forgive my legal naivety, but my mother always said, “It’s better to ask a dumb question than stay dumb forever.”

The explanatory notes talk about DoL conditions. The current legal framework for authorising the deprivation of liberty for individuals who lack capacity is complex and in transition. Under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, deprivation of liberty safeguards have been the established mechanism since 2009 to ensure lawful deprivation of liberty in care settings. However, the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019 introduced liberty protection safeguards as modernising replacements, designed to simplify and broaden protections.

LPS are widely seen as an improvement to DoLS, because they extend safeguards to a wider range of settings, including hospitals and people’s own homes where deprivation of liberty might occur. They also streamline the assessment process, reducing bureaucratic delays and better reflecting person-centred decision making. The Law Commission and various stakeholder groups have supported LPS as a way to address the significant practical and legal challenges posed by DoLS, including the so-called DoLS backlog, where assessments have been delayed for many vulnerable individuals.

Despite that, I do not believe that LPS have yet been implemented, leaving DoLS still in force. I wonder if we are therefore creating ambiguity as we update the Mental Health Act through the Bill’s clauses, such as those addressing conditional discharge and deprivation of liberty, without clarity on how those will intersect with the forthcoming LPS framework that will be introduced under separate legislation. That raises important questions about the sequencing and co-ordination of legislation reform. How will the Government ensure coherence and avoid conflicting provisions when different statutes address overlapping issues at different times?

Given that context, have the Government abandoned the planned implementation of LPS, or do they remain committed to bringing them into force? If the implementation is still planned, will the Government provide a clear timeline for when LPS will replace DoLS? How do the Government intend to ensure that the provisions we are debating will align with or adapt to the introduction of LPS? What steps are being taken to ensure that vulnerable individuals and professionals who navigate this complex legal landscape will have clear, consistent safeguards and guidance through the transition? Clarification on those points is essential to avoid legal uncertainty and to ensure that the reforms provide coherent protection for those deprived of their liberties.

Clause 33 deals with patients who are not under DoLS conditions. It will ensure that even those who are under DoLS conditions, such as detained restricted patients or conditionally discharged patients with lesser restrictions, receive automatic tribunals. It will reduce the current three-year referral intervention for detained restricted patients to 12 months and introduce automatic referrals for non-DoL conditionality discharge patients after two years and then every four years. Again, that is a step forward, but four years feels like a long gap between reviews for those discharged with conditions that still significantly affect their daily lives. Will the Minister explain the thought behind the chosen timeframe? If a person’s condition changes, is there a mechanism to trigger an early referral outside the normal cycle?

The clauses show progress. They reflect a clear intention to strengthen patients’ rights, increase oversight and address historical injustices, particularly for those living under deprivation of liberty conditions in the community. But with complexity comes risk, and we need to ensure that patients understand their rights and the legal support available. The tribunal system must be properly resourced to uphold the safeguards that we place in the legislation.

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[Stephen Kinnock]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. We are absolutely committed to ensuring that we create a space for young people to provide feedback. Some of that will be around past experiences when making their advance choice documents, but much broader opportunities for feedback will absolutely be built into the system. We want this to be a learning process. It is important that the code of practice is not just a document that sits on the shelf gathering dust; it should be a live document. That is why the feedback is so important.

It should be noted that although reflecting on past experiences may be therapeutic for some individuals, for others it can be traumatic, so the measure should be entirely service-user led. We also continue to be concerned about the burden that the amendment would place on independent mental health advocacy services, which are already under strain.

[Gregory Stafford]

I apologise—this may be due to the terminology of “amendment” versus “clause”—but is the Minister saying that the Government are likely to vote against clause 35 as it currently stands? He is talking about amendments and clauses, and that is slightly confusing me. [Interruption.] His officials are nodding.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I don’t know what that nod means.

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[Stephen Kinnock]

We will figure it out as we go along. I have now lost my place. [Interruption.] My answer to the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon is that the Government are voting against clause 35 stand part.

[Gregory Stafford]

Thank you, Minister.

[Stephen Kinnock]

Right. Advocates have told us that implementing what is set out in the clause would raise logistical and resourcing problems, as it would require a significant shift from their current role. They have also raised concerns that if they acted in effect on behalf of the hospital to collect feedback, their independence and impartiality in the eyes of the patient might be undermined. We would prefer to direct resources to increasing access to advocacy services among in-patients, as proposed by the Bill. Advocates play a crucial role in promoting and protecting the rights of patients. We do not wish to detract from that or to dilute their role. I do not commend the clause to the Committee.

[Jen Craft]

Like many Committee members, I was deeply confused about how we were proceeding.

On the face of it, the clause broadly seems as if it should be part of any Act about mental health care, including post discharge. I have spoken about my own experience of interacting with the Mental Health Act as it stands. I might have found the clause fairly helpful post discharge and others might have found it useful as well. However, I have just heard the Minister’s description of the limitations of the clause, and the speech that I was about to make has been thrown into complete disarray by the confusion just now. But I implore the Minister to consider the fact that, when it comes to encouraging participation, understanding, and co-designing and co-producing services, capturing the experience of those recently detained under the Mental Health Act can be extraordinarily useful. Clause 35, which was added by an amendment from the Lords, seems a fairly useful way to do that.

[Gregory Stafford]

Like the hon. Lady, I see many benefits from the clause. Like many Committee members, I am surprised that the Government intend to vote against it.

As has been mentioned, the clause was inserted in the House of Lords by my noble Friends Earl Howe and Lord Kamall. I think it introduces a very valuable and forward-looking provision—namely, a mandatory debrief session within 30 days of discharge. It introduces a formal mechanism for learning from patient experiences following detention under the Mental Health Act. Although patient feedback mechanisms exist in some services, they are not consistently applied or mandated. The clause ensures that every detained patient has the opportunity to reflect on their care with an independent advocate, and that their feedback contributes to service improvement. It reflects a broader shift in mental health law towards transparency, accountability and the patient voice, and aligns with the recommendations from the 2018 independent review of the Mental Health Act, which the Government have used as an argument in favour of many of the other clauses.

Clause 35 is more than just a procedural addition. It represents a shift in culture towards embedding the patient voice and accountability in the mental health care system. It recognises the importance of empowering individuals after detention, supporting their recovery, and learning from their lived experience to improve future services. Mental health charities and third sector organisations have strongly endorsed the clause, seeing it as a meaningful step towards a more rights-based, transparent approach to care.

Clearly, the clause empowers patients, because it gives them a structured opportunity to share their experiences and influence service provision. It promotes transparency by requiring hospitals to report publicly on what they have learned and how they have responded. It supports quality improvement by encouraging services to reflect on and address systemic issues in the delivery of care. Furthermore, it has independent oversight through the involvement of IMHAs, which helps to ensure that feedback is gathered impartially and respectfully.

The reforms prioritise professional clinical opinion, safeguard children from inappropriate influence during periods of acute vulnerability, and elevate the patient voice in the post-care process. In doing so, they align the Mental Health Act much more closely to modern standards of care, international best practice and evolving public expectations. I believe that the clause is essential to strengthening the Bill and ensuring that our mental health system becomes not only more effective but more compassionate, responsive and just.

[Dr Evans]

I rise to speak to clause 35, which would insert new section 23A into the Mental Health Act 1983. It was introduced and passed in the Lords, and rightly so. As the hon. Member for Thurrock said, it seems surprising that anyone might want to take it out.

The clause was introduced as a new duty to offer all patients detained under the Act a consultation with an IMHA within 30 days of discharge. The purpose is to review their experience of hospital and learn from that experience through a report shared with hospital managers. Currently, the Mental Health Act makes provisions for access to IMHAs primarily during detention, particularly around decisions concerning treatment and care planning. However, once a patient is discharged, formal advocacy tends to fall away, unless pursued through broader NHS complaints mechanisms. There is no statutory duty to engage with patients post discharge, to understand how they have experienced their care or to systematically learn from those experiences.

In that context, the clause represents a welcome and important step forward. We know from successive reviews from the Care Quality Commission, NHS England and, of course, the independent review of the Mental Health Act, led by Sir Simon Wessely, that patients often feel disempowered during their detention. Many describe experiences of coercion, poor communication or even trauma. Yet those experiences frequently go unheard: lost in the silence that can follow discharge. Clause 35 seeks to change that, creating a pathway for those voices to be heard, and, more importantly, for services to learn from them. I strongly support that principle.

We need to clarify one thing first: the clause says a patient must “be offered” a consultation within 30 days —it is no more formalised than that. It is not a statutory requirement to take part, but purely to offer. That is important when it comes to making sure that reports are made in partnership with the patient. That is positive language, which would help to support the decision making and feedback loop.

In their rebuttals, I appreciate that the Government may ask whether the clause would mean hospital managers marking their own feedback. They might also ask how we would deal with CQC capacity. Those are reasonable questions, but at the heart of the clause, as agreed by the Lords, is the fact that all too often patients’ thoughts after discharge are not fully taken into account.

[Gregory Stafford]

Surely the fundamental part of the Bill is self-assessment and self-reflection. That does happen in some cases, and certainly in other parts of the healthcare system, but in this area generally does not; when it does happen, it is done in an inconsistent manner. The clause seeks to formalise things and to ensure that there is a benchmark by which service users and patients can feed back to the service they have just come from, to improve services. Does my hon. Friend share my confusion about why the Government would want to take that out?

[Dr Evans]

My hon. Friend makes a strong point. In clinical practice, we know that reflective learning is important, but that is not mandated. As we have seen from the reports, part of the reason why we do not see improvements is that we do not know about them. The clause gives patients the chance to empower themselves in a statutory, regulated way, which then allows us further transparency on how those issues arise.

Let us not forget that patients with good experiences would also have the chance to feed those back, further helping to support the services and hopefully leading to beacons of best practice up and down the nation so that we could then learn from those. That is the idea behind the clause: making sure that the likes of the regulator would be able to share lessons about not only those who have struggled but those who have done well. Clause 35 really offers a rare opportunity to hardwire the patient voice into the feedback loop of mental health services. That is a principle that I and my Opposition colleagues strongly support.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I remind Members that if they want to take their jackets off, they may. It is very warm.

[Gregory Stafford]

I rise to support clauses 36 to 40. Clause 36 addresses a legal gap identified in case law, which held that the Mental Health Act 1983 did not permit the imposition of conditions amounting to a deprivation of liberty for conditionally discharged patients. The clause provides a clear statutory basis for such conditions, but only under strict safeguards. It aims to balance public protection with patient rights, ensuring that DoL conditions are used only when absolutely necessary and proportionate. This is a positive step, because it clarifies the legal authority, resolving any uncertainty, following court rulings, about the legality of DoL conditions in conditional discharges. It protects public safety by ensuring that high-risk patients can be managed safely in the community, under appropriate restrictions. It includes safeguards that require DoL conditions to be justified and proportionate, with a focus on patient welfare, and it aligns with notable human rights law, especially the definitions and principles from the Mental Capacity Act and the relevant case law.

However, I have a couple of questions for the Minister. My view is that there is potential for overuse. Without robust oversight, there is a risk that DoL conditions could be used too readily. What safeguards is the Minister putting in place to ensure that that does not happen? There is clearly an impact on patient liberty, and we need to get the balance right. Even with the safeguards, these conditions significantly restrict individual freedom and therefore must be carefully monitored. How is the Minister ensuring that that will happen? In relation to the legal thresholds, determining whether conditions meet the legal test may require detailed clinical and legal assessment. We have talked about the practical implications of this Act on numerous occasions. I again ask the Minister whether he is certain that we have the relevant clinical and legal assessors out there to ensure that we can push that forward.

Clause 37, entitled “Transfers of prisoners and others to hospital: conditions”, will update the legal framework for transferring individuals from prison or immigration detention to hospital under the Mental Health Act. The previous wording of the Act required that treatment be “available”, but did not specify that it must be appropriate for the individual’s condition. This clause will align the criteria with more modern clinical standards and broader reforms in the Bill, which emphasise person-centred care and treatment suitability. It will also ensure that immigration detainees are clearly included in the scope of these provisions. Again, it is positive, because it updates and consolidates the list of immigration-related detention powers covered by the Act. It supports human rights compliance, because it aligns with principles of lawful and proportionate deprivation of liberty under article 5 of the European convention on human rights; it brings the Act in line with the current clinical and legal terminology; and, most importantly, it ensures that transfers are made only when appropriate treatment—not just any treatment—is available.

I have just a couple of questions for the Minister on this clause. I see potential for disputes. Determining what constitutes appropriate treatment may lead to disagreements between clinicians and authorities. What are the Minister’s thoughts on those potential disagreements? There are also some resource implications. It may increase demand for secure hospital beds if more transfers are approved under the revised criteria. I would welcome any thoughts from the Minister on how to ensure that we have the right number of secure hospital beds, not just as a totality, but in the specific regions and areas where people may be being detained.

Clause 38 is also about the transfer of prisoners and others to hospital, but specifically about time limits. It responds to a long-standing concern about delays in transferring prisoners and immigration detainees to hospital for mental health treatment. Under the current system, there is no statutory time limit, and individuals can wait weeks or months in prison, despite being assessed as needing urgent psychiatric care. That has been criticised by mental health professionals, legal advocates and human rights bodies. The clause will introduce a legal framework for setting and enforcing time limits, aligning with the Bill’s broader goals, which I think we all agree with, of improving patient rights and dignity and timely access to care. Again, I support the clause, because it will reduce delays. It will help to ensure that mentally unwell detainees are transferred to appropriate care settings without unnecessary delay, and will introduce clear expectations and accountability for decision making. It enables some flexibility, I think, because it allows for tailored regulations, to accommodate different case types and operational realities.

Again, however, I have some questions. I think there will be some implementation challenges. Services may struggle to meet the deadlines without sufficient resources —an issue that I mentioned in relation to the previous clause. Also, time limits may be difficult to apply in complex or borderline cases without clear guidance. Does the Minister see a need for explicit guidance in the code of conduct, or in some other form, to ensure that the risk of a rigid application does not make things more complicated or, more especially, mean that a potential patient is sent to the wrong care simply because we are focusing on the time rather than the appropriateness of the care? Of course, I would welcome his thoughts on how any new tracking systems and co-ordination between prisons, hospitals and the Ministry of Justice might work in this case.

Finally, I will briefly touch on clause 39. This is a technical update regarding the term “remand centre”, because that is no longer used in law or in practice; instead, young people are remanded to youth detention accommodation. Given that the clause is purely technical, I support it.

[Anna Dixon]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Harris. I will briefly speak in support of clauses 36 to 40. These clauses reflect the principle of least restriction, albeit for people who are subject to part III, and who are therefore subject to the deprivation of liberty conditions. It is really important that there are frameworks around conditional discharge, and these clauses will do a lot to bring it in line with best practice, and to put the limit set out in the best practice guidelines on a statutory footing to ensure that there is a 28-day transfer. To be successful, that will require multidisciplinary working between the health and justice systems. With that in mind, will the Minister give an assurance that he is confident that the 28-day limit can be met? If there is already data on how many transfers are made within that time limit, in line with best practice guidelines, that would give some assurance that the new statutory time limit is likely to be met.

I am pleased to see that the time limit should be breached only in exceptional circumstances, and that the Bill specifies that a shortage of hospital beds or staff does not constitute exceptional circumstances. It is really important that that is not used as a reason not to transfer or discharge people later than the 28-day limit. Some of the discharge test rests not only on whether there is a risk of harm to another person, but on a public test. Can the Minister clarify how those two tests will work in tandem? Is that already being done in practice?

Finally, I note that the evidence that we have received from the Care Quality Commission says that it welcomes closing the legal gap following the High Court ruling, as set out in the explanatory notes. However, the CQC believes that supervised discharge should be used only “when strictly necessary”, and I know that there are ongoing discussions between the Department’s officials and the Care Quality Commission. Can the Minister give an update on those discussions and clarify what role, if any, the CQC will play in the oversight of these measures?

As the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon said, clauses 67 to 70 bring the Bill in line with youth justice practices and terminology, and with immigration policy. It is important that we take the opportunity to make sure that the Bill is fully up to date and in line with other pieces of legislation, so I support the clauses.

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[Dr Chambers]

I do not know whether we could combine yoga with our proceedings, Mrs Harris.

The hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford spoke really well in a similar vein to what I am about to say. Our amendment 19 to clause 41 would extend the provision of opt-out advocacy services in England to informal patients under 18 years old. Young people and their families and carers often face a nightmare navigating the mental health system. We find this on every level. A psychiatrist who came into my office in Winchester said that he and his wife, who is also a medical professional, were struggling to navigate the system to get care for their own child. His words were quite profound: “If we can’t navigate the system, what hope has anyone else got?”

Even when young people have secured desperately needed in-patient care, often after many months of delay, they can face real challenges in understanding the care being implemented and its impact. Often, such young people are cared for far from home. Enabling them to benefit from mental health advocacy that ensures the pressures on the system do not lead to unfair or damaging decisions for mentally ill young people is crucial. It can help to ensure that the patient’s whole situation and entire history is always taken into account, and that treatment is always appropriate, rather than symptoms just being addressed in isolation. We should be looking to empower patients and their families and carers across the whole system, not just in relation to those who are sectioned.

[Gregory Stafford]

You will be delighted to know that there will be no yoga from me, Mrs Harris.

I rise to support clause 41 and schedule 3, which will expand access to independent mental health advocates to not only those detained under the Mental Health Act but informal voluntary patients. Like many Committee members, I am sure, a number of IMHAs in my constituency have approached me about this, and they welcome the expansion. I pay tribute to the amazing work that they do across Farnham, Bordon, Haslemere, Liphook and the surrounding villages. Previously, only patients detained under specific sections of the Mental Health Act or subject to certain treatments were entitled to IMHA support.

The clause reflects the recommendations of the 2018 independent review of the Mental Health Act and the 2021 White Paper, and aims to enhance patient rights and reduce disparities in access to advocacy. That clearly empowers more patients by giving informal patients access to advocacy support. It improves transparency and accountability in mental health care settings. It ensures proactive outreach so that patients are not left unaware of their rights or support options, and supports informed decision making and potentially reduces coercive practices.

Clearly, there may be some resource implications for advocacy services, which the Minister may wish to touch on. Likewise, there may be some implementation challenges, which other hon. Members have raised, especially around ensuring timely and consistent notification and engagement. There could be potential delays in care co-ordination if advocacy processes are not well integrated. I would welcome the Minister’s thoughts on that.

This shift is long overdue. Too many vulnerable people, admitted voluntarily but feeling powerless, have lacked a clear, independent voice. The clause corrects that injustice by embedding advocacy deeper into the system, moving from passive availability to proactive engagement.

Schedule 3 underpins clause 41 by putting clear duties on hospital managers and advocacy providers alike to ensure that patients are automatically offered support. It is opt out, not opt in. That clarity of responsibility will reduce coercion, increase transparency and ultimately lead to fairer treatment decisions.

Schedule 3 operationalises the principles set out in clause 41 by embedding them in the structure of the Mental Health Act 1983. Like clause 41, it reflects recommendations from the 2018 independent review and the 2021 White Paper, aiming to reduce disparities in access to advocacy and ensure that all patients, regardless of detention status, are supported in understanding and exercising their rights. Like clause 41, it strengthens patient voice, reduces inequalities, improves compliance and encourages the early intervention and resolution of concerns.

Let me turn to Liberal Democrat amendment 19, which was tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Winchester. Clearly, its purpose is to extend the opt-out advocacy services in England to include informal patients under the age of 18. This ensures that children and young people who are not formally detained under the Mental Health Act, but who are receiving in-patient care, still have automatic access to an IMHA.

Currently, opt-out advocacy provisions primarily apply to patients who are formally detained. However, informal patients aged under 18, who may be in hospital with parental consent, can still experience significant restrictions and may not fully understand or exercise their rights. This amendment seeks to close the gap by ensuring that young informal patients are automatically offered advocacy support, recognising their vulnerability and limited legal autonomy.

My view is that this does strengthen patient rights. It safeguards vulnerable patients and promotes equality by aligning the rights of informal patients aged under 18 with those of detained patients. It supports informed decision making and helps young people to understand their rights and treatment options. If the hon. Member is minded to press the amendment, I hope that the Government will at least give it tacit support, even if they do not vote for it. That being said, I would welcome the Minister’s comments on why he does not feel that the amendment, or an alternative draft of the wording, if he does not like the specifics of it, should be included in the Bill. I do believe that this is important.

Government amendments 42 and 43 to schedule 3 are relatively technical but important elements of the Bill that align provision in England and Wales. I have just a few questions for the Minister. Robust rights must come with realistic resources. How will the Government ensure that advocacy services are funded and resourced properly to meet the new wider demand? Although they are technical, the Government amendments will still have an impact. What steps will be taken to monitor consistency so that a patient in Farnham, Bordon, Haslemere, Liphook or one of the villages surrounding my constituency has the same access to an advocate as a patient in Coventry, Aberafan or Swansea. We want to make sure that there is consistency.

Finally, will there be clear standards for timely engagement, especially given the risk of treatment delays if advocacy is not well integrated? If the Minister can answer those questions, I think that this will be a good step forward for patient voice and fairness in mental health, and I would support the clause and schedule 3.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

The clauses will amend section 132 of the Mental Health Act in relation to detained patients, and section 132A in relation to community patients, and insert a new provision in relation to conditionally discharged patients. They place a statutory duty on hospital managers to supply complaints information to detained patients, community patients and conditionally discharged respectively, as well as to their nominated person.

Patients, their family and carers have a right to complain about the treatment they receive, including care and treatment under the Mental Health Act. The patient’s rights to complain are enshrined in the NHS constitution. Although the code of practice currently sets out that information about complaints should be provided to patients when they are detained, there is no statutory duty to do so. Under the clauses, hospital managers will be required to provide information on how to make a complaint about: first, functions under the Bill; secondly, any medical treatment for mental disorder received during their detention; and thirdly, the outcome of any complaint about medical treatment. That includes providing information about how to make a complaint to the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman about the mismanagement of complaints about medical treatment, where the person believes their complaint to another body—for instance the hospital or CQC—was not appropriately investigated.

Hospital managers must take practicable steps to ensure that patients have understood complaints procedures, and information about complaints must be provided both verbally and in writing. The duty requires that information must be provided as soon as practicable after the patient is first detained, when the section that they are detained under changes, when the detention is renewed, or every 12 months for restricted patients under part III of the 1983 Act. For community patients, a duty is triggered as soon as it is practical after being placed on a community treatment order and as soon as practical each time the community treatment order is renewed. For conditionally discharged patients, it is triggered as soon as practicable after being conditionally discharged. I commend clauses 42 to 44 to the Committee.

[Gregory Stafford]

I rise to speak in favour of clauses 42, 43 and 44, which together strengthen the duty to inform patients—whether detained in the community or conditionally discharged—about how to make a complaint about their treatment and the outcome of that complaint. The Mental Health Act has long included duties to tell patients their rights, but too often that information has been patchy, hard to understand or buried in paperwork. The clauses tackle that by requiring clear, repeated information about not just detention, but treatment and the complaints process.

Clause 42 relates to information about complaints for detained patients. Section 132 of the Mental Health Act 1983 originally required hospitals to inform detained patients of their rights, but that was often inconsistently applied. This clause responds to long-standing concerns about transparency and patient empowerment, aligning with the broader goals of the Bill to enhance autonomy and dignity in mental health care. Specifically, there is an expanded duty of information. Hospital managers must now ensure that detained patients understand how to make complaints, not only about their detention, but about their treatment, along with the outcomes of any complaints.

There are some timing requirements, i.e. that the information must be provided as soon as practicable after detention begins and be repeated annually for restricted patients, or after each section 20 report for others. That will improve patient’s awareness of their rights and how to seek redress. It will promote accountability and mental health services by encouraging feedback and complaints, and support better outcomes by addressing grievances early and constructively.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Gregory Stafford Excerpts

Report stage
Friday 13th June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Kim Leadbeater]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for the intervention, although I am not sure that it is relevant to the banning of advertising for assisted dying services, which I will try to stay focused on.

[Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Kim Leadbeater]

I am afraid that I am going to have to make some progress, based on the number of Members who wish to speak today.

I thank the hon. Member for West Worcestershire and the hon. Member for Reigate (Rebecca Paul) for working with me on amendment 73, and I am very pleased that they support it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

As Mr Speaker has already mentioned, in order for everybody to get in—well, in order for most to get in—we need speeches to be shy of six minutes, and interventions to be short. I call Gregory Stafford.

[Gregory Stafford]

Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. I am conscious of those comments and will try to limit my remarks to new clause 13 and some of the amendments to it.

The Royal College of Physicians, the Royal College of Psychiatrists, the Royal College of Pathologists, the Association for Palliative Medicine and the British Geriatrics Society have all said that there are problems with this Bill, and I have heard nothing from its sponsor, the hon. Member for Spen Valley (Kim Leadbeater)—despite trying to intervene on her a number of times—about what she has done to ensure that their concerns have been addressed. This brings us directly to a fundamental concern: namely, the means by which assisted death would be carried out under new clause 13. The impact assessment for the Bill recognises that

“The safety and efficacy of those substances used for assisted dying is currently difficult to assess”.

[Peter Prinsley (Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket) (Lab)]

Does the hon. Member agree that the barbiturates that we are considering are conventional agents? They have been used in anaesthesia to cause loss of consciousness and suppression of respiration for generations. These are not novel substances.

[Gregory Stafford]

I obviously respect the hon. Gentleman, given his medical background, but as far as I am aware those substances have not yet been used for murdering people, which is what we are going to do here. That leads me neatly on—

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Gregory Stafford]

I will make a little progress before taking another intervention.

No safeguards can prevent complications from taking medicines. As I am sure the hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket (Peter Prinsley) knows, there can always be complications. In this case, those could include regurgitation of the drugs, regaining consciousness and seizures.

[Caroline Voaden (South Devon) (LD)]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Gregory Stafford]

Can I just finish this point? During the 27 years that the law in Oregon has been in place, data is available for only about 36% of cases. However, within that, 59 incidents of regurgitation are known to have occurred and nine people are known to have regained consciousness. Different drug protocols have been used in those 27 years but the efficacy and safety of the drugs are unknown, with a time range between ingesting the drugs and death ranging from one minute to nearly six days.

The lack of defined protocols for the regulation, supply and administration of life-ending substances is precisely why I have tabled my amendment (c) to new clause 13, tabled by the hon. Member for Spen Valley (Kim Leadbeater).

[Dr Murrison]

My hon. Friend was right to table his amendment, which I certainly support. Does he agree that the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency would insist that a barbiturate or any other substance used in medicine should be approved for a specific cause? We cannot translate that to a completely different cause or reason for using it. Would he also agree that the way to deal with the issue is for it to be properly regulated through the MHRA?

[Gregory Stafford]

I entirely agree. Some of the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Gosport (Dame Caroline Dinenage) may address that.

[Sadik Al-Hassan]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Gregory Stafford]

I will make a little progress, but I will give way to the hon. Gentleman in a moment.

My amendment would require the Secretary of State to prohibit the use of medical devices designed to induce death by the administration of gas, such as the Sarco suicide pod, which has been in the press recently. That device bypasses medical oversight entirely and presents an ethical rupture in our current framework. If the Bill proceeds without safeguarding against such methods, we risk opening the door to a deeply troubling precedent—one that would erode professional accountability and compromise the integrity of end-of-life care.

[Sadik Al-Hassan]

I would like to share my expertise as a pharmacist with the hon. Member. Drugs can be used for many indications and are quite commonly used in unlicensed situations, where there would be less evidence to support them than in the situation that we are discussing today with new clause 13: an idea that is incredibly well researched, practised and evidenced in multiple countries.

[Gregory Stafford]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. I do not disagree that drugs are used for different things; that is not the thrust of the argument that I am making. What I am saying—relatively clearly, I hope—is that when the drugs we would potentially use in these situations have been used, there have been unintended consequences and side effects. We must ensure that the drugs we use, if the Bill passes, are absolutely effective in what they are intended to carry out: namely, the end of the life of the individual.

[Sir John Hayes]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Gregory Stafford]

This is the last intervention that I will take, as I must make progress.

[Sir John Hayes]

The reason why what my hon. Friend has said is so important is that it is yet another important safeguard, particularly given that, as we learn from analysis in the impact assessment, much of this is outsourced to private organisations. Those organisations need to be regulated in precisely the way he has described.

[Gregory Stafford]

My right hon. Friend is entirely correct.

The Royal College of Physicians has said:

“Medicines prescribed and administered in assisted dying must be regulated for safety and efficacy for this use.”

If that is a requirement of the Royal College of Physicians, we in the House should take it seriously and put it into the Bill.

I will now draw my remarks to a close, but I should say that I also support amendment 99, which would require a report on the drug’s effects before Parliament approves the regulation, as well as a number of the other amendments, which hopefully would remove the wide-ranging Henry VIII powers currently in the Bill. In the light of all that I have said, I remain deeply sceptical as to whether the Bill, in its current state, provides the robust, protective and operationally sound framework that such a profound societal change deserves.

[Adam Jogee (Newcastle-under-Lyme) (Lab)]

I am grateful to you, Madam Deputy Speaker, for giving me my first opportunity to speak in the Chamber on this most important of issues. As I do so, I think of all those who were killed in the horrendous plane crash in India yesterday. I think of their families, their friends and the lives they have left behind. May their collective and individual memories be a blessing.

I rise to speak to amendment 42, tabled in my name and those of more than 60 colleagues from the majority of parties in the House, representing constituencies in all four nations of our United Kingdom. It would remove the automatic commencement of the Bill’s provisions in England. It is a safeguard, good and proper.

As it stands, the entire assisted dying process will commence automatically in England four years after the Bill is passed. Notwithstanding some of the comments we have heard, that will happen regardless of how far along the plans and preparations are—plans for the manufacturing and supply of the drugs that will be used to end the life of anyone who chooses this step; for the identification and training of those on the panel; for the impact on the national health service in England and Wales and its budgets; and all the rest.

Colleagues will know that, as the Bill was originally drafted, the process would have commenced two years after it was passed. I welcome the fact that my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley (Kim Leadbeater) amended that period from two years to four. That was a genuinely welcome acknowledgment that such a serious and consequential change to every aspect of our country, from our healthcare system to our legal system, should not, must not and cannot be rushed. Therein lies the basis of my amendment. If this change is going to happen, let us do it properly. Let us not impose a timeframe that puts us in a bind—one that means we are driven by timing over purpose, and the pressure that comes with a ticking clock, rather than by the need to do it properly.

People living in Newcastle-under-Lyme and York Outer, in Buckingham and Bletchley and Pembrokeshire, are counting on us parliamentarians—those of us who are concerned about assisted dying and those who passionately support it. The Bill’s supporters have won every single vote, apart from on this issue in Committee. Our people are counting on us to make sure, if the Bill passes, that it is a success, that it will be consistent and, most importantly, that it will be safe. If the Bill passes, it will introduce assisted dying in the biggest jurisdiction yet by population. These are uncharted waters; this will not be like anything else. The last thing we should do is rush this process.

In Committee, the hon. Member for Richmond Park (Sarah Olney), who spoke excellently earlier today, tabled an amendment to remove the automatic commencement deadline for Wales. It provided that assisted dying could be rolled out only once Welsh Ministers deemed that everything was ready for a safe roll-out. The Committee voted by a majority to give that extra safeguard to the people of Wales. If it was good enough for the people of Wales in Committee, it is good enough for the people of England today. We face a situation in which assisted dying may proceed in England months or even years before it does in Wales. The provisions and systems may look different. The process of organising the English system to meet the arbitrary four-year deadline would almost certainly lead to rushed decision making.

My hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has sought to remedy the disparity, but her solution is not to extend to my constituents in England the safeguard that the members of the Bill Committee—members that she appointed—voted for. No, her remedy is to allow for automatic commencement to happen in Wales as well, removing the safeguard that the Committee voted for. The answer is not to fast-track the roll-out of assisted dying in both England and Wales, potentially putting the lives of some of the most vulnerable at even greater risk due to rushed decisions that are not fully thought through.

I have not been on these Benches for very long, but I know that arguing for the automatic commencement of legislation is generally, in the kindest interpretation, unusual. For legislation of this magnitude it is, I am afraid to say, reckless, and reinstating automatic roll-out in Wales when the Committee explicitly voted against it borders on the undemocratic.

Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting)

Gregory Stafford Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 12th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Evans]

My hon. Friend is spot on about training. It is one thing to enshrine these measures in primary legislation; it is another thing to have the training and interpretation that go with them. One of the reasons that we have not tabled an amendment on the matter, as yet, is that there could be some concerns about what “cumulative” or “escalating” behaviour looks like. Ask any clinician and they will say that they have seen patients who are on the borderline and are struggling. It can be unclear whether they are within or outside the definition; they could be wavering between the two, given the state of their mental health. That is a real concern, but the broader pattern of identifying the picture of what is happening could be helpful and important.

One way to address the issue would be to review the data and legislation. Would the Government consider carrying out a review two years after the implementation of the Bill, specifically to look at the working of the legislation through the lens of public safety? I hope that there will be no concerns, but that would provide a backstop and a legal safety net. We do not want to wait another 40 years if there are changes that need to be made.

[Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)]

I entirely agree with my hon. Friend’s request to the Government for a review two years after implementation. Does he agree that it needs to be cross-governmental? The Home Office and other bodies such as the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and the NHS will need to be involved.

[Dr Evans]

My hon. Friend makes an incredibly important point. We heard on day one how these services interact, and that is completely correct. We need to look through the lens of public safety, because while we are quite rightly enshrining the autonomous nature of the patient as an individual, there is also the question of what we look at as a society. It includes the likes of local councils, mental health care and NHS care. Schooling could also be involved, as well as the judiciary and the Home Office. I think it is reasonable to ask the Government to look at that, in the light of recent high-profile cases, and say, “What are we doing? Does the legislation really do what we think it does?”

Clause 5 is a good step forward, but we must make sure that it is fit for purpose and that we have a review mechanism in place. I do not think that it necessarily needs to be in statute yet, but it will be interesting to hear the Minister’s response. Conducting a review on such a change, through the lens of patient safety, would be very useful.

There is also the matter of resources, which we keep coming back to. Change in detention criteria will rightly push us towards community-based alternatives—that is the whole point of what we are doing—but unless those alternatives are properly resourced with staffing, crisis services, housing and follow-up care, we will risk replacing one form of system failure with another. I appreciate that the Secretary of State is committed to reporting each year to the House, but will the Government publish a timetable and framework to support the implementation?

As we heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley, training is also critical. Professionals need the tools and time to learn the framework. They need support, implemented in real time, often under pressure and in complex, high- stakes circumstances.

Clause 5 is a welcome and thoughtful step in modernising mental health law. It will strengthens patients’ rights, sharpen clinical practice and bring us closer to a system that balances safety, liberty and humanity. However, we must be mindful about the risk of delayed intervention. In borderline cases in which the threshold is not clearly met but concerns remain high, we must ensure that there is still a route to timely, compassionate support. Otherwise, we may swing the pendulum too far in the opposite direction, from the overuse of detention to the underuse of care.

On Second Reading, I said:

“There is little greater moral burden than deciding for someone who cannot decide for themselves where care ends and control begins.”

Clause 5 typifies that burden: we are deciding who should be detained and why. I said:

“Make no mistake, this is what this House is grappling with”,

and indeed it is what our Committee is now looking at in detail. I also said:

“Involuntary care should never be the first instinct or answer, but a resort to prevent harm to both the individual and those around them.”

I said that compassionate care demands precision not only in its delivery, but in its design. I concluded:

“Without precision, we simply have sentiment.”

I promised then, as I promise now, that

“we will endeavour to ensure that the Government’s sentiment becomes a commitment.”—[Official Report, 19 May 2025; Vol. 767, c. 850-851.]

That neatly sets the scene for discussing Government amendments 26 to 29.

[Gregory Stafford]

Before my hon. Friend moves on to the amendments, I want to press him on the point about training, which my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley brought up. I support the change to the thresholds for detention but, given that it is potentially quite a significant change, what level of training will be required? Does my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth have any suggestion about how long it will take to train the relevant professionals so that there is consistency when the Bill becomes law? Does he feel that there should be a period of cooling off or training time before this part of the Bill is implemented, so that the training can catch up?

[Dr Evans]

My hon. Friend makes an important and poignant point. The Government have rightly stated that this change could take up to 10 years to implement, but we need to ensure that the most important safeguards are set out. Elsewhere, the Government have suggested that they will be in the code of practice. When we were discussing section 5 of the Mental Health Act and other issues, I said to the Minister that we need a constructive timetable, not only to know what the roll-out will look like but so that we can consult with the professions and ensure that they are able to deal with it.

Later, we will again discuss the interface between the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the changes that bring in new tests. That will be really important. We will also discuss the change of statutory safeguards for electroconvulsive therapy and changes to the statutory safeguards around who the second clinician will be—there is quite a feast of movements through this legislation. Make no mistake: that is what the country wants, but the Government must clearly set out some rationale for the timetable.

Unfortunately, the Opposition’s proposal for a costed plan was defeated. We wanted to set out some kind of concrete timetable over 18 months to ensure that we do not slip back, and to give the Government the flexibility to make the necessary cultural and legal changes. I hope that that addresses some of my hon. Friend’s concerns, but he was right to put that point to the Minister.

I oppose Government amendments 26 to 29, which would remove the reference to detention

“by a constable or other authorised person”,

and to delete the proposed definition of “authorised person”. I support the argument advanced powerfully in the other place by Baroness May, whose experience as a former Home Secretary gives her deep insight into the interaction between policing and mental health. Of course, it was under her premiership that the entirety of this discussion was progressed. I thank her for everything she has done, although I am not quite so thankful for the workload that it has created for me in my evenings and weekends. Her central message was clear: we must stop treating mental health as a policing issue and start delivering the right care from the right person in the right place. I wholeheartedly agree, as I am sure the Committee does.

I understand what the Government are trying to achieve. On the face of it, the amendments are technical. They seek to ensure that detention under the Bill is solely based on necessity where there is a risk of serious harm or the need for urgent treatment, and that it is not tied to who is doing the detaining. On paper that sounds reasonable, but in practice those changes will remove vital clarity and will risk baking in a system that has already failed too many people in mental health crisis.

Let us look at the problem with removing “authorised person”. The Bill, as amended in the Lords, wisely recognises the need to broaden the group of people who can respond to mental health incidents so that they include not just police officers, but trained and equipped professionals, mental health nurses, paramedics and approved mental practitioners—people who are qualified to care, not just to detain. The definition of “authorised person” in clause 5(7) ensures that only those with training competence and safety considerations are empowered to act, so it provides a framework for accountability, not a free-for-all. By removing the framework, the Government amendment would create a legal vacuum: it tells us that someone must be detained, but not by whom. In doing so, it would leave NHS trusts, police forces and local authorities with a lack of legal guidance and with a risk-averse default to the police.

I think we agree that the police should not be the first responders. As Baroness May has reminded us, and as many officers have told me, the police are routinely called out to mental health incidents, not because they are best placed to respond but because there is no one else available or authorised. That is neither fair to the police nor fair to the individuals in crisis. A police uniform can escalate distress. A custody cell is not a place of recovery. An officer guarding a patient in accident and emergency for 29 hours, as the Metropolitan police have reported, helps no one—not the patient, not the police and not the public. The 2019 College of Policing snapshot found that 95% of mental health-related calls did not require a police response. That is staggering. It underlines why we must build up the capacity and legal authority of clinical professionals, not erase them from the statute.

I turn to the Government’s argument and why it falls short. The Government’s case is that removing the phrase

“by a constable or other authorised person”

will de-emphasise the police and make the law more flexible. Ironically, however, removing the clarity about who may act risks re-entrenching police dominance in these scenarios, simply because no one else will feel legally empowered to intervene. The Government argue that the definition is unnecessary or potentially restrictive, but I say the opposite: a well-drafted enabling definition gives confidence, clarity and a lawful mandate for healthcare-led responses. This is not about excluding the police altogether. There will always be situations in which an immediate threat to life or serious violence requires a police presence, but that should be the exception, not the structure around which our mental health law is designed.

[Gregory Stafford]

I think, from what my hon. Friend has said and what the Minister said at the outset, that Members on both sides of the Committee want the same thing, which as far as possible is to keep the police out of the making of these decisions, unless of course—I made this point on Second Reading and was intervened on by the hon. Member for Ashford—someone with a mental health issue has a firearm or something like that. The clear point of dispute is about whether the phrase that was placed in the Bill in the other place achieves that. Would my hon. Friend not agree that someone who has served as Home Secretary and Prime Minister and the noble Lords, who have vast experience in healthcare over many years, have probably got the definition right, which is why the Government should support the wording currently in clause 5?

[Dr Evans]

My hon. Friend is right: we agree that this is not a place for the police unless there is an absolute sign of criminal intent. The problem is that what happens is a member of the public sees something, reports it to the police and, naturally, it is the police, the fire service or the paramedics who come forward. If a person is unsure about someone behaving in an irrational manner, which by definition someone with a mental health issue could well be doing, the likelihood is that they will call the police and the police will be the first responders. We know that they tend to be the fastest to respond.

Slightly widening and refining the definition of who can respond would allow us to build a framework and culture that might encourage a first responder—we often say that the AA is the fourth emergency service; it may well be that mental health services would be the fifth emergency service and could respond. That is what we need for service provision. The idea behind this is to try to crowbar the police out of that position, unless absolutely necessary, as my hon. Friend rightly says. Allowing a new framework would be good for safety and good for the police, because they would be freed up to do other stuff. More importantly, it would get the care as quickly as possible to the people who need it the most.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Evans]

I bow to the hon. Member’s expertise on this; the problem is that all the evidence shows that the police are the first there. I would like to see much more of him and his colleagues being able to respond and carry this out. We are giving them the legal certainty to do so. That is the argument for making sure that we have codified safeguards around who is and is not able to make such decisions. At the moment, it is purely the police who are called out to these situations, but this gives us another legal weapon with which we could fight this inappropriate use.

The aim is to codify the safeguards around who can exercise detention, ensure accountability and, importantly, enable health-led alternatives to police detention. Are the Government confident that the decision does not leave a legal grey area around which profession or agency has the statutory power to detain, especially during urgent community or hospital-based crises?

On the authorised person category in the section 135 and 136 powers, the Government say in their letter:

“Extending these powers to ‘authorised persons’…could potentially lead to staff, patient and public safety issues.

That is precisely why the Lords amendment included a tightly defined category of authorised person, subject to the Secretary of State’s regulation, mandatory training and safety provision. The intent is to ensure that when a professional, such as a trained mental health nurse, is better placed to respond than the police, they can do so lawfully and appropriately.

The Government say:

“Section 135 and 136 powers have been designed for police officers who have specific training, equipment and access to rapid support”.

Many frontline NHS and social care professionals, including AMHPs, crisis team members and community psychiatric nurses, already respond to acutely distressed patients in highly volatile environments. They lack the police powers, but not the clinical expertise. The amendments would bring clarity and lawful backing to the situations they already manage. Take, for example, a mental health nurse in a community who arrives at a person’s home to conduct an urgent assessment. The individual is clearly experiencing psychosis, and is at immediate risk of self-harm. Under the current law, the nurse must call the police, delaying the care and potentially escalating the situation. Under the amendment, they could lawfully detain, provided they are authorised and trained.

There are also confusions over the emergency response roles. The Government letter states:

“There is a very real risk of confusion over who should respond in an emergency if multiple agencies have the same powers, which could lead to delays.”

That concern is valid, but confusion is far more likely under the current law, where roles are unclear and NHS professionals must sometimes act unlawfully or wait for overstretched police. A regulated and accountable authorised person category, established in law and detailed in the code of practice, would clarify responsibilities, not blur them. Have the Government done any modelling of the delays and safety risk caused by not empowering suitably trained healthcare professionals to act in urgent situations?

The letter also highlights concerns from stakeholders that this is

“a radical proposal with a number of serious and potentially dangerous consequences and should not be pushed through without proper consideration”.

These proposals were not developed in isolation; they were advanced in the House of Lords, where the former Mental Health Act reviewers, legal experts and mental health professionals carefully considered their scope. They are also consistent with the direction of the 2018 independent review, which emphasised reducing coercion, racial disparity and the overuse of police powers.

The “right care, right person” initiative already expects health professionals to step in, but—unless I stand corrected—the initiative is not underpinned by any legal reform. Without amending the Act, health staff are still expected to take on crisis care without the powers of protection that they need to safely or lawfully do so. How can we expect health-led responses to mental health crises without giving health professionals the power in law to act?

Turning to guidance and the code of practice, the Government say that they will issue further guidance on police handover protocols and the legal frameworks. While guidance is welcome, it is not a substitute for statutory reform. Guidance cannot grant powers to detain or protect professionals from liability. We can have legal clarity with this framework.

If the Government want to push ahead with removing the amendments, will the Minister consider committing to a formal consultation with NHS England, the AMHP leads, frontline staff and patients on creating a legally robust authorised persons role? Would he consider piloting models of community-based urgent response teams that include AMHPs and trained nurses with delegated powers? Would he legislate for police exit strategies in A&E and community crisis responses that are enforceable, not just guidance based? Given our discussion about new clause 24, there is clearly scope for a sensible piece of work in the grey area to improve the interface for patients, clinicians and police. I think that is one we can all agree on.

[Gregory Stafford]

I agree with my hon. Friend. I think we agree on both sides of the Committee that, where appropriate, police should not be the first responders to this issue, although, obviously, there will be situations where they should be. If the Government push ahead with removing the amendments, is there any indication in the Bill, or indeed elsewhere from the Government, of what they will do to achieve what Members on both sides of the Committee seem to want, which is to avoid, as far as possible, having the police as the detainers and responders? If there is nothing else, I cannot see why the Government would want to remove the amendments made by the noble Lords in the other place.

[Dr Evans]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Under the last Government, the “right care, right person” initiative was launched with the Humberside police force to try to ensure appropriate care, but that is an example in isolation.

One solution would be to include guidance in the codes of practice, but it would not have the statutory footing to allow that legal certainty, which is the concern. Another would be to include something in the annual statement that we will receive from the Government. We should work collaboratively to try to find a decent piece of work to look for the evidence base and build a delivery plan to help the police extract themselves from situations, when appropriate, and care givers to insert themselves. It is admirable to share a problem that is difficult not just in England but in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

I agree that the Government are right to proceed with caution, but caution is not the same as inaction, especially when lives are at stake and the law no longer reflects the reality of mental health care. The amendments are not about expanding police powers; they are about reducing the need for police involvement by giving others the lawful authority to act. Although maths may not be my strong point, I am not blind to the make-up of this Committee; I realise that the change will inevitably happen. I want to press the Minister on how he proposes to reduce the burden on the police to safeguard them from thousands of hours spent dealing with mental health crisis issues. In extreme cases, they are not appropriate responders.

This is the key issue to improve so many aspects of our society. We could improve the working life of the police, allowing them to do what they are paid to do, trained to do and passionate about: policing and protecting their communities. We could improve life for the public, because it would free up the police to tackle crime and keep them safe. Most importantly, we could provide the correct care to those patients at their biggest time of need. I hope the Minister will set out how the Government plan to achieve that.

[Sojan Joseph]

I rise to support the Government amendments, which will simply remove the words

“by a constable or other organised person”.

On Second Reading, I highlighted my concern about the amendments made to the Bill in the other place that sought to extend police powers of detention under sections 135 and 136 of the Mental Health Act to other organised persons, including medical practitioners, approved mental health professionals, mental health nurses or doctors and further healthcare and social care professionals.

I know that the noble Lords who introduced the amendments intended to remove the need for the police to be present at mental health incidents in the absence of any risk. However, they would grant the police greater powers; as an unintended consequence, they would also apply to detentions under sections 2, 3 and 5 of the Mental Health Act, where the police currently do not have power to intervene.

A section 2 application is completed by two doctors and a social worker, and the patient may already be in a clinical setting. Section 3 relates to somebody who is already receiving treatment or already has a known diagnosis in a clinical setting. Doctors’ powers extend to that section; the police currently do not have any role in completing a section 3 application. Section 5(4) provides nurses with a holding power for a patient who is already in the clinical setting, where the nurse believes that the patient is at immediate risk; again, the police have no role.

If we did not make the Government amendments, we would give more power to the police to get involved under those sections of the Mental Health Act and put more pressure on police services.

[Gregory Stafford]

I am interested in the hon. Member’s argument, but it seems to be entirely the opposite of the one he made when he intervened on me on Second Reading. He said then:

“Sections 135 and 136 of the current Mental Health Act give the police the power to break into someone’s property or detain somebody in a public place where there is the possibility of the involvement of weapons. Does the hon. Member think that health professionals would be able to manage those kinds of situations? Would the police not be the best people to deal with those situations?”—[Official Report, 19 May 2025; Vol. 767, c. 815.]

In that intervention, the hon. Member was pressing for police involvement; now, he seems to be arguing that he wants to take the police out of these settings. I am a little confused by his stance.

[Sojan Joseph]

What the hon. Member read is absolutely right. I was talking about sections 135 and 136. I am talking here about sections 2, 3 and 5. I absolutely stand by what I said about sections 135 and 136, and I am happy to come to that. As a former mental health nurse, I certainly would not support giving the police greater powers under sections 2, 3 and 5 of the Mental Health Act.

I am also opposed to the amendments passed in the other place because I believe that the extension of legal powers held by the police to other healthcare professionals would represent a major shift in the roles and responsibilities of healthcare and care professionals, placing significant additional pressure on the NHS and social care providers.

The Royal College of Psychiatrists, the Royal College of Nursing and the British Medical Association are among the health and social care organisations that have warned against such an extension, saying that it is

“a radical proposal with a number of serious and potentially dangerous consequences”.

Those organisations also point out that the proposed extension has not been properly tested with relevant health and social care professionals and has been given minimal serious consideration during the eight years in which reform of the Mental Health Act has been under discussion.

The majority of assessment under the Mental Health Act already happens without police involvement. However, where the police may be required to make a detention, I know from my experience working in mental health that the presence of officers can often ensure that an otherwise risky situation remains contained and everyone remains safe.

Entering someone’s home without permission is fraught with huge risk and currently is done only with the assistance of police intelligence. Under section 135, health professionals ask the court for an order to remove somebody forcefully from their residence and the police use that order to do so; sometimes, they have to break in. That is the power that the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth spoke to earlier. Without it, health and social care professionals would be expected to enter homes without police help, and without crucial intelligence that could ensure their safety. As Dr Lade Smith, the president of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, said:

“It is well known that at times, people experiencing a mental health crisis cannot be safely reached and cared for without the assistance of the police. Delegating police powers without proper consultation or planning is likely to disproportionately affect those from minoritised backgrounds and would increase risk to patients and compromise the safety of others. It sets a dangerous precedent.”

I am also concerned that the amendments passed in the other place granting police powers to authorised persons risk damaging their therapeutic relationships with patients. They would have the effect of lessening clinicians’ ability to treat patients, and I fear that patients would be less likely to attend an appointment if they thought they might be forcibly detained by the clinician.

--- Later in debate ---

[Aphra Brandreth]

It is extremely important that people are not put at risk, and that is exactly the point I have been making. People need to be properly trained, and we need to set out who those individuals can be, rather than leaving ambiguity in the wording. The Government amendment will undo exactly the protection that the hon. Lady rightly points out.

[Gregory Stafford]

My hon. Friend is making a clear point, but I want to add that there are clearly places and situations in which non-police professionals, such as mental health professionals, deal with extremely dangerous and violent patients. They are appropriately trained to do so. It is not in isolation that non-police public professionals are dealing with dangerous people. It is about the right situation, the right place and the right training.

[Aphra Brandreth]

My hon. Friend helpfully expands on the points that I and other Opposition Members have been making. If we are not careful, the Government amendments will move us further away from the aim of a person-centred approach.

I urge the Minister to reconsider the amendments. The wording inserted in the other place struck a thoughtful balance. The wording inserted in the other place struck a thoughtful balance. It allowed flexibility, but grounded it in clear criteria of training, safety and competence. Removing that definition will weaken the Bill. It will make it harder, not easier, to ensure that the right person is supporting someone at their moment of greatest need. We owe it to patients, professionals and the police themselves to get this right.

[Gregory Stafford]

The clause is a necessary reset—[Interruption.] Goodness, what a background noise! If only I had such a response to everything I said.

The clause is rooted in the central recommendation of the 2018 independent review of the Mental Health Act, that the criteria for detention are too broad and being applied too inconsistently. Too often we hear stories of people being detained not because they pose a real and present danger, but because services are stretched, community alternatives are not available, or there is simply a lack of clarity on when detention is justified.

This clause is necessarily corrective. It raises the bar by introducing a clear and structured risk threshold that requires the possibility of serious harm to health or safety, rather than vague concerns or subjective impressions. The inclusion of terms such as “likelihood” and the focus on actual risk mark a clear move towards the evidence-based practice that we want to see and away from overreach.

For me, the key strengths of the clause include, first, a higher threshold for detention. Under section 2 of the Mental Health Act, detention for assessment is permitted only if serious harm may occur. That means that professionals must assess the nature and the degree of harm, as well as the likelihood, injecting rigour and proportionality into decision making.

The clause also clarifies the treatment criteria. Under section 3 of the Act, detention for treatment is allowed only if serious harm may occur without it and if treatment is necessary, and, crucially, it must be available. That prevents people from being detained without any therapeutic benefit, a concern that has long plagued the system. The clause also aligns measures across the Mental Health Act: the new threshold applies not only to the initial decision to detain, but to emergency detentions and renewals. That brings consistency and coherence across the different parts of the legislation.

The final key point among the strengths of the clause is the definition of the authorised person, which is vital. It ensures that those tasked with detention powers are properly trained and equipped to deal with the complex and often volatile realities of mental health crises. Whether a doctor, an approved mental health professional or a specially trained nurse, the provision ensures that detention is exercised by someone with relevant expertise, not by default by the police. Taken together, the changes significantly strengthen the legal framework around detention, reduce the risk of misuse and reaffirm the principle of least restriction, the idea that coercive care should be used only when no other alternative exists.

The problems I have with Government amendments 26 to 29 are as follows. The Minister proposes to delete references to

“a constable or other authorised person”

from the clause. On the surface, that may appear to be technical, but in fact I think it is a profound and problematic shift. The amendments would weaken the very safeguards that the clause is trying to strengthen. We must be careful about how we frame this.

The amendments risk undoing the clarity and purpose of the clause by making it ambiguous who can lawfully detain someone under the Mental Health Act. Instead of defining the responsibility clearly and ensuring that it is held by trained professionals, the amendments will strip the clause back to vague flexibility, with no guarantee that the right expertise is present in real-time decisions.

The power to detain and to move individuals to a place of safety, in particular under sections 135 and 136 of the Act, is largely restricted and falls under the responsibility of police officers. These provisions, while designed to protect the public, can often result in the criminalisation of people in acute mental health crises, even when there is no threat of violence or risk to others.

Furthermore, the clause as passed by the House of Lords would relieve police officers of responsibilities that fall outside their core expertise, while also reducing the stigma and trauma associated with police-led interventions. It would streamline the process, ensure that individuals are supported by professionals trained specifically in mental health care, and maintain police involvement only where there is a clear and present risk to safety. In doing so, it would significantly strengthen the system and place mental health crises more firmly within the domain of health rather than law enforcement.

Let me set out the key problems with Government amendments 26 to 29. First, I think that they will blur the lines of responsibility. The clause rightly states that detention must be carried out by a constable or other authorised person, namely someone who has been designated and trained to carry out this high-stakes task. The Government amendments will remove that requirement. In doing so, they risk creating confusion on the ground about who is permitted to act. In a moment of crisis, ambiguity costs time, and time costs lives.

[Jen Craft]

On clause 5(4), the amendment in the other place inserted the phrase

“by a constable or other authorised person”

which relates specifically to the phrase

“unless the patient is immediately restrained from leaving the hospital”.

What the hon. Gentleman describes as a level of ambiguity in the subsection allows that to be done by people who are not necessarily listed as an authorised person, such as a medical practitioner. I think we would all agree that we would not expect to see a nurse, doctor or other clinician immediately and physically restraining a patient, and that when a police constable is not available, other people, such as hospital security staff, can carry out the task. The clause says, “immediately restrained”. The specification in the list of words proposed in the other place can leave people at risk of harm, particularly clinicians.

[Gregory Stafford]

I confess that I do not entirely follow the hon. Lady’s argument. My understanding is that the people she has listed—for example, hospital security staff—are not covered at the moment, so I do not think that that is the case. As I said in response to my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, there are situations, in a number of settings, in which mental health professionals act in the capacity of restraining. With the correct and appropriate training, which is what I think all Opposition Members want, I do not think that the issue that the hon. Member for Thurrock is raising would necessarily arise. Having said that, if she really feels that the wording needs to be tweaked, I look forward to seeing and potentially supporting her amendment to the subsection, and I hope she tables it.

The second key problem is the risk of returning the burden to police officers. We have heard from Members on both sides of the House in the debate, and from police forces up and down the country for years, that the police do not have the expertise, training or capacity to be the first responders to mental health emergencies. Clause 5 finally reflects that reality, helping to move the response from law enforcement to healthcare. The Government amendments would muddy that distinction. They would result in the police once again becoming the default responders—not because it is right but because it is unclear who else is meant to act.

Thirdly, the amendments introduce legal and safe-guarding risks. Without a clear definition of who can detain, one risks inconsistency, poor practice and potentially unlawful deprivation of liberty. The amendments offer no alternative safeguards—just the deletion of the existing ones. That is not reform; it is abdication of responsibility. Finally, they undermine the spirit of the Bill. The Bill aims to modernise mental health legislation by making it more humane and effective, and more rooted in health than enforcement. The amendments point in the opposite direction. They strip away clarity, increase reliance on the police and risk compounding trauma for those already in crisis.

It is not just about legislative precision; it is about protecting people. When someone is in acute mental health crisis, they are at their most vulnerable. Turning up with police officers, sirens and handcuffs does not calm the situation; it escalates it. It creates trauma, damages trust and can lead to long-term disengagement from mental health services. Clause 5 offers us a path out of that pattern. It allows approved professionals—such as paramedics, mental health nurses and crisis practitioners —to intervene early, with care and dignity. It does not exclude the police, where there is a genuine risk to safety, but it rightly repositions them as the last resort, not the first response. The Government amendments may be well intentioned, but they threaten to unravel that balance. We cannot allow vague flexibility to become a smokescreen for inadequate planning or under-resourced services.

If the Minister pushes his amendments to a vote, and, as the parliamentary maths suggests they will, those amendments pass, what will he do to sort out the problem that we, on both sides of the House, have talked about today? He is currently planning to keep the status quo, which we all seem to agree is not appropriate. At least we and our noble Friends in the other place have attempted to improve the situation. What will he and his Department do?

The clause is part of a broader rethinking of how we response to mental health need. It supports community-based care. It pushes for better training. It honours patient autonomy and it places the right people—clinicians, not constables—at the centre of care delivery. We all want a system where people in distress are met with compassion, not criminalisation. Clause 5 helps us to get there. The Government’s amendments drag us backwards. Clause 5 is one of the most thoughtful and necessary parts of the Bill. It raises standards, reduces harm and finally begins to close the gap between what the Mental Health Act allows and what good mental health care demands.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I will touch on the questions that have been asked on cumulative and escalating behaviour, on having a review of public safety and on the training plan. The details will be provided for in a mixture of the code of practice and the annual written ministerial statement.

The code of practice will be based on consulting both those who use the new criteria, such as clinicians, approved mental health professionals and members of the tribunal and, then, of course, on the other side, those with lived experience, service users, families and carers. It will be shaped and drafted on that basis. It will then go out to public consultation and will be laid before Parliament so that Parliament will have an opportunity to debate it. It will be a comprehensive and detailed development of the code of practice, and will address the issues around cumulative and escalating behaviour, the public safety issues and training.

On cumulative and escalating, it is worth noting that under the reforms in both the Bill and the current Act, clinicians have the power to detain on the basis of a risk of harm that may occur, not that already has or is happening at the time. That power already exists.

Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

Gregory Stafford Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Stephen Kinnock]

There were a number of technical and drafting issues. The Public Bill Office ruled that the amendment, as drafted, was out of scope. One of the key concerns was about the unintended consequences of the relationship between physical disability and mental disorder. The drafting of the amendment could have caused confusion, because it could have started to bring physical disability into the scope of the Bill, which is clearly not what it is about. There were a number of technical and drafting issues, but I do not think that they are insurmountable. We can get to where we need to be, just not through a legislative vehicle.

[Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)]

I support the comments of the Minister and the hon. Member for Winchester on the issue. On a cross-party basis, I know that my right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash (Sir Jeremy Hunt) has taken a close interest. Could he also be included in those discussions?

[Stephen Kinnock]

Yes, absolutely. We had a very constructive meeting with the right hon. Member for Godalming and Ash, along with the hon. Member for Dorking and Horley, and we are certainly open to working with that team of people, who are clearly focused on getting the results that we all want to see.

Clause 1 will make it a statutory requirement for the Secretary of State to include, in the statement of principles in the Mental Health Act code of practice, the wording of the four principles identified by the independent review. Those principles are choice and autonomy, least restriction, therapeutic benefit and the person as an individual. This will ensure that the review’s principles underpin the implementation of the Mental Health Act 1983 and are considered when making decisions related to care, support or the treatment provided to patients under the Act.

Embedding the principles in day-to-day practice will help to drive the culture change envisaged by the independent review. We are including the principles in the Act so that they govern the content of the code of practice and can changed only by Parliament. The Government are firmly supportive of the four principles, which were co-designed with service users during the independent review. They have informed every decision made in developing the Bill. We have embedded the principles in measures throughout the Bill, such as via the inclusion of therapeutic benefit in the detention criteria and several measures to improve patient choice and autonomy, including new treatment safeguards, introducing advance choice documents and the right to choose a nominated person.

I turn to clause 2. The code of practice for Wales already includes a statement of principles, although it is not a statutory requirement under section 118 of the Mental Health Act 1983 for Welsh Ministers to do so. Clause 2 will amend section 118 to extend subsection (2A) to Wales, along with the new subsection (2B) inserted by clause 1. To do so, clause 2 will also make amendments elsewhere in section 118 to clarify the application of each subsection, which will be to the Secretary of State in relation to England, to Welsh Ministers in relation to Wales, by virtue of the transfer of devolved functions, or to both.

The extent of the Mental Health Act is England and Wales, and there are separate codes of practice for England and Wales. Both codes of practice currently include a statement of principles, although the principles themselves vary slightly. Clause 2 will place a statutory requirement on Welsh Ministers to include the wording of the four principles identified by the independent review in the statement of principles when preparing the Mental Health Act code of practice for Wales.

As in clause 1, we are putting these principles explicitly in the Act so that they govern the content of the code of practice and so that they cannot be changed except by Parliament, or by the Senedd in respect of Wales. The Welsh code is already required to undergo scrutiny by Senedd Cymru, but clause 2 will also update the position in relation to the Senedd Cymru scrutiny procedure for the Welsh code. I commend clauses 1 and 2 to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

It is absolutely a team effort. Sadly, when people have severe and acute mental health disorders, a multi-agency effort is often required to support them and to help them to get the treatment they need. The process should not be about trying to isolate people. We are keen to ensure that people stay in mainstream society and remain as integrated as possible, because that is often an important part of supporting their mental health condition.

All of that means that local authorities, mental health professionals, social workers, and often children’s social care professionals or adult social care professionals are important in the process—it requires a team effort. That integrated approach will be really important as we build the community services that we want to see.

[Gregory Stafford]

On the point made by the hon. Member for Ashford about local authorities, given that the Government are devolving and reorganising local government structures across parts of the country, how will the Minister ensure that the standards around this issue—and other health and social care issues—are maintained? That restructuring means that we will have a whole load of new local authorities that do not necessarily have experience of dealing with this area.

[Stephen Kinnock]

The devolution Bill and the process of reorganising and restructuring are based on two really strong principles: that it is up to us through legislation to create the outcomes that we need to see delivered across the country and that there are clear standards and targets that we need to see met. But the implementation work needs to be done to deliver those desired outcomes and targets. Local authorities are empowered to do that, which is why we are seeing, for example, a lot of breaking down of ringfencing. The Government are keen to massively reduce the amount of ringfencing, because that has become a straitjacket for local authorities, integrated care boards and others in how they can best manage their portfolio of activities and deliver that devolved power and responsibility.

The answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question is that we want to devolve. We are absolutely committed to decentralising and we believe that is an important part of modern governance. Of course, that has to be done within a framework of set targets and the development of community services that the Bill commits to. All of that will come together to enable those at the coalface, who are best placed to understand them, how to deliver those services to their communities.

--- Later in debate ---

[Zöe Franklin (Guildford) (LD)]

I rise to speak to amendments 2 and 5, which, in summary, would ensure that patients, named persons and independent mental health advocates would receive a copy of a care, education and treatment review meeting report for children and young people with autism or a learning disability.

Patients, along with all those tasked with helping to represent their wishes, should be able to see transparently what has been judged to be safe and appropriate care for them. Being given the opportunity to understand why their care or treatment is changing or remaining the same should be a basic right for patients, yet as it stands they are often frozen out of seeing that final report. Similarly, the nominated person, whether that is a friend, a mother, a sibling, or another parent, often has care of the patient; they know the whole person better than any NHS institution, and will often have a far fuller understanding of the patient’s history.

[Gregory Stafford]

I have a lot of sympathy with what the hon. Lady is trying to achieve with these amendments. My question is about how she would ensure, within the context of the provisions, that the patient’s confidentiality would be maintained where it needed to be.

[Zöe Franklin]

The hon. Member raises an interesting and pertinent point. There will always need to be balance when addressing the issues around patient confidentiality. I have seen from my own casework that when families who have been through mental health crises with their loved ones have not been involved in that process, unfortunately the crisis has lasted much longer and been more significant because those around them have been unable to support the individual. I do not have the answer, but we need to work collectively to find a way to strike that balance in order to address the needs of the patient.

[Gregory Stafford]

Moving on from the confidentiality point, if there is going to be sharing—again, I have a lot of sympathy with the amendments—how would the hon. Lady ensure that disagreements between family members and the patient are safeguarded against?

[Zöe Franklin]

That presents challenges, but again, I would refer back to my own casework, and I am sure there are Members on the Committee who will have had the same experience. There are examples across the UK where health boards and providers find ways to appropriately share information with families and other carers to get the best outcomes for patients. I simply ask that, when the Minister and colleagues in this space have those examples, they share them. I know that there are some areas where this is already done effectively, particularly in Scotland, and I seek to reference those examples.

My final point on amendments 2 and 5 is that we need to ensure that those around a patient are given the opportunity to raise concern or the alarm when part of the report does not meet the patient’s needs. We need to address the patient’s full needs, and to ensure that they are both reflected in the reports and met.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Evans]

I rise to speak to Liberal Democrat amendments 1 to 7 and 51 to clause 4. I welcome the intention behind the amendments, which aim to enhance the care and treatment review process for people with autism and learning disabilities, particularly by addressing housing and accommodation needs and ensuring that key advocates receive reports.

There are positive elements of the amendments that are worth highlighting. I understand the good intent of including housing and accommodation considerations explicitly in reviews, as it recognises that a person’s living situation is often central to their wellbeing and recovery. Additionally, ensuring that nominated persons and independent mental health advocates receive reports promptly promotes transparency and patient advocacy. Shortening the review intervals from 12 to six months could lead to more responsive care planning.

However, I have some significant reservations about the statutory implications of blurring housing, for example, so directly with the care and treatment review process. Housing is traditionally managed under separate statutory frameworks from health and social care, so to embed housing as a statutory element within these reviews risks creating confusion about which agency holds responsibility and may expose health bodies or commissioners to legal obligations that they are neither funded nor structured for.

I have a few questions for the Liberal Democrats. In their eyes, how would the Government ensure clarity over the statutory duties applied to housing recommendations arising from the reviews? Would that not risk delaying or complicating discharges if housing issues became a statutory sticking point within health-led care reviews? Moreover, housing provision often depends on local authorities and housing departments that have their own complex eligibility criteria and resourcing constraints. Are we confident that ICBs and responsible commissioners would be able to co-ordinate effectively across these boundaries, especially given the patchwork of funding and powers in play?

[Gregory Stafford]

To take that point slightly further, given that pretty much every local authority has a different set of criteria by which to determine people’s housing needs, how would, for example, an ICB that potentially crosses multiple local authorities with differing housing needs be able to understand the complexities within the current structure, and ensure that the patient is served best?

--- Later in debate ---

[Gregory Stafford]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Vickers. As I have indicated, I have a lot of sympathy with the amendments, but some practical constraints need to be teased out.

Amendment 1 seeks to ensure that housing needs are explicitly considered during a care, education and treatment review meeting. I can see the pros of that. Clearly, a holistic approach recognises that stable housing is fundamental to mental health and recovery, especially for vulnerable individuals. Addressing housing barriers may reduce unnecessary hospital admissions. Likewise, it could lead to improved discharge planning, ensuring that patients are not delayed in hospital due to a lack of suitable accommodation. All Governments, of every colour and political party, want to see collaboration between health, social care and housing services, and the amendment brings those things together.

As I said in an intervention, however, local authorities and NHS bodies such as ICBs may face challenges to co-ordinating housing assessments within the CETRs. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth mentioned, his constituency crosses a number of local authority boundaries, while my seat of Farnham and Bordon, with two thirds of it in Surrey and one third in Hampshire, has that same issue. The county councils are wonderful and Conservative run, but Waverley is run by Liberal Democrats.

The hon. Member for Winchester, who moved the amendment, recognised the issue of implementation capacity, but there are also likely to be resource constraints. These days, local authorities spend most of their money on social care, education and the bits of health that sit within their remit, so there may be insufficient housing stock or funding to meet the identified needs that the amendment would bring forward. There are therefore practical implications.

[Dr Evans]

Thinking that through, how does my hon. Friend feel that existing statutory requirements to provide accommodation will balance out if we provide another statutory requirement on accommodation in these plans? Does he worry, as I do, about creating a risk, for example, of pitting someone with severe learning disabilities against a homeless person if there is resource rationing thanks to the practicalities of how many houses we have? Members throughout the House agree that we need to build more houses, but until that happens, such local authorities have the resources issue.

[Gregory Stafford]

I agree. Even if the Government build the number of houses that they propose—I have some scepticism—there will always be the potential conflict or disagreement on prioritisation in the housing register and list. As my hon. Friend says, that might well lead to local authorities having to change their criteria, which are not necessarily consistent across local authorities, and, as in his example, potentially pitting a homeless person against someone with mental health needs.

The amendment would also have the potential for scope creep. I have a lot of sympathy with what it is trying to achieve, but expanding CETRs to include housing might dilute their focus and overburden the process. I am interested to hear from the mover and supporters of the amendment how they would ensure that the CETR continues to have that core focus on the health and wellbeing of the individual, rather than potentially be bogged down in the mire of housing issues.

Moving on, amendment 51 would ensure that the care and treatment of individuals with autism or learning disabilities explicitly considered the impact of accommodation and relocation in the planning and decision-making process. Again, I have a lot of sympathy with that. It would promote holistic care planning, reduce trauma and disruption, support continuity of care and, I think, align with the person-centred principles throughout the Bill, which all of us support. Again, however, amendment 51 might complicate discharge planning, if suitable accommodation were limited.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

Does my hon. Friend share my concerns that not resolving housing and accommodation at the point of discharge could lead to a delay in transition? Patients would remain in hospital for longer than might be beneficial to them.

[Gregory Stafford]

I agree entirely. That could be the unintended consequence of amendment 51: in essence, if the housing provision is not there, discharge will be delayed. From my understanding of the amendments in the group, those who tabled them are trying to speed up and improve discharge. My hon. Friend is absolutely right that we need to think about the practical implications of the Bill.

The amendment would require co-ordination among health, social care and housing services, which may be challenging in under-resourced areas. Frankly, because parts of those organisations are not used to working in the ways that the amendment would require, it might fall over without suitable training, the necessary lead-in time and a practical understanding of how it will work.

Amendment 4 would ensure that housing needs are formally considered during the care and treatment review meetings for adults with autism or a learning disability, without an EHCP. I understand that the aim is to support more effective discharge planning and reduce the risk of unnecessary or prolonged hospital stays. That is entirely in keeping with what we should be trying to do in the Bill. Holistic care planning reduces delays in discharge, improves cross-sector collaboration and supports community-based care, which we all support.

Once again, however, there is potential for complexity in the implementation. New processes may be required to involve the housing authorities. Resources and local housing shortages could limit the amendments’ practical impact. Another layer of complex review processes could add to that administrative burden. If there is inconsistent local capacity, the effectiveness of the amendment will almost certainly vary depending on the local housing infrastructure, which could lead to a postcode lottery, for want of a better phrase, in who receives the adequate care and housing.

Amendment 2 would ensure that children and young people with autism or learning disability, as well as their nominated persons and independent mental health advocates, receive a copy of the care, education and treatment review meeting report. I have a lot of sympathy with that. It potentially increases empowerment and transparency, ensuring that patients and their advocates are fully informed, which could enable better participation in care decisions. It has a legal and ethical alignment with the principles of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the UN convention on the rights of persons with disabilities, both of which emphasise supported decision making. It might also improve advocacy, as independent mental health advocates can more effectively represent a patient’s interest when they have access to the full report.

[Aphra Brandreth]

My hon. Friend is making valuable points about the benefits of the amendment. For vulnerable individuals, family involvement is often extremely important, but does he agree that that must be balanced with ensuring that potential disagreements do not put at risk what is best for the individual?

[Gregory Stafford]

My hon. Friend makes a key point that I was about to address. Clearly, where there is a supportive family structure with the best interests of the individual at heart, the amendment will work extraordinarily well. However, we have to be realistic about the practical implications.

Not every patient has a strong family structure around them. Unfortunately, some patients may even have family members who, for financial or other reasons, actively do not have their best interests at heart. There is a potential concern around confidentiality. I ask the hon. Members for Winchester and for Guildford how they would balance that conflict in practical terms, especially when the CETR includes sensitive clinical information that could be used in a way that is not beneficial to the patient by someone who does not have their best interests at heart. As my hon. Friend the Member for Chester South and Eddisbury points out, disputes can happen if patients or families disagree with professional assessments or recommendations.

Finally, although this is probably not the strongest point, we should think about the administrative burden. Given the increased workload that we are putting on all our health and care workers and services, there will clearly be an administrative burden in sharing these reports.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

Not quite: Solihull.

[Gregory Stafford]

I knew it began with S and was somewhere that is not Surrey or Hampshire—because where else would you want to be, Mr Vickers? The amendment would potentially increase the workload, because more frequent reviews place additional pressure on professionals and services.

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

Does my hon. Friend agree that there is a risk that the amendment would not only increase the workload of practitioners, but divert attention from patient care?

[Gregory Stafford]

My hon. Friend is entirely correct. We operate in a resource-confined area. It does not matter what the resource envelope is; it will always be confined. If we use resource to service the very laudable aims of the amendment, it will take resource and money away from another area.

[Dr Evans]

Would my hon. Friend speculate on a question that I hope will be answered by the hon. Member for Winchester? It is about the evidence base behind choosing six months instead of 12. GPs would do learning disability reviews every year, for example, and it is an annual thing with asthma and in similar areas. Is the hon. Member for Winchester aware of an evidence base for why it should be six months? There may not be one—often these can be arbitrary, in terms of just giving a clinical judgment—but I wonder whether there is a specific reason for choosing to reduce the period between reviews to six months.

[Gregory Stafford]

My hon. Friend attributes to me a level of clairvoyance that I do not possess, but I am sure that the hon. Member for Winchester or the hon. Member for Guildford will pick up that point.

The resource implications are not just about the funding. They are about increased workload and the pressure put on the professions and services. As my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley said, the amendment would divert attention away from delivering care, if it is not balanced properly. My hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth is right to ask, “Why six months?” Why not nine months, eight months or any other period? Is there a clinical basis for six months?

[Jen Craft]

On a small point of clarification, the six-month criteria are based on the current NHS guidance around CETRs. It is loose guidance; it is not statutory. The reason that it is six months as opposed to 12 months is that that would bring us closer in line with the guidance.

--- Later in debate ---

[Gregory Stafford]

I thank the hon. Member for her helpful intervention. If that is correct, I will draw my comments on that point to a close.

Amendment 6 concerns CETR frequency. It seeks to change the timetabling of these reviews. The same issues, both positive and negative, run through it as in amendment 3.

Amendment 7 would strengthen the legal obligation on integrated care boards and local authorities by requiring them to implement recommendations from the care, education and treatment reviews rather than merely considering them. That would ensure that review outcomes lead to concrete action and improved care. I do not think that anyone in the Committee could possibly disagree with that point. It would lead to greater accountability and would ensure that CETR recommendations are not ignored or delayed. That would clearly improve outcomes, because it would increase the likelihood that patients receive timely and appropriate care.

The amendment would also introduce stronger legal clarity. By removing “must have regard to” and replacing it with

“have a duty to carry out”,

it would remove ambiguity around the responsibilities of the ICBs and local authorities, supporting the rights-based care and the principles of transparency and enforceability in service provision that we all support.

I hope that the hon. Members for Winchester and for Guildford will be able to clarify the problem of resource pressures, which applies to all these amendments. Local authorities and ICBs may struggle to implement all the recommendations due to funding or capacity constraints. What would be the legal sanction for ICBs and local authorities if, through no “fault” of their own—although one might argue that they should have the necessary resources in place—they genuinely do not have the resources to implement all the recommendations? I would hope that such a sanction did not put them into further financial difficulty.

The reduction in flexibility concerns me. It may limit professional discretion in cases in which recommendations are impractical or outdated. It may require new systems for monitoring and enforcement, and if recommendations are not implemented it could increase the likelihood of legal challenges.

[Anna Dixon]

The hon. Member is going into some detail on these amendments. There is a duty where EHCPs are in place. Local authorities have had their funding cut over many years, so they have found it difficult to meet their EHCP obligations for the many children with SEND needs. Is there not a similar risk that the amendments will put duties on local authorities that they will not be able to meet unless they have sufficient resources? There must be some flexibility as well as duty on local authorities and the NHS to balance their duties and responsibilities with resources.

[The Chair]

There is one minute left, Greg.

[Gregory Stafford]

I will do my best, Mr Vickers. The hon. Lady raises some good points. She made a slightly party political point, but I will forgive her because I made one earlier. Maybe that is our party politicking done for the day.

As the vice-chair of the all-party parliamentary group for SEND, I recognise the issues that the hon. Lady has raised. I would be surprised if there were any hon. Member on this Committee who did not recognise her point. Across the piece, there is a significant problem with the process and the funding of EHCPs. I look to the Minister; I know it is not his responsibility, but I understand that the Government are introducing something around EHCPs.

I will draw my comments to a close, but I ask the hon. Members for Winchester and for Guildford to address those concerns.

[The Chair]

You did very well there: we have two seconds left.

Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting)

Gregory Stafford Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th June 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Danny Chambers (Winchester) (LD)]

It is an honour to serve under your chairpersonship, Ms Furniss. I know that the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon will have spent his lunch time anticipating the responses to his long series of questions. The tension is palpable— I hope he is excited to hear our replies.

[Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)]

Thrilled.

[Dr Chambers]

Unfortunately, I was busy meeting Brian May and talking about farming, so I have not had a chance to work up a really good response.

The point of the Liberal Democrat amendments is to recognise that mental ill health requires holistic care and that many non-clinical factors directly influence mental health. Although the Bill’s scope is understandably narrow, very much focusing on people once they are admitted to hospital for treatment, we need to recognise that, if someone is discharged back into the situation from which they were admitted, they are very likely to have a relapse and to need treatment again. Some of those factors are non-clinical. For example, people living in poverty—those in the lowest 20% of income—are more than twice as likely to suffer mental health issues than those on an average income.

We strongly support the Bill, but we need to recognise that, on its own, it will not improve mental health or do anything to prevent people from developing mental health issues. If our amendments are not within scope or are not appropriate for the Bill, we urge the Minister to work with other Departments, such as the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, to ensure that this good piece of legislation, which we support, can be successful.

The hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon made a point this morning about local authorities. He is right that local authority reorganisation is a challenge, especially when it comes to providing accommodation for young people and for people being discharged from mental health care centres. It is also an opportunity, because the current situation is not fit for purpose. Hampshire county council is struggling to provide the care these people need. Housing, which often affects young people’s mental health, is probably the single biggest issue that comes up in my inbox and when I knock on doors.

I thank the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth. As a clinician, his point about the evidence base, especially when it comes to reviews, is really important. We are discussing a Mental Health Bill that may not be changed significantly for another 40 years, so it is important that we use the best evidence. As a long-time trustee of an evidence-based medicine charity, I am passionate about this.

I thank the hon. Member for Thurrock for pointing out that clinical guidelines suggest six-month reviews. Yearly reviews are used for many medical conditions, and I would argue that a year is also an arbitrary period, rather than one based in evidence. Why six months and not a year, or why a year and not six months?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Chambers]

I will not argue with an esteemed Member who has the hon. Gentleman’s background in mental health. I take his point as it stands.

[Gregory Stafford]

I have been listening carefully to the hon. Member’s argument. I do not disagree with anything in it; I just fail to see how the amendment fits with the clause that we are discussing, which I think may be the point that the hon. Member for Ashford is making.

As far as I can tell, clause 4 is about producing a register of people who have a learning disability or autism, who are at risk of being detained for a mental health episode and for whom those risk factors are active, for example because they have been sectioned before or have presented at A&E. Those are specific incidences. What the hon. Member for Winchester is talking about is more wide-ranging; it is not about touchpoints in the same sense. I can see how he could potentially say, “Well, domestic abuse has led to a mental health episode and therefore to a presentation at A&E or in the system.” However, if we put in societal factors, for want of a better phrase, we could end up putting most people on the list, because most people will have experienced a bereavement. I get what the hon. Member is trying to do, but I fail to see how the amendment matches the overall purpose of clause 4.

[Dr Chambers]

I thank the hon. Member for his intervention. In my maiden speech, I focused primarily on mental health and on the fact that there are so many demographics of people who we know are at significantly higher risk of suicide and mental ill health than the general population. Whether the issue is more appropriately addressed in the Bill or outside it, but using the Bill as a mechanism to highlight it and to cause the proactive engagement of other relevant Departments and other pieces of legislation, I am determined that we are not going to discuss the biggest piece of mental health legislation in 40 years and not even have a discussion about how we proactively engage with groups of people who we know are at very high risk of mental health issues.

[Gregory Stafford]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Dr Chambers]

I will carry on, if that is okay.

Our social and health services need to see the whole person, including their social needs and the factors in their environment that threaten their wellbeing. Trying to treat a mental disorder but failing to account for that person’s lack of housing, which drove their anxiety and depression in the first place, is doomed to fail. A lack of support for a child who has lost their parents at a young age could lead to significant harmful consequences further down the line.

There are a huge range of areas that require change, but for now we would like to press the Minister on three specific issues. We understand that some of them may turn out not to be within the scope of this Bill, but it is still important that they be addressed in some capacity.

Will the Government finally implement a register of all bereaved children to ensure that they get the support they need? Will the Government ensure that all women who go through miscarriage, stillbirth or traumatic birth access mental health support quickly and effectively? Will the Government establish a veterans register to ensure that those who have served in the armed forces and who face particular challenges as a result get the tailored mental health support that they need and do not reach the point of requiring detention?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Evans]

I entirely agree with the hon. Lady’s end point and with the thrust of what she says. Causality is not causation, and we need to be very careful. When we get to the later clauses of the Bill, that will be at the forefront of our discussion.

We cannot deny the reason we are having this legislative debate in the first place: the observation that black men in particular are subject to community treatment orders far more than any other group in the country. However, we must not make a lazy causal analysis and say, “Well, just because that is the case.” For example, black men have a higher risk of prostate cancer, and white people a higher chance of coeliac disease, because of the genetic basis. Is there something in that? Is there systemic bias by clinicians, as she hinted? That all needs to be explored.

The hon. Member for Shipley beat me to the punch when it comes to my closing statement. We owe it to our children and young people not to legislate in haste, so I welcome the spirit of the amendments, and I welcome the debate, but we must be careful to ensure that we are truly legislating for and defining exactly what we know. Otherwise, we risk creating other inequalities and unintended consequences or, worse still, a system that becomes even more flabby and difficult to manoeuvre through. That is the last thing we want for our patients, clinicians and the public.

[Gregory Stafford]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Furniss. I have some criticisms of the specifics of the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Winchester, but I entirely support him and congratulate him on the passion with which he spoke about them. As I remember, his maiden speech touched on a number of these issues. Whether they are within the scope of the Bill is for the Clerks and the Committee to decide, but he made several extraordinarily good points that I hope the Government will take away. If the Bill is not the appropriate place for them, there should be another avenue.

The lead amendment is about the ICB register. It would insert a new subsection to extend the duty on integrated care boards to establish and maintain a register for those at risk of detention to cover all children and young people who meet certain risk criteria. As drafted, the duty to maintain a register under clause 4 may not explicitly include all under-18s. Therefore, the amendment would ensure that children and young people are proactively identified and supported before reaching a crisis point that might lead to detention.

Clearly, there are positives. As the hon. Member stated, early intervention might help to prevent unnecessary detention by identifying risk earlier, which is especially important for children. Likewise, there is a strong argument about equity and care to ensure that young people receive the same proactive planning as adults. That would clearly lead to improved safeguarding through better tracking of vulnerable minors in the mental health system. A corollary to that would be better data collection on youth mental health needs, which I think we would all support. We would be able to use that information to support more informed policymaking and resource decisions.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth highlighted, however, and as I highlighted in the debates on other clauses, there would clearly be a resource demand, especially on ICBs, from expanding registers and services. Likewise, there is the complexity of implementation, because defining who qualifies as being “at risk” may be subjective. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Winchester, when he sums up on the amendments, to give us some indication of how “at risk” would be defined, or whether that would simply be down to the mental health professional or some other medical professional. There are also, of course, privacy and consent concerns related to maintaining a register for minors. Again, the hon. Member may have thought about some practical things that could assuage my concerns about that.

There may also be a risk of stigmatisation. We have to be very careful, especially with children and young people, because being labelled or treated differently due to being on the register would not help their mental health. We would have to have some really strict privacy and data-sharing controls to ensure that they were protected within the proposed system.

As I said in my intervention, I entirely support the aims of amendment 47 because it would specify the risk factors for detention for those on the register of people at risk of detention under clause 4. The criteria for identifying such individuals are left to be defined in regulations as the Bill stands. The amendment would mandate in law specific evidence-based risk factors—which I agree are risk factors for the issues that the hon. Member is talking about, particularly those linked to trauma and social disadvantage—rather than leaving them to discretion.

At a general level, the amendment recognises the role of trauma and social determinants in mental health crises—I congratulate the hon. Member on clearly explaining some of the factors. Going back to our debate on the previous group of amendments, that would improve the early identification of individuals at risk, promote preventive care, strengthen equity and provide clarity and consistency. However, like my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, I am concerned about prescribing a relatively small list and therefore limiting the clause’s flexibility—there may be risk factors that are not listed in the amendment or ones that we have not even thought of.

[Jen Craft]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the Bill makes allowances for the Secretary of State to introduce appropriate risk factors via regulation, and that it is more appropriate to list the risk factors that ICBs should take into account in secondary legislation issued by the Secretary of State than in primary legislation, as amendment 47 seeks to do?

[Gregory Stafford]

I agree with the hon. Lady; that is my understanding, but perhaps the Minister can confirm that when he sums up. The flexibility in the clause is one of its strengths.

[Dr Evans]

Does my hon. Friend share my opinion that it makes sense to agree with the Government? The impact of social media and the evidence coming out about using mobile phones and about the impact of certain sites have been debated in this House for the last five years—since I have been here—and there have been advances. Legislation has been brought forward, but there is a growing consensus on both sides of the House that it never quite keeps up. Allowing the Secretary of State to add risk factors as they come up, even in policy guidance, might be a shrewder way to future-proof the Bill against those difficulties. In 1983, we were not discussing or even thinking about the likes of Facebook, yet here we are. With the advent of artificial intelligence, who knows where we will be in another 40 years?

[Gregory Stafford]

I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. To touch on his point about social media, it is a very useful tool, but is deeply pervasive and can cause the bullying, harassment and mental health issues that he describes. As far as I can tell, the risk factors in amendment 47 would not cover something like that unless it was part of something else—for example, part of domestic abuse, armed conflict and so on.

[Anna Dixon]

This discussion of the list of risk factors throws up a concern for me: one of the risk factors that has been facing families and other constituents of mine in Shipley for some years is the inability to get appropriate support for their children from children’s social care, for example, because there are very long waiting times for child and adolescent mental health services. Even when people have EHCPs, they are often not fulfilled. Does the hon. Gentleman recognise that we need to address special educational needs and disabilities and children’s social care and put those things in place, as the Government are doing? Children with autism and learning disabilities will remain at high risk of much more complex mental health needs if they do not get the support they need at an early stage.

[Gregory Stafford]

Once again, the hon. Lady tempts me to make a party political point, but I shall resist. On her general point, there are factors, such as the ones she described, that would not necessarily fall within the list in amendment 47. [Interruption.]

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We will resume where we left off.

[Gregory Stafford]

Thank you, Ms Furniss. I was coming to my closing remarks on amendment 47. Suffice it to say that some of the concerns that I raised on amendment 8 about the administrative burdens, the data sharing, and the potential safeguarding and privacy concerns transfer through. Again, perhaps the hon. Member for Winchester could give some reassurance on that when summing up.

Amendment 9, as far as I can tell, would extend the duty on integrated care boards and local authorities to exercise their marketing functions in a way that seeks to ensure that children and young people’s needs can be met without detaining them.

[Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that, although the intention behind the amendment may be worthy, there is a lack of clarity in the drafting? In particular, it is unclear what “seek to ensure” means and how that would be legally defined.

[Gregory Stafford]

My hon. Friend is right; although a number of the Liberal Democrats are entirely worthy, there are some concerns about the drafting, which could give rise to ambiguity, legal loopholes and definitional issues. In that example, I do not think that “seek to ensure” is helpful. When the hon. Member for Winchester is summing up, perhaps he might explain how “seek to ensure” can be robustly defined within the law, or if it cannot be, suggest a different form of wording that he may wish to use in a future amendment if this amendment fails to be agreed.

Part II of the Mental Health Act 1983 covers the powers to detain individuals for assessment and treatment. Detention can clearly be traumatic, especially for children and young people. Amendment 9 reflects a growing consensus that detention should be the last resort— I think hon. Members on both sides of the House agree with that—and that community-based preventive and therapeutic alternatives should be prioritised. Again, I think it would be very hard to disagree with that ambition.

On the positive side, community-based care is clearly better than detention in most cases, and, if we can get to a point where people are assessed earlier, as is the intention of some of the other amendments, clearly—hopefully—that would lead to community-based care and not detention. The amendment would also protect children’s rights and support the trauma-informed approaches to mental health that were raised previously regarding amendment 47.

The amendment could also reduce the long-term harm associated with institutionalisation and potentially coercive treatment. As we have heard from Members on both sides, that would align with best practice in child and adolescent mental health services and it would promote and encourage a system of accountability by making ICBs and local authorities responsible for proactive care planning. All of that is extraordinarily laudable.

On the potential downsides, there is an ambiguity about the enforcement of the amendment, as my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley said, because of the lack of legal force or clarity in some of the phraseology. There would be also resource implications and, if there are resource limitations at the ICB or local authority level, that might hinder their ability to provide adequate, community-based alternatives.

I do not say that as an excuse for not supporting the amendment, but the hon. Member for Winchester has to understand the reality of the world we live in. Although I want local authorities and ICBs in every area to be entirely fully funded and resourced—and frankly, I do not think the Government’s cut of 50%, or indeed more in some ICBs, will do anything to help community-based care—there would be resource challenges. There would also be implementation challenges in areas where mental health services are already underfunded or overstretched that could lead to delays in care.

This is the key question that I ask the hon. Member to respond to in his summing up. Members on both sides of the House want to ensure that all people of all ages get the best, most appropriate mental health care as early as possible. But in an imperfect world, if there are potential delays in care because community services are struggling to find alternatives to detention, the unintended consequence could be that someone may not be treated at all because of the onus on defined community-based care rather than detention. Will the hon. Member explain how that would work?

I draw my remarks to a close by saying I, certainly, and the Opposition, entirely agree with the ambitions of the amendments. However, some practical and legal issues would need to be ironed out before I could wholeheartedly support them.

[Stephen Kinnock]

Again, I thank the hon. Member for Winchester for his amendments. I understand the intent behind amendments 8 and 9, but the clauses on registers and the associated duties on integrated care boards and local authorities are specifically aimed at people with a learning disability and autistic people, because of the detrimental outcomes that these groups of people may suffer when detained.

We recognise the concern around the treatment of children and young people, which is why we have several provisions in the Bill aimed at improving their care. However, dynamic support registers are particularly tailored to the needs of people with a learning disability and autistic people, and have been established in NHS England’s policy for some time. We do not have evidence that they would be an appropriate mechanism for wider cohorts.

We do recognise that bereavement, miscarriage, the experience of trauma and difficult life transitions can all have a bearing on mental health. However, access to mental health support is based on clinical need, not on the circumstances that might give rise to that need.

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[Dr Chambers]

I know how much the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon enjoys speaking in Bill Committees—we were on the Tobacco and Vapes Bill Committee together a few months ago—and I am really pleased that our amendments have given so much material for discussion. I really appreciate the input from Members on both sides of the Committee; it has been really insightful, useful and constructive.

It has been rightly pointed out that the current state of local authorities—their funding and their capacity—means that they might not be able to deliver the more holistic care we are pushing for in the amendments, but I do not think that the Mental Health Bill should be limited by the current state of local services and funding. If that is the underlying problem, that is what should be addressed, not the measures in the Bill.

[Gregory Stafford]

I accept that we should aim for the pinnacle and the best. What I was trying to say was that because the amendments restrict us, rather than giving us the space to, hopefully, reach the pinnacle, or to explore other options if we cannot, they could have unintended consequences if we cannot reach that pinnacle.

[Anna Dixon]

rose—

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Although investment and strategy have improved, the system remains under pressure. Between 2019 and 2023 alone, the number of people accessing secondary mental health care rose by nearly a quarter. Workforce shortages persist and continue to undermine delivery. To their credit, the previous Conservative Government brought forward the NHS long-term workforce plan, the first of its kind. With a new Government in office, we look ahead to the long-awaited 10-year NHS plan and revised workforce plan. Again, I am pleased to see the Government continuing in that vein.

[Gregory Stafford]

My hon. Friend is making an excellent case for new clause 11, which could potentially solve funding issues I have raised. He mentioned the NHS 10-year plan. Will he suggest that the Minister looks at ensuring that, if new clause 11 is not passed today, the details in it are fed through into the plan? When it is published, which the Minister has indicated will be relatively soon, the information and outcomes my hon. Friend is trying to achieve through the new clause could be in it.

[Dr Evans]

Far be it from me to tell the Minister what to do, but if I were a wise Minister, I might look at where my predecessors had benefitted from further information and where they may have stumbled. The Bill has been looked at for a number of years by many people from outside and inside the House. Many have been involved throughout its progress, including a former Prime Minister, who tabled amendments in the other place. There is definitely the ability to learn from what the last Government found and to use that information in the kinds of plans that we need.

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[Sojan Joseph]

I rise briefly to speak about training in our health settings. There is, in fact, too much mandatory training in NHS and care settings; the issue is that we are not complying with it. We also heavily rely on agency staff, whose training often nobody monitors. It is not that we are short of training. As my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock mentioned, the Oliver McGowan training was rolled out across the NHS.

[Gregory Stafford]

I want to be clear about what the hon. Gentleman is saying. My understanding of the amendment, for which I have a lot of sympathy, is that the mandatory training will be around appropriate care in the settings listed. I think he is talking about manual handling or data protection stuff. As someone who worked in the NHS for seven years, I entirely agree that there is a lot of “mandatory training” that could be scrapped to make the NHS much more efficient. The amendment is specifically about ensuring that there is appropriate training for those who are working in the settings listed. I hope that he is not saying that he does not think that there should be training for mental health professionals. I am sure he is not saying that, but that is how it is coming across.

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This part of the Bill signals a positive shift, but the path to reform must be paved with more than just procedural reviews. It must be built on enforceable rights, strong community services and the principle that people with autism or learning disabilities deserve to live fulfilled lives with support, not detention.

[Gregory Stafford]

Given that we have discussed the proposed new sections in depth, I do not intend to dilate upon this clause for long. Suffice it to say that the Opposition, notwithstanding the questions asked by the shadow Minister, support the clause, which is essential to ensure the safeguards and progress that we are trying to achieve through the Bill.

Clearly, the clause is prevention-focused and helps avoid unnecessary and traumatic hospital admissions. It leads to better planning because it supports tracked admission of services tailored to individual needs. It also has an element of legal accountability, given that it makes it a legal duty for ICBs to monitor and support at-risk individuals. It is also data driven because it encourages the use of real-time data to inform care decisions.

That being said, a number of the concerns that we raised during debate on the amendments apply to the clause itself. In the Minister’s summing up, can he touch once again on the privacy concerns, as well as the resource demands and the risk of stigma? By that, I mean that being placed on a register could be seen as labelling or pathologising. How do we ensure that the register does what it is supposed to without that risk? Can he also touch on some of the vague criteria and definitional phrases, such as “at risk”, and how they might potentially lead to inconsistent application?

[Stephen Kinnock]

I am conscious that we will be voting imminently, so I will try to rattle through. Going back to my phrase “the red thread”, the thread running through all the shadow Minister’s questions is delivery. The proof of the pudding in all legislation is whether we convert it into action in a way that best delivers for the interests of the British people, and in a way that absorbs the risks, builds resilience in the system and ensures that we are constantly monitoring, evaluating, reviewing and learning from what is happening on the ground and, through a constant process, improving delivery.

The shadow Minister asks some very good questions, but the problem is that so many will relate to the work that we need to do at pace as soon as the Bill receives Royal Assent. This is a sequential process; we first need the legislation and the comprehensive spending review, so that we know our funding package. We then need to start work consulting on the code of practice, getting that feedback and shaping a plan that defines what good community services look like, because we all know that we are a million miles from having good community services at the current time. We are in a state of crisis and the system is on its knees; we are very conscious of all those facts. There is an immense urgency with all this.

The shadow Minister asked about evaluating and updating pathways and CETRs, duty to respond, the information collected, managing the risks, preventing paternalism and ensuring that people do not get labelled. All those things will have to be set out and explained in the project plan. That is something we will all be working very hard on as soon as the Bill gets Royal Assent.

One of the shadow Minister’s factual questions was on how many CETRs have been issued. I cannot give him that number, but I can tell him that, as set out in the impact assessment, 86% of in-patients received a CETR in the last year. If my answer that this is about delivery does not satisfy him and he thinks there are issues that relate directly to the Bill rather than to the implementation plan, I am happy to write to him on that.

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On resuming—

[Gregory Stafford]

I beg to move, That the debate be now adjourned.

[The Chair]

I think everyone is in agreement.

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[The Lord Commissioner of His Majesty’s Treasury (Taiwo Owatemi)]

I am the only one who can move the Adjournment.

[Gregory Stafford]

That is not true. Any member of the Committee can move the Adjournment.

[Taiwo Owatemi]

We can vote on it.

[Gregory Stafford]

On a point of order, Ms Furniss. I called for a Division on the Adjournment before several members of the Committee who are now in the room came back. What is your ruling on whether members who were not here when the Division was called will be allowed to vote?

[Chris Bloore]

With the greatest of respect to the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon, I clearly asked my question before the Question was put. We therefore have not divided yet.

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[Taiwo Owatemi]

Members have 15 minutes to get back when a Division is called in the House. The 15 minutes had not elapsed when the Adjournment was moved. How can the vote be allowed to stand when the rules say that members of the Committee have 15 minutes to get back?

[Gregory Stafford]

Ms Furniss, your ruling, as I am sure Hansard will show, is that we were required to come back at 20 minutes to 6. Opposition members of the Committee were back at 20 minutes to 6, and few others were here. You did not suspend the Committee again when the House divided on Third Reading because you were not here, and therefore the 15-minute rule cannot apply.

[Taiwo Owatemi]

When the previous vote was called, I made it very clear to the Committee that we had three votes plus a vote on Third Reading.

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[Gregory Stafford]

The Chair said that we must be back here at 20 minutes to 6, and that the Committee would be suspended until that point. We have not been suspended since then.

[The Chair]

Arguing about whether we were here or not is not moving us on, is it? We need to know what we are going to do now, so let us stop there. I think the Government Whip will agree that if we adjourn the debate now, the business will resume on Thursday. The Committee has another eight sittings after that, so you should have time to catch up. That is what it would mean.

Question put, That the debate be now adjourned.

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[Dr Evans]

Amendment 52 would amend clause 5 to introduce an important distinction in the grounds for detention under section 2 of the Mental Health Act, namely on whether a person has the mental capacity or competence to consent to admission. This amendment, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, raises questions that go to the heart of how we balance liberty and protection, autonomy and risk in our mental health system.

Under the current Mental Health Act, and indeed under the Bill as drafted, an individual can be detained for assessment if they are experiencing a mental disorder and if serious harm could be caused to themselves or others unless they are detained. There is no distinction based on whether they have the capacity to consent to care. In other words, a person who has full understanding and decision-making ability may still be detained against their will to protect them from themselves.

The amendment proposes a change to that approach, so that if someone lacks the capacity to make a decision about admission and treatment, the current protection should apply—they can be detained if they are at risk of harming themselves or others. But if someone has capacity, understands what is happening and what the risks are, and still refuses care, they should be detained only if they pose a risk to others and not just to themselves.

I will give a brief example to try to bring that to life. Imagine a young adult, aged 22 and living with long-standing depression. They have attempted suicide in the past, but they now clearly and repeatedly say that they do not want to be admitted. They understand the risks, are coherent, consistent and judged by clinicians to have capacity. Under the Bill as it stands, that person could still technically be detained, but under this amendment they could not unless they pose a risk to someone else.

Why does this amendment have merit? There is much in it that is compelling. It puts autonomy at the centre of the mental health framework, which the Committee discussed and agreed on earlier. It aligns more closely with the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which already allows people to make unwise decisions so long as they understand what they are doing. It also echoes the principles in the UN convention on the rights of persons with disabilities, which calls for supported decision making over substitute decision making. It could reduce unnecessary or overly paternalistic detentions, especially of people from marginalised groups who are already disproportionally affected by coercive care.

[Gregory Stafford]

I am interested in the points that my hon. Friend is raising. Could he give any examples of the situations he is talking about? It would help the Committee, and certainly help me, to understand the practical realities of what he is talking about.

[Dr Evans]

I will try to elucidate a little further. We know that some people have fluid capacity, such as those with dementia or depression. How do we ensure that people have safeguards for themselves and the wider community, while respecting their capacity and allowing them to be masters of their own destiny? The Bill literally says that we want to see individual autonomy, and by definition, there is always a balance to be struck. The Bill shifts more to the paternalistic side, which brings some challenges because it could create gaps in protections, as I will explain.

There are clinical situations in which a person in mental health crisis—for example, in the early stages of a manic episode or a severe personality disorder crisis—may present with superficial capacity but be at grave risk of harm. Are we confident that clinicians can assess capacity accurately in real time, in often pressured and emergency contexts? Might we inadvertently tie the hands of practitioners trying to prevent suicide or serious self-injury? If capacity becomes the gateway to protection, what support and guidance will be provided to ensure that it applies fairly, consistently and safely?

That is important when we talk about detention, because detaining people is one thing; the next thing is how we get them out. To understand that, it is worth focusing on the crucial interaction between the Bill and liberty protection safeguards. It is worth my briefly explaining to the Committee what LPS are, how they evolved and why they matter. Liberty protection safeguards are the new legal framework that replaces the old deprivation of liberty safeguards, or DoLS. DoLS were designed to protect people who lack capacity, but had become widely criticised as complex, slow and limited mainly to hospitals and care homes.

In response, the Conservative Government introduced LPS through the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019, to simplify the process and extend protections to community settings such as supported living and people’s own homes. Given that we are talking about Darzi’s shift, that is important. With that context, I turn to the key concerns before us today: how the Bill interacts with LPS, especially when individuals move from hospital detention to community care.

To illustrate why this matters, let us consider the case of Mrs A. She is a 55-year-old woman with bipolar disorder and mild dementia. She was detained under the Mental Health Act after a severe manic episode put her at risk. While in hospital, the Act governed her detention and treatment. After several months, Mrs A stabilises enough to be discharged, but because of her dementia, she lacks the capacity to consent to her care arrangements in the community. She requires supported living, with 24/7 care, which means that she will continue to be deprived of her liberty, but now in the community. Because she is no longer detained under the Mental Health Act upon discharge, the liberty protection safeguards must authorise the deprivation of liberty in the community.

This requires careful consideration. An LPS assessment and best intention decisions are required, and formal authorisation must be in place before she leaves hospital. This transition point is critical, because without clear protocols, Mrs A could find herself deprived of liberty without lawful authorisation—a breach of her human rights. Information sharing between hospital staff, community providers and local authorities may be delayed or incomplete. There may be confusion among professionals about who is responsible for co-ordinating the handover. Training gaps might lead to the inconsistent application of safeguards.

The Bill reforms detention in hospitals, but there is some opacity regarding how the handover to LPS in the community will be managed. Will the Bill ensure a seamless transition, with no gaps in safeguards? If it does not, then how will this be provided? Will there be statutory duties to mandate information sharing and co-ordinate reassessments? How will professionals across health and social care be trained to navigate both systems effectively?

The Bill rightly aims to reduce inappropriate detentions and enhance patient autonomy in hospital, but protections under LPS in the community must be equally robust to maintain dignity and rights post discharge. How will the Government guarantee parity of safeguards across settings? The Bill also seeks to address disproportionate detention rates among ethnic minorities. We must be equally vigilant that the reforms and the wider LPS regime do not perpetuate inequalities once individuals leave hospital. We therefore need to ask the questions: what monitoring is done and what safeguards will be in place?

On detention, I gently ask the Minister to clarify the Government’s plan to manage the vital interface between the Mental Health Act and LPS, even as the Bill stands, to embed clear statutory duties, guidance and accountability to protect all individuals like Mrs A throughout her care journey.

What is the Government’s view on distinguishing between those with and without capacity in the context of detention for self-harm risk? Has the Department assessed the clinical and operational implications of requiring real-time capacity judgments before detaining someone at risk to themselves? Will the Government consider a limited override provision in extreme cases where the risk is immediate, catastrophic and the capacity assessment is finely balanced? We will see more of these kinds of cases as we go forward, with more and more people living with the likes of dementia or acquired brain injuries.

If the Government do not support the amendment as drafted, might they consider refining the code of practice to provide clear guidance on how capacity, autonomy and right to self are waived? The amendment presents a thoughtful and principled intervention. It is not perfect in my eyes, but it challenges us, rightly, to consider whether our mental health laws strike the right balance between protection and personal freedom.

Amendment 53, like its partner on section 2, reflects a growing consensus that the law should better respect the autonomy of people with mental health conditions, especially when they have the capacity to make informed decisions. In introducing a necessary distinction, if someone can truly understand the consequences of refusing treatment and they pose no risk to others, should the state override their decision on their own behalf? The amendment would add a capacity-based distinction into section 3, mirroring the earlier amendment on section 2. Specifically, if a patient lacks capacity to consent to a medical treatment, they may be detained if there is risk of serious harm to themselves or others. If a person has capacity, they may be detained only if there is risk to others. In short, if a person is mentally unwell but understands the consequences of refusing treatment in this case and only poses a risk to themselves, they would not be eligible for detention under this amendment.

Imagine a woman with anorexia nervosa who is dangerously underweight, has a good understanding of her condition and the risk, and refuses in-patient treatment. Under the Bill as it stands she can be detained, but under the amendment if she is judged to have capacity and only poses a risk to herself, she could not be detained under section 3. Therefore, there are huge and far-reaching consequences to the amendment. The wider science is moving towards capacity, but it needs to answer some of these questions. Some are even being grappled with now—take the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill. This truly cuts to the heart of humanity and I am sure there are varying views not only across the Committee, but across society. Similar questions will arise when it comes to capacity.

To that end, the question posed is not simple. In some cases, such as severe anorexia or chronic suicidal tendencies, capacity may be technically present but clinically contested. The stakes could not be higher. The amendment challenges us, and therefore the Government—and rightly so—to ask: are we doing enough to balance liberty and care? Do we have the right clinical tools, legal thresholds and ethical safeguards in place?

New clause 24 is on a different but related subject. This Back-Bench amendment relates to the application for admission in respect of patients who are already on hospital grounds but have not yet been formally admitted. This is really important, because it comes down to the ability. As my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley said, when it comes to the mechanism this is the day-to-day reality. Someone, just because they turn up in A&E, is not under the care of A&E per se until they are admitted. That is when the clinicians will take control. If they just give their name, at what point do we have that grey area? That is the matter of contention in day-to-day working.

Currently, under section 5(1) of the Mental Health Act, applications for detention or admission can be made only in relation to patients who are already admitted to hospital—that is the key part. This leaves a grey area for people who come to hospital voluntarily, perhaps by walking into A&E and seeking help or being brought by an ambulance or the police, but have not yet been formally admitted. The amendment would explicitly allow applications for admission to be made as soon as someone attends or is brought into hospital to seek help, even before formal admission.

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I ask the Minister to set out the Government’s thinking on how the Bill and its accompanying code of practice will address these dilemmas, not just in law but in real life in clinical settings. We must move towards a mental health system that is not only effective but trustworthy, fair and principled. I hope that the Minister will engage with the spirit of the debate as it is intended: not as opposition for its own sake, but as part of a much broader effort to build a mental health system that is both compassionate and just.

[Gregory Stafford]

I rise to speak to amendments 52 and 53, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge and moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley. Clearly, both my hon. Friends have significant clinical experience, and I bow in many ways to their expertise. However, the amendments cause me some concerns.

Amendments 52 and 53

“would add to the grounds for admission to hospital for assessment or treatment that the patient must lack the capacity to consent to that admission, if they would not be detained due to being a risk to others.”

Clearly, both amendments would introduce a capacity-based distinction in the grounds for detaining a person for medical treatment under the Mental Health Act, as my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth mentioned. That would ensure that, for patients who lack capacity or competence, detention is justified if serious harm may be caused to themselves or others unless they receive that treatment. For patients who have capacity or competence, detention is justified only if serious harm may be caused to others unless they received that treatment.

The amendments build on the principle of autonomous individuals, which we have talked about and which, as my hon. Friend said, is in the Bill. People should not be detained solely for their own protection if they are capable of making informed decisions about their care. As my hon. Friend said, that aligns with the Mental Capacity Act and broader human rights principles, aiming to ensure that detention is used proportionately and, most importantly, ethically.

Where the two amendments improve the current legislation is around the strengthening of patient autonomy by limiting the detention of capable individuals to cases where others are at risk. The amendments align the Bill with the human rights principles and the Mental Capacity Act, and clarify a number of legal thresholds for detention, reducing ambiguity in clinical decision making. That will help clinicians to make more sensible and consistent judgments when it comes to who should or should not be detained. Obviously, the amendments promote a proportionality element in the use of coercive powers, and support the person-centred care that we want.

However, I am concerned that the amendments may increase complexity when assessing capacity in applying the correct legal tests. It will absolutely require training and guidance. Government Members have been concerned about mandatory training, and I make no apologies for hoping there would be significant training on this for clinicians when acting in this role, to ensure consistent application of these services. While I accept that the provisions clarify the legal thresholds, I think there is a potential for legal challenges if the distinction is misapplied or misunderstood, hence the need to return to my point about having the correct training. I hope the Minister is able to address some of those concerns, rather than just dismissing the amendments outright.

New clause 24 was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge and moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull and West Shirley—

[Dr Shastri-Hurst]

Solihull West and Shirley.

[Gregory Stafford]

I am doing my best—I will get it right by week three, I promise.

New clause 24 would allow people who have attended or been brought to hospital to seek help or admission as a patient to pursue an application for admission under the Mental Health Act. As other Members have mentioned, section 5(1) of the Mental Health Act allows for the detention of individuals who are already in-patients. However, there has been ambiguity about whether that applies to individuals who are on hospital grounds but not yet formally admitted; for example, those who arrive voluntarily or are being brought in during a crisis. New clause 24 seeks to close that gap by explicitly allowing applications for detention to be made in such circumstances, ensuring that a timely intervention can occur when necessary for safety or treatment, according to my hon. Friends the Members for Solihull West and Shirley and for Runnymede and Weybridge.

I listened carefully to my hon. Friends on the benefits of the new clause, and I accept some of them. However, I have some concerns about deterring people from turning up to a hospital setting, either for some other treatment or to visit friends or relations. I am worried that people would be concerned that they would be forcibly sectioned or detained without their consent by just turning up. There is a real risk of overreach in new clause 24. If we go back to the point about autonomy, people need to have assurance about when and where they will potentially be detained when they seek voluntary help.

The line between voluntary attendance and involuntary detention is the nub of the new clause. While I accept the arguments that have been made by my two hon. Friends, I am not thus far convinced that the balance in the clause is correct, but I am hopeful that the Minister can give some clarity.

[Anna Dixon]

I have a great deal of respect for the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge. I have worked with him on some aspects of the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill; he brings great expertise as a psychiatrist, and an understanding of the Mental Capacity Act that is perhaps greater than mine and that of some Members of the Opposition. However, even though I respect the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, does the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon recognise that we need to ensure compatibility between the Mental Capacity Act and the Bill before us? I hope the Minister will be able to assure us that the legal checks have been done and that the proposals before us are compatible. Given that pre-legislative scrutiny was carried out under the previous Government, I am sure that process fully got to the bottom of these issues, and I therefore hope that we can move on.

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[Gregory Stafford]

Just in case my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge is not following this Bill in Hansard, I will pass on the hon. Lady’s compliments to him. Like her, I have great respect for him; I am not trying to denigrate his great work on the amendments and the new clause. All I am suggesting is that, from a layperson’s perspective, there are some elements that need tightening up, if not changing altogether. I take the hon. Lady’s point about pre-legislative scrutiny, but obviously these amendments and the new clause were not part of that because they have only just been tabled. I therefore think it is entirely appropriate to be debating them now.

[Dr Evans]

I have spoken to my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge and looked into this issue a bit further. Psychiatry is already looking towards future capacity and trying to bring the two pieces of legislation together. I believe that Scotland has already moved in that direction. We are therefore into the cycle of chasing legislation for something behind us. I appreciate the concerns, but that is why the Government need to be alive to these situations. At the end of the day, the nub of the issue is patients getting caught up between capacity and safety under the Mental Health Act. Does my hon. Friend agree?

[Gregory Stafford]

I thank my hon. Friend for his extraordinarily helpful intervention. I was not aware of the changes, and I certainly had not heard of fusion before, or about what is going on in Scotland. Of course, if the new clause had already been enacted in another part of the United Kingdom in some form, I would be much more comfortable with it. But, as I said in relation amendments 52 and 53, if the new clause is to pass in its current form in this Bill or in some future form in another Bill, there has to be a focus on proper training and guidance. Because there is potentially such a legal quagmire, we must ensure that people understand the legal framework within which they can do this.

[Stephen Kinnock]

Once again, I am grateful to the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley for moving the amendments and the new clause on behalf of the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge.

I will first speak to amendments 52 and 53. The new detention criteria explicitly require decision makers to consider the risk of serious harm and the likelihood of harms occurring in order to justify detention. It is right that clinicians have the power to intervene when a patient is at risk of seriously harming themselves, both when they do and when do not have mental capacity.

If we were to accept the amendments and the new clause, we think that patients would be left without the protections that the Mental Health Act provides. For example, let us consider a patient with a serious eating disorder who is assessed as having capacity but is refusing treatment. If there were no longer an option to detain that patient under the Mental Health Act, that could leave clinicians and families without a route for treatment, potentially leading to tragic results.

The pre-legislative scrutiny Committee highlighted concerns about cases where the concept of capacity had been used to justify denying individuals care that they had sought voluntarily, particularly in relation to very ill and potentially suicidal patients. That goes against the spirit of the Mental Health Act and could fall short of professional standards.

Patient choice is, of course, critical, and the changes that we are making recognise that when patients have a say in their treatment, they are more likely to engage. We also think that it is right that when those decisions put people at risk of serious harm, including risk to their own life, there is a duty to intervene.

We recognise that detaining and treating patients with capacity without their consent is a very serious step to take. However, we think that it is right that we intervene when someone is a risk to themselves, not just to other people. That is in line with the Government’s commitment to delivering a cross-sector suicide prevention strategy for England. We should deprive somebody of their liberty and detain them only as a last resort. The threshold of serious harm in the new criteria reflects the gravity of that decision.

Dementia Care

Gregory Stafford Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Freddie van Mierlo (Henley and Thame) (LD)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for South Devon (Caroline Voaden) on securing this very important debate. There is hardly a healthcare issue so big that we do not talk enough about as dementia. Perhaps that is because it is one of the most feared diseases, for understandable reasons.

For decade upon decade—unlike cancer, for example—there has been very little tangible scientific progress, until recently. As the chair of the all-party parliamentary group on access to medicines and medical devices, I will focus my remarks on those treatments. Breakthroughs are coming through thick and fast, with the UK’s Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency approving two disease-modifying therapies in 2024 for Alzheimer’s. Those medicines chart a path to a time when Alzheimer’s and other forms of dementia are a treatable condition that can be delayed to the point where it is, for all intents and purposes, cured. That is incredibly exciting for families such as mine with a history of Alzheimer’s, and more is on the way.

More than 100 medicines are being investigated, so it is a matter of not if, but when new medicines come forward, yet the UK is not ready. The alarm has been raised, but no one is listening. The last Government were asleep at the wheel, and I fear that this Government are too. Moving from a system focused entirely on care to prevention and treatment will require a monumental shift in thinking that breaks down departmental silos and redistributes budget to treatment. We know that reversing brain damage is nigh impossible, but preventing it is not. That is why early detection and diagnosis are so critical.

Dementia begins without symptoms as early as people’s 40s or 50s. We need to identify those people before the onset of decline, but that requires a system with sufficient diagnostic capacity. That means improved GP waiting times, increased capacity at memory clinics and a massive increase in magnetic resonance imaging, positron emission tomography and lumbar puncture test capacity. The lack of capital investment in our NHS has left us dangerously exposed, with the lowest number of MRI scanners per capita in the OECD. The UK has 6.1 systems per million people. In Germany, the rate is 30.5. Emerging diagnostics, including the blood biomarkers being investigated at the Warneford in Oxfordshire, need to be embraced alongside getting the basics right.

The Government must also look actively at how the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence assesses new medicines in dementia. Both lecanemab and donanemab were approved by the MHRA and then rejected by NICE on the same day. That means the MHRA believes these medicines are safe and effective, but NICE believes them too expensive for the NHS, because it fails to consider the economic and social benefits, including savings to informal care.

Do we want a system where those who can pay privately for medicines that delay dementia get treatment, and those who cannot, do not? Even when a new therapy is approved by the MHRA, given the green light by NICE and by some miracle we have diagnostic capacity, patients still may not get their hands on it. Depending on how a new medicine is delivered, we may not have enough infusion capacity. If it is a pill, we will be in luck, but we cannot bank on that. The truth is that the NHS cannot cope with the innovation we all want in dementia. My message to the Government is simple: get ready.

I hope the Minister for Care will take note of one final point: please stop punting problems down to the ICBs. My recent written parliamentary question, asking what steps the Government are taking to increase the number of Alzheimer’s disease specialists, was answered by him yesterday, and he said:

“The provision of dementia health care services is the responsibility of local integrated care boards”.

[Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)]

The hon. Member is making a powerful speech, especially with that last point. Is he, like me, concerned that ICBs will have their funding cut by 50%? Dementia will be one of the many conditions that will suffer because of that.

[Freddie van Mierlo]

Like the hon. Member, I am incredibly frustrated that whenever I put concerns to the Minister, I get pointed towards the ICBs, and when I talk to the ICBs, they tell me to talk to the Minister. There must be responsibility within our system. The Minister has been in politics for longer than me, but I hope he will allow me to offer him a little advice. It is not the ICBs that the people of this country are angry with when it comes to not getting the treatment they deserve; it is the Government. They expect the Government to take responsibility, not pass the buck.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andrew Pakes]

My hon. Friend has answered his own question, given the passion with which he has told that story; the role of young carers is a story to which the House must bear witness. I know that my hon. Friend the Minister for Care is passionate about ensuring that those who care for loved ones facing health conditions get the recognition and support they need, so I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Harlow (Chris Vince) for his question as well as the Minister, in recognition of the role he plays in this issue.

[Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman’s story of his saving his local centre rings a bell with me. The Hunter Centre in Haslemere, which had been run by the Alzheimer’s Society, looked like it was going to close in 2017, but because of some great work by Anne Downing, it was saved and is now thriving—in fact, I am a patron—so I am sure that this can be done not just in the hon. Gentleman’s constituency and in mine, but across the country.

[Andrew Pakes]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving us such a wonderful practical example. I would correct him only by saying that it was not me that saved our centre; it was the campaigners and their families. I would like to ensure that the record represents that it was their work that saved it, rather than me as an individual MP, although I was glad to play my small role alongside their great efforts to hold me to account.

Fundamentally, care belongs in the community. It is our duty to promote and support such initiatives as I have talked about, and to ensure that the wonderful creation that is the NHS is centred on community-based care, not on top-down-based care. It is our duty to promote this and I sincerely hope that this type of provision, alongside the additional services that hon. Members have spoken so passionately about today, will be the hallmark of what comes next and will feature prominently in the 10-year plan and in the remarks that the Minister will shortly make.

Parkinson’s Disease

Gregory Stafford Excerpts

Wednesday 21st May 2025 Westminster Hall

[Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. I thank the hon. Member for Colne Valley (Paul Davies) for his role in securing this vital debate and all Members who contributed.

As we have heard today, Parkinson’s affects 153,000 people in the UK; more shockingly, every hour, two more people are diagnosed. For me, the issue is personal: a close family member was initially diagnosed and treated for Parkinson’s, but more recently that diagnosis was revised to progressive supranuclear palsy—a rarer and more aggressive condition. That journey from uncertainty to diagnosis and then to living with a progressive neurological condition has profoundly impacted me. I have witnessed first hand the critical importance of early diagnosis, emotional support, specialist care and—above all—hope.

Last month, ahead of World Parkinson’s Day, I met representatives of Parkinson’s UK and individuals affected by the condition. I heard powerful accounts from volunteers about the daily challenges that they face with mobility issues, speech difficulties and the emotional toll on themselves and their families. I will continue to commend Parkinson’s UK for its tireless work, both across my constituency of Farnham and Bordon, including Haslemere, Liphook and the surrounding villages, and across the country, providing advice, support and advocacy at every stage of the Parkinson’s journey.

However, I have been concerned that the Labour Government have yet to identify Parkinson’s as a strategic priority. Will the Minister confirm what level of funding is being allocated to Parkinson’s research this year? How does that compare with the past five years? During my tenure at the NHS Getting It Right First Time programme, I was involved in the publication of the neurology national specialty report. That analysis highlighted significant variation in neurological services across England, particularly in managing conditions such as Parkinson’s disease. The recommendations are essential for reducing disparities and improving outcomes, so will the Minister commit to addressing in detail the priorities in the report, beyond general references to cutting waiting lists?

The previous, Conservative Government invested more than £79 million into research into Parkinson’s between 2019 and 2024; in 2022-23, the National Institute for Health and Care Research enabled 114 studies related to Parkinson’s through its infrastructure. We also rolled out a new treatment for advanced Parkinson’s disease through the NHS, which started in February last year, offering an additional option for patients whose symptoms were no longer responding to oral medication. I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm that the Government plan to continue that momentum. What research funding will be maintained or increased and what new treatment options are being supported or explored? The new Government have committed to updating the last Conservative Government’s long-term workforce plan. When will they announce the detail and what specialist training there will be for Parkinson’s nurses and clinicians? Will they maintain the focus on specialist care?

Charities such as Parkinson’s UK do an amazing job, but as with many other sectors they are having to respond to higher taxes and squeezed funding. Will the Minister outline how he is talking to the charitable sector to ensure that the changes that the Government are making in the Budget are not damaging Parkinson’s care?

Finally, what guarantees can the Minister offer that the recent restructuring of NHS England will not worsen access to Parkinson’s services? With 50% cuts to integrated care boards, can the Minister reassure people that Parkinson’s sufferers and their families will not be disadvantaged?

Members from across the House are united in wanting to improve treatment, support and outcomes for people with Parkinson’s. In response to a debate I spoke in earlier this month, the Public Health Minister said that she would be happy to meet with stakeholder organisations to discuss the Parky charter and the progress of Parkinson’s Connect pilots. I would be grateful if the Minister could outline whether the Public Health Minister has arranged those meetings and, if she has not, when they might happen. A meeting would prove the Government’s action on workforce, waiting times, integration, support for carers, and access to research and innovation.

My colleagues in the Conservative party and I stand ready to work constructively with the Government, and with Members from all parties, to ensure that progress is not only protected but accelerated. Let us match awareness with action, for only with action will there be hope.

Mental Health Bill [Lords]

Gregory Stafford Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 19th May 2025 Commons Chamber

[Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)]

Despite having worked in healthcare for most of my career and serving on the Health and Social Care Select Committee, having listened to the speeches thus far this evening, I feel in awe of the experience of hon. Members on both sides of the House, especially the hon. Member for Sittingbourne and Sheppey (Kevin McKenna) and my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer). I also commend the hon. Member for Dorking and Horley (Chris Coghlan), who I know is supported by my right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash (Sir Jeremy Hunt), for his extraordinarily powerful speech.

This Bill is essentially about the duty of care not only to those who have mental health issues, but to the public, including the family, friends, carers, public servants and everyone else who interacts with those individuals. The duty of care also exists to protect those individuals from themselves. As many Members have said, our hope and ambition should be that as few people as possible find themselves in a crisis situation. I therefore entirely endorse and support the comments about ensuring that we have proper and well-funded mental health services, both in the community and in the acute setting.

[Iqbal Mohamed]

The hon. Member mentions support for the person needing help—to help themselves, and also to help society. Does he agree that more and more people are getting into situations where they do not feel that they are being helped, and that they just feel incarcerated and restricted?

[Gregory Stafford]

I agree with the hon. Gentleman that more can be done to help people in crisis. What I would say, however—I think my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge also made this point—is that there are people who are at such a point that, unfortunately, they need to be incarcerated in order to be able to help themselves. Hopefully, they spend their time incarcerated not just away from society but being treated effectively and appropriately.

That brings me to the point that this is a balancing act and a difficult situation. I think all of us of all parties are clear that the current Act is no longer fit for purpose, especially when we think about forensic mental health. As such, I am glad that the Government are taking forward this legislation, which was started under the previous Government. The cross-party consensus we have heard this evening reflects the fact that this piece of legislation has come from both of the major parties. I am likely to be on the Bill Committee after the Whitsun recess, so I will not test the patience of the House by going through every single bit of the Bill I have some interest in or concerns about, but I will briefly raise three important areas, which I am pleased were raised by Members in the other place. A number of Opposition amendments were tabled in the other place which would have strengthened the Bill, and I hope they will be made in Committee in this place.

The first area is reducing unnecessary police involvement. The noble Lord Kamall and Baroness May tabled some amendments that in my view represent a very significant and much-needed shift in how detentions and removals under the Mental Health Act can be managed. Under the current framework, the power to detain individuals and move them to a place of safety—particularly under sections 135 and 136—is largely restricted and falls under the responsibility of police officers. Although those provisions are designed to protect the public, they can often result in the criminalisation of people in acute mental health crisis, even when there is no threat of violence or risk to others.

The amendments tabled in the other place would have allowed authorised and qualified health professionals such as paramedics, approved mental health professionals or specialised nurses to carry out those detentions and to move individuals under sections 2, 3 and 5 of the Act. That would relieve police officers of responsibilities that fall outside their core expertise while reducing the stigma and trauma associated with police-led interventions. It would streamline the process, ensuring that individuals were supported by professionals trained specifically in mental health care and would maintain police involvement only where there was a clear and present risk to safety. That would significantly change and strengthen the system, placing mental health crises more firmly within the domain of health rather than law enforcement.

[Sojan Joseph]

Sections 135 and 136 of the current Mental Health Act give the police the power to break into someone’s property or detain somebody in a public place where there is the possibility of the involvement of weapons. Does the hon. Member think that health professionals would be able to manage those kinds of situations? Would the police not be the best people to deal with those situations?

[Gregory Stafford]

I am sorry if I was not clear for the hon. Gentleman. I thought I had made it very clear that I was talking about situations in which there was no risk to other professionals. Clearly, in the situations he describes, the police are entirely the right people to be involved.

The second area that I want to touch on is that of strengthening safeguards for vulnerable children. What I would like to see introduced is an essential safeguard for children and young people within the mental health care system. As my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge mentioned, the current legislation allows for a nominated person to be appointed to represent the child’s interests. In my view, though, it does not provide adequate protection against the risk that that person could be coercive, abusive or in other ways inappropriate, particularly in cases involving looked-after children or those with complex family dynamics.

As such, I would like to see amendments made that address that gap by establishing clear criteria for who can be appointed as a child’s nominated person. For looked-after children, the local authority would automatically become the nominated individual, ensuring oversight by a public body accountable for the child’s welfare. For other children, only individuals with legal parental responsibility—such as a guardian or someone named in a court order—should be appointed. Such measures would ensure that no vulnerable child would be exposed to undue influence during what may be one of the most difficult or disorienting times in their life. They would align mental health law with broader child protection standards and reinforce the principle that safeguarding must be at the heart of any mental health intervention involving children.

Finally, I want to see amendments made that would introduce more patient voice and accountability. I accept that in its current form, the Bill makes steps in the right direction, but I would like to see an amendment made mirroring the one that was tabled in the other place by the noble Lords Howe and Kamall. Such an amendment would introduce the valuable and forward-looking provision of a mandatory debrief session within 30 days of discharge from detention under part 2 of the Mental Health Act. That session would be led by an independent mental health advocate, and would provide patients with the opportunity to reflect on their experience, raise any concerns about their treatment, and offer feedback in a safe, supportive and non-judgmental setting.

That would be more than just a procedural addition; it represents a shift in culture, which I think we would all agree with, towards embedding patient voice and accountability in the mental health care system. It recognises the importance of empowering individuals after detention, supporting their recovery and learning from their lived experience to improve future services. Mental health charities and third sector organisations have strongly endorsed the proposal, so I hope the Minister will give some indication in his wind-up that he would support a similar amendment.

Taken together, these reforms prioritise professional clinical opinion, safeguard children from inappropriate influence during periods of acute vulnerability and elevate the patient voice in the post-care process. In doing so, they align the Mental Health Act closer to modern standards of care, international best practice and evolving public expectations. These amendments are essential to strengthening the Bill, ensuring that our mental health system becomes not only more effective, but more compassionate, responsive and just.

Oral Answers to Questions

Gregory Stafford Excerpts

Tuesday 6th May 2025 Commons Chamber

[Ashley Dalton]

And he has just sold me on what a wonderful charity it is. I would be more than happy to make sure that the relevant Minister meets the hon. Member to discuss the matter.

[Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)]

10. What progress he has made on the abolition of NHS England.

[The Secretary of State for Health and Social Care (Wes Streeting)]

As the Prime Minister and I announced, NHS England will be brought back into the Department to put an end to the duplication, waste and inefficiency resulting from two organisations doing the same job. That is the final nail in the coffin of the disastrous 2012 reorganisation, which led to the longest waiting times, lowest patient satisfaction and most expensive NHS reorganisation in history. Since the announcement, we have set up a joint board, assessed resources and responsibilities across existing organisations, developed proposals about the role, functions and structure of the new centre, and started detailed operational and legislative planning.

[Gregory Stafford]

The Secretary of State claims to support change, yet delays to NHS reorganisation, including to the promised abolition of NHS England, suggest otherwise. Is it not the truth, as he outlined in his Guardian article, that he is bogging the system down in a slow, top-heavy restructuring, while resorting to tax rises, instead of delivering the decentralised, locally delivered, value-for-money healthcare that our constituents deserve?

[Wes Streeting]

A lot of words and not a lot of sense. We are reforming the NHS and, as a result of these changes, redirecting hundreds of millions of pounds to the frontline. What was the Conservative party’s response to the abolition? The shadow Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, the hon. Member for Brentwood and Ongar (Alex Burghart), said it could be a “great thing”, but it

“could be a total disaster”.

Will they let us know when they have made their mind up?