Scotland Bill

Edward Leigh Excerpts

Monday 29th June 2015 Commons Chamber

[Sir Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment 124, page 14, line 14 , at end insert—

‘( ) The Scottish Parliament may determine the level of each threshold of income at which a Scottish taxpayer becomes liable for income tax at any of the rates set by the Scottish Parliament;”

This amendment allows the Scottish Parliament to decide at what threshold of income Scottish taxpayers should have to pay the basic rate or any of the other income tax rates to be set by the Scottish Parliament.

[The Temporary Chair (Sir David Amess)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clauses 12 to 14 stand part.

New clause 32—Treasury Review of the implementation of Scottish rates of income tax—

‘(1) The Treasury shall, no later than one year after the date on which this Act is passed, publish and lay before the House of Commons a review of the implementation of the Scottish basic rate and any other income tax rates for the purposes of section 11A of the Income Tax Act 2007.

(2) The Treasury review must include—

(a) a review of the revised fiscal framework;

(b) the tax year to which sections 12 and 13 of this Act will apply, and the day on which they are due to come into force;

(c) the number of staff assigned by the Scottish Government, Revenues Scotland and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, to the project implementing the Scottish basic rate, and any other rates;

(d) a report on the identification of Scottish taxpayers who will be liable to pay the Scottish basic rate, and other rates;

(e) the rates and bands at which the Scottish basic rate, and any other rates, have been set by the Scottish Parliament; and

(f) a projection of the impact of the Scottish basic rate, and any other rates, on income tax revenues generated in Scotland and across the UK.’

This New Clause would provide for a review of the progress in implementing the new Scottish rate of income tax. This will include a review of the revised fiscal framework, a task that will hereafter be undertaken by the Scottish Office for Budget Responsibility.

New clause 54—Taxes on income—

‘In Section A1 in Part 2 of Schedule 5 (fiscal, economic and monetary policy) to the 1998 Act, in the Exceptions, after the entry for local taxes insert “Taxes on income.”’

This new clause is intended to devolve income tax completely to Scotland.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

My simple amendment would allow the Scottish Parliament to set tax thresholds, as any good Parliament should be able to do, and is a genuine attempt to elicit from a Minister the reasons why the Scottish Parliament is not currently allowed to set the personal allowance. I am a lawyer, but I do not claim to be a tax expert or an economist. [Interruption.] Well, it’s just the truth. I am not an expert tax lawyer or economist. This is a probing amendment to help us investigate a complex issue, to which we can always return on Report.

The House of Commons Library has illustrated the complexity of the issue:

“The Bill as it stands would allow the Scottish Parliament to set the bands of income at which different Scottish rates of tax would apply. Clause 12(3) states that where there is to be more than one Scottish rate, the resolution which sets these rates ‘must also set limits or make other provision to enable it to be ascertained…which rates apply in relation to a Scottish taxpayer.’”

That is not immediately terribly clear, but it continues:

“So, if the Scottish Parliament wished to, it could set a zero rate of tax over a specific band of income, in effect increasing the personal tax allowance to all Scottish taxpayers.”

Importantly, in its briefing on the Smith commission, the Institute for Fiscal Studies asked why the power to set the allowance was to be reserved. That is the question I am asking. The IFS, a reputable body, has asked it, and I am simply using the amendment to ask it again. I think most people would agree that setting tax and then spending the money raised is a prerequisite of a responsible Parliament.

It is not necessary to go over all the arguments I used on Second Reading or in Committee two weeks ago—they are on record—but suffice it to say that power breeds responsibility. The Scottish Parliament must take responsibility for its own destiny in the firm conviction that it is ready and able to do so. So why are we devolving bands and rates, but not thresholds? Is not setting the threshold at which people start to pay tax—the personal allowance—vital to the decision-making process? Setting a band or rate but not a threshold is like being willing and able to leap the bar in high jump without having any control over where the height is calculated from. It does not make any sense. What we are giving the Scottish Parliament is only half a power. Are not thresholds much the most interesting part of the equation? We spent a lot of time last Parliament debating that point in relation to the UK economy.

[George Kerevan (East Lothian) (SNP)]

Surely if the Westminster Parliament keeps the right to set the initial threshold, it can also vary it, thus taking away from the Scottish Parliament the ability to plan its entire budget, because the threshold could change overnight.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

That is a good point, and I agree entirely. It does not make sense. One Parliament might be trying to manage its own affairs by setting bands responsibly, but another Parliament could cut the ground from beneath its feet by changing the threshold. I do not know why the power has been reserved, but no doubt the Minister will tell us.

[Nigel Mills (Amber Valley) (Con)]

Does it not go even further? Without the Scottish Parliament having control over the rules and the tax base, the UK Parliament could create a load of new reliefs that would cost it a fortune. If we are going to devolve income tax, we ought to devolve the whole thing, not just part of it.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

As I explained, my personal view is that we should devolve the whole thing. It makes logical sense. As I said, setting the thresholds is often much the most interesting part of tax policy in modern Parliaments. When our friends the Liberals were in power with us—we remember those happy times—was not their proudest boast that they, as members of the Government, had lifted hundreds of thousands of people out of tax altogether?

There is an interesting argument here. For the record, I am dubious about lifting the threshold. It is expensive, and surely more, not fewer, people should have a stake in the income tax system. But that is my personal view, and I accept that there are countervailing arguments. For instance, lifting the threshold reduces the pressure on tax credits. I recognise that it is an interesting political debate.

Setting rates and bands without being able to set thresholds makes no sense. Of course, raising thresholds and personal allowances is dramatic and expensive, which is presumably why the Scottish Parliament is being denied the power, but leaving aside the need for and desirability of full control, does not full fiscal autonomy lead to full fiscal responsibility? The more autonomy a Parliament is given, the more responsible it becomes. Countries such as Belgium and Spain—not without their own separatist problems—provide exceptionally broad autonomy to their constituent parts.

That is certainly the case in the United States, where the states have full fiscal autonomy, including the power to issue bonds and the like—the whole lot, as far as I know. This country is definitely not the United States, despite the best efforts of Mr Blair, but if there is one aspect of America we should like to emulate, it is its vigorous civic culture. Its states, counties and towns have real power and the capability to respond to people’s needs and democratic desires. Surely we all want Scotland to have that capacity, just as we want the whole UK to have it. The fact that fiddling with thresholds is so expensive makes Governments and Parliaments niggardly about raising them—each £100 is inordinately expensive—but why should the Scottish Parliament be less responsible than the UK Parliament? Can anybody tell me why a responsible Scottish Parliament should not also be niggardly about that power and use it in a very conservative—small c—way?

Of course, full fiscal autonomy requires a set of support mechanisms through a formula-based grant. That should be based on need, not obscure variations on English spending, which is why I am opposed to the Barnett formula and want to replace it with one based on need—but that is a debate for another time. If the UK Parliament issued a sensible grant formula based on the specific needs of the Scottish Parliament, and if that were followed by full freedom for the latter to set personal allowances, bands and rates, I believe the Scottish Parliament would use that power responsibly and carefully. I contend that the more power we give the Scottish Parliament, the less it will be a grievance Parliament and the more the forces of canny, prudent Scottish financial conservatism will be unleashed. Indeed, the best way to encourage the growth of the Conservative party in Scotland is to give the Scottish Parliament more power. At the moment, all the pressure on it is to spend more money and blame the UK Government when we indulge in any austerity programme.

In the current situation, it is perfectly logical for the voters to choose whichever party complains the most and makes the biggest fuss. I do not blame the Scottish people for doing that. The current system leads to that sort of mindset, whereas the UK system leads to an alternative mindset—we want politicians in power who are careful about how they vary thresholds and bands. It is because Treasury Ministers have that power that people are careful about whom they elect, and Conservatives do not do too badly in that UK set-up.

With full home rule and full fiscal autonomy, the voter would be in charge and would choose representatives who would raise and spend money wisely rather than just go cap in hand to Westminster. That is surely what we want to achieve, so what is the objection? If it is said that the Barnett formula makes such natural freedom unobtainable, the solution is not the denial of power or freedom but the end of the formula. If the argument is that the Scottish tax system could undermine full UK fiscal responsibility, I find it unconvincing. For instance, the Scottish Parliament spends £37 billion and raises £30 billion—quite responsible, actually. The UK spends £732 billion and raises £648 billion. [Interruption.] I thought Scottish National party Members would respond in that way, but I could not resist helping them along.

The serious point that I am making is that the Scottish budget is very small compared with the UK budget. If we gave the Scottish Parliament full fiscal responsibility, it is extremely unlikely that it would upset our fiscal responsibility. The Secretary of State may, of course, be able to deal with that point. He has many more expert advisers than I do, and I will listen to the arguments that are made today and wait for his response. Perhaps he will indulge me, if not with a yes to my arguments then at least with a willingness to listen and, in time, to move. If he is not interested, we could return to the matter on Report.

I make my comments in the spirit of trying to be creative and helpful. We can return to these matters, but I hope that the Secretary of State will not just provide a throwaway line from the civil service brief but will try to respond to the arguments that are made. We are trying to create a responsible Parliament; let us give it full fiscal autonomy.

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship in this Committee, Sir David, and to speak to our new clause 54. I enjoyed much of what the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) had to say, apart from his description of the “separatist problem”, which we tend to call “national aspiration”—I think I know what he meant. I am conscious of the time, so I shall try to cover the debate as briefly as I can.

Paragraphs 75 to 79 of the Smith agreement covered issues of income tax, and stated that income tax would remain a shared tax and that both the UK and the Scottish Parliaments would share control of it. The agreement said essentially that MPs representing constituencies across the whole of the UK would continue to decide the UK’s budget, including income tax. That certainly makes sense with the very partial devolution suggested by the Bill.

Within that framework, the Scottish Parliament will have the power to set the rates of income tax and the thresholds at which they are paid for non-savings and non-dividend income only. As part of that, there will be no restrictions on the thresholds or rates that the Scottish Parliament can set. All other aspects of income tax will remain reserved, as the hon. Member for Gainsborough said, so that even such things as the definition of income could be changed by a UK Government, making subsequent and consequential serious change to the yield forecast by the Scottish Government. That is one reason why, with the partial devolution, we should all continue to vote on that component of income tax in the Westminster Parliament—and it is an even stronger reason, of course, for the devolution of all income tax.

The Scottish Parliament Information Centre analysis for the Scottish Parliament Devolution (Further Powers) Committee—for the rest of the evening, termed “the devolution committee”—found in its interim report on the draft Scotland Bill that draft clauses 10 to 12, now clauses 12 to 14,

“broadly seek to give effect to the extension of income tax powers recommended by the Smith Commission. These would give the Scottish Parliament the power to set rates and bands in relation to non-savings and non-dividend income…above the UK personal allowance.”

Clause 14 also deals with the interaction between income tax and capital gains tax. Currently, individuals who pay income tax at the higher rate also pay CGT at the higher rate. The clause sets out that the rate of CGT that applies to Scottish income tax payers will continue to be calculated using the UK income tax rate limits. That would create an imbalance should there be a change or proposed change for Scotland and people choose to do something in a different way.

There were, however, no draft clauses in relation to the corresponding adjustment in the block grant or the Scottish Government’s reimbursing the UK Government for costs arising from implementation or administration of the powers. Can the Secretary of State confirm that these recommendations do not require legislation?

The Scottish Parliament’s devolution committee interim report said in its conclusion about income tax powers that

“the essence of the Smith Commission’s recommendations has been translated appropriately by the previous UK Government into the draft legislative clauses”,

and that it had “no particular concerns” with “the drafting”. However, it highlighted the

“significant issues still to be resolved regarding the implementation of the new powers, such as an appropriate definition of residency…the details of the administration of the new regime (who collects the tax and how it will function…the need to avoid double taxation and the timing and phasing of the new powers on income tax relative to those already devolved under the Scotland Act 2012”.

Those are all matters that I am sure the Scottish Secretary will address. At paragraph 166, the devolution committee also recommended that

“details on the implementation of the new powers over income tax be produced before the Scottish Parliament is expected to give its legislative consent”.

That is extremely important. It concluded, too, that

“any final detail of the fiscal framework and the other matters we have considered is provided to the Scottish Parliament before the question of legislative consent to any new bill is considered”.

That is a view endorsed by the Scottish Government, and I understand that discussions on these issues are ongoing with the UK Government, in parallel with the passage of the legislation.

It is normal practice for the Scottish Parliament to consider legislative consent before the final stage of a Bill in the Commons; with the Report stage likely in the autumn, usual practice would suggest September. However, the devolution committee suggested 2016 as a more likely date, so when does the Secretary of State believe the Bill will reach Report?

Because of the lack of information on the various technical aspects of the delivery of the tax powers, beyond the wording of the Bill, the committee said:

“As yet, we are not able to conclude that we are content with the fiscal framework and no detriment arrangements as these details are currently being discussed between the two governments.”

Will the Secretary of State confirm that discussions are under way and update us on progress, particularly in respect of the no detriment and no advantage clauses—principles agreed by Smith before the committee reported?

The devolution committee also said:

“both the process of these negotiations and the outcome requires proper parliamentary scrutiny. We recommend both Governments reach an urgent agreement on just how this will be achieved and for the Scottish Government to report to the Committee on what arrangements it proposes to put in place for parliamentary oversight.”

Will the Secretary of State describe what actions his Government are taking in respect of parliamentary oversight, particularly if we do not—as may well be the case—get through the debate on all the clauses and groups of amendments tabled for debate today?

In their response to the devolution committee’s interim report, the Scottish Government made it clear that they were

“broadly content with the clauses in the Scotland Bill relating to taxation”.

It added, however:

“as the Committee recognised, there will need to be extensive discussions between the Scottish and UK Governments over the plans for implementing these provisions.”

I note at this point that there were changes between the draft clauses and the Scotland Bill. In paragraph 165 of the interim report, the devolution committee highlighted one area that required specific clarification, so I ask the Secretary of State to confirm—I am sure he will—whether clause 12(5) of the published Bill now contains a change to specify that a zero rate of income tax is possible?

It is also worth saying a little about the nature of the taxation powers, which has been touched on. They are very limited. Even if we include the VAT assignation, the Scottish Parliament would raise the equivalent of around 50% of devolved expenditure. However, excluding the VAT assignation, the figure falls to barely a third. That is important because many of the submissions to the devolution committee called for more. In its written evidence, the Scottish Trades Union Congress called in its recommendation 2.1 for the

“devolution and assignment of taxation amounting to…two thirds of Scottish public spending (over 50% of all spending in Scotland)”.

The Bill clearly does not reach that standard.

--- Later in debate ---

“that by only devolving non-savings taxes, the Scottish Parliament is put in a precarious position for any future tax rises, and particularly the introduction of a higher rate of tax. As was seen in the year before the introduction of the 50p rate in 2010, and then in the year following the reduction to 45p, those who it affected were able to shift extremely large sums of money between years and between income and dividends, in order to either escape or benefit from the changes in rates. Without the ability to tax dividends, there is a great risk that Scotland will never be able to fully utilise or benefit from any future reform of income tax.”

[Sir Edward Leigh]

rose—

[Stewart Hosie]

I shall give way once, yes.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

That is a very important point. We always moan about tax avoidance. I have been talking to people in Scotland, and it appears now that wealthy people will be putting more and more money into dividends precisely to avoid tax. I cannot understand the logic of encouraging people to avoid paying tax by putting their money in dividends.

[Stewart Hosie]

I agree entirely. None of us should be encouraging tax avoidance or evasion—not least a Tory Government, which is why I am sure the Secretary of State will want to support the full devolution of tax on earned and unearned income. It is a jolly good idea.

However, whether the devolution of income tax is extended or not, issues of implementation must be fully resolved. I ask the Secretary of State to confirm that, as part of the fiscal framework discussions, the following issues are now being fully addressed: the timing of the implementation of the Smith provisions; the length of the transition period and how it relates to the transition period for the Scottish rate of income tax; how the costs of implementation will be met; whether there will be an agreement to revisit the memorandum of understanding between the Scottish Government and HMRC for the Scottish rate of income tax, to ensure that it remains fit for purpose; the enforcement and compliance regime under the Smith income tax proposals; how gift aid and pensions relief will be treated under Smith; how the block grant adjustment will work, although that is much broader than simply income tax; the forecasting of revenues, the interaction between the Office for Budget Responsibility and the Scottish Fiscal Commission and the detail of how we calculate the transfer of revenue; and the continued role of the National Audit Office in working in partnership with Audit Scotland.

The key issue is the forecasting that will drive the revenues that the Scottish Government will get and the block grant adjustment. There has to be a fair balance between the role and input of the OBR and the Scottish Fiscal Commission, particularly given that the OBR uses Treasury numbers to drive its calculations.

As I said at the outset, I am conscious of time; we have many groups of amendments to get through and others will want to speak. I hope that the Secretary of State can answer those important detailed questions on the proposed devolution. I commend amendment 54 to the Committee.

[Ian Murray (Edinburgh South) (Lab)]

I was not able to make it to the House earlier, Sir David; I would like to express my sympathies to everyone involved in the tragic events in Tunisia. Our thoughts are with the families all across the United Kingdom, but especially the people in Scotland who have been caught up.

I want to speak to new clause 32. Part 2 of the Bill devolves significant new powers to Scotland over income tax and other taxes, and it is a real opportunity to provide the powerhouse Parliament promised by the Smith agreement. Clauses 12, 13 and 14 make provision for transfer to the Scottish Parliament of the power to set rates and bands of income tax, including, as the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) was pushing for, the ability to set a zero rate. The full impact of that and other tax measures should not be downplayed.

Lord Smith himself outlined that the measures proposed in the agreement would create one of the most powerful devolved Parliaments in the world. When taking taxation and spending clauses together, Scotland would be only slightly behind the Canadian provinces and Swiss cantons. Likewise, according to the OECD, in exercising power over setting both the rates and bases of income tax, Scotland would rank above sub-central legislatures in Sweden, Norway, Finland, the US and even Germany.

The economic evidence suggests that fiscal devolution can work. It is our responsibility, and that of the Scottish Government, to make sure that it does—that is the genesis of our new clause 32. However, these are hugely complicated processes; anyone who has tried to read the fiscal framework analysis in the Smith agreement will know that. I note that the Scottish National party and its new friend, the hon. Member for Gainsborough, have tabled new clauses that would seek to devolve income tax in its entirety.

I should say at the start that those are perfectly legitimate arguments that have been debated at great length at both the Calman and Smith commissions. Labour disagrees, because we believe fundamentally in the pooling and sharing of resources across the United Kingdom; that is not a criticism of the SNP position, but merely a disagreement on a fundamental broad principle. We have rightly and repeatedly criticised the Smith agreement and the Bill on a number of occasions, particularly on Second Reading and in last Monday’s debate, but I agree with the hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie): in this instance at least, the Bill and the Smith agreement have got it right. That is probably why there are so few substantive amendments to the income tax clauses. The Chartered Institute of Taxation has echoed that by saying that the commission has made a

“pragmatic set of proposals which shows a lot of thought has been given to balancing the desire of Scots for greater tax powers against the practical obstacles to devolution”.

It is worth reflecting on the Scottish Parliament’s current position on income tax. Since 1999, Scotland has been able to vary the rate of income tax by 3p in the pound. Despite the current clamour for more powers, that power has never been used—incidentally, I believe that it has now lapsed, which shows the problems with the fiscal framework. Notwithstanding that, under the Scotland Act 2012, and as a result of the Calman commission, the Scottish Parliament has been afforded control over the first 10p of the basic rate of tax. Obviously, the Smith agreement and the Bill go much further.

The Scottish Parliament will have total control over income tax rates and thresholds and complete freedom over the levels at which those rates and thresholds are set. That is significant as the estimated devolved income tax liabilities on income tax in 2013-14 amounted to almost £11 billion. That is a considerable sum, the collection and deployment of which confers a substantial degree of responsibility on the Scottish Parliament. If they wish, the Scottish Government—of any colour—can increase or decrease that liability.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

I entirely accept where the hon. Gentleman is coming from in saying that he wants responsibility to be shared throughout the United Kingdom. However, can he explain why we should share responsibility over thresholds but not, apparently, over bands or rates? I cannot see the logic of that.

[Ian Murray]

The Scottish Parliament will have a significant ability to adjust the zero rate in particular. I hope that the Secretary of State responds to that point, because the House of Commons Library was quite clear on it. However, there has to be some pooling and sharing. Income tax is the biggest tax that everyone pays. Everyone who works pays a proportion of their income in income tax, above the basic allowance. It is important that everyone has a stake in that game. We could get to a situation in which people who did not have a stake in that game asked what the United Kingdom was for. I fundamentally believe in pooling and sharing, and the Smith agreement struck a reasonable balance.

We need a full analysis of how all the proposals will work. That is why we tabled new clause 32. Some adjustment of the powers might be needed in the future. We do not yet know what effect the implementation of the Scotland Act 2012 will have, because it does not come into force until 2016. The question that the hon. Member for Gainsborough raises relates to what we are trying to achieve with new clause 32, because the report would examine the consequences of this transfer of powers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Edward Leigh]

We are dealing with my amendment, which relates to threshold points. Surely, if incomes in Scotland are generally lower, the Scottish Parliament would want to address the problem for people on lower incomes by lowering the thresholds. Would that not be the logical thing to do? I understand the Secretary of State’s point about the pooling and sharing of resources, but I have to ask the same question of him that I put to his opposite number: why is it okay to pool and share resources on thresholds but not on bands and rates?

--- Later in debate ---

[David Mundell]

No, I will not at this stage—[Interruption.] The hon. Gentleman is one of the most frequent contributors to debates in the House, and he does get to have his say, although not as much as his former leader does. The right hon. Member for Gordon (Alex Salmond) is a very frequent contributor.

The SNP’s new clause 54 goes further than amendment 124, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh). However, to go further than the powers set out in the Bill would break the concept of shared tax and be complicated for individuals and employers with activity on both sides of the border, as they would have to understand and comply with two potentially entirely different tax systems. The Law Society of Scotland agreed with us, saying of the proposed change:

“The administrative burden would increase considerably. The complexities regarding the UK savings and investment market may also be particularly problematic”.

That would not be in keeping with a stronger Scotland within the United Kingdom. It is not what the people of Scotland voted for last September, and I cannot accept the new clause.

On new clause 32, tabled by Opposition Front Benchers, I hope that I can provide some reassurance to the House. The new clause is intended to provide the House with a report on the implementation of the Scottish rate of income tax and the further income tax powers in the Bill. That is a laudable aim, but I can reassure hon. Members that current legislation already provides for annual reports on the implementation of devolved tax powers to Scotland.

Section 33 of the Scotland Act 2012 requires the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers to lay before both Houses of Parliament and the Scottish Parliament annual reports that broadly cover the areas suggested in the new clause. Three reports have already been produced, the most recent in March, and HMRC’s accounting officer for the Scottish rate and the Comptroller and Auditor General have both given evidence to the Scottish Parliament on the progress of tax devolution to Scotland. Of course, Westminster Committees have the opportunity to call for evidence, too. Alongside that existing requirement and to ensure that Parliament can have confidence in the implementation and operation of the Scottish rate, the Comptroller and Auditor General is required to report annually on HMRC’s administration of the Scottish rate.

I can also tell the hon. Member for Edinburgh South that I am satisfied that adequate resources are being brought forward to deal with the issues relating to the transfer of these powers to Scotland and to HMRC’s involvement in that process. I would further reassure Members that reporting requirements are a feature of the negotiations currently under way between the two Governments on the fiscal settlement that accompanies the Bill.

I have set out the rationale behind the Government’s drafting of the Bill, which, as has been widely acknowledged, fully implements the Smith commission’s recommendations on income tax. The fiscal framework will be an important part of the discussions, and we are giving this exercise the focus and priority that it deserves.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clauses 12 to 14 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 15

Assignment of VAT

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Temporary Chair (Mr David Crausby)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss:

New clause 20—Review of operation of VAT refund schemes in Scotland—

‘(1) The Treasury shall, within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, publish and lay before the House of Commons a review of the application of VAT refund schemes for businesses in Scotland.

(2) The review must include an analysis of the impact of the qualifying criteria for the VAT refund schemes—

(a) in Section 33 of the VAT Act 1994, and

(b) for Government Departments and the NHS,

on the level of VAT payable by Police Scotland and by the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service.”

Following the amalgamation of the (formerly regional) Scottish fire and rescue services and Scottish police forces into a single fire service (the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service) and a single police force (Police Scotland) respectively, they are no longer eligible for VAT exemptions under the VAT refund schemes mentioned. This amendment requires the Treasury to carry out and publish a review of the schemes in Scotland, and in particular in relation to the level of VAT payable by Police Scotland and the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service.