Football Governance Bill

Damian Collins Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 23rd April 2024 Commons Chamber

[Lucy Frazer]

The Bill identifies a number of things that we know are important to fans, including heritage assets such as the colour of shirts, badges and the location of a club’s stadium. We know that those are the things fans care about. The Bill ensures a proportionate approach, because we know that engagement with different fans at different clubs, which have very different measures in place, will require us to take a proportionate, case-by-case approach. The regulator must ensure a level of engagement with fans, particularly on the issues that I am identifying, but we also want to ensure that it works for the clubs. Therefore, it will be for the regulator to ensure that a proportionate approach is taken.

I was about to go on to discuss that aspect, because we will be setting a minimum standard of fan engagement, and requiring clubs to seek the approval of their fans for changes to those things I mentioned in order to comply with the strong existing protection for club names. We know that most clubs have a strong relationship with their fans, consciously engaging them in decisions about the club’s heritage. However, there have been some notable exceptions, as we have seen at Cardiff City and Hull City, whose fans have had to battle to bring back or keep their club’s colours, badge and name.

As I said, the regulator will also protect fan interests with the requirement for clubs to seek its approval for any sale or relocation of their home ground. The stadium a club plays in is not only of significant value to fans; it can be the club’s most valuable asset, and it is only right that a club seeking to relocate has to demonstrate that such a move would not significantly harm the heritage of the club.

[Damian Collins (Folkestone and Hythe) (Con)]

The regulator is asked to balance the financial sustainability of the club with heritage concerns and to make an either/or decision, under its purposes. In that scenario, could the regulator decide to allow a club to move if it felt it was best for the club’s future sustainability, even if the fans objected?

[Lucy Frazer]

Yes, that is right; the regulator has to take into account the views of fans and look at the proposals. If it considers the proposals to be good, that change can take place.

Under the new regulator, fans will no longer face the prospect of seeing their club signing up to ill-thought-out proposals, such as the European super league, which several Premier League clubs tried to join in 2021. The House was united in recognising that those proposals for the new competition were fundamentally uncompetitive and would have undermined the football pyramid, against the wishes of fans. This regulator will prevent that kind of closed-shop league from ever getting off the ground.

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[Lucy Frazer]

As my hon. Friend knows, the Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, my right hon. Friend the Member for Pudsey (Stuart Andrew), and I have spent time looking at the issues in rugby, and continue to do so. We are setting out what we hope will be a strong financial framework for football. This is being watched closely by other countries that are looking into what they will do in football. Of course if other sports want to look into this, they can.

I move on to the backstop power. Obviously, broadcast revenue is a hugely important source of income for clubs up and down our top-tier football leagues, but the current distribution of revenue across the top five divisions is not sufficient, and football has not been able to come to a suitable new arrangement. Not only does that contribute to problems of financial sustainability, but it can have a destabilising effect on the sport. To avoid that in future, the regulator will have new, targeted backstop powers to help ensure a sufficient flow of money. However, those powers are intended only as a last resort, and can be triggered only if certain conditions are met. The backstop mechanism has been designed with the industry and leading experts to give football incentives to reach a timely compromise, thereby delivering the right outcomes while minimising costly regulatory involvement.

The final part of the regulator’s job is improving the corporate governance of clubs. We will establish a football club corporate governance code, and will require clubs to report regularly on their corporate governance, setting out how they have applied the code and why that is suitable for their circumstances.

[Damian Collins]

The language in the Bill reflects the language on corporate governance in the Companies Act 2006, but there “corporate governance” includes the relationship that a board of directors has with not only the component parts of the business, but the employees. Should it not be inherent in the Bill that the corporate governance code should suggest how clubs can maintain high player welfare standards?

[Lucy Frazer]

We looked closely at precedents elsewhere, particularly in regulatory fields, when forming the basis of the Bill. We have always been conscious that we are regulating in a commercial space, and that football clubs are businesses. The premier league is world leading. We are regulating because football clubs have failed to solve these issues themselves. What we do not want to do through this Bill is over-regulate, including in areas in which we would not be regulating but for this Bill. We are trying to strike the right balance. That is why the Bill, notwithstanding questions that have been put to me in this House, focuses on financial regulation. Importantly, it does not interfere with the game, or with how players are looked after. The leagues have a role to play, and they should be primarily responsible for running the game.

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[Damian Collins]

The Bill is reasonably clear that the regulator considers not only those rules, but any other rules that it wishes to write into the rulebook. This will give us for the first time ever a subjective test set by the regulator, which can be enforced with statute backing it up.

[Thangam Debbonaire]

The hon. Gentleman seems to be saying that it is a subjective test. I was asking whether there are any objective tests, because I think that is important in terms of fairness. Where are they objective, where are they subjective? Concepts such as competency can be interpreted both objectively and subjectively, and I would appreciate the Minister’s clarification of what he views as the Government’s position.

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[Damian Collins (Folkestone and Hythe) (Con)]

It is a great pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Sheffield South East (Mr Betts), who has done much work on this issue, and to follow the wonderful speech earlier from my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford (Dame Tracey Crouch), who has done such fantastic work on the important fan-led review. It builds on work done over many years by Members and Committees of this House.

When I was a new MP, I took part in the 2011 football governance review undertaken by the Culture, Media and Sport Committee, which was chaired by my right hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Sir John Whittingdale), and this issue has been a recurring theme of interest for the House. The reason is that when clubs get into distress, it becomes evident very quickly that the competition’s primary interest is protecting the competition, not individual clubs.

When a club goes into administration, it can be too late to solve the problems. The actions of the league are to protect the integrity of the competition and to complete the season, rather than to save the individual clubs. Because the leagues are effectively governed by the collective views of the chairs of those clubs, they are often not very sympathetic when one of their own gets into trouble, particularly if they think the clubs have got into financial trouble because they have been overspending or, as the leagues would see it, cheating in some way. As we saw with Bolton and Bury—Bury failed financially and were expelled from the league, and Bolton very nearly were—and as we have seen with clubs like Derby, had there been an intervention and had it been made clear that the clubs were already playing and trading in breach of league rules, as they stood, the situation could have been avoided. There could have been an earlier intervention, rather than waiting until the last minute when nothing more could be done.

It is in response to those concerns that the fan-led review was triggered and this Bill has come forward today. We have seen numerous cases of bad ownership. Massimo Cellino acquired Leeds United a few years ago, and the football league did not think he was a fit and proper person, which demonstrates that there was no fit and proper person test. If a person was qualified to be a company director in the UK, they had as much right to be a director of a football club as any other entity, and he defeated the football league in the courts. We desperately needed a test in which somebody could stand up and say, “We are not convinced by this person’s track record. They cannot own the club.”

Coventry City were owned by an investment fund at one point, and nobody knew who the investors were. Leeds United were owned by somebody we did not know, and Sheffield Wednesday were almost bought by somebody who did not exist. It was the wild west, and the Bill seeks to address this by having a regulator that is required to license clubs and has the power to say to a potential owner, as Ofcom does to broadcasters when it is not happy with how they execute their licence, “We are not convinced that you have met the tests, so you can’t be the owner of this club,” or, “You must demonstrate and prove who you are if you are investing in this club. And we must have a robust business plan that demonstrates that you can run the club sustainably, meeting its requirements for this season and future seasons.” That does not require the regulator to invent new rules for football. It simply requires an independent body to enforce the competition rules that already exist. If we had that transparency and that ability to tackle rogue owners, many of the game’s problems would be resolved.

I do not believe that this form of effective regulation will deter people from investing in English football. If anything, it will encourage them. If someone is looking to buy a club in the championship or league one, with the hope of investing in that club and getting it into the premier league, having proper governance and enforcement of the rules will attract better owners into English football, which will be good for everyone.

I seek the Minister’s advice on a few specific points. As I said to the Secretary of State, the Bill’s structure is very interesting. The primary purpose of the regulator is to ensure sustainability, alongside which it has three objectives to consider: soundness, resilience and heritage. In making a determination, the regulator should always act in a way that is sustainable and that supports at least one of the three objectives.

This raises a question where, say, a club does not own its own ground. The ground might be owned by a private third-party entity that is seeking to push up the rent by an extortionate amount that the club cannot afford to pay, so it has to move to a new ground. The fans might be against the move, and the heritage test might say that the club should not move, but the soundness and resilience tests would say that, no, the club should move. The Secretary of State said earlier that the regulator could set aside heritage concerns and make that decision.

The regulator needs to establish some guidelines and principles that it will follow in making such decisions, so that there is proper consideration and so that it does not always defer to the financial case but considers the other points in the round. It is important that the test for directors is subjective and that the regulator can say when it is not satisfied, rather than the test simply being a tick-box exercise in which people may own a club if they can demonstrate that they do not have live convictions for particular offences. The regulator should have a robust power to say no.

The licensing conditions say that a club has to produce a corporate governance report, and the Companies Act 2006 sets out the sort of criteria that a company has to include in its report. And the Bill’s explanatory notes say that a corporate governance report should cover

“the nature, constitution or function of different parts (‘organs’) of the club; the manner in which those parts conduct themselves; the requirements imposed upon them; and the relationship between them.”

That would exclude the players and any relationship, responsibility or obligation that the club has to them. I agree with Ministers that the regulator should not be writing welfare standards and policies for football, but it could act as a guardian in making sure they are being properly enforced. It could use its investigatory powers, if it feels that there are grounds to investigate, to make sure that welfare standards are being properly maintained. This is important because where this idea has failed in football and other sports in the past, it has been because of the power structure within a sporting organisation, whereby the coach and team doctor often have huge influence over the athletes and it is difficult for people to know where they can safely blow the whistle. A backstop guardian, through the regulator, on welfare standards would be totally consistent with the requirement on the clubs to produce a corporate governance statement to the regulator every year. I urge the Minister to consider that.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

Football Governance Bill (First sitting)

Damian Collins Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 14th May 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Ian Byrne (Liverpool, West Derby) (Lab)]

I sit on the management committee of the Spirit of Shankly football union for Liverpool football club.

[Damian Collins (Folkestone and Hythe) (Con)]

I am a trustee of The Sports Trust in Folkestone, which has previously received funding from the Football Foundation.

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[The Chair]

Stephanie, if you have any other questions, I will bring you in a bit later. There are a lot of Members who have indicated that they want to ask questions.

[Damian Collins]

Q I have a question on the redistribution of money, which is one of the Football League’s principal concerns about the current model. From what you have said, is there not a danger that, despite redistributing more money into the Championship, those clubs will not necessarily get any better? They will probably just end up paying the players they have more than they do at the moment. Redistribution without some sort of control will just fuel inflation.

Kieran Maguire: When we had the introduction of solidarity payments from the Premier League to the EFL, which started to become index-linked to the growth in the Premier League broadcasting, exactly what you suggested tended to be the case. Any redistribution plan has to go hand in hand with a more nuanced and affirmative cost-control measure. Otherwise, you are simply transferring money from the wages of a footballer in the Premier League to the wages of a player in the Championship. I do not see how that benefits the game on a holistic basis.

Dr Christina Philippou: As we have seen, the cost-control issues are still there. The point is to try to fix that concern, rather than just to give more money to be spent poorly, which is not going to fix the problem. Fixing corporate governance and the cost controls will have a much better effect.

[Damian Collins]

Q Do you agree that one of the reasons why we need the regulator is that we need a body with statutory powers to investigate clubs and use real transparency of powers to see what is going on? A lot of clubs that have failed have been reckless, and often they have been trading outside the rules of the leagues they are playing in anyway, but they have just been able to hide that fact until it is too late.

Kieran Maguire: Historically, the authorities, given the mandate that they currently have from the clubs themselves, have tended to be looking in the rear-view mirror. Therefore, they are playing catch-up. One of the advantages of having an independent regulator would be the ability to do real-time investigations and also potentially either to offer advice or, in extreme circumstances, to look at some form of regime change that allows the appointment of trustees and advisers to assist clubs in precarious financial positions.

Dr Christina Philippou: That is the whole point of something like an advocacy-first approach: you can work with the clubs before you get to the problem. Before you get to administration or those serious financial problems that we are seeing, if there is real-time monitoring, if you see the problems ahead of time, and if we have some proper budgeting and corporate governance in football clubs, that should mitigate the problem to a large degree.

[Damian Collins]

Q Briefly, I want to ask about club owners and the business plans of club owners. On your podcast, Kieran, you have recently been talking about Everton in particular. Would you look at a situation like that and say that if this is going to work and make a difference, it is scenarios like that that should be avoided? The checks on new owners’ backgrounds and their proof of finance should be robust enough to stop clubs getting into that kind of mess.

Kieran Maguire: In an ideal world, yes. I do not think that the regulator can convert us into a zero-crisis environment. It is a case of turning down the dial. In the case of Everton, there was no doubt that money was spent in a similar way to what we saw with Roman Abramovich and Chelsea, and with Sheikh Mansour and Manchester City. There was an investment in talent and options in terms of infrastructure as well. The problem is that if you have any business that is living beyond its means, and is reliant on third-party or ownership funding, I think you have to very carefully monitor the ability of that funding to be maintained on a medium to long-term basis. We have seen, sadly in the case of Everton, that that does not appear to have been the case.

Dr Philippou: That is the importance of looking at the sources of funding, which is part of what is in the Bill, in relation to the owners and directors test.

[Mr Betts]

Q Do you think parachute payments, as they currently exist, cause problems or provide solutions?

Kieran Maguire: I think they do both. The intention of parachute payments when they were introduced, which was around 2006, was to address the possibility of clubs going into administration, because of the significant step-downs between the Premier League and the Championship. At the same time, it does mean that you have created a new benchmark in levels of spending that clubs in receipt of parachute payments can achieve, and therefore those clubs in the Championship that want to be competitive are incentivised to overspend, so I think we have a problem. Parachute payments are a clumsy solution to the bigger problem, which is the significant difference between the revenues of not just the Premier League and the Championship, but also between the Championship and League One.

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[Stuart Andrew]

Q The regulator will have a duty to work with the leagues when they are exercising their regulatory functions and have regard to the existing rules within your leagues. How do you see that working in practice, and how are you reforming your own structures to ensure that regulation works effectively? You talked about unintended consequences, Richard—can I just push you to give the Committee a specific example of what those might be?

Richard Masters: It is unclear—a lot of this depends not on the technical drafting of the Bill, but the personality of the regulator, who we are yet to meet. Now the appointments have been made, it depends upon how the regulator and its powers are going to be utilised. For example, if the regulator wishes to put financial controls on virtually all the 116 clubs that it wants to license, I believe that will stop investment into football squads and football in general, and will slow down the growth of English football. That is the principal unintended consequence I would be concerned about.

Mark Ives: On unintended consequences, there are a couple of things, particularly when you consider the size of the National League clubs and how they are staffed. The Bill is written in a way that sets out what it intends; it does not give how it is going to achieve those aims. As far as the clubs are concerned, there is massive uncertainty.

As we see it, one of the unintended consequences is the drain on the resources of those clubs because of the duplication of work and the over-bureaucracy that there may be. For example, we already have a licensing system. Our system includes our football finance regulations, which have been activated since 2013. It is worth noting that we are talking about improving the sustainability of our clubs—but the National League, which is the only division that I can talk about, has not had a club going into administration since 2013, since it brought in its financial regulations. That is not a bad record. Our concern is the duplication of that licensing scheme. As the Minister rightly says, there is a referral back to the league regulations. We had hoped that that would go further and put the onus on the league, on the competition, to be the first to react. If that does not work, then the regulator steps in—rather than create a lot of duplication of work for our clubs, as we see it.

The other issue is costs. The Bill is intended to ensure financial sustainability. Yet the concern of this is that, as with all regulators, the people who pick up that bill are those who are being regulated. I am not sure that the clubs fully understand that. When you are at the bottom level of what is being regulated, the fear is the quantum of those costs. If you have a challenge that goes to judicial review from one of the National League clubs, I suspect that the financial cost on that is not going to be too great. However, if one of the top clubs in the Premier League challenges the regulator, the costs on that are going to be really significant. Those costs get passed on to those being regulated, and they could run into millions of pounds, when the cost of those are being borne by clubs at the National League level. In our view the Bill is not strong enough in clarifying what proportionality means. We have been given assurances: we have had some good meetings with the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, with the Minister and the Secretary of State, where assurances are that it will be proportionate. However, we do not understand what “proportionate” is. So, one of the unintended consequences is the financial and human resource burden on our clubs.

Rick Parry: It is incumbent on us to work with the regulator to make sure that this works for the good of the game. We see big pluses in terms of the regulator bringing independence, transparency and consistency across leagues, which is a bit of a disaster area at the moment. We view it positively: everything we have found so far in terms of engagement with DCMS and in terms of the shadow body that is the regulator is that all these concerns can be addressed. It is going to be a tougher environment, but football needs a tougher environment. We have had 30 years to get this right and we have failed.

Richard Masters: Just to answer your question about what plans the bodies are making to adjust to the regulatory world, we will all have to adjust to the new environment that is coming. I am very happy to do so. Like Rick, we are already meeting with the shadow regulatory team on a regular basis and have had good conversations about how it might work in practice. In reality, I think the performance of the regulator can be managed. We will meet that obligation head on and ensure that they get all the information they need, and we will respond at all times.

The issue that we are most concerned about is what impact that might have on the wider system—beyond the very positive objectives of the regulator to give fans a stronger voice—to improve the sustainability of the pyramid and individual clubs, and to avoid some of the issues we have had in the past. We agree with all that, but it is important to make sure it does not impact on the very good success story that we have at the moment.

Mark Ives: Can I echo that and clarify some points about where we stand on the regulator? From day one, and from when Tracey started the fan-led review, we met the review and we were asked whether we wanted to be part of the regulator. We said yes we did, on the understanding that it would not be too onerous for our clubs, and we would keep a mind on the costs. So we are mindful of that. We embraced the regulator. Our position was always that if there is a regulator, we thought it should be the FA, but for well-documented reasons, we know why that cannot happen. So we move on and embrace the regulator as it is.

Our challenges are not about having a regulator; they are about understanding and clarifying how the regulator will work. We embrace it and we will work with it. We have had some very productive meetings with DCMS and discussions all the way through. All we are trying to do is make sure that it is not too onerous and too costly for our clubs, because we have to protect the interests of those clubs, and they need clarity.

[Damian Collins]

Q Richard Masters, at the beginning you raised some concerns about the checks on new owners. You said you wanted a process that was governed by objectivity and certainty—I think those were the words you used. A lot of people would look at the live example of Everton and 777 Partners and say that that does not look like a situation that is being governed by objectivity and certainty, and that it is the kind of case where the regulator may well have taken a different view from the Premier League and may well have rejected the takeover. Given your concerns about the regulator in this regard, and given that, after eight months, 777 has still not met the criteria that the Premier League has set, I would be interested to know why the Premier League has not rejected it.

Richard Masters: Let me be clear about what the Premier League’s role in this is. As regulator, it is to perform the test. It is not to decide who the current owner wants to sell this club to. That is his decision. At the moment, he wants to continue to have discussions with 777 about it. The Premier League has made very clear the conditions that have to be met by 777 if it wishes to become the owner of Everton. At the moment, obviously, because the takeover has not been confirmed, I will leave it to the Committee to make its own conclusions about where we are with that.

Rick and Mark have talked about some of the benefits of the regulatory ownership test, in the sense that they will get access to more information that we can have, because we are not a statutory body. So we can only get the information that we are provided with and we have strong investigatory powers.

The other thing that Mark talked about was speed. I accept that takeovers that carry on for a very long time are not good for fan certainty. That is why we have a very big team of people who do nothing else in this. All I would say is that over time, particularly in the Premier League, takeovers are becoming increasingly complex. It is not a small undertaking on the part of the regulator to take this burden on. That is why we want to remain involved with it as well. This is very complicated, and we need to make sure that all those decisions are correct, even if that means taking a little more time to make sure that a decision is correct.

[Damian Collins]

Q It would seem that there is a real role for the regulator here, because the regulator could make this a lot simpler by saying, “You demonstrate the proof of funds and where you’re raising those funds from, and until you can do that, the answer is going to be no. You can come to us when you’re ready.”

Richard Masters: It may be that they could come to conclusions quicker. I would imagine that that is possibly correct in that circumstance, but obviously, I cannot imagine what the situation would be like if we had a regulator in the current example that you raise. Obviously, I know a bit more about the background to it all. I cannot say too much about it, but I do think there are some benefits to the regulator working in tandem with leagues on this particular topic. That is true.

[Damian Collins]

Q How would you respond if you were overruled? What would be the effect if the regulator took a different view from you?

Richard Masters: Maybe a bit like “The X Factor”, you need two green ticks to get in. That is it, and in terms of the Premier League operating its own test, in the unlikely event that the regulator said yes and we said no, that person could not take over that club, and vice versa.

[Matt Rodda]

Q This question is for Rick Parry. Where a potential owner has a track record of being associated with clubs overseas that have got into difficulties, do you believe the Bill has enough powers to prevent that in future?

Rick Parry: I think so. I do not think there is any reason to be doubtful at this moment, and within football we have been refining the tests that we apply over time. A decade ago, I think the tests were probably inadequate and overly simplistic. We have definitely refined them. We take a closer look at people’s track records, and I am not fearful that the regulator will be unable to do the same.

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[Ian Byrne]

Q I am happy to get that on the record. I welcome what you said about the ticket prices potentially being included in one of the clauses. I do not think we mentioned kick-off times, which can be changed at the drop of a hat, meaning that hotel bookings have to be cancelled and travel expenses cannot be returned. That is a hugely important element in lots of anger from football supporters. How do we ensure that this is included in the regulatory oversight?

Kevin Miles: Again, what I do not want to do is put a whole shopping list of items into the Bill, because I think that is problematic. We would support some clear direction in the guidance notes about what should be required from clubs. You have identified another important issue. It is a complicated issue, and it is not likely to be solved on a club-by-club basis. However, the idea that we could face a situation where a club declines to discuss with its fan advisory board as part of its fan engagement process an issue as important and impactful as supporters being able to turn up to the games and support their team—which is so important to so many people—seems to me to be absurd. It is common sense that those issues should be part of the discussion, and it is sad to think that there are clubs that do not approach it with common sense and want to discuss it. I think it should be required.

[Damian Collins]

Q Clubs have to produce a corporate governance report annually as part of their licensing agreement. Do you think there is scope there for the clubs to be required by the regulator to set out in that report what their policies for fan engagement are, and then the regulator would have the right to audit them on that?

Kevin Miles: Yes. One of the ideas that we are quite keen on is that, as part of the corporate governance code, there could be a requirement of clubs to have independent directors. In many other aspects of corporate governance codes, there is a particular responsibility on independent directors. Independent non-executive directors do have consideration for the views of other stakeholders in the work of a company. The idea that an INED in a football club could be required by a governance code to have particular responsibility for making sure that fans’ views are taken into consideration would be a very useful addition.

[Damian Collins]

Q I have one other question. One of the biggest concerns for fans is when a club leaves its ground. That can be an extreme case, as in years ago with MK Dons and Wimbledon, which is probably something that could not happen again now. We have seen cases where you have a dispute between the ground owner—a third-party private company—and the club. We saw that problem with Coventry City a few years ago. That was a clear example of where the club says, “We can’t afford to pay the rent that the landlord wants to charge us. We think it’s extortionate”, and they have no option other than to move on. Under the Bill as drafted, if the club made a compelling case to say that sustainability required moving away from the ground, the regulator would sanction it even if the fans were against. Do we need a better mechanism in place to try to resolve these issues and get a fair settlement on rents for clubs to play in grounds, with a view to avoiding their having to move and enabling them to carry on and play where they are?

Kevin Miles: Yes, I think that that is one of the few gaps in the Bill. On the heritage items around playing name, shirt colours, club badge and that sort of thing, there are clear FA rules, and it was clear that the fan voice on those issues will be very important. The FA’s heritage rules do not cover grounds. They have found that difficult to tackle from the point of view of their rules. But the idea that the fan view on some of these issues should not be taken into consideration is an omission. We appreciate that there are other issues involved in staging a relocation. There are big economic issues et cetera. We are not necessarily saying that fans should have a veto over a business decision, but certainly they should have a level of consultation and input into that process.

As an aside, I think we should clearly define the UK-based supporters. It is entirely possible that with some of the clubs these days, given their international fanbase, you could find a huge majority of the football club’s supporter base in Shanghai quite ambivalent about whether the stadium moves 40 miles down the road. There would be a very different feeling among the people who have an extra 40 miles to travel to their home game. So I think it should be the UK supporter base that is consulted in those cases. That consultation should be enshrined.

[The Chair]

We move from the fans’ views to the person who started all this with the fan-led review—Tracey.

Football Governance Bill (Second sitting)

Damian Collins Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 14th May 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Shaun Bailey (West Bromwich West) (Con)]

Q I want to touch more on the point about the proportionality of the Bill. I am looking at the part 5 duties. Do you think that this strikes a balance between regulating clubs like yours and making sure there is a framework, and allowing you to run your clubs in the way you need to? Darryl, if we take Solihull Moors as an example, you are a club that has come out of a merger, effectively, with other clubs and you have had to be agile in how you have done that. If you look at the journey you guys have been on, how do you think that you would have been impacted if this framework had been in place at the time?

Darryl Eales: The interesting thing for me is that the Bill does nail a few points that are very, very important from my perspective. The stadium and the club should be umbilically linked. There should be, for every club, something that prevents owners from separating out the ownership. In our division this year, Gateshead did not make the play-offs, because they did not have tenure of their ground. To me, that seems to be fundamental. Where I echo Steve is that I think there are an awful lot of information requirements in the Bill. When I talk about proportionality, the reality of life at our level is that it will be us doing those things, and without being too rude, I have better things to do with my life than fill in forms.

[Damian Collins (Folkestone and Hythe) (Con)]

Q I was interested in what you said about artificial pitches, Mr Thompson, because in my constituency I have Folkestone Invicta, in the Isthmian League. From what I can see, the Bromley FC model is the sort of model, from a financial sustainability point of view, that a lot of clubs in tiers five, six and seven should be following, because you have not only community use, but paid use of the site every day of the week, rather than a match every fortnight. Do you think that this should be looked at as part of a sustainability issue rather than a football competition issue? Actually, the sustainability of clubs going up into the Football League might necessitate that they have those sorts of facilities, which they monetise throughout the year, and their removal is not just a flat cost but something that compromises their commercial performance across the board.

Steve Thompson: Sutton United are a prime example from a couple of years ago. They went up and had to dig up their pitch. It was very much part of their community and their academy structure. Bromley are in the slightly fortunate position in that they have some land behind the stadium, where they are going to transfer the artificial pitch to, but it will still cost them several hundred thousand pounds. The annoying thing is that Sutton played Arsenal in the FA cup a couple of years back, and Arsenal, who are in the Premier League, happily and readily played on Sutton’s artificial pitch when they were at the National League side—no complaints. Every year, EFL clubs in the FA cup will play on artificial pitches, so that does not seem logical.

There are some arguments about how good the football is on such pitches and things like that, but the majority of young players at the top level now are coming through the EPPP—elite player performance plan—academies, and they all play on artificial pitches. It does not make sense. We have had this happen to four clubs in the past few years, and it is stopping other clubs that have the ambition to be promoted considering putting down an artificial pitch. That might help their community and their academies, but they think, “We can’t do that, because we can’t afford to put it in and then dig it up again.” Supporters are almost turning around and asking, “What’s your ambition?” The ambition of most clubs is to win their league, whatever league they are in, and to go forward.

That brings up another thing about academies at our level, and making certain that clubs at our level get the proper compensation for players that they have developed. At the moment, there is not that—National League clubs are not allowed to register a 16-year-old. Such things are not addressed in the Bill. Whether they should be, I do not know.

[Damian Collins]

Q Obviously, the principal job of the regulator will be financial sustainability. Briefly, do you think one of the issues that we have is this? We have inherited a structure for how football is organised that puts clubs into certain divisions. You could say that there are financial issues at almost every step, as we go up and down, and that clubs in the bottom half of League One and in League Two probably have more in common with the National League clubs than they have with those in the Championship. Do you think there should be common rules that reflect clubs that are effectively community clubs? They will probably never be Premier League clubs, but they need a different kind of model of sustainability.

Steve Thompson: Since 2001, when the second promotion place was introduced, some clubs have gone up and down, but before the end of this season just gone, 40 different clubs will have been promoted, and 29 of them are still in the Football League and one is in the Premier League—Luton Town. For teams that are struggling in the Football League, when they get relegated, the National League is a fantastic league for them to reorganise and to come back. There has been a number of them: Stockport and Wrexham, to name two. The football pyramid needs the National League. We have developed lots of players on loan from the Premier League, the Championship and other Football League clubs, and we are there to help support clubs.

Darryl Eales: To pick up on what Steve said, for me, the distribution of economics is completely inequitable between the two leagues above us and our league—so much so that other than the promotion from the Championship to the Premier League, the next most valuable promotion is from the National League to League Two, which I think drives Steve’s point, but we are entitled to only two promotion places. Fans, when I talk to them—from every club—say, “We don’t understand this.”

[Damian Collins]

Q It is inherent in what you said that the financial sustainability rules in the National League are more effective than those in Leagues One and Two.

Steve Thompson: We were the first league to introduce reporting to His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. About 20 or 25 years ago, a lot of football clubs were basically using HMRC as a bank, and HMRC was reluctant to take football clubs to court. The National League—the Football League has followed us—introduced the rule that HMRC reports to the league if a club is behind with its HMRC or VAT payments, and the league will immediately put them on a registration embargo, which concentrates people’s minds. Since then, we have not had a problem, because when a manager comes and says, “I want to sign a new player,” and you say, “You can’t, because you haven’t paid HMRC,” they look a bit silly. We have quarterly reporting to our league and an annual licence with the FA. That is why I worry that this will just be another layer of bureaucracy.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Rodda (Reading East) (Lab)]

Q You have spoken so eloquently. I am looking at this from the perspective of my local club Reading, which has had very serious problems with the current owner. The previous owner was absolutely wonderful in creating a positive culture. My question is: how do we find more owners with the right intentions and motivation, and help them to play a bigger role?

Sharon Brittan: I completely agree with that. Even in the five years that I have been involved, I have seen better owners coming into the game because the EFL has changed the rules. You cannot having a bankrupt owning a football club, and you cannot have somebody who has been struck off; the rules are much more stringent. I do not want to talk about the numbers, and I do not like talking about them, but the problem we have is that in five years we have put a huge amount of money into the football club. Any sensible businessperson probably would not do that, because they would look at it and say that it does not make any financial sense.

Ian Mather: In direct answer to your question, I would say that it is the numbers. If an owner can look at a football club and think, “Broadly, if I run that club properly and well, with the income I get from running a football club and the sustainability payments from the Premier League, I can roughly break even. I may want to be ambitious and build a new stadium here, or improve the training ground, but broadly I can balance the books.” If you cannot balance the books, or worse, the books get more unbalanced each year, you are reducing the pool of people who can buy into being a football owner.

Sharon Brittan: I agree with Ian.

[Damian Collins]

Q I think I have to ask this, given everything you have said in your very compelling evidence. How has Ipswich Town managed to do what you called the “near impossible”?

Sharon Brittan: Isn’t it fabulous? That is what I love about football: the near impossible can happen.

Ian Mather: I would also answer it by saying that a North American pension fund has provided—

Sharon Brittan: I did not want to say that!

[Damian Collins]

Q You are saying that they had external investment that helped them to compete? Obviously, Luton has gone from League One to the Premier League, as has Brentford. What is the secret behind that? Is it the ownership money?

Sharon Brittan: The Premier League has allowed 13 of our precious 20 football clubs to be owned by Americans. Lose one more and they make the vote. How has that been allowed to happen? The Premier League stops the FA cup replays without even consulting us. How has that been allowed to happen? The Premier League is not fit for purpose, in my humble opinion.

[Damian Collins]

Q But the three clubs I mentioned—Brentford, Luton and Ipswich—is it simply about owners putting in enough money to be able to compete, and without it they cannot? Is that really what has happened?

Sharon Brittan: If this Bill goes through, I would love to fast-forward three years and see where Bolton Wanderers are. Then, you guys can see where a football club gets to when it is run properly in the right way, with the right people doing the right job in an honest, transparent and reasonably sustainable way. There is money, and obviously that helps.

Ian Mather: It is largely to do with money.

Sharon Brittan: But that is their good fortune.

Ian Mather: And Luton has come down again. You need money to drive success, and there is quite a clear correlation between league position and how much money you have, which explains why Cambridge United keep on cheating relegation. We are roughly around where we should be, and it is about the money.

Sharon Brittan: I am looking to get longevity of success; I am not looking to bounce around the pyramid. To get longevity of success, you have to create a culture that people buy into, so that they stay on the journey with you. So far, it looks like we are delivering, but we will see. I think that there are so many unscrupulous things that happen in football. Let us try to prevent those things from happening so that we can enjoy the game and the jeopardy.

[Damian Collins]

Q I wish you well—I think you said the Premier League in three years for Bolton? I think that was the target you set yourself there for people.

Sharon Brittan: Please do not quote me as saying that! If we get rid of the parachute payments, that might be possible. Thank you—I am really appreciative.

[The Chair]

Order. I am afraid that brings us to the end of the time allotted for the Committee to ask questions. I thank our witnesses on behalf of the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Damian Collins]

Q I want to ask Steve Parish first, and then I would welcome your comments, Tony. Steve, you referred to the danger of domination by the big clubs—I think you rightly alluded to the fact that in some ways the Premier League is a two-tier league. Is that not made worse by, effectively, a competition that sets its own rules and organises itself?

Within the Premier League board, you have all those big clubs. Would it be more effective to allow some of the enforcement and supervision of the league’s rules to be done by an independent regulator that is, if you like, separate from the politics of football? It is set up by Government, it is not open to being lobbied or cajoled, and it is not making decisions on the regulation of clubs that it has to trade off against other decisions that are taken by Premier League clubs about how they organise the affairs of their league.

Steve Parish: If the Bill looked at the whole of football, that might be the case, but we are looking at it in a very myopic way. We are not looking at all the European revenue, the growing scope creep of European fixtures, the increase in the size of UEFA club competitions, or the gerrymandering of coefficients, so that even if we qualified, we would not get anywhere near as much money as a club that has been in the league three years previously. Within the Premier League itself, the top clubs have got—what is it?—four times our income. That is probably going to head towards five or six times our income.

The Bill, very narrowly, looks only at the Premier League media money. Actually, the Premier League is the most egalitarian by distribution in Europe by far. Where it is heading to right now is 1.8:1. Although that is worse for Tony and me, this is still by far the fairest league in Europe: in Germany, the ratio is about 3:1—the top club to the bottom club. So actually, in terms of distributing the revenue that it gets, the Premier League has done a very good job of making it fair and maintaining competitive balance.

The problem is that such huge revenue is now pouring into these clubs from European competition, and from the commercial deals that that gives them, that it is creating a massive distortion. What I fear this Bill will create is a permanent top six or top seven and then a kind of washing machine of clubs that will rotate between the two divisions below. That may well be what some people want as a vision for football. It is not mine. Mine, like Sharon’s, is to try to get into the Premier League and stay there. I accept it comes with jeopardy every year. I accept there are three relegation places. I accept that everybody is trying to stay in the league and it is highly competitive. But the aim, I think, of most clubs is to try to stay there, ladder up and improve.

[Damian Collins]

Q Tony, do you have anything to add to that?

Tony Bloom: Obviously I have had many years in the Championship and League One, and we have had many discussions there. The relationships between the Football League and the Premier League, I think, have got a lot worse since there was talk about regulating football. Overall, although there have been difficulties over the years, it has worked very well. But ever since the Football League has realised that there is going to be a regulator and, “If we can’t get a deal, there may be something from that,” things have not worked out so well, so I think there are, again, unintended consequences.

I think it is much better for football—the Football League, the Premier League, the National League and the FA—to work things out itself. Without it being perfect, I think the fact there have been three liquidations since 1992, despite the fact that, as you say, so many clubs are in financial distress—most clubs lose a lot of money every single year—is a very good result. You can look at other businesses. I know we do not want to compare businesses to sport; it is a completely different stratosphere. But I do worry about what will happen if you put in lots of extra regulation and lots of extra cost for the clubs, even though I am sure the Premier League will pay the vast majority of the regulator bill. I am just worried about future investors. That is absolutely critical.

[Damian Collins]

Q If we passed an amendment to the Bill that made parachute payments illegal and they were scrapped, how would that affect your preparations for next season?

Tony Bloom: I think it would be disastrous for the Premier League. The Premier League has done an amazing job to make it far and away the strongest domestic league in the world, and that is where we want it to stay. It is so important for this country. If that was to happen, then outside the biggest five or six clubs, which may think their chance of relegation is tiny, the clubs could not invest the money in players. And then what would you have?

In countries like France, with Paris, and also with Juventus and Munich, there is domination between the top one or two clubs and there is frequently only one winner in the league. The middle and bottom clubs would not be able to invest, and the differential between the top clubs and the middle and bottom clubs would be so big that it would not be so competitive. Then people would not want to watch it; the broadcast money would not be there; and we would veer towards Spain, Italy, Germany and France. I think it would be an absolute disaster. Clubs could not invest because of the worry about relegation. As it is, with the parachute payments, clubs still have to sell players, typically. Often, they get into serious financial problems even with the parachutes.

[Mr Betts]

Q I have a couple of issues to put to both of you. You have said that everything works well. I think most people would be in disbelief at hearing that statement, because we all can see problems in football right the way through. Individual clubs have had them. There are problems right through the leagues in terms of funding and insolvency. Both your clubs nearly got to the point of extinction. Can you not see the need for regulation to stop grounds being sold away from clubs and to stop clubs going into administration repeatedly and facing those problems?

Steve Parish: The reality is that all around Europe and probably the world, football is a billionaire or millionaire-funded industry. That is the reality of it. It does not make money anywhere in the world. We are not unique: this is not a country where uniquely we lose money in football. It is not a business with a profit principle; it is a business with a winning principle. Whatever rules you put in place, people’s desire to win will always trump their desire to make money. So the problem is that if you restrict our league so much that we are taken out of that game, you very quickly could make us very uncompetitive in terms of a European landscape.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

Q Competition arrangements, such as the FA cup fixtures, do not fall within the scope of the Bill. Do you think that is the right choice, and why? Feel free to take this opportunity to add anything on the changes to FA cup replays and why they happened the way they did.

David Newton: The short answer is no, we do not believe that competition format matters should be an aspect for the regulator to consider. In Dame Tracey’s report summaries, competition format was not part of that, and I think we feel that competition format matters should remain the province of the football authorities, whether that be ourselves or the leagues. There are specific football-related matters that should remain in our ambit, and this is certainly one of those we feel quite strongly about.

[Damian Collins]

Q One of the comments on the Football Bill is that it does not particularly mention players, and that the scope of the regulator is purely financial and about financial sustainability. The clubs also, as part of their licensing agreement with the regulator, have to produce a corporate governance report. Do you think the Football Association would have any objection if, as part of that governance report, the regulator asked clubs to demonstrate not only how they are financially sustainable but how they met all their other obligations?

Football clubs are not only licensed by the regulator. They are licensed by the Football Association as well. There are articles of association of the Football Association, which place responsibilities on all clubs. Do you think it would be good and proper due diligence for clubs to have to demonstrate through their corporate governance reporting how they meet all their obligations within football—to the FA, to their players and to the welfare standards they are expected to follow?

David Newton: It is an interesting point. It is not one that we have necessarily considered in detail. I do not see any reason why, in good corporate governance practice, you would not refer to your corporate governance standards with all employees, whether they be players or not. From that perspective, on the face of it, it would seem a reasonable assessment.

[Damian Collins]

Q Would you want some assurance that the job of the regulator in this regard might be to request the information and check up on the clubs, but not to have a role in setting the welfare standards, which would be the remit of the competition organisers and the FA?

David Newton: I guess it depends what you mean by checking up on the clubs. We have quite a strong structure of engagement with the players: the players’ union, and the Professional Football Negotiating and Consultative Committee, on which both leagues and we sit with the PFA to discuss on a quarterly basis every aspect of players’ employment by clubs. We would certainly consider that to be the appropriate avenue for those things to be dealt with. I would not necessarily advocate the regulator having formal step-in rights in respect of players as you have outlined, but reporting standards on employees I can see.

[Damian Collins]

Q That was perhaps not the best use of words. I meant if information was brought to the regulator, or if it had reasonable grounds to be concerned; its primary job would not be to check on those things, but it could relay that information back to you as the FA, which has investigatory powers of its own. It is more a question of whether, in principle, you think that those sorts of standards should be incorporated into the corporate governance standards that the regulator should set. That would simply be good practice.

David Newton: I guess it depends on what you mean by good standards. If you are talking about things like national minimum wage or employment rights, then absolutely, those things would be expected. In football, we have our own structures, as you say, for dealing with player-related disputes, or players not being paid—the leagues have very strong rules on that—so those things are dealt with in the structure. Sharing of information with the regulator will obviously be something that may come into focus, once it is up and running, because it is important that there is not duplication of requests for information and that those information requests are shared efficiently.

[Mr Betts]

Q It has been mentioned that the remit of the regulator and the legislation is on things that do not matter to the FA, but do to the fans, such as the FA Cup. One of the objectives of the regulator is to safeguard the heritage of English football. Do you not think that the FA Cup is part of that heritage?

David Newton: Absolutely, the FA Cup is an essential part of our football heritage. We reflect that and take the FA Cup extremely seriously. It is a fantastic competition. Everyone cares passionately about it within the FA, me as much as anyone else. Prior to Dame Tracey’s report, we had already established heritage assets in protection of club playing names. Since the report came out, we have also established rules in the FA on club crests and club colours, so we are very aware of heritage responsibilities in that respect.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Tracey Crouch]

Q Yes, the world of sport did not fall apart by having more women on boards. Going back to the game, when Charlton were relegated, one of the first things they did was ditch their women’s team. That is not unique; other clubs have done exactly the same. Should the club’s licensing requirements state that clubs have to continue their investment in the women’s game regardless of where they are in the leagues?

Jane Purdon: This is such a tough question, because that money has to come from somewhere, and what do you cut? Do you cut funding to your academy? It is so tough. The real answer is that we have to get women’s football independently standing on its own feet and turning a dollar in its own right.

[Damian Collins]

Q Following on from the previous question, I have asked different witnesses about the corporate governance statement that clubs are required to make. I think you touched on that. Do you think it would be appropriate for clubs to have to consider how they meet their wider obligations as part of that corporate governance statement? I think it would be relevant to the regulator if a club was seeking to meet its financial regulatory standards by trimming back on other things it should be doing.

Jane Purdon: I think transparency is a great thing, as is transparency in sport. If you have ever read the code for sports governance, it kind of flows through that. We said to the sport governing bodies who were not as well resourced as many football clubs, “Tell the world what you are doing. Even tell them when you don’t hit your targets and then explain what you are going to do, because it breeds trust.” Against that, we do need to be proportionate and make sure that we are not asking organisations to report for the sake of reporting, and that there is real value that comes from the onerous work that reporting involves.

[Damian Collins]

Q Would you have a problem if it was merely a requirement for clubs? Clubs have certain obligations they are expected to meet by their competition organisers or by the Football Association, and as part of corporate governance they have an explanatory statement about how they do that?

Jane Purdon: In the legislation there is provision to say how you are meeting this code of practice. I do not have a problem with that in theory. As with all these things, the devil is in the detail, but I think that is right. I have talked about not making it too onerous, but on the other hand it can be a very simple measure to engender trust, and fan trust as well.

[Damian Collins]

Q One final question. The commercial development of women’s football seems to be on an exciting path of growth. Where you have Premier League clubs that have men’s and women’s teams, do you think the club should be regulated—or do you think that they should be regulated separately because they are competing in different competitions?

Jane Purdon: As I say, Women in Football does not have a position on this, so I have to be quite careful. If I am brutally honest, my personal opinion—and this is not shared by all by Women in Football colleagues—is that I am not convinced by the intellectual case for an IFR at all, particularly financially. I would need to be persuaded on that one. Maybe it is something we need to think about going forward in the game, and look at the fact that the two teams, the two set-ups, sit in one legal entity. The plus side is when you have a club like Chelsea or Manchester City, which get it and back its women’s team and provide the spectacle in the women’s game that we are used to seeing in the men’s game, that is fabulous, but there is risk as well. Maybe how we manage that risk is something we need to take forward.

[Damian Collins]

Q I suppose ultimately, however it is done, we would want the same standards to apply to everyone. Clubs that have a men’s team and a women’s team should be regulated in the same way as clubs that just have a women’s team.

Jane Purdon: There is a proportionality. One of the other bodies I chair is PGAAC—the Professional Game Academy Audit Company—which is the academy quality assurance body. It is a joint venture between the FA, the Premier League and the EFL, and there is proportionality in what we do. We quality-assure all the academies, and we have just started doing the girls’ game as well. We are not taking what we apply to Manchester City to what we apply to a League Two community organisation that happens to run a girl’s elite training centre. It has to be proportionate and you have to make sure that you are adding value all the way.

In fairness, for full disclosure, I have spoken to people in the women’s game who disagree and say that if this if this is coming in for the men’s game, it ought to come in for the women’s game. I look at things like the owners and officers test, which we have written to the Committee about, because we think there are real problems in the drafting. I think that is going to be incredibly onerous for clubs. If you then put that into the women’s clubs as well, many of them who are running on much lower resources, it is an unintended consequence of bureaucracy to what end.

[Robin Millar]

Q I am an MP from north Wales. The Football Association of Wales told me that girls drop out of football at teen age. That is the big cliff edge, and it is principally to do with facilities that are available, as it is a time when that is particularly important. What do you think are the biggest barriers to women participating in football?

Jane Purdon: By the way, hearing where you are from, may I sound a note of congratulations to Wrexham FC? I saw it had an attendance of 9,500 for one of its women’s games—wonderful.

What are the barriers? We need the role models. We have those. Our Lionesses are wonderful. We need infrastructure. We need more, more, more, more, more. It is as simple as that. We need more pitches, we need more people, we need more coaches. I sometimes say to people if you want to know what needs to happen in future, take a walk around your town and count up all the football pitches you come across—the ones down the park, the ones in the school, the ones for the professional football club. Now double that. If we are serious about opening up football to the other half of the population, it will look something like that. So, yes: more, more, more.

There has to be some rate of organic growth in this. We cannot do everything at once. Many of the people looking at this, the people at NewCo, the people at the FA and, in fairness, the Sport Minister, have taken a good interest in this. There is good work happening, but we have a long way to go.

Football Governance Bill (Third sitting)

Damian Collins Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 16th May 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Damian Collins (Folkestone and Hythe) (Con)]

Q You mentioned the requirements for the club licensing conditions in schedule 5. Looking at that schedule, it seems to me that the corporate governance statement that clubs will need to produce could be where they make some sort of statement about meeting their wider obligations to the organisation and the people who work within it. Is that what you were referring to?

Sanjay Bhandari: Yes. Schedule 5(7)(2) says:

“‘Corporate governance’, in relation to a club, includes”—

so it is non-exhaustive, and you could argue that it includes equality, diversity and inclusion. Some of the things included are

“the nature, constitution or functions of the organs of the club…the manner in which the organs…conduct themselves…the requirements imposed on organs of the club, and…the relationship between different organs of the club.”

That is probably the area where you might amend it.

If you go back to the September 2023 Government White Paper response, there is a list. Paragraph 65 on page 30 talks about the principles of governance and a wide range of responses, and then it lists the kinds of issues that were regarded as principles of governance, which include:

“independent non-executive directors; integrity; equality, diversity and inclusion (EDI); sustainability; fan representation and stakeholder engagement; training on appointment; following best practice with regard to board constitution and decision-making processes; communication and transparency; and promoting clear guidelines and processes.”

The benefit of adding clarity to schedule 5(7)(2) is that we also have to remember what environment we are in. I have worked in lots of environments, and football is the lowest of low-trust environments. If something is not explicitly in there, there is a fear that it means it is not going to be covered. Our submissions were in response to noises we were hearing that there was going to be an attempt to artificially fetter the power of the regulator. Our view is that if there is going to be a regulator, it should be a standard regulator with the standard inherent powers that any regulator would have to perform its functions and deliver on its objective, in the same way that any other regulator would, so to artificially fetter it to reduce the power to deal with equality of inclusion would be wrong in principle.

[Damian Collins]

Q The language you quoted from the schedule is largely lifted from the Companies Act 2006. What you set out is what you would expect from any other corporation looking at a corporate governance statement, so it should apply to a football club as well.

Sanjay Bhandari: It should. We are doing a project with the University of York, and we are up to 40 pages of a review looking at lots of different regulators in comparison to other industries, and saying, “What should be in that code for football governance, which we will deal with along with the regulator once constituted?” If the provision stayed as it was, though, we would argue that it includes equality, diversity and inclusion, because it is a non-exhaustive list and it falls within some of the subcategories.

It would be difficult, if it was in the corporate governance code under the Companies Act, to say that it is not included. The fear, as has been expressed by other people giving evidence, is that football is a low-trust environment and that is why you are getting this response asking, “Is this a way of wriggling out?”

[The Chair]

There is time for one more question.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I have six colleagues who want to ask questions, so can we make them brief, please?

[Damian Collins]

Q This is principally to Tim Payton because it relates to your written evidence, but if the other witnesses have anything to add I would be happy to hear that. Tim, you recommended an amendment to clause 55(2) on the redistribution of broadcast revenue, so that the regulator’s role is not just to consider broadcast revenue for redistribution but all revenue for Premier League clubs. Could you explain a bit about why you made that recommendation?

Tim Payton: Specifically, at the moment it mentions Premier League broadcast revenue, and that does not address where the game is moving. I picked up the widespread dismay on Second Reading and on Tuesday about the loss of FA cup replays. Why are FA cup replays going? Because the European competitions are expanding. The European revenue that will come in is not captured by the relevant revenue clause, because it goes directly to the clubs. Similarly, FIFA is going to expand the Club World cup, and the big clubs are earning more and more from commercial revenue. I know there is a heated debate about whether you have parachute payments within that clause and how it is triggered, but it is almost an irrelevant debate to us until you address the relevant revenue.

The clause also does not future-proof the Bill because at the moment if you move to individual broadcast selling, which is what the large clubs want to do, the clause is meaningless because there is no revenue left to be redistributed. I think a simple wording change could make it much more effective.

[Damian Collins]

Q Do you agree that, as Steve Parish said on Tuesday, the clause as drafted puts a far greater onus on the smaller Premier League clubs, for whom the Premier League broadcasting revenue is a much greater proportion of their income?

Tim Payton: The way Premier League broadcast revenue is distributed is fantastically collective. I think it is 1:1.6, so it really helps to keep a competitive balance, which of course Richard Masters was stressing the importance of to all of you. But the regulator is in effect having the powers over the wrong bit of the broadcast income. It is Manchester City, Manchester United and Arsenal’s revenue that must be included, so that we have a progressive system of redistribution, but also a check on where the game is heading.

[Robin Millar]

Q In the previous evidence sessions, we have had explained to us—in quite graphic detail at times—the differences between the leagues, the different challenges they face, the different ways that fans experience the game and so on. First, I am keen to hear from the fans’ perspective what you think those risks are across those leagues. Secondly, are you happy that the Bill addresses those risks, for example, in the way that clubs fail?

Alistair Jones: For the EFL, the precipice between the bottom of the Premier League and the top of the Championship is massively disproportionate to wherever it has been before. The simple fact is that over the 72 football league clubs, there is £450 million of losses just last year alone. That cannot continue—everything has to be sustainable.

For me and for Albion fans, a fairer distribution of wealth and a fairer redistribution of Premier League income would make that difference less between the 20th team and the 21st team in the country. At the moment, over £50 million of turnover is written off more or less overnight, and that is dependent on whether parachute payments are consistent. Also, the lack of competition is a big worry. The bottom three of the Premier League were the top three that got promoted last year, and they have just swapped places. It is more than likely that two of the three will be promoted this year.

Sarah Turner: We would like parachute payments to come under the independent regulator because we think it does make it an unfair competition. You are striving to reach the promised lands, so you will throw everything at it, and it makes owners gamble and spend recklessly, which is what has happened to Reading and many other teams. It is an unfair competition because you are pushing yourself so far to get there. We were relegated because of a points deduction to League One, and we are striving to get back up to the Championship.

Tim Payton: We are here because of the European Super League and the furore. I was in the meeting with the Prime Minister where he said he would “drop a legislative bomb” on it. What I hope you are all doing is passing legislation that means we do not need to throw bombs around but we have a good defensive mechanism in place. The two big threats to the heritage and competitive balance of the Premier League are all the revenue being earned outside of that in the UEFA and FIFA competitions and, as I said before, the relocation of our games. I would urge you to look closely at the suggestions we have made for tightening up in those areas.

Football Governance Bill (Fourth sitting)

Damian Collins Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 16th May 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Stuart Andrew]

On the hon. Lady’s points, the term “sustainability” is used in the purposes and not again in its objectives. Our advice from the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel said that “soundness” achieves the same thing, but we are talking about the remit over the entire pyramid. We feel that would overstretch the regulator, which is why we are focusing on the top five leagues.

I understand the points made by the hon. Member for Sheffield South East. On a recent podcast, I repeated the phrase, used by many, that replays are often the David and Goliath of English football. However, in terms of financial sustainability, I cannot imagine a single club relying on the off-chance that it may have a replay at some point as a sustainable business model for its individual club. As I say, that is why the regulator will focus tightly on what the business plans would be.

[Damian Collins (Folkestone and Hythe) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that part of the tension here is that the FA is under pressure from UEFA to free up days in the football calendar? That means it is left in the invidious position where it either does that, or requires teams to play scratch sides to fulfil fixtures when they must otherwise manage their resources for competing fixtures as well. That is why we moved away from never-ending replays in the FA cup in the ’50s and ’60s to a far more limited scope for replays today.

[Stuart Andrew]

My hon. Friend has got it exactly right and articulated it extremely well. We recognise that that is the challenge football has with the obligations it must match with the likes of UEFA and so on. I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention, and with that I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 8

The IFR’s regulatory principles

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart Andrew]

I recognise the intent behind the amendments, which is to add further groups to the list of persons the regulator should co-operate and proactively and constructively engage with. However, we do not think that is necessary, and we believe it would alter the intention and effect of the regulatory principle in question. We have always said that the regulator should take a participative approach to regulation, which means to co-operate constructively with the regulated industry where possible.

The principle’s original intention was to guide the regulator to take that approach, which might not otherwise have been implicit, since the natural instinct for regulators may be not to co-operate with the persons they are regulating. By contrast, for other groups such as fans and members of local communities, it is implicit that the regulator should engage with them where appropriate, not least because the sustainability objective of the regulator is in the very interests of fans. Indeed, fans and local communities are the key consumer group that the regulator is established to protect. They feature in the very purpose of the Bill in clause 1.

My concern is that to list every possible stakeholder that the regulator should engage with during the course of regulation would be a slippery slope that could impact on the effectiveness and, crucially, the speed of the regime. That is not the intention of this principle, nor is it necessary detail for the face of the Bill.

I absolutely recognise that players and fans have a huge role to play in football. It will be for the regulator to engage with those stakeholders during the appropriate process. That is why, absolutely, where collaboration is working well, we would expect the regulator to continue that. Having a comprehensive list might mean that we miss out a group that we would like the regulator to consult. It might also mean that the regulator then feels obliged to consult that entire list on everything, whether appropriate or not, clogging the regulator up, if we are not careful.

[Damian Collins]

I am following what the Minister is saying carefully. Does he believe that it would be appropriate for the regulator to require the clubs to engage effectively with their fans, as the Bill asks them to do, and to ensure the welfare of their players, and that the regulator should stipulate that the clubs set out how they will do that through their corporate governance statement, as part of the licensing regime? When we consider schedule 5, it might be appropriate to reference some of those points specifically in the Bill as part of the licensing condition.

[Stuart Andrew]

My hon. Friend makes some interesting points. We will come to those measures later. I am slightly nervous about having a prescriptive way of engaging with fans. Depending on which club it is, it might be that the way a club engages its fans absolutely meets what the fans want. They might recognise that it is a good working relationship, which achieves the objectives they want. What we want is a minimum standard. Perhaps that is what he is alluding to.

[Damian Collins]

I think my right hon. Friend is right. I would not suggest a prescriptive requirement, but simply a requirement for the club to state its policy.

[Stuart Andrew]

Absolutely, and we will come to that later in the Bill. I take on board the point made by the hon. Member for Barnsley East about the health regulator, for example. We do not need to tell that regulator to co-operate with the very people it is designed and obliged to protect the interests of, so we are following the same pattern here.

Football Governance Bill (Fifth sitting)

Damian Collins Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st May 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Ian Byrne]

I wish to support the excellent remarks by the shadow Minister, who gave a very comprehensive overview of why we need amendments to the Bill. There is a real worry, as I have outlined, that the clubs will seek to dilute the power of the supporter’s voice by filling the boards full of stooges, shall we say. We need some sort of system to ensure that boards are appointed through a democratic and independent process. Supporters trusts are a ready-made option. There are over 130 of them in the football world. They are democratic, independent organisations that have the trust of the wider supporter base, mainly. It would be foolish not to utilise that expertise and the system that is already in place.

If a club has not got a supporters trust we need to have some sort of oversight to ensure there are independent fan voices holding clubs to account, which will be a crucial part of the independent football regulator. We have got to ensure that those boards are fit for purpose and, as I said, not diluted by clubs that want to disempower supporters and supporter voices.

[Damian Collins (Folkestone and Hythe) (Con)]

I want to repeat the point I made on Second Reading about the corporate governance statement, which is part of the licensing condition. I think this is incredibly important—indeed, it will be important for the regulator, because it is part of the conditions of issuing the licence.

My right hon. Friend the Minister has said that the regulator will issue of a code of practice. It is important that we are clear what, in passing this legislation, Parliament intends this code of practice should contain. Competition organisers already require clubs to demonstrate many of the requirements discussed in this debate. For example, the Premier League’s own governance statement says that the Premier League handbook acts as the rulebook for all member clubs, which includes the clubs having to demonstrate

“minimum standards of governance and operation on a wide range of areas, from safeguarding and supporter relations to broadcaster access, stadium infrastructure and club academies”.

By asking for this sort of information, the regulator would merely be repeating requests which the clubs have to fulfil for their competition organisers anyway. I agree with the evidence we received from Kick It Out, which said that it would be extraordinary that such a corporate governance statement would not include the club’s policies on equality, diversity and inclusion. I do not think we would necessarily be asking for the clubs to do more work than they do already. We would simply be asking that their own policies in these areas be clearly set out in the corporate governance statement they give to the regulator. That would mean that the regulator would have the power to hold the clubs to account for those policies. If necessary, the regulator could even audit or investigate clubs if it felt they were in breach of those conditions, which would almost certainly be a breach not only of the pledges they have made to the regulator but of the rules of the competitions within which they play.

[Dame Tracey Crouch]

Will my hon. Friend clarify something? Is he saying is that there is no need to change any part of the Bill? This needs to be reflected in the intent of the corporate governance statement, and some of these things can be included without amendment to the legislation?

[Damian Collins]

My hon. Friend makes a very important point. That is exactly correct. I think it is a question of being clear as to what the corporate governance statement should include, either in the Bill or at least in the explanatory notes. The explanatory notes already say that a description of all the operations of all the elements of the club should be included; it would be extraordinary if we thought that that did not include a statement on equality, diversity and inclusion, or on the welfare of the players. This has been requested throughout the passage of the Bill. In particular, we have heard that at present there is no requirement for an EDI statement, nor are players mentioned at all. As my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford says, without changing the structure of the Bill, or maybe even its wording Bill, we could make it really clear that these things are included through these important corporate governance statements.

[Stuart Andrew]

I thank hon. Members for their contributions. I agree with the hon. Member for Barnsley East that the guidance on corporate governance should be really helpful to clubs that are perhaps struggling with that, and puts it on a statutory footing. As my hon. Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe quite rightly points out, many of these clubs, by obligation of the leagues they are in, already have to provide a corporate governance code. However, as we go further down the pyramid, there are varying degrees of quality for that corporate governance code. That is why having a statutory requirement will, we hope, improve those standards. We recognise that some of those codes work well, but my hon. Friend is right: this will enable the regulator to hold those clubs to account for the way in which they are implementing those corporate governance codes.

[Damian Collins]

My right hon. Friend makes a good point. The requirements will differ at different levels of the pyramid. It would be wrong for us to require a club in League Two to meet the same corporate governance standards as a Premier League club. However, the provision could be worded to say that the corporate governance statements must set out how the clubs meet all the requirements they are expected to meet by the competition organisers for the competition in which they play.

[Stuart Andrew]

I expect that clubs would have to work closely with the leagues as well.

On the issue of EDI, I hope that it is clear this is an area that I personally feel very passionate about. We have made sure that the Bill and the regulator are tightly focused on the finances of clubs, the sustainability of the pyramid and fan engagement. We recognise the importance of equality, particularly, as the hon. Member for Barnsley East mentioned, in light of unacceptable abuses. I regularly engage with the Football Association and the leagues to put pressure on them and to work with them to do more to make improvements in this area. We also work with organisations such as Sport England and UK Sport, because it is not just football where this is an issue.

[Stuart Andrew]

My hon. Friend makes a really important point, which I was just about to come on to. I am glad that she did so—it was a perfect introduction. She is absolutely right. The regulator can consider all of those, and I would expect that it would do so. It can draw on established principles such as, as she rightly points out, the code for sports governance and the UK corporate governance code. It can also draw on the Wates principles on corporate governance for large private companies, and it can also draw on the regulator’s own state-of-the-game reports. There is a whole host of information which I hope will address those issues.

I can confirm to the hon. Lady for Luton South that the phrase, “likely to be affected”, includes fans, so I expect that they will be consulted.

[Damian Collins]

My right hon. Friend’s response is helpful. If the Government are not willing to amend the Bill, and do not feel the need to do so, would he consider writing to the Committee, setting out the guidance which he would give to the regulator when preparing the codes of practice on what the corporate governance code should include?

[Stuart Andrew]

Yes, I would be more than happy to do that.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 5 agreed to.

Clause 21

Discretionary licence conditions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I appreciate my hon. Friend’s comments and his work with his local club. I have met its supporters, and that is one example, although not a lone one, because it has been confirmed, in another example, that both Bury FC’s owners, Stewart Day and Steve Dale, passed the EFL tests. The fan-led review took a number of such case studies into consideration, concluding that things needed to change.

Alongside other measures in the Bill, which will be vital in giving owners a better landscape in which to operate and invest, the review made some distinct suggestions regarding the owners and directors tests, such as: ensuring a consistent and independent approach across all men’s football; giving tests the backing of the regulator to enable access to information not otherwise available to competition organisers, such as that from the National Crime Agency; splitting the tests into two parts to recognise the difference in the obligations and duties of owners and directors; and strengthening the qualification criteria to ensure that prospective candidates have integrity and the intention of running a club sustainably. Overall, I think the clause and this part do a good job of achieving those aims and recommendations.

I have one brief question at this stage. The EFL has indicated that it will stop conducting its owners and directors tests once the regulator is running its tests. However, Richard Masters told the Committee that the Premier League would continue to run its tests alongside those of the regulator. Putting aside the issue of clubs paying twice for the same regulation and the lack of efficiency involved in duplicating structures, a dual system could pose a dilemma. If two tests yield different results, whose decision would ultimately be adhered to? That is difficult to tell from the Bill, and I hope that this is something that the Minister can confirm for us today, or that he will write to the Committee about.

[Damian Collins]

I asked Richard Masters that question when he gave evidence to the Committee and he was clear then that it would require two green lights, as he put it: a person has to pass the Premier League’s own test as well as the test set by the regulator.

[Stephanie Peacock]

That clarity is welcome, but I would still be interested to hear the Minister’s comments. Nevertheless, I am pleased to welcome the clause and I look forward to discussing it in detail.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Betts]

That is a really helpful point. The Bill is about stopping people from doing the wrong things for the wrong reasons, as opposed to stopping people from making mistakes because they are trying to do the right thing but get things wrong. We will never be able to stop that completely.

[Damian Collins]

I echo what my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford said. Part of the problem with the lack of oversight of spending, particularly in the Championship, is that club owners who go in with the best of intentions find themselves competing against other clubs that are spending over 100% of their annual revenue on salaries. They therefore make mistakes in trying to compete with someone else who is already trading in breach of the league’s rules.

[Mr Betts]

Absolutely. Trying to keep clubs in line with the league’s rules, so that others do not over-compete to match them, is vital. We will come on to parachute payments later, including how they can drive these processes.

We cannot go back and undo all the problems of the past. My concern about new clause 3 is about owners who, for whatever reason, have decided to separate the ownership of the club from that of the ground. I know that in future that will require proper consultation and approval from the regulator, but this is being done in some clubs. My own club, Sheffield Wednesday, is one. Derby County has done it, and I think Aston Villa and Charlton have as well—it has happened at quite a few clubs, for various reasons. For Sheffield Wednesday and Derby, it was a way to try to get round the financial restrictions on clubs. Wednesday just made a mess of theirs and got the timing wrong, so they got a points deduction anyway.

New clause 3 is an attempt to say that although we cannot go back and reverse that decision—we cannot force the owners to sell back the grounds to the same organisation that owns the club—we can say that if the club is to be sustainable, the owner has to demonstrate that the ground will be available. A club cannot play without a ground; if it does not have a ground, it is not sustainable. I hope that the Minister will take that point seriously. If he cannot accept the new clause, because there is some—

Football Governance Bill (Sixth sitting)

Damian Collins Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st May 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Rachel Hopkins (Luton South) (Lab)]

I want to carry on the debate about clause 37 and reflect on honesty and integrity as set out in subsection (3), on “matters relevant to determinations” of the “requisite honesty and integrity”, and subsection (3)(g), which talks about

“such other matters relating to honesty and integrity as may be specified”

by rules. I would be interested in a little clarity from the Minister about that. Some of the other prerequisites or matters to be considered, such as whether someone is financially sound, can involve hard evidence, and someone’s competence can be tested by qualifications; integrity, however, is a bit of a subjective matter. It is more about things that are not against the law but are certainly not in the spirit of the law, and it is often behavioural.

Does the Minister have any examples that he might want to see in those rules? Someone might have used poor employment practices, for example, as we have seen in other industries, some of which are regulated and some of which are not. The issue would not reach a tribunal so it would not be a piece of hard evidence, but it would bring into question why an owner or officers of a club, in a different business, deployed fire-and-rehire tactics, for example, that were detrimental to their workforce and local community. Similarly, in a positive sense, would there be any consideration of what high integrity might be: for example, owners and officers who championed equality and diversity—an issue that we have been speaking a lot about in this Bill? I would welcome the Minister’s comments.

[Damian Collins (Folkestone and Hythe) (Con)]

I will be interested in the Minister’s remarks about amendment 1. I understand the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford is making, in seeking to create a bit more flexibility for the regulator. We would all hope that the integrity checks against an individual owner could ultimately “trump”—if she does not mind my using the word—any positive trading relationship. If the person were not considered a good and proper owner, the fact that we had a good trading relationship with their country should make no difference: they should not be able to avoid the checks simply because they come from a trusted trader nation.

However, on the other hand, I can see that having “must” would be helpful for the regulator in two ways. One is that if a would-be owner of a club met all the criteria and therefore should be allowed to acquire the club, but the only block on them was that they were a sanctioned individual, the regulator would have the certainty of knowing that it could not let the deal go through. There would not be grounds for challenge, say, at the Court of Arbitration for Sport over whether an appropriate judgment had been made. There would be no question of the sanctioned person’s suitability on any other grounds. In that particular circumstance, the provision could be helpful.

I imagine that it would be reassuring for the regulator to know that, as was the case when Newcastle United was acquired, if another Premier League club was acquired by a country that was not sanctioned—we did not have a trade embargo with it—but was nevertheless controversial, the regulator would not have to consider that, whether people wanted it to or not, because no Government policy would be saying that we could not trade with or allow investment from that country. The regulator would have the certainty of knowing that it was acting purely within the confines of its role.

I appreciate the intention of the amendment and the reasons behind it, but perhaps the Minister could give us some guidance on whether “must” may be better than “may”.

[Stuart Andrew]

The Government absolutely recognise the intent behind the amendment to ensure the independence of the regulator. We have been extremely clear that the independence of the regulator is vital. That is why the regulator will be set up as a new public body to ensure its full operational independence.

Clause 37(2) does not diminish the regulator’s independence. It does not mean that the regulator needs to consult the Government about the suitability of an owner, nor can the Government interfere with the regulator’s decision. If the regulator determines that an individual does not have the requisite honesty and integrity, or is not financially sound, or that the individual has any source of wealth connected to serious criminal conduct, that individual cannot be determined to be a suitable owner of a regulated club. Clause 37(2) does not override those fundamental requirements. Nor can any individual, fan, league, club or Government influence override them.

The purpose of clause 37(2) is to ensure that the regulator has to have regard to the UK’s foreign and trade policy objectives when it makes a determination about any new or incumbent owner. That will ensure that the regulator cannot make unilateral moral judgments on which countries it may consider unsuitable when it tests owners. We do not want to allow for a scenario where that happens and in effect a regulator, as I said this morning, sets the Government’s foreign policy.

The effect of the amendment would be to increase discretion for the regulator to decide when it will have regard to the UK’s foreign and trade policy objectives when making decisions about owners. The Government believe that their foreign and trade policy objectives are a relevant matter for the regulator to have regard to whenever it makes a determination about the suitability of any and all owners, not just some. Increased discretion for the regulator may risk it making unilateral judgments that stray into foreign policy.

To be clear, requiring that the regulator must have regard to the Government’s objectives does not mean that that must be a decisive factor. It might have limited relevance in a particular case and, if so, the regulator will not have to give that undue weight. The fundamental basis for a regulator’s determinations about owners will be honesty, integrity, financial soundness, source of wealth and, for new owners, sufficiency of financial resources.

I heard what my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford said and we will continue to reflect further, ahead of Report. But for the reasons that I have set out, I am not able to accept her amendment and I hope she will withdraw it.

Clause 37 lists the matters that the regulator must take into account when it conducts owners and directors tests, including what it must consider when determining whether an individual is financially sound and whether they have the requisite honesty and integrity and, for officers only, the competence needed to fulfil the role, and ultimately to determine whether they are sensible—sorry, suitable.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephanie Peacock]

I am pleased to be able to discuss part 6 of the Bill, which provides a backstop power in the event that certain thresholds are met and football is unable to resolve the issue of financial distribution. Before I begin to explore this clause, it is important to set out that, in an ideal situation, these powers would never be used. As the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford set out during the evidence sessions, based on her experience with the fan-led review, a football-led solution to the issue of distribution has always been and remains the preference. I hope that can be kept in mind when discussing this part. Indeed, I welcome the powers but my hope is that their enforcement will not actually be necessary.

Clause 55 broadly sets out the process under this part but most importantly defines what might count as “relevant revenue”, which is money to which the backstop will apply. Relevant revenue is broadly defined as revenue received as a result of broadcasting rights, with the Minister given the flexibility to change that if broadcasting is no longer the predominant source of income. There are a couple of things to clarify. First, it would be good if the Minister could confirm whether such broadcast revenue is meant to cover domestic competitions only. Secondly, it would be appreciated if the Minister could clarify whether broadcasting revenue will still be considered relevant if the funding model changes so that it is paid directly to clubs, rather than through competition organisers. Broadly, though, I think this scope is generally accepted as being the right one.

Issues have, however, been identified with clause 55(2)(b), which is the part of the Bill that excludes parachute payments from the definition of relevant revenue. My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East tabled amendment 27, and I will speak primarily to amendment 31 in my name. First, I would like to set some background to the issue, as it stems from the fact that there is an ever-growing gap between the Premier League and the EFL. Indeed, 30 years ago, EFL revenues were 75% of those of the Premier League; today they are just 6%. In real figures, that means that 30 years ago the gap was £11 million, and today it is £3 billion.

The Premier League’s approach to mitigating that gap is the so-called parachute payments to clubs relegated from the Premier League for up to three seasons. Those payments help to ensure competitiveness in the Premier League by providing clubs with the confidence to invest on promotion in the knowledge that they will be supported if they are relegated. For example, parachute payments might give the club the confidence to sign players on multi-year contracts, and that is incredibly important to consider. The Premier League’s competitiveness and the fact that any team, no matter their size or experience, can compete on any given day is what makes it the most beloved and exciting league in the world.

However, while they help to boost competitiveness in the Premier League, parachute payments—by the White Paper’s own admission—can distort competition in the Championship. In each of the last six seasons, two of the three clubs promoted from the Championship to the Premier League have been in receipt of parachute payments. The knock-on effect of that is that owners of clubs not in receipt of parachute payments are compelled to put ever greater levels of funding into their clubs to try to remain competitive. That overreliance on increasing owner funding has deeply exposed clubs when the funding does not materialise, as we have seen for Wigan, Bolton and Bury.

Further, the size of parachute payments has increased in recent years. Between 2010 and 2020, they have risen from £30 million to £233 million. That is an eightfold increase in a period in which player wages have only doubled. That means that, of the total distributable revenue of the English and Welsh professional game, the top 25 clubs—those in the Premier League—and the five in receipt of parachute payments in the EFL received 92% last season. That is £3 billion for 25 clubs, and £245 million for the other 67 professional clubs. Given the scale of parachute payments, therefore, it is notable that the Bill has definitively excluded them from the definition of relevant revenue. That is why I have tabled amendment 31.

4.30 pm

I want to be absolutely clear that the amendment is not about abolishing parachute payments; I believe that they provide clubs with the confidence that they need to invest, and they are a crucial tool in ensuring the competitiveness of the best league in the world. The amendment would simply give the regulator discretion to decide that, if certain criteria are met, parachute payments need not be excluded from the revenue to be distributed under the backstop provision.

Certainly, there is no reason to single out parachute payments. Whether people are in favour of significant parachute payments or not, they agree that they have an impact on club finances. As such, they will have a significant impact on the regulator’s objectives of protecting and promoting the financial soundness of clubs and the resilience of English football. Given that that relates to the regulator’s core role, the regulator should have the ultimate say on whether parachute payments are considered as part of the backstop provision.

Further, solidarity payments are explicitly linked to parachute payments. Solidarity payments are worked out as a percentage of the value of a year-three parachute payment. Championship clubs receive 30%, League One clubs receive 4.5%, and League Two clubs receive 3% of the value. The regulator, therefore, might find it difficult to look at one without looking at the other.

I emphasise again that the amendment does not predetermine whether the regulator includes or excludes parachute payments. If the regulator has a case, based on its objective evidence base, that excluding parachute payments from relevant revenue is more likely to make clubs financially sound and promote the financial resilience of English football, they will remain excluded. The amendment simply recognises that it should be the regulator that makes the decision, independent from any vested interests.

When making that decision, the regulator will have to pay explicit regard to the fulfilment of its core objectives and its secondary purposes: financial sustainability, financial resilience, competitiveness and investment. Taken together, those are the principles that should decide whether parachute payments are included—not the leagues and not politicians. Only then will we ensure that the regulator can fulfil the purpose of the Bill.

[Damian Collins]

I will make a few points on parachute payments. It is fair to say that they are not part of the redistribution mechanism between the Premier League and the Football League. They can be set as an amount alongside the redistribution that takes place, but, of course, they are not fixed. They are a contractual arrangement that the Premier League enters into with clubs that are in the league or when they get promoted.

For reasons that hon. Members have rightly set out, if the income of a Premier League club drops by at least half after being relegated, even with parachute payments, that will be a severe challenge to its sustainability. It is anyway and it certainly would be if those payments did not exist. Of course, if a club is promoted straight back up, as Leicester City has been this year, the year-two and year-three parachute payments are not kept by the Football League—the money never goes to the Football League—but goes back to the Premier League. Therefore, in many ways, the payments have nothing to do with the Football League; they are made by the Premier League to its member clubs in the event that they go down.

The question is then whether the existence of parachute payments has such a market-distorting effect that the regulator would have to intervene. It is difficult to see why the regulator would need to intervene on the basis of the impact on the clubs that have been relegated; they clearly need that support. From all the evidence that we heard as a Committee—I have not heard anyone this afternoon say anything to the contrary—there needs to be some compensating mechanism for clubs that go down, otherwise the risks are too great.

It is not always about clubs that have gone up and come straight back down again; it is often about quite large clubs—it was Leicester and Southampton last year. Everton could easily have gone down last season and the impact of such a relegation would have been catastrophic. The regulator would therefore have to take a view as to whether the existence of those payments has a distorting effect on the Championship.

Given the remit of the regulator, I urge hon. Members tabling amendments to be careful what they wish for. The regulator may well take the view that its job is not to have an impact on the nature of competition in the Championship, or to make it easier for more clubs to get promoted. Its interest is to promote financial sustainability, so it could easily take the view that parachute payments should stay because they are necessary for the clubs that are relegated.

Alongside that, there must be effective financial controls on Championship clubs. The question of whether a Championship club feels the need to compete against parachute payments is not necessarily one for the regulator. The regulator’s role is to ensure the financial sustainability of the league, so it might say that it can do that through the checks that it can put in place now, and therefore ensure that the situation created before does not happen again.

One could ask whether it is fair for the Championship to be run such that Championship clubs must compete against Premier League clubs, and cannot cook the books or rely on director’s loans because the regulator will stop them. Of course, in some ways the Championship is not competing with the Premier League. It is a league of clubs seeking to get promoted to the Premier League, but it is also looking to develop its own talent. It can buy talent from the lower leagues and from Europe, as it effectively does already. The TV revenue for the Championship, as it stands today, is already greater than for the top division in the Netherlands, Portugal, Belgium or Denmark, all of which are highly-competitive football nations whose pedigree in major international tournaments has been somewhat better than the home nations over the last few decades.

[Mr Betts]

Is it not one of the great strengths of the English pyramid that there is, or should be, the ability for clubs to move around? If there are massive differences in the financial capabilities of the clubs that come down from the Premier League with a view to going back up again very quickly and the other Championship clubs, that effectively removes the element of competition and removes the prospect of promotion from so many clubs that it changes the fundamental nature of the pyramid. Surely that goes against one of the objectives that the Bill is trying to achieve.

[Damian Collins]

I agree with the hon. Gentleman. The strength of the pyramid is one of the most important parts of the English game. It is probably the reason why the Premier League is such a commercial success—there is real promotion, relegation and competitive matches between the leagues. Parachute payments have come in out of necessity because of the requirement for clubs to jump up into a competition in which players are paid so much more and then to come out of it again. The regulator, as we are setting it up, would view the sustainability of the clubs in the Championship as important.

It is difficult to say that Championship clubs in England cannot recruit talent from other major European leagues and cannot develop their own talent. My concern is that, if all we do is push more money into the Championship, we will see a very large inflation of Championship player salaries. There will not necessarily be an improvement in the quality of players in the Championship but those players will be paid a lot more. There would also be even greater calls for bigger solidarity payments between the Championship and League One.

As the hon. Gentleman knows, League One club owners already complain that unless a big club happens to have been relegated into League One—a league that it is not normally in—getting promoted and sustaining a place in the Championship is becoming increasingly difficult because the Championship has largely become a division of former Premier League clubs. There are one or two exceptions—such as Preston North End, which have never played in the Premier League—but they are increasingly rare.

If the amendment were made and parachute payments were to be considered by the regulator, that might lead the regulator to demand much greater payments from the Premier League to the Championship. The logical argument that the Football League is advancing is that it wants more money for the Championship, not that parachute payments should go.

A question that was raised in the evidence session would also come into play: would it be fair for the medium and smaller clubs in the Premier League if the only method of distribution was UK broadcasting revenue, which the Premier League clubs receive equally? As we heard in the evidence session, that would place a much greater financial burden on clubs such as Brighton, Crystal Palace, Nottingham Forest and Everton than it would on Manchester United, Manchester City, Liverpool and Arsenal, for whom that money is a smaller part of their total revenue. Unless European money, other prize money and commercial gate money could suddenly be considered along with parachute payments, we are picking winners. We are saying, “We are going to favour the Championship side at the expense of the teams that play in the lower half of the Premier League.”

This is a highly complex matter with lots of moving parts. As we have heard throughout the debate on the Bill, the different parts of the football pyramid have different demands and income streams, and would make different cases. It is therefore right that parachute payments are kept out of the Bill, because they are a matter for the Premier League and the clubs that are relegated. Of course, the regulator will still be free to take wider consideration of the sustainability of the whole pyramid, which is purely about redistribution and where the money is drawn from. My concern is that—to use the phrase that we have used throughout the Committee’s consideration of the Bill—the unintended consequence of the amendment would be to create different winners and losers. The regulator has the power to look at all those things in the round.

[Mr Betts]

Is the hon. Gentleman saying that the Premier League’s objective in having parachute payments protected in this way is to ensure they that continue, while the issue of the pyramid and more competition lower down is met by even more money from the Premier League to the EFL, irrespective of parachute payments? It seems to me that that is not its position; it actually wants to hang on to as much money as it can for Premier League clubs and to protect parachute payments too. I accept what the hon. Gentleman says about the multitude of issues surrounding competition between clubs in different leagues, but the fact that we cannot solve everything with this amendment does not mean that we should not address one of the problems.

[Damian Collins]

One of the reasons why the Bill is important is that the biggest problem in the pyramid at the moment is the financial sustainability of Championship clubs. There are different pressures and the greatest financial risks are taken there; some of the biggest failures have been at that level. That is why it is important.

Parachute payments exist only because the Premier League wants a more competitive, more attractive league. It does not want a closed league where the same three clubs are going up and down all the time, and the clubs that come up are just cannon fodder for the teams that play in it regularly. It is incumbent on the regulator to take a view on the sustainability of the pyramid, but the Premier League would not wish for that outcome.

We can choose which seasons we want to pick, but I do not think it is proven that parachute payments are having that effect already. There is plenty of evidence of badly run clubs—Sunderland is a good example from not long ago—that have been relegated from the Championship while still in receipt of parachute payment money. A lot of clubs come down with players who are not worth what they are being paid, and are stuck with a Championship squad on Premier League money. That is a problem that many clubs face.

Many problems are about the poor decisions made by managers and owners in the Championship, and a lack of financial oversight. The regulator needs to fix that financial oversight first, alongside considering redistribution in the round. It is easier to do that if we do not confuse that with parachute payments, which as the hon. Gentleman says are a much bigger quantum than the amount of redistribution anyway. We need to get the financial oversight right and look at redistribution in that context. I am concerned that simply asking the regulator to recommend a transfer through the backstop of money from the Premier League to the EFL corporately without the right financial oversight will pour petrol on the fire and drive wage inflation in the Championship.

[Stephanie Peacock]

The hon. Gentleman is making a really comprehensive argument for parachute payments. I want to be clear that my amendment is not proposing to get rid of parachute payments; it simply says that they should not be ruled out. I appreciate that he is saying that we should get this right before we move on, but we are here now setting the regulation. Obviously, if they are excluded, they are excluded.

[Damian Collins]

I will draw my remarks to a conclusion. I appreciate that—the hon. Member for Sheffield South East makes a similar argument—it is not an argument for the abolition of parachute payments. My concern is that if we take that step, we would have to bring into scope all football money, not just the money that the Premier League pays in redistribution to clubs in the lower leagues and through parachute payments. That would be a much wider step and would require further consideration. If such recommendations are to be made in future, that should be done after the regulator is established and we have the state of the game report.

[Dame Tracey Crouch]

I find part 6 to be one of the most infuriating parts of the Bill, not because it is a bad aspect of the Bill but because it should not exist. The truth is that if there had been a deal between the two parties—the Premier League and the EFL—part 6 would look very different. We made it clear in the fan-led review that distributions are an issue for football and they should be able to resolve that issue themselves, but that it was important for backstop powers to be there to intervene if no solution was found. That is what part 6 is, and it has become a more controversial part of the Bill than was perhaps ever envisaged. We had hoped back in November 2021, when we published the fan-led review, that there would be a deal.

--- Later in debate ---

It goes back to the questions that we heard in the evidence session about getting the coding right in the Bill to ensure that, if part 6 is ever triggered, it is correct. However, we cannot ignore the fact that, at the moment, those parachute payments are contractual agreements. Therefore, I think it is right to include the wording as it is in the Bill, which future-proofs any reformed process going forward. At the same time, it is clear that we respect the long-term financial sustainability of football clubs. It is a difficult conversation to have, because we all want to see more money going through the pyramid, but at the end of the day these are agreements between a club that is promoted and a club that is potentially relegated to ensure that they have that safety net if they are relegated. The Bill is correct, but the explanatory notes could be broadened to be a bit more future-proof.

[Damian Collins]

Does my hon. Friend agree that there is a slight danger, if we go down the path suggested by the amendment, of creating an even bigger gap between the big six and everyone else? We would basically be saying to the rest of the clubs, “The parachute payments are not for us: they are for you—the other 14 clubs in the Premier League. If you want them, you can pay for them and pay for the solidarity payments for the football league as well”, because that is effectively what would happen.

[Dame Tracey Crouch]

I completely agree with my hon. Friend. I always refer back to that point in the fan-led review, and we mulled over that issue at length. The truth is that we did not come to a conclusion ourselves, because it is so complex. We have made it clear in the chapter on financial distribution that we hope that there will be reform to the system, but this was back in 2021, for goodness’ sake. I want to bang everybody’s heads together and send them to bed without any tea, because we are dealing with the failure of the leagues to reach a solution, and I hope that the message they get from today’s sitting and the evidence sessions that we had last week is to go away and come up with another solution. The Bill sets out the process if there is no deal on that, and ultimately if there is no amendment to the Bill, let that be an inspiration to people to come together and find a solution.