Oral Answers to Questions

George Howarth Excerpts

Monday 16th November 2015 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Karen Bradley)]

It is incredibly important that the police tackle antisocial behaviour. It makes a difference to so many of our constituents and is an issue that comes up in our postbags.

[Mr George Howarth (Knowsley) (Lab)]

Does the Home Secretary accept the word of the police and crime commissioner for Merseyside, Jane Kennedy, when she says that proposed budget cuts will affect the ability of the police to deal with serious and organised crime, sexual crimes and hate crimes? Does she not think that the police and crime commissioner is in a better position to know this than she is? If not, why did she create the position in the first place?

[Mike Penning]

We created police and crime commissioners because they are locally accountable, which is exactly what happened in the May elections. PCCs were opposed by the Labour party. There are excellent police and crime commissioners out there, but at the end of the day the Government have to decide police funding. We have not come to a conclusion yet. The House will have to wait.

Paris Terrorist Attacks

George Howarth Excerpts

Monday 16th November 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend, and I think the majority of the public agree with him too that our security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies should have the powers necessary to keep us safe and secure.

[Mr George Howarth (Knowsley) (Lab)]

It will not have escaped the Home Secretary’s attention that at least one of the perpetrators of these appalling attacks had previously been on the periphery of an inquiry that the French security services had been carrying out. I welcome the fact that she will be attending the meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on Friday. When she raises the issue of sharing information, will she also talk about sharing information about such cases? If we cannot spot them early enough, we will not spot them before the crime is committed.

Anderson Report

George Howarth Excerpts

Thursday 11th June 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

My right hon. Friend makes a pertinent point and I was pleased to work with him to ensure that we could introduce those extra safeguards in the operation of access to communications data and ending the intrusive use of these powers by local authorities. He is absolutely right. People will not want us to go backwards in how local authorities might use these powers. When intrusive powers are being used, it is essential that their use is necessary and proportionate, and I think that everybody would agree that their use in whether people were getting the right school places was neither of those.

[Mr George Howarth (Knowsley) (Lab)]

I, too, welcome the work that David Anderson has carried out on this important issue. Does the Home Secretary accept that there are many complications in all this, not least administratively, judicially, ethically and procedurally? As a former member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, may I ask her whether she will accept that the timetable she has laid down for the consideration of a draft Bill might be too tight? Will she give some consideration to whether it might be possible to renew the existing legislation if pre-legislative scrutiny needs to take more time?

[Mrs May]

I understand the point that the right hon. Gentleman makes. We have the deadline of December 2016, which was put in consciously by the previous Parliament because it believed that it was necessary to look again at the legislative framework and that that should be done within a limited timetable. So I hesitate to suggest that we should at this stage say that that timetable should be changed. We should do what we can to ensure that we meet the timetable. I fully recognise that these matters are complex, and they raise issues in relation not just to what David Anderson has put in his report, but to other circumstances. It always behoves Government to make sure there are no unintended adverse consequences of any decisions that are taken in relation to that, and we will try to ensure that the maximum amount of time is available. At this stage, we should retain that December 2016 deadline because Parliament set it for very good reason.

Home Affairs and Justice

George Howarth Excerpts

Thursday 28th May 2015 Commons Chamber

[Marie Rimmer (St Helens South and Whiston) (Lab)]

Does the hon. Gentleman understand that many of the jobs that have been created are part-time, insecure and low-pay jobs, with no protection in work? Does he also understand that many people are not on unemployment benefit purely because of the massive number of sanctions that take them out of receiving benefit, therefore varnishing the figures? He talks about rebalancing; this country has become more unbalanced with the wealthiest doubling their wealth while the poorest are suffering more, with many people visiting food banks—

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr George Howarth)]

Order. The hon. Lady should realise that interventions must be brief.

[Andrew Stephenson]

I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention, but all I would say is she is completely wrong in every point she makes. Office for National Statistics figures show that 80% of the new jobs created under the last Government in the last year have been full-time jobs. We are starting to see wages rise. In the north of England, so often overlooked and neglected by the Labour party, we are starting to see a real economic recovery and this Government need to work to support that. That is why Conservative MPs across the country have been returned, the vast majority with increased majorities, and the hon. Lady’s party’s negative campaign was rejected by the British public.

Unemployment across Pendle has more than halved. Yesterday, on the same day as the Queen’s Speech, we saw that consumer confidence is now at a record high and people’s positivity about their job prospects and personal finances is at its highest level for seven and a half years. That is great news, as is the news that unemployment in Pendle now stands at just 2.5%, but there must not be an ounce of complacency from anyone in any part of this House. The Government must continue to do everything they can to support our businesses, large and small, and make the UK the best place to do business in the world, allowing those businesses to create the well-paid jobs our constituents want to see.

This is particularly important in Pendle, because while the vast majority of firms continue to expand, on the last day Parliament sat before the general election Rolls-Royce contacted me to say there would be a further 121 job losses at its sites in Barnoldswick in my constituency, a deeply regrettable decision given the huge support provided to the aerospace sector by the coalition Government, the size of Rolls- Royce’s order book and the fantastic skills workers have at the two Barnoldswick sites.

I raised my concerns with the former Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, the former right hon. Member for Twickenham, and I have already been in touch with the new Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills about what the Government can do to support workers. I am being kept updated on what is being done by the Barnoldswick Rolls-Royce skills and job retention action group. However, this just goes to show why the measures in the Queen’s Speech on continuing to support British manufacturing and the British recovery are so important.

Finally, I would like to turn to what was said in the speech about the NHS about implementing the NHS’s own five-year plan, increasing the health budget and ensuring the NHS works on a seven-day basis. In 2007, under Labour, Burnley general hospital saw its accident and emergency department downgraded as more and more services were transferred to Blackburn. Poor care was regularly front page news; there were reports on the high rates of hospital-acquired infections such as MRSA. Thanks to the action taken since 2010, we have seen a real improvement in the NHS in my area. In 2014, we saw the opening of a new £9 million urgent care centre at Burnley general hospital, a new £4 million health centre in Colne and a new £6.3 million A&E at Airedale hospital. Hospital-acquired infections have more than halved. Since 2010 East Lancashire Hospitals NHS Trust has recruited 391 extra nurses and 40 more doctors. Also, in March this year, the last Government announced a £15.6 million cash boost to refurbish parts of Burnley general hospital, following extensive lobbying by the former Member for Burnley, my hon. Friend the Member for Rossendale and Darwen (Jake Berry) and myself, but we need to go further, and that is why I welcome what was said in yesterday’s Queen’s Speech about further strengthening our NHS and the other Bills due to come before this House.

I believe Her Majesty’s Most Gracious Speech sets out a clear and ambitious programme for the year ahead and I look forward to working with the Government to deliver it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr George Howarth)]

Order. Before I call the next speaker, it might be helpful to say that, because of the good discipline that has been shown in speeches, we can now extend the speech limit to 12 minutes.

Counter-Terrorism: Conflict Zones

George Howarth Excerpts

Monday 2nd March 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

To take the latter point first, the shadow Home Secretary made that point and I am happy to do that again, as I have on many occasions in the past and as I did at the weekend. The men and women working for our security services do an excellent job for us. It is challenging work that they are doing unseen and unknown and without general praise precisely because they have to be unseen and unknown. They do an excellent job for us. As for the comments made by Cage, I must say to my hon. Friend in this House that there can be no excuse for the barbarism shown by those operating in the name of ISIL. I condemn anybody who attempts to excuse that barbarism away in the way that has been done by Cage.

[Mr George Howarth (Knowsley) (Lab)]

May I ask the Home Secretary not to set her face completely against the potential the control orders might still offer? Will she give further thought to helping families to be more resilient, particularly when young members are susceptible to violent extremism? Will she give more support and encouragement to projects such as the JAN Trust, which are very helpful to people in that situation and certainly need to be encouraged?

[Mrs May]

The comment that has consistently been made about control orders concerns the power of relocation, but as the shadow Home Secretary said yesterday, TPIMs are effectively the same as control orders if we bring the relocation powers back, which we have done. The right hon. Gentleman is right that many good groups up and down the country are providing support for families. I launched a project by Families Against Stress and Trauma—FAST—last summer, which works with those families whose sons and daughters might have tried or might want to travel to Syria. I also commend the work of Inspire and Sara Khan, standing up with Muslim women throughout the UK against the radicalisation of young people.

Terrorist Attacks (Paris)

George Howarth Excerpts

Wednesday 14th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for pointing out that a significant number of people who are in positions where they are aware of the impact of communications data have made the necessity of communications data well known and public. As I indicated earlier, I hope that everybody in the House understands and appreciates the importance of ensuring that, as far as is possible, there are no safe spaces for terrorists to communicate.

[Mr George Howarth (Knowsley) (Lab)]

The Home Secretary will be aware that in the cases of the London bombings, the brutal murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby and, according to early reports, what happened in Paris last week, those involved were on the periphery of investigations that had already been undertaken. Will she give a commitment that she will have urgent talks with the Security Service and the leadership of counter-terrorism police about how we can get smarter in reviewing the previous investigations and cases in which those individuals and networks, who clearly pose a threat, have appeared on the periphery?

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

George Howarth Excerpts

Tuesday 6th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Pete Wishart]

Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker.

Unfortunately I missed the beginning of this debate on temporary exclusion orders. I apologise to the right hon. Member for Delyn (Mr Hanson), because I wanted to welcome the Labour party out of the anti-civil liberties wilderness. These are actually worthy amendments. I do not think I have congratulated the Labour party on any measure it has taken on civil liberties and security in the course of the past 15 years. This is the Labour party of 90 days’ detention, of ID cards, of control orders, of national databases—

[Mr George Howarth (Knowsley) (Lab)]

I have listened with great interest to the hon. Gentleman’s contributions throughout the passage of this Bill. While he is on the subject of the Labour party, will he tell us whether he is likely to support the amendments tabled in the names of my right hon. Friend the Member for Delyn (Mr Hanson) and others?

[Pete Wishart]

That is what I am doing. I am congratulating the Labour party. This evening, for probably the first time in 15 years, I will be rushing through the Lobby to support the Labour party. Come on board! Re-establish the Labour party with its civil liberties—

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

George Howarth Excerpts

Monday 15th December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Caroline Lucas]

I thank the Home Secretary, and I accept that she is technically correct, but I am describing a situation in which, because a person has not been able to follow the process that she described, they cannot find a way back and feel as though they were in exile.

If the primary purpose of counter-terrorism policy is to make us safer, it is surely sensible to ensure that individuals who definitely pose a threat are somewhere where it is easier to keep an eye on them, investigate them, arrest them, charge them and prosecute them, should the evidence warrant it. Surely we want suspected terrorists close at hand so that we can take targeted action against them rather than allow them to roam who knows where doing who knows what. As the old adage goes, “Keep your friends close and your enemies even closer”. Moreover, if someone is intent on carrying out a terrorist attack on British soil, does the Home Secretary really believe that having to apply for a permit and attend an interview will act as any kind of deterrent or obstacle?

The Government’s scheme does have one element to recommend it, which is the steps taken to ensure that agencies and the police know of an individual’s location should they need to place him or her under surveillance. That comes from the stipulation that someone return on a specific flight to a specific airport. However, I argue that the same outcomes could be secured by placing a simple notification requirement on carriers, as set out in new clauses 4 to 6. Crucially, as the right hon. Member for Holborn and St Pancras described, that approach would not automatically alert a terror suspect to the fact that they had come to the notice of the authorities and that their return was being monitored. I argue that it would instead facilitate a targeted and intelligence-led response, and that the ability to undertake close surveillance of suspects would be maximised, with a view to arrest and prosecution. The option under existing counter-terrorism powers of interviewing a suspect on their arrival back in the UK would also be retained, and there would be further options as appropriate.

I have some concerns about the human rights aspects of the proposals on TEOs, but I also believe that they could end up being counter-productive from a security perspective. They will not provide the robust level of security that people in Britain have a right to expect.

[Mr George Howarth (Knowsley) (Lab)]

The right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), my right hon. Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Frank Dobson), the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) and now the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) have all argued, from slightly different standpoints, that the ideal situation is to have some sort of judicial process. I do not think anybody could argue against that from a democratic and human rights perspective. In cases in which there is the possibility of a prosecution or other judicial process to bring about the type of outcome that we desire, that is clearly the preferred option.

As I see it, the choice is between the measures in the Bill—temporary exclusion orders with a managed return—or a form of judicial process that might be even worse than that. Perhaps the Home Secretary will correct me if I am wrong, but in almost every case I can envisage that would be affected by this process, the information that will determine the trigger of a temporary exclusion order would be based on intelligence—she is not shaking her head in disagreement, so I will assume assent on that point. If that is the case, any form of judicial process to verify or authorise that process would inevitably involve wholly or partly closed proceedings. It would be impossible to give evidence from intelligence in open court for all the reasons that we have repeatedly debated. Although that is the ideal situation, given the presumption that in most, if not all, of these cases the evidence will be intelligence based, it will be difficult to rely solely on a court proceeding, no matter how it was constructed or held, other than on the basis that it would be either closed, or at very least semi-closed.

[Mr David Davis]

The right hon. Gentleman is a thoughtful and long-standing expert in this area, and he is right to say that it will be a Special Immigration Appeals Commission style process. In the past, however, SIAC-style processes with control orders and TPIMs have prevented quite egregious errors—he will remember the case of MI5 presenting the same passport two weeks running against two different suspects, and that being caught and stopped by the SIAC. My concern is not just about the increase in power; it is also the error rate and the fact that someone can be denied serious rights without a proper review. The right hon. Gentleman is right that a SIAC-style process would be necessary. He knows I am not fond of that, but it is better than nothing.

[Mr Howarth]

I think I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention, but none of that changes the fact that, regardless of the quality of the submission to the SIAC court, some intelligence material would be required. Even from a justice point of view that is not an ideal situation, and that is a problem.

[Julian Smith]

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that as well as the intelligence issue, the British people want the state to act in a nimble and dynamic way, as long as measures are proportionate, against one of the biggest threats to our security in decades? I suspect he acknowledges that broader point given his role on the Intelligence and Security Committee.

[Mr Howarth]

I was coming on to talk about the sorts of cases that we might be confronted with. If my remarks answer the hon. Gentleman’s point, so be it. If not, I am sure he will intervene again.

Temporary exclusion orders and the managed return process, as the Home Secretary described it, is seen as the alternative to a judicial process that for various practical reasons would either be not very just, or at least closed or partly closed. It would therefore be impractical and difficult to judge whether proceedings were fair or otherwise for anyone who was not involved, and even for some of those who were. In principle the provisions in clause 2(1) are probably acceptable, but I have a couple of issues—this goes directly to the point made by the hon. Member for Skipton and Ripon (Julian Smith)—about how they will work in practice. Perhaps one way of looking at it would be to give examples of the kinds of cases that we are likely to see with people returning from Syria or Iraq. For convenience, I have bracketed them under three headings. They are not mutually exclusive and it is possible that in some cases all three will apply, and in others just one.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Howarth]

I think I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for his intervention, although I rather suspect it was aimed more at the Home Secretary than at me. Some fighters out there are involved in ISIS or another group and they went out to fight for a completely different cause from the one they have ended up fighting for. It is literally that complicated.

On the disillusionment front, we will talk about the Prevent strategy tomorrow. I suspect there are some means by which Prevent, or a revised form of Prevent, would be appropriate for those who have come back disillusioned and want to reintegrate back into society.

I am sure nobody will disagree that the most difficult group are those who were radicalised in the UK, adopted a particular kind of Salafist view and went out specifically in pursuit of jihad. They think still that they are out there creating a caliphate, which is the whole meaning behind what ISIS are doing. Some will return not because they have stopped believing in that particular ideology, but because they want to resume their activities in the UK. That is the most difficult group.

To conclude, I would be grateful if the Home Secretary answered a couple of questions. I realise it is difficult in an open forum such as this, but will she indicate what assessment will be carried out of the individuals concerned to determine which of those three categories—it might be all three—they fit into? Will the conditions applied to a managed return relate to that assessment? If she could say a bit more about that, it might give people greater confidence that the process she is proposing is preferable to a judicial process that, because it is based on intelligence, might at worst be completely closed and at best partly closed.

[John McDonnell]

I seek some clarity on clause 9 on pages 5 and 6.

We know of two young men who have left my constituency to fight—we believe—in Syria, and we worked with one of the families, with the assistance of the Government, to enable them to go to Turkey to try and convince the young man to return. When I read his letters to his parents, I found them to be extremely sincere. He thought he was going to Syria to fight against the Assad regime—he called it “jihad”—to protect people being bombarded by the regime and to prevent what he considered to be war crimes. I also found him sincere in his hope that his parents would not be distressed. It was a rather sad leaving letter. At one point, he explained to his parents that there was still a few bob left on his Oyster card for them to use. It was a short, extremely moving letter from a young man in his late teens, early 20s, explaining his intentions. I believe that many young men, and possibly women, have gone out with what they and others would consider to be the best of intentions: to engage in a military action to protect people from the abuse of human rights by a dictatorial regime that, as we now know, was using gas and other weapons against its own people.

I am trying to find a mechanism to encourage people to come back and be reintegrated into our society because I think that a lot of people who went out realise they made a mistake; they might have thought their intentions virtuous in the first instance, but I think many of them would now acknowledge that they made a mistake and it has gone wrong. Clause 9, however, introduces significant offences. It states:

“An individual subject to a temporary exclusion order is guilty of an offence if, without reasonable excuse, the individual returns to the United Kingdom in contravention of the restriction on return specified in the order.”

It would be extremely helpful if the Home Secretary gave us greater clarity, either now or later, about what a reasonable excuse would be. I would not want practicalities—for example, a person not knowing they had an exclusion order against them—to be an issue. Clause 9(4) states:

“In a case where a relevant notice has not actually been given to an individual, the fact that the relevant notice is deemed to have been given to the individual under regulations under section 10 does not…prevent the individual from showing that lack of knowledge of the temporary exclusion order, or of the obligation imposed under section 8, was a reasonable excuse for the purposes of this section.”

We need to be clear about what a reasonable excuse would be in this instance.

Many of these individuals already led chaotic lives, but they are now in a zone of operations that in itself is chaotic, and I think that many will want to return. However, the fact that there is uncertainty about what would be a reasonable excuse for returning—of getting on that plane and coming back—and the risk of up to five years in prison or a summary conviction of up to 12 months could act as a disincentive.

I think we should be easing the path as best we can to as many as possible of those who want to come back to be de-radicalised or rehabilitated. In some instances, unless we are absolutely clear about the nature of these offences and, in particular, about what would be construed as a reasonable excuse for return when the person does not know whether a temporary exclusion order is in place, it could provide a disincentive to carrying out the purpose that the Government, the Opposition and others want to happen—the process of managed return.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr George Howarth]

My hon. Friend has already answered the question that I was going to ask, but I will make my point anyway. I am sure he agrees that there is no comparison between the barbaric acts that are being committed by members of ISIS and what was done by the freedom fighters in South Africa.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

Of course that is true. I have no truck with those who commit those barbaric acts, and nor does any other Member.

Our job is to scrutinise legislation, and that is exactly what we are doing tonight. We can vote to change some of the amendments tonight, or we can return to the issues on Report. However, I hope the Home Secretary understands that a great many of us are deeply concerned about the principle of dealing with British nationals in this way, as we would be in relation to any other country. We are concerned about the long-term consequences: about what such treatment does to those people, and about the increased radicalisation of others. My hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) talked about that.

I have encountered young people who have been attracted to what ISIS is doing. They say that what the west did in Iraq and Afghanistan was appalling, and was questionably legal in the case of Afghanistan and definitely illegal in the case of Iraq. We are living with the consequences of the war on terror of 2001, and if we continue to try to create legal obstacles and make value judgments about people without considering the overall policy we are following, we will return to legislation such as this again and again, year after year.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mrs May]

This has been a constructive and well-informed debate. Some Members have raised practical questions and others have raised questions of principle, but it was the right hon. Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Frank Dobson) who brought home to us why we must look at the issue of our terrorism legislation when he explained that his own constituency had been affected by not the theory but the actuality of terrorism, and that people had lost their lives as a result. So this is not an academic discussion; we are talking about a real threat to this country, and we need to do everything we can to combat that.

The hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) talked about the balance between civil liberties and national security. I have always taken the view that without our security we cannot enjoy our civil liberties, but I would simply point out that this Government reviewed counter-terrorism legislation when we came in and took a number of steps such as reducing the period of pre-charge detention from 28 to 14 days, so we have been very conscious throughout of the need always to be aware of the freedoms we hold dear and the desire to ensure we can maintain them.

I am grateful for the constructive tone adopted by most of those who spoke in the debate. There will of course be discussion of the details and consideration of how best to achieve our desired objective, but many of those who spoke recognised the legitimate aim of what the Government are doing. It is perfectly legitimate to try to ensure we can manage the return to this country of those who may pose a threat to the people of the UK.

The right hon. Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth) talked about the complexity of the situation we are dealing with, particularly in relation to Syria and Iraq. People going out there, sometimes with the best of intentions, may find themselves being radicalised. People may go out to fight or work with one particular group but get caught up in fighting with other, more extreme terrorist organisations. So it is a very complex picture; I understand that.

The right hon. Gentleman raised the question of whether people would be looked at in categories, and described a number of categories. As I have said, individuals will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Whether they meet the criteria set out in the Bill will be considered, and that will include looking at them in much the way he described, and putting in place the appropriate measures in relation to particular individuals. Of course, such considerations will be made in consultation with operational partners, notably the security services and the police, but that this will be done on a case-by-case basis is a very important element that people should remember.

[Mr George Howarth]

My point in illustrating those categories is that the hope is that the conditions attached to the return would point individuals in the direction of prevention or some form of surveillance, as the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) accepted might be necessary. I was interested in those two things coming together.

[Mrs May]

I understand the point the right hon. Gentleman was making, and the intention is indeed that that will be done on a case-by-case basis—both the question whether there should be a TEO, and how that individual would be managed on their return to the United Kingdom. For some, it would be appropriate to look at further action when they return to the UK—for example, it could be right to put someone on a TPIM—or it might be appropriate for them to be put in the direction of some form of programme that helps to de-radicalise them. The right hon. Member for Holborn and St Pancras raised the issue of potential prosecution, too, and it may be that there is evidence and it is appropriate to prosecute somebody when they return. So we are talking about this being done on a case-by-case basis. I know that is a well-used phrase, but that is genuinely intended to operate in this instance.

I hope that answers the point the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) made in referring to her two constituents who had died in Syria. Of course we think of the father she quoted, who has seen his sons die in those circumstances. Again, I assure her that we would decide whether to impose a TEO on a case-by-case basis. As I have said, people will go out to Syria for a whole variety of reasons, some of them believing they are going for humanitarian purposes.

The Government have given a clear message to everyone: if you are thinking of going out to Syria for humanitarian purposes, don’t go. There are better ways of helping the people of Syria than going out there and potentially getting caught up in the fighting and losing your life.

I welcome the constructive approach adopted by the right hon. Member for Delyn (Mr Hanson), who led for the official Opposition, and by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve). I want to respond to some of the points that they and others have raised. A number of Members spoke as though the Opposition’s notification and managed return proposals were an alternative to the Government’s proposals, but I think the right hon. Member for Delyn made it clear that they were in addition to our proposals. The hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) asked what would constitute a reasonable excuse. In fact, that would ultimately be for the courts to decide. A reasonable excuse could involve circumstances in which an individual had inadvertently breached the terms of their permit to return to the UK for practical reasons—for example, when their plane had been diverted.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

George Howarth Excerpts

Tuesday 9th December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Pete Wishart]

I see by his response that he is not. I hope the amendments are rejected and that in future we do something that will make our country safe without having to resort to measures such as TPIMs.

[Mr George Howarth (Knowsley) (Lab)]

I wish to take slight issue with the hon. Members for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart) and for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas). The hon. Gentleman’s speech seemed to play to a particular event that will take place over the next few months in Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom, and it was more about distancing the Scottish National party from the position taken by Labour. That is fair enough; he is entitled to do that but he seemed to be putting rather more heat than light into the debate. To be slightly more serious—as I am sure he intended to be—the problem with the approach taken by him and the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion is that they describe a black and white world where either we have the evidence, in which case we go through the court system, prosecute someone and if that is successful they receive an appropriate sentence, or else there is not enough evidence to bring forward a court case so someone is not controlled at all. The difficulty is that the world is not black and white in that way.

Suppose one of our intelligence agencies has information from a liaison partner—the United States, for example—about somebody’s connections, or plans that they may be involved in with a third party elsewhere in the world to commit an act of terrorism in this country. There is a problem with taking such a case through the courts because the information it is based on is governed by the control principle—namely that that information is the property of the other agency, which in this case is in the United States. To allow that information to appear in a court case as evidence would undermine the relationship between the UK and that liaison partner.

[Caroline Lucas]

rose—

[Mr Howarth]

There is an argument against that, which I suspect the hon. Lady is about to make, but an inescapable choice has to be made.

[Caroline Lucas]

No one is suggesting that the issue is black and white. There are shades of grey and balances of judgment, but the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart) and I are saying that with TPIMs and control orders, that balance of judgment is wrong. If we look at things such as intercept evidence, we can see that there will be other ways of bringing evidence to bear to help us reach a solution, rather than the draconian and counterproductive measures suggested by those on both Front Benches.

[Mr Howarth]

I am interested in the hon. Lady’s intervention. Later in the proceedings we will discuss intercept evidence, although I suspect that she will take an entirely different view on that from me, my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) and the Minister. I hope to comment on the limitations of intercept evidence because it is not always feasible to rely wholly on evidence that in some cases may not exist. Some people may operate in a world where they are not connected online, and do not make telephone calls or give any indication of their intentions. The obvious example is Roshonara Choudhry who was convicted and is now serving a prison sentence for trying to kill a Member of this House. It would have been impossible to find out through intercept evidence what she was intending to do, so there is not always the possibility of relying on that entirely.

My hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North asked the Minister a series of questions and I hope he will respond positively. For some people the court system is not appropriate although they are known to be a threat for various reasons, and there must be some way of dealing with that.

[James Brokenshire]

The contribution by the right hon. Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth), a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, encapsulates some of the challenges and difficulties surrounding the principles of this debate. It is notable that contributions over the past hour have been about some of the principal issues concerning the types of measures that should be available to deal with the threat of terrorism, as well as—obviously and rightly—more detailed examination of the Bill.

We have had this debate on previous occasions, and I respect the view of the hon. Members for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) and for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart), whose approach has been entirely consistent. In some cases, however, there will be an inability either to prosecute or deport an individual, yet a significant risk will be attached to them—the point made by the right hon. Member for Knowsley. The Government have a responsibility to deal with that risk.

My strong preference would be for prosecutions—absolutely, there are no two ways about it—but that is not always possible for a range of reasons. That is the challenge the Government face in terms of seeing the threat and the risk, and being able to assure national security, as the public and the House would expect. Therefore, reluctantly, a measure is required, and we judge that TPIMs are the appropriate way to meet that risk and challenge. I would prefer that that were not the case—in that I agree with the hon. Members for Brighton, Pavilion and for Perth and North Perthshire—but from the intelligence picture that I have seen and the advice I have been given, sadly and regrettably I believe that TPIMs are necessary to be able to guard national security in that way.

Since April 2010 more than 750 people have been arrested for terrorism-related offences. More than 210 have been charged and more than 140 successfully prosecuted. I say to the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) that the introduction of TPIMs was part of a careful and considered counter-terrorism review. She will recall the debates. Consideration was not rushed, but made on the basis of careful analysis of all counter-terrorism legislation to examine the risk and the threat, and what was appropriate and proportionate. That led to a number of changes under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, the point that the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire was underlining. An assessment was made of which powers were no longer necessary because they no longer added to the protection of the public. That is why we made a number of changes and I was proud to be the Minister leading that Bill through the House. It was part of the process of constantly evaluating and assessing the measures in place in order to consider what is proportionate, appropriate and necessary to guard our national security. In our judgment it is appropriate to make further changes, which is why we seek to bring these measures before the Committee today.

TPIMs have always been part of a package of legislative measures and investment provided to the police and security services to undertake further investigations. That investment will have led to other prosecutions. People who not have gone on to a TPIM have been brought before the courts as a consequence of that investment in capabilities. That is a positive result and something I think right hon. and hon. Members wish to see.

The Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 provides a powerful range of measures to manage the threat from terrorists who cannot be prosecuted or deported. TPIM notices are imposed only in cases that require stringent measures, but where they are used, they provide a valuable capability. The Government are committed to ensuring that the appropriate tools are available to our security services and the police for the protection of national security. That is why clause 12 introduces a new power for the Secretary of State to compel a TPIM subject to reside anywhere in the UK, subject to the restrictions we have talked about in the debate thus far. It is important to recognise the benefits that accrue and that there are safeguards in place. The Secretary of State has to make an assessment to determine whether a TPIM should be granted, why we judge it is human rights compliant and how that view has been upheld by the courts.

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[Mr George Howarth]

I wish to begin by providing some context. The Intelligence and Security Committee’s report in February 2013 referred to the Home Office’s assessment that there was a

“25% shortfall in the communications data that public authorities would wish to access and what they are currently able to access.”

That is, of course, an estimate, as it is not possible to be precise about what is unknowable, but the existence of a shortfall is a legitimate cause for concern. The report goes on to suggest that

“left unchecked, this gap will increase.”

Perhaps the Minister will be able to say whether it has increased and, if so, whether by an appreciable amount. It would be interesting to know that, and I suspect it has increased.

It is worth spending a little more time examining what we know about both the scale and the sources of interceptions that take place. In his annual report for 2013, the interception of communications commissioner, Sir Anthony May, noted that the total number of authorisations for interception of communications data under part 1 of RIPA stood at 514,608, down from 570,135 in 2012. He pointed out that these figures do not represent sole individuals, because

“public authorities often make multiple requests for communications data in the course of a single investigation but also make multiple requests for communications data in relation to the same individual.”

The figures give some indication of the scale of this, rather than the number of individuals who are covered. Under the same process, Sir Anthony notes that 87.7% of authorisations were at the request of the police and law enforcement agencies, 11.5% were from the intelligence agencies, and the rest were from local and other public bodies.

Worldwide, the scale of online communications is daunting. About 3 billion people have access to the internet, and during the time I have been speaking more than 200 million e-mails will have been sent, 2 million Google searches will have been made and there will have been 6 million Facebook views. So why is it considered important that the police, intelligence agencies and other bodies have access to some of the data records of these online communications? Overwhelmingly, internet traffic is benign; it is people using the various platforms for perfectly legitimate and legal purposes. However, a small proportion—I estimate it to be no more than a tiny fraction of 1%—is used for illegal purposes, and my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) referred to some other purposes that are cause for concern.

My hon. Friend’s new clause 2 would, if agreed, require the Home Secretary to review the time taken by communications service providers to disclose information linking an individual to an internet protocol address. That is important for two reasons. The first is that, as we tragically discovered with Fusilier Lee Rigby’s murder, CSPs will, on occasion, receive information that in some cases could crucially be the catalyst for a warrant to enable greater surveillance measures on an individual to take place. In turn that can, in some cases, prevent a terrorist attack.

IP addresses are the key to unlocking who is contacting whom, and that can be critical. But they are not straightforward. Typically, a communications service provider with, say, 10 million to 15 million customers would have allocated to it 100,000 IP addresses. For the larger commercial bodies or public bodies, a series of static IP addresses will be allocated. But for the vast majority of users, IP addresses are dynamic. In practice, a range of numbers is allocated randomly to customers, which is why the former head of GCHQ used the analogy of finding a needle in a haystack.

Secondly, the range of platforms is constantly changing, with new ones entering the market all the time. A good example of that is WhatsApp, which was recently acquired by Facebook for $22 billion. On 1 April, that platform, which is adaptable and easy to use, handled, over a 24-hour period, 64 billion messages, 20 billion of which were sent and 44 billion of which were received. In such a dynamic sphere of activity, it is vital that procedures are in place and properly monitored to ensure that, when the security and intelligence services need to locate a needle in a haystack, the haystack is still in place, and that is what this section of the Bill seeks to ensure. It means that urgent inquiries of either a historical or planned terrorist or criminal activity can be located.

[Julian Smith]

The right hon. Gentleman makes a powerful case for us to go further. What would he do now? He has made it clear that there are many technologies that need much more scrutiny and oversight. What would he do if he were in charge?

[Mr Howarth]

Had the hon. Gentleman waited a while longer, I was about to say what more could be done. It is right that we have a statutory provision, and, subject to the concerns that my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North highlighted being satisfied, the provisions contained in the Bill are appropriate. However, there is a problem that we cannot resolve within the context of our own domestic legislation. Many of the communications service providers are not based in the UK; they are based mostly in the United States. Increasingly, the Republic of Ireland is seen as a location of choice for some companies. Google and perhaps one other CSP have already relocated there. It is increasingly clear that whatever legislation we put in place, it will not, of itself, be enough to resolve the problem.

[Mark Field]

Does the right hon. Gentleman also accept that the increased knowledge of the general public and—dare I say it—of individuals who would do us harm about the techniques adopted by the security services and others have also helped to ensure that there is now much more sophisticated encryption in place, which also plays an important part in further reducing our capacity to know precisely what is happening on the internet?

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[Mr Howarth]

The hon. Gentleman is quite right and he, like me, is a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee. We have good reason to believe that there are any number of encryption packages that can be bought quite openly on the internet. It is a matter not just of the communications service providers encrypting communications that take place but of individuals buying packages that enable them to do that themselves, which makes the situation even more difficult.

What more can we do? It is no use pretending that this problem is unique to the UK; it is a very difficult international problem. I know that the Home Secretary, the Foreign Secretary and others are in constant dialogue with their opposite numbers in the United States, but there needs to be a growing understanding between ourselves and the places where CSPs are located that there cannot be this ungoverned space within which criminal activity can take place unchecked on the basis that it is in another jurisdiction from where it is being perpetrated. That issue can only be properly resolved by states, either bilaterally or multilaterally, agreeing protocols and ways of dealing with these issues. Obviously, it is much more easy to do that with friendly states—states with which we share common values—than it is in some other areas where internet providers might decide to locate because there will not be many controls on them. Clearly, that is another matter that needs to be seriously avoided.

We need to have order in this ungoverned space. I am talking about legal compliance and there not being this free space in which crime, terrorism and other activities can illegally take place. It is also important that the CSPs take a more responsible view of what they are being used for. Like the hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field), I have seen some CSPs washing their hands of such responsibilities, saying, “That is a matter of jurisdiction. We are not in that jurisdiction so we will comply with the laws where we are.” That might be good for their reputations with their customers, but it is a fairly cynical way of operating. I hope that, through the intervention of our own Government and Governments elsewhere, CSPs can be brought to the view that they should behave responsibly and in such a way that upholds the law right across the world—except in cases where the rule of law does not operate.

[Mark Field]

Is the right hon. Gentleman happy for me to put it on the record that it is also the case that many CSPs do a very good job of co-operating with the police and law enforcement agencies? Part of the difficulty has been that the revelations of the past 14 or 15 months have exposed what some would call an over-cosy relationship between those service providers and the state. I am talking about not so much here in the UK, but in mainland Europe and the United States of America, and it has been commercially damaging to many of those providers.

[Mr Howarth]

As always, the hon. Gentleman makes a good point. Sometimes the difficulty is that the amount of data and communications that providers store means that they are unable to know what is there. Very often, controls are triggered electronically, and so human eyes might not necessarily see the communication that relates to a terrorist plot, organised crime or even, in a hidden corner of it all, some kind of child abuse. Quite often, no human eyes see it, and it may be that only after an event—as in the case of Fusilier Lee Rigby—do people become aware that there was a communication that indicated that someone was about to or was likely to do something, and that knowing about it could have made a difference, as we concluded in our report the other week. Perhaps I have presented too cynical a picture of communications service providers. I know that, on occasion, they do co-operate constructively, but I believe that increasingly we need the space in which they operate to be better regulated, and that requires international controls agreed between responsible allies and CSPs themselves.

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[John McDonnell]

indicated dissent.

[Mr Howarth]

I look forward to hearing what my hon. Friend has to say. I acknowledge that he and his supporters have a valid point to make. I just think it is a tricky area in which to legislate and there might be a better way of doing it that we have not thought of yet.

[John McDonnell]

Everyone else who has spoken so far seems to have explained my amendments, and I am grateful to them. I tabled new clause 1 and amendment 11 because there is now a sense of urgency about dealing with this matter. I speak as the secretary of the National Union of Journalists group in Parliament—a group of MPs drawn from various political parties in the House. Throughout proceedings on RIPA and DRIPA and now this Bill, we have been discussing this issue. To put it simply, this House has always recognised in legislation the need to protect journalists, because we see journalism as one of the bulwarks of democracy in this country. Although we may not be enamoured of journalists or individual newspapers at times, we believe they play a vital democratic role in exposing what happens, particularly in regard to the behaviour of public authorities, Governments, corporations and others. That is why over the years we have written into legislation protection for journalists, as well as for other professions where there are issues of confidentiality, and the House has accepted that in all the debates so far.

--- Later in debate ---

The hon. Lady will be well aware of the review that David Anderson is conducting, which is due to report next May. She will also know that, as per the discussions we had on DRIPA, the Bill is time-limited to December 2016. Indeed, she will note that the provisions in clause 17 are time-limited to December 2016, for the very reason that the House will need to return to these matters in the next Parliament. I think that is right and proper, so that the issue can be considered in the round and in the light of the different reports, including the ISC report, David Anderson’s report and the Home Affairs Committee’s report, which was published in the past few days, in order to inform a measured, proper debate in the next Parliament on these issues, recognising the speed at which DRIPA was brought before the House and, equally, to ensure that the legislation remains in the right place.

[Mr George Howarth]

I have a suggestion. Where a situation is changing rapidly, such issues are sometimes dealt with in legislation by adding a schedule that can then be updated by order. It is not necessarily the best way, but it is one way of dealing with that type of situation.

[James Brokenshire]

I recognise that in certain circumstances that might be appropriate, but the challenge in this case is the fast-paced nature of technology, which means we would always be playing catch-up. The original RIPA legislation was therefore intended to be technology-neutral so that, if the technology moved on, it was still able to capture that, just as our criminal law is intended to cover all forms of communications. I think that might be a better way of seeking to achieve that. However, that is part and parcel of David Anderson’s review of RIPA, and therefore the existing legislation and a number of the themes that have been touched on by right hon. and hon. Members in this debate, and also the continuing utility of these provisions.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

George Howarth Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr George Howarth (Knowsley) (Lab)]

Before coming on to specific provisions in the Bill, I want to say a few words on the context. Taken together, the provisions need to be subjected to a number of tests, some of which have already been debated, to see whether they are a coherent and effective way of tackling the problems we have already experienced with home-grown terrorism, and the problems of fighters in Syria and Iraq coming home, which has already started to happen.

The first and most important test, which has been discussed but needs to be reiterated, is whether proposed restrictive or intrusive measures strike the right balance between personal liberty and the right to privacy, and the degree of monitoring and restrictions placed on those who are considered to be posing a threat.

The second test is in some ways more problematic. It relates to the practical and legal framework in which any of the measures must operate to be effective in practice. The exchange between the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and the right hon. and learned Member for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) brought out perfectly how legal principles and practical considerations sometimes do not quite work out in the way set out in a Bill.

My final introductory point is not so much a test, but, rather, relates to having a better understanding of the paths to radicalisation, something my right hon. Friend the Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz) talked about. If we ignore those paths and do not understand them, there will always be a danger that proposed measures will be ill-suited to the problem we are trying to challenge.

Before saying a few words on the process of radicalisation in the UK, I want to thank, like my right hon. Friend the Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears), the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence at King’s college London, and in particular its director Peter Neumann. Its work has shaped my own thinking on this subject.

Researchers who have studied the phenomenon of radicalisation have identified certain key ingredients. These include “root causes” or “grievances”, including poverty, political marginalisation and exposure to a specific ideology—we have talked about how violent jihadism seems to offer an answer, or at least an explanation, for that sense of grievance—and what my right hon. Friend the Member for Leicester East called “peer group pressure” and what social scientists call “social and group dynamics”. However, this area is problematic, because there are different types of group and different types of individual; some act alone, operate differently and are influenced by different means.

I shall give two examples. First, Mohammad Sidique Khan, the leader of the London bombers, whom my right hon. Friend the Member for Salford and Eccles mentioned, became disillusioned with his family and the local mosque over the teaching on arranged marriages. He wanted to make other life choices, as is modern and understandable in a young person, but the initial rejection escalated to the point where he became a violent jihadist and bought completely into the Salafist violent ideology, which was then reinforced by group loyalty. The ISC in its report studied that issue in great detail.

Secondly, by way of contrast, there is the case of Roshonara Choudhry, who tried—thankfully unsuccessfully —to murder my right hon. Friend the Member for East Ham (Stephen Timms). She was a lone wolf, as the media put it, unconnected to any group; her radicalisation took place entirely on the internet. She had a grievance over foreign policy, bolstered by a growing sense of a particular version of Islamic identity, which took on a violent and ideological character. Those are some of the things that researchers have come up with and which we need to take into account.

The hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) talked about counter-narrative in the context of the Prevent strategy and was asked about comparisons with Nazism in Germany and Marxist-Leninism. I understand the point, but there is a difference: the ideology we are talking about is intertwined with a particular view of Islam, which makes it a different kind of belief. Nazism and Marxist-Leninism offer particular world views, but this offers a world view that extends beyond the realms of the world—if he follows my meaning.

We ought to acknowledge that perhaps the state is entirely the wrong organ to propose a counter-narrative. If I were a Muslim in this country, I would resent the state’s telling me what Islam was and what I could believe, as I would were I a member of a Christian faith, a Hindu or any other religious believer. It is not the job of the state to tell people what views to hold. I agree that there is a need for a counter-narrative, but I do not believe it is the role of the state to come up with it—and certainly not to promote it.

Part of the Bill deals with the problem of communications data, and here I think there is one area where a certain part of the private sector could help. I refer to internet providers. Our ISC report last week referred to an unnamed internet provider that had some information about one of the people who killed Fusilier Lee Rigby that was not passed on to the agencies.

A paper that came out earlier today from the Quilliam Foundation made what I think was a sensible suggestion. It said:

“Private sector companies, particularly social media companies and ISPs, can also work to facilitate”

what it calls “counterspeech”,

“in a way that provides deliverables to counter-extremism. These private companies benefit from supporting counterspeech content as a means of countering online extremism since it creates a healthier realm of ideas within their platforms and naturally develops a more hostile environment for individuals wanting to use online platforms for extremist and/or terrorist-related purposes.”

I think that is a good idea, so I hope Ministers and others will think carefully about how those companies can be used if not exactly to promote a counter-narrative, at least to provide space where a counter-narrative can exist, and perhaps in some cases even a side bar where the opposite point of view can be put.

The final issue I want to cover is TPIMs. The ISC, on which I and other right hon. and hon. Members sit, raised its concerns about them in two of our annual reports. In 2012-13, we said:

“The Committee shares the concerns of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation over what happens when individual Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures…come to the end of their two-year limit. The Government must take steps now to ensure that they have sufficient policies in place when TPIMs have reached their limit and cannot be extended.”

In our annual report of 2011-12, we said:

“The Committee is concerned about the potential increase in the overall risk as a result of the introduction of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs) regime.”

My late friend, Paul Goggins, who was also a member of our Committee, pursued this issue doggedly both in our Committee and on the Floor of the House. I would like to cite a point he made in June 2011:

“My final point is whether the whole new TPIM system represents the same level of risk as we had with control orders or a greater level of risk. I can only assume that the Home Secretary believes there is an increased risk from the new TPIM system, otherwise why would she be committing a serious level of resource—whatever that level is—to the police and the Security Service to help them deal with the additional work and the additional pressures that will result from the new system?”—[Official Report, 7 June 2011; Vol. 529, c. 88.]

As ever, Paul showed a sensible note of caution in what he said at the time, and in view of what has happened since, he was characteristically prescient in the remarks he made.

I started with a principle or a test, saying that the loss of civil liberties on the one hand always has to be balanced against the gains in national security on the other hand. As we have heard, those judgments still cannot be fully made in respect of large sections of the Bill. I do not oppose its Second Reading and I do not think that there is any move to do so, but a number of questions remain to be asked and a number of tests remain to be passed before everyone can feel comfortable with it, and I hope that those concerns can be laid to rest during its later stages.