Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Lord Vaux of Harrowden Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 15th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I began by thanking the noble Baronesses opposite for their constructive engagement with us on the Bill. Our meetings with the Ministers have been genuinely useful, and I welcome the spirit of good faith and collaboration with which the Minister has approached our discussions. Tackling fraud against the public purse is a shared ambition across this House and it is in that constructive spirit that we have brought forward the amendments in this group.

As drafted, Clause 2 provides that the Minister may

“investigate or take enforcement action in respect of suspected fraud against another public authority … only at the request of that public authority”.

In other words, the Public Sector Fraud Authority can act only if invited to do so; indeed, that was the word used by the noble Baroness in Committee. This is an extraordinary limitation to place on an organisation whose very purpose is to root out fraud across government. The Bill seeks to confer considerable powers of investigation and enforcement upon the Cabinet Office, yet the exercise of these powers is ultimately hamstrung by the restriction in Clause 2. The effect is to create a PSFA that is at once empowered and yet toothless: an authority that has wide-ranging powers on paper but which cannot use them unless those potentially under scrutiny choose to permit it.

It cannot be right that a public authority suspected of fraud has the power to decide whether to be investigated. To rely on departments or agencies to invite in the PSFA to look at themselves or their work is, frankly, far too weak. There are obvious disincentives: the reputational risk, the potential embarrassment and the possibility of drawing attention to failings that might otherwise have gone unnoticed. As my noble friend Lord Maude of Horsham notably observed in Committee, assuming that departments will voluntarily expose their own shortcomings is a triumph of hope over experience.

If we are serious about protecting the taxpayer, the PSFA must be able to act proactively—to initiate investigations where credible concerns arise and not to wait passively for a polite invitation that may never come. I have been in government and I know how these things work. We cannot rely on good will; we must be both forthright and proactive in tackling this issue, which is an offence against every single person in this country.

Fraud against the taxpayer is not a matter to be settled or not by an informal phone call between Permanent Secretaries, as we were told could currently happen. Such a situation must be backed up by a statutory mechanism that ensures action is taken swiftly and decisively. Of course, such discussions can and should happen in the first instance, but there needs to be a way to compel such action if necessary. Our amendment would therefore enable the Minister for the Cabinet Office, through the PSFA, to undertake proactive investigations or recovery actions in respect of suspected fraud against a public authority on their own initiative, where it is in the public interest to do so. It would preserve the authority’s own internal fraud functions under subsection (5) but would finally give the PSFA the power it needs to do its job properly.

This amendment is not about centralising control or creating a culture of interference. It is about closing a glaring loophole, one that every complacent official and every fraudster will otherwise see coming a mile off. It is about ensuring that when the PSFA becomes aware of fraud that awareness marks the beginning of an investigation and not the point at which the system grinds to a halt while waiting for consent to be granted.

Alongside this, and in the same spirit of strengthening accountability, we have tabled a second amendment—one which we raised in Committee and return to today—as we believe the Government should take this opportunity to outline how they are working to create a counterfraud duty and culture across public authorities. Amendment 19 would require that, where a recovery made under Clause 10 exceeded £50,000,

“the public authority on whose behalf the amount was recovered must conduct an internal review into the circumstances giving rise to that recovery”

and provide that review to the Minister within three months of completion.

This is a practical, proportionate proposal to ensure that public bodies learn from their mistakes. It seeks to prevent the creation of a pass-the-buck-to-the-PSFA mentality. The PSFA cannot and should not become a convenient dumping ground for departmental failures. Fraud and error often originate within the systems and processes of individual departments. Responsibility for preventing and detecting it must therefore remain with them. I hope, in her remarks on this Amendment 19, that the Minister can set out to this House how this culture is being created, and how authorities are going to be held accountable for the mess in their own houses without simply leaning on the PSFA.

This is a big opportunity for us to get this right. If we want to tackle fraud, then we cannot create a mighty but toothless body with expansive powers on paper but which has no power to go after fraud when it should. We risk creating a situation in which the PSFA is legally unable to tackle fraud, and where it goes unchecked when it is known about but not formally referred to the PSFA. The noble Baroness may stand up and say that she expects many cases to be referred to the PSFA, but this misses the central point, which is that the PSFA must be able to tackle all fraud of which it becomes aware and can have a role in stopping. It is not a question of which cases are referred to the PSFA, but which cases will be missed because the PSFA was not invited to go in after it. This is simply not good enough. We must be really clear now in giving the PSFA the power to tackle wrongdoing proactively. I beg to move.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I speak very briefly in support of Amendment 2. Before I start, I would like to echo the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, about the exemplary engagement on this Bill, which has been extremely constructive. I am very grateful to both noble Baronesses for that.

The Bill as it is currently written creates a range of powers for the Minister of the Cabinet Office to investigate fraud against public authorities and to recover amounts, but the Minister can use those powers only in relation to other public authorities if requested to do so by that public authority. That does seem somewhat perverse. It is not uncommon for those who manage organisations to hide the fact that they have been subject to fraud, because they could be criticised for allowing that fraud. We could have a situation where the Minister has reason to believe that a public authority has been the victim of fraud—perhaps a whistleblower has tipped them off, as in the last group—but, despite having reasonable suspicion, the Minister would not be able to use these new powers. I do not see how that makes sense. If these new powers are to be effective in reducing fraud, it must make sense that the Minister can use them in any situation reasonably considered to be in the public interest, not only when the public authority requests them.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I find myself in a difficult position: I am not usually one to want to give more power to Ministers of State or bodies like the PSFA. However, I am very sensitive to contemporary events in which local authorities have not necessarily always been open about things happening on their watch. I am thinking of things like the grooming-gangs scandal: things happen, and they are covered up. I therefore want to be in a position where the correct authorities can intervene if they suspect something wrong is happening. In that sense, I do with some trepidation support Amendment 2.

However, I also want to emphasise the importance of the second amendment in this group, Amendment 19, because one of the things that is absolutely crucial to building trust—which I know the Minister has emphasised this Bill can do—is that we have transparency, that we are able to see wrongdoing and that it is open for the public to find out what is happening locally. Otherwise, a culture of secrecy could well continue. These amendments are sensible in engendering real trust in the process moving forward.

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[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 3 and 4, tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie. Both concern the information-gathering and information-sharing powers in this Bill, and both are designed to ensure that those powers are exercised with fairness, clarity and restraint.

The first amendment to Clause 3 would require that any information notice issued to a bank or financial institution includes a clear statement that the person named or described in that notice is not necessarily guilty of the suspected fraud. This is an important safeguard. As noble Lords will recall, Clause 3 enables investigators to issue information notices to banks when there is a reasonable suspicion of fraud. That is a proper and necessary power which is central to the operation of the Bill, and we do, of course, accept that. However, it is equally vital that the use of that power does not inadvertently imply culpability on the part of the individual concerned. Particularly in the early stages of implementation, when departments and financial institutions are still adjusting to these new processes, there is a real risk that an information notice could be misinterpreted as a formal accusation of wrongdoing. A simple, clear statement of non-culpability within the notice would prevent that risk. It would protect innocent individuals from reputational harm, ensure that they are not subject to debanking or any action from the side of the bank, ensure transparency in the use of investigatory powers, and demonstrate that the Government are determined to act fairly as well as firmly in the pursuit of fraud.

This is a small addition, but one with significant practical effect. What may seem a technicality in legislation can have a tangible effect on people in the real world—those who will be affected by the words we use and that we approve in this Bill. Clarity on this question would be a small change for the Government, but it could avoid risking some serious and damaging circumstances for those outside this place who have done nothing wrong, but who may nevertheless be presumed to have done so without the sort of clarifications we are suggesting. We therefore hope the Government will look closely at how such a clarification might be built into the final version of the Bill.

The second amendment, to Clause 5, concerns the disclosure of information once it has been gathered. As the Bill stands, Clause 5 allows the Minister to disclose information to another person for the purposes of exercising the powers in the Bill, but it gives no definition of or limitation as to who that other person might be. That is an extraordinarily broad formulation. Our amendment would simply require the Secretary of State to specify, by regulations, the persons or categories of persons to whom such information may be disclosed. This would provide a transparent and accountable framework that allows for flexibility but still ensures that Parliament has visibility of how and where sensitive data can be shared.

We are not seeking to obstruct the legitimate flow of information between public bodies. On the contrary, we recognise that effective information exchange is essential to combat fraud across the public sector, but we must ensure that these powers are not open-ended. We trust the present Minister to use them responsibly, but as noble Lords have often reminded us, we are legislating for future Ministers and Governments, and the safeguards we build in now will protect individuals for years to come.

These are not amendments on which we intend to divide the House. We bring them back to ensure that these important issues are not lost as the Bill progresses, that the Government meet the challenge they raise, and that appropriate assurances or refinements are provided before the Bill leaves this House. Both proposals are constructive. One protects individuals from being unfairly stigmatised when information about them is sought; the other ensures that personal information, once obtained, can be shared only within clear, regulated limits. Together, they speak to a single principle: that strong powers must always be matched by strong safeguards. We therefore hope that the Minister will take these concerns in that spirit and consider how best to address them as the Bill moves forward. We look forward to hearing her response. I beg to move.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to add my support for Amendment 3, which would require any information notice to include a statement that the notice does not imply that the person named is guilty of fraud. This is important because a bank that believes a person is guilty of fraud must take actions that may include closing or freezing accounts, issuing suspicious activity reports, and so on.

This has been an area of much discussion as the Bill has gone through Committee, and I know that the financial services industry has raised a number of concerns. Many of those concerns have been dealt with by amendments tabled by the Minister, but this amendment would put it beyond doubt. It adds no onerous obligations, so I urge the Minister to accept it.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, throughout Committee, concerns were raised about the amount of information-gathering power the state will have, particularly the relationship between banks and the information that could be gained. I cannot emphasise enough the plea that these amendments make, particularly Amendment 3: that it is important when such power is being accrued that we do not forget very important principles such as “innocent until proven guilty”.

There is no doubt that if you have information that suggests that somebody could be guilty of fraud, that does not make them guilty. Unless there is a constant reminder that they are being investigated or information is being gathered, they will potentially be subject not only to stigmatised attitudes but to debanking measures and discriminatory actions, as we have just heard.

I really hope the Minister can reassure us that we are not going to be glib about the impact of the powers the Bill accrues to the state, which could destroy innocent people’s lives. That might not be the Government’s intention, but it could be an unintended consequence. Therefore, this amendment is very important, and we need guidance or reassurance, or to hear the ways in which this could be dealt with.

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[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I have already taken the opportunity to reiterate the concerns I have expressed about parts of the Bill. I find myself in the somewhat against-the-grain position of agreeing with much of what was said on behalf of the Opposition. Amendment 26 seems to me entirely reasonable, given the level of concern that has been expressed about the extension of government powers over matters that are essentially personal. Although we are not going to vote on these amendments, I very much hope that my noble friend the Minister, in replying to the debate, will give a clear assurance that these workings—which, it has to be said, go into new areas of state control—will be looked at on a continuing basis and not automatically become a matter of routine.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I am generally supportive of all the amendments in this group, but particularly Amendments 17 and 22. This Bill, and particularly this part of it, impose a range of onerous obligations on the banks and other financial institutions that are affected by it and that have to respond to information notices and so on. But nowhere does the Bill provide for how the costs that arise from those obligations should be dealt with, or for how to ensure that they are proportionate.

Amendments 17 and 22 simply add an important level of review and transparency, which would allow us to ensure that the costs being imposed on those institutions are reasonable and proportionate. The very fact of the requirement to prepare impact assessments and to review the costs of compliance should of itself ensure that these costs are kept at the forefront of the Government’s mind when using these powers. I therefore hope that the noble Baroness will accept Amendments 17 and 22.

On Amendment 26, I absolutely support the concept. I am just slightly confused as to whether it is not already covered by Clause 65, but I support the principle.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, there are five of these amendments. Amendment 16

“would ensure that the outcome of consultations required by section 38(6) is laid before Parliament prior to the implementation of regulations”.

Amendment 17 is a proposed new clause, which

“would ensure that changes to the means through which deduction orders are processed are accompanied by an impact assessment”.

Amendment 22, which has received some support, would require the Minister to undertake yet another review:

“of the costs banks are having imposed upon them by Part 1 within 12 months of the new section coming into effect”.

Amendment 26 proposes another new clause, requiring the Minister

“to publish an annual report on the use of powers conferred by Part 1 of the Bill, which must then be laid before Parliament”.

Finally, Amendment 112 is a proposed new clause that

“would require the Minister to publish an annual report on the estimated scale of fraud against public authorities”,

which must again be laid before Parliament.

This would be a pretty hefty tome of things to be laid before Parliament: a book all by itself. Whereas these Benches welcome measures that increase clarity and accountability, is it necessary to prescribe additional reporting mechanisms beyond those already established? Our focus has been on ensuring that existing processes are effectively implemented. I do not think they always are, but that is what has to be done. They also have to be accessible, rather than imposing formal obligations that may not meaningfully enhance anything. I understand the thrust of these amendments, but they would produce a tome of regulations—with a line of civil servants to deal with that—yet provide no meaningful improvement.

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[Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent (Lab)]

My Lords, I now turn to government Amendments 23, 24, 68 and 69, regarding the disclosure of information to the independent reviewers. These amendments rightly respond to the challenge put forward in Committee by noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Finn and Lady Kramer, to provide all relevant information to independent reviewers. I am pleased to make these amendments today to demonstrate this Government’s commitment to supporting the independent reviewers in the PSFA and the DWP to carry out robust and transparent reviews.

On the PSFA side, government Amendments 23 and 24 will oblige the Minister to disclose all reasonable information to independent reviewers appointed under Clause 65 for the purposes of carrying out the review. The independent reviewer will determine what information is reasonably required. With regard to the DWP, in Committee my noble friend Lady Sherlock made it clear that the DWP Secretary of State will provide the independent reviewer of eligibility verification measures with all relevant material so that they can carry out their review. Recognising the underlying concern and to clarify our intent, we are today bringing forward government Amendments 68 and 69, which oblige the Secretary of State to disclose necessary information to the independent reviewer of EVM for the purposes of carrying out the review.

To be clear, for both sets of amendments substituting the word “must” for the word “may” does not signal a change in our approach. The Government have always been committed to providing all relevant information that is reasonably required to the respective independent reviewers to support the open and transparent use of powers and to promote accountability. These amendments today reinforce that commitment and make it crystal clear.

I hope that these amendments reassure your Lordships’ House that the Government will provide all relevant information to the independent reviewers, and I encourage noble Lords to back them. I beg to move.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, we have a lot of discussions in this House about the difference between “may” and “must”. I think in this case it is very important. It is essential that the independent reviewers, who are such an important safeguard throughout this Bill, are provided with all the information that they require, so I am delighted and thank the Minister for putting forward those amendments. My joy, however, is not unbridled, because she has caveated the “must” with

“where the information is reasonably required”.

Nowhere in this does it tell us who decides what is reasonable in this case. That opens the possibility of disagreement between the independent reviewer and the department, or the Minister, as to what is reasonable. That is regrettable. It would be better if the independent reviewer decided what they wanted, was given everything they required and it was up to them to decide what was reasonable. This provides the opportunity for doubt and disagreement, and we will come on to that in a later amendment next week. However, overall, I welcome these amendments.