Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 15th May 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent]

That the Bill be now read a second time.

[Baroness in Waiting/Government Whip (Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am proud to bring this Bill to your Lordships’ House with my noble friend Lady Sherlock. I am grateful for the engagement that we have had with noble Lords on the Bill so far and look forward to working with your Lordships as the Bill progresses. I also look forward to hearing the maiden speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Spielman, which I am sure will be excellent—good luck!

There have always been people who commit fraud. Sadly, this is not a new problem, but over the past decade fraudsters have become increasingly sophisticated in the techniques that they use to steal people’s money, using data, technology and a variety of scams. Banks and similar entities have transformed their ability to spot and stop fraud and to protect their customers’ money. They have invested in new technology and changed processes, but this Government believe that the public sector has not proactively followed their lead. In 2023-24, fraud and error against the public sector reached an astonishing £55 billion. That includes: fraud against our public services, including those who abuse the tax system; fraud by dishonest companies that use deception to win public contracts; and benefit fraud by criminal gangs and individuals. In 2024-25, benefit fraud and error stood at a staggering £9.5 billion a year.

Fraud against the public sector is not a victimless crime. It takes money away from vital public services, erodes trust and harms innocent people. It is ultimately public services that suffer, and it is taxpayers who are the victims of this crime. They are rightly incensed when their money lines the pockets of criminals. It is theft from the taxpayer—from every single one of us. Delivering this Government’s plan for change is possible only if we do more to ensure that taxpayers’ money is protected and spent wisely. The Government made a manifesto commitment that they will safeguard taxpayers’ money and will not tolerate fraud or waste anywhere in public services. This Bill is part of our plan for delivery.

I turn to the detail of the legislation before us. Part 1 of the Bill contains measures that gives the Public Sector Fraud Authority—I will refer to it as the PSFA for the rest of my speech—within the Cabinet Office powers for the first time to tackle fraud across the public sector on behalf of government departments and public bodies that do not have the capability, capacity or powers to do so. Noble Lords will know that the scope of the activity of the state is vast.

Fraudsters will attack vulnerabilities wherever they can find them, and the impact is not just on the state but on real people. For example, in a case referred to the PSFA earlier this year, a firm had received £370,000 in funding to provide skills training, having, it is believed, provided false or inaccurate details to create the false impression that the criteria for the funding scheme were met when in fact they were not. Not only does the fraudster gain, but the money is diverted from people who could legitimately benefit from it. In another example, a grant of £125,000 was awarded to a youth group focusing on community activities. It did not go to the intended purpose but was, it is believed, defrauded. That money would have had a direct impact on the ground in the community, but did not, because we were defrauded, as were that community.

At the moment, however, it is difficult for public authorities that have been defrauded, or the PSFA or other authorities, to take the kinds of actions that the public expect against these and other much larger frauds that take place. It is extraordinary that they cannot get the necessary information to prove the offences and do not have the powers to take enforcement action or recover funds.

Part 1 of the Bill puts this right. It builds the foundational structure for a long-lasting change in how public authorities take action on fraud where they cannot do so now. First, the Bill will provide the PSFA with powers to obtain search warrants from the court to enter premises and seize evidence as part of fraud investigations. So in the skills case I mentioned, the PSFA would have been able to go into the so-called provider’s premises and seize payroll and enrolment records to prove whether it was entitled to the funding. These powers will be used only when approved by the courts, and the police will continue to be responsible for arresting suspects if required.

Secondly, the Bill contains measures for the PSFA to compel businesses and individuals to provide information where there is a suspicion of fraud against the public authority, and to penalise them if they do not. In the youth group case, PSFA could have required business records to be provided using these powers. Separately, the Bill also provides powers to allow the PSFA to request communications from telecom providers using the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, authorised and overseen by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office. When fraudsters conspire to attack the state, this power will enable investigators to connect to their network and show who is involved. The Bill also enables information-sharing between the PSFA and other parties in the course of a fraud investigation, which is vital in tackling multi-agency cases.

Thirdly, the Bill introduces the power to impose civil penalties on behalf of other public authorities against those who have committed or have tried to commit fraud. These penalties can be used as an alternative method of taking action against fraudsters, compared to often lengthy criminal prosecutions. The introduction of civil penalties for fraud means that there can be meaningful consequences for breaking the law, even when criminal prosecution is not appropriate or viable.

Fourthly, the Bill will introduce new debt recovery powers for the PSFA, so that we can get public money back from those who can afford to repay but refuse to do so. This includes powers to recover fraud-related or error-related debt from an individual’s earnings, using a deduction from earnings order, or directly from financial accounts using a direct deduction order. These are broadly similar to existing powers used across government, including by HMRC. I reassure your Lordships’ House that there will be strong safeguards in place for these powers, to ensure that vulnerability is considered and deductions are affordable and fair. The PSFA’s authorised investigators and officers will be highly trained, to the same standards as the police, for the criminal powers in Part 1 and will be members of the Government Counter Fraud Profession, which sets high standards of professionalism, ethics and integrity that members must meet.

Finally, to address some of the fraud we saw over the pandemic, the Bill will double from six to 12 years the time limit for civil claims to be brought in alleged cases of Covid fraud, giving public authorities more time to investigate complex cases relating to those who exploited a national emergency for personal gain. It is an affront that some people used the time of a national crisis to loot the public purse, and this Government are committed to taking action, of which this is the first step.

Part 2 is focused on addressing fraud and error in the social security system. Here, the Bill will modernise, extend and strengthen DWP’s existing counter-fraud powers, bringing it in line with other bodies such as HMRC. It introduces new powers that will improve DWP’s access to important data that can be used to find and prevent fraud and error more quickly and effectively and, crucially, improve DWP’s ability to recover money from taxpayers. Taking each of these in turn, first, there are comparable powers to those I described for the PSFA, which will allow authorised investigators in the DWP to apply for and obtain search warrants to enter premises and seize evidence relevant to fraud investigations. These powers will be used by specialist DWP serious and organised crime investigators. This will reduce DWP’s reliance on the police and, as in the PSFA’s case, these powers will be used only when approved by the courts; the police will continue to be responsible for arresting suspects.

Secondly, the Bill will update DWP’s information-gathering powers for investigating fraud. At present, DWP has the powers to require information from only a limited list of third parties. This does not include key organisations and sectors that could help to prove or disprove suspected fraud—for example, airlines, which might hold travel records that are relevant to investigations of fraud conducted overseas. To add to that, there is limited ability to require responses to requests to be sent electronically; currently, DWP cannot make someone provide this information digitally. This approach is somewhat outdated in a digital age and underlines that the changes in the Bill are long overdue. The Bill widens who the DWP can compel information from, and it will enable us to require the information to be provided digitally by default. This is comparable to the information-gathering provisions I described for the PSFA earlier.

Thirdly, the Bill makes provisions for the DWP’s new eligibility verification measure, which will enable the department to require banks and other financial institutions to provide crucial data to help identify incorrect benefit payments that people might be getting as a result of not meeting the rules for their benefit—for example, if someone has too much in savings, which could make them ineligible for a benefit, or if they are fraudulently claiming benefits while living abroad when they should be living in the UK. This data will mean that we can identify potential incorrect payments much sooner for key eligibility criteria.

We know that people lead busy lives and sometimes genuine mistakes happen. That is why this measure is so important, as it will help to identify not only potential fraudulent cases that require further investigation but errors too, ensuring that the DWP can correct errors quickly, and preventing people building up large debts that they then need to repay. In response to considerable misinformation about this measure, I want to stress to your Lordships’ House that under the eligibility verification measure, the DWP will not be able to access people’s bank accounts or look at what they are spending, nor will it be able to share any personal information with banks. Furthermore, this data will be considered without the presumption of any wrongdoing. No decision about benefit entitlement will be made from the data gathered through this measure alone; and, crucially, any final decision about someone’s benefit entitlement will always be taken by a human being. The Information Commissioner has noted that this proposal addresses many of the concerns the commissioner held about the previous Government’s proposals.

The fourth element of Part 2 is about broadening DWP’s abilities to punish fraudsters using a financial penalty as an alternative to seeking prosecutions. At the moment, DWP can give financial penalties only in cases of benefit fraud. Part 2 extends our ability to use them in the cases of fraud against any type of DWP payment. For example, if we have a future grant scheme similar to the Kickstart employment scheme, we will be able to ensure that that money could be recouped. This will ensure that more fraudsters committing a wider range of fraud can be dealt with swiftly without going to court.

Finally, the Bill contains new debt recovery powers for DWP. These powers will enable the DWP to recover money in cases where a person owes the department money but is not in receipt of a benefit or in Pay As You Earn employment, where there are existing powers. This will be used only where people repeatedly refuse to agree to affordable voluntary repayment terms with DWP. In these cases, the Bill will enable DWP to obtain from banks the bank statements of these debtors, to verify that they have sufficient funds to pay. Having considered this information, DWP debt enforcement agents will determine what is an affordable deduction, with maximum limits for regular deductions set out in the legislation. DWP can then recover the money from their bank accounts, through either a one-off lump sum or regular deductions. This will be done in a fair and manageable way, with time for the person to make any representation, and the right to appeal. No one will be pushed into hardship because of this action.

As a last resort, if someone owes DWP more than £1,000 and puts their money out of reach of our other recovery methods, DWP can apply to the court to disqualify that person from driving for up to two years. This is similar to the powers the Child Maintenance Service has been able to use for the last 25 years in cases where a parent repeatedly refuses to make payments to support their child, and it has proved somewhat effective in encouraging debtors to engage with the process. A court will not be able to make a DWP disqualification order if it considers that the person needs a driving licence for work or for another essential purpose, such as if the person is disabled or a carer. This disqualification order will always at first be suspended, and repayment terms will be set by the court. A person will be disqualified from driving by the court only if the repayment terms the court has set are not met without good reason. This measure is for people who have repeatedly refused to engage with DWP’s debt management system and have actively frustrated the process of debt recovery. It is an important power that is designed to bring debtors to the table to agree voluntary, affordable and sustainable repayment plans with the DWP.

We are clear that an individual keeping money to which they are not entitled is serious and will result in serious consequences. These powers ensure fairness in debt recovery, seeking to guarantee that those who are no longer on benefit or in paid employment are not treated more favourably and able to evade repayment of money owed to the public sector.

Parts 1 and 2 come with strong new safeguards, including provision for independent oversight and reporting. The Cabinet Office and the DWP will commission His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services to undertake inspections on the use of the new investigations powers that both departments are using. The DWP will make a similar arrangement with His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland and the Independent Office for Police Conduct will handle any serious complaints that arise from the use of the new powers of entry, search and seizure for the PSFA and the DWP. The Police Investigations and Review Commissioner will deal with similar matters for the DWP in Scotland.

Separately, the Minister for the Cabinet Office will appoint an independent person to inspect the PSFA enforcement unit’s use of the powers in the Bill. Their work will complement and build on the oversight provided by the inspectorate. The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions will also appoint an independent person to oversee the use and effectiveness of the DWP’s new eligibility verification measure in line with the legislation and the code of practice. Both independent persons are required to provide reports to respective Ministers which must be published and laid in Parliament.

Codes of practice will accompany relevant parts of the Bill and, where appropriate, will be consulted on. Drafts of relevant codes will be made available to noble Lords ahead of Committee. Across the Bill, provision is made for persons subject to the powers to make representations, request reviews or appeal against decisions. These routes will be clear and provide opportunities to challenge the Government’s approach.

Many of the measures in this Bill are not novel to government. Instead, they modernise existing powers and bring the DWP and the PSFA in line with other public bodies, such as HMRC. Overall, this Bill will help deliver the biggest crackdown on public sector fraud in a generation. It is expected to save £1.5 billion over the next five years as part of wider action in the DWP’s efforts to save £9.6 billion.

The Bill delivers the biggest upgrade to the DWP’s counterfraud powers in more than 14 years. It brings in new powers to tackle fraud right across the public sector by empowering the Public Sector Fraud Authority, and not before time. Our approach is tough but fair. It is tough on criminals who cheat the system and steal from taxpayers, and tough on people who refuse to pay back money, but fair on claimants, by spotting and stopping errors earlier and helping people to avoid getting into debt. It is fair on those who play by the rules and rely on the social security system, and it is fair on taxpayers, by ensuring that every pound is spent wisely, responsibly and effectively on those who need it. I beg to move.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 4th June 2025 Grand Committee

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak briefly as the other opposition Front-Bencher working on the Bill. I shall make a few introductory remarks on the purpose of the Bill as we begin Committee. I join my noble friend Lady Finn in welcoming this opportunity to have a productive, collaborative opening discussion on what the Bill is actually about and what it should be about.

Public sector fraud, as we have debated, is a crime that hurts every taxpayer in the country. It hurts every public service user and is an insult to everyone who works hard, pays their taxes and contributes to our society. This is a problem that we need to take steps to address, and the Government are right to reintroduce legislation and restart the process, which I know both Ministers acknowledge was started under the previous Government.

As noble Lords will be aware, my main focus will be on the second part of the Bill, which covers the DWP. This will not be covered so much in the amendments under discussion today, although I want to take the opportunity at the outset to flag up in advance and highlight some of the concerns that I have around these provisions and where my focus will be in the forthcoming Committee days. I hope this is helpful to the Committee.

First, on banks, there are still many questions over how the relationship between the DWP and the banks will manifest itself. We do not have clarity from the Government over how the process will work in practical terms or the costs that will be incurred by the DWP and financial institutions as a result of compliance under the terms of the Bill. As we highlighted at Second Reading, the Government, if they remain committed to human oversight of all decisions and reviews of information obtained from banks, could see a massive increase in their workload. Gaining greater clarity on this relationship, how it will work, the impact that it is anticipated to have and the resources required will form part of our approach on this part of the Bill.

Linked to this is the need to test the means to the end. What will be the cost for the expected return? How will the return be defined? That is the identity and recovery of fraud; also, the measurement of the deterrent factor in taking greater and more stringent measures to combat fraud—to take the challenge to the fraudsters, who have been seen to become ever more sophisticated. We will wish to challenge enforcement. What works? What are the sanctions for those who are convicted? Are they effective? What costs and resources are judged to be estimated in respect of this aspect of the Bill?

Secondly, we want to ensure that the Bill protects vulnerable people and recognises additional factors that may lie behind, for example, an overpayment. Proportionality in the exercise of these powers is vital, and we need to ensure that we do not cause greater harm than good in the pursuit of our shared objective. This concern is shared by noble Lords in this Committee. I am hopeful that we can reach an understanding with amendments that protect vulnerable people.

Finally, we see the Bill as an opportunity to combat those who seek to share information, allowing people to defraud the benefits and welfare system—the so-called “sickfluencers”. This is a serious problem. Thousands of people every day are consuming content that informs them of how to play examiners and score certain points based not on their actual health condition but on a script they have been taught online. These assessments are the mechanism through which the state determines eligibility for welfare payments. “Sickfluencers” who actively encourage dishonesty and make money out of a dishonest gaming system for exploitation must be stopped. We shall support amendments that seek to make this an explicit offence, so that there can be no room for doubt that these actions are wrong and could be criminal.

This is an important discussion on a topic that deeply affects everyone in our country. I welcome the opportunity to discuss ideas and suggestions for improvements to the Bill, which attempts to achieve a noble task. I and my noble friend Lady Finn will work in good faith with the Government and noble Lords across the Committee to improve the Bill and to make it effective and responsible.

[Baroness in Waiting/Government Whip (Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent) (Lab)]

My Lords, and so we begin. I thank all noble Lords present for their participation and engagement. On a personal note, before we get to the substance and serious detail of the Bill, this time last week I was having my make-up done for getting married, so I welcome noble Lords joining me on my honeymoon in our Palace.

Moving on to the substance, I remind your Lordships why we are here today. Fraud against the public sector takes money away from vital public services, enriches those who seek to attack the Government and damages the integrity of the state. This Government said clearly in our manifesto that we will not tolerate fraud or waste anywhere and that we will safeguard taxpayers’ money. This Bill is part of those efforts. This is a Government focused on delivery. The Bill makes provisions

“about the prevention of fraud against public authorities and the making of erroneous payments by public authorities; about the recovery of money paid by public authorities as a result of fraud or error; and for connected purposes”.

This is already in the Bill’s title. There is no need for an additional new clause at the start of the Bill to set out a purpose that reiterates this, albeit in different language.

It is important for your Lordships to understand the real impact of fraud against the public sector. This is a dry term for something profoundly impactful. It is not government or state that is the ultimate victim of such fraud. It is not the Chancellor’s pocket that is picked, although the Treasury bears the brunt of at least £55 billion of fraud and error each year. The real victim is the British people. Every taxpayer who pays their fair share pays a fraud premium, because fraudsters cheat the system and skim from the top. It is taxpayers who are the victims. Every citizen who uses public services, knows how much good every penny can be put to in the communities in which we all live and rightly expects that the money will go to support their community is being defrauded. It is our citizens who are the victims.

Everyone who is in need, and who relies on the benefits and welfare systems that others cynically abuse, is a victim of public sector fraud. Noble Lords across your Lordships’ Committee will share my contempt for fraudsters who attack the British people in this way, and will want to take decisive action to start putting things right.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I apologise for not congratulating the Minister for choosing to spend her honeymoon in these august surroundings. What better way?

At Second Reading, I highlighted the cultural problem with tackling fraud—that it is often safer to overlook than to uncover—so we have to change the culture and ensure that proper tackling of fraud is a cultural practice embedded within every public authority and government department. There is merit in creating a body with the powers to investigate fraud externally, but we need to make sure that proactive prevention and investigation into fraud start at home. Our Amendment 2 seeks to create an obligation for the Minister for the Cabinet Office to support public authorities in undertaking their own investigations into fraud when it occurs in said public authorities. In further developing the PSFA, the Bill provides us with a new resource and opportunity to support departments to intervene early and create mechanisms through which they can tackle this issue internally.

This objective has several key advantages. One major advantage is that this approach recognises that public bodies are complex, with unique funding mechanisms and operational procedures. Internal fraud teams bring intimate knowledge of these environments and have greater capacity to pursue targeted objectives, using knowledge that external agencies may lack. This allows for swifter detection of anomalies, targeted interventions and smarter use of data and insight.

Another significant advantage is that conducting internal fraud investigations inspires deterrence. Internal investigations can often begin before fraud escalates or becomes systemic. Timely action minimises losses and creates a departmental culture that stands more firmly against fraud. Not waiting for an external body to point out what has already gone wrong can embed a culture of deterrence and proactive interdepartmental counterfraud measures, which are an opportunity to minimise losses and therefore departmental damage.

Of course, internal investigation must never mean internal cover-up. The answer is not to sideline external oversight but to complement it. We must ensure that departments are equipped with the right skills, resources and authority to carry out investigations properly and that they are held to account when they fall short.

Our Amendment 24 seeks to strike this balance by requiring public authorities to conduct an internal review if they lose £50,000 or more through an overpayment or fraud, and to provide that report to the Minister for the Cabinet Office. This measure seeks to meet the benefits that I have just outlined, while embedding in law that responsibility for fraud cannot be outsourced. Authorities that lose money must take account of why this has happened and, fundamentally, they must also take responsibility for it. Making them accountable to the Minister is a mechanism through which we can achieve this.

I hope that the Government will consider supporting the amendments in this group, which seek to embed departmental accountability for fraud while utilising the resources of the PSFA to create intradepartmental cultures that deter and counteract fraud. I beg to move.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, if we continue at this speed, the Chief Whip will be disappointed that we are doing only seven groups. It is probably unlikely that we will continue at this speed, but I can aspire.

While I appreciate the comments from the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, I want to be clear that Amendment 2 is unnecessary as it is duplicative. It would insert “investigating”, as a way that the Minister can support other public authorities’ actions in response to fraud, separately from the explicit function of investigating if a request is made of the Minister by the public authority, which is earlier in the same clause. It is unnecessary because the word “tackling” in the same line of the clause cited covers any activity to support a public authority dealing with fraud and supporting them in their own investigations too. It is deliberately drawn broadly so, if adopted, this amendment would not change the scope of Part 1.

The Government’s intention with Part 1 is for the PSFA to become one of the ways that public authorities deal with fraud, by requesting that it take on a case for investigation, enforcement or recovery. The PSFA is also happy to support other public authorities in their own fraud investigations, and already does so. Which option is best will depend on the facts of the case.

Amendment 24 would require departments to conduct an internal review if, following a PSFA investigation, it is confirmed that they have lost more than £50,000 to overpayment or fraud. All losses at this scale should already be investigated and reported on. There are established audit, assurance and reporting processes for this.

In addition, the facts of the case would already have been established by the PSFA, and learnings taken from it will be shared on a cross-government basis to aid the prevention of fraud—hence the establishment of the PSFA within the Cabinet Office. This amendment would create an extra burden on each department and replicate the work of the PSFA, and is unnecessary as its core aim will already be addressed through other activities.

I hope that this explanation reassures the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and that she can therefore withdraw her amendment. I expect that we will discuss more of this in great detail as we continue.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her response. As we draw the debate on this group to a close, I thank all noble Lords who have engaged with the issues—so I thank the Minister. We are clear in our recognition that tackling fraud must go beyond enforcement. It must be a culture embedded across every public authority and government department. Although it is right that the Public Sector Fraud Authority must have the powers and resources it needs to act decisively, with these amendments we highlight that fraud prevention cannot and must not rely on external investigation alone. The work must begin within departments themselves.

Amendment 2 reflects our view that the Minister for the Cabinet Office should have a duty to support public authorities in carrying out their own investigations, and the amendment seeks to use the resources of the PSFA to encourage early intervention, the development of internal counterfraud capability, and ensuring that every public body has the tools to act on fraud swiftly and effectively to counter fraud at home.

Our Amendment 24, which would require internal reviews for significant losses, is a proportionate and reasonable step towards building a culture of accountability across the public sector. If a public authority loses £50,000 or more through fraud or overpayment, it is right that the public body must work to understand what went wrong, and it is right that it must explain this to the Minister. Without our amendment, we risk allowing the same mistakes to recur, with no mechanism for learning or redress within the public body itself.

Our amendments seek to promote a culture of responsibility. They seek to ensure that no department or authority sees fraud as someone else’s problem or as a matter that will simply be dealt with elsewhere. The message that these amendments send is clear: tackling fraud must begin at home. These proposals are balanced, targeted and grounded in practical experience. I hope the Government will reflect carefully on these points and consider working with us to embed this into the Bill. I beg to withdraw the amendment.

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[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, for raising whistle- blowers in respect of the Bill and for highlighting the importance of the protection of those who feel that they must speak out if they see an action or actions that they feel could be fraudulent or not in the public interest. Indeed, it could be actions that should be being taken but are not.

Ensuring that we have adequate protections for whistleblowers is vital to building confidence with the people we need to come forward if we are to tackle fraud. In respect of public sector fraud, such people are employed in local authorities or in the Civil Service. If certain protections are not in place, this can have a detrimental effect on recruitment, retention and perhaps career management.

In tackling fraud, we will inevitably ask—and, in fact, trust and expect—public officials to make the right calls and decisions in their day-to-day work. These decisions can often be incredibly tough, involving sensitive matters and perhaps involving close colleagues. So reassuring public sector workers that they will be protected when they do the right thing is of paramount importance, and we would support further reassurance from the Government that whistleblowers will be protected and supported when they come forward.

Amendment 3, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, presents a sensible proposal for the creation of a whistleblowing reporting channel that would guarantee anonymity and protect whistleblowers, who would themselves be legally defined. The noble Baroness might like to explain in her summing up, however, what she means by

“a process to update whistleblowers in cases of fraud”.

How would she see this work?

On her Amendment 66, we do not think it necessary to establish an office of the whistleblower, although I understand that, as she said, this is very much a probing amendment. It sounds laudable, with laudable aims, but we see this as potential overregulation—the setting up of another body, at an unknown cost and with an unknown number of employees and resources—when we believe that what we need is a proportionate and workable system, as the noble Baroness herself has said in her Amendment 3, and an established process by which fraud is able to be reported with protections in place.

There is a danger that if you set up a body such as a specific office for whistleblowing, you can perhaps unwittingly encourage too many false flags, where whistleblowing is almost encouraged and a bureaucracy is created. It is important that evidence of whistleblowing is protected only where it is substantive and where there are protections in place—not flimsy or based on hearsay, for example. Of course, wrongful reporting can have a devastating effect on people’s lives.

These are really questions for the Government to answer, because the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and I share the same objective: pushing and encouraging the Government, in the Bill, to demonstrate practically what actual new protections there are for those who see or perceive fraud in their area of public sector work, bearing in mind that fraudsters can be cunning and clever. It often surprises one who is ultimately seen to commit fraud—it is often in an unexpected area or from people you would never suspect of committing fraud.

I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, that it is good to make comparisons with other whistleblowing processes, which she did with a deal of eloquence. I want to make a comparison with the NHS, as I understand that the NHS has upgraded its protections for whistleblowers. Thus Health Education England is listed as a prescribed person under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, which was referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. That means that workers at other organisations or companies who wish to raise concerns—in other words, whistleblowing—relating to the education, training and sufficient supply of healthcare workers at their employing organisation or company can do so to HEE. Prescribed persons enable workers to make public-interest disclosures to an independent body where the worker would prefer not to disclose to their employer direct, and the body may be able to take action on the disclosure.

We know that whistleblowing is the term used when a worker provides information to their employer or a prescribed person relating to wrongdoing. The wrongdoing will usually, though not always, relate to something that they have witnessed at work. This is also known as disclosure, which was raised by the noble Baroness as well. To be protected by whistleblowing law, a disclosure must be a qualifying disclosure. That means that the worker making the disclosure believes that doing so is in the public interest and it relates to one of the following categories, which I suspect the Committee will be aware of: criminal offence, breach of a legal obligation, miscarriage of justice, endangering health and safety, damage to the environment and covering up wrongdoing in any of those categories.

Workers have the right not to be subjected to any detriment as a consequence of making a disclosure. To qualify for protection when making a disclosure to a prescribed person, workers must have a reasonable belief that the matter falls within the prescribed persons remit and that the information disclosed is substantially true. Meeting these criteria is referred to as making a protected disclosure. Workers are encouraged to seek independent advice to help consider whether they might meet the criteria for making a protected disclosure. As the Committee may know, that can be obtained from Public Concern at Work or Speak Up or through a legal representative. In addition, HEE is required to report in writing annually on whistleblowing disclosures made to it as a prescribed person without identifying the workers concerned or their employers.

Rather than set up a new whistleblowing body— I have used the HEE as an example—I press the Government to find an existing mechanism, maybe within the Cabinet Office, a body that exists already and can be set up in the public sector and defined as a prescribed person specifically for public sector fraud, rather than setting up a particular office for the whistleblower.

We need to recognise that, although we are asking workers to do the right thing, we are also asking them to do something that is emotionally difficult and distressing. People should be empowered to stand up for the correct use of public money, which can happen only if cast-iron reassurances can be given to them.

With those explanations, I hope the Government will consider these points as they progress with the Bill, focusing on practical, sensible but proportionate proposals that will encourage people—which is the whole point—to come forward when they are made aware of some wrongdoing.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, on the important issue of whistleblowing. Protections for whistleblowing are a key aspect of counterfraud investigations. A huge amount of the information originally received to guide our investigations comes from whistleblowers, so making sure that the appropriate protections are in place is incredibly important going forward. I welcome the opportunity to explore what more can be done and to reflect on what currently exists.

It will not surprise the noble Baroness that I am unlikely to commit to a new agency within this Bill today, but I welcome the opportunity to meet her to explore in more detail anything that she believes we can do within the confines of the Bill. I sat through a similar debate on the Armed Forces Commissioner Bill, when we also touched on these issues. I would like to reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, that the meeting she suggests is one that we have already discussed, but we will now advance it. I will meet all the agencies that she has highlighted to talk about what they do and do not require.

Currently, to qualify for the whistleblowing protections provided by the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, as inserted into the Employment Rights Act 1996, a worker needs to have a reasonable belief that their disclosure tends to show one of the relevant failures set out in legislation, that the disclosure is in the public interest and that the disclosure needs to be made to the relevant person—for example, the employer, a legal adviser or a prescribed person. The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, touched on the challenges of using “workers”. DBT guidance sets out the definition of a worker as extending to agency workers and individuals supplied via an intermediary; non-employees undertaking training or work experience as part of a training course, otherwise than at an educational establishment; self-employed doctors, dentists, ophthalmologists and pharmacists in the NHS; police officers; student nurses; and student midwives. So although it is “worker”, there is a slightly wider definition.

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[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, this has been a very useful debate, and I hope to be able to give some clarity on some of the issues that have been raised. It would be remiss of me, and I should have done it earlier, not to thank the noble Lord, Lord Maude, for starting the process of where we have ended up today. He and the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, started a great deal of this under the previous Government. We are now seeking to ensure that the PSFA has the appropriate powers to deliver what they started.

Before I move on to the substance of this group, I think it would be helpful to respond to a question that was touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, about what a public authority means with regard to the Bill and what we are actually talking about. Public authority is defined in Clause 70 “Interpretation”. The definition is:

“‘public authority’ means a person with functions of a public nature so far as acting in the exercise of those functions”.

It would include, for example, other government departments, arm’s-length bodies and local authorities. This is a broad definition that takes in a wide range of organisations and delivery mechanisms for public functions to ensure that fraud against the public sector in its widest sense can be tackled.

Whether a body comes into the definition of public authority will be tested before a case is adopted, but let us be clear that, especially when we are talking about fraud, it would be surprising if someone was targeting the public sector and they stopped at the remit of one government department just because we define it as one government department. We all know, and noble Lords who have served in government are even more aware, that MHCLG, the Cabinet Office, the DfE and the Department of Health will have multiple users that may touch on different levels of fraud, which is why it is important that we have the breadth of definition.

On the substance of this group, Amendment 4 would remove error from the scope of the amounts that the Minister can recover. This would significantly change and restrict the scope of the PSFA’s recovery function. It would mean that, if the PSFA investigates a case and does not find fraud but does find that a person has had money that they were not entitled to, it would not be able to take action to recover it, including using the debt powers in the Bill. The PSFA would have to refer the matter back to the public authority concerned to take whatever error recovery actions it is willing and able to take.

In response to concerns raised by many noble Lords, including the noble Baroness, Lady Fox—I am pleased that I was able to make her happy at the beginning of Committee stage—it is very likely that the PSFA will encounter payments that could be classed as error. Fraud and error are difficult to separate. Indeed, the National Audit Office and the PSFA do not attempt to do so in their measurement methodology. This is because proving fraud requires evidence of intent, and it is often impractical or impossible to do so. One of the purposes of the Bill is to do more to evidence fraud and take the right action to tackle it, but I hope noble Lords will agree that when you have money that you are not entitled to, you should pay it back and it should be recoverable if it is not paid back. That has always been a principle that the Government have adopted.

Before I move on to wider detail, I want to touch on some comments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, on the loophole for public authorities. Public authorities are the victims, not the perpetrators. Even without powers, the PSFA enforcement unit is getting referrals. We do not foresee a shortage of cases coming our way. The PSFA must be able to triage and pursue the most impactful and value-for-money cases. This is a genuine question—which is why we are here in Committee—of culture and approach, and one that we should have a conversation about. The Government genuinely believe that a collaborative approach with other government departments will yield more co-operation in terms of investigations than a more aggressive approach. Being invited in will ensure that government departments actively engage with us, as has proven to be the case during our pilot so far.

I believe it will assist your Lordships’ Committee if I briefly set out the circumstances in which a public authority would recover an amount of money. Accounting officers of public authorities are required to follow the principles set out in the HM Treasury publication Managing Public Money in annexe 4.11, which is— apparently—readily available to noble Lords. The relevant section states:

“Most organisations responsible for making payments will sometimes discover that they have made overpayments in error. In principle public sector organisations should always pursue recovery of overpayments, irrespective of how they came to be made. In practice, however, there will be both practical and legal limits to how cases should be handled. So each case should be dealt with on its merits”.


Amendment 5 would remove the words:

“only at the request of that public authority”

from Clause 2(1). I believe the intention of this amendment is that PSFA should be able to simply decide to open a fraud investigation irrespective of the wishes of the target of fraud, in the same way that the police can open an investigation into other crimes. However, omitting the deleted words but not otherwise changing the clause would create an element of uncertainty over who is responsible, in the first instance, for dealing with fraud against a public authority. At the moment, it is clearly the public authority. If the intention of this amendment is that it should be for the Minister for the Cabinet Office to decide to investigate, whether or not the public authority wants the Minister to step in, this may conflict with the preservation of public authorities’ own fraud functions in Clause 2(5)(b).

Responsibility for managing fraud is, in the first instance, given to accounting officers of public authorities, as set out by Managing Public Money annexe 4.9—which I am sure all noble Lords have read. There may also be other unintended consequences by the adoption of this amendment, specifically whether the revised working of the clause might actually compel the Minister for the Cabinet Office to investigate all public sector fraud. That is something beyond the current capacity of the PSFA, which I am sure we will discuss in great detail later in Committee. If the PSFA finds fraud off its own bat, as it were, it might not then be clear on what legal basis, if any, it would be able to recover it, as it would not be acting on behalf of the public authority per se. The Government seek to maintain the status quo of acting at the request of public authorities as a matter of operational practice as set out in this Bill, in order to prevent any confusion.

The noble Lord, Lord Maude, raised a query about the Treasury not taking this seriously. The PSFA reports to the Cabinet Office and HMT. It works closely, advising HMT on fraud as part of the spending review process. I hope that that is somewhat reassuring, given where we are in the spending review process.

Amendment 6 would remove the restriction in Clause 2(2) on the PSFA undertaking cases at the request of the DWP and HMRC. This would be a significant change in policy intent. HMRC and DWP have 84% of the counterfraud resource across His Majesty’s Government, including thousands of people and their own designated powers. The PSFA role envisaged is supporting those departments which do not have well-developed fraud investigation, enforcement and recovery functions or powers, not seeking to subsume those with targeted powers that are already well established. For once, this is a government department not seeking to gather other people’s power and staff. Neither HMRC nor DWP need the further assistance of Part 1 of this Bill and there are many other public authorities which do.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

If the Minister does not mind, can I pick up the issue that the noble Lord, Lord Maude, raised? Nobody knows how to manage government more closely than him; he is deeper steeped in this than any of us. How does the Minister anticipate dealing with the fragmentation of investigation? If HMRC is chasing down someone, you can almost be certain that it will be dealing with public procurement in a different way and that there will be other issues around that particular entity. Is there a mechanism she sees that will break down those siloed lines?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I reassure your Lordships’ Committee, particularly the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, that the PSFA and HMRC or the DWP can and will do dual investigations and work closely together. They have their own powers. I think the case of HMRC is probably more relevant than the DWP, but they will work collaboratively and do joint operations while having their own separate remits. It is not that they will not work together; however, we anticipate that especially where there is evidence—as I said earlier, it is about breadth of government—we would expect the majority of the PSFA’s work to be outside of those government agencies or public authorities.

Amendment 7 is unnecessary because it straight- forwardly duplicates matters already dealt with elsewhere in the Bill. Clause 1(1)(a) states that the Minister is given the function of investigating “suspected fraud” against public authorities. Clause 70, the interpretation clause, defines “suspected fraud” as

“conduct which the Minister has reasonable grounds to suspect may constitute fraud”.

I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, is content that the issues she raises in this amendment are appropriately dealt with.

Finally, Amendment 8 would restrict the fees that the PSFA could charge a public authority for investigation, enforcement or recovery action to no more than the amount that is recovered. Cash recovery is the hardest part of enforcement. Many initiated investigations will close without reaching the recovery stage—for example, because no fraud is found, an alternative approach is taken or because recovery is not possible even if the investigation is successful. The amendment would mean that no fee could be charged in those cases, despite the PSFA having necessarily invested resources into the investigation with the agreement of the public authority to have taken the case and undertaken the actions in the first place. That does not represent good value for money and runs contrary to the guidance in Managing Public Money on cost recovery.

In the most serious cases, cash recovery may not be the main or even a major factor; it will be the disruption of criminal gangs and prosecution of serious offenders. Such cases may be long, complex and multi-agency, and costs will probably exceed any potential recovery quite quickly. In cases of organised crime, assets may be irretrievable, laundered beyond reach or overseas. The public interest in investigation is to punish the criminals. The adoption of this clause would also fail to acknowledge or promote the deterrent effect of the investigations. The PSFA cannot be restricted in the cases that it selects by how much of its costs it can recover; that is counterproductive and counterintuitive.

I have two other points to raise.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I beg the noble Baroness’s pardon but, if the PSFA can charge more than it recovers, is that not a massive disincentive for the public authority to ask it to come in to begin with, given that it has to ask ?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

There is a balance here, because of the positives that go alongside this. There is a genuine issue that, if a criminal gang is actively targeting a public authority, the investigation and prosecution of those people in itself is something that the public authority would wish to see. There will always be costs involved in criminal activities, even if they cannot all be recovered. The police actively investigate criminal gangs, with the pragmatic understanding that not all costs can be recovered. There is also a deterrent effect in prosecuting people to ensure that everyone is aware that, if you defraud the state, you will be prosecuted. We will not always be able to get the money back, but we must be realistic about what is in front of us and what we can achieve.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I have not thought this through, but a no win, no fee approach seems quite useful. If the PSFA, which will have many successful prosecutions where it brings in fees that are well above its actual costs, it will have a resource that will surely allow it to pursue cases where there is not a successful recovery but where it is important for the case to go ahead. I am just wondering whether there is not a model that might work more effectively.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

The noble Baroness makes an interesting point. That is why the Cabinet Office and the PSFA are adopting a test-and-learn approach to see what will and will not work. Having said that, we have to be realistic that we will not always be able to recover funds and someone has to pay for the cost of the investigation. The balance of what that looks like is something we will have to explore as cases progress.

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[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will just pick up the issue that has been raised by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. We are dealing tomorrow with a statutory instrument that attempts to provide safeguards against banks and other organisations deciding to close people’s bank accounts or to deprive them of other financial services. It is often the people who are under the most financial pressure who find it difficult to get banked in the first place. They can get a basic bank account if they are lucky, but to get a bank account with any of the features that make financial life reasonable is exceedingly difficult. I therefore share the noble Lord’s concern that we do not start a hare running.

Banks are eager to offload people who do not have a lot of exciting and interesting activity. If this notice gives them an excuse to do that, I can see that an awful lot of banks will seize that opportunity, so I raise this as an issue to be wary of. In fact, we have an SI going in the opposite direction tomorrow, so this is really for the Government to make sure that one hand knows what the other hand is doing.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I apologise in advance, because I think we are about to have a vote—or not, if the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, does not press her Motion.

Some significant points have been touched on in this very short debate. I will respond to each amendment in turn. Amendment 9 looks to introduce a test of reasonableness to determine whether an authorised officer has appropriately considered that information sought is both necessary and proportionate. Clause 3(1)(a) and (b) already set out the test for issuing an information notice: an authorised officer will have the power to compel information only when it is necessary and proportionate to do so, and only when the information being requested relates to a person whom an authorised officer has reasonable grounds to suspect has committed fraud.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

What the Minister says is not quite true. It is where “the Minister considers” that it is necessary and proportionate to do so, not simply where it is necessary and proportionate to do so. That is an important difference—hence the reasonableness requirement.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

The noble Lord is going to inspire me to go into more detail. There must be reasonable grounds to suspect that fraud has taken place, which follows the basic rule that there must be an objective basis for that belief. It must be genuinely suspected that the fraud has been carried out by the individual, and the belief must be based on facts and/or information that are relevant to the likelihood of needing to obtain information for the purpose of investigating suspected fraud against public authorities. It must be objectively reasonable for them to suspect this, given the information available to them. The reasonable grounds test is a standard and widely accepted test used by various organisations, including the DWP, the Serious Fraud Office and the police. We are seeking to replicate that.

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[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I shall begin where I left off. I was responding to Amendments 12, 13 and 14. It is necessary that an appropriate period is provided for a first or third party to request a review of an information notice. That is why we introduced the seven-day period for information holders to request a review. This ensures that those attempting to hold up an investigation by requesting a review for no necessary or legitimate reason do not hold it up for an extensive period. If all safeguards were fully utilised as outlined across the Bill, it could already result in delays to the investigation of two years or more, potentially enabling continuing activities that defraud public authorities in that time. We are seeking to make every effort to balance appropriate safeguarding with effectiveness and protecting the public purse. Extending this period to 28 days would add an unnecessary delay in the investigative process.

Amendment 14 would have no material effect over and above what has already been drafted as, in the event that the notice is upheld or varied, details will be provided to the information holder in order to inform their next steps, should they continue to not comply. On Amendments 15 and 16, while I am sympathetic to the intent of the amendments tabled, we believe them to be unnecessary. It is vital that any data-sharing powers between public authorities are done in a way that is relevant and effective for an investigation. An example of this would be sharing information with the public authority that has been defrauded or with the Serious Fraud Office. Imposing a prescriptive list of persons—who could regularly change—who can have information disclosed to them will restrict the intent and scope of the Bill. The clause details that information can be disclosed only for the purpose of exercising the core functions of the Minister, which already restricts to whom and for what purpose the information can be disclosed.

The Bill already contains safeguards to ensure that all data processing, including data-sharing, must be done in accordance with current data protection legislation, which is why I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, is prepared to withdraw her amendment.

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[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, your Lordships are speedy and my Chief Whip is confused, but I appreciate the opportunity to discuss some important issues and to put on the record things that I hope will reassure noble Lords.

Before I move to the substance of the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, I will respond to the question posed by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. I have not met StepChange, but that is an interesting suggestion. We have engaged with wider stakeholders. With regard to how the PSFA will be using the PACE powers that we request, that is in the next group of amendments so we will discuss those in more detail then, if that is okay. I will revert, and I will ensure that I have a meeting with StepChange before we progress such conversations. The people behind me are nodding at me.

As this group of amendments addresses three distinct areas of concern, I will take those in turn. I will start with the recruitment of authorised investigators. Under Amendment 17, the Minister would have to prepare and publish guidance on the process by which authorised investigators were appointed within six months of the Bill coming into force. We do not believe that the amendment is necessary. The PSFA is bound by well-established Civil Service recruitment principles under- pinned by relevant legislative provisions. All recruitment to the role of authorised investigator will be based on merit via fair and open competition.

Clause 7(3) of the Bill states that an individual can become an authorised investigator only if they have been authorised by the Minister to exercise the PACE powers conferred in the Bill. The Minister will not make such a determination unless they are content with the evidence provided to them demonstrating that the candidate has been suitably trained in the use of PACE powers and is ready to take on the responsibility of utilising them safely. All authorised investigators will receive bespoke training that will cover all aspects of investigative practice, including the relevant PACE powers. Training will be to the same standard as other law enforcement bodies that use PACE powers.

Authorised investigators will work to clear operational guidance to ensure that they are delivering the use of the powers in a lawful and transparent way. They will also become members of the government counterfraud profession, and their training will align with the profession’s investigator standard. Existing investigators within the PSFA’s enforcement unit, who will work to become the PSFA’s first authorised investigators, bring with them a wealth of relevant knowledge, skills and experience from previous roles in both the police and investigation services within government departments. These powers will be in safe hands. I hope noble Lords find that reassuring.

The disposal of property is incredibly important. On the face of it, the purpose of Amendment 18 is to remove the provision of the PSFA to make any changes to the relevant property that the court considers necessary for the purposes of avoiding or reducing any risk of the property being used in the commission of an offence. Noble Lords have indicated in the explanatory statement for the amendment that they wish to probe

“the Government’s expectations of what types of changes to seized property may be deemed necessary by the courts”.

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, has said it all, so I will be very brief. I have to say that I am extremely uncomfortable with giving these sorts of police powers to civil servants and others. We have an example in the recent past of powers being used inappropriately by a non-police agency in the Post Office Horizon situation. I am very uncomfortable about it. I am interested to hear why we should not allow the police to deal with these things and why we should give them to civil servants, but I will take some convincing.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I think it is now my turn to say, “I’m back”. This is a very important part of the Bill, and it is right that we discuss it in some detail. It was also raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, in the previous group.

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, for flagging her concerns regarding the PSFA seeking powers under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. For ease, I will now refer to it as PACE. Clause 7 designates authorised investigators with the necessary authority to use limited provisions from PACE within the remit of public sector fraud investigations. Specifically, they are the power to apply to the courts for a warrant to enter and search premises and seize evidence and special provisions to apply to the courts to gain access to certain types of material which are regarded as excluded material or special procedure material. These powers will only be used in criminal investigations to enable all reasonable lines of inquiry to be followed and all relevant evidence to be collected.

To reassure noble Lords, when executing a search warrant, authorised investigators will be accompanied by an officer who has the powers of a constable. This could be either a police officer or an officer from another government department, such as HMRC or the NCA, with the powers of a constable. They will ensure the safety of the authorised investigators and will be able to use their own powers of arrest or reasonable force if necessary. We are not seeking for the Cabinet Office to have powers of arrest. They will always be accompanied by appropriate officials who have powers under PACE.

Authorised investigators will adhere to the relevant PACE codes of practice, which provide robust safeguards around the use of these investigative tools. Every application for a search warrant or a court order under PACE must be scrutinised and authorised by the court. Authorised investigators will also be subject to robust internal and external scrutiny. This will come from the PSFA’s independent person, as appointed under Clause 64, His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services and, as required, the Independent Office for Police Conduct.

To reassure the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, we are very aware of the Horizon scandal and the impact that that had on normal people’s lives. We want to put in every safeguard to make sure, and we hope we have, that these powers could not be used to replicate such a scandal. The PACE powers sought in Clause 7 are the minimum necessary to allow the PSFA to effectively undertake criminal investigations. We are not seeking the full use of PACE powers under this clause for the PSFA.

Turning to Schedule 1, this modifies the provisions of PACE adopted in Clause 7 so that they apply appropriately to authorised investigators within the PSFA. Schedule 1 provides a route for authorised investigators to apply to the court for access to excluded material. Access to special procedure material is provided under Clause 7 and Schedule 1 to PACE. It also establishes a legal framework that allows the PSFA to transfer evidence seized under PACE to other organisations, securing the chain of command—I mean the chain of evidence. It has been a long week; I was getting married a week ago.

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, the Minister mentioned a number of safeguards, including the authorised officer being accompanied by a police constable. I cannot find any of that. Where can I find those safeguards?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

The noble Lord raises a very interesting point. It is in the guidance, but I will write to him so that he has a written record.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister and repeat that to spend her honeymoon in this way is truly admirable.

Our proposal in this group is straightforward: that Clause 7 and the corresponding Schedule 1 do not stand part of the Bill. The powers set out in them are neither minor nor administrative; they are both sweeping and consequential, as the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, pointed out. They are powers to enter private premises, to search them in the absence of the owner, to seize property and to retain it indefinitely if deemed necessary.

Clause 7 permits junior civil servants in the Cabinet Office to apply for search warrants in connection with indictable offences. These officials, who are under no legal obligation to possess police-level investigative training or operational experience, would be empowered to enter someone’s property and seize anything they believe is linked to a criminal offence. They may seize computerised information. They may retain this property for as long as they consider necessary. These are serious powers. They are, in every meaningful sense, police powers, and we believe that it should be the police who exercise them.

That is not a theoretical objection; it is a practical one. If the Government believe that the investigation of fraud against the state demands this level of intervention, they should work with law enforcement to build capacity, not attempt to bypass it—as I said previously. The public expect these duties to be undertaken by the police, not officials from within the Cabinet Office.

We are not proposing an end to investigations by the PSFA—far from it. We recognise the importance of this work, and the Government’s own framing of this clause makes it clear that investigations can proceed substantially without the need for these powers. If that is the case, transferring this responsibility to trained police officers, rather than allowing civil servants to exercise it, would not hinder the PSFA’s ability to investigate fraud. It would ensure that intrusive state powers are exercised by those who are properly equipped to wield them.

This is a matter of constitutional balance and operational integrity. Clause 7 and Schedule 1 confer powers that go beyond the traditional remit of the Civil Service. They risk blurring the lines between executive authority and law enforcement. We therefore hope that noble Lords across the Committee, and the Government, will consider supporting this proposal as a measured change, keeping powers in the remit of those who are best placed to exercise them, while ensuring that PSFA investigations can continue in the pursuit of the objectives we all support.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 9th June 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I see the first amendment in this group as a purely probing amendment to try to clarify matters; I trust and have every hope that, in the debates on the Bill, they will be clarified.

I ask the mover of Amendment 25 and the Minister to clarify something. I wonder about the change to the end of the amendment, which says

“awarded by a court or tribunal in relation to costs”.

I would have thought that that was covered already under Clause 13(2)(b)(i), which refers to

“costs that are awarded by a court or tribunal on or in relation to a claim for a recoverable amount”;

I agree with that. Then there is sub-paragraph (ii), which is about the Minister exercising their powers. Is that not covered by paragraph (b)(i) without adding it to (b)(ii)? This is a purely technical point because I think that it is there already.

[Baroness in Waiting/Government Whip (Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent) (Lab)]

Good afternoon, my Lords. I think that we are going to be as speedy as we were last week; the Chief Whip will continue to approve.

The amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, would create additional burdens for the court system. They would also challenge the future viability of the PSFA and, therefore, its central mission of tackling public sector fraud.

Before I move on, I want to respond directly to a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn. I believe that what is at stake and what is really being contested here is a matter of approach. As I said in Committee last week, being invited in to investigate by a government agency ensures a collaborative approach. We are hoping that, by working with government agencies rather than imposing ourselves on them—this is what we are learning through our current test-and-learn approach—the agencies will engage with us, meaning that we will be more likely to succeed in getting the evidence base that we need to determine the fraud.

On the specifics, the powers in the Bill let the PSFA investigate fraud against the public sector. A key rationale for this must be the deterrent effect. The PSFA must, therefore, be able to recover the money lost so that it can be used for public good and ultimately show fraudsters that their ill-gotten gains will not stay theirs for long. It is only reasonable that an element of costs recovery for the PSFA is part of this process. Amendment 23 would remove the ability of the PSFA potentially to charge for its services in future. The PSFA will act on behalf of other government departments, developing the expertise and capability required effectively to investigate fraud and recover the money lost. Providing the option to keep some of the recovered funds, subject to agreement with the public bodies concerned, will help fund the development of this expertise and will provide value for money for government and the taxpayer.

I reiterate this point to provide a level of clarity on the issue highlighted by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn. The PSFA would seek to recoup its costs and not necessarily to retain all the funds awarded. We will agree a portion with the public agency that we are acting on when the PSFA takes the case. That will be agreed in advance.

Amendment 25 limits how the PSFA can recoup reasonable costs incurred in exercising the Chapter 4 recovery powers, meaning that only a court or tribunal can award them. There is already scope in Clause 13 for courts and tribunals to award costs in relation to a claim brought by the PSFA, as highlighted by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. However, this amendment would limit the operational flexibility of the PSFA and create extra burdens on the court system if we had to keep going back to the courts for all costs. A key aim of the Bill is to minimise the burden on the courts while ensuring that there are ample safeguards and protections in place. We already stipulate in the Bill that any costs charged have to be reasonable; we will be transparent about how we work out reasonable costs in our published guidance. However, we should always remember that investigating fraud and recovering losses is an expensive business for the Government. It is not fair that these costs are shouldered by law-abiding citizens. If you have committed fraud against the state, you should pay for this.

On how the PSFA wants to charge for its services, it is important that we recognise that, regarding money between departments and the impact on value for money, it is not uncommon for departments to charge each other for their services. The impact assessment sets out how the powers in the Bill will support the PSFA to recover up to £53.7 million over 10 years under current modelling. A significant proportion of this would otherwise have been lost to government. We create value for money by bringing funds lost to fraud or error back to government so that they can be used for public good. I hope that that explanation reassures the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and that she will therefore not press her amendments.

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Moved by

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent]

26: Clause 14, page 9, line 33, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—
“(a) the period for appealing mentioned in section 60(2)(a) has passed without an appeal being brought, or”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 60, page 32, line 25.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, before I outline the amendments in this group, I will refer to government Amendments 30, 31, 104 and 105, as your Lordships will have noticed that these have been withdrawn from the Marshalled List. Together, these amendments had sought to ensure that there was no conflict between the prohibition on a bank telling an account holder that it had received a deduction order information notice from either the PSFA or the DWP in respect of the holder’s account and any possible subject access requests, and would limit how long the prohibition had effect. Unfortunately, we found that the wording of these amendments did not achieve the desired effect. For this reason, they have been withdrawn but we will retable them once they are compliant.

I turn to the amendments in question. The current drafting of clauses in Parts 1 and 2 of the Bill may inadvertently prevent the First-tier Tribunal from exercising its right to extend the amount of time a person has to make an appeal, where there is good reason to do so. Therefore, government Amendments 26, 60, 63, 64, 86, 87, 100, 101, 119, 120 and 125 seek to prevent this from occurring and to clarify drafting across the Bill.

These amendments ensure that the First-tier Tribunal maintains its ability to extend the time limit for an appeal where there is good reason to do so, at the discretion of the tribunal. These amendments do so across the provisions in the Bill where there is a route of appeal available. This will ensure the proper consideration of appeals and that the system is focused on fair judgments. I beg to move Amendment 26 in the name of my noble friend Lady Sherlock.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I note the Minister’s remarks about the withdrawal of some government amendments. I will not go through them all. I look forward to their redrafting. I start by making the small point that there is an element of unpreparedness to the Bill. I realise that there is quite a lot of work in progress. My understanding is that it is an unusual approach to take, to withdraw and then redraft. The Minister will probably say that I am going too far, and I therefore look to a further explanation of that point.

Putting that to one side, the amendments that the Government have tabled appear at least in principle to be sensible changes, which permit a tribunal to extend the time limit for bringing an appeal about a direct deduction order. This relates to a DDO appeal in the public sector section of the Bill but also, as I understand it, in the DWP section, as it applies to the eligibility verification notice in respect of the agreed arrangements between the banks and the DWP. Here I refer to government Amendment 87 in particular.

However, this provides me with an opportunity to do a bit of questioning. Can the Minister outline some of the situations in which the tribunal could consider it “reasonable” to grant an extension to the review period? I suspect she will say that this is up to the tribunal to decide, but it would be helpful to understand the obvious reasons—and some of the less obvious reasons—why the tribunal could offer some leniency.

I presume that the appeal process would include an appeal not just on the DDO but to delay a payment of the DDO and to seek a reduction in the amount payable per week, with the total amount payable over a longer period. Is there an expectation that a longer period has a maximum length of time applied and a cut-off? Otherwise, it could be endless.

In the process of considering and drafting this amendment, I am sure that the Government have had regard to precedent and to how this provision has been used in other Acts. I am aware that similar provision exists in other statutes and, if the Minister could share examples with us of where extensions have been granted to individuals, why and for how long, it would help and allow the Committee to understand the practical ramifications of this amendment. I hope that the circumstances are exceptional, but the wording used in the amendment is for it to be seen as

“reasonable in all the circumstances”.

I hope that that adds to my argument.

Are there parallels to be drawn and lessons learned—for example, from the child maintenance system, for which I had responsibility—where the paying parent is defaulting on DDO payments and the tribunal system is therefore involved? Can some analogies be created?

As I said earlier, there is merit in seeking to allow greater flexibility in granting an appeal. Individuals should have adequate opportunity to exercise this right, but within reason. The amendment is, to that extent, well intentioned and it is something that we support. However, we must also be alive to the risk posed by so-called bad actors. We must ensure that flexibility does not come at the cost of action. We need to make sure that this appeal system allows those with genuine concerns to be heard and recognised, while minimising opportunities for vexatious complaints that are designed to delay and clog up the system, rather than use it responsibly. For example, it could be easy for an individual to claim that he is not able to fulfil his obligations to pay his DDO because, he states, he is suffering from mental health problems or has fluctuating psychotic episodes. What is the tried and tested system for tribunals to assess these claims thoroughly and have the necessary powers to refute or rebut what may be deliberate and vexatious claims?

In seeking precedent here, what is the experience of appeals to tribunals in other sectors—on the volume of cases, the exceptions and the knock-on effect on courts’ resourcing and delays to all cases in the pipeline? It would be most welcome to have some further clarity from the Minister about the considerations that she has towards the amendment, particularly in reference to precedent, which gives us some idea of how this is going to work.

I finish by echoing the words from my noble friend Lady Finn, who said on the last group—and she is right—that fraud against the taxpayer must be confronted robustly. My arguments on this group form the basis of that.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I thank the noble Viscount for his comments, some of which, as he will appreciate, will be explored in more detail as we get to the DWP part of the Bill, Part 2. We will explore all these issues in more detail later in Committee, including some of the examples that he seeks about how all the powers in the Bill have precedent already, although I will touch on some.

However, I will start by querying the noble Viscount and pushing back a little on the suggestion that we were unprepared with this Bill. There was a genuine drafting error. Mistakes happen; human beings are known for making them occasionally. Given the late tabling of some of the amendments, a level of genuine solidarity and collaboration across your Lordships’ House, about how we work and move forward, may be better judged.

Regarding some of the points made, I will start with the specific point about what kind of circumstances would be reasonable to extend the timeframe for appealing an overpayment notice. In all circumstances, it is wholly up to the tribunal to decide what would be a reasonable extension from one month. There are recognised principles to guide the exercise of discretion to extend time periods, or not, which the tribunal will consider. A three-stage approach is applied to consideration of any extension: first, assessing the seriousness and significance of the failure to comply with the time limit; secondly, considering why the default occurred; and, thirdly, evaluating all the circumstances of the case to enable the tribunal to deal justly with the application.

I will address the point made about civil penalties and examples of how they are used from the position of the PSFA. We will address this in more detail with the DWP as we move forward. There is precedent across government for civil penalties to be issued to the civil standard by officials delegated to by Ministers, instead of penalties being issued by court. Examples include the Environment Agency and the APHA. In instances where penalties are issued in the above manner, it is also standard practice across government departments such as the Home Office, the Environment Agency and HMRC for appeals to be made to a court or tribunal as the final route of challenge should an individual feel that a penalty, including the amount, is unfair or incorrect. We are seeking to emulate those powers for the PSFA.

In instances where penalties are not issued by officials and are issued via courts, the courts have the right to extend the specified period within which an individual or business may appeal a decision. This is part of the civil procedure rules. The noble Viscount touched on the Child Maintenance Service. As we progress through Committee, I will use it in many examples regarding the powers of the PSFA and how we will seek to use the precedent already established by the CMS.

With that, I hope that noble Lords will appreciate that these amendments are important to ensure that the Bill as it stands does not interfere with the tribunal procedural rules. Those rules are in place for good reason. While it was not our intention to impact the discretion that tribunals have on appeal timeframes, we want to bring absolute clarity to this. This also creates additional protections for people who want to engage their appeal rights. I therefore hope that your Lordships will support these amendments, which I commend to the Committee.

Amendment 26 agreed.

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[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, given the tone of the debate that we have had so far, it may be helpful if I start by giving noble Lords some clarity on some of the issues that have been discussed.

Direct deduction orders are a mechanism by which public funds lost to fraud and error can be recovered directly from a liable person’s bank account. However, DDOs will be used only if the liable party has repeatedly chosen not to engage with the investigation and to come to the table. This is not the first and only mechanism for engaging to recoup funds; that is an important principle here.

At this point, it is also important for me to clarify exactly what is being said about junior civil servants. The people who will undertake this work are trained members of the counterfraud profession, and the PACE powers have to be approved by a magistrate. The appropriate safeguards are in place. While I am at it, I reassure the Committee that no algorithms will be used by the PSFA for anything to do with financial information gathering and the powers outlined here. I remind noble Lords that the liable person will be kept informed at the outset and throughout the process of a fund recovery.

Amendments 27 and 75 would, together, restrict the use of the direct deduction power, so that it can be used only following an application to the appropriate court. We agree with the sentiment that there should be protections in place to ensure that direct deduction orders are used proportionately and appropriately. However, this would place unnecessary and avoidable additional work on the courts, and reduce the effectiveness of the power and the amount of taxpayers’ money returned to the public purse. By this stage of the process, a liable person would have already agreed that the amount is recoverable or the courts would have made a final determination that it is.

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

The noble Baroness mentioned a moment ago that a direct deduction order can be made only when a person has already agreed that an amount is recoverable. Could she point out where that is in the Bill? I cannot find it anywhere.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I am assured that it is in the Bill. I ask noble Lords to bear with; as soon as that has been passed to me, I will highlight exactly where in the Bill it is.

It is in Clause 12. That was like magic.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

Could the noble Baroness explain again why a garnishee order—the collection of debt from a third party—is not mentioned in the legislation at all?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, a garnishee order is used to obtain money directly from a third party. That is not the process that we are undertaking; we are regaining money directly from an individual, as opposed to a third party. I am happy to write to the noble Lord with more guidance on that, but that is my understanding.

I move on to Amendment 29, which would necessitate a “reasonable belief”, rather than a “belief”, that a bank account is held by the liable person prior to the PSFA requesting bank statements from the bank to inform decisions on direct deduction orders. In practice, the PSFA will already be operating at this level as it will already, through the course of its fraud investigation, have developed an overview of the liable person’s financial information.

In addition, having thrilled the Committee with my recitations from Managing Public Money last Wednesday, I am excited to be able to quote from another government page turner, The Judge Over Your Shoulder. All “public law powers” must be exercised with

“reasonableness or rationality—following a proper reasoning process and so coming to a reasonable conclusion”.

Making a Minister’s belief a “reasonable” belief therefore has no effect, because they are already subject to it.

In addition, Clause 19 lets the PSFA issue a general information notice to banks, which provides confirmation of the accounts that a liable person holds. The amendment is therefore not adding anything new.

Amendment 62 seeks to remove the ability to restart a deduction from earnings order once it has been suspended. For some context, a deduction from earnings order is a mechanism by which public funds lost to fraud and error can be recovered directly from a liable person who is not in PAYE employment. Having listened to the debate, I have some sympathy with noble Lords; however, it is important that the PSFA remains able to issue, vary, suspend and restart, or revoke a deduction from earnings order, for very human reasons.

We need to be able to suspend and restart a deduction from earnings order due to a temporary change in the liable person’s circumstances; for example, if they were temporarily hospitalised. People’s lives, as we know, can be messy; it is important that we have the flexibility to recognise that. Where it is more appropriate to revoke the order altogether, this is provided for in Clause 47.

The purpose of the amendment therefore overlaps with existing provision which gives the necessary flexibility while maintaining clear communication with both employers and liable persons, maintaining a fair and transparent debt recovery process. If this provision was adopted, an unfortunate consequence would be the end of such flexibility and the reluctance of anyone to suspend payments due to having to restart the process.

I hope that this explanation reassures noble Lords and that the noble Baroness will withdraw Amendment 27.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have a number of points. It was very interesting that the Minister concluded in relation to one of these amendments that “people’s lives can be messy”. It is precisely for that reason that in saying that DDOs will be issued only due to a lack of engagement, without any consideration of why that lack of engagement might happen, it might well be because people’s lives are very messy, to quote the Minister. So I am not convinced by that at all.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

To reassure the noble Baroness, efforts to engage with a liable person would not be just a one-off hit. There would be over a dozen attempts, under my understanding of the Act. So it is not just a one-time effort to engage with each liable person. By the time we got to the process of a direct deduction order, there would have been multiple efforts to engage with the liable person.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

It is quite feasible that I have missed the multiple efforts in the reading of the Bill. Maybe it is there—it might be another bit that I have missed. But I do not think that is clear, so maybe that could be clarified.

I am sure that this is the intention—the problem is the principle. We were given the explanation that I thought we would be given: we are doing this directly and not going for judicial authorisation because the courts just have too much work on. I always worry about an explanation that says that it will cause too much work for the courts. On this basis, we may as well cut out sending anyone to a court and put them into prison—because that court process is so darned long-winded for everything, is it not? But we do not say that, because the court system sets in place safeguards to ensure that people are not unfairly treated. We do not have a direct situation where a Government of the day simply decide that the courts are dispensable with. That is the principle that I was trying to raise here, so I do not think that is a satisfactory answer.

I was also unconvinced by the argument, which I will go through, that HMRC already has powers to deduct money directly from bank accounts under Schedule 8 to the Finance (No.2) Act 2015. Actually, there are statutory safeguards, including the requirement that HMRC retains £5,000 in the debtor’s accounts, and guidance about who HMRC should deem as at a particular disadvantage. That is not in this Bill. It is part of that Bill, which was cited as a reassurance to me.

The comparison with child maintenance is also a false comparison. Child maintenance is money owed by one parent to ensure provision for their dependant who does not live with them. That differs greatly from an individual claiming money from, for example, the social security system, who potentially has been overpaid—as I keep pointing out, through no fault of their own. I do not think those two things count as equivalences at all.

I was grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, for the amendment on stop-starting DDOs. I have some sympathy with her approach in terms of them being permanently never allowed to start again. My nervousness with it is that it feels so arbitrary. The explanation given was that people have messy lives, which is fine, but I do not want to be in a situation whereby I am nodding through a system that means that people could keep having their direct deduction orders stop and start because of the messiness of government. We are told that it is the messiness of people’s lives, but it is not clear that that would be the only reason why this would occur; it is not in the Bill.

Of course, I shall not press my amendments, but I imagine that I will return with some of them on Report.

--- Later in debate ---

We urge the Government to give serious consideration to these amendments. A fair and functional system of debt recovery must be one in which people can have confidence, and that confidence rests on the safeguards, transparency and procedural fairness that these changes would help to secure. I beg to move.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome the opportunity presented by this group of amendments to talk about some of the safeguards in the Bill for the recovery powers. The liable person will always be provided an opportunity to voluntarily repay, as I said in the previous group. The Bill affords them rights of making representations, and review and appeal to a court or tribunal. There are set maximum regular deduction rates and we have written into the legislation that deductions must be fair and affordable. Vulnerability will be considered at every step of the way and action taken where appropriate to tailor our approach accordingly.

As the Government have developed this approach, we have had to balance necessary and proportionate safeguards against the requirement for operational flexibility to efficiently and effectively recover money that the liable person should never have had in the first place—money that could and should have been used for the public good. I firmly believe that we have struck the right balance here. Unfortunately, the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, while well intentioned, will negatively impact our recovery activity while not providing any meaningful additional protections.

Amendment 28 would limit recovery from joint accounts if the liable person had a sole account from which the full amount owed could be recovered within five years. To reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, what this amendment misses is that recovery from a joint account is already limited to the beneficial interest of the liable person. I understand her concerns about how that would be allocated but we believe we have a responsible medium here. The joint account holder is able to make representations on this matter to ensure that the funds taken into consideration are solely those of the liable person.

The amendment therefore limits the operational flexibility of the PSFA to undertake recovery action and provides no further protection to joint account holders. The time taken to recover will depend on the facts of the particular case and on the amount being recovered—five years may be suitable for some amounts but may not be where the PSFA is recovering substantially larger amounts and is seeking to do so over a longer period.

There may also be circumstances where repayment needs to take place over a longer period; for example, for those who are vulnerable or face hardship but none the less have the money to make repayments. It is important that the PSFA retains the flexibility required to recover a wide range of debts of varying amounts and to tailor repayments to the liable person’s circumstances.

Amendment 33A would require the PSFA to try to establish the joint account holder’s beneficial interest before using the formula defined in the Bill. This is duplicative and already provided for under Clause 20(3), which states that

“the presumption does not apply where the Minister has reason to believe that the liable person’s beneficial interest is different from the presumed share”;

that is, on review of the statements obtained for the account in question. As mentioned already, all joint account holders will have the opportunity to make representations as to their beneficial interest before any money leaves the account.

Amendment 34 would require the PSFA to provide the direct deduction order notice to the liable person within seven working days of it being provided to the bank. However, the current drafting already stipulates that the order must be shared

“as soon as reasonably practicable”.

I cannot foresee many circumstances where this would ever be more than seven days; after all, we want the money back. It is also important to maintain an element of flexibility to ensure that the banks have sufficient time to put in place the restrictions under Clause 26. This is to prevent the liable person from moving money out of their account and circumventing the debt recovery process.

Amendment 50 relates to applications to vary direct deduction orders and would compel the PSFA to set out its reasons behind any decision. This amendment is duplicative. The PSFA would be doing this anyway as a matter of good public law. The liable person should know why applications have been agreed or rejected, and it is necessary they know why if they are then to take up their review and appeal rights. The PSFA would also publish guidance on applications to vary, setting out its high-level approach.

Amendment 53 relates to the unfortunate circumstance where someone dies while a deduction order is in place. It would compel the PSFA to write to the next of kin or estate to confirm the cessation of the order. The Bill already stipulates that the order ceases as soon as the PSFA becomes aware of a death. This simply creates another administrative burden for the PSFA as it would be expected to hold information on next of kin or personal representatives—information that the banks themselves are unlikely to hold as it is not mandatory for this information to be given to banks by account holders.

The suggestion in Amendment 55 is an interesting one. It would prevent suspended direct deduction orders being restarted after a period of 24 months. This would impact the discretion that the PSFA could offer to those who owe money but have experienced an impactful, if temporary, change in their circumstances; for instance, through losing a job or undergoing medical treatment. It would also limit the operational flexibility of the PSFA, which would still have a duty to establish the most appropriate way of responding to such circumstances, balanced against the duty to recover money lost to fraud and error.

For example, someone may come forward to the PSFA after a DDO has been put in place and seek to negotiate because of a change in their circumstances. They may seek to engage directly and to negotiate their payments going forward but then fail to see things through. This could happen over a period of two years; we would then have to start the process all over again. Moreover, the Minister will already have the power to revoke a DDO if the liable person’s circumstances necessitate it.

I hope that these explanations reassure noble Lords and that the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

There is one matter that occurs to me in respect of Amendment 53. In the event of somebody’s death, where the deceased has been subject to a DDO, could this be included in the “Tell Us Once” service? That is, where a next of kin registers the death with the registrar, could the DDO be highlighted as part of the “Tell Us Once” service? Of course, this would include the highlighting of that revocation.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I thank the noble Viscount for giving me the opportunity to reassure him that, yes, it can and it will.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

On Amendment 55, I understand that 24 months may not be the right number, but it cannot be right that an order can stay open indefinitely so that, 10 or 15 years later, the PSFA can suddenly start taking money from the account again. There must be some sort of drop-dead point; I wonder where that should sit.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I beg the leave of the Committee to consider that; I will reflect on it and come back in due course.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

I thank the Minister. I thank my noble friend for bringing up the “Tell Us Once” service. A lot of people have said that it has brought them a lot of comfort after a relative has died; if this service could be incorporated here, that would be very good indeed.

In this group of amendments, we have made the case that, although the objectives of recovering public money, tackling fraud and commanding support are not in question, as we have constantly reiterated in Committee, the mechanisms by which the Bill proposes to do so raise legitimate concerns that cannot easily be brushed aside. I emphasise that our amendments do not seek to frustrate the intent of the legislation; on the contrary, they are designed to ensure that the framework being created is legally sound and operationally effective.

We are talking about powers that will reach into people’s bank accounts and affect the relationships that they have with innocent third parties, whether they be joint account holders or dependants; I heard very clearly what the Minister said about joint bank accounts but there are still issues here that may have to be worked through or thought about. This is a significant undertaking on behalf of the Government, and it comes with a weighty responsibility to get the detail right.

Today, we have raised not theoretical issues but practical, real-life scenarios where the Bill, as it is currently drafted, could cause confusion, injustice or unnecessary distress. We have heard how a blunt formula could allow assets to be shielded or, worse, wrongly seized. We have pointed to the risk of leaving innocent third parties in the dark. We have also highlighted the critical importance of transparency when powers are exercised and challenged. I should say that, in terms of the innocent third parties in the dark, the “Tell Us Once” commitment is most welcome.

It is not enough to say that the Cabinet Office will act reasonably. The law must require the Cabinet Office to do so. It must give people the right to be informed, the right to understand decisions made about them, and the right to challenge those decisions with the benefit of clear reasoning and evidence. We are not opposing the principle of direct deduction orders. We are simply asking for a system that reflects the complexity of real people’s lives and relationships, and that recognises that justice must not only be done but be seen to be done. We believe, therefore, that these amendments are proportionate, constructive and necessary. They would not weaken the Government’s ability to recover funds; they would strengthen the public’s trust in how that ability is used.

I say again: we support the aim of the Bill but, if we are to ask the public to accept a system of such reach and impact, we owe it to them to ensure that it is as fair, clear and humane as possible. I believe that our proposals today are a step towards achieving just that, and I hope the Government will give them the serious consideration they deserve. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw.

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[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I did not speak at Second Reading, but the Bill has attracted my interest for the reasons a number of noble Lords have pointed out about procedure and due process. I share the concern about the risk of debanking en masse a group of individuals whom banks will view as not particularly good customers in terms of the money they deposit and as they now come with greater risks. I would also like to know what the Government’s thinking is on that issue.

Looking at this from the point of view of the bank, I am a bit concerned about the relationship between Clause 19(4) and Clause 19(10). Clause 19(4) says:

“The Minister may give an account information notice relating to an account only for the purpose of determining whether to make a direct deduction order in respect of the account”.


If the bank receives such a request for an account information notice, but for some reason considers there may be a different purpose in that request, what is the bank supposed to do? Clause 19(8) says:

“The bank must comply with a notice given under this section”.


However, Clause 19(4) puts a clear limit in terms of the lawfulness of giving an account information notice. Who is to assess whether there is any doubt as to the purpose of that account information notice?

In Clause 19(10), it says:

“Information given to the Minister in response to a notice under this section may be used by the Minister for the purpose of exercising the core functions but not for any other purpose”.


Of course, the core functions are wider than the purpose identified in Clause 19(4), which says that you can give an account information notice only for the purposes of determining whether to make a direct deduction order. But then, in Clause 19(10), that information may be used for wider purposes than enabling the taking of that decision.

That puts the bank in a bit of difficult position. It is told that it must comply with a notice but also that the notice must be only for the purposes of determining whether to make a direct deduction order. If it has any doubt, presumably it owes a duty to its customers and will have to consider how to behave in that situation. Further, it is also told that the information it will be providing may be used for wider purposes than simply the making of a direct deduction order. I would like to hear from the Government how they see the relationship between these various provisions in Clause 19, and where that leaves the bank in that kind of scenario.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, is it not always the case that you get the most difficult question just before you stand up? I am going to speak really slowly until I get a speaking note that gives me the appropriate answer.

I confirm that the Government are extremely mindful of the burdens this Bill places on business, including the banking sector. We want to ensure that it is not subject to disproportionate burdens or costs in complying with these measures. I will start by referring to the Bill’s published impact assessment, which sets out all the expected costs to businesses, including banks, of the PSFA measures. This has been green rated by the Regulatory Policy Committee and sets out the minimal expected costs to businesses where it has been possible to do so, including to banks for Part 1 of the Bill’s measures.

Throughout the development of this Bill, we have tried to strike the right balance between requiring actions from banks in a fair and proportionate way while achieving our policy intent of recouping vital public funds lost to fraud and error. This is why there has been sustained engagement with key representatives of the sector, including UK Finance, individual banks, building societies, HM Treasury and the Financial Conduct Authority. Some of this is reflected in government amendments that we will discuss later in Committee.

We know that the sector is supportive of the Bill’s objectives from the evidence provided by UK Finance in Committee in the other place. We have benefited from the sector’s operational insights, which have led us to table a number of amendments as a direct result to ease the implementation and delivery of the recovery powers. The PSFA and the DWP will, for their relevant measures, will continue to work closely with banks on the design and implementation of relevant measures, including consulting on relevant regulations.

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[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

Can I just press the Minister a little more? I realise that, as she rightly said, we will explore these matters later in Committee—in particular, when we look at the DWP aspects of the Bill—but it would be helpful to have a bit more information on what the banks are thinking. What is their experience in terms of the work that has been undertaken so far? As the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, said—she is concerned about the so-called government inspectors approach taken by the banks—obviously, they are not doing this out of the good of their hearts. So it would be helpful to have a little more information, given that the work is by no means done; it is a work in progress. I have certainly been pulled up for calling this whole process a pilot scheme—I think that it is called “test and learn” or something—but some more information for the Committee at this early stage would be very helpful.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, it would be inappropriate for me to speak on behalf of the banks, and I do not think that noble Lords would want me to do so. But as far as I am aware—having said I will not speak for them, I am now going to—the banks are supportive of the approach we are taking. In terms of fraud, we are working very closely with them. The banks, however, want us to be as similar to HMRC as possible, and we are trying to do that. Given that those are regulations they currently work with in day-in, day-out, that is what we are trying to emulate. I think that is as far as I can go. The noble Viscount should be reassured that we are engaging directly with UK Finance regularly, and he might want to reflect on the evidence that it gave in Committee stage in the other place about how comfortable it was with this section of the Bill.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

I think it is fair to say that UK Finance and the banks, in terms of all the evidence that I have read, are obviously happy to sit down with Ministers to try and negotiate their way through this Bill. I do not think that is entirely fairly or accurately described as them being happy with this. They are being asked to do things by coercion in this Bill. I am not saying that word to be offensive. I mean they have not chosen to do it—the Government have told them they have to do it. In many instances, banks are required to do what the Government tell them in relation to their own customers or face penalties if they do not. Consequently, they are trying to negotiate the best of a bad deal. That is not quite the same as an enthusiasm for the Bill. I think that is worth noting, as we would not want to mislead.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I remind the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that what I actually said was that I did not want to speak on behalf of the banks. However, I find the word “coercion” a complete exaggeration and unnecessary. Just to clarify as well, the banks will not face penalties at any point in the Bill, unless I am to be corrected—and if I am wrong, I will correct the record. This is a process of trying to recoup government funds—taxpayers’ funds—to make sure that we get the money back. That is what we are trying to do and that is why this legislation is in place. We are working with the sector to make sure we can get our money back.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

I think we all want to see a system that robustly tackles fraud against the public purse but that also recognises and respects the practical consequences of how it is delivered. The debate on the amendments in this group has shown that we need to be honest about the fact that in this Bill we are asking commercial banks to step beyond their core functions and dedicate staff time, infrastructure and internal resources to deliver outcomes for the state. When the public sector is asking the private sector to help to tackle public sector fraud, that is no small ask and should not be treated as such.

The noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, have correctly highlighted the problems when you place onerous responsibilities on the banks in regard to a class of individuals. There is obviously a danger that it is going to make it less likely that vulnerable people can access services because the banks will just decide it is not worth the bother and will debank difficult or troublesome people. Those are very important areas to be worked through.

I really appreciate that the Government are still in discussions, but we are actually legislating here and now, and it is a bit uncomfortable that the discussions are obviously still ongoing while we are trying to refine the legislation. It would be good if we could keep this alive with what the banks actually want to conclude.

The amendments that we have proposed today on requiring due regard for cost, on ensuring review after implementation and on giving banks a voice in determining their recovery of the cost are all designed to introduce fairness, clarity and proportionality in what would otherwise be quite a heavily one-sided obligation. The amendments do not dilute the objective of the Bill, nor do they place unreasonable burdens on government. They recognise that the success of this policy depends on continued collaboration and good will from the financial sector, and that is something that cannot be taken for granted if banks are expected to absorb ever-growing public responsibilities without recognition or recourse.

We have heard much today about partnership in tackling fraud, but partnership requires reciprocity; it means listening, engaging and sharing responsibility—not simply offloading it. These amendments are an invitation to government to show that they understand that principle and to embed it in the Bill.

Before I finish, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, for pointing the potential inconsistency in Clause 19, between subsections (4) and (10). We would be interested to hear how that will operate. This is not a question of principle—

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

Before the noble Baroness—I hope—withdraws her amendment, I need to clarify something, as I misunderstood the advice that I received from my Box. I need to apologise to the Committee and to make it very clear that there are penalties up to £300 a day that could be on banks —but it is more likely to be £300 under Clause 53, which is why we are working with them on guidance and why there are ongoing conversations.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

I thank the Minister.

To conclude, these amendments are not on a question of principle, because we all support the purpose. It is a question of practicality and fairness and maintaining a constructive relationship between the state and the financial institutions on which it relies. I urge the Government carefully to reflect on that relationship and urge noble Lords to support the amendments in the interests of a Bill that is both effective and equitable. On that basis, I beg to withdraw.

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Moved by

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent]

35: Clause 23, page 15, line 3, leave out “, or a method for calculating the amounts,”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment means that a regular direct deduction order given by the Minister for the Cabinet Office must specify the amounts to be deducted.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, these amendments all relate to the determination of deduction amounts for regular direct deduction orders. Government Amendments 35, 36 and 37 amend Clause 23 to ensure that a regular direct deduction order from the Public Sector Fraud Authority must specify the amounts to be deducted. Government Amendment 43 is a consequential amendment to Clause 26.

Government Amendments 110, 111, 112 and 115 make an equivalent amendment for regular direct deduction orders issued by the DWP under Schedule 5 to ensure that the order must specify the amount to be deducted. These amendments arise from the continued engagement that we are having with representatives of the finance industry, as I said in the last group, and seek to address their concerns.

In this case, concerns were raised that the Bill potentially placed an unnecessary decision-making responsibility on banks and financial institutions—specifically, a duty that they may be required to provide or make a calculation of the amount to be deducted when receiving a regular direct deduction order. They requested that we remove these implied duties if it was the Government’s intent to always specify amounts to be deducted. As this is the intent of the PSFA and the DWP, we agree with the proposed suggestion to remove the references to calculations and make it explicit that government should always specify the deduction amount. These amendments achieve that under both parts of the Bill, address this concern and clarify the duties on the banks when making a regular direct deduction. I therefore beg to move the amendments tabled in the name of my noble friend Lady Sherlock.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, the government amendments in this group are in principle welcome. They sensibly seek to simplify deduction orders and ease the operational burden they place on banks—which, let us be clear, are intimately involved in enabling the exercise of the provisions in the Bill. However, the real issue here is not with the content of the amendments but with the process that led to their necessity. These changes are not minor corrections, nor are they are clarifications. They alter the way in which deduction orders function and work operationally. They exist because the Government have belatedly taken on board feedback from banks and financial institutions—institutions that clearly, and surprisingly, were not properly consulted before the Bill was introduced. As I said in the debate on the previous group, this raises serious concern about how the Bill is being developed.

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We support these government amendments but believe they also serve as a compelling argument for why our Amendment 40 is not just reasonable but necessary. We must ensure that the banks and financial institutions are properly consulted at all relevant stages so that we work with these vital partners, not against them.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I appreciate the points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, specifically her questions as to why calculations for DDOs are in the Bill in the first place and why the need for this change did not come to light earlier. Referencing calculations is established practice in the context of employers making calculations for deduction from earnings orders, hence the drafting reflected here for direct deduction orders. Continued engagement with the financial sector has covered an array of content related to the Bill. As we have moved to discuss implementation, any issues raised have been considered and, where appropriate, acted on by officials in order to smooth the implementation of the powers.

This Government have been engaging extensively with the financial sector. It requested that we remove references to banks calculating amounts to be deducted through a regular DDO. This is because the banks felt that it would create an excessive burden that gave them too much responsibility for making decisions regarding deduction amounts. Utilising the deduction order information notices, the PSFA will already have a fuller understanding than the bank of the liable person’s total financial affairs. Along with its obligation to ensure that deductions are fair and affordable, it is right that the PSFA determines what the deductions will be, and it provides another safeguard. I therefore hope that your Lordships will support these amendments. I commend them to the Committee.

Amendment 35 agreed.

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Moved by

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent]

36: Clause 23, page 15, line 8, leave out “, or different methods for calculating the amounts,”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 23, page 15, line 3.

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Moved by

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent]

41: Clause 26, page 16, line 14, leave out “first notice” and insert “pre-deduction notice”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, together with my other amendments to clauses 26 and 27 to the same effect, would replace the tag “first notice” with “pre-deduction notice”. This has no substantive effect but is intended to be easier to understand.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, this next group of government amendments seeks to bring further clarity to the process of engaging with banks on direct deduction orders. Government Amendments 41, 42, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 113, 114 and 116 seek to clarify the purpose of the previously named “first notice” by renaming it a “pre-deduction notice” for the PSFA and the DWP respectively. It is just changing the name, nothing more. These minor and technical amendments reflect that the Government are acting in response to feedback from the banking sector about the description of notices. It felt that the naming was confusing, so we have changed it. We appreciate the sector’s engagement.

Similarly, government Amendments 106, 107, 108 and 118 follow on from feedback from the sector for greater clarity on the approach to the issue and subsequent processing of the notices, and make the application of the powers easier for financial institutions to understand. They support the intention that all relevant parties impacted by the debt powers of the Bill are correctly notified of the action to be taken. I beg to move.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

It is great to be having a dialogue with the noble Baroness. We welcome the Government’s amendments in this group which, taken together, amount to a series of technical clarifications and improvements to the Bill. As the noble Baroness said, they do not fundamentally alter the policy intent, but they help to tighten its operation, provide greater clarity and ensure that the provisions are more workable in practice. We broadly support these amendments and will not oppose their inclusion.

However, I note that even so-called technical amendments can have material consequences for those tasked with delivering the measures in the Bill—whether public bodies, private firms or individuals. It is important that any changes, however minor they may appear, are properly explained and fully understood by those affected.

I also take this opportunity to remind the Committee that, when a Bill is heavily reliant on secondary legislation and technical detail, as this one is, we must be especially vigilant in making sure that these fine-tuning amendments do not obscure bigger questions of transparency, proportionality and accountability. We will continue to keep a close eye on those issues as the Bill progresses. So, while we support this group of amendments, we urge the Government to maintain the spirit of openness and collaboration that they have shown so far as further changes inevitably arise, and to ensure that the cumulative impact of even minor adjustments is properly assessed. With that said, we are content to support these amendments.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I take this opportunity to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, for both her engagement and support for this group of amendments and her wider engagement on the Bill.

While these amendments alone are relatively minor, together they reflect the importance of the ongoing consultation with key stakeholders, which is intrinsically linked with a desire to ensure that the legislation is as clear, precise and straightforward to implement as possible. The PSFA has consulted departments, public bodies, academics and non-public sector groups over many years of policy work to identify and resolve gaps in debt management powers across government. The PSFA has continued to work with stakeholders to consult on these powers as they go through Parliament and is committed to continuing to do so during implementation. We have listened directly to feedback raised by the financial sector and are taking the steps necessary to bring the clarity it seeks. I therefore hope that your Lordships will support these amendments.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

In support of my noble friend Lady Finn and in the spirit of agreeing with what is going on, I just want to ask a probing question of the Minister that is perhaps a little unfair. As we have noticed, there are a number of government amendments here and there is work in progress. The agreement between the Government and the banks continues. Does she have any idea when this will end? In other words, as Committee progresses, should we expect further government amendments as the banks and the Government work together to nail down the detail of agreements concerning the Public Sector Fraud Authority and the Department for Work and Pensions?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I thank the noble Viscount. I feel like these may be famous last words, but I am assured that we hope not to table any more government amendments in Committee.

Amendment 41 agreed.

Moved by

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent]

42: Clause 26, page 17, line 2, leave out “first notice” and insert “pre-deduction notice”
Member's explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for my amendment to clause 26, page 16, line 14.

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Moved by

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent]

45: Clause 27, page 17, line 11, leave out “first notice” and insert “pre-deduction notice”
Member's explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for my amendment to clause 26, page 16, line 14.

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Moved by

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent]

46: Clause 27, page 17, line 12, leave out “in relation to an account that they hold” and insert “(other than a bank) in relation to an account”
Member's explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for my amendment inserting a new clause after clause 36.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, we recognise that there can be extenuating and difficult circumstances where someone has to take over another’s personal and financial affairs, such as making a power of attorney. Government Amendments 46, 61 and 121 clarify the role of a legal deputy with regard to the direct deduction order provisions for the PSFA and the DWP. These amendments follow our ongoing engagement with the financial services sector, which sought clarity as to how it would carry out a direct deduction order where a legal deputy has been put in place. We have benefited from the operational insight of the banks and have tabled this amendment to ease the operationalisation of the recovery powers.

Government Amendment 61 inserts an additional clause after Clause 36 to ensure that the provisions about direct deduction orders in Part 1 operate effectively where a person acts on behalf of an account holder by virtue of a power of attorney or as a court-appointed deputy. The amendment has the effect that any direct deduction order provisions and requirements have to be carried out by any legal deputies of the liable person, ensuring that recovery action can still proceed effectively.

Government Amendment 46 is a consequential amendment to ensure that the restrictions to prevent someone frustrating the direct deduction order will also apply to a person acting on behalf of an account holder.

Government Amendment 121 makes equivalent provision for the DWP as government Amendment 61 does for the PSFA. This brings clarity to the financial institutions that have to deal with deputies. It also brings protections to the liable person, ensuring that they are not unfairly given a non-compliance penalty if it is in fact their legal deputy who is not engaging with us on repayment or attempting to frustrate a deduction order. I beg to move.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, we welcome the Government’s amendment to make provision for cases where an individual with liability under the Bill has a person with power of attorney appointed to act on their behalf. This is a pragmatic step recognising that in some circumstances an individual may not be capable of handling their own financial affairs, whether due to age, illness or incapacity, and that there must be a clear legal route for compliance and communication to proceed.

It is right that, despite these circumstances, we should continue to recover public money that has been gained through fraud, given that adequate safeguards are in check, which I and my noble friend Lord Younger will address later in Committee. We therefore support the principle behind this amendment. It brings a degree of clarity and certainty to what could otherwise be a difficult area and ensures that the processes set out in the Bill can still function effectively when a liable person is not acting for themselves.

However, we wish to raise a concern which we hope the Minister can provide reassurance on. While this amendment provides for cases where a power of attorney exists, it does not appear to make provision for what happens when no such power is in place. In reality, there will be vulnerable individuals who may not have granted a power of attorney and who may also lack the capacity to manage their affairs independently.

In such cases, how will the provisions about direct deduction orders, as set out in Part 1, continue to operate effectively? Who is to be regarded as liable under the provisions in the Bill? Who will be entitled to challenge a notice or a penalty? Without a mechanism to address this situation, there is a risk that enforcement could falter—or worse, that it could proceed inappropriately without proper safeguards in place for the individual concerned.

We would therefore welcome the Government’s thoughts on how such cases will be handled in practice and whether there are plans to issue guidance or put in place safeguards to ensure that vulnerable individuals without formal representation are not unfairly affected by the processes introduced by this Bill.

While we support this amendment in principle, we urge the Government to look carefully at the wider landscape of capacity and representation and to ensure that the Bill can operate fairly and lawfully in all cases, not only where a power of attorney is in place. This, again, addresses our view that we must take these days in Committee as an opportunity to try to imagine how the Bill will function practically. We hope that the Government take this chance to bring on board some of our concerns and take action to address and clarify this issue—which, in our submission, would make achieving the purpose of the Bill easier and make the Bill more effective.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, for raising those specifics and for the collegiate nature of her contribution, giving me enough time to get the appropriate reassurances from my colleagues. I also thank her because we have not yet really discussed the vulnerability protections that are in place, and this gives us an opportunity to do so. As we progress through Committee, there will be many opportunities to discuss this, but I welcome the opportunity to provide some level of reassurance now.

Existing government standards on vulnerability, such as His Majesty’s Government’s debt management vulnerability toolkit, will be utilised by the PSFA. Vulnerability assessments will be carried out at the start of each investigation. These will review any evidence of financial, social or personal vulnerability and then determine how best to engage with the personal impact and subsequent enforcement action. Vulnerability will be kept under regular review as a case progresses and the vulnerability assessment will be regularly updated. During debt resolution, the liable individual will have additional opportunities to identify vulnerabilities. Debt resolution policy will take vulnerable customers into account and there will be a range of adaptations and forbearances on offer to support them. We will publish further guidance on this issue related to vulnerabilities.

These amendments resulted from direct engagement with the finance sector. We have been keen to seek its insight on how to use these powers and to table amendments that bring clarity to its roles. However, these amendments also ensure that those who act as a legal deputy on behalf of an account holder must adhere to the terms of any deduction order put in place. They set out clear obligations for them and put protections in place for the liable person whose affairs are being looked after by such a deputy. I hope your Lordships will support these amendments.

Amendment 46 agreed.

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Moved by

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent]

47: Clause 27, page 17, line 13, leave out “first notice” and insert “pre-deduction notice”
Member's explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for my amendment to clause 26, page 16, line 14.

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Moved by

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent]

51: Clause 29, page 18, line 1, after “order” insert “other than under subsection (7)”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment removes an unnecessary requirement to seek representations from account holders before a direct deduction order is varied in circumstances where their consent is required in any event.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I turn to a group of amendments designed to remove duplication and bring greater clarity to certain parts of the debt recovery powers for the PSFA and the DWP.

Government Amendment 51 seeks to simplify drafting by removing an unnecessary requirement for the PSFA to seek representations on an application to vary a deduction order where, in order to make such a request, all account holders must have already consented. Government Amendments 52 and 117 seek to leave out redundant subsections to remove duplication. The subsections referenced outline that a bank must comply with a varied direct deduction order as per Clause 23(5) for the PSFA or new paragraph 7(5) in Schedule 5 for the DWP. However, Clause 23(5) and new paragraph 7(5) already state that a bank must comply with every direct deduction order. Government Amendments 98 and 99 remove unnecessary references to a payment or credit in Clause 85, both of which are within the relevant definition of “benefit” already as a result of Section 121DA(5) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992.

These amendments will help make the Bill as clear as possible, which I trust is welcomed by your Lordships’ Committee. I beg to move Amendment 51 tabled in the name of my noble friend Lady Sherlock.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak very briefly on this group of government amendments which make a number of technical and definitional clarifications to the Bill. We on these Benches broadly support the changes in this group. These amendments serve an important purpose in tightening the language of the Bill and ensuring that the provisions are legally coherent, internally consistent and practically operable. We recognise the importance of ensuring that statutory language is as clear and precise as possible, not only for those who will be responsible for implementing these powers but also for those who may be subject to them.

In some cases, these amendments address minor inconsistencies in wording; in others they bring greater alignment between different parts of the Bill or between this Bill and the existing legislation. These are the kinds of technical improvements that are important to ensure that legislation operates as intended and we welcome the Government’s attention to detail in this regard. It is, of course, always preferable for such clarifications to be made earlier in the process—sorry to spoil it; it was getting too friendly—but we appreciate that, particularly in complex Bills such as this one, a certain amount of refinement is inevitable as the provisions are examined more closely by Parliament.

While there is no need to dwell at length on what are by nature technical changes, we support the amendments in this group and are pleased to see the Bill improved through their inclusion.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finn. I simply end by stating again that the effect of these amendments is to clarify the drafting and remove redundant drafting that is already provided for. It is important that we have clear and precise legislation to aid implementation of these powers, all of which will be used to tackle the scourge of fraud against the public sector. Therefore, I hope noble Lords will provide their support to these amendments.

Amendment 51 agreed.

Moved by

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent]

52: Clause 29, page 18, line 24, leave out sub-paragraph (ii)
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment removes a provision that is redundant (because section 23(5) applies in relation to every direct deduction order).

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[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I have lots of bits of paper, and they are all written in my handwriting, which means that it will be even harder for me to read them—so bear with me.

Amendments 56, 57, 58 and 59 would establish a new body with responsibility to conduct reviews of direct deduction order decisions. Under the current drafting, internal reviews can be requested to challenge, for instance, whether a direct deduction order is the most appropriate form of repayment or whether the deduction amount is fair and affordable. Internal reviews are important, as they provide a straightforward and affordable way for the liable person to present a challenge to direct deduction order decision-making. They are an impartial element of many review processes. Indeed, if we turn to cross-government precedence, we can look at Child Maintenance Service and HMRC deduction orders. Both of these include an internal review stage without necessitating the creation of another new body.

For DDO reviews, the reviewing officer will be a trained authorised officer of a higher grade than the original decision-maker. To answer the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, that is in Clause 66(3) of the Bill. They would not have been involved in this case until a review had been requested. They may decide to uphold, vary or revoke the direct deduction order. This decision will be based on an assessment of the material held and any relevant new information provided by the liable person.

To reassure the Committee, as the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, anticipated, if the liable person disagrees with their decision, there are further appeal rights through the First-tier Tribunal. We specified the First-tier Tribunal for ease of access; no costs are awarded, and there is quick access to justice. We believe that that is a responsible option.

We believe that the amendments are duplicative, as there is already the right to independent review built into the legislation. Also, the proposals outlined in the Bill would not require the extra costs or resources that the application of these amendments would. I highlight Clause 64, which already creates the role of an independent person, who will have the responsibility of reviewing how the PSFA are using the powers and whether this is being done correctly, ensuring another layer of independence and safeguard.

On some of the specific questions, Clause 35 outlines the appeal process. The liable person can make representations before the DDO and then make appeals to vary the terms throughout engagement.

The noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, asked why the liable person cannot challenge the amount owed in the internal review. That was not quite his question, but this is the answer I have. All reviewing appeal options will clearly be signposted to the liable person throughout our interactions with them; the liable person will already have had opportunities to challenge the amount owed, either as a result of fraud, error or the application of a penalty, in the relevant court or tribunal proceedings. We believe that that provides more than ample opportunity to challenge.

While we want to let people present their positions, we also do not want them to be allowed to excessively frustrate the recovery process and cause unwanted delay in the return of vital funds.

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[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

Maybe I should just clarify. I am not suggesting that the Cabinet Office is full of malign people out to behave badly, and I was not suggesting that they all need to be punished. I was more suggesting that the reason why it would be useful to have an independent review body was for exactly the reasons that fellow noble Lords have pointed out—that if people wish to challenge decisions that are made, it is very important they feel they can go to a body where they will not necessarily be working directly with the people who made the original decision, as has been described. No one is suggesting that there is an evil, scheming group there.

The comparison with the Horizon scandal that I was trying to make was about the sense of intimidation and fear when someone feels that they have been wrongly treated, then when they appeal or try and go to a body to sort it out and it ends up being the same people who punished them in the first place. Maybe I misspoke before, but it is this that I am concerned about—so I would like this independent review body to exist so that those who are liable have somewhere independent to appeal to, straightforwardly.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, in response to the noble Baroness, I state that there is the First-tier Tribunal opportunity, in terms of there being an independent process to go to. That is why we have put in place the additional safeguards with regard to the independent person who will be appointed to review all cases at their discretion, not at that of the Cabinet Office, as well as HMICFRS—so there is someone who has oversight. That is also why we are making ourselves subject to the IOPC for matters of complaints, as outlined in the Bill.

The noble Baroness raises a very important point about Horizon. I assure noble Lords that the Horizon scandal and how we ensure that it is not repeated has been central to this Government’s thinking on safeguarding. In light of the seriousness of events, the Government wish to proactively ensure the highest levels of oversight in new legislation, and that is why they exist in this Bill.

With regard to one of the points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, on the appointment of the independent person subject to a parliamentary pre-appointment hearing, the Government cannot commit to this at this stage. Cabinet Office guidance states that it should be discussed between the relevant Secretary of State and the chair of the relevant Select Committee. The Government want to make sure that the independent person is demonstrably independent and are exploring all available routes to achieve that. I hope that we will be able to discuss that further in due course, but with these explanations I hope that I have reassured noble Lords and that therefore they will not press their amendments.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

I just wanted a bit more clarity in terms of the Child Maintenance Service, which she alluded to. My understanding is that, if there is a problem with cases looked at by the CMS, they go up to a different level to ICE—the independent case examiner—and complaints are reviewed.

I am a little bit confused as to exactly what the Minister’s argument was. Backing up the argument from my noble friend Lady Finn, we are strongly looking for independence in the public sector. I was not quite sure whether the Minister was saying that it was okay because rather like the Child Maintenance Service there is an independence or if it is something else?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I apologise if I was not clear. My point was that internal reviews are already a normal process within government. HMRC, the DWP and the Child Maintenance Service already adopt them.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

I thank noble Lords and thank the Minister for her response. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, may feel that this is consensual camaraderie. However, I can assure her that, while I am very grateful to the Ministers on the Bench opposite for their constructive engagement, I do not think there was very much consensual in what I said in my Second Reading speech on the powers of the Cabinet Office and various other parts of the Bill. I really did emphasise that I was very concerned about junior civil servants being granted sweeping powers, with the reviews and redress being carried out merely by a higher-grade official—the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, made that point—within the same department and not by an external body. The concern has always been that the Cabinet Office is appointed as investigator, juror, judge and debt collector. The individual affected has limited power to challenge the decisions, and then only after the damage has been done. I have been very clear, I hope, on those concerns and will be clear as we carry on going through the Bill.

This debate has laid bare a crucial flaw at the heart of the Bill, one which speaks not just of good process but to the principle of fairness, accountability and trust in government. We cannot expect the public to accept that legitimate and fair review decisions as impactful as a direct deduction order can be undertaken by the same department that made the order the first place. Our amendments in this group offer a simple, reasonable and principled solution that, when a request for a review is made, that review must be carried out by an independent person or body.

I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, in this regard that we refer to an “independent person” but in Amendment 59 we refer to establishing a body to serve as an independent reviewer, so we are probing at the moment on how that might be set up, rather than being specific. The point is the independence of the body or the person. This should not be a colleague or a coworker and not someone in the same chain of command. No system of justice can command public confidence if it allows a single team to be judge and jury in its own cause.

Let us be clear. We are not seeking to tie the Government’s hands or strip departments of their operational roles; we are proposing a balanced and proportionate framework that keeps Ministers accountable to Parliament but ensures that the initial decision is subject to meaningful independent scrutiny. That is a safeguard for the individual and for the integrity of the system itself. This matters because the consequences of these powers will be real—they are sweeping powers, as I have repeatedly said—and immediate for the people affected. If those people are to have any confidence in the fairness of the system, they must know that their right to request a review is not simply a paper exercise. It is not good enough to say that this will be a small team and the risks are manageable. In fact, the small size of the PSFA makes the case for independence even stronger. Close colleagues reviewing each other’s decisions behind closed doors is a recipe not for fairness but for suspicion and mistrust.

Our amendments, particularly Amendment 56, place a simple duty on the Minister to appoint an independent person or body when a review is requested. Amendments 57 and 58 ensure that that person can reach a clear conclusion to uphold, vary or revoke the order and that the applicant is told what the decision is. Amendment 59 provides a model for how such a reviewer might be appointed, with proper parliamentary scrutiny.

If we truly believe in the legitimacy of these powers, we must also believe in the legitimacy of the mechanisms that hold them to account. A fair and independent review process is a necessity. This is not just a procedural issue; it is a test of whether this Government are serious about wielding these powers with proportionality, care and respect for the people over whom they are exercised. The public will not trust a system that allows the Cabinet Office to mark its own homework, and nor should they.

These amendments provide a path forward—a way to deliver a fraud prevention system that is strong but just, decisive but accountable, and both effective and legitimate. I urge the Minister to accept this principle of independence and to adopt these proposals or some version of them as important measures which would improve the system of review that the Government have presented. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw.

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Moved by

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent]

60: Clause 35, page 21, line 3, leave out from “person” to end of line 5 and insert “may not bring an appeal under subsection (1) after the end of—
(a) the period of 28 days beginning with the day after the day on which the person was notified of the outcome of the review, or(b) such longer period (if any) as the Tribunal considers reasonable in all the circumstances.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment means that the tribunal can extend the time limit for bringing an appeal in relation to a direct deduction order of the Minister for the Cabinet Office.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th June 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger of Leckie, raise important considerations about procedural fairness and transparency in the implementation of the Bill. Amendment 60A, which would allow applicants to request a review into the existence or value of the payable amount, would provide a valuable safeguard, ensuring that individuals have an accessible means to challenge decisions where there might be uncertainty or dispute. This aligns well with the principle of natural justice and could help prevent errors going uncorrected.

Amendments 61A and 61B focus on the mechanisms surrounding direct deduction orders, emphasising the need for accountability and parliamentary oversight. Requiring an impact assessment to accompany any changes to the processing of these orders, as proposed in Amendment 61A, would encourage transparency about the potential costs and effects on banks’ operational capacity. Similarly, Amendment 61B’s provision that consultation outcomes must be laid before Parliament prior to implementation would ensure democratic scrutiny. Together, these amendments would contribute to a more open and considered approach, balancing the efficient recovery of public funds with the need for oversight and due process, and I support them.

[Baroness in Waiting/Government Whip (Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent) (Lab)]

My Lords, this has been a helpful and constructive debate. I shall just clarify some points that have been made and respond directly to some of the questions. I think I can answer them all; if not, I will reflect on Hansard.

Amendment 60A would enable the liable person to appeal against the existence and value of what they owe as a result of fraud or error as part of the appeal process for direct deduction orders. I remind noble Lords that direct deduction orders are used only if a liable person has opted not to come to the table and negotiate. This is not the first way in which we would have engaged; it is at the end of a process.

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Moved by

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent]

61: After Clause 36, insert the following new Clause—
“Deputies(1) This section applies where a person (a “deputy”) acts on behalf of an account holder (including a liable person) in relation to their account by virtue of—(a) a power of attorney, or(b) an appointment by, or an order of, a court.(2) The following provisions apply in relation to the deputy of the account holder as they apply in relation to the account holder—(a) section 17(7);(b) section 19(5)(b) and (c);(c) section 19(9);(d) section 19(9A);(e) section 21;(f) section 26(1);(g) section 28;(h) section 29(3), (6) and (8)(b);(i) section 30(3);(j) section 31(3);(k) section 32(2);(l) section 34;(m) section 35.(3) Section 29(7)(a) and (b) applies in relation to the deputy of the account holder instead of the account holder.”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause, together with my amendment to clause 27, page 17, line 12, ensures that the provisions about direct deduction orders in Part 1 of the Bill operate effectively where a person acts on behalf of an account holder by virtue of a power of attorney or an appointment by, or an order of, a court.

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[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I wanted to reiterate my particular support of Amendments 62A and 62B, even though they do not go as far as my amendment in relation to suspended orders. The sense of a sword of Damocles hanging over people is something that we could do with getting rid of. That would be an easy thing for the Government to accept without in any way compromising the aims of the Bill.

In relation to the other amendments, which I broadly support, I want to emphasise something that I keep thinking as I read the Bill and sit through Committee. Many aspects of the legislation can create an atmosphere of fear, uncertainty and sometimes even paranoia about what is going on if there is a sense of secrecy. This could be alleviated with the opening up of human communication to explain reasoning. These are difficult situations. We are talking, in some instances, about people who have committed wrongdoing of some sort, but it is important that liable persons have a sense of understanding the process. Very often, the way that the process gets stuck behind closed doors has created all sorts of problems in parallel situations.

I want to emphasise how, if things are left to internal processes, it can reduce them to hollow box-ticking. Civil servants or whoever knowing that they can be answerable will ensure that better work is carried out. It will also help to smooth the way for people to take this Bill seriously and not see it as some grand state surveillance conspiracy. It is important, in order to give credibility to the fraud recovery at the heart of the Bill, that the Government are seen to be as flexible as possible about all parties being held to account for what would otherwise be seen as some quite draconian powers.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, all these amendments pertain to deduction from earnings orders—or DEOs, as I shall refer to them from here. DEOs are a mechanism by which the PSFA can instruct an employer to make deductions from the liable person’s salary in order to recover the money owed as a result of fraud or error. This power can be exercised only after the amount owed has been agreed by the liable person, a court or tribunal, or if the penalty appeal period has lapsed or an appeal has been finally determined. People can avoid their employers being contacted if they simply engage with us and pay what they owe.

DEOs are an established mechanism used by the courts, the DWP, the Child Maintenance Service and some local authorities. We have sought to emulate best practice and established processes to make it straightforward for the employers that have to implement them. There are safeguards for the liable person, such as a protected earnings amount of 60% and the requirement for deductions to be affordable and fair, as set out in Clause 41.

Before an order is made, the liable person will have the opportunity to make representation on the proposed terms. Amendment 61C would create an obligation for the PSFA to provide the reasoning behind its decision to proceed with a DEO following these representations. Amendment 61D would create a similar obligation for the PSFA to demonstrate that it has taken the liable person’s wider circumstances into account when determining the level of affordable and fair deductions. Both these amendments are duplicative as the PSFA would be doing this anyway, as a matter of good public law. As I outlined previously, guidance will also be published detailing what information will be supplied to the liable person as part of the wider decision-making processes.

Amendment 61E would limit the regulation-making powers in Clause 41(7) to establishing affordability considerations. We have striven to put as much detail into the Bill as possible, but there are elements where it is valuable to have a degree of flexibility so that further conditions or restrictions can be added to the measures to reflect wider societal, economic and technological changes. This amendment would severely limit the Government’s ability to adapt to these changes and impact the efficacy of this recovery method, thus potentially reducing the money lost to fraud that could be recovered in the future.

Amendment 61F would require that the PSFA consults with employers on the level of admin costs that they can charge the liable person for implementing a DEO. There are standard charges of £1 per deduction period allowed by the courts and other organisations that use DEOs. It is not for the PSFA to set up a different regime single-handedly, as it will be following established processes already used across government. If it is felt that changes to this charge should be made, they would need to be done in conjunction with the other bodies.

Amendments 62A and 62B would prevent a suspended DEO from being restarted after 24 months. We discussed the same matter on Monday, in relation to direct deduction orders. I confirm that I am still reflecting on the points raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox and Lady Finn, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, which also apply to DEOs, and I am having meetings with officials on them. It is important that the PSFA has discretion in how it can react to individual circumstances counterbalanced against its duty to recover money lost to fraud and error in the most appropriate way. There is a balance to be struck and I shall report back on my reflections in due course.

Finally, Amendment 62C would require that, when the PSFA revokes a DEO, it provides the reasoning to both the liable person and their employer. In practice, this would be shared with the liable person as a matter of good public law to safeguard the public law duty of fairness in decision-making for the individuals subject to the orders. However, there are serious privacy considerations that could be undermined by providing such information to the employer. Upon the establishment of a DEO, the employer is not told anything about the DEO other than what is to be deducted from the liable person’s salary. This is the only information of relevance to the employer. Any other information would be a breach of privacy.

Regarding some of the other points raised, particularly by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, I think it would be helpful to your Lordships if I assist them with some more information on safeguards. Regarding the safeguards in place for the use of DEOs, including preventing hardship, the Public Sector Fraud Authority has committed to the following safeguards: vulnerability assessments, maximum deduction amounts, opportunities for representation, reviews and appeals, and the ability to notify a change of circumstances. The PSFA will continue to utilise best practice from across government.

On the question of who determines the amount of debt owed, the Public Sector Fraud Authority’s investigation will calculate the debt owed to the Government as a result of fraud or error following an investigation into suspected fraud. The liable person will be notified of the recoverable amount. If they do not agree, a firm and final determination will be sought by a court or tribunal.

The noble Baroness, Lady Finn, asked what is meant by “among other things” in Clause 41. Clause 41(6) gives the Minister powers to

“make further provision about the calculation of amounts to be deducted”

in respect of DEOs. To be clear, to make further provision would not allow the Minister to qualify or change the provision, only to add specific conditions or restrictions that can be taken into account when calculating the amount to be deducted. As given as an example in Clause 41(7), the key consideration will be hardship and defining what constitutes hardship. It is important that the definition of hardship is not fixed, as what constitutes hardship today may look very different in, say, 10 years’ time.

The term “among other things” could also include other items that can be taken into account when calculating DEOs that are not so immediately obvious. For example, the regulations could be used in allowing for a different deduction rate around the Christmas period, when the liable person might have other outgoings that would not be reasonably foreseeable when the order was first given.

I hope that goes some way to assuring noble Lords about our safeguards and that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I listened to the Minister, and I listened to her the other day on the same subjects regarding DDOs. A question occurs. In many cases, the amount owed is set by the court. Why, then, does the court not decide how that amount should be repaid? Why do we have to go through all these processes and decisions by the departments rather than the court?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

The noble Lord makes a very interesting point, on which I will have to reflect and come back to him, if that is okay.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

I thank the Minister and look forward to her reflections. In closing, I return to the core principle running through each of the amendments in this group: public confidence in enforcement powers depends not just on the ability to cover funds but on the manner in which those powers are exercised. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, was also emphatic in this regard.

Whether they concern ensuring that decisions are properly communicated, that personal circumstances are demonstrably considered, that employers are consulted on the burdens placed on them or that enforcement is time-bound and proportionate, our amendments seek to build a framework that is seen as being as fair and accountable as it is effective.

We have not sought to unpick the intent of the Bill or to weaken the Government’s ability to recover what is owed. But we have sought to refine it responsibly and constructively, so that those affected by its provisions are treated with clarity, respect and procedural justice. We have argued, with these amendments, that decisions should be explained in writing, circumstances must be considered and shown to be considered, and powers must be bounded by purpose, not open-ended phrasing. I take the Minister’s points on “among other things”, but it is a rather clumsy way to write legislation. The fact that she introduced “among other things” and gave some examples shows that this should be more tightly drawn.

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[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 63A addresses the important issue of those who facilitate fraud by providing information, advice or support. It proposes that such individuals could be subject to penalties. I believe that this measure helps to close potential loopholes and hold accountable not only primary offenders but those who enable wrongdoing. From an individual’s perspective, this could strengthen the integrity of the system and act as a deterrent against abuse.

Amendment 63B seeks to prevent the Minister from unilaterally determining penalties for persons who have not received a payment, which is crucial to protecting individuals from unfair or arbitrary penalties that could cause undue financial or reputational harm.

Amendments 63D and 64A focus on transparency, accountability and procedural fairness—elements that directly affect the experiences of those subject to the Bill. Providing written reasons for decisions following a review, set out in Amendment 63D, would ensure that individuals fully understand the outcomes and the rationale behind them, enabling them to respond appropriately, or seek further recourse if necessary. Amendment 64A would remove the Minister’s sole authority to change the appeals process and would instead require independent review—we have discussed in previous sittings what “review” and “independent” mean—and parliamentary oversight. It would introduce vital protections for individuals and guarantee that any changes to how appeals are handled are thoroughly scrutinised, preserving fairness and maintaining public confidence in the system’s impartiality. On that basis, I support these amendments.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, these amendments all pertain to the scope, application and oversight of the civil penalties measures. The measures have been designed using established cross-government best practice so that the PSFA may effectively deter and recuperate money lost to fraud and include numerous safeguards for individuals and businesses.

I find myself in the unique position, so far in this Committee, of agreeing with the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, although maybe not for the reasons that she set out, on Amendment 63A, which would unnecessarily extend the legislation by adding a definition of “help” to Clause 50. The Fraud Act 2006 establishes the fraud offence, which includes an individual making

“a gain for himself or another”.

The Fraud Act does not define “help” in terms of making a gain for another. This is because the Act focuses on the “dishonest intent” of a fraudulent act. Under Clause 70(1)(c), the offence at common law of conspiracy to defraud is already punishable under the Bill. Clause 70(1)(b) includes and covers Sections 6 and 7 Fraud Act offences. This allows for penalties to be issued against the fraud “influencers” we have already discussed during the Bill’s passage. The offence at common law of conspiracy to defraud is also already included in our definition of fraud. It is therefore unnecessary to define “help” in order to use either the Fraud Act or this Bill, although I was very tempted to quote Beatles lyrics—that may just be the time of day.

Amendment 63B would amend Clause 52 by replacing the Minister with the First-tier Tribunal in cases where a fraudster attempts to take public money but is stopped before they receive the payment. There is existing precedent for not using the First-tier Tribunal as the first-instance decision-maker: for example, in the Home Office for the employment of illegal workers. The legislation also includes the right to appeal a decision to the appropriate court following the receipt of a final penalty notice—I will come on to that.

Amendment 63C seeks to broaden the requirement of Clause 58(4) beyond Clause 58(2)(c) so that it may apply to Clause 58(2)(a) and Clause 58(2)(b). This is unnecessary, as Clause 58(3) already requires the Minister to give notice to an individual if the penalty is upheld. While I recognise its intent, it is unnecessary to include Amendment 63D in the Bill. While there is no obligation under common law to provide an explanation for a positive decision—that is, to amend or cancel the penalty—authorised officers will do so as part of the review process. They will also provide an explanation for a decision to amend or cancel the penalty as part of the review process. The civil penalties code of practice and further guidance will support authorised officers.

Amendment 64A would add additional unnecessary complications to the legislation. It is the intent of the legislation not that regulations may be made to reduce or abolish the appeals provisions for penalty notices but that any further regulations may improve, streamline or make the appeal process more efficient. For example, appeals for civil penalties may be heard at the same time as appeals against debt recovery notices.

I turn to the specific points raised by noble Lords. In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, I remind the Committee that the tribunal appeal is already in the process at a later stage, that of determining the penalty. Bringing the tribunal in earlier would add time and burden. I think that I have covered the other points in my speech, and the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, will remind me if I have not—she may be about to—but I hope that my explanations reassure noble Lords and that the noble Baroness will therefore withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

I thank the Minister for giving answers to most of my questions, even if they were not entirely to our satisfaction. In closing, I return to the central purpose of this group of amendments: to ensure that the enforcement powers granted under this part of the Bill are clear in scope, fair in operation and subject to meaningful oversight.

Before I continue on to the other amendments, I will address the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. The Minister states that the existing law is sufficient, but there is quite a lot of evidence, and anecdotal evidence, that sickfluencers, as they are called—sick influencers—are active and busy. How many people have ever been pulled up or—

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

This is a point where I should say that there are two parts of the Bill. I am sure that, as Committee progresses, we will discuss sickfluencers. This part of the Bill is making sure that the PSFA has the powers to deal with similar online influencers—I do not think we can call them sickfluencers in relation to fraud—who are leading the charge. Obviously, the PSFA is seeking new powers and we hope to be able to use them. Therefore, I cannot provide the noble Baroness with the data for what prosecutions may or may not have been made up until this point. But we hope that, with new powers for the PSFA, that will be part of the work going forward.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness. When we were seeking to introduce this definition of “help”—I take on board the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox—we were trying to presage the fact that this would come up in a later part of the Bill. I deliberately, in my opening remarks, did not reference sickfluencers, but the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, obviously understood where I was going with that. I am just not convinced about how effective the law currently is in this area.

Our other amendments respond directly to the challenges posed by modern forms of fraud and the expanding reach of administrative enforcement. Whether we are seeking to define what it means to help commit fraud in an online age, requiring that penalties based on hypothetical harm are assessed by an independent tribunal or ensuring that decisions and processes are explained clearly to those affected, these are not procedural niceties; they are essential guarantees of accountability and trust. We cannot afford to leave grey areas for those who seek to exploit the system from the sidelines and we also cannot allow the exercise of significant powers, particularly those that impact people’s livelihoods, to proceed without checks, explanation or independent scrutiny.

This group of amendments does not frustrate the aims of the Bill; it strengthens the Bill. It ensures that public funds can be protected in a way that is not only effective but proportionate, just and transparent. We are asking for three simple things: definitions that are clear so that enforcement can be targeted where it is needed most; penalties subject to oversight, particularly when no actual loss is concerned; and decisions and appeals processes that are robust, explainable and open to democratic scrutiny. These are reasonable, moderate and constructive proposals. They do not undermine the Bill’s purpose; they help it to stand on firmer constitutional and ethical ground. I urge the Minister and all noble Lords to consider them seriously and to support a set of changes that would not only improve this legislation but help to secure public confidence in the integrity of its application. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, while I recognise the concerns that underpin this amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, it is both unnecessary and potentially duplicative, given the extensive scrutiny already taking place through existing and robust channels, as my noble friend Lady Coffey made clear. First and foremost, we must acknowledge that a comprehensive public inquiry is under way into the Government’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic. That inquiry, established under the Inquiries Act 2005 and chaired independently, has broad terms of reference, including examination of procurement processes, ministerial decision-making and the use of public funds. The amendment risks pre-empting, duplicating or even undermining that process by imposing a parallel and more narrowly framed exercise before the formal inquiry has concluded its work.

Let us be clear: the Covid-19 pandemic presented an unprecedented national emergency. Ministers, civil servants and public bodies were called on to make swift, high-stakes decisions in the face of an unfolding crisis. They did so with little warning, under extraordinary pressure and with the primary objective of protecting lives and livelihoods. In that context, decisions were taken at pace to ensure that vital supplies were sourced, support was distributed rapidly, and services could continue to operate. Was the system perfect? No—but to assume that those who contributed to the effort to tackle Covid were doing so for malign reasons is inaccurate. However, that is not to say that we should not seek to recover money where errors were made, and it is of course right that we take steps to realise this outcome, which has been the guiding principle of all our engagements with the Bill: public money should be recovered.

We should therefore make full use of the mechanisms that already exist to assess and recover losses. The National Audit Office, the Public Accounts Committee and internal departmental review bodies have all examined pandemic-related spending and made a series of recommendations, many of which are already being implemented. Indeed, the Public Sector Fraud Authority continues to track and pursue recoveries on this matter. To impose an additional reporting requirement through the Bill, especially one that compels Ministers to publicly acknowledge failings before the full picture is known, would not serve the cause of accountability; rather, it risks creating a politicised and partial process, which may generate more heat than light and overlap confusingly with the broader inquiry now under way.

Let us not lose sight of the bigger picture. The Bill is about strengthening the framework to combat public sector fraud going forward; it is not the right vehicle for relitigating decisions taken in the darkest days of a national emergency. The public inquiry will give us the full breadth and depth of insight that is needed, with the benefit of time, evidence and impartial examination. In the meantime, let us not cast unfair aspersions on public servants and Ministers who, in the face of enormous uncertainty and unimaginable pressure, acted on the whole with integrity, urgency and a profound sense of duty.

I urge noble Lords to recognise that the proper process is already in place and that we must allow it to do its job without prejudging its conclusions. For these reasons, I respectfully oppose the amendment.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I find myself agreeing with the sentiment behind the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. The Government are committed to investigating and combating cases of fraud and error in Covid-19 spending. If I touch on some of the things that the Government are already doing, perhaps he will be reassured that we are already taking this seriously.

The Bill will give the Public Sector Fraud Authority powers to conduct investigations, levy civil penalties and recover money. It also doubles the time limit for civil claims against Covid fraud from six to 12 years to ensure that we can continue to investigate. Although the proposed amendment to mandate a report on public sector fraud during the Covid-19 pandemic underscores the importance of accountability, it is unnecessary given the existing frameworks already in place. The question is whether appropriate reporting processes on Covid-19 spending have already been established—and I would argue that they have.

A dedicated Covid Counter-Fraud Commissioner has already been appointed to review losses of public money to fraud, error and underperforming contracts during the Covid-19 pandemic. Working collaboratively with departments and agencies such as the Public Sector Fraud Authority, His Majesty’s Treasury and the Department of Health and Social Care, the commissioner is focused on public funds lost to fraud, error and underperforming contracts during the Covid-19 pandemic.

The commissioner’s remit includes: assessing recovery efforts to date to determine where additional recoveries can be made and ensuring they are vigorously pursued; ensuring that maximum recovery efforts have been made and providing assurances on this to the public and Parliament; reviewing individual contracts to provide additional attention and reassurance on spending that is disputed; and, from this work, generating lessons and making recommendations for the future. By placing this responsibility with an expert dedicated commissioner who reports directly to the Chancellor and works in close co-ordination with key departments, the Government have ensured a clear and strategic approach to addressing pandemic-related fraud.

Given the breadth and focus of this work, introducing an additional ministerial reporting requirement would be duplicative and could divert resources away from ongoing recovery efforts. It risks creating unnecessary bureaucracy and delaying outcomes. We genuinely believe that the outcome the noble Lord seeks is already in place within government.

To touch on the debate, which was about the wider lessons to be learned from the Covid-19 pandemic, the Bill is specifically about fraud, but I am more than happy to meet the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, to discuss resilience in the round and the work that the Government are currently doing, as I believe a private meeting would be a more appropriate forum. I hope that that these assurances reassure the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, and that he therefore feels able to withdraw his amendment.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

Before the Minister sits down, let me say that Tom Hayhoe, is, I think, six months through his contract. Do the Government intend to extend it beyond the fixed one year, and when does the Minister anticipate that he might share reports—he may already do that with Ministers, but when they will be shared with Parliament?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, this is what I can say currently, but if there is additional clarification, I will come back to the noble Baroness. Mr Tom Hayhoe’s appointment is a fixed one-year appointment. He will be required to provide a report to Parliament, which will present lessons and recommendations for procurement in future during a time of national crisis, so he will be reporting on his efforts outside and within the Treasury.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I have a rearguard action on this amendment, because it seems strange to me—and it may seem strange to anybody among the public—that we can have a Bill called the Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill, but we do not recognise within that Bill one of the biggest efforts of fraud that occurred in this country during Covid-19. Those still rumble on—those billions of pounds. For a Bill called the Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill not to include those is a grave error.

There may be some crossover and duplication, but if there is, it does not matter, because it is in the Bill and the Government will not have to pursue things if they are being dealt with elsewhere. They may be dealt with elsewhere, but there has to be a backstop, and the backstop should be in this Bill. It will do no harm in future to have it in the Bill, even if other things may address the problems that occurred and could, sadly, occur again when another event takes place. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, these amendments are very close to my party’s heart. I warmly welcome Amendments 67 and 68, which would place an important emphasis on transparency and accountability by requiring the Minister to publish annual reports on the use of powers under Part 1 of the Bill, as well as on the estimated scale of fraud against public authorities. Too often, no one knows about the scale.

These measures represent a vital step forward in ensuring that Parliament and, by extension, the public, receives regular, detailed information about how these powers are exercised and the ongoing challenges faced in tackling fraud. Such openness is essential because it is openness that solves these problems, builds trust in the administration of public funds and allows for informed scrutiny and debate. From my party’s perspective, these amendments align closely with our long-standing commitment to open government and evidence-based policy-making. By mandating annual reporting, they would help to illuminate the practical impact of the Bill and provide the data that is necessary to assess whether these powers are effective, proportionate and fair. This ongoing oversight will be invaluable in refining approaches to fraud prevention and recovery and ensuring that public authorities are both empowered and held accountable.

I look forward to supporting these amendments as the Bill goes forward, as well as to continuing to work to strengthen transparency and public confidence in this important area.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, for raising the important issue of the annual reporting of the PSFA on both the use of the powers conferred on it in the Bill and the extent of fraud against public authorities.

Under Clause 64, an independent person will be appointed through the office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments as a regulated appointment to oversee the use of the powers that this Bill conveys on the PSFA. We will appoint someone with the right skills and demonstrable independence. The independent person will proactively review the PSFA’s investigative functions and use of powers, which will culminate in regular reports being produced on an at least annual basis for the Minister for the Cabinet Office.

I know that the noble Baroness cares about ministerial oversight and accountability. The powers granted to the Minister for the Cabinet Office will be delegated to trained authorised officers; I can assure her that there will continue to be strong and regular ministerial oversight of their safe and effective use. Once the Minister has reviewed the report, it must be laid before Parliament. Reports will both provide assurance on where powers are being used appropriately and challenge where improvements could be made, ensuring that civil servants are using the powers in this Bill as intended. They will provide assurance that suspected cases of fraud are being investigated in accordance with the legislation, codes of practice and guidance; and that that is being done effectively in the pursuit of the intentions of the Bill.

The findings or summary of any and all independent oversight, including the independent person’s report, will be published on an annual basis in the interests of transparency. External oversight bodies will also report on the use of powers by the PSFA following inspections. These reports will be made publicly available. With regard to annual reporting on the extent of public sector fraud, the PSFA oversees the counterfraud performance of ministerial departments and public bodies. It already publishes a report on the extent of fraud against public authorities: the Fraud Landscape Report. I hope that that reassures noble Lords.

I want to address one point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, on how the Government estimate the level of unknown fraud and error. The best available evidence suggests that the level of fraud and error in unexamined areas of government activity is between 0.5% and 5%. This is based on a Cabinet Office review of around 50 fraud and error estimates that includes every major department. Methods used across government to estimate the extent of fraud and error include statistical sampling, modelling and benchmarking. More detail can be found in the NAO report.

There are already provisions to review the use of powers the Bill conveys on PSFA and reporting relating to counterfraud activity across government. I hope that this explanation reassures noble Lords and that the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, will withdraw her amendment.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

The noble Baroness might expect one of us to intervene. I understand where she is coming from in terms of reports, because these amendments are basically focusing on the laying of reports. However, outside the Room I have asked in the past about the current level of fraud. The noble Baroness alluded to it, but perhaps she could confirm that at the moment, the estimated level of public sector fraud stands at £55 billion. I know that I have asked for this before but it would be very helpful to have a breakdown of how much public sector fraud there is when it comes to the DWP aspects of the Bill. I think I am asking about the same issues, but it would be extremely helpful to know where we stand right now as a base, in terms of the level and quantity of fraud, and any breakdowns.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I am more than happy to write to the noble Viscount.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her response. In closing this group, I return to the central theme that underpins Amendments 67 and 68: that transparency is not an optional extra in the fight against public sector fraud but an essential condition of legitimacy, accountability and effectiveness. We are granting significant powers under the Bill, powers to recover, to penalise and to compel, but the exercise of those powers must not exist in a vacuum. The public, and indeed Parliament, must be able to see how those powers are being used and whether they are making a real, measurable difference.

Amendment 67 would ensure that the use of these new powers is reported on annually. It would allow us to track how these tools are deployed, where they are having an impact and where further improvement or scrutiny may be required. It would give Parliament, committees and the public a vital feedback loop, not to micromanage but to hold the system to account and ensure that it continues to serve its intended purpose.

Amendment 68 would complement that by shining a light on the scale of the challenge itself. If we are to treat fraud with the seriousness it demands, we must start by being clear-eyed about the extent of the problem. I am sure that internal estimates are already being produced within government; this amendment simply asks that they be published regularly and in good faith, so that we can judge our progress, measure impact and direct resources more intelligently.

I take the point the Minister made about the estimates ranging from 0.5% to 5%, but I am sure she will agree that, given the enormous amounts of these figures, that that 0.5% to 5% is a rather wide range of figures of billions of pounds. Would she like to expand on that and give me what the actual amounts in 0.5% to 5% might be?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent]

It is suggested to me that the actual amount, as touched on by the noble Viscount, is at least £55 billion, but I will be writing to all members of the Committee who are present.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her answer. Is that the 5% or the 0.5%? Anyway—

These amendments would not add bureaucracy for bureaucracy’s sake. They would build confidence, encourage departmental responsibility and improve operational performance. They would not be constraints on ministerial power, but a scaffolding of legitimacy around its use. Crucially, they would reflect the truth that we have heard echoed throughout the passage of the Bill, that public trust is hard won and easily lost. If we are to strengthen that trust, we must show not only that we are serious about tackling fraud but that we are equally serious about demonstrating how we are doing so and being accountable for the results.

Once again, these are reasonable, proportionate and practical amendments, and I hope the Minister will reflect on them not as additional burdens but as meaningful opportunities to improve the transparency, responsiveness and long-term success of this legislation.

I emphasise that I am not being a total nuisance in pushing on the quality of data. It is not a new phenomenon; I spent many years in the Cabinet Office tearing my hair out about the quality of data. The one thing that I learned when I was working for the noble Lord, Lord Maude of Horsham, when he was the Minister in the Cabinet Office, was that the quality of the data improves by greater transparency. I just make that point; it is not a criticism of the Government, but a criticism of the data process within government.

In conclusion, I urge noble Lords across the Committee to support the principles in these amendments and, in so doing, to support the kind of open and accountable government that underpins any effective public policy. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I am also pleased to express support for Amendments 68A, 68B and 68C, which collectively strengthen ministerial and parliamentary oversight of the powers exercised under the Bill by authorised officers on behalf of members of the Cabinet Office, as other noble Lords have said. Ensuring that robust oversight mechanisms are in place is essential to maintaining public confidence in how these significant powers are deployed. By enhancing scrutiny, these amendments help to guarantee that such powers are used appropriately and proportionately, reducing the risk of misuse or error.

Amendment 68C, which requires investigators to hold professional qualifications comparable to those of officers in the Department for Work and Pensions Fraud Investigation Service is particularly welcome. They need professional qualifications. This commitment to professionalism and expertise safeguards the integrity of investigations and reinforces trust in the system. From our perspective, it is crucial that those entrusted with such important responsibilities are properly trained and qualified, ensuring fairness and consistency in enforcement. Together, these amendments produce a more transparent—we always come back to transparency—accountable and professional framework for combating fraud within public authorities.

Let it see the light and, when it does, there is a way of controlling it. Too often, whoever are in government think they know best and ask, “Why do we have to make ourselves open to scrutiny?” But it is that scrutiny, that existence of light from beyond, that makes the legislation fit for purpose. I support these amendments.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, all the amendments in this group relate to Clause 66, which defines an authorised officer. It would be a fair assessment of the position of the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, that she does not trust that, in her words, “junior civil servants to use these powers appropriately”. I will reassure her and the Committee that, first, it is not seniority that is key; it is professionalism and experience. The PSFA has already committed to training its authorised officers, who will utilise powers as set out in Clause 66, and authorised investigators, who will use the PACE powers in Clause 7, to predefined standards as set out by the government counterfraud profession investigator standard guidelines. This will align the PSFA with those using similar powers in other government departments such as HMRC and the DWP.

The team at the PSFA are serious people. Current members of the PSFA’s enforcement unit include former police officers and civil servants who have worked in investigatory roles across a number of government departments. They have experience of conducting counterfraud investigations and bring with them a wealth of relevant experience, skills and knowledge. I was tempted to get all their CVs to read out, but I thought that that may prolong Committee a little.

First, the powers in Clause 7 can be used only by authorised investigators specifically authorised to use the PACE powers and not authorised officers. The amendment requiring that those powers can be exercised only as provided in Clause 66 would render Clause 7 unusable.

Secondly, although the Minister will delegate the operation of these powers to authorised officers, the Minister will retain accountability and strong oversight. There will, of course, be strong ministerial interest in the effective, safe and value-for-money use of these powers. Noble Lords will know that I cannot speak for all future Ministers, but the current Minister meets individually with the chief executive of the PSFA very regularly.

Thirdly, the proposed delegation of powers in this Bill to authorise officers follows precedent elsewhere, including in HMRC and the DWP.

Fourthly, the amendment also calls for records of decision-making. In criminal investigations, the PSFA is already bound by legal obligations to record decisions and will do so through a dedicated case management system and the internal review process. The PSFA will have similar processes for civil cases.

Finally, the powers in the Bill are subject to review by an independent person as specified under Clause 64, and will be subject to inspections by His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services. Inspection reports will be publicly available and those by the independent person will be laid before Parliament.

I think it would be helpful if I gave some additional clarity on some issues raised by noble Lords. The Civil Service grade that an authorised officer would be required to hold has been a theme of some debate in your Lordships’ Committee, so I think some clarity will be helpful. The Bill does not stipulate a grade that an authorised officer needs to hold. The grade is less critical than the training they undertake. However, the PSFA anticipates that, in practice, all authorised officers will be of at least HEO grade. This is comparable to other organisations such as HMRC and the DWP. Clause 66 does, however, stipulate that a review must be conducted by an authorised officer at least one grade senior to the officer involved in the initial decision.

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[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I warmly welcome Amendment 68D, which proposes a comprehensive and rigorous approach to fraud risk management for public authorities overseeing significant spending schemes. The amendment reflects a proactive commitment to safeguarding public funds by requiring authorities managing more than £100 million annually to register their schemes, conduct thorough fraud risk assessments and use robust methods to measure and report fraud. Such measures are vital to identifying vulnerabilities early and taking meaningful action to prevent loss, which aligns closely with my party’s values of transparency—which I keep coming back to—and responsible stewardship of public money.

Moreover, the role assigned to the Public Sector Fraud Authority in verifying fraud rates, publishing comparisons and enforcing corrective actions would introduce a much-needed layer of independent oversight and accountability. The requirement for independent audit and parliamentary scrutiny would further strengthen this framework in ensuring that these responsibilities are not only carried out diligently but openly reported and reviewed. The amendment offers a significant opportunity to improve fraud prevention at scale, protect taxpayers and build public trust in how government spending is managed.

I fully support this proposed step forward. I relate this to my time on Barnet London Borough Council, when I chaired the audit committee. The idea that audit can make things work better and that scrutiny and bringing things into the open will form better department management as well as better control of finances was the premise of the world I lived in when I chaired the committee for eight years. I therefore support the amendment proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, tackling public sector fraud is a foremost priority for this Government. Amendment 68D raises interesting points. It seeks to put some of the work that the PSFA does with departments and public bodies to improve their management of fraud on a statutory basis, and to explicitly have it cover all government schemes or programmes over £100 million.

While we have been debating the fraud investigation activities of the Public Sector Fraud Authority, for which we believe there is a very strong case, we have understandably not given as much time to the wider responsibilities the PSFA already holds, as detailed in its published mandate—which is wonderful bedtime reading, as per my theme; I like to give bedtime reading on each day in Committee. This is not part of the Bill, but it might be useful for noble Lords if I spend a moment to update the Committee on the other work of the PSFA.

The PSFA works with departments to improve their understanding of fraud and to improve their action on the risk of fraud through a range of modern techniques. Fraud investigation is, of course, only one part of this. Alongside this, public bodies need effective capabilities to understand and reduce the risk of fraud, through tools such as fraud risk assessment and fraud measurement, which this proposed amendment covers, and also through intelligence, fraud prevention, deterrence, process design, the use of data and analytics, fraud detection and the shaping of an organisation’s culture.

I would like to set out some key principles around how the Government approach fraud risk. Accounting officers within departments are responsible for managing public sector organisations’ risks, including fraud. Each organisation faces a range of fraud risks specific to its business, from internal and external sources. Managing Public Money—also a fascinating read—already sets out that, for any new major area of spend with high fraud risk, departments shall assess the risk of and impact from fraud at the outset. This identifies the potential for fraud and the different impacts that fraud could have for the spend area.

In high-risk areas, once spending is approved, this results in the development and continued maintenance of a detailed fraud risk assessment. High-risk areas would be the highest areas of government spending where fraud measurements are not yet in place and which have been identified as high risk by a mandatory initial fraud risk assessment process. The PSFA was introduced with a published mandate that openly sets out how it will work with departments and public bodies and what is expected of all parties. Government departments and public bodies must comply with this mandate. The mandate sets out that public bodies must use initial fraud impact assessments, in line with Managing Public Money, submit quarterly data returns on the levels of fraud and error they find and report on their progress against their action plans and key metrics.

Departments and public bodies are also required to ensure that they adhere to the counterfraud functional standard. This is independently assured by the Public Sector Fraud Authority on a rolling basis. The functional standard outlines the expectations for managing counterfraud, bribery and corruption activity. It clarifies the basics that public bodies should have in place, promoting efficient, coherent and consistent management across the public sector. The PSFA’s published mandate enables it to conduct expert reviews on public bodies’ fraud work. To date, the PSFA has reviewed 31 public bodies against the counterfraud functional standard. The PSFA’s mandate also requires it to publish a report on fraud across government annually. This includes the levels of detected fraud and corruption and associated error in departments and public bodies—excluding tax and welfare, as these are published elsewhere. Fraud measurement exercises are used as a tool to understand fraud risk in the highest areas of loss.

The Government have also created a high fraud risk portfolio, in line with the PSFA’s mandate, that details the highest risk areas of government spending where there are not yet fraud measurements in place. The Government decided that schemes on this portfolio should undertake fraud measurement exercises and report these to the centre. This is currently being tested with the current schemes on the portfolio, where it is operating on a “comply or explain” model, enabling us to assess the burden and impact of this approach. The PSFA will continue encouraging and supporting departments to do more targeted measurement. Just last year, the government counterfraud profession launched its first qualification for fraud measurement practitioners.

The amendment also recommends that all the findings are reported to the National Audit Office, in the form of the Comptroller and Auditor General. The PSFA’s mandate already enables the PSFA and the NAO to work very closely to share information on public body performance in dealing with fraud:

“The PSFA will openly and regularly update on its activities and the data it holds to the National Audit Office (NAO). This will include performance data and the compliance with mandatory processes and data requests”.


In addition, this is an area that the Public Accounts Committee has paid keen attention to, and the PSFA has committed to share the high fraud risk portfolio with the committee on reading-room terms.

I hope that the collective measures I have outlined reassure noble Lords that the Amendment 68D would serve only to replicate responsibilities and duties that already exist and that the noble Baroness will therefore withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, as we close the debate on this amendment, let us return to first principles. Public money must be protected, not just recovered after it is lost. That protection starts not with more powers but with stronger systems—systems that encourage responsibility, enable scrutiny and reward transparency.

Amendment 68D would be a practical, proportionate step towards that goal. It sets out a clear set of duties for public authorities that manage major spending schemes—duties that mirror the kind of basic risk management we would expect from any serious organisation handling significant funds. It is not, as I have emphasised, about adding layers of bureaucracy but about lifting the standard of governance across government. It is about saying to departments and public authorities, “If you are entrusted with large sums of public money, you must also be prepared to demonstrate how you protect that money from fraud, and you must do so in a way that is transparent, measurable and independently verifiable”.

This amendment is not just good policy; it is good practice. It would ensure that those with front-line responsibility for major schemes understand and own their risk landscape. It would support the PSFA by creating a consistent baseline of risk information and freeing up its capacity to focus on oversight and intervention, rather than firefighting. It would give Parliament and the public a clear view of where fraud controls are working and where they are not.

The red/amber/green system offers not just transparency but motivation. It highlights good performance, surfaces areas of concern and gives departments an incentive to improve. That is how you change behaviour: not by wishful thinking or ministerial Statements but by law. If a department reports low fraud rates and the authority finds something very different, it must act. It must issue a notice, demand an action plan and ensure that changes are made. If no action is taken, the Comptroller and Auditor-General can audit compliance and report to Parliament. That is what proper fraud prevention looks like. It does not wait for the scandal; it creates a system that sees the risk before the damage is done.

Amendment 68D is not an optional refinement; it is the core of the Bill’s purpose restored. Without it, we will once again be left with false confidence, unreliable data and billions lost in plain sight. In short, this amendment is a road map for better practice—one that I believe both Parliament and the Government should support. I beg leave to withdraw.

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[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I am pleased to support these amendments, which, once again, seek to enhance the independence, transparency and accountability of the Public Sector Fraud Authority. By probing the Government’s openness to specifying that both the chair and the non-executive members of the authority should be independent—whatever that means—Amendments 68E and 68F reinforce my party’s commitment to ensuring that public bodies operate free from undue political influence. Independence at these levels is crucial for maintaining public trust and guaranteeing impartial oversight of fraud prevention and recovery efforts.

Furthermore, Amendments 69A and 71A, which seek to clarify and limit ministerial powers around appointments and eligibility criteria, would strengthen the governance framework of the authority, promoting fairness and transparency in its leadership. The requirements in Amendments 74A and 74B for timely publication of annual reports and controls on authorising authentication would help to ensure openness and proper organisational integrity.

Finally, Amendments 74C and 74D would confirm that the Minister retains responsibility for functions even when extended to the authority, which would balance operational independence with necessary political accountability. Collectively, these amendments embody my party’s values of good governance and robust oversight, which are essential to protecting public funds and enhancing the effectiveness of fraud prevention. I heartily support these amendments as part of the transparency to which we are committed.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for raising the important issues of independence, recruitment, reporting and powers should the PSFA become a statutory body. The purpose of creating a statutory body is to place individual enforcement decisions at arm’s length from Ministers, but we have been clear that, while the PSFA enforcement unit is small, creating a new statutory body is not proportionate, so the Government will not commence Schedule 2 in the immediate future.

The approach in Schedule 2 adheres to published guidance in the Public Bodies Handbook. It follows the same approach used elsewhere, such as Schedule 1 to the Victims and Prisoners Act, which established the Infected Blood Compensation Authority. Amendments 68E and 68F seek to insert “independent” before the description of the chair and non-executive directors. These are ministerial appointments, but I remind your Lordships that the Government have been clear that, should the PSFA be established as a statutory body, its enforcement decisions would be fully independent of the Minister. To ensure this, the chair and non-executives will be public appointments and will follow the Cabinet Office Governance Code on Public Appointments, which is overseen by the Commissioner for Public Appointments. This will ensure that their recruitment is transparent and includes an independent member on the recruitment panel. This is similar in approach to the Infected Blood Compensation Authority, which uses the same legislative language. Amendment 69B seeks to insert words to a similar effect in respect of the chair appointing the chief executive and executive board members, so it is linked to these amendments.

In respect of Amendments 71A and 74B, which seek to remove the Minister’s power to make regulations on the eligibility rules for members of the PSFA and to prevent the PSFA from authorising a person who is not a board member of the authority authenticating its seal, it is important to note these are common provisions in the creation of public bodies. The seal is the means by which the PSFA will be able to enter into deeds and contracts, such as leasing property, and authenticating the seal just means signing next to it to show that the deed has been approved. Although authentication would usually be done by a board member of the PSFA, we have built in a degree of flexibility so that it can be delegated, for instance to its legal officers, should the need arise. As noted, the Infected Blood Compensation Authority and other public bodies such as the independent monitoring authority, established in the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, have similar provisions. They serve to improve the efficacy and administrative efficiency of such public bodies.

As to Amendments 74C and 74D, which would see the Minister retain responsibility for the exercise of functions in the Act after they have been extended to the PSFA, and Amendment 69A, which would make the chief executive and other executive members’ ministerial appointments, I refer your Lordships to my earlier point. One essential reason in setting up the PSFA as a statutory body would be to remove any perception of potential political interference. These amendments would be counter to that policy intention.

Finally, Amendment 74A would require the PSFA to publish its annual report within three months of the end of the financial year. The Bill currently stipulates, in paragraph 12 of Schedule 2, that this should be as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of each financial year. That is for good reason. The accounts will need to be reviewed by the Comptroller and Auditor-General, whom we would then need to commit to this timeline. Additionally, Erskine May, our own guidance on reporting, notes that accounts, together with an NAO report, must be laid no later than the following January. A statutory PSFA would follow Erskine May, as well as His Majesty’s Treasury’s guidance on Managing Public Money and the annual Government Financial Reporting Manual, to ensure that its report follows best practice.

I turn to the specifics of the points that have been touched on. The noble Baroness, Lady Finn, asked why eligibility regulations under paragraph 6(1) of Section 2 are useful. The ability for a Minister to lay eligibility regulations in respect of a board’s membership is a common feature in setting up public bodies. They can be used, for example, to safeguard independence, ensure expertise at its inception, or improve public trust by excluding certain individuals or demanding certain attributes. Examples might include barriers against those who are currently politically active, or have conflicts of interest or criminal convictions.

With regard to powers being exercised on a Minister’s behalf and safeguarding, there are numerous safeguards built into the Bill, such as independent oversight of all the provisions by external bodies. There are also obligations to obtain the permission of the courts for debt recovery and rights of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal. Furthermore, authorised officers will be civil servants, obliged to follow the Civil Service Code, which requires that they act solely according to the merits of the case.

In response to my noble friend Lord Davies, I am more than happy, especially given the circumstances with our noble friend Lord Sikka, to write to him with all the points of the speech I would have responded with, and I am happy to share that with all Members of the Committee—that pertains to group 9.

I take the opportunity to reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. Will any roles be outsourced? No—we are clear that they have to be authorised officers as defined in Clause 66: they have to be civil servants.

I hope that, with those reassurances, noble Lords will not press their amendments and we can move forward to the next group.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, as I emphasised at the outset, across this group our amendments have been probing in nature, and I am grateful for some of the clarity that the Minister has given. We are seeking clarity, not confrontation. We are trying to establish whether the Government see the authority as a truly independent body with the authority to challenge where needed, or simply as a well-staffed extension of the Cabinet Office. In seeking those answers, we are also pressing for a model of governance that ensures effectiveness, credibility and accountability from day 1.

At the heart of our amendments is a simple but critical question: how do we make sure that the watchdog has teeth and is not quietly tethered by ministerial influence? Amendments 68E and 68F speak to the need for independence at the top through a chair who is genuinely independent, free to challenge, credible in doing so and accountable to the Minister. We know from other public oversight bodies that institutional trust starts at the top so, if the Government truly believe in empowering the PSFA to be a fearless voice in the fight against fraud, they should have no hesitation in embracing the modest strengthening of the governance framework.

Likewise, Amendments 69A and 69B ask fair and important questions about how the PSFA’s executive leadership will be chosen. We are not seeking to strip the chair of responsibility; we are asking whether there is a clearer, more robust process that would enhance the authority’s legitimacy and avoid the risk of it becoming either too insular or too directed from above. Ensuring that executive appointments are overseen by a group of independent non-executives, rather than a single individual, is possibly an act of good governance. I am grateful to the Minister for clarifying that the independent non-executive appointments will follow the guide for public appointments.

Amendment 71A, meanwhile, takes on a different but equally significant concern: the breadth of ministerial regulation-making powers over eligibility for authority membership. In a body designed to scrutinise government spending and investigate fraud, the power of a Minister to decide who is eligible to serve—and more worryingly, who is not—is a red flag. The Government may never intend to use this power in order to silence critical voices or to manipulate the composition of the authority, but the mere fact that such a power exists could undermine confidence in the PSFA’s independence. This amendment seeks simply to close that door before it becomes a problem; it should not really be necessary if the full OCPA guidance is being followed.

The final amendments in the group, Amendments 74A to 74D, reinforce the need for clarity, transparency and constitutional responsibility. Whether it is ensuring the timely publication of reports, safeguarding who may speak for the authority with the official seal or distinguishing between operational delivery and retained ministerial accountability, these changes are about shoring up the credibility of the entire framework. Together, these amendments ask the Government to take seriously the institution that they are creating.

I know that the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, did not move his amendments; I am grateful for the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton. I want to take the liberty, if I may, of saying that a lot of what the noble Lord said chimes with the need for public accountability and transparency, as well as with a number of the points that we have been making. Although we recognise the vital importance of oversight, we have concerns that some of the amendments might create an unnecessary, burdensome framework that might impede the PSFA’s operational effectiveness; for example, the requirement for all meetings to be open to the public could present a significant operational concern. However, we understand the purpose and principle behind what the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, is trying to do.

Turning back to this group, these amendments ask the Government to take seriously the institution that they are creating. If the Public Sector Fraud Authority is to succeed—we all want it to—it must be allowed to operate with genuine independence, proper oversight and clear lines of public accountability. That is not bureaucracy or delay; it is simply how we build a body that the public can trust and on which Parliament can rely. We offer these proposals not to frustrate the Government’s ambition but to strengthen it by ensuring that this new authority is not only operationally capable but constitutionally sound. I urge the Minister to reflect on the questions asked and to work with us to ensure that the governance of the PSFA lives up to the seriousness of its mission. I beg leave to withdraw.

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In conclusion, I am aware, like the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock—who will be more than aware—and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, that until July 2024 I was speaking in defence of the algorithmic approach. But I feel very happy to be on the other side of the fence and asking, as I see it, the necessary and key questions to be sure that these measures work appropriately and effectively.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, it does not look as though we are ending on an easy group for me. Amendments 75A and 79A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, cover the same ground in Parts 1 and 2. The amendments would add a definition of what cannot constitute “reasonable grounds” in the legislation, setting out certain factors that will not constitute reasonable grounds for suspicion.

Although I understand the intention behind the amendments, I want to assure your Lordships that stereotypes and generalisations would not be considered reasonable grounds for starting an investigation or issuing an information notice. Under the information powers, an information notice may be sent only when an authorised officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that a relevant offence has been committed. An authorised officer must genuinely suspect that the fraud has been carried out by the individual, and that belief will be based on an objective assessment of facts, information and/or intelligence. “Reasonable grounds” are a standard test used by other organisations, including the police, and it is clear that they cannot be based on a hunch or the types of personal factors listed in the amendments.

The DWP has well-established safeguards to ensure that this test is applied properly in practice, with authorised officers documenting all reasoning for their decisions, including the basis for their suspicion, and through the Bill the PSFA will implement comparable safeguards. Management checks provide further internal assurance, and both the PSFA and the DWP intend to appoint His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services to independently inspect the use of these powers.

Finally, DWP guidance for authorised officers is also included in the new draft code of practice, which has been made available to noble Peers as a working draft prior to consultation. The PSFA will draft guidance on the lawful use of its information powers, which will cover this issue.

I will review the specific points made, especially regarding automated processes, and will probably end up writing to noble Lords on the questions I do not cover, but I will give a flavour of the Government’s thinking. Do the PSFA or the DWP use automated processes that enable generalisations and stereotypes when gathering information about individuals? No, we do not. The DWP does not use automated processes to decide whether an information notice will be issued, and the PSFA will not do so when the power is granted. An information notice may only ever be issued by an authorised officer, who must carefully consider whether it is necessary and proportionate to do so and document their reasons.

Regarding artificial intelligence in fraud and error, given what is being debated in the Chamber, I feel that we have two AI conversations going on. The DWP has a responsibility to ensure that fraud is minimised so that the right payments are made to the right people at the right time. Fraud controls are vital to reduce waste and protect taxpayers’ money. Advanced analytics, including machine learning, will play a critical role in tackling fraud, error and debt.

There is currently one fraud error and error machine-learning model in full deployment on universal credit advances, and others are at various stages of testing and development, designed to prevent fraud in the highest areas of loss. We have been careful to implement a supervised machine-learning approach and incorporate human intervention to consider the case and make further inquiries if necessary. Our use of advanced analytics does not replace human judgment. The Bill does not introduce automated decision-making.

To improve our approach and assure Parliament and the public of our processes, we intend to develop fairness and analysis assessments, which can be published through the annual report and accounts process. We will ensure that the fairness analysis assessment sets out the rationale for why we judge the models to be reasonable and proportionate, but without divulging the detail of our fraud and error controls, which would put the department’s security at risk.

The noble Viscount will know better than me that two proofs of concept were completed by the last Government on this issue. So there is proof of concept on EVM, but we are clear, especially from the PSFA side, that we will continue with a test and learn approach to this, and will report back with any other developments. As I said, DWP decisions on fraud and error will be made by a human. I will review his other questions to see whether I need to write to him. I hope that that gives a level of reassurance to noble Lords, and that the amendment can be withdrawn.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

I appreciate the answers that the Minister has given. I also appreciate that there are more answers to come, but could she add to the answer in writing about the timing for the remaining proofs of concept: when they are going to be completed? I see that as being germane to the rolling out of this process.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I will add that to the list of things to write to noble Lords about, if that is okay.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

It is very reassuring, of course, to hear the Minister, absolutely correctly, insist that individual officers will not choose who to discriminate against. When I supported this, I was not thinking that the officers of the state would necessarily be wandering around with their own prejudices and saying, “nick them” or “investigate them”. I would want to imagine that that would not be the case.

What I think we are talking about here—and this is because the use of technology is so profoundly important to what the Government want to do—is the latent biases in the training data. The connections made between data points are notoriously inaccurate and can be arbitrary, so we are seeking some reassurance here, and I will come back on this in another group. In relation to the accuracy and inaccuracy of algorithms, as I said, last year, two-thirds of the claims flagged by the DWP algorithm as high risk were legitimate in the end, so this is not a foolproof method. Consequently, I am not entirely convinced or satisfied that the Minister has quite answered what the concerns were—certainly that I was raising.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent]

I am so sorry to have disappointed the noble Baroness, but I will be writing to all Members to answer the questions I have outlined.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I am sorry for the Minister’s knees: I apologise in advance. But before she theoretically sits down, in her response, she said that the DWP is essentially relying on existing practices and that this is going to be a continuation of practices that exist in the DWP. In that context, it is important to raise the fact that the Equality and Human Rights Commission has opened an investigation into the treatment of disabled and chronically ill people by the DWP, which suggests that there are real issues here. I note in this context that the EHRC had been going to come to an arrangement with the department, but then decided that the situation was so serious that it had to open a formal investigation. I guess what I am asking is: can the Minister assure me that what is being proposed in the Bill is going to take into consideration previous issues and, hopefully, correct them?

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent]

The noble Baroness will be very aware that we now have several days of Committee before us on stage 2 of the Bill, and I look forward to discussing this and many issues with her as the Committee stage progresses.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this short but informative debate. I seem to be getting a bit of a track record. I thought my previous record was managing to get an amendment signed by both the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. I might even have surpassed that with this one. I am not sure quite what that says.

I am partially reassured by what the Minister has said, and obviously I am sure that she and her team will follow the safeguards that she has talked about. But those safeguards are not in statutes. For example, she talked about decisions being taken only by humans in relation to putting out information requests. That is not the case. The code of conduct refers only to decisions that will affect benefits, not the information request side of things, and it is only in the code of conduct, which can be changed at will. I am uncomfortable here.

We are talking, particularly with the eligibility verification process, about very large amounts of data, potentially on 9.9 million people. Who knows how many will flag up eligibility indicators? But without a shadow of doubt, the department will be using some form of algorithmic or AI tool to decide which of those are the ones the department wants to concentrate on. If that is the case, that is where the bias can creep in. If bias creeps into the algorithm or the machine learning tool and comes up to a person, it is easy to say “computer said yes” or “computer said no” and not to question the data coming to you.

I am not totally comfortable that there really are the safeguards at the moment. We are going to come to the human interaction at a later stage of the debate, so I will not go further into that. To be honest, I suspect that the Netherlands, Sweden and Australia probably had similar safeguards. They did not work. I cannot say for certain, but most departments believe that they are doing the right thing and that the safeguards are working. But they did not in those cases, and real problems were caused to vulnerable people.

I will withdraw the amendment but this is something that we will definitely come back to. Just in passing, I also welcome the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, to the right side of the fence with us. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 15th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness in Waiting/Government Whip (Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent) (Lab)]

My Lords, so we begin Report. I thank all noble Lords for their genuinely constructive engagement on this important Bill, as we seriously engage in efforts to protect taxpayers’ money—something I know every Member of your Lordships’ House cares vehemently about. I especially thank the Opposition Front Benches, who have given much of their time to make sure this works. I hope that they will see, through the responses from the Government today, that we have tried to listen and make as many amendments as possible to make sure this Bill is effective and will work in practice.

Once again, I warmly welcome the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, on the important issue of whistleblowing, as I did in Committee. The noble Baroness is committed and diligent in this area. As ever, she has proved to be tenacious and determined, but with due cause, ensuring that we can prevent some of the appalling scandals she named.

It is clear that protections for whistleblowing are a key aspect of counterfraud investigations. A 2023 National Audit Office report into whistleblowing showed that a total of 41 organisations employing civil servants recorded and reported 939 concerns over a three-year period. Fraud was consistently the most common category, representing 39.9% of all concerns across the three years. It is only right that the PSFA closely considers its role in this landscape. As such, I am pleased to have an opportunity to place on record our efforts since your Lordships last debated the issue. We are listening to your Lordships’ House. We are doing everything we can to ensure that both this legislation and the work of the PSFA are as effective and impactful as they can be.

Officials across government have come together to understand what can be done in the public sector fraud whistleblowing space. In particular, the PSFA Bill team has worked with the other Bill teams, where this important issue has also been raised recently in your Lordships’ House, to ensure that departments work in partnership to deliver a coherent response.

As a result, I am pleased to give the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, a series of commitments this Government can make. First, to ensure that this important issue continues to be taken forward effectively, officials will continue co-ordinating across the whistleblowing landscape to identify areas where the PSFA can add value, such as joint guidance documents on public sector fraud. The PSFA will also seek to work closely with officials in the SFO and HMRC. HMRC has deployed a whistleblower incentivisation scheme and the SFO has developed proposals for a similar scheme. The PSFA and the SFO have already agreed to identify areas where they can support each other’s work on whistle- blowing. Once Jonathan Fisher’s review is published, the PSFA will work with other government departments to consider, and where possible adopt, his whistleblower recommendations.

I am also pleased to announce that as soon as is practicable—likely to be within 12 months of the powers being first used—the Government will ask the independent reviewer, who will be appointed under Clause 65 of this Bill, to conduct a review of the PSFA’s use of whistleblowing in cases of public sector fraud.

The PSFA will also endeavour to publish updates on whistleblowing in public sector fraud in its annual reports, where appropriate. Those reports will be used as an opportunity to communicate routes available for whistleblowers on public sector fraud. Also, once this Bill becomes law, PSFA will seek a place on the DBT prescribed persons list under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998.

I look forward to future engagement on this issue. Given the commitments I have outlined and the necessity of maintaining the focus of this legislation, I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, will not press her amendments.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, the Minister has described some real momentum. As I say, we would always want more; when we put down amendments, we have an ideal target in mind, but this is an area where progress matters. I thank the Minister and I will indeed withdraw my amendment.

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[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, our principle generally is that the lowest level of government should make those decisions. To put it up to central government would be overloading central government. It would be like “Yes Minister” with a row of civil servants—bless them—dealing with something that has been sent up from the local authority or public body which did not need to be sent up. Although I have sympathy with what the amendments are trying to do, the idea of loading central government with issues that can be dealt with responsibly at a lower level seems to be against what we are trying to do in this House. So, respectfully, we will not be supporting these two amendments.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, fraud against the public sector takes money away from vital public services, enriches those who seek to attack the Government and damages the integrity of the state. This Bill is part of the Government’s response to this urgent and challenging problem. The Bill gives functions and powers to the Minister for the Cabinet Office, which will be exercised by authorised officers and investigators based in the Public Sector Fraud Authority.

I hope it will assist your Lordships’ House if I remind noble Lords of the PSFA’s mission. The PSFA is the UK Government’s centre of expertise for the management of fraud and associated error against the public sector. It leads the Government’s counterfraud function, which brings together the approximately 16,000 people who work in government departments and public bodies to fight fraud. The standards and guidance that the function creates, led by the PSFA, must be used in central government and can be used more widely in the public sector and beyond to improve the robustness of how we understand, prevent and respond to fraud.

These two amendments would make significant changes to the Government’s intention in bringing forward this Bill on how the PSFA works. They would change the impact of the Bill and are unnecessary to be put into law, so we cannot accept them.

On Amendment 2, the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, offered a version of this amendment in Grand Committee that simply deleted line 10, which I resisted because removing that line without putting something else in its place would have created uncertainty and potentially conflicted with the preservation of public authorities’ own fraud functions in Clause 2(5). It is clear this draft has been influenced by the debate on the original, and I thank the noble Baroness for it; however, the new version goes further and dramatically changes the impact of the Bill.

Amendment 2 would create an extensive new power for the Minister for the Cabinet Office and change the relationship between the PSFA and the public authorities it works with. The Government’s intention is that the PSFA offers a public sector fraud service, collaborating with public authorities which have been attacked by fraudsters to take action to investigate, enforce and recover the funds. Collaboration is vital in the Government’s fight against fraud. Noble Lords will be aware that last month the Government announced that, in the previous 12 months since April 2024, over £480 million was prevented from going into fraudsters’ pockets. Driving this kind of cross-government collaboration is what the PSFA is for. We can do more, which is why we need the Bill, but the PSFA is already working.

I firmly believe that the normal mechanisms of government can ensure that counterfraud co-operation happens, as it is already happening in the work of the current pilot unit in PSFA. In issues of national importance, there will also be some moral and public pressure for something to be done, so I believe it is not necessary for the Minister to have a directive power in law to investigate on their own initiative. We truly believe that the collaborative approach outlined in the Bill combined with the normal operations of government will ensure the PSFA has the access it needs.

The definition of public authority in Clause 71 is broad and this amendment would affect different public authorities differently. For central government departments, it would mean that a Minister below Secretary of State level could direct and override Secretaries of State. For local authorities, the amendment would mean a new power for central government to take over a responsibility without their consent. The Local Government Act 1999 already has powers to this effect, and we do not want to create a new one specifically for fraud.

Amendment 19 would require departments to conduct an internal review if, following a PSFA investigation, it is confirmed that they have lost more than £50,000 to overpayment or fraud. All losses on this scale should already be investigated and reported on. There are established audit, assurance and reporting processes for this. In addition, the facts of this case would already have been established by the PSFA, and learning taken from it would be shared across government to aid the prevention of fraud. This amendment would create an extra burden on the department and replicate the work of the PSFA. It is unnecessary, as its core aim will be addressed through other activities. Therefore, after my very persuasive arguments, I encourage the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, to withdraw her amendments.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

I thank the Minister for her incredibly persuasive arguments. We are clear that this is an unacceptable settlement if the PSFA can act only if invited by the very body that may have failed. That is not a system of scrutiny; it is an invitation to inertia. It cannot be right that officials in a department where fraud is suspected should have the power to decide whether to be investigated. The DWP does not wait to be invited before it goes after benefits cheats, and there is no reason why public officials should be held to a different standard.

The Government are proposing to create an authority with wide powers on paper but no real agency in practice—a watchdog told to bark only when asked. In short, it should be called out for what it is: a farce. Fraud against the taxpayer is not a matter for polite phone calls between Permanent Secretaries; it demands action that is statutory, swift and unambiguous. When credible evidence of fraud arises, that must be the starting gun for any investigation, not the moment the system looks away.

Our amendment gives the PSFA the ability to act proactively, with proper safeguards, wherever fraud occurs. If we are serious about protecting public money, we cannot design a system that waits to be asked before doing its job. I am not satisfied that the response from the Government meets the conditions set out, and therefore I want to test the opinion of the House.

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[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, we are in a world of information-sharing and information-gathering, and this is where that starts and stops. Amendment 3 would ensure that

“information notices issued to banks and financial institutions include a clear statement that the person to whom the information relates is not necessarily guilty of suspected fraud”.

Amendment 4

“would limit the persons to whom information may be disclosed by requiring the Secretary of State to specify eligible persons in regulations”.

In our view, these are sensible safeguards and regulations. On that basis, we on these Benches broadly support the amendments.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I appreciate the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, bringing forward these amendments again. I find myself agreeing with the concerns outlined by the noble Baroness and other Members of your Lordships’ House. I reassure all noble Lords that we are already undertaking this work, and that the safeguards are in place.

On Amendment 3 and the issue raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, we will be including specific information in guidance for authorised officers to ensure that information notices advise the information-holder that the investigation is ongoing, and no inference should be drawn that the individual specified on the notice is guilty. This amendment is therefore not required as it is already our intention to do this, and it will be achieved in guidance.

Turning to Amendment 4, I again assure the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and other Members of your Lordships’ House that I agree with the intention of the amendment, which is why there are already safeguards in the Bill that restrict the disclosure of information. Clause 5 details that:

“Information can only be disclosed for the purpose of exercising the core functions”.


This restricts to whom and for what purpose the information can be disclosed. However, also including a prescriptive list of persons who can have information disclosed to them would further restrict the intent of the clause and the effectiveness of its scope in exercising the core functions detailed in Clause 1 of the Bill.

I hope to further reassure noble Lords that the PSFA’s enforcement unit would also have memoranda of understanding for each person it would be sharing information with, as well as maintaining a data protection impact assessment to ensure that this information is shared and held in adherence to data protection legislation. We have taken every step to ensure that there are appropriate safeguards in the disclosure of information, while balancing this with making the powers relevant and effective for an investigation. I hope that this reassures noble Lords and that the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her response, to the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, for his support, and to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for their support for Amendment 3.

These are, on the face of it, small and technical matters, but they go to the heart of how the Bill will operate in practice. The smallest drafting choices, the subtlest omissions, can have real consequences for individuals caught up in these processes. We cannot allow the system to treat people as wrongdoers when nothing has been proven or concluded. The language of the Bill must make that absolutely clear. What may seem a flippant technicality in this Chamber can, in the real world, determine whether someone is wrongly stigmatised, denied banking services or placed under suspicion without cause. That is why these details matter, because fairness, clarity and restraint are not afterthoughts; they are the foundation of public confidence in the powers that this Bill creates. I thank the Minister for her engagement and hope that, as the Bill progresses, these small but important safeguards might be reflected in the final drafting. On that note, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, clearly, it would be best if something such as who these investigators are was in the Bill so that we have more detail. What we are being offered by these amendments is to require the Minister to outline in statutory guidance the process for appointing authorised investigators. This is by no means as good as having it in the Bill, but I believe that statutory guidance has to be carefully considered, because who is appointed to investigate should be decided not just with a flick of a pen but with more careful consideration. We on these Benches are broadly supportive of this amendment, because we believe it would add additional transparency to the appointment process.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, it is essential that any individual authorised to use the powers enshrined in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is competent to discharge their duties under the law. We are committed to ensuring that this is the case for the authorised investigators created by the Bill. However, for legislation to require the publication of guidance on an internal appointment process is not only unnecessary but inconsistent with established practice in this area across other government departments. Government departments with similar investigative powers—for example, HMRC, the Home Office, Defra and even the Food Standards Agency—are not required to and do not publish statutory guidance on this point.

Let me reassure your Lordships’ House that Ministers take their responsibilities seriously. It is for this reason, as we have consistently affirmed, that no investigator will be authorised to exercise these powers until the Minister is entirely satisfied that they possess the requisite training and expertise. This training will cover: proficiency in relevant aspects of PACE, particularly the legal framework and applications of Section 8 and Section 9, and PACE codes of practice as far as they apply to the PSFA’s powers; proper procedures for applying for and lawfully executing warrants, including entry, search, seizure and handling digital information; and proper handling and retention of and access to evidence. Crucially, they will be trained in safeguards for individual rights during investigations and warrant execution, and in the proper handling and retention of and access to evidence.

Training will be provided by the College of Policing by means of a series of bespoke training courses, the first of which has commenced this week. Individuals will be required to demonstrate proficiency in all relevant facets of PACE before the Minister will authorise them as authorised investigators, with particular emphasis on the legal framework alongside its accompanying codes of practice. These authorised investigators will be members of the government counterfraud profession, and they will be required to meet the appropriate professional standards.

Therefore, I urge noble Lords to consider that the existing framework, bolstered by our commitment to rigorous training, already provides necessary assurances and that an amendment to codify this is unnecessary. I reassure and remind noble Lords that these powers cannot be exercised in any specific case unless a court has granted a warrant—the ultimate safeguard. I hope that this explanation reassures noble Lords and that the noble Baroness will therefore withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, we will not seek to divide the House on this amendment. I am sorry to disappoint the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for whose support I am very grateful, but we will look in later groupings today at safeguards on the PACE powers granted to civil servants.

The amendment speaks to an important point, one that we have raised repeatedly throughout the passage of this Bill. We are granting serious powers to officials under this legislation—so-called authorised investigators, who will be able to exercise these powers, some of which are drawn from the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. We can never forget that these are not minor administrative tools; they are police-level powers to search, seize and compel. If we are to trust such authority to civil servants then Parliament and the public deserve full oversight of how those powers are used and, quite simply, by whom. That is the question this amendment asks and it is one that must be answered clearly before this framework is implemented.

The process for authorising investigators, the standards they must meet and the accountability mechanisms that apply are not small matters of drafting detail; they go to the heart of public confidence in this regime. We appreciate that the Minister can tell us now how this process will work, but some sort of formal, documented statement setting this out would be immensely helpful as a way of us having this beyond the Minister’s word. While I trust the noble Baroness completely, we do not know if we can always trust her successor or her successor after that. Setting this out would allow everyone to know the standards and process and would ensure that these are being met, not only now but in the future.

In short, I am grateful to the Minister for her response, but I hope the Government will reflect seriously on this issue and possibly come back with something at Third Reading. The powers in Clause 7 are significant and so too must be the safeguards that accompany them. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Moved by

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent]

6: Clause 9, page 7, leave out lines 32 to 34
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, and my amendment to clause 9, page 7, lines 38 and 39, would remove provision that is no longer needed because of the general data protection override in section 183A of the Data Protection Act 2018, which was inserted by section 106(2) of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 and came into force on 20 August 2025.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I was on my honeymoon last week, which is why our amendments were tabled in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock. This time last week I was in Santorini—I told the noble Baroness I would get that in—and I think I have done awfully well to get to group 5.

The provisions of a Bill that recently passed in your Lordships’ House have a direct impact on how we draft and interpret legislation across government, including this Bill. As a result, we no longer need to state in the Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill that provisions authorising the processing of information do not override existing legislation. This is now a routine requirement across all government Bills. We are therefore making a series of amendments across Part 1 and Part 2 of the Bill to ensure that the rules and safeguards set out in the new Act are properly implemented throughout the Bill. The amendments to the PAFER Bill are a necessary step to align with this new legislation, bringing legal clarity and consistency across all legislation. These are technical but required amendments. I beg to move.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, we understand that these amendments are technical in nature, designed to ensure that the Bill is properly aligned with the changes made by the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025. We therefore appreciate that these are tidying amendments that do not alter the policy substance of the clause but simply ensure legal coherence. I thank the Minister for bringing them forward—and I hope she enjoyed her honeymoon.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, my honeymoon was fabulous.

I am grateful for the support of the House on these consequential amendments, following the Data (Use and Access) Act coming into force. I hope that noble Lords will provide their support to these amendments.

Amendment 6 agreed.

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[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, for raising the important issues around annual reporting and the PSFA—both the use of powers conferred on it by the Bill and the extent of fraud against public authorities—as well as her point on the implementation of direct deduction orders, particularly concerning the regulations, the publication of consultation outcomes and the impact these powers may have on the banking industry. While I agree with the intent behind these amendments, unfortunately they are duplicative or would otherwise create an unnecessary burden for the PSFA. I will address each in turn.

Amendment 16 would require that the outcome of any consultation required by regulation-making powers for direct deduction orders in Clause 38(6) is laid before Parliament prior to the implementation of regulations. This amendment is duplicative: where a consultation is required, the Explanatory Memorandum of the relevant statutory instrument must detail and consider the outcome of that consultation exercise. Furthermore, the Cabinet Office consultation principles also set out that where a consultation concerns a statutory instrument, His Majesty’s Government should publish responses before or at the same time as the instrument is laid. We completely agree with the noble Baroness, which is why the provisions are there.

Amendment 17 seeks to hold the PSFA to commit to

“an impact assessment covering projected costs and effects on the operational capacity of banks”,

should any changes be made to the means by which deduction orders are processed by way of regulation, as set out in Clause 38. This amendment is also duplicative, as statutory instruments require that the impact on the relevant sector is considered and set out in the Explanatory Memoranda—even if that is to say no impact is expected—with reasons given as to why. Where the impact is expected to exceed £10 million, a full and separate impact assessment must be prepared and published alongside the SI.

The Government are extremely mindful of the burdens this Bill places on businesses, including the banking sector. We too want to ensure that they are not subjected to disproportionate burden or costs in complying with these measures, and we want to assure noble Lords that the PSFA is working on how to effectively operationalise the recovery powers in partnership with representatives of the banking sector. Throughout the development of the Bill, we have tried to strike the right balance between requiring actions from banks in a fair and proportionate way and achieving our policy intent of recouping vital public funds lost to fraud and error. That is why there has been sustained engagement with key representatives of the sector including UK Finance, individual banks, building societies, His Majesty’s Treasury and the Financial Conduct Authority. We know that the sector is supportive of the Bill’s objectives from the evidence provided by UK Finance in Committee in the other place. We have benefited from the sector’s operational insights and, as discussed on the previous group, we have tabled a number of amendments as a direct result, to ease the implementation and delivery of the recovery powers.

Amendment 22 would require the PSFA to undertake a review after 12 months on the cost to banks of complying with provisions under Part 1 of the Bill. The Bill’s published impact assessment—which sets out all expected costs to business, including banks, from the PSFA’s measures—has been green-rated by the Regulatory Policy Committee and sets out, where it has been possible to do so, the minimal expected costs to businesses, including banks, of the measures in Part 1 of the Bill. Provisions already exist under Clause 24 for banks to be able to deduct administrative costs that would offset what the review would report on. This amendment would create disproportionate administrative burden on the PSFA when, candidly, it should be using its resource to pursue those who defraud the public purse.

Amendment 26 would require a report on the use of powers by the PSFA to be published and laid in Parliament. I know the noble Baroness genuinely cares about ministerial oversight and accountability of officers using these new powers. I assure her that in addition to the reports that will be commissioned from inspectorates —such as His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services—the independent person appointed in line with Clause 65 will proactively review the PSFA’s investigative use of the powers, including their efficiency and effectiveness. We have previously stated that these would be annual reports, and they will be laid before Parliament.

Lastly, I turn to Amendment 112, on annual reporting. This would require the PSFA to publish and lay in Parliament an annual report on the extent of fraud against public authorities based on the Government’s internal estimates. The PSFA already oversees the counterfraud performance of ministerial departments and public bodies and already publishes a report on the extent of fraud against public authorities through its fraud landscape reports. These set out levels of detected, prevented and recovered fraud and error as reported by departments and public bodies to the Government’s Counter Fraud Function’s centre of expertise. For transparency, these are now published online. We expect the next one to be published before the end of the financial year and can commit to sharing this with Members who have spoken in this debate.

I think I have touched on all the points raised, although there was a question from the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, on other safeguards. It may be helpful to reassure your Lordships’ House that we have the following additional safeguards in place. Authorised officers and investigators will be trained extensively and will be permitted to use the powers only once the training has been completed. They will follow detailed procedures and have strong guidance; for instance, on how to assess and handle potentially vulnerable suspects. There will be rights to make representations, request an internal review and appeal decisions through First-tier and Upper Tribunals across the civil penalty, debt recovery and information gathering powers. In addition, we will consult on and publish a code of practice detailing the calculation and application of penalties issued where fraud is found and where there is non-compliance with the information sharing and gathering requirements and debt recovery powers within the Bill.

I hope that reassures your Lordships’ House and the noble Baroness that we are already taking steps to achieve the same aim, and she can therefore withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her remarks. I also thank the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Brixton and Lord Vaux, for their support for some of the amendments. I thank the Minister for the consideration she has given as well.

At the heart of this debate is a simple but important point: if we are to make the system work, we have to work with the banks, not simply through them. They are, in effect, being recruited as operational arms of the state, helping to investigate, enforce and recover public money. That partnership brings responsibilities on both sides. These amendments were never about creating obstacles; they were about ensuring that transparency, consultation and accountability are built into the process. The banks are being asked to play a vital role, and we must show them that their experience, concerns and costs will be reflected in how the Government engage with and implement the Bill. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, is entirely right that public authorities responsible for spending taxpayers’ money must manage their fraud risks carefully. While we expect the enforcement powers in this Bill to be a powerful force against public sector fraud, prevention of fraud by designing spending programmes and fraud controls in the first place is the most important tool that we have.

I shall set out the work that the PSFA already does to hold public authorities to account for their fraud risk management performance and set out some ways in which we can go further. I hope that, in doing so, I shall convince the noble Baroness that her amendment is unnecessary. It is already a requirement for major new areas of public spending to have a fraud risk assessment; that is set out in both Managing Public Money, which tells accounting officers their duties, and the Treasury’s Green Book, which details how to appraise a project. The PSFA scrutinises those fraud risk assessments, holding departments to account both for the absence of risk assessment and for fraud risk assessments that do not meet the standard. Some 31 organisations have so far been through the PSFA’s rigorous assurance regime.

The highest-risk government schemes receive additional scrutiny of their fraud risk management practices on a regular ongoing basis. The highest risk here is not justified only with reference to the size of spending, although that is important, but with the scale of fraud risks that a programme faces. That is in addition to the PSFA’s broader scrutiny of departmental performance and capability. The PSFA assesses and holds public bodies to account for: their compliance with the counterfraud functional standard; the make-up of their counterfraud workforce and level of investment; the ambition and performance against their impact targets; and their ability to collect and report to the PSFA on all frauds against them.

The PSFA publishes the fraud landscape reports. These outline the main risks and issues across government, including the levels of detected fraud and corruption, and associated areas in departments and public bodies, excluding tax and welfare, as these are published elsewhere.

However, publishing fraud risk assessments, as this amendment calls for, would provide a how-to guide for fraudsters. The PSFA works closely with the National Audit Office, which can, as it chooses, offer independent scrutiny and has done so in reports, such as Using Data and Analytics to Tackle Fraud and Error, in July, and An Overview of the Impact of Fraud and Error on Public Funds for the New Parliament 2023-24, in November last year. In short, much of what the noble Baroness calls for in this amendment is already happening, but she is quite right—as this is fundamentally a question of protecting taxpayers’ money—that we can go further, so we are.

First, fraud measurement is most sophisticated in HMRC and DWP, where detailed audits and sampling are possible and proportionate. In other areas of government, effective fraud measurement is typically prohibitively expensive. Fraud is a hidden crime, but the noble Baroness is right that we need to do more here. The PSFA is pressing for a fraud measurement plan to be put in place for the highest-risk schemes across government, and we will make those highest-risk schemes report to the PSFA on their levels of fraud and error. This will include what has been estimated, detected, recovered and prevented. We are now also asking the highest-risk schemes to report on levels of counterfraud resourcing so we can assure that resourcing matches the threat.

Secondly, accountability is critical. The PSFA will redouble its efforts to hold departments to account for substandard fraud risk management. Where fraud risk assessments are of poor quality, where departments are falling behind on the counterfraud standards or where counterfraud workforces are insufficient or made up of the wrong skills, Cabinet Office Ministers and their departmental counterparts will ensure accountability and drive improvement. The action that the noble Baroness calls for is therefore already under way or is something that we recognise as a gap and are taking action on.

The noble Baroness is right to call for action, but the appropriate place to pursue that action is not in this legislation but through the PSFA’s published mandate, which we will look at again in light of the noble Baroness’s points to check that it is fit for purpose. I would welcome a discussion with her and my officials on what changes to our published mandate would achieve her goals—the invitation will obviously also be open to all noble Lords who have an interest.

We are trying to make sure that the counterfraud landscape is fit for purpose across departments. We are both listening to the comments of your Lordships’ House as well as progressing with the Bill. I therefore hope that that provides reassurance to your Lordships’ House and specifically to the noble Baroness, and I hope that she can withdraw her amendment.

[Lord Gove (Con)]

My Lords, I listened with the close interest to the Minister’s response, which it seems to me can be crystallised in a few words: that my noble friend Lady Finn is absolutely correct; her amendment is on the button, but officials in the Cabinet Office regard it as simply too much work to implement and do not want to have this actually in the Bill, but to have some sort of arrangement, some side deal or side letter to address it. When we are dealing with sums of public money as significant as those acknowledged in the legislation, surely it would be better to accept the amendment because the Minister has acknowledged that it is spot on and there is not a single element in the logic put forward by the Opposition Front Bench with which she takes issue.

The only possible objection that the Minister raised is that a public assessment of fraud risk would be a how-to guide for fraudsters. Surely the fraudsters do not need support; it is other departments that need support in dealing with this issue. If she cannot accept the logic and power of the amendment, will she commit to coming back to the House within six or 12 months and reporting, if it is the case that the proposal that she puts forward is inadequate, that she will accept the amendment put forward by my noble friend Lady Finn? As is clear from the paucity of the arguments provided for her by her officials, there is no gainsaying the force with which my noble friend Lady Finn made her case.

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[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

I have a huge amount of time and respect for the noble Lord, which is why I am smiling. He knows better than to suggest that I can bring forward and accept an amendment in 12 months’ time, after the legislation has already passed. However, he is right, and I agree with the principle and intention of everything the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, proposes. My argument is that this is wrong vehicle. It is the published mandate and the role of the PSFA as it exists—which was established by the previous Government—that we should open up, to ensure that it is fit for purpose as a cross-government vehicle and outlines its clear objective. That is the offer that I made to the noble Baroness.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her remarks and the careful consideration she has given this issue. I am really disappointed that the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, has decided that he can no longer support the amendment. He warmly welcomed a similar amendment in Committee, describing it as

“a comprehensive and rigorous approach to fraud risk management for public authorities overseeing significant spending schemes”.—[Official Report, 11/6/25; col. GC 243.]

At its core, this amendment is about building a culture of responsibility and transparency across government—one in which fraud prevention is owned by every department and every accounting officer, not simply outsourced to the PSFA. We cannot afford a system in which the authority becomes a convenient safety net, while departments step back from the task of managing their own risk. As we said in Committee, let us return to first principles: public money must be protected, not just recovered after it is lost. This must be a whole-of-government effort, driven by evidence, accountability and openness. Departments need to know how they are performing and Parliament needs to be able to see this. That means regular, comparable data that is published, verified and available for scrutiny by both Houses.

We appreciate the Minister’s response and the spirit in which it was given, but I agree entirely with my noble friend Lord Gove: we do not believe that the reporting requirements set out in her answer are adequate. We need to see real movement on how these efforts are assessed—which departments are performing well, which are falling behind and how that performance is being improved. This information must be made public and open for review, and we know that this can be done without compromising ongoing investigations.

Transparency and accountability are not threats to enforcement; they are its foundation. This amendment goes to the very heart of what this Bill should be about: creating a genuine culture of responsibility across the public sector when it comes to tackling fraud. For too long, fraud management has been treated as a technical or procedural exercise, buried within internal reporting chains and obscured by bureaucratic complexity. The effect has been that too many departments and agencies see fraud as someone else’s problem, something to be passed up to the centre or delegated down to a third-party body such as the PSFA. However, the fight against fraud cannot be subcontracted. It has to begin and end with the public authorities themselves, which are entrusted with billions of pounds of taxpayers’ money.

Our amendment seeks to ensure that accountability is clear, transparent and public. It would require departments not merely to report internally but to publish their own risk assessments, have their fraud rates independently verified and be held publicly to account for their performance. In the long run, the success of the PSFA should not be measured by how much it does but by how little it needs to do because public authorities have developed the systems, culture and leadership to manage fraud effectively themselves. Yet as the Bill stands, that is not the direction of travel. This amendment is therefore essential to shift the incentives away from centralised dependency and towards departmental ownership, transparency and responsibility.

I am extremely grateful for the offer of further discussions from the Minister, but this is a matter of principle and effectiveness. We cannot have great power, as the Government are proposing, without great responsibility. I therefore wish to test the opinion of the House.

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Moved by

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent]

23: Clause 66, page 35, line 29, leave out “may” and insert “must”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, together with my amendment to clause 66, page 35, line 30, would mean that the Minister must provide information where the information is reasonably required for the purposes of independent reviews carried out under clause 65.

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[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I now turn to government Amendments 23, 24, 68 and 69, regarding the disclosure of information to the independent reviewers. These amendments rightly respond to the challenge put forward in Committee by noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Finn and Lady Kramer, to provide all relevant information to independent reviewers. I am pleased to make these amendments today to demonstrate this Government’s commitment to supporting the independent reviewers in the PSFA and the DWP to carry out robust and transparent reviews.

On the PSFA side, government Amendments 23 and 24 will oblige the Minister to disclose all reasonable information to independent reviewers appointed under Clause 65 for the purposes of carrying out the review. The independent reviewer will determine what information is reasonably required. With regard to the DWP, in Committee my noble friend Lady Sherlock made it clear that the DWP Secretary of State will provide the independent reviewer of eligibility verification measures with all relevant material so that they can carry out their review. Recognising the underlying concern and to clarify our intent, we are today bringing forward government Amendments 68 and 69, which oblige the Secretary of State to disclose necessary information to the independent reviewer of EVM for the purposes of carrying out the review.

To be clear, for both sets of amendments substituting the word “must” for the word “may” does not signal a change in our approach. The Government have always been committed to providing all relevant information that is reasonably required to the respective independent reviewers to support the open and transparent use of powers and to promote accountability. These amendments today reinforce that commitment and make it crystal clear.

I hope that these amendments reassure your Lordships’ House that the Government will provide all relevant information to the independent reviewers, and I encourage noble Lords to back them. I beg to move.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, we have a lot of discussions in this House about the difference between “may” and “must”. I think in this case it is very important. It is essential that the independent reviewers, who are such an important safeguard throughout this Bill, are provided with all the information that they require, so I am delighted and thank the Minister for putting forward those amendments. My joy, however, is not unbridled, because she has caveated the “must” with

“where the information is reasonably required”.

Nowhere in this does it tell us who decides what is reasonable in this case. That opens the possibility of disagreement between the independent reviewer and the department, or the Minister, as to what is reasonable. That is regrettable. It would be better if the independent reviewer decided what they wanted, was given everything they required and it was up to them to decide what was reasonable. This provides the opportunity for doubt and disagreement, and we will come on to that in a later amendment next week. However, overall, I welcome these amendments.

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We look forward to hearing from the Minister that this will be corrected in due course and that the Government will bring forward a further amendment to ensure consistency and fairness across the Bill. For now, however, we thank the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, for tabling these important amendments and the Government for having listened and acted upon the concerns that were raised in Committee.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions of noble Lords to this group. I will respond specifically and reassure the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, about who will decide and how it will be decided what constitutes relevant material for the independent reviewer under Clause 65 and what happens if they disagree.

The independent reviewer under Clause 65 will determine what information is reasonably required from the PSFA. They must be able to demonstrate to the Minister that the information requested will allow them to carry out the review and how. What is and is not relevant for the independent EVM reviewer is a matter of fact. Information must be given to the reviewer only if it will allow them to carry out their functions as prescribed by Section 6 of new Section 121DC of the legislation. If required, the independent EVM reviewer must be able to demonstrate to the Secretary of State that any information they request will allow them to carry out their review.

There may be rare examples of information that the Minister or Secretary of State may not share, such as information relating to national security, should they deem that it would be unreasonable to do so. Should there be a disagreement between the Minister and the independent reviewer, a resolution mechanism will be agreed between the reviewer and government. Ultimately, the Minister may not disclose the information, and in extreme cases, any ministerial decision to withhold information could be subject to judicial review. The independent reviewer will also be able to comment on any information withheld from them in the report which will be laid before Parliament.

In response to the questions from the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, as to why “must” is not across the Bill and why the DWP has not echoed this requirement in Clause 89, this is, as the noble Baroness has mentioned, going to be debated in a forthcoming group. However, I note that this divergence arises from the construction of Part 1 of the Bill. Unlike the DWP, the PSFA has one clause, Clause 65, relating to all independent reviewers. We have noted that we intend to meet the duty of Clause 65 by appointing a new independent reviewer to review PSFA use of powers and by commissioning HMICFRS—I am not sure what is easier to say, the full name or the acronym—to conduct inspections of our new investigative powers and end-to-end case processes.

We are keen to let the independent reviewer whom the Government will appoint have access to all reasonable and relevant information, which may include live cases. We would not want HMICFRS to consider live cases given the significant disclosure burden. However, in the PSFA’s case, given the small volume of cases, we believe that we can handle that challenge should an issue arise. With DWP, it really is in terms of scale and access to live cases. With the PSFA, we think that we can manage the difference.

I hope that those points have reassured noble Lords. Obviously, we will continue to debate some of these issues next week. I am grateful for this short debate and any support for the government amendments. I hope others will support these important amendments, which will help to improve transparency and promote accountability.

Amendment 23 agreed.

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[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, the main focus of my remarks in this group will be on Amendment 35. This amendment, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie, would insert a new clause after Clause 70 to require the appointment of an independent reviewer to assess how the Public Sector Fraud Authority uses the PACE powers—the investigatory powers derived from the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which the Bill proposes to confer upon it.

Under the amendment, the independent reviewer would be tasked with examining how these powers are used in practice, including their effect on police time, their operational impact, whether they have improved the efficiency of investigations and whether any complaints or disciplinary issues have arisen in relation to their use. The reviewer would report to the Minister within five years of the powers coming into force and annually thereafter, with those reports laid before both Houses of Parliament.

We have brought this amendment forward as a genuine compromise. We on these Benches want to work with the Government to ensure that the Bill succeeds in its purpose, which is to strengthen our national effort to combat fraud and to deliver a substantial and lasting reduction in losses to the public purse. We are not opposed to giving investigators the tools they need to do that job, but if the Government are still intent, as we understand they are, on extending PACE powers to civil servants within the PSFA, then those powers must be accompanied by robust and transparent oversight.

This amendment is designed to provide precisely that. It is a balanced and proportionate measure that ensures accountability without hampering operational effectiveness. The Government have been clear in their reasoning for granting these powers. They have said that it will save police time and resources, that it will allow investigators to act more efficiently, and that powers will be used responsibly and, where necessary, in conjunction with the police. Our amendment would simply hold the Government to those assurances. It asks them to demonstrate through an independent review mechanism that that these powers are indeed delivering on the objectives they have set out.

If the Government are confident that the PSFA will use these powers effectively and responsibly, and I have no reason to doubt their confidence, then they should have no hesitation in supporting this amendment. It would help them prove their case. The amendment gives the Government five years before the first review—ample time for the new arrangements to bed in, for the PSFA to become established, and for the data to show whether the powers are working as intended. Thereafter, annual reporting would ensure continued transparency and accountability.

It is clear that this amendment is not an attempt to frustrate the Bill—quite the opposite. It is an attempt to make it stronger, fairer and more credible. Oversight and review are not obstacles to effective governance; they are its foundation. If these powers are to be trusted, they must also be tested. We are therefore offering the Government a constructive path forward to accept a mechanism that ensures evidence-based assessment of how these powers are used, whether they are proportionate, and whether they are delivering measurable benefits.

If the Government’s case is correct that these powers will save police time, strengthen enforcement and be exercised with care, then this amendment would simply enshrine a process that will confirm that success. It is a sensible, good faith proposal that supports the Government’s stated objectives and ensures that Parliament and, indeed, the public can have confidence that this expansion of powers is justified, proportionate and effective.

If the Government are confident in their case, they will support this amendment. It is drafted to aid them, not to hinder. It is to help them demonstrate transparently and independently that these powers are being used well and wisely. If they are not minded to support us, I hope that the Minister will take this opportunity to set out to the House what alternative proposals the Government are considering to address these concerns. If the Government have no alternative, then I ask the Minister whether we on these Benches might come back at a later stage with a new amendment designed to address them. We cannot forget that we are talking about substantial powers which will be wielded against people in this country outside these walls. If we do not legislate responsibly now, we risk the well-being of those people to whom we all owe a duty. I beg to move.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, it could almost be that we are back in Committee. It is the “Baroness Finn, Baroness Anderson show”. I do not think many people would pay, but still.

I welcome the continued and unwavering commitment of the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, to independent oversight. I once again reassure her that the Bill as it stands delivers rigorous and robust safeguards and oversight, addressing the intent behind these amendments efficiently without the need for duplicative amendments.

On Amendment 25, internal reviews are important as they provide a straightforward and affordable way to present a challenge to decision-making. They are an impartial element of many review processes. Under the current drafting, internal reviews can be requested to challenge, for instance, whether a direct deduction order is the most appropriate form of repayment or whether the deduction amount is fair and affordable, as well as the use of other powers in the Bill. The reviewing officer will be a highly trained authorised officer of a higher grade than the original decision-maker. They may decide to uphold, vary or revoke the direct deduction order. This decision will be based on an assessment of the materials held and any relevant new information provided. Crucially, should a review not provide satisfaction, there are further independent appeal rights through the First-tier Tribunal.

On Amendment 35, the independent oversight of the use of the powers under Part 1, including PACE powers, is so central to the passage of this Bill that we already have clauses in place to mandate it. As we have said, Clauses 65 and 66 require that an independent person appointed by the Minister undertakes reviews of the use of powers contained in this legislation. The independent person will conduct reviews to consider whether the exercise of the powers is in keeping with the legislation, codes of practice and relevant guidance. They will produce a report of their findings for the Minister, including any recommendations they deem appropriate. The Minister is then required to publish the report and lay it before Parliament.

As we have stated, the Government intend to meet the duty imposed by this clause in two ways. First, the Government will commission His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services—HMICFRS—to inspect the PSFA’s use of the new investigative powers, including end-to-end investigative processing. Secondly, the Government are creating a new position for an independent person to whom the PSFA oversight team will report. The independent person will carry out reviews and report on whether the PSFA’s use of the powers in this Bill is in keeping with the legislation, codes of practice and relevant guidance, and consider areas where HMICFRS or other oversight bodies have not already reported. The employment of an independent person will also fully comply with the Cabinet Office Governance Code on Public Appointments, which is overseen by the Commissioner for Public Appointments. Clause 66 provides for the arrangements of timing of reviews between the Minister and the independent person.

In summary, the amendments are duplicative at heart. The right to independent assessment is already built into the legislation, via appeal and in the form of the independent reviewer to be appointed to review the use of the Bill’s powers under Clause 65. These would not require the addition of extra costs, people or processes that Amendments 25 and 35 would entail.

However, the Government note that Amendment 35 specifies particular areas of focus for a reviewer beyond what is in the Bill. Your Lordships’ House has also raised other areas that it would like an independent reviewer to consider. We have been clear that the independent reviewer appointed under Clauses 65 and 66 will have discretion to decide how and where they focus their reviews. Even so, to ensure that the House’s concerns are heard, I am committing to compiling a list of all the concerns raised here and in the other place to put before the independent reviewer for consideration once appointed. I will also request that the independent reviewer meet with all parliamentarians who have raised areas where they think his or her work should be focused. That way, the independent reviewer and the report they will lay before Parliament will be certain to meet Parliament’s priorities for scrutiny of the use of these powers. Given these assurances and this additional option, I hope the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendments, as the purpose is already met by the Bill as it stands and the commitments that I have just made.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 21st October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, the amendments, as has been clearly stated by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, concern ministerial and parliamentary oversight—it is the oversight that is important—or the powers granted to authorised officers for reclaiming finances under this Act.

As has been stated by other noble Lords, these amendments would require that a Minister of the Crown authorise the use of such powers where the amount involved exceeded £10,000. This would also oblige the Public Sector Fraud Authority to maintain a register of instances in which the powers were exercised, with a relevant Minister required to lay a copy of that register before Parliament.

On these Benches, we have been critical throughout the passage of the Bill of the broad powers—and in some cases inadequately checked powers, as described by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux—granted to recover funds identified as perhaps fraudulent. We therefore support these amendments, as they would introduce additional senior authorisation for cases involving substantial sums and provide a necessary level of parliamentary oversight. If the noble Baroness pushes her amendment to a vote, we will support her.

[Baroness in Waiting/Government Whip (Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent) (Lab)]

My Lords, while I appreciate the intention behind these amendments, the reality of their drafting would give Ministers the ability to block politically inconvenient investigations. They would prevent counterfraud enforcement at any kind of scale, and they would expose the identities of civil servants investigating serious criminals. On that basis, we cannot accept them.

Although we cannot agree to the amendments, it might surprise the noble Baroness that I believe there is a lot that we agree on. We agree that the measures in the Bill are powerful and must be used with care; we agree that staff must be appropriately trained before they are able to use these powers; and we agree that robust oversight, both internal and external, is essential.

With regard to ministerial oversight, for as long as the powers sit in the Cabinet Office, they will be exercised in the name of the Minister for the Cabinet Office. However, the amendments go beyond accountability; they bring the Minister into specific operational decisions. It is not appropriate to mandate that the Minister for the Cabinet Office be brought into hundreds of operational decisions in the way that the amendments suggest.

First, Ministers must be free to delegate, or the work of government will grind to a halt. Your Lordships’ House would be rightly concerned if Cabinet Office Ministers, who need to make government more effective and efficient, were spending their days taking detailed counterfraud operational decisions.

Secondly, it would be inappropriate for Ministers—of whichever party happens to be in power—to take operational decisions on individual enforcement cases. That would make enforcement political. It would necessarily expose every case to charges of political interference; it would place honest Ministers in an invidious position; and it would give dishonest Ministers the power to block investigations that were politically inconvenient.

However, the noble Baroness is right that Ministers should know what is happening in their name. Ministers are accountable and must therefore choose how these powers should be delegated, not simply hand them over to civil servants and forget about them until a crisis occurs, which I know is a genuine concern. In response to the noble Baroness’s challenge, let me set out what Ministers will do before any of the powers are used.

Ministers will scrutinise the set-up of the PSFA, its plans to use the powers, the oversight arrangements in place, and the skills and experience of authorised officers and authorised investigators. They will also decide what thresholds they wish to set and what constraints they wish to place around the exercise of powers in their name. Ministers will decide what reports they want to receive and their frequency. They will also decide how they wish to appoint authorised officers and authorised investigators, and will take a strong interest in the training, experience and professionalism of those staff. Finally, Ministers will be accountable to your Lordships’ House and the other place to show that they have done that. I am happy to commit to Ministers bringing forward a statement before the powers are first used to demonstrate that these commitments have been fulfilled. Every time there is a change of Ministers, officials will ask for the new Minister’s view on these questions, and not silently continue out of sight, which I know is a genuine concern of the noble Baroness. She is absolutely right to draw attention to how delegation works in government; it is for Ministers who are accountable to decide on the appropriate delegation.

I turn to the seniority of civil servants provided for in proposed new subsection (1B) in Amendment 28. By requiring senior civil servant sign-off for every use of the powers in Part 1, the noble Baroness seeks to set the bar for internal authorisation too high. Currently, the PSFA’s enforcement unit is relatively small—I love using the word “relatively”; it is not large—so the number of information notices envisaged in a year, for example, could all be reviewed by a senior civil servant. However, we are making this legislation to last decades, and its operation cannot be contingent on keeping our capacity to pursue public sector fraudsters small. At any scale, requiring excessive civil servant grading in legislation is a strict operational limitation and unnecessarily expensive.

That is why those who use these powers successfully elsewhere in government, such as HMRC, do not have these requirements in either their legislation or their practice. It is not the grade that matters; it is skills, experience and professionalism. Authorised investigators and authorised officers in the PSFA will all be members of the Government Counter Fraud Profession. They will undergo bespoke training, on top of the previous knowledge, skills and experience they bring to the role. Current members of the PSFA’s enforcement unit bring a wealth of experience with them. They include former police officers, customs officers and other civil servants who have worked in investigatory roles across a number of departments.

Noble Lords have been clear in this debate that they are particularly concerned about the use of PACE powers. Let me remind your Lordships’ House that it is the courts that will authorise any application that the PSFA makes under PACE. No civil servant—of any grade—nor any Minister can authorise a search warrant or a production order under PACE. Only the courts can authorise such actions, each and every time we seek to use them.

That means that the PSFA must be able to demonstrate, to the court’s satisfaction, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that an offence of fraud has been committed against a public authority and, as set out in PACE, reasonable grounds to believe that the material sought is likely to be of substantial value to the investigation—I repeat: it must be of substantial value. This means that the subject of an application has the protection of a court’s scrutiny before authorised investigators can execute a warrant or production order.

Moreover, the powers in the Bill are subject to review by an independent person, as specified under Clause 65. I have committed to ensure that the independent person will be passed all the concerns raised by parliamentarians, including those we have heard today. The PSFA will be subject to inspections by His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services. Inspection reports will be made publicly available and will be laid before Parliament.

Finally, I turn to the question of maintaining a register that has to be laid before Parliament. We will of course keep meticulous records of how and when powers are used; that would be a bare minimum for good investigatory practice. Those records will be made available to the independent reviewer, who will report on the use of the powers to Parliament, ensuring democratic oversight. However, laying this register before Parliament carries significant risks; it may compromise ongoing cases and expose the identities of investigators to dangerous individuals, jeopardising their safety and the integrity of the justice system. We must remember that we are talking about people who undertake criminal activity—online in some cases—so publishing the names of the investigating officers could make them vulnerable.

On the points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the appalling Horizon scandal, I want to take this opportunity to reassure and remind noble Lords that the scandal was based on private prosecutions that the PSFA will not undertake.

I understand the noble Baroness’s concerns and have set out how Ministers will act in an effort to assuage them, but the amendment cannot stand. It would allow dishonest Ministers to block politically inconvenient investigations, it would make counter-fraud enforcement at any scale impossible, and it would expose the names of officials to the fraudsters they are investigating. I urge the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her reply, but I must be absolutely clear that we are not satisfied that the tests we have set out have been met, or with the responses received. The Government ask this House to confer upon the Public Sector Fraud Authority powers that are extraordinary in scope: powers to compel information, to enter premises, to seize property, and to reach directly into the private finances of individuals. Those are powers that, in any other context, would belong to the police. We have voiced, as has noble Lord, Lord Vaux, reservations about granting police powers to civil servants in this instance.

Our amendments seek to provide a clear statutory foundation for the exercise of those investigator enforcement powers, ensuring that they are explicitly bound by the structures and intentions set out by Parliament. They provide a clear chain of accountability: from the official who exercises the power, through to the Minister who authorises it, and to the Parliament that must ultimately answer for it.

I hear what the Minister says about dishonest Ministers choosing to block an investigation, but ultimately, if a Minister chooses to block an investigation, that is a decision for the Minister who is responsible for the public finances and who will be accountable in Parliament for his or her decision. It is not about putting Ministers in charge of operations. The clear purpose behind these amendments is to create a clear chain of accountability for great powers, because that clarity matters. That is how responsible government works, and that is how public confidence is earned and sustained. Instead, the Government’s proposal leaves the PSFA largely insulated from meaningful scrutiny. It gives immense authority to civil servants, while shielding their actions from the transparency and parliamentary visibility that such authority demands. That is not proportionate oversight.

The recent China espionage scandal has laid bare the dangers of confusion and obfuscation when questions of accountability and responsibility are left unresolved. These amendments would provide the structure and safeguards the Bill so plainly lacks. They do not remove powers, but they make those powers defensible. When we are dealing with an authority that will routinely exercise serious and far-reaching powers, there can be no room for ambiguity. We must have clarity about who is responsible, who is accountable and where the lines of authority lie. These amendments provide that certainty. They embody the minimum requirements for a just and serious law.

We have tried at every stage of the Bill to work constructively with the Government, and I appreciate the engagement we have been given, but the state must be equipped to confront fraud in a way that preserves trust. That trust is earned through transparency and accountability. These amendments offer a constructive and proportionate way to embed those principles into the Bill. We have a duty to ensure that power is never granted without accountability and that no one, however well-intentioned, operates beyond the reach of ministerial and parliamentary scrutiny. For that reason, I wish to test the opinion of the House.

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Moved by

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent]

34: Clause 70, page 37, line 28, leave out from “provision” to end of line 31 and insert “about—
(a) the establishment of the Public Sector Fraud Authority (“the PSFA”), and(b) the transfer of functions conferred by or under this Part to the PSFA or to another public authority.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, together with my amendments to Schedule 2, would give the Minister the power to establish the PSFA by regulations subject to the affirmative procedure (rather than using commencement regulations) and would permit the transfer of functions under Part 1 of the Bill to a public authority other than the PSFA, including on an interim basis if the PSFA is subsequently established.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I now turn to Amendments 34, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40. This group of amendments addresses some concern we have heard throughout the passage of this Bill—most recently from the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, during Grand Committee—that the enforcement unit being part of the Cabinet Office means that there is limited oversight and accountability for the use of the powers in Part 1 of this Bill.

However, setting up the PSFA’s enforcement unit as a stand-alone statutory body would be disproportionate while it is still small. While I strongly believe that the PSFA has established a robust oversight provision and built a multitude of safeguards into this legislation, as well as into its processes and structures, I am aware of how complicated and contentious this space is, particularly in respect of protecting the public from the misuse or incorrect use of powers.

We have therefore tabled this group of amendments to enable the PSFA and the powers in this Bill to be merged with another statutory body, rather than necessarily being set up as a stand-alone statutory body, although the power to do that remains. This builds flexibility into the legislation to achieve the same aim, in terms of separation between investigators and Ministers in future, but avoids the need to set up an entirely new statutory body if it is not considered proportionate to do so.

Importantly, this would enable the PSFA’s enforcement unit to be moved at arm’s length from Ministers sooner, adopting the protections, governance and accountability set out in Schedule 2 to the Bill. As the Government have said during the passage of this Bill, it is not proportionate to set up a new stand-alone ALB for a small enforcement unit. These amendments allow for even a relatively small unit to be placed at arm’s length from Ministers, if desired, without incurring disproportionate overheads.

Ministers also have a responsibility to the taxpayer to ensure public money is spent judiciously and where it is most needed. It is counter to government policy to establish a new statutory body when its function could be undertaken by existing bodies. Building in this flexibility through these amendments enables us to achieve the same policy intent without necessarily adding to the proliferation of ALBs. When it is the right time to establish the PSFA’s enforcement unit at arm’s length from Ministers, that will happen only with engagement, debate and agreement with both Houses of Parliament.

Your Lordships’ House has spoken, and we have listened. I beg to move.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, we give this amendment a partial welcome. It speaks to a principle that we on these Benches have consistently raised in relation to the formation and constitution of the Public Sector Fraud Authority. The change proposed here—that the PSFA should be established through affirmative regulations rather than by simple commencement—is certainly a step in the right direction. It introduces an additional layer of parliamentary scrutiny and prevents the authority from being created entirely at the discretion of the Minister. That is an improvement, and we are pleased to see it reflected in this amendment.

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On our previous day in Committee, I indicated that, alongside my noble friend Lord Younger, I would consider the assurances given to us by the Minister on the review of PACE powers, specifically within the Cabinet Office section. We discussed this on Amendment 35, which I believe will be called after discussion on this group. Having done so, on the back of what the Minister set out last week, I am assured that our concerns in this area have been met. I am therefore not intending to push this matter to a Division. I thank the noble Baroness for working with us on this point to ensure that the independent reviewer in Part 1 has the power to assess the use of PACE powers and whether it meets the metrics that we set out.

[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness and the Opposition Front Bench for their support—not for concessions but for the commitments that I made on Amendment 35. I am pleased that we came to a level of agreement.

I am grateful for the level of support that is available for these government amendments. It would be helpful to confirm that, regardless of the statutory body where the PSFA ultimately ends up, the PSFA as an entity will publish public annual reports on its operations, including on the use of new powers in the Bill and the findings of reviews on the use of these powers. Should the PSFA either transition to a stand-alone statutory body or be merged with an existing arm’s-length body, it will be required by the Bill to produce an annual report for the relevant Minister, who would then lay it before Parliament.

We have put significant safeguards in this legislation, and listened to the debates both in Committee and on Report, to make sure that as many safeguards as can be have been added. These amendments will provide important flexibility regarding the future of the PSFA, when it is put on a statutory footing. They address concerns we have heard through the passage of this Bill about the oversight and accountability of the enforcement unit while in the Cabinet Office and the disproportionality of setting up a new ALB while the unit remains small. I therefore hope that noble Lords will support these amendments.

Amendment 34 agreed.