Pride in Place

David Simmonds Excerpts

Wednesday 15th October 2025 Commons Chamber

[David Simmonds (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)]

This statement speaks of pride. Conservative Members have pride in our local pubs, 200 of which have closed in the past six months, hammered by the Labour party’s business rates rises. We have pride in our restaurants, which are closing in record numbers under the business rates burden imposed by this Government. We are proud of our local shops, which—according to the British Retail Consortium—are buckling under an additional £7 billion of annual costs imposed by this Government. We are proud of our family businesses, the bedrock of our high streets, which are buckling under new taxes introduced by this Government. We are proud of our family farms, which are also buckling under the new taxes imposed by this Government. We are proud of our local councils, which face maxing out their council tax rates. We hear of £20 million at a local level, but councils across the country are maxing out their council tax, not to invest in new local services, but to pay an additional £1.5 billion of annual costs imposed on them by this Government’s job tax—every year, when it comes to delivering services, a net £1.5 billion worse off. We are proud of the workers of this country, of whom there were 4 million more when the Conservative party left office last year. In the retail sector alone, 97,000 have lost their jobs since this Government took office. As such, this programme is a fig leaf—elements relabelled from past programmes such as the long-term plan for towns, slightly redirected to Labour areas—that covers up a collapse in the ability of our elected local representatives to invest in their communities. As with so many things, that collapse gets worse every day under the Labour party.

Let me pose some specific questions to the Minister. First, why is there so much complex governance around this? Why not listen to the cries of our local leaders in Croydon, Somerset and Hertfordshire—people across the political spectrum who are saying, “Why not just give the councils the money to get on with this? Why tie this up in bureaucracy and red tape?” How much of this money has simply been rebadged from other, previously announced Government programmes? Why the change in methodology? In the interests of transparency, can the Minister set out for the House why the funding now seems to be landing in areas that are more likely to support the Labour party?

How much of this funding sits outside of the 2025 spending review, and is therefore deeply in question from the start? How much of this money—like so many of this Government’s announcements, such as on housing—has been put in the public domain, but promised as spending towards the tail-end of the next Parliament, perhaps the very definition of jam tomorrow? Finally, can the Minister tell us how today’s announcement will help small businesses on all our high streets across our country to recover from her colleague the Chancellor’s £2.7 billion tax hike in this year alone?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I am disappointed by the hon. Member’s lack of contrition and his failure to say sorry. The Conservatives presided over 14 years of failure, during which, over a period of austerity, local government and local civic institutions were denuded and deprived communities were hollowed out. He says that we are funding areas of deprivation—that is because we actually care about funding those areas. Candidly, if I had the record of the last Government, I would not stand at the Dispatch Box and give us lectures.

Let me pick up the specific questions that the hon. Member asked. First, why are we tying this up in process? There is no process, but we have said that communities should be in charge. The difference between this scheme and the things done by the last Government is that we want to put communities in the driving seat and give them power. We want local authorities to enable and facilitate, but we absolutely need our community leaders. Members across the House will know them—the people who are networking, championing and making change happen. We want them around the table, driving the change that their community needs.

On the methodology, the Conservative party obviously did some fiddling, but we do not do that. We have focused on two metrics: multiple deprivation and community needs. That is putting investment into the areas that most need it, because they are both deprived and, critically, have low social infrastructure and social capital. That is why we are funding the areas that we are funding. We all remember the Conservatives’ last Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Richmond and Northallerton (Rishi Sunak), saying that they actively diverted funding away from areas of deprivation. That is something that the Labour party will not do and has not done.

Finally, turning to the funding profile, we are desperate to move with momentum. We want to get the investment out. It is a 10-year commitment—that is an absolute game changer. No Government have ever said to communities, “Come up with an investment plan and we will fund you over a decade.” We think that is game changing for communities on the ground, but we are not going to wait. We are already giving programme capital investment to the 75 places that were in phase 1, in order to start the work of kick-starting that programme, and then their funding will flow next year. For those places in phase 2, capital and capacity investment will be going into them from next year and then flowing in the year after. We are very clear about this opportunity for our communities.

This is not about party politics, so I am incredibly disappointed by the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner (David Simmonds). This is an opportunity to support parts of our country that have been absolutely hollowed out. I would expect a bit more contrition. [Hon. Members: “Why?”] Because of your record. Because you sat—

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting)

David Simmonds Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 14th October 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government (Miatta Fahnbulleh)]

The amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish a statement when directing the establishment of a new combined authority, setting out how the proposed combined authority would affect the physical geography, community identity and boundaries of other public services in the local area. I have no doubt that the intention of the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon is absolutely right and that such matters are important; as I have said, the examples of the Isle of Wight and Cornwall highlight that. In practice, however, such matters will already have been considered through the process set out in the Bill.

In deciding whether to establish a new combined authority, the Secretary of State will already be required to have regard to the likely effect on the exercise of functions in neighbouring local government areas. In addition, the Secretary of State is already subject to the statutory tests requiring them to have regard to the need to secure effective and convenient local government in relation to areas of competence. The proposal itself can be expected to cover those issues. There is therefore no need for a separate statement, and so I hope that the hon. Member will withdraw the amendment.

[David Simmonds (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)]

In our consideration of the issue, the Minister is asking the Committee to give a great deal of weight to the meetings she has described having had with various local leaders and Members with particular concerns about the impact on their local areas in terms of national identity, heritage and geography. Will she share with the Committee a little more detail on the substance of those discussions, so that before we vote we can understand what exact assurances may have been given to local leaders and what their understanding of them is, so that we are all completely clear?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

On Hampshire and Solent, for example, our conversation was very candid. The leaders were clear about some of the debates that they had had within the council; as the Minister, I said what opportunities would be open to them, and I expressed the fact that in the context of the Isle of Wight, the name was completely down to the constituent authorities. We support constituent authorities working together collaboratively to ensure that all the constituent parts are happy with the deal and the proposal.

On Cornwall, I believe that the Secretary of State, my boss, had those conversations, but I have also had some with MPs. We absolutely recognise the uniqueness of Cornwall and its identity. There are clear things that we know Cornish MPs and the council want, such as protection for the Cornish language, which we are in discussion about. There are clearly opportunities to build on the existing devolution deal. The previous Government provided a devolution deal for Cornwall in recognition of that exception. Another issue might be housing, which is big in Cornwall, for example, and the area is especially exercised about that, in particular in the context of the impact of tourism. We are happy to have a conversation about continuing to support the local authority to make inroads on some of those issues.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Once the Bill comes into force, there will be various ways in which functions can be conferred on a combined authority or combined county authority that will be operating as strategic authorities. The clause makes the necessary amendment to existing legislation to clarify these wider options. It is a small but important clause that will ensure our new devolution framework can operate effectively.

[David Simmonds (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)]

I thank the Minister for that introduction. It is the implementation of this that is the subject of political contention, but a great deal has been said, and a vote has been taken. There is nothing further we can do on those issues at this stage, but I expect they will be the subject of great debate in the remaining stages of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6

Combined authorities and CCAs: decision-making and validity of proceedings

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Schedule 2 stand part.

New clause 48—Greater London Authority: decision-making—

“(1) The Greater London Authority Act 1999 is amended in accordance with this section.

(2) In section 42B (Assembly’s power to reject draft strategies), in subsection (5)(b), leave out “at least two-thirds” and insert “a simple majority”.

(3) In schedule 4A (Confirmation hearings etc)—

(a) in paragraph 10(5) leave out “at least two-thirds” and insert “a simple majority”;

(b) in paragraph 11(5) leave out “at least two-thirds” and insert “a simple majority”.

(4) In schedule 6 (Procedure for determining the authority’s consolidated council tax requirement)—

(a) in paragraph 8(4) leave out “at least two-thirds” and insert “a simple majority”;

(b) In paragraph 8C(4) leave out “at least two-thirds” and insert “a simple majority”.

(5) In schedule 7 (Procedure for making of substitute calculations by the authority), in paragraph 7(4), leave out “at least two thirds and insert “a simple majority”.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)]

I rise to speak to new clause 48, tabled in my name. I also want to raise another issue for consideration by the Minister at a future stage.

In clause 6, the new rules for mayoral combined authorities give simple majority voting for relevant decisions by bodies to adopt budgets or policies, such as spatial development strategies, local transport plans and other strategies set out elsewhere in the Bill. For example, schedule 2 outlines that

“a resolution to adopt the strategy is to be made by a simple majority of the constituent members present and voting”.

There are other rules to do with a tied vote.

I think that the Bill should also amend the Greater London Authority Act 1999 to give simple majority voting for decisions by the London Assembly on the budget and mayoral strategies of the Mayor of London. That is for consistency of decision making across the different authorities and bodies, and for fairness to London’s democracy. Along with many Opposition Members, this is something that I have wanted for some time now, as I was a member of the London Assembly in my previous job. In these Committee debates I will frequently bring up examples from my long experience of being part of an effective scrutiny body in a devolved authority at the strategic level—I feel that I have a good handle on how it works.

Using “a simple majority” is the right way to go about this. The Minister has talked about building consensus and working in partnership. I really value it when cross-party working can result in genuine dialogue, with mayors that will listen and make changes, and bodies scrutinising or working with them to put forward their own ideas and have them taken up. Those are all really healthy things for our democracy. New clause 48 would simply amend the parts of the 1999 Act that outline how the Assembly votes. Currently, the Act requires at least a two-thirds majority for any changes to be made, and the new clause would instead insert the words “a simple majority”. It is a very simple change, which the Minister should consider.

The second issue I want to raise relates to forward plans, which are incredibly useful for the general public, or anyone who wants to influence mayoral decisions and the decisions of combined authorities or local authorities. At the moment, only local authorities have this particular requirement written into law, under the Local Authorities (Executive Arrangements) (Meetings and Access to Information) (England) Regulations 2012, which clearly set out how key decisions are to be included in forward plans. I am not talking about planning decisions but key decisions, as set out in the schemes of delegation. Those forward plans are required to be published in advance, so that people who want to influence or scrutinise those decisions can bid to change them, or for things to be taken into account at the appropriate time.

Again, this certainly comes out of my experience in the London Assembly. It unanimously passed a motion in 2022 that was put forward by one of the Liberal Democrat members and me, which said that the Mayor of London should publish a forward plan. However, he did not agree to do that, as he said that he was complying with everything in legislation; so the answer seems to be for legislation to require both the Mayor of London and these new combined authority mayors to publish a forward plan along the same lines. Looking at the 2012 regulations, it would be very simple to change the current wording, “local authorities”, to “strategic and local authorities”, if the Minister wanted.

I also point the Committee to the excellent report published last month by the GLA oversight committee, a cross-party committee currently chaired by a Labour member of the London Assembly. It makes exactly the same request: for a forward plan of key mayoral decisions to be put into the 1999 Act. Because of the complexities of the different regulations, I have not tabled an amendment for such a change, but I hope the Minister would consider the question of effective scrutiny of these new bodies and the ability to influence them. I hope she could potentially come forward with a new clause at a later stage for us.

[David Simmonds]

The Opposition support the amendment; the principle of having a simple majority is sound. In oral evidence, we heard about why Manchester works and London does not, and there is a logic to implementing those measures consistently across the country. We support introducing that consistency.

There is a broader question, however. I understand what the Minister and the Government are trying to achieve; it would clearly be frustrating if one authority was effectively acting as a blocker. However, I asked the Minister earlier to give us some assurances about the treatment applied when financial impacts occur that affect one or more of the constituent authorities in a combined authority area. There will be cases—we have seen them in planning, for example—where an authority argues that to deliver its housing target, a site in another local authority’s area must be developed, because it does not have sufficient developable land to hit the target that it has been given; legally, it is not that authority’s decision. There will be other examples.

I am mindful of some of the Government’s amendments that introduce a lot more scope into this Bill for mayors and combined authorities to undertake their housing responsibilities. One of the main routes for funding is through borrowing against the housing revenue account, which is ringfenced. Each individual local authority has a legal duty to balance that account and the power to borrow against it; it also holds all of the legal housing duties and responsibilities. The purpose of the measures is to make mayors the vehicle for the delivery of asylum accommodation, as opposed to asylum hotels, as is the case now to some degree. Yesterday, on the Floor of the House, another Minister in the Department alluded to this in his response to a question about asylum accommodation.

Those decisions will have a significant impact on the legal obligations of the authorities that sit beneath the mayoral authority. There is a risk that being outvoted in a decision made at combined authority level would put an individual constituent authority in breach of its legal obligations to balance its dedicated schools grant, its housing revenue account or some other element of its council tax account. Will the Minister, either now or in writing, set out what arrangements will apply in the likely situation of a conflict between the legal obligations on a constituent authority to balance the budget and the strategic decisions put forward by the combined authority? How will the conflict be resolved without undue detriment to the constituent authority in particular, which is the one that will find itself in court?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I will respond to the amendment to clause 48, and then I will pick up the specific questions from the hon. Member. The GLA has a different and long-established governance model. In London, the mayor is elected by the people of London to make decisions; the Assembly’s role is to scrutinise those decisions. As a London MP, I think that model has worked well for London for well over 25 years. It is tested and it strikes the right balance between the executive authority of the mayor and the scrutiny of the Assembly.

--- Later in debate ---

[David Simmonds]

Let me give a concrete example: the long-standing proposal for Heathrow expansion airport. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has set out her absolute determination to ensure that happens, because it is part of her Government’s growth agenda. It is likely to be directed under these powers and in the purview of the Mayor of London, who will ultimately have some planning role in the decision making. However, as well as being the planning authority, the London borough of Hillingdon, within which Heathrow sits entirely, has legal duties in respect of air quality. It is already breaching those duties, which it has no means of fulfilling, simply because of that external factor.

If the Treasury and the Mayor of London were say to the combined authority, “In pursuit of the growth agenda with which we have been tasked, we are determined to see this expansion take place,” immediately that local authority would be put in significant legal jeopardy. To give an indication of the scale, when the Localism Act 2011 was debated and there was also interaction with European Union standards, it equated to an annual fine of £150 million to be paid by the legally responsible local authority. That is a significant jeopardy, and it is by no means the only one—in the case of special educational needs and disabilities obligations, for example, there are significant duties to pay compensation in the event of failure.

We can all envisage situations where a mayor decides that, for the good of everybody, they want an individual place to take a hit, but through the judicial review process that places that individual local authority at significant moral and financial risk. If the Minister sets out how those very significant and real risks will be addressed, I will be grateful.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank the hon. Member for that very detailed and specific example. The concerns he raised have been heard and noted. Both in practice and principle, ensuring that no constituent authority is put in either financial or legal jeopardy underwrites all of this. I will take the hon. Member’s points away and write to provide the relevant reassurances.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The devolution White Paper set out our commitment to introduce a new category of established mayoral strategic authority, representing the highest level of devolution in England. The clause delivers on that commitment. It enables a mayoral strategic authority that meets the eligibility criteria set out in the English devolution White Paper to submit a written proposal to the Secretary of State for designation as an established mayoral strategic authority. Designation will provide a strategic authority with access to the highest level of powers and functions in the devolution framework, as well as the right to request additional devolved functions and eligibility to receive an integrated funding settlement.

In the event that a Secretary of State decided not to designate an authority as an established mayoral strategic authority, they would be required to notify the authority in writing of the reasons for their decision. It would remain open to the authority to submit a fresh request at some future point. Importantly, once an authority has been designated as an established mayoral strategic authority, it will not be possible for Ministers to remove its status through secondary legislation. In that way, we will hardwire the powers and functions of established mayoral strategic authorities into our system of government, future-proofing arrangements against unnecessary change and ensuring permanent and enduring devolution.

[David Simmonds]

I draw the Committee’s attention to a topic to which we will return throughout our proceedings: the extent to which the devolution legislation is about the powers of the Secretary of State to designate this or direct that. Ironically, we are embarked on a course of action that started with us hearing about how it was going to be locally led, despite all evidence to the contrary, yet as we proceed, we have clause after clause and paragraph after paragraph referring to new powers for the Government to make local authorities do this or to direct them to do that. It is clearly not in the spirit of devolution.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The clause does two things. The proposal to become an established mayoral strategic authority will come up from the locality. The power is about the ability of the Secretary of State to designate it as such at its request; it is not about the Secretary of State imposing the status on any area. Critically, it will lock in the established mayoral authority for good, and will, in fact, contain and curtail the power of future Secretaries of State to decide that they will change the status of an established mayoral authority, therefore locking in devolution for the long term.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 9

Appointment of commissioners by mayors

--- Later in debate ---

[Sam Carling (North West Cambridgeshire) (Lab)]

With your permission, Sir John, I will make some references to schedule 3 as well as clause 9, just to do it all in the same place. I will start by responding to some of the hon. Lady’s points. She raises some valid concerns. I will just give the perspective of someone who lives in quite a fractious combined authority area. I think my combined authority board currently has two Conservatives, two Lib Dems and two Labour—that is not enough people, so it must be 3:3:2, but I cannot remember which way around.

We also have the Manchester system at the moment, whereby different people hold different portfolios, which has led to a lot of politicisation. We have a Conservative mayor now, and we previously had a Labour mayor, but under both there was a lot of game-playing going on and a lot of difficulty, so I think it would be helpful for the mayor to be able to appoint commissioners just to get on with delivering their strategy. They are directly elected, and although I disagree with my mayor on a lot of things, I accept his mandate. It may well be helpful for mayors across the country to be able to deliver the strategy that they have stood on.

My concern relates to the relative sizes of combined authorities in a uniform approach to commissioners, and whether we can look at how to deal with that. To give an example, Greater Manchester has 3 million residents; Cambridgeshire and Peterborough has around 1 million. Similarly, the Greater Manchester combined authority has 3,500 staff—or 4,600 if you include Transport for Greater Manchester—while Cambridgeshire and Peterborough combined authority has 139 employees, according to a freedom of information request from March 2024. The difference in scale is significant, and obviously the amount of work for commissioners to oversee is therefore significant.

I do not want to put the Minister on the spot now, but could she write to me at some point to give context on whether the Government have considered modifying the number of commissioners that a combined authority mayor can appoint with respect to that variance in size, or perhaps the allowance payable to those commissioners, so they would be more part time in smaller authorities? I note that amendment 293, which we will discuss later, relates to allowances, and I can imagine that the Government want to allow flexibility so that local areas can do what is best for them, which makes perfect sense.

Within my area, if commissioners were paid at director level, that could cost well over £1 million. Senior officers can earn in excess of £100,000, which is a significant sum, and it is more than mayors themselves or many Government Ministers earn. That may well be appropriate in London, where it works and seems to be doing a great job, but London is a lot bigger than some other authorities. I thank the Committee for listening to those thoughts, and if the Minister could give some clarity on how we can deal with some of those issues, I would be really grateful.

[David Simmonds]

The Opposition have some sympathy with the points that have been made in the debate. It is an area in which there is scope to move towards a degree of consensus. I think that we all recognise that part of the underlying thinking behind the mayoral combined authority is that it brings a new element of leadership, and from those models where they are established, such as in London, we can identify some of the issues. As we heard at the start of the Committee, there is clear evidence about accountability.

One of the issues that persists in London is that there are a number of advisers—whether they are commissioners or not is a moot point—who undertake sometimes quite highly paid roles on behalf of the mayor, but they are not visibly accountable to the GLA, the boroughs or anybody else. That begins to undermine public confidence, and it clearly creates a sense of distance between those who are elected and those who they are there to serve.

While I agree that there is no reason why somebody who is elected should not occupy those roles, one of the issues with the proposed amendment is that there is clearly a risk of constraining them—in particular, in relation to the wording of the proposed amendment. When we consider some of the statutory roles that might be occupied—directors of children’s services, statutory directors of social care, monitoring officers, section 151 officers and others who have legal duties—there is a risk that by defining it as narrowly as the amendment does, we create some concerns about the interaction between those who are part of the professional officer corps that serves local government and those who are political appointees. I do not think that that is intentional; it is simply a risk that arises from the way in which it is drafted.

We will not be supporting the amendment, but I am mindful of the comments that have been made by those on the Government Benches about the need to ensure that those who occupy the roles are fit to do so, and that they are publicly accountable, because they will be public servants and they need to be answerable to effective scrutiny measures for the work that they do.

[Siân Berry]

I want to participate in this debate, despite having not tabled any amendments. I am grateful to the Members who have done so. The issue of commissioners is interesting. It is also interesting that the Government have chosen this model to codify in the Bill. From my experience, I believe that the London model of how this is done is far ahead of other combined or strategic authorities that already exist, and of the Government’s imagination in terms of the Bill. London Assembly members are used to having the equivalent of commissioners—deputy mayors—to scrutinise. The Assembly members do that effectively, not only by asking the deputy mayors questions and making them accountable, but also by providing them with evidence and new ideas, and by highlighting problems across the strategic area. Many effective changes have been brought through in that way.

However, to have those kinds of commissioners without that level of scrutiny is a mistake. In that respect, I am not in favour, and I am not convinced by the argument from my Liberal Democrat colleagues that people who are separately responsible for running services—many of them statutory services—and who have a lot of other responsibilities and duties in the constituent part of the strategic area are the right people to be given those kinds of roles. It is a really interesting question.

I have also found that, aside from a very short period when a Green deputy mayor was appointed to serve under an independent mayor in London, most mayors seem to be allergic to appointing anyone from an opposition party to any of those roles. There are examples of independently minded, effective, delivery-focused people. Chris Boardman, in Manchester, was mentioned. However, there does seem to be a party political element to the appointment of the roles, if the Minister and the Chair were to look at the record.

In conclusion on this clause—and it will come up in relation to other parts of the Bill—we collectively need a wider discussion about scrutiny and governance of the new roles. Some of the comments earlier from the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner suggested that if we all got together in a room, we might be able to come up with a better idea than what is being proposed. I very much agree with that. There are things that we should be discussing.

It was pointed out to us in evidence that we will lose something like 90% of our elected representation in certain areas. In certain parts of the country, people will end up with somewhat of a deficit of overall elected representatives—people to come to with casework. More should be looked at on whether or not a model more like the London Assembly could be adopted, where people are separately elected with strategic responsibilities. In London, there are constituency Assembly members, and Assembly members who are London-wide and take a more strategic view. Those are good models that have worked, and the Government and others should look at that. It is not up for debate today, but my new clause 15 proposes a review of scrutiny, which I will argue for later. When the Government come to look at this in review, which inevitably they will have to do, I hope they will look again at potentially having more directly elected—

[David Simmonds]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Siân Berry]

I will.

[David Simmonds]

I am listening attentively to what the hon. Lady described. We heard in evidence from Councillor Sam Chapman-Allen of the District Councils’ Network that under these proposals, shire England stands to lose 90% of its elected representation, which the hon. Lady referred to. There is not anything really concrete in the Bill that sets out what scrutiny should look like—what those minimum standards should be. There are elements about conduct and things like that, but that is very basic. Does the hon. Lady have a view about what a good model should look like, so that local residents can exercise their control over what happens in their neighbourhood effectively?

[Siân Berry]

I am attempting in my speech not to be too biased towards what I am used to, because that is a failing as well. We should discuss this in a very open way. Other new clauses I have tabled contain proposals for things such as a citizens assembly. We should look at international examples as well. When there are proposals to spend a significant amount of money on the commissioners, there is value in spending an appropriate amount on decent scrutiny and elected representatives. Again, I am biased—I am an elected representative. I think we are good value, but that is a case to be made.

Finally, I cannot find any mention in schedule 3 about guidance that the Secretary of State may issue to commissioners about conduct, standards and transparency. I would like some reassurance from the Minister about guidance on those aspects of the job. Even if they are not elected, they are accountable to the public and must be given a process and regime of standards, and potentially be brought into existing standards systems. Without scrutiny, standards and regulations to govern their behaviour, I worry about this in the same way as several other Members today have.

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[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The amendments will prevent a commissioner from exercising certain fire and rescue functions that should be reserved as functions of the mayor, as head of the fire and rescue authority in the area. The effective delegation of fire and rescue functions to a commissioner can ease capacity constraints on the mayor, by ensuring that there is a dedicated individual with the time and expertise to focus on executing those functions. Fire and rescue functions are already delegated successfully to deputy mayors for policing and crime in Greater Manchester and in York and North Yorkshire. The ability to delegate to a commissioner, without the need for secondary legislation, simplifies that process. If they wish, mayors will be able to make an existing deputy mayor for policing and crime the public safety commissioner, meaning that individual could lead on both policing and fire.

However, certain functions should be the sole responsibility of an elected mayor, as head of the fire and rescue authority. The retained functions are those with the most significant bearing on the strategic direction of the fire service, such as its budget, its risk plan, and the appointment or dismissal of the chief fire officer. It is important that these decisions are taken right at the top, and that the person taking them is accountable at the ballot box.

These amendments provide for the effective delegation of fire and rescue functions. They ensure that decisions are taken at the right level and support the Government’s commitment to ensure that our communities are safe.

Amendment 70 agreed to.

Amendment made: 71, in schedule 3, page 112, line 3, at end insert—

“(6) In this paragraph “excepted fire and rescue functions” means—

(a) functions under the following provisions of the FRSA 2004—

(i) section 13 (reinforcement schemes);

(ii) section 15 (arrangements with other employers of fire-fighters);

(iii) section 16 (arrangements for discharge of functions by others);

(b) the functions of—

(i) appointing, suspending or dismissing the chief fire officer;

(ii) approving the terms of appointment of the chief fire officer;

(iii) holding the chief fire officer to account for managing the fire and rescue service;

(c) approving—

(i) the community risk management plan;

(ii) the fire and rescue declaration;

(d) approving plans, modifications to plans and additions to plans for the purpose of ensuring that—

(i) as far as reasonably practicable, the CCA is able to perform its fire and rescue functions if an emergency occurs, and

(ii) the CCA is able to perform its functions so far as is necessary or desirable for the purpose of preventing an emergency or reducing, controlling or mitigating the effects of an emergency, or taking other action in connection with it;

(e) approving any arrangements for the co-operation of the CCA in relation to its fire and rescue functions with other Category 1 responders and Category 2 responders in respect of—

(i) the performance of the CCA’s duty as a fire and rescue authority under section 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (duty to assess, plan and advise);

(ii) any duties under subordinate legislation made in exercise of powers under that Act.

(7) In sub-paragraph (6) and this sub-paragraph—

“Category 1 responder” and “Category 2 responder” have the meanings given in section 3 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (section 2: supplemental);

“chief fire officer” means the person with responsibility for managing the fire and rescue service;

“community risk management plan” means a plan which—

(a) is prepared and published by the combined authority in accordance with the Fire and Rescue National Framework, and

(b) sets out for the period covered by the document in accordance with the requirements of the Framework—

(i) the combined authority’s priorities and objectives, and

(ii) an assessment of all foreseeable fire and rescue related risks that could affect its community, in accordance with the discharge of the combined authority’s fire and rescue functions;

“emergency” has the meaning given in section 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (meaning of “emergency”);

“fire and rescue authority” means a fire and rescue authority under the FRSA 2004;

“fire and rescue declaration” means a document which—

(a) is prepared and published by the combined authority in accordance with the Fire and Rescue National Framework, and

(b) contains a statement of the way in which the combined authority has had regard, in the period covered by the document, to the Framework and to any community risk management plan prepared by the combined authority for that period;

“fire and rescue functions” means—

(a) functions of a fire and rescue authority which the combined authority has by virtue of an order under section 105A, or

(b) functions which the combined authority has as a fire and rescue authority by virtue of section 1(2)(f) or (g) of the FRSA 2004;

“Fire and Rescue National Framework” means the document prepared by the Secretary of State under section 21 of the FRSA 2004;

“fire and rescue service” means the personnel, services and equipment secured for the purposes of carrying out the functions of a fire and rescue authority under—

(a) section 6 of the FRSA 2004 (fire safety);

(b) section 7 of the FRSA 2004 (fire-fighting);

(c) section 8 of the FRSA 2004 (road traffic accidents);

(d) any applicable order under section 9 of the FRSA 2004 Act (emergencies);

(e) section 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (duty to assess, plan and advise) and any applicable subordinate legislation made under that Act;

(f) any other provision of, or made under, an enactment which confers functions on a fire and rescue authority;

“FRSA 2004” means the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004.”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This would define the “excepted fire and rescue functions” which a commissioner appointed by the mayor of a CCA would be prevented from exercising by Amendment 70.

[David Simmonds]

I beg to move amendment 293, in schedule 3, page 112, line 16, at end insert—

“(2A) The relevant remuneration panel may not recommend allowances which exceed the amount paid in salary to a person employed at director level within the relevant authority.”.

This amendment ensures that Commissioners cannot be paid more than Directors working for the authority.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 292, in schedule 3, page 112, line 22, at end insert—

“(5) The relevant remuneration panel must consider, and make recommendations about, whether commissioners appointed by the mayor, and councillors in the constituent areas, should be eligible for the local government pension scheme.

(6) Recommendations of the relevant remuneration panel relating to the local government pension scheme must have the aim of achieving value for money.”.

This amendment requires remuneration panels to consider whether mayoral commissioners should be eligible for the LGPS and justify those findings.

[David Simmonds]

These amendments concern the remuneration of commissioners and have two purposes.

There is a long-established principle within the arrangements for the remuneration of elected officials in local government that an independent panel, which is able to take evidence from the public and other good sources in the local area, will make a recommendation to the local authority about what the scheme of allowances payable should be. That brings a degree of transparency. Councils are currently required to consider the recommendations and to update their scheme from time to time, including voting to renew it each year. That has certain elements. One is whether commissioners—in this case, those who are appointed and are part of a mayoral combined authority—should be eligible for the local government pension scheme.

We heard an announcement from the Secretary of State on this issue, and it is the view of the shadow team that it is a sensible step. Changing the local government pension scheme from a final salary scheme to an average salary scheme was led by councillors, and it was instrumental in convincing a very large body of appointed officials to move over to that scheme, saving the taxpayer millions of pounds. However, it is also important that those appointed as commissioners are considered for eligibility and that each mayor is transparent about the recommendations and advice they have undertaken around that.

The second point to consider is around remuneration. We often hear it cited that there are people in the civil service, the NHS and local government who are paid more than the Prime Minister, which is used as a benchmark for excessive pay. Whether or not we agree with that—personally, I do not, as I recognise that there is a professional salary structure for these roles, in which those people will participate for the whole of their careers, that is very different from the context for politicians—it is none the less important to recognise that those who are appointed into mayoral roles should be subject to some degree of constraint.

As is the case with local government, it seems reasonable that we do not see elected officials appointed on a very significantly higher salary than senior professionals who are advising in the same field. The amendments aim to bring a degree of transparency and rigour to that, and to ensure that, in the potential circumstance where a mayor chooses to stretch the limits of their powers of appointment, shall we say, there is some degree of constraint so that the public can see that the taxpayer pound is being carefully husbanded.

[Sam Carling]

We have just heard the Minister speak about having statutory guidance on this issue. Does the hon. Member agree that one way of making this change, rather than through these amendments, would be for the guidance to include some clear indications to the remuneration panels about what roles they should consider comparable for mayoral commissioners. That might be council leaders or cabinet members rather than senior officers; or it may be senior officers, where appropriate.

[David Simmonds]

I understand the issue that the hon. Member is highlighting. One thing that emerged from the debate about councillor pensions was that they were essentially taken away by a decision of Parliament, without the process of legislation. One of the risks here is that statutory guidance, robust as it can be and coming with a duty to “have regard”, can be changed quite quickly. Therefore, if this is not clearly set out on the face of the Bill, the ability of this Parliament and of local communities, as we are observing, to exercise the degree of accountability and scrutiny that they might wish is undermined. That is why we have proposed these amendments.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank the hon. Member for his thoughtful contribution on this critical question of how to ensure value for money in the remuneration of commissioners. It is important that allowances paid to commissioners accurately reflect the work they do but also represent value for money. We completely agree with that principle. That is why the Bill, as drafted, has a clear process for setting the allowances of commissioners. The relevant authority must consider a report by a relevant remuneration panel, and payments cannot exceed the amount specified in that report.

Ultimately, what commissioners are paid is a local decision, and we have crafted the measures for that, but it is a decision that needs to be made in alignment with recommendations, as is the practice across local government. Adding a further requirement that commissioners cannot be paid more than directors would reduce local autonomy in decision making and would pre-emptively undermine the relevant remuneration panel. The Bill is about empowering places, but what we can and will consider is how we set up statutory guidance to provide clarity about what is possible and to deal with some of the potential pitfalls that the hon. Member has raised.

Amendment 292 seeks to place a duty on remuneration panels to consider and make recommendations about the local government pension scheme. Again, I understand the intent behind the amendment and the importance of ensuring that public officials in local government are properly remunerated and incentivised. However, I do not believe the amendment necessarily advances that.

We value the work that remuneration panels do to make considered recommendations about allowances that should be paid locally. However, overall access and eligibility to the local government pension scheme is dealt with at national level. It is therefore not clear what value the amendment would add, which is why I ask the shadow Minister to withdraw it.

[David Simmonds]

I have listened intently to what the Minister has said. I think the risk is that, if things are delegated to statutory guidance, what emerges later on will not meet the expectations set out in the debate. I will therefore push for a vote on these amendments.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The clause will ensure that all combined authorities and combined county authorities can pay their members an allowance where they take on special responsibility for the combined authority or the combined county authority. Constituent council members regularly take on important additional responsibilities, particularly leading on policy portfolios such as housing or transport. We heard from the leader of Manchester city council about the important role she plays for that combined authority. They are crucial in driving forward local policy, ensuring that it meets the needs and aspirations of our communities. Indeed, their role will grow in importance as we increase the powers and functions available to combined authorities and combined county authorities.

However, currently, constituent council members can be paid for such special responsibilities only by their council, not the combined authority or combined county authority. This simply is not right; members should not be expected to do important work for free, and constituent councils should not foot the bill for work done in service of another body. Ensuring that the combined authority or combined county authority can pay its members creates a fairer system, allowing areas to recognise and reward hard work that delivers for communities. To ensure transparency and accountability, pay will be determined following a report by an independent remuneration panel.

[David Simmonds]

I draw the Minister’s attention to the existing arrangements for independent remuneration panels. She has referenced the proposals for how this kind of situation will be handled. However, we can envisage circumstances such as those that we heard about in Greater Manchester, where the mayoral commissioners are effectively drawn from the leadership of those local authorities.

There is a degree of ambiguity in proposed new sections 52A(6) and 113E(6), which refer to allowances paid

“in respect of the same special responsibilities”.

For example, I think of a situation where someone is a cabinet member with responsibility for transport in a constituent authority and also undertakes a strategic transport role as part of the combined authority. We as politicians would recognise that those are two different things, in the same way that a Minister undertaking duties in the Government is paid separately from their role as a Member of Parliament because those two things are distinct.

Transparency and clarity are important to retaining public confidence. Clearly, we do not want to create a situation where there is a degree of dispute, such as where a mayoral combined authority expects the constituent council to pay, or vice versa, and where an individual who wishes to take up those duties is inhibited from doing so. It would be helpful if the Minister could set out how the statutory guidance will address that issue so the Committee can be confident that we will not see this act as a barrier to participation in the governance of these new authorities.

[Sam Carling]

I have some more thrilling financial commentary, so I hope the Committee will forgive me. First, I welcome what the Minister has just said. Exactly this situation happened in Cambridgeshire and Peterborough, where our mayor went on medical leave for some time. His deputy, Councillor Anna Smith, who is a good friend of mine, ended up taking on the deputy mayoral role, so she had to drop hours at work and faced a significant loss of income. Our council took the decision to pay her as essentially a cabinet member, but it was not ideal. Clause 10 will resolve so many issues.

I want to highlight a discrepancy in that, at present, there is usually no allowance for members who sit on the combined authority board. A lot of the time, it is the leader of the council who does so, and it is often considered to be part of their portfolio, but it is not always leaders who sit on the board. That can lead to people taking on a very significant commitment without any financial support, despite potentially having to reduce hours at work and the like, if the councillor in question has a job, as many do. That is not conducive to having a diverse range of elected representatives to do these jobs.

Following local government reorganisation, if we have fewer leaders on boards and more holders of other portfolios and councillors, we may see this problem increase. I encourage the Minister to consider either altering the clause or making other provisions as the Bill progresses to allow combined authorities, if they wish, to pay an allowance to their board members for that role.

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[David Simmonds]

The Opposition have significant concerns about the import of amendments 82, 76 and 79. We have made a number of references to some interactions with different elements of local government finance, but clearly the measures will open the door to very substantial tax rises through the vehicle of the mayoral precept. Worse than that, they open it up to being used for any purpose, in effect.

In the sometimes tense relationship between central and local government, there are disputes about who should pick up the tab—for example, the ongoing debate about asylum costs. That is very much having an effect in my local authority, which has the highest number of asylum seekers per capita of any in the country. Such individuals are only a cost to the local authority, as a result of central Government policy. The Bill opens up the scope for mayors to directly tax people for the purposes of environmental legislation, or social care, which consumes around 70% of the budgets of local authorities, or any other function that authorities may choose to undertake—making Manchester a nuclear-free zone, or whatever it may be—despite the fact that those are not functions that mayors undertake by statute. I am sure we all agree that there should be an opportunity for politicians to speak up, but there needs to be some limit on it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I would just point out to the hon. Gentleman that the mayoral precept was introduced in 2017 by a Conservative Government, and that mayors are directly elected. Like Members of Parliament, mayors are not immune to political pressures around tax rises, and examples across the country show that mayors are as thoughtful about the right balance between investing in their services and managing tax increases as national politicians—in fact, when we think about the record of the last Government, perhaps more so.

[David Simmonds]

That was a fairly shameless political pitch, but we should just reflect on the debates that took place across the Dispatch Boxes yesterday during Housing, Communities and Local Government questions, when it was highlighted that we have a Mayor of London who is quite happy to issue precepts to indulge his personal political priorities but is an abject failure in discharging his mayoral functions around housing. Thousands of people are unable to find homes in the capital because the mayor is failing to build out more than 300,000 planning permissions that have already been granted by the local authorities. That is an injustice that is being inflicted on the citizens of our capital, and this provision, as envisaged by this Labour Government, potentially inflicts the same, or an even greater, injustice on other areas of the country. For those reasons, we remain deeply concerned about it.

Particularly in an environment where, as we heard earlier, local authorities were left £1.5 billion worse off—net—by the Government’s decision to introduce additional taxes on their employees, the temptation will be for the mayoral precept to be seen as the catch-all or safety valve through which additional taxes can be extracted to meet whatever demand central Government choose to impose, without central Government being accountable for it. That is why we oppose the measures.

[Siân Berry]

I had not previously heard the Conservatives’ argument on this issue, and I have to say that I disagree. The Minister said that the original intention of the policy was to allow for a wide range of precepting, and if there is one thing that directly elected mayors are really accountable for, it is the level of precept that they set.

I am in favour of creativity in conversations with the electorate about what initiatives, appropriate to the local area, might be funded by precept on a short-term basis or just in the local area. The way that the provision is set up allows mayors to be properly accountable for that. I worry less about it resulting in huge tax rises without consent, because consent is built in at election time.

I appreciate the concerns about austerity continuing in councils that are underneath and part of the combined authority if mayors are taking up available taxpaying powers. In every debate in this Committee, I would love to bring up the fact that all this reorganisation is happening in the absence of an end to austerity. The Government need to provide more funding to local councils so that this is not all being taken in council tax, which is a very unfair tax.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

The amendment relates to where a mayor has police and crime commissioner functions: secondary legislation about the arrangements for setting the precept must provide that the police and crime commissioner component is ringfenced. Where a mayor has police and crime functions for more than one police and crime commissioner area, secondary legislation must provide that there is a separate police and crime component for each area. The legislation currently provides that there must be separate components for police and crime administrative functions and for mayoral general functions.

The amendments mean that Ministers have the flexibility to provide for either one component for non-police and crime functions, or multiple separate components for different types of non-police and crime functions. I hope Members are following. This gives Ministers the option to direct how precept spending on non-police and crime functions is accounted for, by setting this out clearly in secondary legislation. In doing so, they will be able to ensure that the precept is accounted for in ways that best reflect how the precept should be spent—whether that means allowing for full flexibility across the non-police and crime component, or ringfencing money to be used for certain functions.

Amendments 78 and 81 will give the Secretary of State the ability to make an order about the preparation of budgets for all an authority’s functions. The provision in the Bill currently only provides that power in relation to the mayor’s general functions. This needs to be updated to align with the expanded mayoral precepting powers introduced by the Bill. This allows Ministers to set out the procedures that should be followed in the preparation and calculation of a budget.

By enabling Ministers to set clear direction on the preparation of budgets and the calculation of precepts, these amendments allow for consistent processes to be set across the sector, to give full effect to the expanded precepting powers.

[David Simmonds]

I have two questions for the Minister. First, given that these budgets, and the precepts that the amendments relate to, will sit within that bit of the Local Government Finance Act 1992, will the requirement for budgets to be balanced in-year apply to all the accounts that the Secretary of State will be giving direction to?

The second question—the Minister may wish to write to the Committee on this—is, will the consistency that she referred to be introduced by giving the Secretary of State individual, and in effect case-by-case, power to issue these directions for different authorities? Clearly, our concern is that if the door has been opened to, in effect, unlimited precept rises, and these were to be used by the Secretary of State to bail out a significant amount of debt in one of these reorganised local authorities—which I know is a significant concern of many of the local authorities that are proposing reorganisation—that would not apply everywhere.

There are certain parts of the country where there are very high levels of debt, and others where those levels of debt do not exist at all. It would be, in effect, a condition of those constituent authorities’ doing the devolution at all that they were not asked to bear that cost. Yet this Bill introduces a back-door power for the Secretary of State to direct that they would go down that route. How do the Government propose to ensure that that is forestalled, so that they can have the assurances that they would need as a necessary minimum?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

There are two processes that I, as the Minister for devolution, as opposed to the Minister for local government reorganisation, am constantly keen to emphasise. There is a devolution process and there is a local government reorganisation process, which my colleague the Minister for Local Government and Homelessness, my hon. Friend the Member for Birkenhead (Alison McGovern), is taking forward. We know that some authorities are in a difficult financial position as part of that, and we are having a conversation with those authorities in the context of the proposals they are putting forward. That is still very distinct from what we are trying to do through the devolution process, and it is important that colleagues do not conflate the two.

What I would say on the wider questions that the hon. Gentleman raised is that there is nothing that we are proposing to do through the Bill that denudes or undermines the standards for financial prudence and financial accountability that sit across the local government landscape.

[David Simmonds]

Turning to the question of how a mayoral precept will be used under this group of amendments that the Government have tabled, if we think of the reorganisation in Thurrock or Surrey, both those local authority areas contain a single authority that has a very high level of capital borrowing, or a high level of debt. Those authorities have been assured that there will be three years’ worth of revenue support; in effect, there will be a Government grant to cover the revenue cost of the borrowing for three years. However, the borrowing cost is extended over 40 or 50 years, so there will be a very long period of time where, as things currently stand, that local authority will be expected to meet that cost, when it comes into being.

Clearly, one way of doing that is for the Secretary to State to say, “You will raise your precept, and that is how we will deal with the debt,” but that runs contrary to the proposals for devolution where those authorities have said, “We will do this, but it is simply not fair or ethical for us to accept those debts on to our books.” I am just seeking an assurance from the Minister that either the existing provisions that require the in-year balancing will apply, in which case the Government will deal with this prior to the devolution arrangement coming into existence, or the provisions will not apply, in which case those authorities need to be mindful that the likely consequence of devolution will be a massive increase in the precept levy purely for the purpose of paying off someone else’s debt.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

To answer the specific question, yes, in-year balancing will apply. The purpose of the precepting function is to allow the mayor to invest in key things that will drive the economic prosperity of the area and the core functions that we have set out in the Bill. It would be a very brave mayor who chose to raise the precept not to deliver on that. In the end, they are democratically elected, and it will be for their residents and constituents to show them the consequences of that at the ballot box.

Amendment 77 agreed to.

Amendments made: 78, in clause 11, page 15, line 15, at end insert—

“(b) in subsection (5)(b), after ‘functions,’ insert ‘or the other functions of the authority (other than any PCC functions that are exercisable by the mayor), or both’.”

This enables the Secretary of State to require the mayor of a combined authority to prepare an annual budget in relation to the authority’s functions, excluding any mayoral PCC functions, either separately to or in combination with the budget relating to the mayor’s general functions.

Amendment 79, in clause 11, page 15, line 17, at end insert—

“(b) in subsection (2), omit ‘in respect of mayoral functions’.”

This provides that the issuing of precepts under the Local Government Finance Act 1992 in respect of expenditure relating to the functions of a mayoral CCA is a function exercisable by the mayor acting on behalf of the CCA.

Amendment 80, in clause 11, page 15, line 17, at end insert—

“(b) in subsection (4)(a), for the words from ‘consists’ to the end of that paragraph substitute ‘includes a separate component in respect of the mayor’s PCC functions,’.”

This provides for flexibility where the mayor of a mayoral CCA has PCC functions as to how the components of the CCA’s council tax calculation which relate to the CCA’s other functions (both mayoral and non-mayoral) are to be set out.

Amendment 81, in clause 11, page 15, line 17, at end insert—

“(b) in subsection (5)(b), after ‘functions,’ insert ‘or the other functions of the CCA (other than any PCC functions that are exercisable by the mayor), or both’.”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)

This enables the Secretary of State to require the mayor of a CCA to prepare an annual budget in relation to the CCA functions, excluding any mayoral PCC functions, either separately to or in combination with the budget relating to the mayor’s general functions.

Clause 11, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 12

Power to borrow

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I will speak to clause stand part and amendment 83 before responding directly to amendment 20. On the clause, all existing mayoral combined authorities and mayoral combined county authorities have powers to borrow for all their functions. That allows them to invest in economically productive infrastructure. Unlike for local authorities, the existing process for confirming the power to borrow money on mayoral combined and mayoral combined county authorities is by making a bespoke statutory instrument after an institution has been established. To confirm such powers by bespoke statutory instrument is highly inefficient and slow. The clause streamlines the process by giving the power to borrow to mayoral combined authorities and county authorities for purposes relevant to all their functions. It preserves existing safeguards by requiring them to obtain the Secretary of State’s consent before they exercise the power for the first time in respect of functions other than transport, policing, and fire and rescue. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Government amendment 83 is minor and technical. It simply clarifies that the reference to section 12 coming into force relates to clause 12 of the Bill. Amendment 20 would require a combined authority or combined county authority to produce a report, to be laid before the House by the Secretary of State, detailing the reasons for which they are seeking consent to exercise borrowing powers. As my hon. Friend the Member for Banbury and Opposition Members have pointed out, this would be an onerous, costly and time-consuming process. The amendment is well-intentioned, but we do not think it necessary.

Like the rest of local government, combined authorities and combined county authorities must operate within the prudential framework, which comprises statutory duties and codes that are intended to ensure that all borrowing and investment is prudent, affordable and sustainable. The framework already provides robust mechanisms of oversight and accountability. In addition, the exercise of borrowing powers by mayoral combined authorities and county authorities to date has not raised issues. Amendment 20 also contradicts the Bill’s aim of furthering devolution and increasing financial autonomy for these authorities. For this reason, I hope that the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon will withdraw it.

[David Simmonds]

I want to make sure that I can reconcile the Minister’s observations and the import of the amendments with her reply to me earlier, when she said that the requirement to balance in-year will apply. Clearly, the provisions essentially state that the Secretary of State can give consent for a substantial degree of borrowing, but it is not at all clear in the clause or the amendments what the purpose of the borrowing would be.

Manchester’s improvements to its transport system are fantastic, but they were funded by central Government as part of the devolution deal, and they are now creating a significant ongoing deficit in the mayoral budget, which has to be covered, essentially, through precepting—by levying those in the local area to cover the cost. There is clearly a concern with that. If the borrowing is for capital purposes there is a clear strategy for its repayment, and it must be for the purposes of capital investment. However, if borrowing is undertaken to cover shortfalls between revenue and the mayor’s expenditure on day-to-day costs, this House would have significant concerns about it in relation to our national accounts. Can the Minister tell the Committee how that decision making will sufficiently constrain a mayor or combined authority from undertaking borrowing that is for the purposes of day-to-day revenue expenditure, so that we do not find a large debt bubble growing underneath these new bodies?

[The Chair]

Minister, do you want to comment on that particular point?

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

As the local transport authority, combined authorities and combined county authorities deliver a range of local transport functions across their area. Each combined authority or combined county authority agrees its own transport budget for the year and, in many cases, constituent councils contribute to this through a transport levy. This is because constituent councils receive funding for some transport functions directly from Government.

The clause standardises the power for combined authorities and combined county authorities to levy such funding from their constituent councils to cover the cost of their transport functions, where they are not otherwise met. This power has proved effective in supporting transport delivery in local areas. For example, each of the seven councils of the West Midlands combined authority pays a levy based on its population figures, which goes on to fund a range of functions from subsidised bus services to the English national concessionary travel scheme, which provides free bus travel for eligible older and disabled people.

This power complements clause 39, which provides combined authorities and combined county authorities with the power to pay grants to constituent councils. Together, these powers support partnership working between combined authorities and combined county authorities and their constituent members.

[David Simmonds]

Again, I seek a point of clarification from the Minister. I understand the purpose of the clause, but clearly there is a distinction between a levy, where it is the constituent authority that is required to pay, and a precept, where it is the taxpayer who is paying for it through their council tax bill. I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify, if necessary in writing, how it will work where there is a dispute about the payment.

If we take London as an example, we have a London-wide concessionary travel scheme, but it is has very different application in different boroughs. It is easy to foresee a situation where, particularly if the purpose of the overall transport levy does not benefit the whole of the mayoral combined authority area, there will be a dispute about whether that is an appropriate way forward. Particularly if the levy is large, it would have a significant impact on the budget of the constituent local authority. Can the Minister set out how that type of process will be addressed in practice?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I have agreed that I will write on the specifics; I think this question comes back to the same theme of how we mitigate collective decision making and agreement across constituent authorities that put at risk their financial viability, or cut across the legal obligation of a particular constituent authority, and I will capture that in writing. However, I would say that we cannot legislate for every eventuality. Indeed, I do not think that is the purpose of legislation. What we can draw on is the practice that we see across the country. Broadly, it is not in the interests of a mayor, who has been democratically elected by the residents and constituents of any of their constituent authorities, to make decisions that will be fundamentally detrimental to those constituents.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

It is vital that the devolution framework works for the unique circumstances of London’s governance, which we have talked about in this Committee. That is why the Bill will enable Government to confer functions on the Mayor of London, the Greater London Authority and its functional bodies. Previously, the Government could change the powers of the Greater London Authority only via primary legislation. This clause brings London into line with other strategic authorities by enabling the Government to change its powers via secondary legislation. This will ensure that the Greater London Authority benefits from the devolution framework and can deepen its powers over time.

[David Simmonds]

Again, I have a question of clarification; can the Minister tell the Committee whether these powers apply to a transfer of functions, as opposed to the conferral of functions? We know there have been situations, and we can certainly envisage some within the overall package of the Bill, where the statutory duties of the constituent authorities could be transferred over to the mayor, either en bloc or in part. Indeed, there might be times when it might be a sensible approach; if there is an example of a significant failure in one authority, that could be looked after by the mayoral office while the situation is turned around—that goes to the point raised about South Northamptonshire. However, can the Minister clarify whether this refers solely to new powers that are conferred, or opens up the door to the transfer of functions that are currently statutory duties of constituent authorities?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

This clause relates to functions and powers that sit underneath the devolution framework that we have talked about and are putting on the face of the Bill, and the seven areas of competencies that this measure applies to.

We currently have a situation where, for example, certain powers will go to Greater Manchester that currently would not necessarily go to the Mayor of London and the GLA, and that does not feel right. Clause 15 allows a mechanism and a process to make sure that there is consistency across the piece, and that we can achieve that without having to go through primary legislation.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 15 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16

Members of legislatures disqualified for being a mayor of a strategic authority

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Siân Berry]

I agree with the principle of not having too many people able to do double-hatting, but it is a fact that there have been overlapping periods when mayors of different combined authorities and London have also been MPs, either at the beginning or end of their term. That has been dealt with in a pragmatic way, with nobody overextending those kinds of double-hatted jobs.

As I understand it, and I would like the Minister to clarify this, writing this rule into statute would mean that, while nobody would be prevented from campaigning to be a mayor or an MP while in either of these jobs, at the moment they are elected, the situation then becomes illegal. An instant resignation takes place on that day. There would be immense disruption across a wide area—perhaps not so much for one constituency, as we have got used to having by-elections for various reasons, but in holding a mayoral by-election.

I wanted to check whether the Government’s intentions here, in making that resignation statutory and instant, are not a bit too much, when these issues have been previously worked out. Does there need to be more detail in the clause to allow for a transition period?

[David Simmonds]

The Opposition have a high degree of sympathy with the points made by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. It is very striking when we compare our local and regional democracy with those of other countries: in our nearest neighbour, France, with the cumul des mandats, there is almost an expectation enshrined in their politics that, for someone to become Member of the national Parliament, they will have represented their area as a mayor. Indeed, when President Chirac cast around to find someone who was eminently qualified to become Prime Minister of that country, he took the view that there was nobody within the National Assembly who could possibly meet that standard; it needed to be somebody from local or regional government. He lighted on Alain Juppé, the well-reputed mayor of Bordeaux, who served with great distinction as Prime Minister. If we begin to introduce restrictions of this nature, it will significantly constrain the ability of our politics to rise to the challenges that our communities and our areas face.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I will take the other interventions.

[David Simmonds]

I ask the Minister to reflect that it used to be the practice of this House that any MP appointed as a Minister had to resign and fight a by-election, because they were undertaking a function different from that for which their constituents had originally elected them. That practice was abandoned because of the extent of the disruption it caused to the work of government and of the House, as well as the cost of those by-elections, so I ask the Government to reflect. We have learned from experience, cross-party, that having these types of requirements is not conducive to good democracy. Perhaps the Minister will undertake to reflect on that.

[The Chair]

Are you going to intervene as well, Mr Holmes?

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[Manuela Perteghella]

The amendment and new clause 46 are about giving devolution in England a clear direction and fair footing, and replacing uncertainty with a proper plan and accountability. It will create a clear road map for devolution.

The Bill already includes a requirement for an annual devolution report to be published, but there are currently no plans to include any forward-looking strategy. Why is a commitment to publish a strategy and timeline for further devolution important and necessary? The local authorities that were left out of the devolution priority programme are facing a cliff edge in terms of funding streams that are now being redirected to mayoral strategic authorities.

Right now, devolution is happening, but unevenly. Cumbria, Cheshire, Warrington, Greater Essex, Hampshire and the Solent, Norfolk and Suffolk, and Sussex and Brighton are all in the devolution priority programme, putting them on a fast track towards improved transport opportunities, housing and economic growth. Regions such as Kent and Wessex, which were left out of the devolution priority programme, are left not only without the benefits of funding and the regional voice of an elected mayor, should they want one, but without the knowledge of when they can expect those things. The amendment would require the Government to report annually to Parliament on progress made. This transparency will prevent future Ministers from delaying or cherry-picking which regions get devolution next.

The amendments, which require a forward devolution strategy to be published, are therefore important to give councils like those in my area, which are at the beginning of their devolution journey, reassurance that plans are being progressed for devolution in their areas if they are not in tier 1. It is important that councils know not only their current financial situation, but how and when finance and governance are likely to change. The amendment would give local authorities certainty as councils could plan ahead, invest and prepare for new responsibilities. As I said earlier in the debate, devolution must be equitable and consistent, not a patchwork of deals and negotiations.

[David Simmonds]

The Opposition have sympathy with the points the hon. Member made. We can rarely have too much transparency, but we are conscious that these new bodies and devolution arrangements will be subject to a degree of political oversight. There will be manifestos, on which the public will have a vote. There will be the element of scrutiny, which we have not heard enough about yet but which we would like to think will be built into the new arrangements for these authorities. There will also be a regular process of elections, which will determine who provides the necessary level of leadership. Layered over that, there will be both the political priorities of the devolved authority and those things that are more part of the administrative function. Local authorities have historically had council plans and forward plans that set out decision making, all of which are part of this arrangement. Although the points have been well made, the Opposition are therefore not convinced that what the amendment would add is sufficient to justify its inclusion in the Bill.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I will respond to amendment 363 and new clause 46 before discussing clause 19.

In the English devolution White Paper, the Government set out clearly our ambition to have universal coverage of strategic authorities in England. That direction of travel is clear. It is also important that the process is led locally, and that areas can submit proposals for devolution that reflect their unique circumstances at a time that makes sense for them. A centrally mandated strategy would cut across that principle, requiring areas to work to a timeline set by Government. That would not only be challenging, but go against the grain of what we are trying to do. The new clause is therefore not necessary. We have set the ambition, and we will work with areas to enable them to come forward with proposals at the appropriate time.

Clause 19 amends existing requirements for the annual report on devolution to ensure that it reflects the introduction of strategic authorities as a category in law. To indicate how the report will look should the Bill receive Royal Assent in its current form, this year’s report was laid before this House and the other place earlier today, so Members can spend their evening reading the report with a glass of wine if they wish. It covers strategic authorities that were established and details of the new devolution framework as set out in the English devolution White Paper.

I commend the clause to the Committee, and ask the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon to withdraw the amendment and not to press the new clause.

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Third sitting)

David Simmonds Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 14th October 2025 Public Bill Committees

[David Simmonds (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)]

I echo the Minister’s welcome, Sir John. It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair.

We will refer to a good deal of evidence on all parts of the Bill, but it is important to set out briefly—in terms equivalent to those used by the Minister—the concerns that the Opposition continue to have about the significant democratic deficit that arises from the measures in the Bill; the risk of losing the efficiency and local insight that come from many of our local government structures; and, in the context of a country that already has fewer elected representatives per voter than any other developed democracy in the world, the impact of stripping out, by some estimates, up to 90% of elected representation. I therefore echo your comments, Sir John, on the importance of scrutiny of the Bill. Local authorities are the means by which our voters, our residents, exercise control over what happens in their neighbourhoods and communities. It is critical that the legislation gets that right.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

We absolutely recognise the hon. Member’s point about democracy. Directly elected mayors can play a powerful strategic role. They are a key new part of the devolution architecture that we have seen work well across the country. I point to Greater Manchester, which has delivered the fastest growth of any local economy. They sit alongside strong democratic structures that we will have in local government. The Bill is complementary to that and does not cut across or undermine those structures.

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[Siân Berry]

The amendment relates to the fact that the new strategic authorities simply must be tasked with reducing inequality as well as creating growth. We know that growth for growth’s sake does not trickle down or help everyone equally. The strategic authorities must be tasked with understanding, measuring and reducing socioeconomic inequality. The socioeconomic duty in the Equality Act 2010 is not yet commenced for England, but if it were the amendment would have to be made.

The amendment would make poverty and socioeconomic inequality an area of competence for devolved authorities, ensuring they can take action to address the root causes of disadvantage in their areas. As co-chair of the all-party parliamentary group on poverty and inequality, this is an issue close to my heart. In July, the officers and I sent a letter to the Secretary of State for Education and the Minister for Women and Equalities to ask about the urgency of commencing the socioeconomic duty. We said,

“The urgent need for the duty could not be clearer. Rising child destitution, increasing reliance on foodbanks and untimely excess deaths attributable to austerity policies all highlight the imperative for a legal tool to reduce socio-economic inequalities”.

We also said,

“Activation of the Socio-Economic Duty marks an important shift from piecemeal responses to rising poverty and widening inequalities, to a proactive systemic approach, embedded across all policy areas”.

The Bill is an opportunity to embed those principles.

I do not believe that these two actions—the commencement of the duty and the writing of this Bill—are mutually exclusive in achieving these goals. I cannot see why, given the Government’s promise to enact the duty, the new bodies should not be set up with it in place and in mind. I know that organisations including many local authorities are already preparing to comply with it in England. Towards the end of last year, one of my Green party colleagues on the London Assembly questioned the Mayor of London with some urgency about the work that he is doing with local authorities and agencies across London to prepare for this. We are now approaching the end of this year and it is still not in place. I believe that the Bill is the right place to start putting this into legislation.

I do not plan to push the amendment to a vote, but I would like to hear more from the Minister about when the Labour Government plan to bring the duty into force, and what plans Ministers have to use a statutory instrument to apply it to strategic authorities and mayors. Even if they will not accept the amendment, I would appreciate anything on the record asking those bodies to get ready for the duty, so that when they are set up, they can hit the ground running on addressing poverty and inequality in their areas.

[David Simmonds]

The Opposition have some sympathy with the amendment, but we spent time reflecting on its implications and appropriateness for the Bill. I suspect that, to a degree, the Minister and I agree on this point. If we reflect on the legislative framework around our local authorities from their earliest origins, the relief of poverty and addressing inequalities—the duties that the amendment refers to—have been enshrined. It goes back as far as the Poor Laws, but in more recent years the National Assistance Act 1948 compelled all local authorities to support those destitute in their areas, and the Localism Act 2011 gives scope for local authorities to use their economic powers through activities such as procurement in ways that specifically benefit the local area.

The Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023, which was much debated and broadly had cross-party support, is reflected in a lot of this Bill. It was specifically about local authorities using their powers to support the economy of their local area. Just a short time ago, some of the members of the Committee were in this room debating the Planning and Infrastructure Bill, in which the Government set out a vision—contested to some extent—about how those measures affecting local authorities will address persistent issues of inequality. We recognise that sometimes that is about legislation, but sometimes it is about Government action.

Mention has been made of food banks, which were rolled out under the last Labour Government as a means of addressing persistent issues of poverty. I remember them being opened during my time as a local authority councillor, and Gordon Brown visiting and saying, “This is an example of how we expect local authorities to address some of these persistent issues.” Local authorities already have these duties at both the strategic and the micro level. I question whether it is necessary to add an amendment that, in essence, reflects existing duties throughout all the different tiers of local government in England.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I shall start by setting out the purpose of clause 2, then turn to amendment 261. The clause provides some broad thematic policy areas under which functions and powers of strategic authorities are arranged in the Bill. Defining those areas on the face of the Bill will bring clarity and purpose to the role of strategic authorities, which all parties agree we need to do. We want to empower mayors, who know who their areas best, to respond to local needs, so they can be the ones driving change and improvements in economic prospects and living standards and poverty. These thematic policy areas are deliberately broad, to allow for a wide range of activities.

I have a lot of sympathy with the intention behind amendment 261. Alleviation of poverty and tackling socioeconomic inequality should be a core part of what we do and a core metric of economic success. However, as the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner set out, those duties are already baked into the very function and purpose of local authorities and, critically, they cut across all the thematic areas that we have set out.

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[Vikki Slade]

Amendments 4, 28 and 29 seek to ensure that this is a genuinely community-led devolution—I am sure that we will repeat that many times throughout the morning. Fundamentally, the Bill seeks to move decision making closer to home, which we welcome. However, closer to home needs to start at home, and we want it to be councils that take the initiative to establish a single foundation authority, not the Secretary of State. We also believe that the public should play a role, and therefore this process should involve consultation, which we believe these amendments will provide.

This is a really important issue for us; we think it is fundamental to the whole concept of devolution. As a result, my hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon will speak to these amendments in more detail, and we will push amendment 4 to a vote.

[David Simmonds]

We know there will be quite a degree of debate on this in due course. We sympathise with the objectives of the amendment, and we all share the concern that local people should be the ones who initiate change in the structures that govern their local areas, not the Secretary of State or the man in Whitehall who knows best. Therefore we have sympathy with the objective, and we shall return to that debate later on with some of the amendments around the structures.

[Manuela Perteghella (Stratford-on-Avon) (LD)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir John. Amendments 4, 28 and 29 would make English devolution genuinely local by ensuring that local consent and public consultation come first. Amendment 4 would change clause 3 so that local authorities must apply to the Secretary of State themselves to become a single foundation strategic authority, rather than Whitehall imposing devolution on local councils. Amendments 28 and 29 would remove the parts of schedule 1 that would allow the Secretary of State to prepare a proposal for there to be a mayor in an existing combined authority area, and for the establishment of a combined county authority, without public consultation.

One of the greatest criticisms of the Bill is that it proposes a top-down, Whitehall-led devolution, which is not really devolution at all. In my county of Warwickshire, the choice of which strategic authority we create, form or join must come from local elected representatives who are closer to their communities and understand better the needs of our constituents. Such an important shaping of future governance must have grassroots support and should not end up being imposed by central Government, especially if we want to decentralise powers to tackle socioeconomic inequalities, address regional disparities and promote real autonomy.

Without the amendment, local people will lose the right to decide their own governance arrangements. Whitehall will be able to impose devolved powers, force mayoral models on to areas that have not asked for them, and redraw local governance boundaries behind closed doors. Community involvement and local consent are essential to ensure transparency and accountability in devolution decision making.

Amendment 4 reaches the heart of the issue at hand. It would ensure that devolution is locally led, not imposed. It would ensure that a council that wishes to become a single foundation strategic authority must initiate the process itself, rather than wait for the Secretary of State to decree it. If devolution is to have legitimacy, it must be built on local consent, local ambition and local accountability. Without that, we risk the Bill becoming an exercise in central control and a top-down approach dressed up as devolution. We would like to push amendment 4 to a vote.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Both the policy intent and the practice with places going through the devolution process are locally led. The impetus is coming from local leaders and local authorities that are working with their communities to drive the process.

On amendment 4, the Government have been clear that we will consider non-mayoral devolution arrangements for single local authorities on an exceptional basis where certain criteria are met. Designation is not intended as the end point; it is a stepping stone towards deeper devolution, which is what we hope will be the journey for all parts of the country. It is therefore most appropriate for the process to be initiated by the Secretary of State rather than the local authority. However, to be clear, the Secretary of State will not be able to designate a council as a foundation strategic authority unless the council itself consents to that designation. That is a robust safeguard that will protect the interests of the single local authority concerned. I agree with the sentiment behind the amendment to ensure that the Secretary of State has regard to the need to secure effective and convenient local government. I am pleased that those criteria are already embedded in the Bill when conferring functions on a single foundation strategic authority.

Amendment 28 seeks to remove the Secretary of State’s proposed power to direct for there to be a mayor for an existing combined authority without local consent. The Government have been clear about the benefits of mayoral devolution; we are seeing it across the country. For example, South Yorkshire mayoral combined authority brought the Supertram network back into public control after 27 years, and there are already drops in fare evasion, increases in usage, ticketing apps and improved clearing. Greater Manchester authority has taken control of its bus service, resulting in increased punctuality and ridership and cheaper fares. The North East combined authority has secured a £450 million development for one of the largest film studios in Europe, with the potential to create over 8,000 jobs.

We know the impact of this devolution model. We are seeing it across the country and we want to see it in more areas. We are clear that mayors with skin in the game are best placed to drive forward growth, reform public services and deliver the change that their communities want. Every resident in England should be able to benefit from deeper mayoral devolution in their area.

[David Simmonds]

There is, perhaps, a risk of the Committee being inadvertently misled, in that all these points are being described as locally led. The Committee needs to be clear: local authorities were told that they needed to submit the proposals or the Government would take powers to direct them to do it. It was a gun to their heads. It was not the case that local authorities came forward proactively. During the 14-year era under the previous Government, it was clear that proposals that did come forward for reorganisation would be entertained by Government, and a number of those were taken forward, but compulsion was not the case. It is only since the Government told local authorities that they either had to come forward or would be directed to do so that we have seen the proposals, so it is not the case that they are locally led. The Committee needs to be clear on that.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I completely disagree. I have been having conversations, for example, with our strategic combined authorities that are going through the process. The difference between this Government and the last is that we have created a clear sense of the powers and the economic opportunities that areas can take forward. Take, for example, our current devolution priority area. I am the new Minister, and I am having the first set of conversations with them. Every single one is excited and enthusiastic about the prospect. At the moment, the demand for devolution deals is outstripping our ability to respond, because we have attached to them clear powers, access to funding and the ability to drive the change that we want to see in those areas. So I completely reject the premise that places are being driven to do this.

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[Vikki Slade]

Nobody is suggesting a veto; we are suggesting a voice. There is a big difference. We have already heard that district councils felt that they were pushed around by the county councils, and the experiences of town and parish councils are simply an acceleration of that; when these proposals were being put forward by the Minister earlier this year, there was absolutely no role for those councils. We are simply saying that there are layers of local accountability that we believe should be on the list of people who are consulted.

This is a simple amendment that says, “You are already consulting other organisations in the chain of command. You should also include the town parish councils in that chain.” That is why we believe that amendment 33 is critical, as it

“would require the Secretary of State to consult local councils prior to proposing the area in which they are situated is added to an existing combined authority”,

and why we will push it to a vote.

[David Simmonds]

I shall speak to the amendments standing in my name. There is a degree of overlap between the points made so far and the subject matter of my amendments: all of them revolve around the issue of localism and consent. As has been clearly expressed, I have a degree of sympathy for the points that have just been made, particularly those about the role of parish and district councils in agreeing to and steering this devolution process.

When we had our witness session just a few weeks ago, we heard from Councillor Sam Chapman-Allen of the District Councils’ Network and from Justin Griggs, the head of policy and communications at the National Association of Local Councils, which represents the parish councils and parish meetings of England. Both of them emphasised in their evidence the need for and the importance of that local voice. I reflect on legislation passed recently—particularly the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, which strengthened the powers that our communities sought for local authorities to deal with unauthorised encampments. One of the things we missed was the opportunity to enable parish councils and parish meetings to use those powers. That is a really concrete example of where our constituents would have benefited.

We know there are both sins of omission and sins of commission. I suspect it is a sin of omission that the Government have failed to use the opportunity of this legislation to complete the devolution work that they talk about, and to ask, “What role will those elected bodies at the town and parish level be able to play in the context of this new devolved world?” It speaks to something that I know the Opposition have real concern about: a form of institutionalised disrespect for local leaders that is built into this process. There is wholesale abolition of the local voice at scale, and proposals that the Secretary of State will direct, rather than consent.

Sir John, you will perhaps call to mind Lord Porter, formerly Gary Porter of South Holland, as one of those many local leaders whose approach and insight really shaped the nature of that local community. Reflecting on my time in local government, I had the opportunity to serve with people with very senior public and private sector leadership experience who steered the strategy of the local authority to deliver for local residents. To be told that the Government’s view is that they are to be mere community convenors, and they are not to have a role in that strategic leadership, is frankly insulting to the work that so many of our local leaders do.

The value of that was spelled out very clearly in our evidence session. I was particularly struck by Councillor Bev Craig, the Labour group lead and LGA vice-chair at the Local Government Association, who talked about how the Greater Manchester model worked because of that local leadership and the power of those individuals to come to the table and drive forward devolution, efficiency and service quality.

The amendments broadly fall into two categories that I have made today. The bulk of them are entirely about removing the ability of the Secretary of State to dictate to local areas—as was threatened by the Government when this devolution process started—what that devolution arrangement would look like, without the consent of those local areas. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hamble Valley has spelled out, of the many proposals that have come forward, we have not seen a single one embracing what the Government have set out, but a number of rival proposals for that reorganisation.

It is very clear that there is not any significant degree of local consent. There is a threat, and there is some money on the table to bail local authorities out, but they can have it only if they do what the Government want. If local authorities do not do it now, the Government will take powers to make them do it to their own agenda later on. That is the very opposite of localism. When we put the Localism Act 2011 through Parliament, it was broadly supported by all local leaders and Members of Parliament, and that was because we recognised the value it added at all levels. This process, however—the centralising element of the Bill—says that it will be a man or woman in Whitehall who decides: they will tell us what is in the interest of our community.

[Sean Woodcock (Banbury) (Lab)]

The hon. Member is talking about localism and the importance of things being done with communities, not to them. I was a Cherwell district councillor when we were involved in joint working with South Northamptonshire. I remember clearly that the leaders of South Northants district council were distinctly unimpressed by the level of consent that they were given when the Conservative Government told them that Northamptonshire county council, which the Conservatives bankrupted, was being disbanded and that joint unitary authorities were to be created in Northamptonshire. Was he so exercised about local consent at that point?

[David Simmonds]

The short answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question is yes. I have spent a good deal of my time in local government. One of the key issues that we learned from the process, and one of the reasons why former Secretary of State Eric Pickles said that he had a pearl-handled revolver in his desk—for anyone who came to him to suggest forcing local government reorganisation on England—was the need to get things right with local consent.

There are times, which I think we can all see in the local government landscape at the moment, when, because of geography or failure of leadership, we know it is necessary for Government to intervene, and Governments of all parties have done so. Northamptonshire was an example of such a place. Individual local authorities within it had not failed, but there had been a collective failure of the public service in that area. The Government therefore felt compelled to intervene to remedy that, as opposed to imposing an alternative vision for how they thought the local area should be governed.

New clause 23 stands in my name. It seeks to enshrine in the legislation the principle of consent. We have the very opposite of what we have been told as a Committee, that this is all locally led. Clearly, the Government are already using the levers in their power to compel local authorities down a certain route. Under the force of such compulsion, local authorities feel that that is what they have to do, because it is the only way to address some of their reasonable and justifiable concerns. The timetable, the process and all those things come at the same time as a wholesale reorganisation of planning and infrastructure, which is stripping away the local powers and voices that are so critical to ensuring that the infrastructure and new housing that we all want are delivered.

The view of the Opposition, therefore, is that we need to enshrine in this legislation not powers for Whitehall but powers for people—powers for people to shape through their local leaders the community structures of service that deliver for them and the taxes that they pay. People are represented to exercise such powers. Enshrining the consent of local authorities is a small step in that direction.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I will respond to amendments 30, 31 and 33 first, and then amendments to 266 to 280. I appreciate the intention of the Liberal Democrat amendments, and I reiterate that I think we are completely aligned in this Committee in our desire not just to push power down, but do so in a locally driven way. On the specifics of the lead amendment, the principal body affected by the designation that we are seeking will be the unitary council or the county council. The Bill already provides that no designation can be made without the consent of the relevant councils.

On amendment 31, the Secretary of State must already notify the proposed constituent councils, and any other persons that the Secretary of State considers appropriate, about a proposal to direct the establishment of a combined authority. The Secretary of State must consider the representations of that body. As my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Cheshire said, there is no shortage of representation and voice from individual town and parish councils. We think that the process of engagement is already there and that to impose additional requirements to consult every town and parish council in the proposed areas would be disproportionate and also risks conflating the distinct roles of town and parish councils, which, as I said at the evidence stage, we absolutely see having a role to play in the new architecture of strategic authorities.

Strategic authorities have been created to tackle regional issues and to capitalise on the opportunities that exist over a significant economic geography, such as pursuing, for example, integrated transport. Town and parish councils, meanwhile, will continue to represent their local communities, managing neighbourhood services and supporting initiatives that improve the day-to-day lives of their residents. Each tier of local government will be accountable to their local communities and should continue to represent their interests and to work in alignment.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

We will discuss neighbourhood governance and neighbourhood boards later in the Bill. When it comes to areas that do not have town and parish councils, we recognise there is an opportunity for us to create structures so that there is stronger community representation and a stronger community voice. There is an opportunity for us to design something that works in areas where town and parish councils do not exist or may not be appropriate. We want to create flexibility so that local areas can find the right structures for them, so that neighbourhoods and communities have the voice and representation that we want to see across the country.

I turn to amendments 266 to 280. As I have said before, we have been accused of compulsion, and all I can do as a new Minister is point to the feedback that I get from the local areas that we speak to. Our engagement to date suggests there is genuine enthusiasm and momentum, because areas can see the economic opportunity and what a strong Mayor can do for their area. The Government have been clear in our aims: we want to get universal coverage of strategic authorities across England, because we can see the benefits that places like Greater Manchester and Liverpool are experiencing. We want that for every single resident across the area.

[David Simmonds]

During the evidence sessions, we heard senior local government leaders describe “inconsistent and…unhelpful messaging” on the building blocks of the new authorities—I quote what I wrote down. When we heard from those who are intended to be part of the investment agenda, they described no “meaningful consultation” from the Government on the proposals. How does the Minister square that with the idea that this is strategic and locally led?

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

That is not the feedback that I heard in that evidence session. At the moment the places in our devolution priority areas are going through a process of consultation. They are talking to their constituent councils, voting it through the council chamber and taking it to their residents to make the case.

What we are seeing is positivity and momentum. Our job as a Government is to build on that and support and enable that. I come back to the point that there is a backstop power that we do not expect to use. But in the instances where we have got a blockage, we want to be able to help create a strategic authority so that we do not have devolution deserts and parts of the country left behind. We are very clear that the powers will commence only at the point that they are needed, rather than on Royal Assent.

Finally, new clause 23 would impose disproportionate consent requirements for these processes, requiring strategic authorities to seek the consent of all district, parish and town councils in their area. As I have said, there are already provisions in place to ensure a level of consultation. A primary aim for us in this Bill is to make the process simpler, more streamlined, more effective and less expensive. That is the feedback that we have had from places that have gone through the process and the feedback that we are getting from places going through the process.

My worry is that the proposed amendments would undermine the principle of having a process of devolution that is far more streamlined and far easier for places. Again, the feedback we are getting from conversations is that there is enthusiasm, appetite and commitment to do this. We want to make it as easy as possible for places, which is why I hope that hon. Members will not press the amendments.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Vikki Slade]

Our councils are struggling to make ends meet. With so many on the edge of a precipice, I can see why they would be queuing up to create a strategic authority, which come with millions of pounds. There is, however, huge concern in councils that the cost to set up and run these organisations is oblique, and that there is a risk that the cost of running them will be passed to local people through additional precepting. I can tell the Committee from experience that the tens of millions of pounds that it is said will be saved by creating strategic authorities generally are not saved, and that if they are saved, they are replaced with other costs and take 10 years to materialise. Many councils do not have 10 years before they will go bust.

I am acutely aware that some funding was put aside for those organisations in the devolution priority phase, but when I asked the previous Minister what was happening with funding for future phases, I was met by stony silence. He explained to me that in order to progress there would need to be money in the settlement, but at the same time he talked about having already made a three-year settlement. That suggested to me that those organisations that are not already funded perhaps will not be funded within a three-year period, because there is no money. Given that those organisations are already telling us that they are £300 million short this year because they are not in the programme, but the Minister has no money set aside for next year to continue the programme, where is the money coming from?

Our amendments 38, 39 and 361 would require the Secretary of State to ensure that authorities receive adequate funding at least to facilitate their establishment, if not their continuation. It is crucial that local leaders—and local people, when they vote to make this progress—do not tie themselves down to additional costs that they cannot afford. That is why we feel it is important to press amendment 39 to a vote. My hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon will elaborate further.

[David Simmonds]

I had the privilege of spending 24 years in local government, divided equally across the previous Labour, Conservative and coalition Governments. I do not think that local government felt at any point in those 24 years that it was well funded and there was plenty of money to go around. In every single one of those years, irrespective of who was in government, our starting point when setting council tax was, “How are we going to meet a very substantial savings target?”

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[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Clause 4 introduces schedule 1, which will streamline and simplify existing processes for establishing new combined authorities and combined county authorities, and for changing the arrangements of existing authorities. The Government have been clear that their goal is to achieve universal coverage of strategic authorities. We are therefore confident that clear and tangible benefits of devolution will be experienced across the country. We have also been clear that we want to create mechanisms that will ensure that the process is streamlined—that it is fast, and effective and efficient locally—and allows representation, but fundamentally allow us to move through the process that we see appetite and demand for across the country.

The powers introduced by the clause will be used as a backstop. They will be deployed only where we have devolution deserts and we want to work with areas to remove blockages, to the benefit of residents.

[David Simmonds]

We return to the theme that areas can have devolution provided it is in the form that Whitehall dictates. It remains a significant concern to the Opposition that we are proceeding in this manner, but that point is made and I suggest that we move on.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 1

Establishment, expansion and functions of combined authorities and CCAs

Amendment proposed: 266, in schedule 1, page 79, line 15, leave out subparagraph (b).—(David Simmonds.)

This amendment, and Amendments 267 to 273, remove the ability of the Secretary of State to create, or make certain changes to the governance or composition of, combined authorities without consent of the councils involved.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I will begin by talking to Government amendments 63 and 65. The Government recognise that the creation of a combined authority or combined county authority can cause some concern in prospective constituent councils. One of the main worries is that the new institution could create new financial burdens on existing councils.

Many existing combined authorities and combined county authorities already include provisions in their constitutions that enable constituent councils to veto decisions that could create a financial liability on them. We recognise that those provisions have helped to soothe concerns about establishing new combined authorities and combined county authorities. That is why the amendments will create a standardised requirement for non-mayoral combined authorities and non-mayoral combined county authorities to obtain the consent of affected constituent councils before exercising their functions in a way that could create a financial liability on these councils. That will ensure that any future non-mayoral combined authorities or non-mayoral combined county authorities will need to comply with this requirement without the constituent councils needing to secure agreement to its inclusion in the individual authority’s constitution.

I turn to Government amendments 62 and 64. In the English devolution White Paper, the Government set out that in combined authorities and combined county authorities without a mayor, most decisions would require a simple majority vote. That is provided for in clause 6. However, in the White Paper, we also said that key strategic decisions would require unanimity in non-mayoral authorities. The budget for the authority is one of those decisions.

Similarly to amendments 63 and 65, amendments 62 and 64 introduce a standardised requirement for non-mayoral combined authorities and non-mayoral combined county authorities to obtain the consent of all their constituent councils when adopting or amending their budget. That includes the direct contribution of those councils to transport expenditure.

Government amendments 66 and 67 are minor, technical amendments. They amend the terminology used in schedule 1 so that references to secondary legislation within the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 use the term “regulations” rather than “orders”.

[David Simmonds]

I have a couple of questions for the Minister. It feels as though these amendments are intended to bring some welcome consistency and clarity.

The Committee will know that local government finance is largely regulated by the Local Government Finance Act 1992, but that older legislation on council tax fixing and budget setting all essentially states that a local authority’s budget must balance in-year. A local authority is not the same as central Government—it cannot borrow to fund its day-to-day expenditure.

However, one implication of the Secretary of State’s allocation of all these new powers to mayors or combined authorities is that they may choose to incur expenditure that imposes a liability on an individual local authority without seeking that authority’s consent. For example, there would be a legislative conflict if the mayoral combined authority decided to increase spending, or to increase rights to services for social care, which a local authority has to pay for, without giving the local authority the opportunity to include that in its budget.

Will the Minister give us clarity, first, on accounting standards? The legislation mentions that local authorities should refer to guidance from the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy. CIPFA is not the only accepted accounting standard in the public sector, although it is generally a reliable one. Given our previous discussions and the evidence we have heard about access to local audit and financial advice, can the Minister confirm that accounting standards other than CIPFA will be accepted, if a local authority relies on them? Or will they have to be reframed within CIPFA? That will let the Committee and member authorities know exactly where they stand.

Secondly, while this is a fairly catch-all provision, there will be areas—we have seen this in Greater Manchester most recently—where central Government fund the investment and set-up of a new transport network but the ongoing running costs must be met by trading that service to local residents, and a large deficit emerges; essentially, the service runs at a significant loss. Especially if the underlying authority is a transport authority that issues freedom passes, that can have a significant financial impact. Essentially, council tax payers of one authority subsidise the costs of service delivery by a mayor.

We see significant elements of that in London under Mayor Khan. I think that was one reason why the Labour leader of Manchester city council spoke about how Manchester works and London does not. It would be helpful to have clarity—if necessary, in writing to the Committee—about how those trade-offs will be managed effectively, so that the capital costs of mayoral projects are not subsidised by the revenue or capital budgets of individual local authorities. Particularly with larger projects, mayoral authorities do not always have to meet the same tight financial requirements, especially in respect of things like education. It would be useful to know how that will be managed so that local authorities do not suddenly go bust because something emerges from the financial accounting arrangements between the new structures.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I thank the hon. Member for his detailed, complicated questions. We will write in response, particularly on the public accounting standards.

We have set what we think is a good baseline. There will obviously be some flexibility for constituent authorities. The hon. Member will remember from the evidence session that the accountability and financial framework across local government is a current challenge, so we are looking to drive improved standards across the piece. That will apply to strategic authorities as much as to local authorities, but we will write fully in response.

On the wider question about the balance and the trade-off, our judgment is that for non-mayoral combined authorities, where constituent authorities operate together, we should put in those safeguards. In essence, constituent authorities act in concert, collectively, to make decisions. Whether it is a question of financial liabilities or transport budgets, it is right that all the constituent authorities provide consent. In the case of the mayor, however, our view is that because the mayor has his or her own democratic mandate and the ability to direct, that is separate from what we see in non-mayoral combined authorities.

Inevitably, there will be safeguards. In the evidence session, we heard really powerful evidence that the mayoral model works well when the mayor works in lockstep with constituent authorities and the two are aligned, with a strategy that they work around. We have seen examples of where the model does not work well, and we have had to go in and support and remediate the process when the mayor works without their individual local authorities. The model drives that. However, we think that there is something specific in the mayor’s democratic mandate; we have a model where there is a majority vote, with the mayor on the side of the majority, in order to drive through big strategic decisions.

[David Simmonds]

I am grateful to the Minister for undertaking to provide that clarity in writing. She said that there are differences between a mayoral authority and a combined authority without a mayor. We have seen a good case study in the Mayor of London’s decision that he wished to be seen to fund free school meals in primary schools, but the budget that is provided is less than the cost. School budgets, which are determined by the Department for Education, are subsidising the shortfall in the money provided by the mayor. We see posters on the tube saying that the mayor is funding this, but in fact the amount he provides is less than the cost. Probably all London MPs have had representations from schools that have said, “We are having to make staff redundant because of this shortfall. It’s a significant burden. It is causing a real cost.”

That is an example of where accounting and legal decision making sit across several different authorities. Although it is not the only ringfenced local authority grant, it would be helpful to have clarity about how the dedicated schools grant will be managed in a mayoral combined authority, so that we do not see a repeat of what happened in London with school budgets being raided to cover up a shortfall in a mayoral policy proposal.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

I am happy to provide that clarity in writing.

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[Manuela Perteghella]

This Government’s plans for devolution involve folding existing local government structures into larger combined authorities. From a central Government perspective, the benefits are clear. Each region has a single point of contact, accountability and new structures through which to work. However, devolution should deliver benefits in both directions and be truly community-led.

If proposals are prepared by the Secretary of State and the Department rather than being locally-led, we believe that a basic requirement should be that each new authority is appropriately sized, and that physical geography and cultural identities within the authority—especially community identities—are looked at. We need to look at the boundaries of other public service structures in the area that could be affected by the new combined authority, such as fire and rescue services, police forces and integrated care boards. In my area, we have local government reorganisation and the ICBs are being reorganised as part of NHS England reform or abolition, so both are changing at the same time. In geographical local areas, we have not just NHS commissioners but other NHS services, such as local NHS trusts.

Looking beyond size—I hope that the Government are flexible about size, because of all the other important considerations with any new authority—authorities should be shaped carefully to reflect economic zones, as well as physical geography. Crucially, there must be careful thought about how the proposals will align with public services. I have already talked about the organisation of ICBs, but there are also, for example, existing transport hubs and established boundaries for fire and rescue services.

A less tangible but no less important requirement is respect for distinct community identities. For example, my area is in the county of Warwickshire. South Warwickshire is very rural, with hundreds of parish and town councils, while north Warwickshire has different economic areas and is more populous and urban. Proximal areas may not be well-suited partners in new combined authorities, so what kind of flexibility will there be to think about services and the shared history of local communities so that such areas do not have a false cohesion?

We would like regional and sub-regional cultures to be taken into consideration, because those are what brings communities together. This goes back to the role of parish and town councils as the first tier of government: they know their communities best, which is why they should have a say in any consultation. They know their boundaries; they know which bus services should be improved so that residents can go to hospital and so on.

Practically, we are asking the Government to consider all these areas, boundaries and services, because if combined authorities backfire, governance structures could fail and might not deliver at all for areas that are already struggling. Requiring the Secretary of State to make a statement accompanying each proposal for a new combined authority, covering its impact on the shared areas that I have mentioned, would improve the quality of combined authority proposals.

[David Simmonds]

The Opposition have listened attentively to the points made by the hon. Member for Camborne and Redruth and by my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East (Joe Robertson). My hon. Friend the Member for Hamble Valley may speak later to the amendments in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East, but they both relate to the need to recognise in local government structures the heritage of the parts of England that are affected.

From all the evidence that we have heard, and from many Members’ contributions, we know just how important it is that people feel that the name of their local authority area—that most basic of things—has a connection to them. On top of that are layers of geographical and economic considerations, as well as the trouble of learning it, all of which have an impact. That is why we and others are so keen to support measures to ensure that historical names are not lost in any of the Government’s proposed devolution measures, and that that heritage is fully recognised in any structures that follow.

[Paul Holmes]

I will briefly elaborate on what my hon. Friend the shadow Minister has said about amendments 43 and 44. I do so on behalf of my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East, who has been a tireless and fierce campaigner for his constituents, and not only at Prime Minister’s questions.

I represent a Hampshire constituency whose southern parishes look out on the Isle of Wight. If I take a walk down Hill Head beach or somewhere in Hamble, I always see it. In Hampshire, the Isle of Wight is a constant. It is a constant presence on the coast of southern England, but it is also a vital part of our county. It has a proud set of people who have a booming economy that contributes so much to the county of Hampshire, and which is a major part of the county’s identity.

The Minister has talked about wanting local views and localism to be at the heart of the devolution agenda. I believe her. We had a brief interaction earlier, and although we can disagree about whether that devolution has been forced or voluntary, I absolutely believe that the Minister intends to make sure that if devolution happens, the regions involved have an identity and the right to an economic injection that delivers for people locally.

It would be very easy for the Government to accept amendments 43 and 44, because they would do nothing to change the mechanics or principles of the Bill. They would merely ensure that a region of very proud people is included within the description of the mayoralty that is proposed for Hampshire.

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I have had several conversations with Ministers and am satisfied with the Government’s assurances at this stage that Cornwall will receive a devolution arrangement that allows us to access the highest level of devolution without the requirement to join a mayoral combined authority, and that the recognition that we live on a multinational island will be protected. It is very important to understand that—

[David Simmonds]

I know that the hon. Gentleman is not the only person with an interest, and that there are other amendments on the same topic. He mentions that he is satisfied with the Government’s assurances. We have not directly sought those assurances; would he be willing to set out for the Committee the nature of them, so that we can all understand what has been committed to and can be well informed when we come to make voting decisions later on?

[Perran Moon]

I have had no commitments; I have had discussions with Ministers. We have had discussions about the difficulties with the proposals made here, with the potential for the Bill to become a hybrid Bill and the complications that that would bring. I am happy to keep talking to the Government in a spirit of openness, reflecting the views of every political party in Cornwall bar one. On that basis, I am content to keep talking. I cannot support the amendments because of the negative change that I think they would make to the nature of the Bill, so I will be voting against them.

Oral Answers to Questions

David Simmonds Excerpts

Monday 13th October 2025 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call the shadow Minister.

[David Simmonds (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)]

Despite that answer, it is clear that things are getting worse. Our councils are battling with the cost of this Government’s border failures. The 22% rise in small boat arrivals, combined now with Chagossians arriving in rising numbers, throwing themselves at the mercy of our local authorities as they escape Starmer’s sell-out, is stretching council housing budgets to breaking point. The Government have refused to answer my written questions about what financial support they provide to councils housing asylum seekers and refugees who are granted asylum in their areas. Can the Minister tell the House how much of the proposed rise in council tax is for the cost of the Government’s asylum failures, and will he publish the full costs and support in the interests of transparency?

[Matthew Pennycook]

The hon. Gentleman is conflating two separate issues. Genuine asylum seekers who have been granted refugee status and who can stand on their own two feet and work will rent, in some cases in the private rented sector and in other cases in market housing. Some dispersal accommodation for those seeking asylum will, of course, be in the private rented sector, and that can add pressure to local rental markets. That is why decisions must be made in co-ordination with local authorities and taking into account local housing pressures. More importantly, that is why the reduction in hotel use needs to be proceeded with in an ordered and managed way, not the chaotic way that the Conservatives have been calling for.

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (First sitting)

David Simmonds Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 16th September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Manuela Perteghella (Stratford-on-Avon) (LD)]

I declare that I used to be a parish councillor and, until March, a district councillor for Stratford-on-Avon.

[David Simmonds (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)]

As per my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests, I am a director of Localis think-tank, which has contributed evidence. I am also a parliamentary vice-president of the Local Government Association and for London Councils, which has also submitted evidence.

[Lewis Cocking (Broxbourne) (Con)]

I am a former councillor and I know lots of the witnesses from my previous role leader of Broxbourne council.

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[The Chair]

Would the witnesses like to say a few words about themselves?

Justin Griggs: Good morning. I am Justin Griggs, head of policy and communications at the National Association of Local Councils. We work in partnership with our 43 county associations to support, promote and improve England’s 10,000 parish councils, which are the community tier of local government in England.

Sam Chapman-Allen: My name is Councillor Sam Chapman-Allen. I am the chairman of the District Councils’ Network for England, representing 169 district and unitary councils, the single biggest arm of local government, delivering 45% of all planning permissions across the country. I am also the leader of Breckland council in Norfolk.

[David Simmonds]

Q This is a question for both of our witnesses. The title of the Bill is the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill. Both of you have very deep roots at community level in representing the voices of local people. Could you set out your views about how the measures in the Bill will impact on the ability of elected parish, district and borough councillors to exercise that power, control and voice on behalf of those residents and communities?

Sam Chapman-Allen: To start off, at the DCN we are absolutely in favour of devolution as long as it is meaningful for our local community. I think the threat and the concerns that we have so far with what is presented in the Bill is that district councils, which are responsible as the planning and housing authority, have no seat round the table of the new strategic authorities that are being established. If we want to work in partnership with this Government, delivering 1.5 million homes, you need those planning authorities around that table.

Beyond that, many things are missing. If we look at what is being devolved from Whitehall and those Whitehall Departments, it is very short in its forthcomings. Some of those powers are just about recentralisation. If we are going to achieve what devolution should be, which is a bottom-up approach where local residents get to shape what their local communities look like, and the centre truly devolving, you need to make sure that those constituent councils—which are the housing authority and the planning authority, and are in control of economic growth—have a seat round that table to drive that agenda forward.

Justin Griggs: At the National Association of Local Councils, we have long advocated for a shift of power out of Whitehall and into our communities, but it is important that that devolution goes beyond the regional, sub-regional and principal authority levels, and into communities themselves. That is why we welcome the ambitions, taken together, that the Government have set out in the White Paper and the Bill. They provide some helpful recognition of the important role that parish and town councils play in their communities—as local leaders, with skin in the game, who know their places best, and providing a wide and growing range of hyper-local public services, such as using neighbourhood planning to plan for housing within their areas, tackling the cost of living crisis, stepping up to support communities during the covid pandemic and working with their communities on climate change.

However, it is important that the Bill goes further and takes more steps to strengthen communities, and parish and town councils. It is helpful that there are measures in the Bill that seek to strengthen the relationship between strategic authorities, unitary authorities and parish councils. That could very much be strengthened. But there are a number of other areas that the Bill could be strengthening to support parish and town councils to do more for their areas, to work with mayors and strategic authorities, and definitely to support colleagues in principal authorities to deliver public services in what is a very challenging financial environment.

[David Simmonds]

Q Thank you very much to both the witnesses. It has been a helpful start. Councillor Chapman-Allen, you referred to the role of your constituent authorities in the planning system. We know that a big focus of the Government is around an increase in housing. What impact will that have on the ability of the overall system to deliver the necessary number of planning permissions and the necessary strategic planning—undertaking this extensive reorganisation, which involves, essentially, the abolition of most of those planning authorities at the same time?

Sam Chapman-Allen: The reason why my members are able to successfully deliver 45% of all new homes across the country is localism. It is being close to those communities and able to work across every mile within our villages, towns, cathedral cities and coastal communities. But it is about taking our communities with us, to understand where those houses need to be built, what the challenges are and how we overcome them together. When you begin to introduce strategic authorities at a large scale, which sometimes seem very distant, you have to have that piece in between it to allow people to have a local voice and representation.

How can a mayor, sitting in a strategic position, be supposed to deliver on housing and planning, when the local authority, which is responsible for housing and planning, does not have a seat round that table? That is the challenge and the risk. This Government have a clear mandate of 1.5 million homes. To achieve that, they need all those councils round that table. We need to make sure that the public have that ability—democratic accountability at a hyper-local level—driving forward not just housing but also wider place-shaping.

[David Simmonds]

Q One of the issues that we aired in the debate when this subject first emerged on the Floor of the House was that at the Government’s chosen footprint of 500,000 minimum population, the Bill implies the abolition of 90% of the local elected representatives in each of those areas. I know the cross-party concerns about the risk of losing that community voice. With your experience at community, district and borough level, it would be helpful for you to spell out what you think is the impact of that potential democratic deficit, especially on contested issues such as planning.

Sam Chapman-Allen: You will appreciate how busy your inboxes and mailsacks are, with the casework that you receive daily from your residents. When you begin to remove councillors, that casework does not disappear; it just becomes a bigger challenge for a single councillor. The risk is as we begin to get bigger those mega-councils, and we begin to think about how to ensure that those councillors can represent their communities. Does it become a full-time job? Does it then preclude other people from being able to stand to become community champions?

The reason why local government and district councils work successfully, in the same way as London boroughs and Manchester metropolitan councils, is because they are hyper-local. There are circa 200,000 to 350,000 residents per council, and they have local councillors representing a couple of thousand people. As we move forward with mega-councils, the risk is that a single councillor will be representing some tens of thousands. The independent think-tank Localis has done some analysis of the current proposal for a 500,000 threshold. We could see 90% of councillors across shire areas removed overnight. That would be a democratic deficit and an absolute catastrophe.

If we look back through the pandemic, as Justin has alluded to, community councillors were out every single day, just as you were as MPs, supporting the most vulnerable, making sure that communities could bounce back and, more importantly, giving support to local businesses to make sure that they could bounce back as well and grow from strength to strength. My concern is that if we begin to move ourselves to a distant model, there will be a democratic deficit and unaccountability, and the ability of a councillor to know that every resident, street, business and community leader will be lost.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government (Miatta Fahnbulleh)]

Q My first question is for Councillor Chapman-Allen. First, I should put on the record that the 500,000 number that has been cited is not fixed. The Government will prioritise making sure that there are clear links and that we have that democratic basis, so that communities feel connected to their local institutions. That is a priority for us and we will proceed on that basis.

Strategic authorities are made up of constituent local authorities, and at their best, where they work, it is based on partnership. Can Councillor Chapman-Allen give the Committee examples from among his membership, where strategic authorities already operate, of that collaboration among the constituent authorities, which will always have a key role, working in tandem with the mayor to deliver for communities?

I also have a question for Mr Griggs. The role of neighbourhoods and the connection between communities and the places where elected representatives serve is fundamental to what we are trying to do with the Bill. The part of the legislation on neighbourhood governance is looking to bolster and strengthen that. What are your views on how that will create new opportunities not only for community partnership working but, critically, for community voice and power?

Sam Chapman-Allen: Thank you for your question. To start, I think the 500,000 figure as the initial threshold has caused confusion. I think that many of the submissions that will be received in the devolution priority areas next week and then in the rest of the country in November will show that many councils are submitting models of 500,000-plus. Let us put that into context: they will be some of the biggest councils in the western developed world. I think that will ensure there is a democratic deficit.

In relation to strategic authorities and constituent members, the only model where all district councils, or all principal councils, are members are in Cambridgeshire and Peterborough. If you look at what is taking place there, you will see it is a really successful model. Yes, there is a little bit of grit every now and then, but that is why scrutiny, governance and accountability are so important. We will not always agree on everything.

If we look at a model in which all principal councils are members—I cite Greater Manchester, with Andy Burnham and his 10 councils within that area—they all share responsibility together. All of them within that locality are the responsible authorities for housing and for planning, and they are working together to drive the agenda forward around the real challenges that localities face. They have had some real successes, and I do not think anybody should take that away from them. I know that you have Lord Houchen giving evidence later; he will give exactly the same example of where you have those principal councils able to pull the levers to get stuff done.

Justin Griggs: First of all—

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[The Chair]

We will now hear evidence from Councillor Bev Craig, Labour group leader and vice-chair at the Local Government Association; Councillor Kevin Bentley, leader of Essex county council and Local Government Association senior vice-chair; and Councillor Matthew Hicks, chair of the County Councils Network. This panel will finish at 10.44 am.

[David Simmonds]

Q I have a question on accountability for all three panellists. With the proposals for the new mayoral roles and the reorganisation of local government, a key challenge will be ensuring that the mayor, on a large footprint, is accountable at a local level. There are different systems in place in London and Manchester, for example, which are probably the best-known mayoral authorities at the moment. I would be interested in your reflections on what you think works well, and on what challenges the Government might need to fix in this legislation to ensure the accountability is really effective.

Bev Craig: Good morning, I am Councillor Bev Craig. I am a Local Government Association vice-chair and leader of the Labour group. I am also the leader of Manchester city council, a city of 630,000 people. In my spare time, I am also the Greater Manchester combined authority deputy mayor for economy, business and international issues. In response to your question, the first thing to say is that, across the Local Government Association, we have been calling for devolution from Whitehall to communities for quite some time. We have spent a lot of time thinking through what accountability looks like in that context.

As we move from combined authorities to strategic authorities, it is important to make sure that the Bill reflects not only the competencies of local authorities within new strategic authorities but points of collaboration. For example, in the Greater Manchester system, each of the 10 local authority leaders holds a portfolio. That is perhaps a key difference from the London model, where deputy mayors appointed by the Mayor of London hold a portfolio.

From experience, looking across the country, we think it is really important to bind organisations that have different competencies in different areas into the same shared goal in a place. Many of our members have raised with interest what will happen in the move to majority decision making, rather than consensual decision making. From the LGA’s perspective, we have been quite keen to keep that under review. As it currently stands in Greater Manchester, it is consensual decision making that leads us into a place. A model that binds in local authorities from the beginning is really important. Let’s be honest, in my place, we are the ones building homes. My local authority and I are contributing to growing the economy, and Greater Manchester benefits when we work as one.

Kevin Bentley: I am Kevin Bentley, the senior vice-chair of the LGA and leader of Essex county council. Also, Matthew is actually the leader of Suffolk county council, not Sussex county council. There is no such authority as Sussex county council, unless something dramatic has happened overnight that we are not aware of—that would be rapid devolution.

I absolutely agree with what Bev has said, and we already have that form of scrutiny with police and crime commissioners, and it works well. That works on a model where constituent parts and people who are not necessarily in leadership roles actually have the ability to scrutinise. In the same way, we have scrutiny panels that could hold the mayor to account, which is important. Every action has a consequence, and every action should be challenged on behalf of the public. I absolutely believe there should be good scrutiny of mayors, and I think any mayor would welcome that good scrutiny.

Matthew Hicks: I am Matthew Hicks, the leader of Suffolk county council and chair of the CCN since last Wednesday. Sorry I could not be with you today—diaries are still clashing a bit.

I agree with my colleagues, as I think it is critical that we look at the mayoral commissioners and ensure they are subject to effective and proportionate scrutiny and accountability. Mayors can be voted out every four years, but genuine democratic accountability is really important. I think having structures in place on scrutiny, overview and audit will be key.

[David Simmonds]

Q Councillor Hicks, your point about audit is probably a good entry point for my follow-up question. We are aware that a very large proportion, more than half, of education authorities have a council-killing debt associated with the high needs block in their dedicated schools grant. The Committee has received many representations about the indebtedness of some authorities in areas that are proposed to be part of these mayoral combined authorities. Do you feel that sufficient attention has been given, and that there is sufficient assurance in the system that those debts and deficits will not be a financial barrier to delivering the ambitions that you all share for the new authorities? If so, could you tell us a bit about that? If not, how could that be addressed?

Kevin Bentley: It is a constant conversation. With the high needs block, you are talking about a system that needs to be changed rather than just an issue at the money end—that is perhaps another conversation for another panel. It needs to be addressed soon for the sake of society.

The debt question is a live one. The LGA and constituent councils within the DPP are talking to the Government about debt. Of course, there is good debt and bad debt. Asset debt means that a council is doing things, which is very good, and there are other debts that are not good. We are aware of the councils in that situation. It is a constant conversation. My view has always been that we cannot allow any new authority to start with a major deficit that it cannot cover. We must have that serious conversation with the Government, and we are having those conversations. Has enough attention been given to it? I would like to see more.

Bev Craig: That is a fairly consistent point across Local Government Association members. A significant underfunding of local government has built up over the last 14 to 15 years. There is a big job in taking local authorities back from the brink, which is a conversation for another panel. It is one of the reasons why we will continue to make the point that a well-resourced, well-run local authority can transform and change communities, so they need to be resourced in a way that they can do so.

Matthew Hicks: I echo that. From the CCN’s perspective, SEND is one of the biggest issues, and the growing DSG debt is a huge issue. The Government have said they are going to look at that imminently, and we would absolutely welcome positive changes. That debt is growing, and it is almost unspoken. It is critical that we understand that debt, but also understand the impact if we were to have fewer unitaries. That debt would be transferred to those new unitaries. How would very small unitaries cope with that?

[The Chair]

I understand that Councillor Craig has to go fairly soon.

Bev Craig: As long as we finish on time, I can make a quick exit.

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[The Chair]

We will now hear evidence from Catriona Riddell, the director of Catriona Riddell & Associates Ltd, and Ion Fletcher, the director of policy for finance and regulation at the British Property Federation. We will end this panel at 11.14 am.

[David Simmonds]

Q This question is to both witnesses. There are a number of different elements in the Bill on which you have relevant expertise, but can you give the Committee your view on the impact of the envisaged reorganisation on the planning system? What impact will the measures in the Bill about upward-only rent reviews have?

Ion Fletcher: Good morning, everyone. My name is Ion Fletcher. I am the director of finance policy at the British Property Federation. Our members own, develop and invest in both commercial and residential property across the UK.

In high-level terms, our members have had a good experience with devolution so far. Having combined authorities with responsibility for planning, transport and place making, and strong convening powers, means that our members are able to invest with confidence, knowing the strategic aims for that area. We hope to see that replicated with strategic authorities. We can get into more detail—Cat is better placed to comment on the reorganisation and the impact on planning.

We feel that the way that upward-only rent reviews were introduced into legislation without any meaningful consultation is not good policymaking. We feel that it will not do much to help the high street and it could have a negative impact on new investment and development.

Catriona Riddell: Hello, I am Catriona Riddell, a strategic planning specialist. There are two components to this. First, it is about the fact that fewer than 30% of local plans are up to date. That is partly because all the decisions and all the financial, technical and political risk sit with individual local planning authorities. It is right that there is a separation of decision making in the way that we had before 2010 for 40 years.

If that decision making is now through the new strategic authorities, that is probably the right place for it in terms of the new spatial development strategy, which I know sits with the Planning and Infrastructure Bill. However, there is no point in strategic authorities having the responsibility to prepare those strategies if they do not also have some responsibility to deliver them. The range of delivery mechanisms set out in the Bill will help that.

For example, in the last few weeks, the Mayor of the North East combined authority announced a massive housing development in Newcastle on a site that has been derelict and unviable for many years. She has used her convening and financial powers to bring together Homes England, local authorities and others to bring forward development on that site. On the delivery side, the powers and funding that the mayors will have to make sure that spatial development strategies and local plans are implemented will be really important

In terms of local government restructuring, it is fair to say, as everybody has already this morning, that resources are thin on the ground. They are getting thinner the longer this goes on. People want a resolution. They want to move to the new local government structure as soon as possible to make sure that the resources within the local government family remain.

But, again, before 2010, for 40 years planning resources were done in two ways. The strategic level is where all the specialist skills sat, and then the planners and others were within the local authorities. They worked as two parts of the same team. We do not have the specialist skills in local authorities anymore; they have to pay to bring that back. A lot of specialist skills are rare anyway, so they are difficult to get. Having some teams and general support at the strategic scale will be invaluable to local authorities going forward.

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Q I have a question for Mr Fletcher and then a question for both witnesses. You have expressed some reservations and concerns about the upward rent review. Is it fair to say that the position among your members is not unanimous? Mark Allan of Landsec, who I think was the previous president of the organisation, has said that he thinks the changes are favourable, and that the status quo is complex and suboptimal. It would be good to clarify that there is not a single position that thinks this is averse.

Northern Ireland went through a very similar reform about a decade and a half ago. I am interested in your assessment, because most people would look at that property market and think it works well. There was a transition, and it has ended up in a position that, most people would argue, is not just benign and effective but consistent with what we see in other countries. I am interested in your views, and then I will have a question for both of you.

Ion Fletcher: I think that Mark would also say that the way it was announced was not great; it should have been done with prior consultation. One of our main concerns is about how one of our members was recently in Malaysia and Singapore, and his investors were asking him questions about it: “Where did it come from? Why was there no consultation?” It has been noticed overseas, and by people who are deploying capital into our towns and cities. It was not something that was trailed, either in the Labour manifesto or in any of the discussions about devolution. In fact, it is a bit odd to find commercial leasing provisions in a Bill that is mainly about local government reorganisation and strategic authority powers.

There is also the focus on the high street. Upward-only rent reviews are not what is keeping shops empty at the moment. That is more to do with business rates and a lack of demand for space. Most high street shops are on leases of five years or less, so upward-only rent reviews are not going to be an issue; they do not have those clauses in them.

The real value of upward-only rent reviews to investors and developers is that they provide predictability of income. If you are thinking about undertaking a new development project or refurbishing an existing commercial building, having the confidence about the level of income that you are going to get gives you much more security, and it de-risks the project. It makes it more likely to happen. At the moment, there is a shortage of development going on—there is a bit of a development viability crisis across both residential and commercial property—so adding more uncertainty in the form of unexpected policy changes does not help.

In relation to your point about international comparators, yes, Ireland went through this, as did Australia about 20 years ago. There is a transition period. The industry can and would find ways to adapt, but the point is: what problem is it really trying to solve? Is the disruption that it is going to cause in the meantime—the transitional costs, for example—worth the candle?

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Second sitting)

David Simmonds Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 16th September 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

We will now hear oral evidence from Tracy Brabin, chair of UK Mayors and Mayor of West Yorkshire; Lord Houchen, Metro Mayor of the Tees Valley; and Donna Jones, Hampshire police and crime commissioner and mayoral candidate. We have until 2.40 pm for this panel.

[David Simmonds (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)]

Q37 Welcome to our witnesses—all of you are known to most Members here. From your experience running devolved authorities, what are the potential benefits and challenges of the Bill?

Tracy Brabin: Thank you very much for inviting me to give evidence. It is a real pleasure to be here. I am very excited about the way that mayors can help you as you take the Bill through Parliament. When I was a Member of Parliament, I sat on Bill Committees going through Bills line by line, as you are. It is great that we can have our voices heard.

The opportunities for the Bill are exceptional. It gives us a statutory footing for mayoral strategic authorities and clarity around the framework for devolution. We have seen from the leadership of the Government that devolution by default is the theme. One challenge when we have not had clarity is that some Departments have bought into that memo and some have not. The Bill gives us the statutory framework so that mayors who are new and are coming on to devolution understand the three tiers.

The Bill gives us that great opportunity for clarity, but also elements such as the right to request. You will know that a number of established mayors and mayoral strategic authorities across the country are further along than newer mayoral strategic authorities, have certain powers and are already delivering faster growth than the rest of the country. The Bill gives them the opportunity to request further powers, freedoms and flexibilities. For example, as UK Mayors, we have a consensus on 16-to-19 skills, on careers, and on a visitor levy that would give us the opportunity to have an income stream—£20 million for London and potentially £1 million to £2 million for my own region—that we could reinvest in our regions.

The challenges are always about potentially not being brave enough and pulling back from devolution. We have a country that is so centralised. If we continue to do what we have always done we will get the same results. I think this is a revolution of devolution, and I am really pleased to see the enthusiasm and determination of so many Ministers and Members of Parliament to get it over the line.

We are also here to help you go further. This is only part of the process. As we say among the mayors, this Bill is the floor, not the ceiling; it will be iterative as we go forward over the years. We are here to support your thinking and help with understanding.

Donna Jones: Thank you very much for the question. I have only got positive things to say. This was started by the previous Government and has been continued with gusto by the Labour Government, and I am very grateful for it and welcome it. When the new mayoral combined authority in my area, Hampshire and the Isle of Wight—two counties; 2.2 million people—is created in May next year, it will be one of the largest in the country straightaway.

We should have had a devolution deal 10 years ago. I remember negotiating, when I was the leader of a city council, with Greg Clark, the then Secretary of State. We had the deal on the table from the Treasury and it covered about 50% of the geographical area that I currently represent as police and crime commissioner. We lost out. The Secretary of State was shuffled into another Department and it fell by the wayside. That was a great pity, particularly for the health inequalities that we have across my sub-region of the country, and for the businesses that I believe have lost out on inward investment and opportunity—the opportunity cost really is the biggest thing. When you look at the most recent pot of money that the Government announced, in March this year, the roads infrastructure fund— £15.7 billion—I have calculated that my area probably would have got over £2 billion of that money for roads, and we desperately need that.

We need a seat around the table that Tracy is chairing and at the Council of Nations and Regions meeting as well. We need a mayor to be championing and spearheading my sub-region. The final positive thing for me is the opportunity in Hampshire and the Isle of Wight, two of the largest parts of the south-east of England. Over the last decade, on average, our gross value added has been about £800 per head under that of the rest of the south-east. We have opportunity, but we do need some investment and we need someone to be spearheading.

I do not really want to be negative, but I am going to identify one challenge. I think it will dissipate over time, but to start with, for whoever becomes the mayor of Hampshire and the Solent, it is going to be a bit of a sales job, because the public are saying, “It’s another layer of government.” On the whole, there is a lot of misunderstanding around the opportunity that is coming. However, over time, when you are able to demonstrate the programmes you have delivered, the investment you can secure and the positive things that can come out of working closer with the Government, I think the public will very quickly come around to the fact that they really do desperately need a mayor for Hampshire and the Solent.

Ben Houchen: I will pick out a few points. First, to directly answer the question, I think the planning powers coming through the Bill are going to be hugely helpful. Giving mayors a strategic role in that, including in setting the spatial framework—I appreciate that we used to have spatial frameworks and we are coming full circle back to them—and having democratic oversight invested in a single individual, or what people see as a single individual, anyway, is really important. Obviously, we will have to get the permission of the majority of the councils within the combined authority area, but having that focal point is really important.

The drawback of the planning powers is that they are going to be very slow to arrive. The current indication from the Department is that by the time the legislation has passed and all of statutory instruments have gone through, we will not get the powers until maybe July, potentially September, next year. That is a long time to wait for powers that I think we can all agree are going to help with our growth and progress as a country.

The other thing that is still to be clarified is how we will be able to exercise those powers. There is still some grey around what types of planning permissions we will be able to instigate ourselves, through mayoral development orders, and what we will be able to do to call in. In effect, we are getting similar powers to the Mayor of London, but at what threshold? In my area, Teesside, being able to call in maybe 10, 20 or 30 houses would be significant to drive through development and growth, but we are not sure whether the threshold is going to be set at 20 or 30 houses or at 100, 200 or 300 houses. Some clarity on that is going to be really helpful. The reason we need the clarity is that we are all in the process of having to set up the teams within the organisations, and recruit the planners and the experts. That really needs to start now, and without that clarity it is quite difficult to take that step forward. But planning is substantially the best power within the Bill to date.

I personally think—as a mayor, I would say this; I am sure Tracy would agree with me—that more mayoral powers give us directly elected mayors more democratic oversight and accountability with the public. The other side of that coin is that there is a rebalancing of powers at the combined authority, slightly away from the collective of the councils that we have in our combined authority cabinet, and towards investing direct powers in mayors. I absolutely do come down on that side, not just because I am mayor, but because there is a way in which you can make quicker progress by investing more mayoral powers, whether in the establishment of development corporations, in some of the planning powers or in various other things in the Bill. We saw it a little bit at the end of the previous Government, but we are seeing with this Government an acceleration of those powers. Again, it really depends which side of the fence you sit on whether that is a positive or a negative.

Single pot has been parroted as a huge success. I think it is a good success and a good step forward, but I am mindful that we should not over-celebrate something that is not the success that it is sometimes portrayed to be. There are still a lot of restrictions on how you can move the money around. Sometimes it is communicated as, “We’ll have a pot of money and it will be for us to decide how to move those pots of money around.” Actually, within the rules, there is a percentage of money that can be moved from one pot to another. Even within that, sometimes, there are so-called retained projects; in particular, for example, with transport money, the Department for Transport keeps its claws in by saying, “Okay, it’s your money, but we’re going to keep oversight of this project,” and if it is not happy, in effect it has a veto on taking it to the next stage.

It is a good step, but it feels, throughout the Bill, that we have taken half a step from where we want to be. That is not a criticism—the Government have done really well in getting the Bill to where it is. This goes to the point about the right to request. Nobody wants to have taken the strategic decision about what devolution should be, so the Bill is a bit of a halfway house to move devolution on a bit. I think we need, as a collective, and as a UK Government, to decide on the future destination of devolution. The Government have only been allowed to get to where they are because that question has not been answered and, to be frank, it was not answered for three or four years under the previous Government either.

The Bill is a good step forward, but there are lots of things to be cautious about. I make those points because if we want to go as quickly as the Government have said—and I completely agree with their rhetoric around growth—it could have gone a little bit further, a little bit more quickly.

Tracy Brabin: Not every mayor has the potential for the integrated settlement at the speed at which they feel they are ready. That is a challenge. For Members’ understanding, the organisation is funded from top-slicing of projects, so there is a real desire from mayors to have dedicated funding to run the organisation—for example, your legal or HR departments. Everything is top-sliced from projects. That is not necessarily the most sustainable or strategic way to fund an organisation.

[David Simmonds]

Q A fairly straightforward question: what is your view on whether mayoral precepts should be limited? Should there be any constraints on their use to cover some of the debts currently held by some of the authorities that may be merged into what eventually emerge from this process as mayoral combined authorities?

[The Chair]

Pithy answers, please.

Tracy Brabin: The mayoral precept is democratically held by the mayor for the public. It would be for transport projects; it would be allocated to something specific. For example, the Mayor of Greater Manchester, Andy Burnham, uses it for young people’s travel. The Bill widens the opportunity to use the precept, but none of the public would be happy if you were paying off debts. It is fundamentally for betterment of and investment in communities, in the way that the police and crime commissioner precept is held to deliver better outcomes, whether that is more police community support officers on the street or initiatives around violence against women and girls. It is democratically held by the mayor. We have not introduced it as yet in West Yorkshire, but others have.

Donna Jones: I will be very brief because I am conscious that there are lots of Members on the Committee. The referendum limit is the prohibitor. Essentially, a mayor, like a police and crime commissioner and a council, can precept to the level that they want, but you have to have a referendum if you are going over that limit. Although the Government are right to want some checks and balances, so that you do not get areas that are really out of kilter with others, a referendum is prohibitive: it becomes very political, and it is very costly to do. Therefore, I think there should be a simpler mechanism if a mayor wants to precept above the Secretary of State’s agreed level. Perhaps that could be with written consent from the Secretary of State, as opposed to a referendum.

Ben Houchen: I am not a fan of mayoral precepts generally. I have not raised one, and have promised ever since I was elected not to raise one. Some transparency could be brought to the legislation. You have mayoral precepts, you have transport levies, and there is lobbying from a number of mayors around tourism taxes and so on. From a constituent point of view, forgetting the rights and wrongs of it, all that could be consolidated into a single precept, rather than having a separate transport levy, which can be quite opaque, particularly where you have new combined authorities. Some of those taxations are merged into combined authorities, and who has actually raised the levy can be quite lost. It ultimately all comes into the combined authority once it is established, but the Committee could take away the question of how that could be consolidated to streamline the precept. From the public’s point of view, the mayor has the ability to raise a mayoral precept; there is no reason to have a transport levy as well. For transparency’s sake, that should be clarified as a single levy, if you are going to have one.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Q To follow up on the point that you made around local growth, which is a big driver of everything that we are doing, what things should we think about in the context of local government and powers and resources in order to deal with the huge challenge that we have around reviving our high streets?

Andrew Goodacre: We touched on good examples, and we should look to learn from them. On local engagement, you need local leadership, but they need help sometimes. That help could be internally from the next level of authority up, or it could be from an external body. One body that I thought was beneficial to high street regeneration at a local authority level was the high streets taskforce that was set up as part of the Institute of Place Management for Manchester Metropolitan University. It has now ended as a body, although in name it carries on because stakeholders—we were one of those stakeholders—would meet on a quarterly basis to discuss opportunities, challenges, good news and bad news on high streets and high street regeneration. We would share those ideas and share them back with the high streets taskforce, and they would help that local decision making.

Quite often what you find is that people know what they want to do. They just do not quite always know how to do it. A think-tank independently managed and run could help them with that “how” and the implementation of their ideas. If you do not bring it back as it was, something similar would really help that local decision making, because sometimes the pride is there, the passion is there; they just do not always have the nous to make it work in the way they hoped for.

With regard to high streets, I see it from a retail point of view, but I recognise the fact that high streets are increasingly dominated by experiential elements—cultural, leisure, more hospitality driven—and I have no issue with that. It does mean that we need better change of use of some of the retail sites that become empty. I know planning is part of this whole issue, so speeding up the planning process is important.

Ideally, I would like to bring homes back into high streets where the possibility exists. There are some large, empty buildings. I live quite near Stratford-upon-Avon and I still go past a VHS store that closed in 2016. It is still empty. I find it remarkable that a landlord can let a big place like that stay empty for so long. We have not looked at the opportunity of what more we could do with that, or what we could do differently with that. If we can bring homes and people back into high streets as places where people want to live, preferably with affordable properties for younger people, I think you would start to create local economies that would drive some of those high streets as well.

Allen Simpson: The question is what level you devolve at. Clearly, we are all nimbys. Nimby is an irregular verb—you are a nimby; I am concerned about my local environment. There are circumstances in which we need to find ways of treating high streets like strategic infrastructure. There will be asymmetric benefits and costs if you live close to a high street or, as people used to, above shops—that is less common than it was—versus being in the surrounding community. Sometimes local politicians do need help. We have seen an approach to that in London that the Committee will have views on.

I am very much in favour of hospitality zones, which have specific licensing approaches, where there is some form of recognition that you get to a “yes” more quickly. There is a specific question around Andrew’s point about bringing people back into former high street or commercial areas, in the City of London or elsewhere, around agents of change. I am very in favour of placing a burden on developers to fit the development around hospitality, rather than buying a flat next door to a pub and then being annoyed that there is a beer garden, for which I have zero sympathy.

[David Simmonds]

Q At what level, or by what mechanism, do you think the views of local businesses, particularly smaller businesses, should be captured and used to influence the decision making of the new authorities that will come into being? I was very conscious listening to your descriptions that you very ably depicted some issues that those businesses might face. How do you make sure that the mayors, and the decision makers feeding into those mayors understand what the impact of those decisions will be, and take those views into account?

Andrew Goodacre: That is a good question. What works well at the moment is the business improvement district model. Where it falls down slightly again depends on the people involved. A good BID represents the voice of local businesses, which are paying through business rates, because the levy is on the business rate, as we know. What I saw in Enniskillen at that time was a BID that really listened to its stakeholders, shared ideas with them and took back the feedback. One of the things introduced there was an Enniskillen gift card that could be used in any shop in that area—ideal for the tourist market that it is trying to appeal to.

We should establish BIDs; the problem with them is that they can be very indifferent, in terms of their make-up and the quality of them. Again, the funding often becomes a point of contention because you are adding to business rates, which is already a massive point of contention for most business owners. In a way, I would like to see BIDs funded in different ways, through the devolution White Paper. Their performance would therefore be a bit more targeted. Part of their performance metrics should be the ability for them to show that they have engaged, understood and taken forward what local business people want, in my case, within their high street.

Allen Simpson: An observation: if you are looking to drive growth, by definition you are looking to bring in businesses that are not there or do not exist, so to some extent your problem is how you consult businesses that do not currently exist. To some degree, it is less about having consultation with specific businesses and more about having an approach that is pro the foundation of businesses in a given area. Clearly, there will be examples where licensing rules could be better consulted on so that existing businesses can expand, but I wonder whether it is less about consultation and more about taking a proactive approach to growth.

[Maya Ellis (Ribble Valley) (Lab)]

Q Both the industries that you represent rely on tourism. One of the things that has come up in discussions that I have had about local government reorganisation is the branding of an area. I just wondered about your thoughts—you have touched on bids and hospitality zones. By way of an example, my area of Ribble Valley is known for food and drink and for weddings. Ribble Valley borough council will disappear in local government reorganisation. One of the biggest fears about that seems to be about the branding of it. We have looked at things such as the English riviera in Torquay, and how they have created a bid to brand that. What are your thoughts on that? Do we have enough mechanisms to protect those brands within the UK, which may disappear as borough council areas, but your industries will still need?

Andrew Goodacre: I think it would be a shame if we lost some of those brands that people have worked hard to create. I think the visitor economy is so important. The most successful independent retailers are in those visitor economies, because people often visit looking for something different that you do not see in a chain store of a large retailer. Creating that identity is something that I hear all the time from successful places. They feel as if they are part of an identity—they have something around them that says, “Yes, we can buy into this.” The riviera example is a good one. It would be a shame if that local effort—that local sense—was lost. I think Falmouth is another good example. Falmouth has created its own essence of Cornwall within that place. You should not lose that. They are so important. It seems counterintuitive that a push for devolution to create more power at a local level means that you would lose local identities. That would be counterintuitive, so we need to make sure that does not happen. Actually, those should be reinforced with better funding.

Allen Simpson: I ran Visit London for five years, so I worked on this a lot. My observation is that the money is not there. Unless you are London, Edinburgh or, to a certain degree, Manchester, which has a very high-quality marketing agency of its own, the money just is not there to do it. Visit Kent has just gone bust. The ability to market a region—sometimes, we devolve the responsibility but not the money with it, and I think that is an example. Equally, not everywhere can be branded. I am not going to pick on anywhere in particular or have one of my regular digs at Essex, but where there is a solid local brand, at the moment, we do not have sensible ways of doing that—just mechanisms to do it. Visit Britain works quite hard internationally to disperse people’s awareness of the UK outside of Edinburgh, York, Lincoln and London, but towards a domestic market, which I think is largely what you are talking about, the exam question is, “What is the pot of money handed down to local communities to do it?” because it is incredibly expensive doing marketing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Q Thank you, Mr Davies and Mr Butler, for setting out the gravity of the situation, the urgency and need to reform, and how the Local Audit Office is an important step. You both candidly made the point that it is necessary, but not sufficient. I am interested in what key building blocks are needed in addition. Obviously, we need to deal with the backlog—that is a given—but, alongside creating this institution, what are the top three things that the Committee should have in mind in order to deal with the problem we have today?

Gareth Davies: The first would be skills and capacity. This sector has suffered from a loss of skilled expertise. Public audit is not interchangeable with company audit; it is a specialist field—you are auditing political institutions and reporting in the public interest. It is a different skillset, with some common areas with the rest of the auditing profession, and it attracts people who are interested in how public bodies become successful and how they achieve value for money, and so on. The pool of experts in that area has reduced sharply, so the system faces the challenge of building up that body of expertise and skills.

It is not just the auditors. In the past, the auditors did a lot of the training, and people then went on to careers in local government, the rest of the public sector and other sectors. It was a breeding ground for the finance function of local authorities. Individual local authorities cannot typically sustain large training programmes of accountants on their own, so having a regime that supports the development of that skillset is vital.

The other essential is getting hold of local government financial reporting and radically simplifying it, streamlining it in a way that can still be incorporated into the whole of Government accounts. That is always the caveat, and the reason for some of the complexity, but I do not believe that it is an impossible task. At the moment, the accounts are too easily dismissed as only of interest to the auditor because they are long, complex and quite difficult to follow in many places. There is no reason why we should put up with that. I know the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy and the wider profession have started work on what professionals think would represent a high-quality, meaningful financial statement that would clearly explain to taxpayers how we have used their resources.

There is a danger that everyone focuses only on the council budget and ignores the accounts. That is dangerous, because the balance sheet matters as well as annual expenditure.

Bill Butler: I can save quite a lot of time by saying that I agree with all of that. This may happen on a number of occasions, and we have not shared briefs. If you start with those who prepare the accounts, that needs to be revitalised. It is moribund, and people are looking at the scale of this task and finding it difficult. Some of this can be the support that Members and Ministers can bring to bear in terms of its importance, because—again, echoing Gareth—it is not considered to be interesting and it is too easily put aside, but that is not going to get any better. There is a real risk that it will get worse unless preparers are properly supported, and unless it is clear what revisions are possible to make the accounts simpler and deliverable.

There are issues around how we encourage colleagues who work in the audit firms. That is a broader issue, because they are bound by the technical standards imposed across the firms by their relationship with the Financial Reporting Council. However, at the moment, that seems occasionally to act as a block to overcoming that risk. We need to be honest about the fact that that risk assessment is there and about what we can do around it.

As Gareth said, we have been looking, with CIPFA, at reforming local government accounts for some considerable time. The clock has now ticked down, I think. One of the things I hope for is that the commitment shown to reform so far carries on across these broader areas, not of all of which are susceptible to legislation, but all of which would be, I hope, susceptible to encouragement.

Gareth Davies: I would like to add one other thing, because an important bit of the full picture is governance arrangements in local authorities. I know that the Bill includes provisions on audit committees, but it is important that local authorities have robust audit committee-type arrangements. I am not prescriptive about exactly what form they should take, but meaningful engagement with internal and external audit and a connection to the governance of the authority as a whole through its political leadership are essential to good governance. That means having somewhere where difficult questions can be asked and answers gained.

In quite a few of the disasters we have seen in local government finance in recent years, it is the governance arrangements that are primarily at fault in not picking up on excessive risk-taking and lack of understanding of the nature of the risk being taken on, and so on. It is another example of where a more robust audit system will not, on its own, solve everything—although it will definitely help, because it will bring those questions to the audit committee table—but the audit committee itself needs to be a functioning, robust and effective part of the governance of the authority.

Bill Butler: If I may say so, these are not things that can wait for the Local Audit Office, which has a massive task to perform anyway. If we wait, these problems become intractable, and the organisation’s chances of succeeding, if it has any at all, are very low,. They are issues that need to be addressed now, while we have the opportunity and—I hope everybody agrees—a pressing need.

[David Simmonds]

Q I would like to ask you some questions about the risks you outlined in broad terms, and how they play out in the context of the devolution and reorganisation envisaged in the Bill. For the record, I was involved in launching public sector audit appointments some years ago.

In a local authority, there is the collection fund, which essentially covers all the income that it is due to collect, then there are pension schemes, the dedicated schools grant, the housing revenue account and the parking revenue account, where there are slightly variable legal ringfences. All of those pose risks and many of them are impacted by elements of the devolution proposals affecting who will be responsible for decision making and what that revenue might underpin in terms of borrowing or day-to-day expenditure. Will you give us a sense, from your experience, of what the risks are, what the potential opportunities are and where changes are needed to, for example, the ringfences, and your views on the inclusion of the dedicated schools grant in the annual, legal council tax-fixing process, which might help or hinder the proper management of some of those financial risks.

Gareth Davies: Do you want to go first, Bill?

Bill Butler: Yes, then you can agree with me.

[The Chair]

We heard that!

Bill Butler: I think the nature of those statutory balances is actually one of the significant things in how we handle the disclaimers, because they are a part of the mechanism that is different from a balance sheet outside of local government. Of course, because they are statutory, that does mean that they are amenable to change.

On how they will affect the broader issues, it depends on where you are, because there are still quite a lot of places where there are no problems and where you can deal with it. The problem arises, as I alluded to earlier, when there is a bad apple in the barrel. We have seen in previous reorganisations that bringing on board a set of accounts and an organisation that is not on top of those things—where there is no assurance about where those boundaries have been set—poisons the water across the whole thing.

If you have one district coming into a newly constituted authority or organisation, the whole of the account will cause problems. That problem tends to be long standing in nature; the people who might have been able to help you resolve it have gone, and the attention is focused elsewhere. It is impossible to say, other than on a case-by-case basis, how that would impact things, but my view—our view, I think—would be that if those issues can be addressed and clarified now, that will lead to a better situation. If you have places with four years’ worth of disclaimers, finding a way through the statutory balances is will be fundamental to avoiding problems down the line.

Gareth Davies: All I would add is that, in a way, that is a good example of the accreted layers of complexity that now represent local government accounts. There was a strong argument for each ringfence when it was created, but when you stand back, the total picture is now very messy and complex. This is an opportunity to take stock and say, “Which bits of this actually serve our purpose now? Is there an opportunity here for simplification?”

As Bill says, some of these are statutory balances, which can be determined by Government, and that may be one way of accelerating the restoration of proper audit opinions, for example. Rather than the auditor agonising over questions like, “Where do I get the assurance over this statutory balance? It’s not been signed off for many years,” using the statutory process for determination of the balances might be part of the solution. Of course, there are all sorts of downsides with that kind of thing, but it is important that we are clear about how long it will take to get to a properly constituted set of accounts for a new organisation.

Bill Butler: Striving for something that is good, rather than pursuing excellence and achieving nothing, is fundamentally important.

--- Later in debate ---

[David Simmonds]

Q I have two questions that follow from that. On that last point, I know that CIPFA has argued that a much higher degree of consistency is needed in the way statutory balances are accounted for, and I am conscious that that can make millions of pounds of difference at an individual local authority level. I am interested in your views about how the new arrangement should or should not seek to constrain decision making in order to improve consistency.

Secondly, in respect of specific funds, in debates around devolution, it is often argued that, for example, there should be freedom to spend the proceeds of the parking revenue account beyond the current constraints—that the revenue, for example, should be used to prop up social care, or whatever it may be, in a way that it simply cannot within the current legal framework. Do you have any views about decisions or tweaks that the Bill should make to those arrangements, based on the risk and assurance issues you have outlined?

Bill Butler: Not from where I sit. It is a policy area that I would avoid, although I understand why you would ask the question.

Gareth Davies: Yes, I am required to avoid it. The reason I am here today is to discuss public audits, essentially, rather than policy decisions on those kinds of financial matters. Clearly, there is a point at which the two things meet, which is really where we are talking now, but it is not for me to give a view on what should or should not be in a ringfence.

[David Simmonds]

Q What about the CIPFA guidance point? Can you address that?

Bill Butler: There is a standard basis for it standardisation and simplification so that you can move between sets of accounts. It seems hugely sensible. Interestingly, I can remember having similar discussions in the early 1980s, when I first qualified, with the then Department of the Environment’s technical advisers. We have made some progress. Yes, the inconsistency is odd. As Gareth said, it causes problems for auditors as well, because they move between places. It does not help the underlying problem that we have been discussing.

[Vikki Slade]

Q You have talked about policy issues, the lack of trust and the suspicion around transparency. I am sure we have all heard assumptions that things are going on in councils. What is your assessment of the possibly complementary role of local public accounts committees sitting alongside the Local Audit Office? Fundamentally, councils, health authorities and education are all intermingled—they are all spending public money. Do you have a view on whether this might be the time to go for that?

Gareth Davies: I work with the current Public Accounts Committee in Parliament. In that set-up, it is an essential part of the effectiveness of the accountability system. I have seen how the Committee works, and it works extremely well on a non-partisan basis. It has a hugely dedicated membership pursuing accountability across government, so it is a very effective model in the House of Commons. Such a body is normally positive in local government in the context of combined authorities—that is where I have seen it mentioned most. As I said earlier, having an audit committee in every local authority is an essential part of good governance. Questions like, “Are we managing the risks to the organisation effectively? Are the controls that we think we have in place operating as intended?” are the meat and drink of an audit committee agenda.

Where a local public accounts committee might have an effect would be in looking across the public service landscape—say, at a combined authority or sub-regional scale, in Greater Manchester, in the west midlands or wherever. I think there is a gap there at the moment. One of my last roles before I stopped auditing local government was auditing the Greater Manchester combined authority; it was ramping up in scale at the time, and it was getting to be very significant, including some health spending and so on. As we know, it is the most developed of the devolved set-ups at the moment. I can see how, in that arena, a local public accounts committee would add real value by looking beyond the institution, which an individual audit committee cannot do, and by looking at value for money in the sub-region. If that is what we are talking about, it would be a body that we in the National Audit Office could engage with in order to follow the public pound from national policy making, through to sub-regional infrastructure and so on, and through to council delivery. All parts of that are important, including right at the individual local authority level.

Bill Butler: I have nothing to add.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Q I have a final question, if I may, Chair. We heard very clearly from the last panel that the reforms that were put in place are necessary but not sufficient, and that we need to think about how we build on things such as skills and capacity. From the perspective of someone at the coalface, what are the things that we need to get right? What should we reflect on as we take through these reforms in the Bill?

Mark Stocks: It is still fragile. I thought Gareth and Bill were accurate in what they said. We need to have more capacity so that we are not reliant on just a few suppliers. For that, there has to be consistency in terms of message. We need to get to grips with local authority accounts. If I went and did a set of NHS accounts, they are perhaps 100 pages long. The average local government accounts are 200 to 250 pages long, so the work involved is immense. That is why it takes longer, so we have to get that right.

We need to start to deal with some of the risks in local government, to be candid. It is quite difficult to deal with the breadth of what local government does. If you add on top of that the financial issues that they face and the issues that are asked of them in terms of policy, that layers on quite a scope for auditors, which means that we have to bring in specialists to do some of the work. I do not think that will get any easier under the current landscape.

[David Simmonds]

Q The previous panel addressed some of the complexities of the local government finance landscape, with the different accounts and so on. I am interested in your perspective as someone from the audit sector that receives many of these contracts, first on the challenges involved in skilling up the sector with the necessary knowledge and training. I am also interested in your perspective on the standardisation question. I think we all understand that audit is sometimes more of an art than a science—sometimes the other way round. How do you end up with something where everybody understands what is expected of them, in the context of a high degree of transparency that often is not really there in the commercial sector? How do decisions to deviate from that standard impact on the wider perception of the state of that organisation?

Mark Stocks: Local government accounts are complex. These are highly complex sorts of businesses, if I can use that phrase, that deal with any number of services. What we see now are local finance teams who are stretched, to be candid. There has been a lack of investment in them over the years. Gareth talked about trainees going from the Audit Commission into local government, but that does not happen now. There is a bunch of people who are around 50, who may be disappearing in the short term, so we have to sort out the strength of local government finance teams. As I said, we also need to sort out the complexity of the accounts.

In terms of the standards, all local government accounts are under international financial reporting standards, and that will not change. That is a Treasury requirement. How that is interpreted and what is important in those accounts is open to judgment. The emphasis from the LAO on whether it is more important for us to audit income or to audit property will make a difference to what local auditors do. I would always argue that it is more important to audit income.

It is very difficult to standardise anything that we do, because local government is not standardised. I can take you from a district authority that spends £60 million, most of which is housing benefit, to an authority that spends £4 billion and has significant regeneration schemes and companies. The skillsets that you need and the ability to standardise is very difficult. You have to have the right skills to do the work.

[Manuela Perteghella]

Q Do you anticipate any issues in the working relationships between the new Local Audit Office and the local authorities it will audit?

Mark Stocks: The Local Audit Office cannot look like the Audit Commission. The Audit Commission took a particular tack in terms of what it did and the level of scrutiny that it put on local government. If the Local Audit Office follows suit, which this Bill does not allow it to, I am sure there will be problems. But the way the Local Audit Office is configured in the Bill is to make local audit stronger. As long as the Local Audit Office sticks to that, I do not think there will be too much of a problem.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Could that paper be sent to the secretariat and circulated around the Committee?

Zoë Billingham: Certainly.

[David Simmonds]

Q I would like to ask you to enlarge on this subject. The point at which Professor Denham finished was a helpful starting place. I think we all share the desire to see that level of community empowerment. What is very striking, when we compare local government in all its forms in the UK with what is well established in other countries, is how little of it there is, relatively, and how few powers people in local authorities already have. One of the concerns we flagged is that the chosen footprint of half a million envisages, in shire England, the elimination of 90% of existing local councillors in one fell swoop. I am interested in how, in the context of a country that is already massively under-represented at local level, we can address that manifest democratic deficit in this process.

And to come to the point that both of you have touched on, the Bill as drafted assumes power upwards to mayors, and it introduces a raft of powers—in chapter after chapter of the Bill—whereby the Secretary of State will direct the mayor and the authority, requiring them to produce various strategies. In a country that is already very centralised anyway, how do we develop and encourage local leaders to come forward in a context where there will be significantly fewer roles for them to fulfil, and where those roles will be significantly more constrained than they have been used to?

Professor Denham: Let me break that down into a number of sections. First, on local government reorganisation and size, I will be straightforward: Sir David and I did not propose local government reorganisation. We proposed creating what would now be called strategic authorities from what we generally call upper-tier authorities—the unitaries and the counties. I am not saying that there would not have been a need down the line to do something about what will be a messy system, but in terms of getting growth plans and those things up and running—I just put that on the record, because I am not going to get too far into the issue. However, if you are where you are at the moment, I would commend the idea of community empowerment plans and a proper legal framework for devolution below those levels.

What I would say, though, is that there is a level of devolved function that needs to operate at the level of strategic authorities. If you are going to have really good local growth strategies, and if they are going to tie into a national industrial strategy, it could not be done, say, at the level of a city such as Southampton, where I was an MP for a long time. You need a bigger body. However you do it at the micro level, that strategic level must operate effectively.

To tie my threads together, if you go to other European countries with a higher level of devolution, they have an intermediate forum between the strategic body and the national, where these issues are thrashed out, best practice is worked out and, in a sense, the Secretary of State does not exercise their direction powers without discussing it with the mayoral council first. You actually say, “How is that going to work then? How is that power going to be used?” So building in that layer means the right sort of compromise between the desire of Governments to get on with things and the need to engage people at local level. That would be one way of dealing with it.

You are inviting me to say we should keep all the district councils, but I am going to pass on that one, because that was not part of our proposals.

Zoë Billingham: Let me just build on that and the question of scale. As John says, the proposed 500,000 scale of the unitaries post-reorganisation is very large compared with European counterparts, and that poses some big questions, not least whether the projected efficiency savings will be realised. However, town and parish councils still exist within the system, and we have previously done work that looks at what we call the hyper-local tier of governance. While they are imperfect bodies, there are improvements that can be built upon at that hyper-local level, in addition to having some sort of formal forum, as John says, to engage with communities.

If the neighbourhood area committee proposal continues as planned, I would really urge that to be—the majority—taken up by community leaders and young people. There are other ways that we can help to counterbalance this through democratic innovations. There was talk, for instance, about remote meetings and remote voting, which are not currently available. Especially when you speak to young people about why they do not engage with local politics, they say that meetings are at the wrong time and too far away, and if you do not have a car, you cannot get to them, especially in rural communities. So I think this could be a real opportunity to see how normal council business is done and improve on it.

Finally, to build on the point about participatory methods, it is about making sure that unitaries are committed to properly engaging with their communities on the big questions they face, and not seeing it as distancing from communities.

--- Later in debate ---

[Miatta Fahnbulleh]

Q The Government will do our very best to make sure that chaos is not the thing that comes out of this set of reforms. I think most people would concede that the status quo is not optimal and therefore reform is required. The piece that I want to push back and follow up on is the need for public participation. That is the whole basis on which our planning system works, but there is something about accountability and the mandate that sits with the mayor. Ultimately, if people do not like the set of decisions that the mayor drives through a development plan, they can boot them out in an election, so there is a specific piece around the function of the mayor that means that they can hold that development plan and the public are able to hold the mayor to account.

Naomi Luhde-Thompson: I think we need to reflect on what became of the regional spatial strategies, and on whether that was an issue around social licence and public consent. Obviously, an examination was attached to them in their development, and there was accountability in different formats. If it is not clear to people that they are going to be involved, you will just get disempowerment and disenfranchisement, and then people are just going to say, “Well, it’s nothing to do with me. I haven’t been able to be involved, and I haven’t been able to have an influence.” Those routes to influence and to participate properly, which means having an impact on the outcome, need to be very clearly laid out so that people can participate. I agree with you that it is a whole discussion. Planning is the way we organise ourselves in space, in society and in places. That is what it is supposed to be, so we need to make it like that.

Your point about democratic accountability is really important. One of the things that the Better Planning Coalition has been looking at is the national scheme of delegation, which will have a huge impact on whether there is democratic accountability for planning decisions at local level. If people realise what is happening only when the bulldozer turns up at the end of the road, that is obviously a failure of the system. If they feel that a decision has not been made in a way that is accountable, if there is no one for them to go and talk to, and if they do not have public speaking rights at planning committees any more and cannot have their say on that decision, I think that will lead to a democratic deficit.

[David Simmonds]

Q To pick up on the point about a democratic deficit, one of the things that has been much debated is that the Government have embarked on two major pieces of legislation: the Planning and Infrastructure Bill, and the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill. Both will have a huge impact on the policy area, particularly around housing. We know that housing delivery has collapsed, and part of the solution to that in the Planning and Infrastructure Bill is to strip out a lot of the environmental protections, which you have referred to. Then the devo Bill comes along and removes much of the community voice as well—for example, by reducing the number of planning applications that may be considered by a local planning committee. Can you tell us a little bit about how, perhaps in an ideal world or a more optimal world, that community voice could be secured behind the delivery of the types and number of homes that communities want, but in a way that best reflects the needs of those local communities and those areas?

[The Chair]

Bullet points would be great.

Richard Hebditch: This is not a good way to start an answer, but it is a massive challenge, and I very much recognise that. One of the things is around democratic legitimacy. As Naomi was saying, it is not about entirely removing local planning authorities’ say in how they deal with applications. It is important to ensure there is a community voice in the development of local plans as well. There is a challenge, as previously mentioned, if local government reorganisation is going on at the same time.

It is also about having a level of democratic accountability within the strategic layer. I mentioned the lack of structures for these new strategic authorities beyond the indirectly elected constituent authorities. The previous panel was discussing ideas that might improve engagement. There are risks in relying on elections every four years as the entire democratic legitimacy, particularly in a time when you have five parties all quite close together in polling, and you are seeing that in local authority elections at the moment.

There are risks in relying on that to justify your decisions without necessarily having a structure for what happens in the gap between those four years to ensure democratic voice and community engagement. It is not necessarily for the Bill, but maybe there is something around ensuring that there are adequate reviews of how this will operate, drawing on the ideas that the previous panel was discussing. We also now have the national covenant between civil society and national Government, so it is about whether we can look at similar things at a strategic layer and at a local layer.

Naomi Luhde-Thompson: Let me add just one example. I do not know whether anyone knows about the Salt Cross area action plan. It is West Oxfordshire district council: 2,000 homes on a greenfield site, and they want it to be zero carbon. It is going to have business on it and affordable housing. The community is really supportive, because that development is bringing things for them. The only problem is that those developing it want to strip out some of the things about zero carbon, for example, so there is a conflict there. I think that is all about—this is a whole different conversation—land values and land value capture, and how you get the public benefit out of development.

--- Later in debate ---

[Perran Moon]

Q Meur ras—thank you, Chair. I am afraid it is Cornwall again, Minister. In 2016, commenting on the previous Government’s plans for redrawing boundaries, the Council of Europe’s advisory committee on the framework convention for the protection of national minorities said that

“Article 16 prohibits restricting the enjoyment of the rights of the Framework Convention in connection with the redrawing of borders.”

The Bill currently excludes Cornwall from accessing the highest level of devolution unless we compromise our national minority status. Is there an appetite in the Government, before we pass a Bill that breaches the framework convention, for making special provision in the Bill for Cornwall so that it can access the highest level of devolution without compromising our national minority status?

Miatta Fahnbulleh: First, let me thank you for being such a consistent, persistent and passionate advocate for Cornwall. The Government absolutely recognise Cornwall’s national minority status. We recognise the uniqueness of Cornwall and are trying to operate within that framework. Ultimately, strategic authorities, at their best, try to drive economic performance and growth, so geography matters.

The conversation that we want to have with Cornwall is: “If you want to drive growth and employment opportunities, and if you want to create jobs in your area, what is the best geography to do that in?” That is not to deny Cornwall’s uniqueness and specialness, which I think every single Committee member recognises and appreciates, but it is to say that if our objective is to make sure we are delivering for your community in Cornwall, what is the best spatial strategy to do that? That might require collaboration beyond the boundaries of Cornwall.

[David Simmonds]

Q I think we have established that the Department has not done an independent assessment of the financial impact of the reorganisation that has been described, so we do not know where we stand with that, but let me push for a little more clarity on the footprint. It is clear from the representations from local government leaders that the Government had previously given them the steer that unless their bid was for a footprint of around half a million, or had a very strong justification for why it was larger or smaller than that, the Government were unlikely to approve it. That was the evidence given to us by the previous Minister.

Clearly, a number of those authority areas are in the process of finalising their bids, and in some areas there is dispute at different levels of local authority as to what the footprint should be. Many of us will have been pleased to hear you say earlier, Minister, that that was flexible, in your view—that it was not intended to be a strong guideline, but was something where you were looking at a much greater level of latitude. So that we can have assurances in relation to the relevant groupings later in the Committee process, will you commit to all those local leaders—in particular any who have submitted a bid on the understanding that it had to be around that 500,000—that there will be the opportunity to revisit that if it was not dictated by their local circumstances and preferences but, in their minds, something required by the Government?

[The Chair]

Can you come to the question, please?

[David Simmonds]

That is the question.

Miatta Fahnbulleh: I come back to, “What is the purpose of this?” We are not doing reorganisation for the fun of it—it is not fun. We are doing it because we think it will help us to drive certain outcomes. Our assessment is that around 500,000 is the sort of scale that allows us to do certain functions. That has to be consistent and compliant with what makes sense locally. The whole purpose of localism is that you have that interaction between the two. We have therefore given a benchmark for what we think makes sense, but when we look at proposals we will, of course, take into account the specific circumstances. If an authority comes forward with 100,000 or 200,000, we are likely to say that that probably does not cut the mustard, but we want to have that conversation, because fundamentally this has to be aligned and make sense on the ground. Otherwise, none of this will play out in the way that we want it to.

[David Simmonds]

Just to check—

[The Chair]

Order. I really want to allow other Members to get in.

[David Simmonds]

Q May I put a point of clarification? If there is no independent financial assessment, on what basis do the Government have a view that 500,000 is the most efficient size?

Miatta Fahnbulleh: I come back to the fact that it is not just about savings and efficiency, but about removing fragmentation and about what makes sense in terms of the types of services that we are asking local authorities to deliver—it is a whole set of things. That is our benchmark, but ultimately the basis of localism is to say to places, “Given these parameters, what do you think makes sense?” We will use that to make decisions.

[Vikki Slade]

Q Most areas that are currently undergoing local government reorganisation seem to be moving at pace to set up town and parish councils, if they do not have them, to protect their assets, protect their identity and retain local democratic accountability, because they are nervous about decisions being taken a long way away. That demonstrates how much they are valued. Yet places are not being supported to do so. There is no duty to co-operate with, include or consult with town and parish councils in the Bill. The funding for neighbourhood planning is gone, and I have had confirmation today that it is not coming back. There is no money to support the community right to buy. I believe that the desire for devolution is genuine, and we share it, but if you want to devolve to truly local people, you have to include and value the community level. Will you be open to reviewing the role of town and parish councils and how local people can truly get involved, either through town and parish councils or through community activism, rather than it being top-down?

Miatta Fahnbulleh: The push of powers to communities is absolutely critical to us, and the duty on local authorities to think about neighbourhood governance is trying to get to the heart of that. Parish councils may be the structures and institutions that the local authority decides to build on, but it is not consistent across the country, so we have to ensure that we are finding the right governance structures for different places so that communities have a genuine voice. We have to ensure that we have diversity of representation, which we need for this to be enduring and for it to ensure that there is power and voice for communities. The commitment is there, and that is why we have it. We were very clear that this was not just about strategic authorities or local authorities, but was absolutely about the neighbourhood level. How we get that right has to be a conversation—an iterative relationship with places. That is the bit that we are absolutely committed to.

Draft Building Safety Levy (England) Regulations 2025

David Simmonds Excerpts

Monday 15th September 2025 General Committees

[David Simmonds (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Sir Desmond. I am sure you will be pleased to hear that His Majesty’s Opposition do not propose to divide the Committee on the regulations. As the Minister set out, they arise from the Building Safety Act 2022, which was passed by the Conservative party in Government.

After extensive consultation, the regulations should command broad support. We welcome in particular the commitment to enshrine the exemptions for smaller sites and for other types of development, about which extensive representation has been made about how the imposition of a costly levy would significantly inhibit their deliverability. We support the proposal for regular reporting on the outcome. We are aware that there has been extensive consultation with the 295 local authorities that act as building regulations authorities, and that their representations are reflected in the grant award to ensure that there are sufficient resources to get the system up and running. I am sure we will scrutinise the resulting reports in due course.

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

David Simmonds Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 2nd September 2025 Commons Chamber

[David Simmonds (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)]

It has been a wide-ranging debate. I particularly thank my right hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Wendy Morton) and my hon. Friends the Members for Bromley and Biggin Hill (Peter Fortune), for Isle of Wight East (Joe Robertson), for Reigate (Rebecca Paul), for Romford (Andrew Rosindell), for Bromsgrove (Bradley Thomas), for Broxbourne (Lewis Cocking), for Keighley and Ilkley (Robbie Moore) and for West Suffolk (Nick Timothy) for their contributions. The range of issues that they and other Members covered starkly highlighted the wholesale inadequacy of the Bill in relation to the scale of the challenges that our country and our communities face.

There are big issues facing local government, which deals with some of the most difficult tasks faced by any of our public services. We know that the cost of social care is rapidly growing and will consume a greater share of the available resources. Since this Government took office, there has been a collapse in the delivery of new housing. It is down 17% in the country as a whole and there has been a 66% drop by large social landlords under Mayor Khan here in London. As we have seen in the news today, the Government’s chums in the unions have voted to extend their strikes until March 2026. The people of our second city are left with their waste uncollected and populations of rats.

[Wendy Morton]

As an MP for a constituency neighbouring Birmingham, I see all too often the impact of the strikes. Does my hon. Friend agree that this issue is absolutely shocking? The one thing that residents expect from their local council is a regular collection of their household waste, and often garden waste and recycling as well. Birmingham city council is failing the residents.

[David Simmonds]

I thank my right hon. Friend for highlighting that issue; she has been a champion for the voices of those affected by it. While I understand that Ministers have come to the Dispatch Box time and again and said that they must wash their hands of it, the unions said in their statement today that there was “no point” negotiating with the council, because it lacked the authority to resolve the issue. The Government need to roll up their sleeves and get involved.

While our second city struggles with these challenges, here we have a piece of legislation about tinkering with structures. Not only that, but, as we learned just a week ago, it is an entirely uncosted plan. The Department has not undertaken any assessment of the cost-benefit of the measures contained in this legislation. That comes against the backdrop of the decisions of this Government which, as we know, are making the financial situation of our country more perilous by the day. In the first few months of this financial year alone, the Government borrowed £60 billion more than they raised in taxes. Borrowing costs have hit a 27-year high—a level seen only in the early days of the last Labour Government in 1998.

This Bill opens the door to a host of tax-raising powers. As we go through the pages and pages of new powers for Ministers and the Secretary of State to direct local authorities in one way or another and to instruct communities to accept this or that, we see the prospect of local authorities, which are already left a net £1.5 billion worse off by the Government’s rise in national insurance contributions, facing the maxing out of parking charges, huge increases in borrowing and big rises in business rates and council tax.

The £60 billion black hole that this Government have created just in this financial year will need to be bridged somehow. The Chancellor will be back to tell us how in a few weeks’ or months’ time, but I think we can see a clue already that local communities and local authorities will be the route by which those costs are raised. When we read what this Bill has to say about neighbourhood governance, the threat is very clear even at parish council level. Those parishes—the smallest unit of local government, but one with precepting powers—will be one of the local kitties that the Government expect to raid to finance the consequences of their economic mismanagement.

When we think of Sir Humphrey’s famous advice that it was always best to

“dispose of the difficult bit in the title”

of the Bill, because it did a lot less harm there than in the text, we can see that when this Bill talks about devolution, it devolves to the local level the responsibility for those tax rises and service cuts. Can the Minister tell the House how many libraries will close to pay for this Bill? How many road projects will be set aside? How many more communities, such as those referred to by the Labour leader of Shrewsbury, will lose their regular recycling and bin collections to pay for it? How high will council tax go?

What is the limit that Ministers will set on the tax rises that the Bill will drive? What is the maximum parking charge or fine that Ministers think it is reasonable for councils to have? What level of costs will local businesses have to face? When we debated the Bill on business rates that sits behind many of the financial elements of this Bill, Ministers said that they wanted to tax Amazon, but they ended up taxing our local high street stores and our pubs. On average, local pubs alone have to pay £6,500 extra a year, and that was before the £60 billion that this Government have borrowed in the last few months.

I am going to finish with a direct plea to the Minister, for whom I have a great deal of respect. He led his party in local government—he was its champion—and for many years, he was a local councillor too, earning a huge degree of respect in this House and in that wider family as a result of the work he did. At the Government’s favoured population level for new unitary authorities, this Bill abolishes 90% of all the councillors in England’s shires at the stroke of a bureaucrat’s pen. That is 90% of the voices of those local communities—people such as Chris Whitbread, who stood up for his community against this Government over the Bell Hotel in Epping. These people have been the voices of their communities on migrant hotels, on protecting their green belt and on air quality. They are the people who stood up for their local communities on issues such as the grooming gangs, which we heard so much about earlier from the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Birmingham Yardley (Jess Phillips).

This Bill could have been transformational—a chance to step up that voice of local communities. I am sorry that the Minister lost his battle to let those communities keep their voices, but he still has time to change course, to support our reasoned amendment, start again, and build a cross-party consensus on the future of local government. Let this not be the funeral oration for local democracy in England.

Draft Local Audit (Amendment of Definition of Smaller Authority) Regulations 2025

David Simmonds Excerpts

Monday 1st September 2025 General Committees

[David Simmonds (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. I am sure we are all delighted to be here—I could sense the excitement in the room when Members read the subject matter.

The Opposition commend the Government for their efforts to bring about a greater degree of fairness in local government audit. This has been a challenge for many years, in particular as a result of many larger audit businesses stepping away not just from very small public bodies, as the Minister described, but even from large local authorities, where the fees have not been large enough to justify the risks. A slew of big names, with which we are all familiar, have departed from that area of work.

We should recognise that efforts have been made over the years to address that problem. In my time in government, I was involved in launching Public Sector Audit Appointments Ltd as a means by which local authorities, working together, sought to increase the supply of effective and accredited auditors to undertake this work, but all of us, whether we represent areas with larger metropolitan authorities, or rural areas where small parish meetings sit within the audit envelope of a large local authority, are conscious of the importance of transparency. Because there is a large degree of consensus on this subject, we will not oppose the regulations this evening.

Birmingham Bin Strikes

David Simmonds Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd July 2025 Commons Chamber

[David Simmonds (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)]

As the hon. Member for Birmingham Perry Barr (Ayoub Khan) alluded to, the House knows that the origins of the dispute in Birmingham are in the 2017 settlement of the equal pay arrangements, which created a £760 million liability for that local authority under the Labour party, and which have been undermined at every turn by the relationship between Labour’s administration in Birmingham and the unions. It is clear that that local authority and its leadership have been dodging scrutiny and accountability at every turn. They refused even to debate the local authority Conservative group’s proposals for a plan to end the strikes and clean up the city.

I have a series of questions for the Minister. What guidance will he give his seven-strong commissioner team to bring about an end to the strikes? What public health assessment are the Government carrying out of the impact of more than 21,000 tonnes of uncollected rubbish and a huge increase in the rat population in Birmingham? Will he consider withdrawing the facility time for Unite the union, which is currently refusing to go about the process of bringing an end to the strikes? Will he tell his commissioners—including Tony McArdle, whose appointment has been announced today—that Birmingham’s besieged households must not be held to ransom by the unions for a day longer? Will he tell the House who he thinks has failed the households of Birmingham more? Is it the Labour council, in leaving rats on the streets and 21,000 tonnes of uncollected rubbish in a heatwave, or this Government, who have failed to intervene to bring an end to this blight on residents’ lives?

[Jim McMahon]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his questions, which I will try to answer in turn. Let me say, though, that we will take no lectures at all from the party that was in government for 14 years and saw the downgrading of local authorities across the country, including in Birmingham.

Although these are our commissioners, as the hon. Gentleman says—that is correct: they are Government appointed—let us not forget which Government appointed them. They were appointed on the watch of the previous Government. Today we are just announcing a change in the lead commissioner. We need to be careful not to politicise those people, who believe in public service and are helping out the local authority and supporting the Government in trying to turn that council around. Let us leave the politicisation of the commissioners to one side and deal with the facts.

Last time I was in the Chamber, the Conservatives were talking down the role of bin workers, as if somehow that work was degrading. At that time, I think they were suggesting that the armed forces might be brought in to collect waste and that that would somehow degrade their role. That was never going to be the case, but it was a glimpse into how the Conservatives view the workers who are affected. One thing that is absolutely certain is that the Labour party believes in the power of frontline workers and in the importance of these frontline roles. We absolutely value the role of refuse collectors, and we see the implications of waste not being collected. But we have got to be clear, too, that whatever settlement is on the table has to be lawful and affordable, and it cannot cross the red line of undermining the equal pay negotiations that are taking place. I hope that we can agree at least on that basis.