Oral Answers to Questions

Graham Stringer Excerpts

Monday 18th November 2024 Commons Chamber

[Graham Stringer (Blackley and Middleton South) (Lab)]

Deciding to defer or to review is just as much of a decision as one to go ahead or not to go ahead, because it means that nothing is happening. The Typhoon factory at Warton is currently idle—no Typhoons are being produced—which is bad for exports and bad for our defence. Can the Secretary of State tell the House when we will take a decision to procure more Typhoons? There are 25,000 jobs at risk, as well as the country’s defence.

[John Healey]

I have had the privilege of visiting Warton, and I have seen the skills, the technology and the workforce’s commitment and dedication to that job. The reviewers of the strategic defence review will produce their final report and make recommendations in the spring. In the meantime, my hon. Friend rightly points to exports. It may interest him to know that, last week, I was in Turkey and Saudi Arabia to discuss with Defence Ministers the future role that UK-made Typhoons could play in the defence of both countries.

Combat Air Strategy

Graham Stringer Excerpts

Thursday 27th June 2019 Westminster Hall

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to make a brief contribution to this debate under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. All three previous speakers have shown absolute mastery of the detail, which I cannot hope to match in this context, so I intend to draw out some of the broader issues and seize a particular current opportunity: the forthcoming election of a new leader of the Conservative party and Prime Minister.

Occasionally in politics, a window of opportunity opens, usually when aspiring leaders of the nation wish to generate support from those whom they presume to lead. We on the Select Committee on Defence met on Tuesday and decided that we would write to both of the final candidates in the leadership election. I have in front of me the text of the similar letters sent to each, picking up on the Foreign Secretary’s bid for the support of defence-minded MPs. In those letters, we spell out the fact that the Defence Committee, whose members represent four different parties, has for several years been absolutely united about the fact that we need to be spending more on defence.

In particular, the Committee believes that we ought to have as our target figure not the bare 2% of GDP that we currently just about manage to spend, but a figure approaching 3% of GDP, the proportion of gross domestic product that used to be spent by the United Kingdom—not during the cold war, when that figure was 4.5% to 5%, but as late as the mid-1990s, several years after the cold war had come to an end.

The complexity of weapons systems in any of the dimensions that we might care to identify—land, sea, air, cyber-space, or space itself—is increasing. If we do not have an adequate financial base for defence, it is difficult to see how any of those projects can hope to be brought to fruition. That applies as much to what from this moment onwards I will call “the Tempest strategy” as it does to every other system.

In a few moments, I will come back to the terms of the letter that I sent. However. I want to emphasise what my hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Anne-Marie Trevelyan) has just said by noting that as these advanced weapons systems get more complex, their numbers get fewer, and they have to be planned longer and longer in advance. Needless to say, they also cost a great deal more. I am a little more familiar with the cycle involving warships than I am with aircraft, but we can see the same pattern. For example, there are two types of submarines: nuclear-powered attack submarines and ballistic missile submarines. No sooner have we completed the construction of a class of one of those vessels than we have to construct a class of the other.

[Graham Stringer (in the Chair)]

Order. I do not wish to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman, who is making some interesting points, but the question is “That this House has considered Combat Air Strategy progress and next steps.” I hope the right hon. Gentleman will focus his remarks on the objective of the debate.

[Dr Lewis]

All will become clear very soon, Mr Stringer; you have my assurance.

Just as we must not interrupt that cycle, whether it be for a nuclear-powered submarine that is an attack submarine or a nuclear-armed submarine that is a ballistic missile submarine, we must not interrupt it for frigate or destroyer construction. We face exactly the same problem with aircraft strategies: we have gone from the Typhoon to the F-35, and even as we are introducing the F-35—the fifth-generation aircraft—we must already be planning for the sixth. That is despite the fact that, as has been pointed out, one of the existing aircraft still has at least 20 years to go in its lifespan, and the other has only just begun a period in service with the Royal Air Force lasting probably twice that. The question that arises, therefore, is how the new generation of aircraft can be financed.

With that, we come back to the issue of what we are being promised. Whenever Prime Ministers or Defence Secretaries are in place, we are told constantly that all is fine and everything in the garden is rosy and flourishing, yet when Defence Secretaries leave their position, they immediately call for increases. Recently, one brave Defence Minister even said at the Dispatch Box that we are not spending enough on defence. Now, we find that the Foreign Secretary is saying that within the next five years we ought to increase defence spending by a quarter, and he even made a speech at Mansion House suggesting that over 10 years, the rate of increase should be that much greater.

Looking at the Tempest strategy, we have to ask ourselves how an aircraft of that degree of complexity, requiring so long to be designed and brought into service and demanding so much in the way of our resources, will be financed. The sole issue that I wish colleagues to consider today is that, if it takes 30 years to conceive and build the sixth generation of our air power, we will have to invest a great deal of money in it. We on the Defence Committee have worked across party lines to try to change the terms of the debate on funding aircraft, land systems and naval systems, as well as dealing with the issues that arise from what are commonly called the 21st-century threats in space and cyber-space.

It is a matter of concern that there have been indications that the permanent part of defence and security machinery has been advocating that we move away from our traditional profile and stance: of investing in such systems as those aircraft to a greater degree than the rest of our NATO European allies. Normally, as we know, the overall burden of NATO’s expenditure has been borne by the US superpower; the continental allies have put forth something below the minimum guideline and we have been somewhere in between.

It has been disturbing to see arguments being put behind the scenes that we should come to terms with the fact that we should not in future seek to outdo our continental European allies and should lower our expenditure to the level they invest. Personally, I feel that would be a disastrous mistake—it would mean that we would no longer be able to rely on retaining an industrial base that could produce and develop weapons systems of a complexity to keep us at the cutting edge of air power, sea power and land power, let alone protect ourselves in space and cyber-space.

HMY Iolaire

Graham Stringer Excerpts

Wednesday 12th December 2018 Westminster Hall

[Bill Grant (Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock) (Con)]

I compliment the hon. Gentleman on securing this debate. I pay tribute to the memory of those who lost their lives in the Iolaire disaster, and to the islanders themselves, who secured a memorial at Holm in 1958, 39 years after the tragedy. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman would explain to those gathered here how those islands recovered from the loss of a generation of young men, who gave so much during the first world war only to lose their lives a mile from the safety of their own homes.

[Graham Stringer (in the Chair)]

Order. I remind hon. Members that interventions should be short and to the point. They are tending to become a little lengthy, and I intend to call the Minister in a minute.

Armed Drones

Graham Stringer Excerpts

Tuesday 1st December 2015 Westminster Hall

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

[Graham Stringer (in the Chair)]

Order. I intend to call the Front-Bench spokespersons at 10.30 am. There are 25 minutes left for other speakers, so I hope you can do the arithmetic yourself.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

I congratulate the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) on securing this important debate; I supported him in doing so at the Backbench Business Committee. He set out a number of concerns, which I hope the Minister will address, not least of which is the question of why Parliament was told that the reliance was on self-defence of the UK, when the message to the UN relied on collective self-defence of Iraq. People might say that that is an arguable or pedantic point, but the fundamental principle matters; it should matter to us in Parliament, and those of us with any concern for international law and the standing of the UN.

Members have touched on a number of issues. Some suggested that we should not relate the issue too much to the experience in Northern Ireland, but when we consider some of the decisions made in the formative years of the involvement in Northern Ireland of the British Army and the intelligence services in the early ’70s, and what then became normative, questions do arise for us. We cannot just casually accept, whenever we ask questions about this matter, people saying either “Don’t ask” or “Don’t expect a full answer.” The real answer is, “We know, and it is okay.” Many hon. Members accepted that sort of line down the years when we raised questions about the nature of operations in Northern Ireland; and many of them then declared themselves shocked when they read in the de Silva report that something close to a kill list was operated in Northern Ireland, and that Parliament was being misled. It is still not clear whether Ministers were misled or were part of the misleading. That experience of sleepwalking through the formative stages of a new situation or operational vista, and of other standards becoming normalised, means that we need to ask questions at parliamentary level.

We should also remember that the Prime Minister told us about this extrajudicial killing in the context of a wider statement about Syria and refugees. It is not clear whether we would have had a statement just on the killing. That sad statement came at the end of a recess, and it is not clear what the standard would be in future. The hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) said that the standards to be followed and the decision-making processes are identical to those for manual aircraft, but I do not think that, in parliamentary terms, we do know that. He may have been briefed to that effect, but we have not been told that. Many of us have asked questions, including on the all-party group on drones, and have not received full information. Let us remember that manual aircraft would not have been sent in to kill Reyaad Khan, so we are not talking about like-for-like at all.

The hon. Member for East Renfrewshire (Kirsten Oswald) raised the question, as did the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden, of the protection of operators and of knowing exactly where they stand in the system. There is not clarity on any of those issues. If the hon. Member for Strangford is so confident of the answers, he should join us in calling for a much fuller clarification of the policy and practices, so that when we have a system, moving forward, it is not determined by default and drift, but by real deliberation, real design and proper delineation of standards, principles and procedures.

[Graham Stringer (in the Chair)]

Before I call the Front-Bench spokespeople, I hope to be able to give the proposer two or three minutes to respond to the debate.

Afghanistan

Graham Stringer Excerpts

Wednesday 11th February 2015 Westminster Hall

[Mr Simpson]

The hon. Gentleman makes a valid point. That is the law of unintended consequences. I do not think that we, the Americans or our allies wanted things to turn out in that way in either Iraq or Afghanistan, but he is correct: that story is continuing and should concern all of us.

Were the policy and strategy outlined by the British Government at the time correct? Were they well thought through? Was the intervention considered calmly and rationally, taking into account the best advice of Whitehall, the Departments—the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Development —and the intelligence services?

[Graham Stringer (Blackley and Broughton) (Lab)]

I have enjoyed the first eight minutes of the hon. Gentleman’s speech. A thesis gaining ground is that after the British Army’s failure in Basra, the top of the Ministry of Defence wanted to increase our involvement in Afghanistan in order to prevent greater cuts in the Army and to prove itself after not being as successful as it had wished in Basra. Does he agree with that thesis of a direct connection between Iraq and Afghanistan?

[Mr Simpson]

There is a direct connection, although I do not necessarily completely agree with the hon. Gentleman’s logic. If he will bear with me, I shall come on to that.

The basis of British foreign and security policy is twofold: first, absolutely to hang on to and stand by the special relationship with the United States of America; and, secondly, to play a leading role in NATO. Those two elements merge in our participation in the operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. We need to think seriously about the first, our special relationship with the United States of America. Crucial to it, and part of our mythology, is the way in which Winston Churchill persuaded the Americans to come into the war when we were on our knees. That, however, is of course a myth, because the United States of America eventually came into the war because Hitler declared war on it after the Japanese attack.

The special relationship, in many respects, has been more important to us than to the Americans, because of the decline of empire and because we want to participate with and influence a superpower with which we had much in common. However, by the time of our participation in Iraq in the 1990s, it seems to me that there was a serious problem with the ability of a British Prime Minister to influence the United States of America and make certain that Britain’s national interests were addressed.

At a military level, our problem is increasingly that we cannot will the military resources to the promissory notes we write to the Americans. Sustainability of political and military effort then becomes very crucial indeed, and we are found wanting—not because the military are incompetent or because the men and women in our armed forces are not courageous, but because we are punching above our weight. We need to look seriously at what we can and cannot do as a powerful regional power with global interests and commitments.

Combat Troop Withdrawal (Afghanistan)

Graham Stringer Excerpts

Wednesday 7th November 2012 Westminster Hall

[Paul Flynn]

The hon. Gentleman has raised some fair, reasonable points. The problem is that there is a fixation among the great nations—the Soviet Union felt the same—that somehow, we are so powerful and rich that we can transform a 13th-century society into a modern state. That is beyond the powers of any nation. In 2001, a Member of the Russian Duma banged me on the back and said, “These British people are very clever. They have just captured Afghanistan. Wonderful! We Russians did that. We were there for 10 years. We spent billions of roubles. We killed 1 million Afghans. We lost 16,000 of our own troops. When we ran out there were 300,000 mujaheddin in the hills, and when the mujaheddin took over a couple of years later, they were the cruellest, worst Government in Afghanistan for a century.” We have committed ourselves to the same myth: that we can move in there, where traditions are deeply embedded.

The other myth, which was repeated last week by the Leader of the House and all the Ministers, is that we are in Afghanistan to protect Britain from terrorism by the Afghan Taliban. Again, that will go on and on, it will be repeated and repeated, but it is not true. I will call it a deception—I get in trouble if I call people liars. People are not being imbeciles when they say such things, but let someone justify the claims this morning. Where are the Taliban terrorists who threaten Britain? We have had terrorists from Bradford and Birmingham who have threatened Britain. We have terrorists who have huge tracts of the world in which they operate—in Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan—where they are completely out of control, and we are not there. But we say that the terrorists we are protecting Britain from are in Afghanistan and that they are Taliban.

I asked a previous Secretary of State whether he had ever spoken to any Taliban and simply asked, “Why are you killing our soldiers?” Would the Taliban reply, “Oh well, our plan is, when we have killed all your soldiers, we will come over to London and Newport to blow up your streets.” Would they say that, or would they say, “We are killing your soldiers because they came here and occupied our country by the force of their arms, and it is our sacred, religious duty as Afghans to expel them from our country. This is what our fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers did.” Look at history: this is the fourth time that we have invaded Afghanistan, and each time we have withdrawn. What has happened in history is what will happen in the future. The Afghans combine when they have a foreign enemy in their land, and when the enemy goes they fight and war among themselves.

[Graham Stringer (Blackley and Broughton) (Lab)]

In a sense, my hon. Friend is not putting the argument as strongly as it could be put. The fact that the justification for troops remaining in Afghanistan for 10 or 11 years is so weak—and in many cases false—is more likely to create home-grown terrorism than to prevent a terrorist threat from Afghanistan. The continuation of the war is the threat, not the people in Afghanistan.

[Paul Flynn]

One of the joys of having a blog is that everything one says remains on it. I will send my hon. Friend a letter that I sent to Tony Blair in 2003. I told him that if we joined Bush’s war in Iraq, we would not reduce the threat of terrorism, but increase it. If we did that without getting a settlement in the Israeli-Palestinian situation, the Christian west would again seem to be using unfair double standards against the Muslim population of the world—that is how it would be interpreted. We have now done the same in Afghanistan. All kinds of false conclusions have been drawn, but what we have done is not reduce the threat of terrorism, but increase it by giving a cause to young Muslims, from the ones in my local mosque to those in the far corners of the world. That is quite the reverse of what we claim to be doing.

Have the young men and women who died reduced the threat of terrorism in this country? They have produced a situation such that most of the Muslim population throughout the globe believe that all we do is badly intentioned as far as the Muslim world is concerned. That foolish piece of tawdry film was made, but such is the conviction among the Muslims of the planet that there were riots in many places, because they believe that we wanted to insult the Prophet. The division between the Christian and Muslim communities of the world has been deepened by the actions of all Governments in this country and by our presence in Afghanistan. The claim about what we are doing there is not true.

Another, even uglier side of the situation was exposed recently in The Sunday Times after one of the leaders of this country’s Army, Sir—I do not know how long he will be a sir—John Kiszely, was filmed revealing his intentions and ambitions in life. This is a man who has been honoured in his country, but when asked if he was willing to prostitute his insider knowledge and his energies in order to serve the commercial cause of a foreign arms dealer, he said—he has not denied it—yes, he would go along with that, it seemed a good idea, and when he was waiting for the Queen to arrive at the Armistice service there would be a chance to talk to important Ministers, which was “a great marketing opportunity”. It is the most solemn time of year, when we mourn the deaths of the millions of our people who have given their lives in battle, and one of the people there regarded it as a great marketing opportunity.

Deeper than that, however—I am not into conspiracy theories, but the ideas come forward as one ages in life—is the question whether we have a military-industrial complex. Extraordinarily, 3,500 very senior members of the armed forces have moved into arms firms since 1996. They have done their service in war and retired at a relatively early age after 20 years, and 3,500 of them are working for arms firms. On the other side, there are members of arms firms who are deployed in the Ministry of Defence. So we have a monstrous entity, a Siamese twin, created from the military and the arms firms, whose prime objective is perpetual war. If the wars stop, their influence and profits stop and their activity ends.

Look at recent history: we went into Iraq in pursuit of non-existent weapons of mass destruction; we stayed in Helmand to protect against a non-existent Taliban terrorist threat to this country; and we are now being told that we should be prepared for a war with Iran to protect ourselves from non-existent Iranian long-range missiles carrying non-existent nuclear weapons. There are forces in the world—I do not accuse the Government of this—looking to keep the industrial-military complex going in the interests of jobs and profits, while on the other side are the Dan Collinses, the people who die in war.

I believe that we can follow the example of Canada, which lost a large number of combat troops—a higher proportion of deaths relative to its population than any other country in the world. It decided to pull out of Afghanistan, and in a debate in the Canadian Parliament all parties supported the decision. The Dutch took a bit longer—there was a bit more debate in the Netherlands about withdrawal—but again, the people who served in Afghanistan came out, their heads held high, their mission over, because they saw the hopelessness of staying longer. Why can we not do the same? That is what the country wants. We should not send another soldier into battle.

The reason that our soldiers are being sent into Afghanistan now is to act as human shields for political reputation. From the history of warfare, we know how politicians have generally played an ignoble role, and that is true at the moment. The fear is that withdrawal will expose the mistakes of the past. Constituents of mine and their relatives have to face the bitter realisation that, in the consolation they have clung to by saying, “My son died in a noble cause,” or “My daughter died for a worthy cause,” they were deceived. They will have to face the reality that there was a deep deception. Politicians shrink from that conclusion. They do not want to face up to it, because it is unbearable to think that their decisions as Ministers or shadow Ministers led to deaths that were in vain, but that truth has to be seen. There will be an inquiry, perhaps in five or 10 years’ time, about Helmand, and the unpalatable truth will come out.

Last week, I attended the meeting of the Select Committee on Defence when it discussed defence procurement. A number of questions were dealt with, and it was a rather laid-back session without a great deal of conviction on either side. I got the impression that the Committee members and the officers, who had often met, were going over riddles that had been solved a long time ago. In that session, Brigadier Doug Chalmers, who has just returned from commanding Britain’s force in Helmand, said that the Afghan commanders were “equally shocked” by the blue-on-green attacks, but that after talking to British soldiers engaged in advising and training Afghan forces he was sure the attacks had not dented their morale—a completely implausible statement. Of course it has dented their morale.

During that session, when asked by the Chairman whether he seriously believes that Afghan forces will be sustainable once NATO-led troops give up their ground combat role, the witness replied that it was

“as assumption we have to make”.

He clings to that comfort blanket because the realistic answer is unpalatable. Facing the truth is unpalatable. He cannot do that. When asked to whom the Afghan police and army will give their loyalty when we leave, he said that he hoped it will be the elected Government—a forlorn hope. I hope we can at least face reality this morning.

I was worried that the commemoration of the great war would be used in a way that again avoids the truth—that dodges the truth. I have every confidence in the Member of Parliament who is in charge, because he was one of the 12 in this Parliament who voted against the Iraq war, but I find the conclusion of the Prime Minister’s speech on the subject disturbing. He said that we are going to commemorate the war—but there were 16 million deaths: what conclusion are we going to reach? Most of us would reach the conclusion seen in the works of Siegfried Sassoon, Robert Graves or Wilfred Owen, but I do not think that is what the Prime Minister has in mind. He concluded:

“At the end of the war, a 20-year-old soldier in the great war wrote, ‘but for this war, I and all the others would have been party to oblivion like the countless myriads before us, but we shall live for ever in the result of our efforts.’”

The person who wrote that was killed the following week. He did not live for ever; he was not immortal; the Prime Minister did not even mention his name. He went into oblivion, like all the others, another of the 16 million deaths in that war. There should be no question of glorifying and fictionalising that war as we are doing with the deaths in Afghanistan.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

I wait with interest to see what the solution is to security problems around the world. Having an academic discussion as if we are in a common room is not the answer when the country faces the threats it does.

My hon. Friend the Member for Newport West said that our reasons for invading Afghanistan were similar to those of the Soviet Union. No, they were not. I totally disagree with his view that the situation would have been different had Obama been elected in 2001. People should not be selective in how they interpret history. There was no instant response from the Americans after 9/11. In the period before the invasion of Afghanistan, there was a window of opportunity. I accept that there was a window of opportunity for the Taliban to give up bin Laden, but did they? No, they did not. Afghanistan gave him and other terrorist groups a safe haven, and now that it is no longer a safe haven and he is no longer here, the world is a safer place.

My hon. Friend also raised the idea that there is somehow a Christian campaign against the Muslim world.

[Graham Stringer]

Before my hon. Friend moves on, I wish to say that I do not agree with the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas). Getting bin Laden was a completely justifiable objective, but was the mission not over and finished in December 2001 when he escaped through the mountains at Tora Bora? There has been a huge mission drift since then.

[Mr Jones]

No, it was not. Let us remember: in Afghanistan we were also dealing with a failed state that had been in chaos, with warlords and fighting since the fall of the Communist Government. In terms of the safe havens it would have given, it was right to try to bring stability and benefit to the Afghan people.

The hon. Member for Newport West refers to some kind of Christian campaign. He should remember that Muslim nations are fighting alongside our forces in Afghanistan, including the United Arab Emirates, Turkey and, one of the largest Muslim countries, Malaysia.

2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers

Graham Stringer Excerpts

Thursday 18th October 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Baron]

I completely agree. This is a clear opportunity to say that we stand side by side with the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. At the end of the day, soldiers take orders, which is absolutely right. However, we are having this debate because we contend that 2RRF has been felled by political considerations, to save more poorly recruited Scottish battalions ahead of the 2014 Scottish referendum.

Let me be clear that I, for one, think that the cuts to the Army, and certainly their scale, are a big mistake. In this increasingly uncertain world, when many countries that are not necessarily friendly to the west are increasing their defence spending, I am really concerned about the scale of our cuts and about the ability of the Territorial Army, much as I respect it, to plug the loss of those regular battalions. I believe that no battalions should be cut, Scottish or otherwise, but if there are to be cuts, they must be based on military logic and not political calculation born out of the misguided view that it will somehow help to save the Union if we save more poorly recruited Scottish battalions.

[Graham Stringer (Blackley and Broughton) (Lab)]

I, too, congratulate the hon. Gentleman on his leadership of this campaign. Can we not find further evidence that the decision was not made on military grounds in the fact that it was not part of the Government’s initial proposals but was added later to take political considerations into account? Does the hon. Gentleman agree?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Robathan]

I regret very much the attitude of the hon. Gentleman. Others will look at the debate and decide whether he started it, or whether we did. Frankly, it is pathetic and childish to argue in such a way.

[Graham Stringer]

I sympathise with the Minister; as an ex-military person, he must be in an uncomfortable and lonely position. However, rather than having a debate about the nation’s finances, which would be more appropriate at another time, will he respond to the points that have been made on both sides of the House? What is his argument against the fact that the decision to get rid of the battalion was made on political grounds, and not on military grounds? That is the substantial point of the debate.

Libya

Graham Stringer Excerpts

Tuesday 24th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[Nick Harvey]

If any decision were to be taken to go down that route, that would be discussed with Arab countries through the contact group. I stress to the House that the Arab League support for what we are doing in Libya remains strong, and we will consult our allies in the Arab League as we go along.

[Graham Stringer (Blackley and Broughton) (Lab)]

The Minister’s reason for withholding information from the House makes no sense at all. If French helicopters are attacking Gaddafi’s forces, there is no tactical advantage to knowing that there will be British helicopters attacking with them; that gives no militarily useful extra information to Gaddafi. When he made the original statement, the Prime Minister gave a commitment to keep the House informed in detail. There should be a votable resolution on the matter because there has undoubtedly been mission creep towards an objective of regime change since the start of this war.

[Nick Harvey]

I am not withholding information from the House. There is no information to withhold. No decision to deploy attack helicopters has been taken, and if any decision is taken we will take steps to inform the House. The idea that we should have a votable resolution each time we make a tactical decision to use a different air asset is ludicrous.