English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill (Fourth sitting)
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debateTuesday 14th October 2025
(1 day, 16 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesEnglish Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill 2024-26 View all English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 14 October 2025 - (14 Oct 2025)
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The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Amendment 305, in schedule 1, page 83, line 32, at end insert—
“(5A) The Secretary of State may not make an order under this section that has the effect of placing Cornwall in a combined authority with any other authority.”
This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from making an order establishing a combined authority which would include Cornwall and any other area east of the Tamar in the same combined authority.
Amendment 43, in schedule 1, page 84, line 13, at end insert—
“(9A) If the order establishes a combined authority which contains the Isle of Wight, the authority’s name must include ‘the Isle of Wight.’”
Amendment 306, in schedule 1, page 86, line 18, at end insert—
“(5A) Neither the added local government area nor the existing area of a combined authority in the order includes Cornwall.”
This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from adding a local government area to an existing area of a combined authority if either area includes Cornwall.
Amendment 44, in schedule 1, page 86, line 32, at end insert—
“(7A) If the proposal establishes a combined authority which contains the Isle of Wight, the authority’s name must include ‘the Isle of Wight.’”
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government (Miatta Fahnbulleh)
The amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish a statement when directing the establishment of a new combined authority, setting out how the proposed combined authority would affect the physical geography, community identity and boundaries of other public services in the local area. I have no doubt that the intention of the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon is absolutely right and that such matters are important; as I have said, the examples of the Isle of Wight and Cornwall highlight that. In practice, however, such matters will already have been considered through the process set out in the Bill.
In deciding whether to establish a new combined authority, the Secretary of State will already be required to have regard to the likely effect on the exercise of functions in neighbouring local government areas. In addition, the Secretary of State is already subject to the statutory tests requiring them to have regard to the need to secure effective and convenient local government in relation to areas of competence. The proposal itself can be expected to cover those issues. There is therefore no need for a separate statement, and so I hope that the hon. Member will withdraw the amendment.
David Simmonds (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)
In our consideration of the issue, the Minister is asking the Committee to give a great deal of weight to the meetings she has described having had with various local leaders and Members with particular concerns about the impact on their local areas in terms of national identity, heritage and geography. Will she share with the Committee a little more detail on the substance of those discussions, so that before we vote we can understand what exact assurances may have been given to local leaders and what their understanding of them is, so that we are all completely clear?
Miatta Fahnbulleh
On Hampshire and Solent, for example, our conversation was very candid. The leaders were clear about some of the debates that they had had within the council; as the Minister, I said what opportunities would be open to them, and I expressed the fact that in the context of the Isle of Wight, the name was completely down to the constituent authorities. We support constituent authorities working together collaboratively to ensure that all the constituent parts are happy with the deal and the proposal.
On Cornwall, I believe that the Secretary of State, my boss, had those conversations, but I have also had some with MPs. We absolutely recognise the uniqueness of Cornwall and its identity. There are clear things that we know Cornish MPs and the council want, such as protection for the Cornish language, which we are in discussion about. There are clearly opportunities to build on the existing devolution deal. The previous Government provided a devolution deal for Cornwall in recognition of that exception. Another issue might be housing, which is big in Cornwall, for example, and the area is especially exercised about that, in particular in the context of the impact of tourism. We are happy to have a conversation about continuing to support the local authority to make inroads on some of those issues.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Perran Moon (Camborne and Redruth) (Lab)
On a point of order, Sir John. Can we ask the Clerk to speak a little louder? We are struggling to hear at the back.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
Once the Bill comes into force, there will be various ways in which functions can be conferred on a combined authority or combined county authority that will be operating as strategic authorities. The clause makes the necessary amendment to existing legislation to clarify these wider options. It is a small but important clause that will ensure our new devolution framework can operate effectively.
David Simmonds (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)
I thank the Minister for that introduction. It is the implementation of this that is the subject of political contention, but a great deal has been said, and a vote has been taken. There is nothing further we can do on those issues at this stage, but I expect they will be the subject of great debate in the remaining stages of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 6
Combined authorities and CCAs: decision-making and validity of proceedings
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
Moving from devolution by deal to devolution by default is at the heart of the Bill. Clause 6 and schedule 2 are essential to achieving that. The Bill ensures that strategic authorities have a consistent set of functions, and these provisions standardise how they exercise those functions. Many existing strategic authorities have complex and varied arrangements for agreeing fundamentals such as budgets and transport plans. That makes it hard for the public to understand how decisions are made and, therefore, to hold the strategic authority to account.
The provisions in clause 6 and schedule 2 would create a transparent and consistent default voting arrangement—a simple majority. It would unblock decision making to ensure that the right decision, even if it is difficult, can be made. In mayoral strategic authorities, the mayor must be in the majority for a vote to pass. Mayors are directly accountable to all voters in their area, so it is right that decisions cannot be made if they disagree. The Government expect mayors and other strategic authority members to continue to work together to build consensus. We heard time and time again in the evidence sessions that the model works well when the mayor works in partnership with its constituent authorities, but it is important that one member cannot get in the way of the right decisions being made for the entire area. It is therefore imperative that clause 6 and schedule 2 remain within the Bill to ensure that mayoral strategic authorities can operate effectively, and to provide the public with clarity on how decisions are made, so they can hold these institutions to account.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
I rise to speak to new clause 48, tabled in my name. I also want to raise another issue for consideration by the Minister at a future stage.
In clause 6, the new rules for mayoral combined authorities give simple majority voting for relevant decisions by bodies to adopt budgets or policies, such as spatial development strategies, local transport plans and other strategies set out elsewhere in the Bill. For example, schedule 2 outlines that
“a resolution to adopt the strategy is to be made by a simple majority of the constituent members present and voting”.
There are other rules to do with a tied vote.
I think that the Bill should also amend the Greater London Authority Act 1999 to give simple majority voting for decisions by the London Assembly on the budget and mayoral strategies of the Mayor of London. That is for consistency of decision making across the different authorities and bodies, and for fairness to London’s democracy. Along with many Opposition Members, this is something that I have wanted for some time now, as I was a member of the London Assembly in my previous job. In these Committee debates I will frequently bring up examples from my long experience of being part of an effective scrutiny body in a devolved authority at the strategic level—I feel that I have a good handle on how it works.
Using “a simple majority” is the right way to go about this. The Minister has talked about building consensus and working in partnership. I really value it when cross-party working can result in genuine dialogue, with mayors that will listen and make changes, and bodies scrutinising or working with them to put forward their own ideas and have them taken up. Those are all really healthy things for our democracy. New clause 48 would simply amend the parts of the 1999 Act that outline how the Assembly votes. Currently, the Act requires at least a two-thirds majority for any changes to be made, and the new clause would instead insert the words “a simple majority”. It is a very simple change, which the Minister should consider.
The second issue I want to raise relates to forward plans, which are incredibly useful for the general public, or anyone who wants to influence mayoral decisions and the decisions of combined authorities or local authorities. At the moment, only local authorities have this particular requirement written into law, under the Local Authorities (Executive Arrangements) (Meetings and Access to Information) (England) Regulations 2012, which clearly set out how key decisions are to be included in forward plans. I am not talking about planning decisions but key decisions, as set out in the schemes of delegation. Those forward plans are required to be published in advance, so that people who want to influence or scrutinise those decisions can bid to change them, or for things to be taken into account at the appropriate time.
Again, this certainly comes out of my experience in the London Assembly. It unanimously passed a motion in 2022 that was put forward by one of the Liberal Democrat members and me, which said that the Mayor of London should publish a forward plan. However, he did not agree to do that, as he said that he was complying with everything in legislation; so the answer seems to be for legislation to require both the Mayor of London and these new combined authority mayors to publish a forward plan along the same lines. Looking at the 2012 regulations, it would be very simple to change the current wording, “local authorities”, to “strategic and local authorities”, if the Minister wanted.
I also point the Committee to the excellent report published last month by the GLA oversight committee, a cross-party committee currently chaired by a Labour member of the London Assembly. It makes exactly the same request: for a forward plan of key mayoral decisions to be put into the 1999 Act. Because of the complexities of the different regulations, I have not tabled an amendment for such a change, but I hope the Minister would consider the question of effective scrutiny of these new bodies and the ability to influence them. I hope she could potentially come forward with a new clause at a later stage for us.
David Simmonds
The Opposition support the amendment; the principle of having a simple majority is sound. In oral evidence, we heard about why Manchester works and London does not, and there is a logic to implementing those measures consistently across the country. We support introducing that consistency.
There is a broader question, however. I understand what the Minister and the Government are trying to achieve; it would clearly be frustrating if one authority was effectively acting as a blocker. However, I asked the Minister earlier to give us some assurances about the treatment applied when financial impacts occur that affect one or more of the constituent authorities in a combined authority area. There will be cases—we have seen them in planning, for example—where an authority argues that to deliver its housing target, a site in another local authority’s area must be developed, because it does not have sufficient developable land to hit the target that it has been given; legally, it is not that authority’s decision. There will be other examples.
I am mindful of some of the Government’s amendments that introduce a lot more scope into this Bill for mayors and combined authorities to undertake their housing responsibilities. One of the main routes for funding is through borrowing against the housing revenue account, which is ringfenced. Each individual local authority has a legal duty to balance that account and the power to borrow against it; it also holds all of the legal housing duties and responsibilities. The purpose of the measures is to make mayors the vehicle for the delivery of asylum accommodation, as opposed to asylum hotels, as is the case now to some degree. Yesterday, on the Floor of the House, another Minister in the Department alluded to this in his response to a question about asylum accommodation.
Those decisions will have a significant impact on the legal obligations of the authorities that sit beneath the mayoral authority. There is a risk that being outvoted in a decision made at combined authority level would put an individual constituent authority in breach of its legal obligations to balance its dedicated schools grant, its housing revenue account or some other element of its council tax account. Will the Minister, either now or in writing, set out what arrangements will apply in the likely situation of a conflict between the legal obligations on a constituent authority to balance the budget and the strategic decisions put forward by the combined authority? How will the conflict be resolved without undue detriment to the constituent authority in particular, which is the one that will find itself in court?
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I will respond to the amendment to clause 48, and then I will pick up the specific questions from the hon. Member. The GLA has a different and long-established governance model. In London, the mayor is elected by the people of London to make decisions; the Assembly’s role is to scrutinise those decisions. As a London MP, I think that model has worked well for London for well over 25 years. It is tested and it strikes the right balance between the executive authority of the mayor and the scrutiny of the Assembly.
Siân Berry
It is notable that recently the London Assembly has, on a number of occasions, made constructive changes to the mayor’s budget at stage one of budget setting, which have simply been overturned at the second stage. This tendency, I think, is part of the growing need for a change in the threshold.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
We think that the model works well. We have heard representations from constituents, local authorities, Assembly members, and the mayor himself. Any model needs to evolve; as we think about how we expand the powers of the mayor, which we want to, we will also be thinking about reforming the GLA to make it fit for purpose in the 21st century. We will take into consideration some of the points that have been made in this Committee.
On the specific question about decisions at the strategic authority level putting an individual local authority in breach of its legal obligations or jeopardising its financial viability, all our experience of combined authorities is that they always operate within the legal duties of constituent authorities. I struggle to think of an example where constituent authorities have been put in such a position by their mayor and the decisions of the collective. There are sufficient safeguards in place to mitigate that risk.
I hope that majority working will benefit the collective area. This Government will make sure that clear legal obligations on constituent authorities are not breached. I am happy to write to the hon. Member to provide further reassurance on that point. I think we agree that we want clear and effective decision making with a democratic mandate, that will not jeopardise individual authorities by forcing them to breach their legal requirements and/or putting them in financial distress.
David Simmonds
Let me give a concrete example: the long-standing proposal for Heathrow expansion airport. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has set out her absolute determination to ensure that happens, because it is part of her Government’s growth agenda. It is likely to be directed under these powers and in the purview of the Mayor of London, who will ultimately have some planning role in the decision making. However, as well as being the planning authority, the London borough of Hillingdon, within which Heathrow sits entirely, has legal duties in respect of air quality. It is already breaching those duties, which it has no means of fulfilling, simply because of that external factor.
If the Treasury and the Mayor of London were say to the combined authority, “In pursuit of the growth agenda with which we have been tasked, we are determined to see this expansion take place,” immediately that local authority would be put in significant legal jeopardy. To give an indication of the scale, when the Localism Act 2011 was debated and there was also interaction with European Union standards, it equated to an annual fine of £150 million to be paid by the legally responsible local authority. That is a significant jeopardy, and it is by no means the only one—in the case of special educational needs and disabilities obligations, for example, there are significant duties to pay compensation in the event of failure.
We can all envisage situations where a mayor decides that, for the good of everybody, they want an individual place to take a hit, but through the judicial review process that places that individual local authority at significant moral and financial risk. If the Minister sets out how those very significant and real risks will be addressed, I will be grateful.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I thank the hon. Member for that very detailed and specific example. The concerns he raised have been heard and noted. Both in practice and principle, ensuring that no constituent authority is put in either financial or legal jeopardy underwrites all of this. I will take the hon. Member’s points away and write to provide the relevant reassurances.
The Chair
As I said this morning, Minister, if you are going to write to the Member, I would be grateful if you did so in a timely fashion and made that correspondence available to all members of the Committee for consideration.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2 agreed to.
Clause 7
Combined authorities and CCAs: powers not limited by other provision or
powers
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
Clause 7 is a small but important clause that supports the wiring of our new devolution framework. As hon. Members will know, the Bill introduces a systemic approach, ending one-off deals and creating a standardised devolution framework in which strategic authorities and mayors are given a clear and coherent set of functions. However, the Government recognise that it may, on very rare occasions, be necessary to tailor the exercise of specific functions to reflect local circumstances and to preserve the smooth running of public services. Clause 7 provides that existing powers that allow Ministers to modify how a function is exercised by an individual combined authority or county combined authority can continue. Exceptions will be rare, but this flexibility, where appropriate and necessary and where it reflects local circumstances, will be essential to ensure the smooth running of public services.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 8
Combined authorities and CCAs: designation as established mayoral strategic authorities
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
The devolution White Paper set out our commitment to introduce a new category of established mayoral strategic authority, representing the highest level of devolution in England. The clause delivers on that commitment. It enables a mayoral strategic authority that meets the eligibility criteria set out in the English devolution White Paper to submit a written proposal to the Secretary of State for designation as an established mayoral strategic authority. Designation will provide a strategic authority with access to the highest level of powers and functions in the devolution framework, as well as the right to request additional devolved functions and eligibility to receive an integrated funding settlement.
In the event that a Secretary of State decided not to designate an authority as an established mayoral strategic authority, they would be required to notify the authority in writing of the reasons for their decision. It would remain open to the authority to submit a fresh request at some future point. Importantly, once an authority has been designated as an established mayoral strategic authority, it will not be possible for Ministers to remove its status through secondary legislation. In that way, we will hardwire the powers and functions of established mayoral strategic authorities into our system of government, future-proofing arrangements against unnecessary change and ensuring permanent and enduring devolution.
David Simmonds
I draw the Committee’s attention to a topic to which we will return throughout our proceedings: the extent to which the devolution legislation is about the powers of the Secretary of State to designate this or direct that. Ironically, we are embarked on a course of action that started with us hearing about how it was going to be locally led, despite all evidence to the contrary, yet as we proceed, we have clause after clause and paragraph after paragraph referring to new powers for the Government to make local authorities do this or to direct them to do that. It is clearly not in the spirit of devolution.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
The clause does two things. The proposal to become an established mayoral strategic authority will come up from the locality. The power is about the ability of the Secretary of State to designate it as such at its request; it is not about the Secretary of State imposing the status on any area. Critically, it will lock in the established mayoral authority for good, and will, in fact, contain and curtail the power of future Secretaries of State to decide that they will change the status of an established mayoral authority, therefore locking in devolution for the long term.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 9
Appointment of commissioners by mayors
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I beg to move amendment 68, in clause 9, page 11, line 19, leave out from “function” to “, or” in line 20.
This would omit this wording is because of its replacement by the new section 30A(2) of LURA 2023 (see Amendment 220).
Miatta Fahnbulleh
Government amendments 68 and 69 are consequential to Government amendment 220, which we will discuss later. Government amendment 220 will ensure that responsibility for fire and rescue functions sits directly with the elected mayor, who can delegate them only to a public safety commissioner and not to deputies or officers, thereby strengthening accountability. Government amendments 68 and 69 simply remove wording that will be superseded should Government amendment 220 be accepted.
Amendment 68 agreed to.
Amendment made: 69, in clause 9, page 12, line 7, leave out from “function” to “, or” in line 8.—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)
This would omit this wording is because of its replacement by the new section 107DZA(2) of LDEDCA 2009 (see Amendment 220).
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 2—Policy delivery in areas of competence—
“(1) Any function of a mayoral combined authority or mayoral combined county authority which—
(a) relates to an area of competence, and
(b) is not a mayoral function exercisable solely by the mayor
must be exercised by or under the direct authority of the constituent members of that authority.
(2) No person may be appointed to exercise any function that relates to making or delivering policy relating to an area of competence unless that person is an elected member of—
(a) the relevant strategic authority, or
(b) a constituent council within the relevant strategic authority.
(3) Nothing in this section is to be taking as preventing the appointment of staff by the strategic authority or its elected members for the purposes of administrative, advisory or technical support for the exercise of its functions.
(4) For the purposes of this section, ‘constituent members’ means any elected representative who is—
(a) appointed by a constituent council to be a member of the mayoral combined authority or mayoral combined county authority;
(b) any person acting in the place of a person appointed under paragraph (a).”
This new clause provides that any policy delivery or development relating to an area of competence in a strategic authority is carried out by an elected representative.
New clause 21—Power to provide for an elected mayor to appoint a deputy mayor—
“(1) The Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 (section 107C) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1), leave out ‘one of the members of the authority to be the mayor’s deputy’ and substitute ‘a deputy mayor’.
(3) In subsection (3)(c), leave out ‘the person ceases to be a member of the combined authority’ and insert ‘the person ceases to be a councillor of a constituent council of the authority’
(4) In subsection (4), leave out ‘another member of the combined authority’ and substitute ‘another councillor of a constituent council’.”
This new clause would amend section 107C of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 so that a mayor is no longer restricted to appointing a deputy mayor from among the leaders of the constituent local authority members of the Combined Authority.
New clause 22—Mayoral special advisers—
“(1) The Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 (section 15) is amended as follows.
(2) After section 15 (Definition of ‘special adviser’ insert—
‘15A Mayoral special advisers
(1) A mayor may appoint one mayoral special adviser.
(2) A mayoral special adviser is a person who holds a position within a mayoral strategic authority and whose appointment to that position meets the requirements in subsection (3).
(3) The requirements are—
(a) the mayoral special adviser is appointed to assist the Mayor after being selected by the Mayor personally;
(b) the appointment will end not later than—
(i) the day on which the Mayor ceases to hold office, or
(ii) if earlier, the end of the day after the day of the poll at the election following the appointment.
(4) The Secretary of State must publish a code of conduct for mayoral special advisers (“the code”).
(5) Before publishing the code (or any revision of it) the Secretary of State must consult the Council of Nations and Regions.
(6) The code must provide that a mayoral special adviser may not—
(a) authorise the expenditure of public funds; or
(b) exercise any power in relation to the management of any part of the mayoral or strategic authority.
(7) The code must provide that a mayoral special adviser may—
(a) engage in political activity; and
(b) provide party-political advice to the Mayor.
(8) The code must form part of the terms and conditions of service of any mayoral special adviser.
(9) A person appointed under this section is not to be regarded, for the purposes of Part I of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 (political restriction of officers and staff), as holding a politically restricted post under a local authority.’”
This new clause would insert a new section into the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 to establish a statutory framework for the appointment of “mayoral special advisers”. It makes provision about appointment, function, code of conduct, and exemption from political restrictions.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
The public rightly expect that mayoral strategic authorities will have access to the expertise they need, that they will work with businesses and other stakeholders, and that mayors will work full time to deliver for their communities. Mayoral strategic authorities will undertake critical new functions, including a stronger set of planning, transport and skills powers and, increasingly, police, fire and public health duties. The authorities will also represent their region in engagement with national bodies, and undertake joint working with partners. It is simply not realistic to expect a single mayor to do all that on their own.
The appointment of commissioners will be a local decision and no additional funding will be provided. I will gladly take Members’ questions now, but when we discuss schedule 3 in four groups’ time, I will expand on some of the checks and balances we are introducing to ensure that commissioners add real value to local decision making. I commend clause 9 to the Committee.
Vikki Slade (Mid Dorset and North Poole) (LD)
The name of the Bill promises devolution and community empowerment, yet a number of its clauses cause the Liberal Democrats some concern, and this is one. A key principle of democracy, local or national, is to have elected people—Ministers, Members of Parliament or councillors—delivering for the people who elect them. It makes little sense that a mayor of a combined county authority or combined authority, with dozens or scores of skilled constituent councillors and council leaders beneath them, might instead choose to appoint a commissioner to such an important role.
We heard in oral evidence from Councillor Bev Craig about the model used in Manchester, where the leaders of the constituent councils perform one of the portfolios. That strikes me as much more appropriate in a large strategic authority, where each of those individuals has skin in the game. There is no reason why a mayoral authority should not operate in the same way as large unitary authorities do. Mine represents more than 400,000 people and does not require a commissioner to look at planning, although it does have a head of planning—a paid member of staff. Policy decisions have in the English system traditionally been made by politicians, so I struggle to see why creating a new layer of authorities, further away from people, should take away the principle that such decisions should be made by elected people.
Some have suggested that there are not enough constituent council leaders in some areas—perhaps areas that have only three or four council leaders. There are some incredible deputy leaders and portfolio holders. There may be a case for drawing from a broader pool, but suggesting that those people are not sufficiently qualified in understanding their area or area of expertise could damage the respect that council leaders have in their area, as well as the connection between a constituent council and the strategic authority that sits above it. If we want constituent councils to drive better strategic decisions and better strategic outcomes for all residents, it would be much more sensible to give those individuals a real role in the authority. Given the way that additional responsibility allowances are scheduled, that can be a lot cheaper, because the Bill does not provide for people to have the double allowances that we already have in other parts of the system.
If we bring in external individuals as commissioners, there will be few checks and balances; they are not democratically accountable. The mayor may well be able to remove them, as is detailed in the Bill, but the public cannot remove them. Fundamentally, the people who are making policy decisions should be able to be removed by the public. They should also be held to the standards regime, as well as the other elements of conflicts of interest and financial declarations that councillors must follow.
I think that is all I want to say, but I feel really strongly that a model is there, such as the one in Manchester. We have heard about London evolving over time, but we have some great models running in the country. To me, it seems a sensible way forward to look at what they are doing in Greater Manchester, which is already incredibly successful.
Siân Berry
I am attempting in my speech not to be too biased towards what I am used to, because that is a failing as well. We should discuss this in a very open way. Other new clauses I have tabled contain proposals for things such as a citizens assembly. We should look at international examples as well. When there are proposals to spend a significant amount of money on the commissioners, there is value in spending an appropriate amount on decent scrutiny and elected representatives. Again, I am biased—I am an elected representative. I think we are good value, but that is a case to be made.
Finally, I cannot find any mention in schedule 3 about guidance that the Secretary of State may issue to commissioners about conduct, standards and transparency. I would like some reassurance from the Minister about guidance on those aspects of the job. Even if they are not elected, they are accountable to the public and must be given a process and regime of standards, and potentially be brought into existing standards systems. Without scrutiny, standards and regulations to govern their behaviour, I worry about this in the same way as several other Members today have.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
Commissioners can and will support mayors in getting the job done for their communities. They are not compulsory. There is no obligation on a mayor to appoint commissioners, but it gives the mayor the option of increasing capacity and expertise to do that. The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion talked about the example of Greater Manchester, where they have council leaders who are portfolio leads. It is worth pointing out that Manchester also uses commissioners—for example, on active travel—so it can be complementary or can supplement. It is just giving them an additional set of levers in order to respond.
It is also worth pointing out that there will be some roles that the mayor has accountability for that they simply cannot delegate to councillors—for example, strategic planning powers, where direct delegation to a commissioner might expand the mayor’s capacity to dispense with that responsibility. However, to the point about checks and balances, which has been made time and again, it is important to be clear that we completely agree on the need for accountability for commissioners. They will be accountable to the mayor for their performance, who has the power to terminate their appointment, and the combined authority or combined county authority must also agree before any non-mayoral functions are delegated to the commissioner. Critically, the combined authority or combined county authority overview and scrutiny committee will also have the power to recommend the termination of commissioners if they think the commissioner is not performing or delivering. A two-thirds majority of members of the authority is required to accept that recommendation.
Siân Berry
Does the Minister believe that the people who are able to recommend that the commissioner be terminated have sufficient ways to discover whether or not they should be?
Miatta Fahnbulleh
The hon. Member made the point about the scrutiny of commissioners, which is a fair and valid point, and my hon. Friend the Member for North West Cambridgeshire made the point about flexibility in different contexts, particularly for smaller strategic authorities. We have come at this in such a way as to allow local areas as much flexibility as possible, but these are valid points about making sure that the model is flexible enough to respond to specific contexts. We will provide further detail in statutory guidance on the selection and appointment of commissioners, as well as other operational matters that the combined authority or combined county authority will need to consider, and we will take some of the points that have been raised as we do that in due course.
Lewis Cocking (Broxbourne) (Con)
The Minister talks about our scrutiny committees being able to recommend the termination of commissioners. Has she given any thought to their involvement in the appointment of commissioners? For example, currently, those appointed as deputy police and crime commissioners have to appear before the police and crime panel, which makes a recommendation to the police and crime commissioner about their suitability for the role. Has the Minister given any thought to how scrutiny committees can get involved before someone takes on the commissioner role, rather than waiting to see if they are good or not and then making a recommendation to the mayor?
Miatta Fahnbulleh
We have done this through the constituent members of the combined authority, so that before an appointment can be made, the full combined authority will need to agree to that appointment. We think that provides sufficient safeguards and the ability to scrutinise; however, the point about how we ensure ongoing scrutiny of the work being done and the performance by more than the mayor and the combined authority is a fair point, and we will take it away.
Manuela Perteghella (Stratford-on-Avon) (LD)
The commissioners are not accountable to the public; they are accountable to the mayor, who will of course be elected. The Minister talks about scrutiny, but what about holding them to account on public standards? What kind of framework is there to ensure trust in these commissioners?
Miatta Fahnbulleh
All holders of public office have to adhere to public standards; that is as true for national Government as it is for regional and local government. We expect those standards to apply, and the safeguards we are putting in place by enabling the mayor to terminate based on performance or poor conduct will ensure that they are upheld.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 9, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 3
Commissioners
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I beg to move amendment 70, in schedule 3, page 111, line 33, at end insert—
“(d) excepted fire and rescue functions.”
This would prevent a commissioner appointed by the mayor of a CCA from exercising “excepted fire and rescue functions” (defined in Amendment 71).
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 71, 73 and 74.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
The amendments will prevent a commissioner from exercising certain fire and rescue functions that should be reserved as functions of the mayor, as head of the fire and rescue authority in the area. The effective delegation of fire and rescue functions to a commissioner can ease capacity constraints on the mayor, by ensuring that there is a dedicated individual with the time and expertise to focus on executing those functions. Fire and rescue functions are already delegated successfully to deputy mayors for policing and crime in Greater Manchester and in York and North Yorkshire. The ability to delegate to a commissioner, without the need for secondary legislation, simplifies that process. If they wish, mayors will be able to make an existing deputy mayor for policing and crime the public safety commissioner, meaning that individual could lead on both policing and fire.
However, certain functions should be the sole responsibility of an elected mayor, as head of the fire and rescue authority. The retained functions are those with the most significant bearing on the strategic direction of the fire service, such as its budget, its risk plan, and the appointment or dismissal of the chief fire officer. It is important that these decisions are taken right at the top, and that the person taking them is accountable at the ballot box.
These amendments provide for the effective delegation of fire and rescue functions. They ensure that decisions are taken at the right level and support the Government’s commitment to ensure that our communities are safe.
Amendment 70 agreed to.
Amendment made: 71, in schedule 3, page 112, line 3, at end insert—
“(6) In this paragraph “excepted fire and rescue functions” means—
(a) functions under the following provisions of the FRSA 2004—
(i) section 13 (reinforcement schemes);
(ii) section 15 (arrangements with other employers of fire-fighters);
(iii) section 16 (arrangements for discharge of functions by others);
(b) the functions of—
(i) appointing, suspending or dismissing the chief fire officer;
(ii) approving the terms of appointment of the chief fire officer;
(iii) holding the chief fire officer to account for managing the fire and rescue service;
(c) approving—
(i) the community risk management plan;
(ii) the fire and rescue declaration;
(d) approving plans, modifications to plans and additions to plans for the purpose of ensuring that—
(i) as far as reasonably practicable, the CCA is able to perform its fire and rescue functions if an emergency occurs, and
(ii) the CCA is able to perform its functions so far as is necessary or desirable for the purpose of preventing an emergency or reducing, controlling or mitigating the effects of an emergency, or taking other action in connection with it;
(e) approving any arrangements for the co-operation of the CCA in relation to its fire and rescue functions with other Category 1 responders and Category 2 responders in respect of—
(i) the performance of the CCA’s duty as a fire and rescue authority under section 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (duty to assess, plan and advise);
(ii) any duties under subordinate legislation made in exercise of powers under that Act.
(7) In sub-paragraph (6) and this sub-paragraph—
“Category 1 responder” and “Category 2 responder” have the meanings given in section 3 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (section 2: supplemental);
“chief fire officer” means the person with responsibility for managing the fire and rescue service;
“community risk management plan” means a plan which—
(a) is prepared and published by the combined authority in accordance with the Fire and Rescue National Framework, and
(b) sets out for the period covered by the document in accordance with the requirements of the Framework—
(i) the combined authority’s priorities and objectives, and
(ii) an assessment of all foreseeable fire and rescue related risks that could affect its community, in accordance with the discharge of the combined authority’s fire and rescue functions;
“emergency” has the meaning given in section 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (meaning of “emergency”);
“fire and rescue authority” means a fire and rescue authority under the FRSA 2004;
“fire and rescue declaration” means a document which—
(a) is prepared and published by the combined authority in accordance with the Fire and Rescue National Framework, and
(b) contains a statement of the way in which the combined authority has had regard, in the period covered by the document, to the Framework and to any community risk management plan prepared by the combined authority for that period;
“fire and rescue functions” means—
(a) functions of a fire and rescue authority which the combined authority has by virtue of an order under section 105A, or
(b) functions which the combined authority has as a fire and rescue authority by virtue of section 1(2)(f) or (g) of the FRSA 2004;
“Fire and Rescue National Framework” means the document prepared by the Secretary of State under section 21 of the FRSA 2004;
“fire and rescue service” means the personnel, services and equipment secured for the purposes of carrying out the functions of a fire and rescue authority under—
(a) section 6 of the FRSA 2004 (fire safety);
(b) section 7 of the FRSA 2004 (fire-fighting);
(c) section 8 of the FRSA 2004 (road traffic accidents);
(d) any applicable order under section 9 of the FRSA 2004 Act (emergencies);
(e) section 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (duty to assess, plan and advise) and any applicable subordinate legislation made under that Act;
(f) any other provision of, or made under, an enactment which confers functions on a fire and rescue authority;
“FRSA 2004” means the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004.”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)
This would define the “excepted fire and rescue functions” which a commissioner appointed by the mayor of a CCA would be prevented from exercising by Amendment 70.
David Simmonds
I beg to move amendment 293, in schedule 3, page 112, line 16, at end insert—
“(2A) The relevant remuneration panel may not recommend allowances which exceed the amount paid in salary to a person employed at director level within the relevant authority.”.
This amendment ensures that Commissioners cannot be paid more than Directors working for the authority.
David Simmonds
I understand the issue that the hon. Member is highlighting. One thing that emerged from the debate about councillor pensions was that they were essentially taken away by a decision of Parliament, without the process of legislation. One of the risks here is that statutory guidance, robust as it can be and coming with a duty to “have regard”, can be changed quite quickly. Therefore, if this is not clearly set out on the face of the Bill, the ability of this Parliament and of local communities, as we are observing, to exercise the degree of accountability and scrutiny that they might wish is undermined. That is why we have proposed these amendments.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I thank the hon. Member for his thoughtful contribution on this critical question of how to ensure value for money in the remuneration of commissioners. It is important that allowances paid to commissioners accurately reflect the work they do but also represent value for money. We completely agree with that principle. That is why the Bill, as drafted, has a clear process for setting the allowances of commissioners. The relevant authority must consider a report by a relevant remuneration panel, and payments cannot exceed the amount specified in that report.
Ultimately, what commissioners are paid is a local decision, and we have crafted the measures for that, but it is a decision that needs to be made in alignment with recommendations, as is the practice across local government. Adding a further requirement that commissioners cannot be paid more than directors would reduce local autonomy in decision making and would pre-emptively undermine the relevant remuneration panel. The Bill is about empowering places, but what we can and will consider is how we set up statutory guidance to provide clarity about what is possible and to deal with some of the potential pitfalls that the hon. Member has raised.
Amendment 292 seeks to place a duty on remuneration panels to consider and make recommendations about the local government pension scheme. Again, I understand the intent behind the amendment and the importance of ensuring that public officials in local government are properly remunerated and incentivised. However, I do not believe the amendment necessarily advances that.
We value the work that remuneration panels do to make considered recommendations about allowances that should be paid locally. However, overall access and eligibility to the local government pension scheme is dealt with at national level. It is therefore not clear what value the amendment would add, which is why I ask the shadow Minister to withdraw it.
David Simmonds
I have listened intently to what the Minister has said. I think the risk is that, if things are delegated to statutory guidance, what emerges later on will not meet the expectations set out in the debate. I will therefore push for a vote on these amendments.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I beg to move amendment 72, in schedule 3, page 112, line 23, leave out from beginning to end of line 27 and insert—
“Ending of appointment
8A The appointment of a person as a commissioner ends if—
(a) the appointment ceases to have effect in accordance with paragraph 2(2), 4(3) or 5,
(b) the appointment ends—
(i) in accordance with the terms and conditions included by virtue of paragraph 6(1), or
(ii) in accordance with paragraph 6(2),
(c) the appointment is terminated in accordance with its terms and conditions—
(i) by the mayor for the area of the CCA (whether that is the person who made the appointment or a successor), or
(ii) by the commissioner,
(d) the appointment ceases to have effect in accordance with paragraph 10(4), or
(e) the commissioner dies.”
This would state the ways in which the appointment of a commissioner can end.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
Simply, these amendments set out the ways in which a commissioner’s appointment can end. Specifically, it can end if the appointment is invalid, if the person becomes ineligible, if the term of the appointment ends, if the appointment is terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions, if a recommendation to terminate the commissioner’s appointment is accepted, or if the commissioner passes away.
We have talked about the accountability mechanisms that we are putting in place to ensure that commissioners play the role they should play, but they are accountable to the mayor. We have also talked about the role of the scrutiny committee in providing oversight and recommendations about termination.
Amendment 72 agreed to.
Amendments made: 73, in schedule 3, page 116, line 40, at end insert—
“(d) excepted fire and rescue functions.”
This would prevent a commissioner appointed by the mayor of a combined authority from exercising “excepted fire and rescue functions” (defined in Amendment 74).
Amendment 74, in schedule 3, page 117, line 10, at end insert—
“(6) In this paragraph ‘excepted fire and rescue functions’ means—
(a) functions under the following provisions of the FRSA 2004—
(i) section 13 (reinforcement schemes);
(ii) section 15 (arrangements with other employers of fire-fighters);
(iii) section 16 (arrangements for discharge of functions by others);
(b) the functions of—
(i) appointing, suspending or dismissing the chief fire officer;
(ii) approving the terms of appointment of the chief fire officer;
(iii) holding the chief fire officer to account for managing the fire and rescue service;
(c) approving—
(i) the community risk management plan;
(ii) the fire and rescue declaration;
(d) approving plans, modifications to plans and additions to plans for the purpose of ensuring that—
(i) as far as reasonably practicable, the CCA is able to perform its fire and rescue functions if an emergency occurs, and
(ii) the CCA is able to perform its functions so far as is necessary or desirable for the purpose of preventing an emergency or reducing, controlling or mitigating the effects of an emergency, or taking other action in connection with it;
(e) approving any arrangements for the co-operation of the CCA in relation to its fire and rescue functions with other Category 1 responders and Category 2 responders in respect of—
(i) the performance of the CCA’s duty as a fire and rescue authority under section 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (duty to assess, plan and advise);
(ii) any duties under subordinate legislation made in exercise of powers under that Act.
(7) In sub-paragraph (6) and this sub-paragraph—
‘Category 1 responder’ and ‘Category 2 responder’ have the meanings given in section 3 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (section 2: supplemental);
‘chief fire officer’ means the person with responsibility for managing the fire and rescue service;
‘community risk management plan’ means a plan which—
(a) is prepared and published by the combined authority in accordance with the Fire and Rescue National Framework, and
(b) sets out for the period covered by the document in accordance with the requirements of the Framework—
(i) the CCA’s priorities and objectives, and
(ii) an assessment of all foreseeable fire and rescue related risks that could affect its community, in accordance with the discharge of the CCA’s fire and rescue functions;
‘emergency’ has the meaning given in section 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (meaning of ‘emergency’);
‘fire and rescue authority’ means a fire and rescue authority under the FRSA 2004;
‘fire and rescue declaration’ means a document which—
(a) is prepared and published by the CCA in accordance with the Fire and Rescue National Framework, and
(b) contains a statement of the way in which the CCA has had regard, in the period covered by the document, to the Framework and to any community risk management plan prepared by the CCA for that period;
‘fire and rescue functions’ means—
(a) functions of a fire and rescue authority which the CCA has by virtue of regulations under section 19, or
(b) functions which the CCA has as a fire and rescue authority by virtue of section 1(2)(f) or (g) of the FRSA 2004;
‘Fire and Rescue National Framework’ means the document prepared by the Secretary of State under section 21 of the FRSA 2004;
‘fire and rescue service’ means the personnel, services and equipment secured for the purposes of carrying out the functions of a fire and rescue authority under—
(a) section 6 of the FRSA 2004 (fire safety);
(b) section 7 of the FRSA 2004 (fire-fighting);
(c) section 8 of the FRSA 2004 (road traffic accidents);
(d) any applicable order under section 9 of the FRSA 2004 Act (emergencies);
(e) section 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (duty to assess, plan and advise) and any applicable subordinate legislation made under that Act;
(f) any other provision of, or made under, an enactment which confers functions on a fire and rescue authority;
‘FRSA 2004’ means the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004.”
This would define the “excepted fire and rescue functions” which a commissioner appointed by the mayor of a combined authority would be prevented from exercising by Amendment 73.
Amendment 75, in schedule 3, page 117, line 31, leave out from beginning to end of line 36 and insert—
“Ending of appointment
8A The appointment of a person as a commissioner ends if—
(a) the appointment ceases to have effect in accordance with paragraph 2(2), 4(3) or 5,
(b) the appointment ends—
(i) in accordance with the terms and conditions included by virtue of paragraph 6(1), or
(ii) in accordance with paragraph 6(2),
(c) the appointment is terminated in accordance with its terms and conditions—
(i) by the mayor for the area of the combined authority (whether that is the person who made the appointment or a successor), or
(ii) by the commissioner,
(d) the appointment ceases to have effect in accordance with paragraph 10(4), or
(e) the commissioner dies.”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)
This would state the ways in which the appointment of a commissioner can end.
Schedule 3, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 10
Combined authorities and CCAs: allowances for members with special responsibilities
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
The clause will ensure that all combined authorities and combined county authorities can pay their members an allowance where they take on special responsibility for the combined authority or the combined county authority. Constituent council members regularly take on important additional responsibilities, particularly leading on policy portfolios such as housing or transport. We heard from the leader of Manchester city council about the important role she plays for that combined authority. They are crucial in driving forward local policy, ensuring that it meets the needs and aspirations of our communities. Indeed, their role will grow in importance as we increase the powers and functions available to combined authorities and combined county authorities.
However, currently, constituent council members can be paid for such special responsibilities only by their council, not the combined authority or combined county authority. This simply is not right; members should not be expected to do important work for free, and constituent councils should not foot the bill for work done in service of another body. Ensuring that the combined authority or combined county authority can pay its members creates a fairer system, allowing areas to recognise and reward hard work that delivers for communities. To ensure transparency and accountability, pay will be determined following a report by an independent remuneration panel.
David Simmonds
I draw the Minister’s attention to the existing arrangements for independent remuneration panels. She has referenced the proposals for how this kind of situation will be handled. However, we can envisage circumstances such as those that we heard about in Greater Manchester, where the mayoral commissioners are effectively drawn from the leadership of those local authorities.
There is a degree of ambiguity in proposed new sections 52A(6) and 113E(6), which refer to allowances paid
“in respect of the same special responsibilities”.
For example, I think of a situation where someone is a cabinet member with responsibility for transport in a constituent authority and also undertakes a strategic transport role as part of the combined authority. We as politicians would recognise that those are two different things, in the same way that a Minister undertaking duties in the Government is paid separately from their role as a Member of Parliament because those two things are distinct.
Transparency and clarity are important to retaining public confidence. Clearly, we do not want to create a situation where there is a degree of dispute, such as where a mayoral combined authority expects the constituent council to pay, or vice versa, and where an individual who wishes to take up those duties is inhibited from doing so. It would be helpful if the Minister could set out how the statutory guidance will address that issue so the Committee can be confident that we will not see this act as a barrier to participation in the governance of these new authorities.
Sam Carling
I have some more thrilling financial commentary, so I hope the Committee will forgive me. First, I welcome what the Minister has just said. Exactly this situation happened in Cambridgeshire and Peterborough, where our mayor went on medical leave for some time. His deputy, Councillor Anna Smith, who is a good friend of mine, ended up taking on the deputy mayoral role, so she had to drop hours at work and faced a significant loss of income. Our council took the decision to pay her as essentially a cabinet member, but it was not ideal. Clause 10 will resolve so many issues.
I want to highlight a discrepancy in that, at present, there is usually no allowance for members who sit on the combined authority board. A lot of the time, it is the leader of the council who does so, and it is often considered to be part of their portfolio, but it is not always leaders who sit on the board. That can lead to people taking on a very significant commitment without any financial support, despite potentially having to reduce hours at work and the like, if the councillor in question has a job, as many do. That is not conducive to having a diverse range of elected representatives to do these jobs.
Following local government reorganisation, if we have fewer leaders on boards and more holders of other portfolios and councillors, we may see this problem increase. I encourage the Minister to consider either altering the clause or making other provisions as the Bill progresses to allow combined authorities, if they wish, to pay an allowance to their board members for that role.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I understand the concerns expressed by the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner and the context in which that could arise. Our judgment is that if the independent remuneration committee does its job, we can mitigate around that. There is always a balance. We are trying to live the spirit of the Bill and to create as much autonomy, space and power for the mayor and constituent authorities to make such decisions, rather than us specifying nationally. As we get representations from strategic authorities going through the process, we will reflect that in statutory guidance, but we think we have the right balance. The important role that the remuneration committee will play will help to mitigate some of the risks the hon. Member mentioned.
On the specific example raised by my hon. Friend the Member for North West Cambridgeshire, we are not prohibiting elected members from sitting on the combined authority. It is within the gift of the combined authority. Again, we are giving as much flexibility as possible for an authority to come up with measures that work for a particular local area.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 11
Mayoral combined authorities and CCAs: precepts
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I beg to move amendment 82, in clause 11, page 14, leave out from line 35 to line 13 on page 15 and insert—
“(a) omit subsection (11)(a);
(b) in subsection (11)(b), for ‘that section’ substitute ‘section 107G of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009’;
(c) omit subsection (12)(a);
(d) in subection 12(b), for ‘that section’ substitute ‘section 41 of the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023’.”
This removes the restriction on mayoral combined authorities and mayoral CCAs only being able to issue a precept in connection with mayoral functions.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
The amendment updates the clause to ensure that mayors have the power to precept across all their functions. It replaces the provisions added to the Local Government Finance Act 1992 by the Bill, which needed clarification. The amendment will mean that, by virtue of being major precepting authorities, combined authorities and combined county authorities will have the power to precept across all their functions. It repeals provisions that previously restricted that precepting power to specific functions. The amendment more effectively meets the policy intention to allow mayors to precept for everything that they are required to do. That will give mayors more flexibility in how to fund mayoral priorities to create growth and improve local services.
Government amendments 76 and 79 provide that the issuing of precepts under the Local Government Finance Act is a function exercisable only by the mayor, and that that is the case for mayoral and non-mayoral functions. By removing restrictions from the existing legislation, the amendments will establish that precepting is a function of the mayor for expenditure relating to mayoral and non-mayoral functions, meeting the original policy intention. It has always been the intention of the Government that issuing a mayoral council tax precept should be a function of the mayor alone. The amendments will ensure that that will be the case and will ensure that mayors can precept across all their functions.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I would just point out to the hon. Gentleman that the mayoral precept was introduced in 2017 by a Conservative Government, and that mayors are directly elected. Like Members of Parliament, mayors are not immune to political pressures around tax rises, and examples across the country show that mayors are as thoughtful about the right balance between investing in their services and managing tax increases as national politicians—in fact, when we think about the record of the last Government, perhaps more so.
David Simmonds
That was a fairly shameless political pitch, but we should just reflect on the debates that took place across the Dispatch Boxes yesterday during Housing, Communities and Local Government questions, when it was highlighted that we have a Mayor of London who is quite happy to issue precepts to indulge his personal political priorities but is an abject failure in discharging his mayoral functions around housing. Thousands of people are unable to find homes in the capital because the mayor is failing to build out more than 300,000 planning permissions that have already been granted by the local authorities. That is an injustice that is being inflicted on the citizens of our capital, and this provision, as envisaged by this Labour Government, potentially inflicts the same, or an even greater, injustice on other areas of the country. For those reasons, we remain deeply concerned about it.
Particularly in an environment where, as we heard earlier, local authorities were left £1.5 billion worse off—net—by the Government’s decision to introduce additional taxes on their employees, the temptation will be for the mayoral precept to be seen as the catch-all or safety valve through which additional taxes can be extracted to meet whatever demand central Government choose to impose, without central Government being accountable for it. That is why we oppose the measures.
Vikki Slade
I have no principled objection to the mayor setting a precept. I found it confusing when I heard Mayor Houchen explain how he had a zero precept. How does anything get done? Where does the money come from? [Interruption.] I am sure he has a salary, and I am sure he has an extensive office that is paid for by someone. I accept that the principle of a precept is, in some respects, self-limiting, but what bothers me is that the combined authority mayors have no referendum cap, unlike upper-tier, lower-tier, police and crime or fire authorities.
It is fire authorities I particularly want to speak to, because although some Government amendments have been tabled on the role of the mayor in terms of fire and rescue, there is almost silence in the Bill about the role of the fire and rescue service, while embracing it completely and almost making the whole service disappear. I am really concerned that fire authorities are already desperately under-resourced. Dorset and Wiltshire Fire and Rescue Service gets £1.76 a week per household. It has desperately been trying to get a 20p per week increase, but has been told, “No, you can’t have that.” There is nothing in the Bill that protects and ringfences any money for fire services, whereas there is more talk about police services. I am looking for some reassurance and commitment about how fire services funding will be properly resourced and ringfenced to make sure that no area suffers as when we had those horrendous wildfires, where fire services had to beg, borrow and steal equipment.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
We are all hugely sympathetic to the funding of fire and rescue—as we see climate change, the imperative of fire and rescue services is key—but it is outside the scope of the Bill. We believe that we have the balance right between allowing precepting powers for mayors and allowing democratic accountability by which the electorate can hold any mayor and politician to account.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I beg to move amendment 77, in clause 11, page 15, line 15, at end insert—
“(b) in subsection (4)(a), for the words from “consists” to the end of that paragraph substitute “includes a separate component in respect of the mayor’s PCC functions,”.”
This provides for flexibility where the mayor of a mayoral combined authority has PCC functions as to how the components of the authority’s council tax calculation which relate to the authority’s other functions (both mayoral and non-mayoral) are to be set out.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 78, 80 and 81.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
The amendment relates to where a mayor has police and crime commissioner functions: secondary legislation about the arrangements for setting the precept must provide that the police and crime commissioner component is ringfenced. Where a mayor has police and crime functions for more than one police and crime commissioner area, secondary legislation must provide that there is a separate police and crime component for each area. The legislation currently provides that there must be separate components for police and crime administrative functions and for mayoral general functions.
The amendments mean that Ministers have the flexibility to provide for either one component for non-police and crime functions, or multiple separate components for different types of non-police and crime functions. I hope Members are following. This gives Ministers the option to direct how precept spending on non-police and crime functions is accounted for, by setting this out clearly in secondary legislation. In doing so, they will be able to ensure that the precept is accounted for in ways that best reflect how the precept should be spent—whether that means allowing for full flexibility across the non-police and crime component, or ringfencing money to be used for certain functions.
Amendments 78 and 81 will give the Secretary of State the ability to make an order about the preparation of budgets for all an authority’s functions. The provision in the Bill currently only provides that power in relation to the mayor’s general functions. This needs to be updated to align with the expanded mayoral precepting powers introduced by the Bill. This allows Ministers to set out the procedures that should be followed in the preparation and calculation of a budget.
By enabling Ministers to set clear direction on the preparation of budgets and the calculation of precepts, these amendments allow for consistent processes to be set across the sector, to give full effect to the expanded precepting powers.
David Simmonds
I have two questions for the Minister. First, given that these budgets, and the precepts that the amendments relate to, will sit within that bit of the Local Government Finance Act 1992, will the requirement for budgets to be balanced in-year apply to all the accounts that the Secretary of State will be giving direction to?
The second question—the Minister may wish to write to the Committee on this—is, will the consistency that she referred to be introduced by giving the Secretary of State individual, and in effect case-by-case, power to issue these directions for different authorities? Clearly, our concern is that if the door has been opened to, in effect, unlimited precept rises, and these were to be used by the Secretary of State to bail out a significant amount of debt in one of these reorganised local authorities—which I know is a significant concern of many of the local authorities that are proposing reorganisation—that would not apply everywhere.
There are certain parts of the country where there are very high levels of debt, and others where those levels of debt do not exist at all. It would be, in effect, a condition of those constituent authorities’ doing the devolution at all that they were not asked to bear that cost. Yet this Bill introduces a back-door power for the Secretary of State to direct that they would go down that route. How do the Government propose to ensure that that is forestalled, so that they can have the assurances that they would need as a necessary minimum?
Miatta Fahnbulleh
There are two processes that I, as the Minister for devolution, as opposed to the Minister for local government reorganisation, am constantly keen to emphasise. There is a devolution process and there is a local government reorganisation process, which my colleague the Minister for Local Government and Homelessness, my hon. Friend the Member for Birkenhead (Alison McGovern), is taking forward. We know that some authorities are in a difficult financial position as part of that, and we are having a conversation with those authorities in the context of the proposals they are putting forward. That is still very distinct from what we are trying to do through the devolution process, and it is important that colleagues do not conflate the two.
What I would say on the wider questions that the hon. Gentleman raised is that there is nothing that we are proposing to do through the Bill that denudes or undermines the standards for financial prudence and financial accountability that sit across the local government landscape.
David Simmonds
Turning to the question of how a mayoral precept will be used under this group of amendments that the Government have tabled, if we think of the reorganisation in Thurrock or Surrey, both those local authority areas contain a single authority that has a very high level of capital borrowing, or a high level of debt. Those authorities have been assured that there will be three years’ worth of revenue support; in effect, there will be a Government grant to cover the revenue cost of the borrowing for three years. However, the borrowing cost is extended over 40 or 50 years, so there will be a very long period of time where, as things currently stand, that local authority will be expected to meet that cost, when it comes into being.
Clearly, one way of doing that is for the Secretary to State to say, “You will raise your precept, and that is how we will deal with the debt,” but that runs contrary to the proposals for devolution where those authorities have said, “We will do this, but it is simply not fair or ethical for us to accept those debts on to our books.” I am just seeking an assurance from the Minister that either the existing provisions that require the in-year balancing will apply, in which case the Government will deal with this prior to the devolution arrangement coming into existence, or the provisions will not apply, in which case those authorities need to be mindful that the likely consequence of devolution will be a massive increase in the precept levy purely for the purpose of paying off someone else’s debt.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
To answer the specific question, yes, in-year balancing will apply. The purpose of the precepting function is to allow the mayor to invest in key things that will drive the economic prosperity of the area and the core functions that we have set out in the Bill. It would be a very brave mayor who chose to raise the precept not to deliver on that. In the end, they are democratically elected, and it will be for their residents and constituents to show them the consequences of that at the ballot box.
Amendment 77 agreed to.
Amendments made: 78, in clause 11, page 15, line 15, at end insert—
“(b) in subsection (5)(b), after ‘functions,’ insert ‘or the other functions of the authority (other than any PCC functions that are exercisable by the mayor), or both’.”
This enables the Secretary of State to require the mayor of a combined authority to prepare an annual budget in relation to the authority’s functions, excluding any mayoral PCC functions, either separately to or in combination with the budget relating to the mayor’s general functions.
Amendment 79, in clause 11, page 15, line 17, at end insert—
“(b) in subsection (2), omit ‘in respect of mayoral functions’.”
This provides that the issuing of precepts under the Local Government Finance Act 1992 in respect of expenditure relating to the functions of a mayoral CCA is a function exercisable by the mayor acting on behalf of the CCA.
Amendment 80, in clause 11, page 15, line 17, at end insert—
“(b) in subsection (4)(a), for the words from ‘consists’ to the end of that paragraph substitute ‘includes a separate component in respect of the mayor’s PCC functions,’.”
This provides for flexibility where the mayor of a mayoral CCA has PCC functions as to how the components of the CCA’s council tax calculation which relate to the CCA’s other functions (both mayoral and non-mayoral) are to be set out.
Amendment 81, in clause 11, page 15, line 17, at end insert—
“(b) in subsection (5)(b), after ‘functions,’ insert ‘or the other functions of the CCA (other than any PCC functions that are exercisable by the mayor), or both’.”—(Miatta Fahnbulleh.)
This enables the Secretary of State to require the mayor of a CCA to prepare an annual budget in relation to the CCA functions, excluding any mayoral PCC functions, either separately to or in combination with the budget relating to the mayor’s general functions.
Clause 11, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12
Power to borrow
Manuela Perteghella
I beg to move amendment 20, in clause 12, page 16, line 24, at end insert—
“(9AA) A combined authority or CCA must provide a report to the Secretary of State to lay before both Houses of Parliament a report detailing the reasons for which they are seeking consent to exercise the power conferred by section 1.”
This amendment would require the combined authority or CCA to lay a report before Parliament detailing the reasons for which they are seeking the Secretary of State’s consent for exercise of the powers conferred by section 1 on mayoral combined authority or mayoral CCA.
Manuela Perteghella
No, the amendment is not kicking anything into the long grass. We have to get the Bill—this devolution—right. It is all about accountability, as I said when we were discussing the commissioners. This is a big change. Some of the Committee will already have unitary authorities and I will talk later about devolved Administrations, but for my constituency, that will be new. We need to get it right. Going back to the cost, that will be smaller compared with the cost of what could go wrong.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I will speak to clause stand part and amendment 83 before responding directly to amendment 20. On the clause, all existing mayoral combined authorities and mayoral combined county authorities have powers to borrow for all their functions. That allows them to invest in economically productive infrastructure. Unlike for local authorities, the existing process for confirming the power to borrow money on mayoral combined and mayoral combined county authorities is by making a bespoke statutory instrument after an institution has been established. To confirm such powers by bespoke statutory instrument is highly inefficient and slow. The clause streamlines the process by giving the power to borrow to mayoral combined authorities and county authorities for purposes relevant to all their functions. It preserves existing safeguards by requiring them to obtain the Secretary of State’s consent before they exercise the power for the first time in respect of functions other than transport, policing, and fire and rescue. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Government amendment 83 is minor and technical. It simply clarifies that the reference to section 12 coming into force relates to clause 12 of the Bill. Amendment 20 would require a combined authority or combined county authority to produce a report, to be laid before the House by the Secretary of State, detailing the reasons for which they are seeking consent to exercise borrowing powers. As my hon. Friend the Member for Banbury and Opposition Members have pointed out, this would be an onerous, costly and time-consuming process. The amendment is well-intentioned, but we do not think it necessary.
Like the rest of local government, combined authorities and combined county authorities must operate within the prudential framework, which comprises statutory duties and codes that are intended to ensure that all borrowing and investment is prudent, affordable and sustainable. The framework already provides robust mechanisms of oversight and accountability. In addition, the exercise of borrowing powers by mayoral combined authorities and county authorities to date has not raised issues. Amendment 20 also contradicts the Bill’s aim of furthering devolution and increasing financial autonomy for these authorities. For this reason, I hope that the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon will withdraw it.
David Simmonds
I want to make sure that I can reconcile the Minister’s observations and the import of the amendments with her reply to me earlier, when she said that the requirement to balance in-year will apply. Clearly, the provisions essentially state that the Secretary of State can give consent for a substantial degree of borrowing, but it is not at all clear in the clause or the amendments what the purpose of the borrowing would be.
Manchester’s improvements to its transport system are fantastic, but they were funded by central Government as part of the devolution deal, and they are now creating a significant ongoing deficit in the mayoral budget, which has to be covered, essentially, through precepting—by levying those in the local area to cover the cost. There is clearly a concern with that. If the borrowing is for capital purposes there is a clear strategy for its repayment, and it must be for the purposes of capital investment. However, if borrowing is undertaken to cover shortfalls between revenue and the mayor’s expenditure on day-to-day costs, this House would have significant concerns about it in relation to our national accounts. Can the Minister tell the Committee how that decision making will sufficiently constrain a mayor or combined authority from undertaking borrowing that is for the purposes of day-to-day revenue expenditure, so that we do not find a large debt bubble growing underneath these new bodies?
Miatta Fahnbulleh
Yes, I will answer that question. There is a contradiction in the hon. Member’s position. He has spent much of today talking about the need for us to take a more local approach and to give local leaders and communities control, yet he is talking about restricting that very power. Everything that the strategic authority and mayoral combined authority will do will have to operate within the prudential framework. There are robust mechanisms to ensure that all their financial mechanisms adhere to the standards that we expect across local government and national Government.
The shadow Minister gave the example of Greater Manchester. That was a combination of a grant—a lot of devolved areas have an investment fund—borrowing and precepting. That is what we would expect for big capital projects. My experience suggests that mayors across the country have the aptitude and ability to make the right economic decisions on how they balance investment in things that will unlock the economic potential of their areas. We should trust them to do so, as the hon. Member has been saying all day.
Manuela Perteghella
As I said, the amendment would give Parliament the opportunity to assess whether devolution requests are handled with consistency and fairness across the regions, because at the moment they are not. I therefore wish to press it to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The Chair
We have a number of clauses on which I feel we can make some progress. My proposal is that we get to either the end of clause 19 or 5 pm, whichever comes first. I will not sit here in the cold for much longer than that.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
As the local transport authority, combined authorities and combined county authorities deliver a range of local transport functions across their area. Each combined authority or combined county authority agrees its own transport budget for the year and, in many cases, constituent councils contribute to this through a transport levy. This is because constituent councils receive funding for some transport functions directly from Government.
The clause standardises the power for combined authorities and combined county authorities to levy such funding from their constituent councils to cover the cost of their transport functions, where they are not otherwise met. This power has proved effective in supporting transport delivery in local areas. For example, each of the seven councils of the West Midlands combined authority pays a levy based on its population figures, which goes on to fund a range of functions from subsidised bus services to the English national concessionary travel scheme, which provides free bus travel for eligible older and disabled people.
This power complements clause 39, which provides combined authorities and combined county authorities with the power to pay grants to constituent councils. Together, these powers support partnership working between combined authorities and combined county authorities and their constituent members.
David Simmonds
Again, I seek a point of clarification from the Minister. I understand the purpose of the clause, but clearly there is a distinction between a levy, where it is the constituent authority that is required to pay, and a precept, where it is the taxpayer who is paying for it through their council tax bill. I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify, if necessary in writing, how it will work where there is a dispute about the payment.
If we take London as an example, we have a London-wide concessionary travel scheme, but it is has very different application in different boroughs. It is easy to foresee a situation where, particularly if the purpose of the overall transport levy does not benefit the whole of the mayoral combined authority area, there will be a dispute about whether that is an appropriate way forward. Particularly if the levy is large, it would have a significant impact on the budget of the constituent local authority. Can the Minister set out how that type of process will be addressed in practice?
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I have agreed that I will write on the specifics; I think this question comes back to the same theme of how we mitigate collective decision making and agreement across constituent authorities that put at risk their financial viability, or cut across the legal obligation of a particular constituent authority, and I will capture that in writing. However, I would say that we cannot legislate for every eventuality. Indeed, I do not think that is the purpose of legislation. What we can draw on is the practice that we see across the country. Broadly, it is not in the interests of a mayor, who has been democratically elected by the residents and constituents of any of their constituent authorities, to make decisions that will be fundamentally detrimental to those constituents.
The Chair
I am grateful to the Minister for saying that she will include that in her correspondence, which we look forward to with enthusiasm.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 14
Combined authorities and CCAs: minor amendments
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
Committee members will recall that clause 1 introduced the established mayoral strategic authority as a specific type of strategic authority. It drew a distinction between combined authorities and combined county authorities led by a mayor, and those operating without one. Clause 14 inserts the formal definitions of an established mayoral strategic authority, a non-mayoral combined authority and a non-mayoral combined county authority into the relevant existing legislation. These are minor but necessary provisions intended to give clear meaning to the existing legislation.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 15
Additional functions of the GLA
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
It is vital that the devolution framework works for the unique circumstances of London’s governance, which we have talked about in this Committee. That is why the Bill will enable Government to confer functions on the Mayor of London, the Greater London Authority and its functional bodies. Previously, the Government could change the powers of the Greater London Authority only via primary legislation. This clause brings London into line with other strategic authorities by enabling the Government to change its powers via secondary legislation. This will ensure that the Greater London Authority benefits from the devolution framework and can deepen its powers over time.
David Simmonds
Again, I have a question of clarification; can the Minister tell the Committee whether these powers apply to a transfer of functions, as opposed to the conferral of functions? We know there have been situations, and we can certainly envisage some within the overall package of the Bill, where the statutory duties of the constituent authorities could be transferred over to the mayor, either en bloc or in part. Indeed, there might be times when it might be a sensible approach; if there is an example of a significant failure in one authority, that could be looked after by the mayoral office while the situation is turned around—that goes to the point raised about South Northamptonshire. However, can the Minister clarify whether this refers solely to new powers that are conferred, or opens up the door to the transfer of functions that are currently statutory duties of constituent authorities?
Miatta Fahnbulleh
This clause relates to functions and powers that sit underneath the devolution framework that we have talked about and are putting on the face of the Bill, and the seven areas of competencies that this measure applies to.
We currently have a situation where, for example, certain powers will go to Greater Manchester that currently would not necessarily go to the Mayor of London and the GLA, and that does not feel right. Clause 15 allows a mechanism and a process to make sure that there is consistency across the piece, and that we can achieve that without having to go through primary legislation.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 15 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 16
Members of legislatures disqualified for being a mayor of a strategic authority
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
Clause 16 will prevent individuals from being a Member of Parliament, or of the devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland, and a mayor of a strategic authority at the same time.
The Government are clear that mayors are central to delivering the growth, economic prosperity and change that local communities want. Already, the impact of our mayors, from West Yorkshire to the North East, from Greater London to the West Midlands, is being felt clearly. However, their responsibilities will only increase once this Bill is in law.
It is right that the role of mayor receives the officeholder’s full time and attention. Both MPs and mayors have a duty to represent the constituents that elected them. Fulfilling two different democratic roles could lead to conflicts of interest, given the differences in public expectations for each role and the differing responsibilities of a mayor and an MP. Clause 16 prevents that conflict and will ensure that regions benefit from their mayor’s full time and attention.
Siân Berry
I agree with the principle of not having too many people able to do double-hatting, but it is a fact that there have been overlapping periods when mayors of different combined authorities and London have also been MPs, either at the beginning or end of their term. That has been dealt with in a pragmatic way, with nobody overextending those kinds of double-hatted jobs.
As I understand it, and I would like the Minister to clarify this, writing this rule into statute would mean that, while nobody would be prevented from campaigning to be a mayor or an MP while in either of these jobs, at the moment they are elected, the situation then becomes illegal. An instant resignation takes place on that day. There would be immense disruption across a wide area—perhaps not so much for one constituency, as we have got used to having by-elections for various reasons, but in holding a mayoral by-election.
I wanted to check whether the Government’s intentions here, in making that resignation statutory and instant, are not a bit too much, when these issues have been previously worked out. Does there need to be more detail in the clause to allow for a transition period?
Paul Holmes
I am not sure that I can beat the excellent oratory of my hon. Friend the shadow Minister, but I want to add some context in my own style on why this clause is a bit of a sledgehammer to crack a nut.
The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion has adequately and expertly addressed why there may be need for overlap in different local situations. She is absolutely correct to say that there have been instances where that overlap has been dealt with in an orderly manner and has been sorted within the usual confines of the democratic mechanisms we currently have.
All the way through the Bill, which I think has admirable aims, the Minister and the Government have said, “Let local people decide.” Now, local people presumably have elected those mayors or those MPs who now might want to be a mayor; I declare an interest here, as this clause will stop me running for the Hampshire and the Solent mayoralty. I will not cry in front of the Minister, but it will mean that my hon. Friends here would have to listen to some of my more mundane speeches for the next three or four years.
Local people have elected their MPs and they should have the right to determine whether those MPs are the people they want to be the mayors. The hon. Member for Barnsley North (Dan Jarvis), served as a mayor from 2018 to 2022. At no point did anybody on the Labour side of the House say that he was not good enough to do both jobs at the same time. Ken Livingstone was a mayor and a Member of Parliament from 2000 to 2001. I do not think anybody who was on the Labour side of the House at the time—I grant that many of the Members on that side of the Committee Room were not in the House at the time—was saying that he could not do two jobs at the same time.
This clause just seems very restrictive. If an election is going ahead and a city or region says, “Actually, we do not want you to be our mayor—we want you to remain an MP”, that person will not win the election. The Minister has said many times today that, on elections and democracy, local people should have their say. I find it strange that we seem to be taking quite a restrictive measure on who can and cannot stand in a democratic event, decided democratically by local people, for candidates who, presumably, are local too. I have some concern that this is overreach.
I also think that MPs are generally sensible—I do not want to create breaking news here, but they are generally sensible and, as the Minister said in the context of mayors setting council tax precepts, they are also not immune to the moods and feelings of the local people that they serve. If a local MP wants to stand for election as mayor, they have the right to say that to their constituents. If they get a massive kickback from their constituents, they either will not win the mayoralty or they will not stand.
Local MPs should have the right to make that decision. Local people in that constituency or that region should have the right to say that they do not want that person; or that they might want that person, and allow that person to stand down from Parliament at a time of their choosing, if they are allowed to stand for the mayoralty, and resist the cost of a sudden burst of by-elections to this House. Let local people decide. Let local politicians be local. If they are not wanted, they will not be voted in.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I thank hon. Members for their comments, and I have some sympathy with the arguments made. However, in a world where we are giving greater powers to mayors, which is the process we are going through with this devolution Bill, the idea that someone can exercise those functions to the best of their ability alongside the very important role we all do as MPs is a stretch. It is right for residents and constituents that we say, “If you are elected as a mayor, you ought to be doing that job full time.”
Several hon. Members rose—
Miatta Fahnbulleh
If I may finish, I will give way to hon. Members. The point about transition is a fair one. To clarify, we are setting out in legislation that, at the point someone is elected as a mayor, they resign as an MP, and vice versa. It is at the point of gaining office that this comes into effect. In response to the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion’s example of the transition period when campaigning, there are flexibilities within that.
Siân Berry
I appreciate that, but these are two things in different directions. A sitting mayor who becomes an MP would need to resign as mayor that day, given what the Minister has just outlined for us. A mayoral by-election across a large area is a much bigger thing than a parliamentary by-election, and I am not sure that making it instantly statutorily illegal has been properly thought through.
David Simmonds
I ask the Minister to reflect that it used to be the practice of this House that any MP appointed as a Minister had to resign and fight a by-election, because they were undertaking a function different from that for which their constituents had originally elected them. That practice was abandoned because of the extent of the disruption it caused to the work of government and of the House, as well as the cost of those by-elections, so I ask the Government to reflect. We have learned from experience, cross-party, that having these types of requirements is not conducive to good democracy. Perhaps the Minister will undertake to reflect on that.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
We are trying to create empowered mayors with huge responsibility over transport, housing, infrastructure and skills. That is a full-time job—bigger even, candidly, than that of an individual Minister. It is absolutely right that they should, if elected to do that job, be doing that job. Hon. Members have made important points about how we get the transition right in order not to have disruption. I thank the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner for his encyclopaedic knowledge of the history of local and national government and the precedent that Ministers used to resign their seats. We will reflect on that and think about how we get the transition right.
Paul Holmes
My intervention will be very brief. I am slightly burnt by my experience on the Planning and Infrastructure Bill Committee, where the Minister constantly said that they would reflect, and we never heard back from them until after the Committee had finished. May I seek assurance from the Minister—she does not need to give an answer today—that, on the point of the immediacy of the vacation of the office, she will come back to us in writing to give us the steer of her reflections and what actions she will take in regard to these concerns, if any? Will she commit to doing that before the Committee rises?
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I am happy to make that commitment.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
Clauses 17 and 18 make technical but necessary changes to existing legislation. As hon. Members will know, some functions conferred on combined authorities or combined county authorities are exercisable only by a mayor acting on behalf of the authority.
Clause 17 clarifies that, where a function is conferred on a mayor, it should be taken to be a function of the underlying authority that is exercisable only by the mayor acting on behalf of the combined authority or combined county authority. This is because mayors of strategic authorities are not corporate entities in themselves; therefore, all functions must be conferred on the underlying authority.
Clause 18 clarifies the meaning and extent of the “general functions” of mayors in combined authorities and combined county authorities. The term “general functions” here refers to non-police and crime functions. It is appropriate for the mayor alone to be able to exercise their judgment in certain cases, and to be held fully accountable for those decisions and ultimately to the public. I commend these clauses to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 19
Report under section 1 of the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016
The Chair
We now come to amendment 361 in the name of Manuela Perteghella. Do you wish to press this to a vote?
David Simmonds
The Opposition have sympathy with the points the hon. Member made. We can rarely have too much transparency, but we are conscious that these new bodies and devolution arrangements will be subject to a degree of political oversight. There will be manifestos, on which the public will have a vote. There will be the element of scrutiny, which we have not heard enough about yet but which we would like to think will be built into the new arrangements for these authorities. There will also be a regular process of elections, which will determine who provides the necessary level of leadership. Layered over that, there will be both the political priorities of the devolved authority and those things that are more part of the administrative function. Local authorities have historically had council plans and forward plans that set out decision making, all of which are part of this arrangement. Although the points have been well made, the Opposition are therefore not convinced that what the amendment would add is sufficient to justify its inclusion in the Bill.
Miatta Fahnbulleh
I will respond to amendment 363 and new clause 46 before discussing clause 19.
In the English devolution White Paper, the Government set out clearly our ambition to have universal coverage of strategic authorities in England. That direction of travel is clear. It is also important that the process is led locally, and that areas can submit proposals for devolution that reflect their unique circumstances at a time that makes sense for them. A centrally mandated strategy would cut across that principle, requiring areas to work to a timeline set by Government. That would not only be challenging, but go against the grain of what we are trying to do. The new clause is therefore not necessary. We have set the ambition, and we will work with areas to enable them to come forward with proposals at the appropriate time.
Clause 19 amends existing requirements for the annual report on devolution to ensure that it reflects the introduction of strategic authorities as a category in law. To indicate how the report will look should the Bill receive Royal Assent in its current form, this year’s report was laid before this House and the other place earlier today, so Members can spend their evening reading the report with a glass of wine if they wish. It covers strategic authorities that were established and details of the new devolution framework as set out in the English devolution White Paper.
I commend the clause to the Committee, and ask the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon to withdraw the amendment and not to press the new clause.