European Union (Withdrawal) Act

David Davis Excerpts

Thursday 6th December 2018 Commons Chamber

[John McDonnell]

I recognise the valid intent of that intervention, and if the hon. Gentleman will stay the course with me a bit longer, I might be able to respond to it.

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

I, too, welcome the right hon. Gentleman’s approach and the tone and tenor of his opening remarks. I hope that during his speech—perhaps not immediately—he will lay out his criteria for acceptance of whatever the outcome should be, not in terms of his rather artificial six tests, but real criteria in the national interest.

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[John McDonnell]

I believe that under a comprehensive customs union agreement, it is so much more unlikely that there would be any need for that fall-back position, and we would be able to offer permanency in an agreement rather than something that is a defective insurance policy.

Others may agree with the Chancellor on his initial assessment, and, in that case, I cannot see why this arrangement—

[Mr David Davis]

rose—

[John McDonnell]

Let me press on.

A variety of commentators have criticised the Prime Minister’s proposals, none more scathing than Mervyn King, the former Governor of the Bank of England. Leaving aside his description of the Government’s handling of this issue as

“incompetence of a high order”,

overall he says:

“It simply beggars belief that a government could be hell-bent on a deal that hands over £39 billion, while giving the EU both the right to impose laws on the U.K. indefinitely and a veto on ending this state of fiefdom.”

Many will share the view expressed by Nicole Sykes, the CBI’s head of EU negotiations, which were revealed in an email where she said that there is

“no need to give credit to negotiators I think, because it’s not a good deal.”

Let me move on to my third point, which is Labour’s alternative. I believe that the majority of hon. Members in this House agree that the Prime Minister’s deal is not a good deal. So over the next few days, and possibly—as was hinted at this morning—for even longer, Members will be searching for a way forward. I believe that Labour’s proposals for a new approach to our European relationship offer that way forward. Our European partners will have seen that the Prime Minister’s deal that they reluctantly endorsed has not proved to secure the support it requires in this House or in the country. I believe that they will see the need, now, for a constructive renegotiation if both their and our own economic interests are to be protected in the long term. Indeed, that is what has happened in the past.

Labour’s new deal will secure the economic interests both of ourselves and our European partners. It rests on three posts. Labour would prioritise a permanent and comprehensive customs union—yes, with a British say in future trade deals. We would deliver a strong, collaborative relationship with the single market—and yes, we would guarantee that the UK does not fall behind in rights for workers, consumers and the environment. Labour has always been clear: we respect the referendum result, but we have always said that we want a Brexit that puts jobs and the economy first—and that is exactly what Labour’s approach will do.

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[Stewart Hosie]

This is actually the problem with this debate. There has been a series of almost universally identical assessments from dozens of different organisations, yet some people—I want to be careful about the tenor of this—have ignored all expert opinion. There has been the gut instinct reaction, “That’s what we’re going to deliver and”—by sheer force of will—“things will be better.”

[Mr David Davis]

rose—

[Stewart Hosie]

Hold on a moment.

I think it is important—this is why I have laid it out in this way today—to demonstrate that, from the start of the exercise, pre-referendum, between the referendum and the withdrawal agreement and since the withdrawal agreement, expert opinion tells us one thing. The hon. Lady is perfectly at liberty to disagree with that. She might come back in five, 10, 15 or 20 years and say, “I told you so. It wasn’t that bad.” But if we go in blindly to something as substantive and perhaps irrevocable as this and get it wrong, the public will never forgive us.

[Mr Davis]

The hon. Gentleman, quite rightly, makes the point that a number of expert economic opinions all say much the same thing, but of course that is exactly the same as was the case before the referendum. [Interruption.] Members may not like the facts, but I will repeat the facts to them. Exactly the same was true before the referendum. The Government’s forecast was in the middle of those expert opinions and the outcome was approximately £100 billion out in the first two years after the referendum. So there is a reason to say that the experts may be all talking within a hall of mirrors.

[Stewart Hosie]

I do not doubt that some of the assessments given for what might have happened to date, before we leave, were wrong. I was very clear from the outset of the referendum that nothing would happen. My personal view was that nothing would happen in the first couple of years. Indeed, even after we leave I do not think the impact will be immediate. But when we look at big foreign direct investment decisions on £1 billion investments to access a market of 500 million or access a market of 70 million, I suspect at that point we will begin to see some very substantial and negative consequences for the UK economy.

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[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

Before I attempt to pick up on the shadow Chancellor’s final views on where we are going, rather than on where we are, I draw the House’s attention to a wider issue, which I think goes to a quite important set of facts that the hon. Member for Dundee East (Stewart Hosie) was talking about in terms of Scotland’s export arrangements. When economic historians look back on this time in 100 years’ time, I suspect that they will view Brexit as small by comparison with what has happened with the entire global trade. In the last third of the century, we have seen a huge transformation in the wealth of the world off the back of free trade. About a quarter of the world’s population, or well over 1 billion people, have been raised out of absolute poverty—$2 a day or thereabouts—by free trade. It has been a magnificent story over about one third of a century.

In that time, this has had an impact on us, too. We have gone from having 60% of our trade with the European Union and 40% with the rest of the world 20 years ago to nearly the other way around—in a couple of years, 60% will be with the rest of the world and 40% will be with the European Union. I am loth to quote forecasts, given the bad name that they are being given at the minute, but the projection—not a forecast—is that that will continue.

To pick up on the point made by the hon. Member for Dundee East, if we take the top three markets for British goods, or UK goods, in the rest of the world versus Europe, the top European ones of Germany, France and the Netherlands are dwarfed by our sales to America, China or Australia—our top three in the rest of the world. I take his point that we have to look very carefully, as we did when I was in government, at the regional balance of some of these exports, but the aggregate picture is very clear. Our trading future is more in the rest of the world than it is in Europe. This has huge implications—massively underestimated by Treasury and Bank of England forecasts over and again—for the need to keep our freedom to do trade deals to maximise our ability to exploit that.

I am not going to spend very long on the actual proposal that the Government have put in front of us, because it seems to me very clear that it will not survive the end of this debate. Very quickly, the Attorney General’s advice tells us that the backstop would endure indefinitely and that it would tie us to the customs union with no escape. That has massive implications for what I just said. The deal would still leave us, whatever the Chancellor says, subject to the rule of the European Court of Justice, albeit by a back-door and concealed route. It would see Northern Ireland carved out of the United Kingdom and tied to the European Union single market and the customs union, and it gives away £39 billion in exchange for the vaguest of political promises on a future deal. Because of all that and because we would be locked in at the discretion of the European Union, it puts us in a formidably bad negotiating position for the future. In my view, other than the constitutional issues, that is the most serious practical aspect of what is proposed. I do not believe that it will survive, which means that the shadow Chancellor’s question, “What are the future options?” is the central question of the debate.

[Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP)]

I am grateful to the former Secretary of State for giving way. I note his reluctance to believe in forecasts, but he has not always been reluctant to forecast. In fact, on 25 May 2016, a month before the referendum, he said:

“The first calling point of the UK’s negotiator immediately after Brexit will not be Brussels, it will be Berlin, to strike a deal”.

If my memory serves me right, he became that “UK’s negotiator immediately after Brexit”. Can he tell us how the striking of the deal in Berlin went and when will we see it? Is that what he has in his hand now, or has he lost it?

[Mr Davis]

People have to read more than one line of a speech. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman’s iPad is too small to carry more than one sentence. I also said that the critical part of the negotiation would not be the first two years, but the last three months, when France and Germany would determine the outcome. If the hon. Gentleman wants to quote me again, he should get it right next time.

[Richard Graham]

May I make one small point? My right hon. Friend has focused on the backstop on the Northern Irish border, and he has quoted the Attorney General as saying that we could be in that indefinitely, but surely the “if” is if we decide to go into the backstop in the first place. The other option is to extend the transition. Does he not agree?

[Mr Davis]

That is what is laid out in the proposal, but the transition will then come to an end, and at the end of that, we will still have to make a decision on where we are going, backstop or no. I am afraid that we are always in, and the point is that it is at the behest of the European Union, not at our behest. I have nothing against the European Union, but it is the negotiating partner that may gain an advantage from delay.

[Mr Simon Clarke (Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland) (Con)]

May I reassure my right hon. Friend on that point? It is clear from article 3 of the protocol that it is not necessarily a right for us to have that extended transition. We can only ask for it, and that is a different thing.

[Mr Davis]

Yes, that is also true, but the general point is that the overall timetable is not in our control; it is in the other side’s control. As we have seen throughout this entire negotiation, the moment we gave away sequencing at the beginning, we gave an advantage to the other side. My right hon. Friend the Member for Clwyd West (Mr Jones), the former Minister of State, is nodding: he remembers it.

There are essentially three emblematic conclusions to this. The first is the World Trade Organisation, which we have talked about already—I doubt whether it will be a deliberate conclusion, but it is a possible one—the second is Norway, which a number of Members on both sides of the House have suggested might be the best outcome, and the third is Canada plus, plus, plus. There are compromises between them; there are mixtures of them; but those three essentially capture the possible outcomes.

Let me start with the issue on which I disagree with pretty much everyone who has spoken so far: the World Trade Organisation deal, the so-called no deal. The Chancellor called it a strict no deal, because he knows full well all the preparations that have been made in the Government to create a basic no deal, or basic negotiated outcome. There is a whole stratum, a whole spectrum, of possible types of no deal. Some of them deal with the issues that my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Worcestershire (Nigel Huddleston) raised earlier—aviation, data and so on. If this deal goes down, as I think it will in a few days, there will be a scramble in London and Brussels to start putting those one-on-one, unilateral negotiations together. So there is a range of possibilities.

[Helen Goodman]

I am slightly puzzled why the right hon. Gentleman is so critical of the backstop arrangement, given that he himself signed off the original draft in December last year.

[Mr Davis]

The hon. Lady clearly has not read my resignation letter, in which I made clear what I had said to the Prime Minister about that backstop arrangement.

[Ms Dorries]

Aviation and the WTO were mentioned earlier by my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Worcestershire (Nigel Huddleston). The EU itself is looking for a deal on aviation, as we would be, so there is actually no difference. The EU still does not have a deal on aviation.

[Mr Davis]

That is hardly surprising, given that we have the biggest aviation hub in Europe and one of the biggest in the world.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

It was said earlier that all the regions in the United Kingdom would support the backstop. Members of the Democratic Unionist party in the House do not support the withdrawal agreement. Does the right hon. Gentleman recognise—I suspect that he does—that Unionists feel alienated by proposals that will weaken our position in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, because the EU will have the final say on what happens in relation to the single market and the customs union over Northern Ireland?

[Mr Davis]

Let me reinforce the point that I made to the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman): I told the Prime Minister that last December, as everyone now knows.

I do not take a utopian or a dystopian view of the WTO option. There are Conservative Members who think that it will be the best option in the long run, because it is the freest in terms of outcomes, and there are those who fear it as a complete disaster. I think that it is neither. There has been an enormous amount of black propaganda about the outcome of the WTO proposal. A month or two ago, we heard that the supplies of insulin would dry up. No, they will not. We talked to pharmaceutical companies and to the NHS, and they did their checks. No drugs will dry up, full stop. My hon. Friend the Member for Mid Bedfordshire (Ms Dorries) mentioned aviation. We were told that planes would be grounded, but a European Commission briefing document showed in January 2018 that there would be EU-wide contingency measures ensuring no stoppage of aviation.

[Antoinette Sandbach]

I should be grateful if my right hon. Friend looked at the evidence that pharmaceutical companies have given to the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee about the catastrophic results of a no-deal Brexit. I recall him saying that we would not need an implementation period, because we would have had our deal by now. I am afraid that it is not as easy or as simple as he appears to wish to outline.

[Mr Speaker]

Order. It is in order for Members to intervene, and it is in the nature and tradition of parliamentary debate in this place. However, I hope that I can be forgiven for making the point that if Members intervene and are not subsequently called to speak, they will not complain—brackets: what are those pigs I see flying in front of my very eyes?

[Mr Davis]

What a pity, Mr Speaker. I enjoy interventions, as you well know.

My hon. Friend the Member for Eddisbury (Antoinette Sandbach) has misquoted me from somewhere. It was I who negotiated the implementation period element, precisely because it is not without hiccups. It is not without issues. There will be practical issues in the first year of a WTO outcome, but that does not overwhelm the big advantages—the massive advantages—of having the freedom to negotiate our trade deals in the future.

[Mr Alistair Carmichael (Orkney and Shetland) (LD)]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr Davis]

I am afraid not, on this occasion. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will forgive me. I have just almost been given instructions.

Let me now say a little about delays at Calais. The first thing to say is that the French do not intend them to happen. I know that, in our chauvinist way, we expect the French to misbehave, but that is not their intention. The prefect of the Calais region, the representative of Calais and the head of French customs have all said in terms that they will do everything in their power—through lower inspection rates, light-touch phytosanitary inspections and the rest—to ensure that the trade between Calais and Dover will work. If there is a hiccup—we have had them before, with driver strikes and so on—we shall be able to divert 20% to 40% of the trade to other ports. That is a good example of the wild assertions that are simply not right.

I am very sorry that the Chancellor is not here, because I wanted him to hear what I had to say about the projections to which the hon. Member for Dundee East referred and on which I think he relied rather too much. It was not “The Rees-Mogg Times”, or some other organisation on one side of the debate, that criticised the Bank of England. It was a Nobel prizewinner, Paul Krugman—hardly a Brexiteer—who castigated the Bank, as did Andrew Sentance, a former member of the Monetary Policy Committee, who, again, is not a Brexiteer. Those were simply disgraceful polemical projections. They were not forecasts in any way, and I think that the Bank will come to regret them, if it has not done so already. So that is the practical element.

There is another issue to bear in mind. The WTO option is a walk-away; that is the problem—it is a walk-away. It is an outcome that we do not want, but we need it to have a proper negotiation; that is a hard fact that we have to face. We all think that we will suffer most from a WTO outcome, but that is simply not the case. There is an asymmetric arrangement here. We have a floating pound, to cite the German chief economist of Deutsche Bank, and the movement of the pound is what has protected us so far in the past two years, and it will protect us again. We have unilateral capability that nobody else in Europe will have: the ability to change our taxes and regulations to make sure we get the FDI—foreign direct investment—that the hon. Member for Dundee East talked about.

Finally, of course, we have the upside of the other free trade agreements, and that is another reason why I am sorry that the Chancellor is not present, because one of the big differences between him and me is that he does not believe free trade agreements deliver a large economic bang for their buck. The past 30 years of world history, however, show that there are billions of people in the world who might just take a different view on that.

The second option I want to talk to briefly is the Norway option. I looked at that option very carefully; indeed, I got castigated from my own side for paying it too much attention, but I thought that it was very important to ensure every single possible option was explored well, and I was approached by, and talked at great length to, my hon. Friend the Member for Grantham and Stamford (Nick Boles).

Norway plus appears to its protagonists to have three virtues. First, they say that it is the easiest option to negotiate; it involves the smallest movement and therefore is the simplest negotiation. Secondly, they say it meets the conditions of the referendum. Thirdly, they say it is the softest of soft Brexits. All those are possibly good arguments, except that they are not true. The negotiation would not be simple; we cannot simply stay in the EEA, as that does not work. Jean-Claude Piris, ex-head of the EU legal service, said in terms that we will have to renegotiate every single clause of the EEA arrangement. It will require unanimity from 30 different members, and they will exact a price. One of the advantages of Norway, we would think, is that we could control our own fisheries policy, but would we get that with a vote from Denmark, from France and from Spain? No, we would not. That is one of the problems: the negotiation hurdles are very big. It is reported that Michel Barnier said this was a possible outcome, but only in conjunction with customs union membership. With the two together, we are locked in; we are basically in a worse position than the Government’s proposal. We are basically locked into the single market—no say and no control, but in every other respect, including the free movement of people and paying money, we will be locked in. Norway does not find it satisfactory politically, and, frankly, a country like ours certainly should not. So that does not work. Finally, it is said that this option delivers on the result of the referendum. No, it does not. Free movement, money, independent trade policy, jurisdiction of the supranational courts, rule taker—on all those criteria, we fail under Norway.

So what is left? The last option is the free trade agreement. I have long thought this was the best option. This is the one that has been called Canada plus, plus, plus and super-Canada and a variety of other names, and somewhere buried in the middle of my old Department of DExEU there is a pile of papers laying out how this can be done in detail, including some legal text. The concept is simple, and that is important in this context, because we will have very limited time in the last few months to negotiate this. I made the point a couple of years ago when making this argument that these are the three months that matter: the EU always takes the negotiation down to the wire—to the last day, the last hour, the last minute, the last second, and sometimes it stops the clock to allow the negotiations to conclude. And that is what is going to happen here; I suspect we are going to go deep into time on this.

Why was this option attractive? It was attractive because we could build it from precedents. Canada is an EU-negotiated precedent, and we could add to it—this is the plus, plus, plus bit—all the bits that are not good about the Canada option. There is no decent mutual recognition agreement; we can lift that out of South Korea or the Australian deal. There are no decent phytosanitary arrangements; we can lift that out of New Zealand. So we can go back to the EU and say, “Here we have a proposal constructed entirely of your own precedents. It can’t undermine the single market, because you negotiated it. It can’t undermine the four principles, because you negotiated it.” That is the attraction of the Canada plus, plus, plus option—it is based on that template. It is all based on precedents previously negotiated by the Commission. So it is perfectly possible for us to create a draft legal text on the basis of where we are now and put that back to the EU and say, “The £39 billion rides on this. You have to agree the substantive elements before we sign off and then you have to agree the detailed elements by the end of 2019.” There is plenty of time to do that on the basis of existing boilerplate text. That is what we should be doing. We should stop grovelling to Europe and start grasping our future.