(14 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberI understand the concern that the Select Committee flags up and the reasons why my hon. Friend raises that point here today, but whatever else happens in the SDSR, the Government are absolutely committed to the priority for Afghanistan, and nothing will be done to undermine the efforts of our front-line troops there, nor the way in which they are equipped or supported. That is our paramount, top priority; it remains defence’s main effort and, whatever decisions are taken for the long term, none will be taken that will undermine in the short term the work that we are performing on the front line.
In a recent interview with The Press and Journal, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury said that the social and economic consequences of any base closures or rundowns would be taken into account. Will the Government publish those assessments?
The Government—the Treasury in particular, but all Departments—will take seriously the economic consequences of all the decisions that are taken in the comprehensive spending review. If there are consequences that need to be addressed, every possible effort will be made to put in place remedial measures. How precisely the Government Departments that are responsible for such measures will approach the matter will be explained in due course. It is not predominantly an issue for the Ministry of Defence. All the decisions that are made across all Departments will have consequences, and the Government as a whole will do their utmost to address those consequences.
I do not think that that is within the scope of the study under consideration; the study is about how we might improve the existing programme’s value for money and delivery. Again, I cannot pre-empt the decisions that the National Security Council will arrive at shortly, when it addresses the value-for-money report, but my hon. Friend’s point is considerably wide of its scope.
The coalition agreement also said:
“Liberal Democrats will continue to make the case for alternatives,”
and the Liberal Democrats will. I shall continue to argue that in government; my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) will continue to argue the case for alternatives outwith government. But, the Government are proceeding with the programme, and that is the point that I wish to make clear today. The arrangements that the right hon. Member for Coventry North East left in place are those which the value-for-money report is studying, and to the extent that any better value for money can be squeezed out of the programme, that is the objective of the exercise.
When giving way, there is always a trade-off between allowing people to intervene and eating up the time that they could otherwise use to make their own contributions.
So, by way of conclusion, I simply say that the point has been made that we have not liaised adequately with industry. Industry has a regular dialogue with the Government, and we understand the industrial challenges and issues. We want and need a resilient defence-industrial base, and having a strong defence industry is a formidable strategic asset. It is a key part of our international security relationships, it obviously provides jobs, tax revenues and an improved balance of payments and its long-term prosperity rests also on offering good value for money to the British taxpayer.
We have difficult choices ahead of us, and the SDSR is a highly complex undertaking with many issues interwoven. As we pull the threads together and try to weave a better whole, we have to ensure that we get the balance right not only in defence but in other security services, foreign policy and international development. We must balance those matters with domestic concerns and investment in public services. I cannot say that the final decisions on defence will be pain-free, but that is the same across all Departments. I can say that we will strive to take those decisions based on what is right for the country and for defence as a whole, in the strategic and financial conditions in which we find ourselves.
It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. and learned Member for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell), who echoes many of the points that I have made before in representing what has been described as the most defence-dependent constituency in the UK, as it is home to both RAF Lossiemouth and RAF Kinloss.
I commend the Backbench Business Committee for securing this timely debate. As we all know, the National Security Council and the defence strategy group within the MOD will make key decisions within the next few weeks, so it is very timely for us to discuss this subject this week. I also commend the Defence Committee and its members for their timely report which I hope will be taken on board not only by the MOD, but—and perhaps more importantly—by the Treasury.
The strategic defence and security review is very important because it will determine whether there will be a continuing relationship between the armed forces and many of the regions and nations of the UK. That relationship includes the footprint of service personnel and key contracts such as those for building aircraft carriers on the Clyde and at Rosyth. During a Westminster Hall debate I secured on 20 July 2010, I said:
“I fear that the SDSR will lead to large parts of the UK having no defence infrastructure, with fewer bases, reduced units and manpower, and severely imbalanced defence spending.
There are reasons to believe that Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and some English regions will come off worst. That worrying prospect is supported by past regional and defence statistics issued by the Ministry of Defence. In recent years, the MOD has confirmed that more than 10,000 defence jobs have been lost in Scotland and that there has been a defence underspend in excess of £5.6 billion. The defence underspend statistics for Wales and Northern Ireland in the same period are £6.7 billion and £1.8 billion respectively. No doubt, if the MOD provided regional breakdowns for the English regions those would show that other areas have also been badly disadvantaged.”—[Official Report, 20 July 2010; Vol. 514, c. 65WH.]
I note with interest that the MOD published last week, for the first time, an answer that included English regions. I am surprised that that has not been picked up in the media or in this House. That answer bears out the case that I and the SNP have been making about the massive centralisation of defence spending in recent years.
The parliamentary answer given on 6 September 2010 shows that if one compares what each region receives as a percentage of their population some shocking trends emerge. For instance, in 2007-8 the south-east of England received 172% of its population share of spending, and the south-west received even more, with 247% of its population share. All other nations and regions got less than their fair share. If one excludes London, the two regions of the south-east and south-west of England took up a mammoth 45% of all expenditure, but account for only 22.1% of the population. Most shockingly, the north-east of England accounts for only 1.2% of spending, but has 4.2% of the population. That is a shocking indictment of 13 years of a Labour Government, with the north-east of England largely represented by Labour MPs. I will leave it up to Members from that part of the world to make that case.
More was spent on defence in London—a city—in 2007-08 than was spent in Scotland. MOD spending as a percentage from financial years 2003-04 to 2007-08 increased by 25% in the east midlands, by 21 % in the south-east, and by 15.2% in the south-west. But in the same period, it was down 40% in Wales, down 7.5% in the north-east of England and down 9% in Scotland.
All the statistics I have given were provided by the MOD and are available from Hansard. In Scotland, the defence underspend increased from £749 million in 2002-03 to £1.2 billion in 2007-08. That represents an increase of 68% over six years. Between 2002 and 2008, the underspend in Scotland totalled a mammoth £5.6 billion. So between 2005 and 2008, there has been a drastic real terms decline year on year in defence spending in Scotland. In total, the last Labour Government slashed defence spending by £150 million in those years. There was actually a 3% cut in defence spending between 2006-07 and 2007-08.
Can the hon. Gentleman advise me whether his party’s recent U-turn on an independence referendum is in recognition of the fact that 40,000 defence jobs in Scotland would be lost if it became independent?
The hon. Lady has obviously not been listening to the facts, because under the Government she supported, defence spending was cut in Scotland. Unfortunately, we have had no apology for that. We are going to the country in next year’s election and the people will have their say. Perhaps the Labour party will live up to the invitation from their former leader to “bring it on”, but they may not be so confident about that now. The lack of confidence is not with the SNP, but with the Labour party.
I look forward to an apology from anyone on the Labour Benches for the cuts in spending that Scotland endured and the cuts in jobs that the defence sector in particular suffered. Since Labour’s strategic defence review—according to the MOD’s answers to parliamentary questions—10,480 fewer people are employed in defence jobs in Scotland, including more than 1,800 fewer service personnel, 4,600 civilian jobs and another 4,000 jobs that were supported by defence expenditure. We have had no apology from the Labour party for all those cuts.
Shockingly, there are now only 11,000 service personnel in Scotland. Pro rata, that is fewer per head than in the armed forces of the Irish Republic. If we spent our population’s share of the contribution to the MOD on defence in Scotland, significantly more would be spent and the jobs total would increase.
When Labour was in government, it amalgamated regiments, destroying the golden thread, which was so important to Scottish infantry regiments. In the first tranche of cuts at RAF Lossiemouth, 340 service jobs were lost. In the second tranche in 2005, 700 service jobs were lost. At RAF Leuchars, 160 service jobs were cut and at RAF Kinloss it was 180 service jobs. RAF Buchan and RAF Stornoway were closed and RAF Machrihanish was mothballed. The Royal Navy mooring and support depot at Fairlie was closed. The Royal Naval storage depot at Rosyth was closed and HMS Gannet lost 245 service jobs. That all happened on Labour’s watch and we have yet to have an apology. Since the last SDSR, it has been established as a fact that there have been cuts to defence jobs in Scotland, while MOD statistics show that the numbers have risen elsewhere in the UK. A mammoth, multi-billion pound defence underspend has opened up, and we hear from the SDSR that serious cuts are pending.
Despite the fact that there are fewer air bases and aircraft in Scotland than in our Scandinavian neighbours of comparable size, the SDSR is considering base closures; despite the fact that there are only four Army battalions based in Scotland, there are fears that Scottish-recruited units could be further cut and barracks closed; despite the reduction of conventional naval craft to a handful of minesweepers, there is an option to cut them yet further; and despite military command functions having been recently downgraded in Scotland, a further downgrading is being considered.
There is a real danger in this defence review of a further geographical concentration of the UK defence footprint, away from Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and the north of England: look where the current service headquarters are, look where the main operating bases and garrisons are, look where the main training facilities are, look where the defence budget is being spent, and ask whether this trend is going to continue. As I said in that earlier debate:
“UK Governments have been content to recruit young men and women from across these islands and often to send them into harm’s way. At some point soon, the MOD must ask itself whether it is acting in the interests of the whole UK. Defence policy is not just about strategic and foreign policy considerations, which must of course drive any review; it is also about the defence footprint, about where our personnel are stationed and about where defence resources are spent”—[Official Report, 20 July 2010; Vol. 514, c. 68WH.]
among many other factors.
There is a challenge here to Defence Ministers, the Conservative party and the Liberal Democrats: will they intervene in the SDSR to ensure a balanced defence footprint across the nations and regions of the UK? We will not have to wait long to find out, but I hae ma doots.
With the leave of the House, Mr Deputy Speaker, I will reply. This has been a good debate. When the Backbench Business Committee decided on this subject for today’s debate, it would have been pleased to think we would get 30 speeches from the Floor of the House of such wide-ranging nature and all of a positive and constructive tone. As I said at the beginning, the SDSR has not yet made any of the big decisions, but it is just about to do so. This could not, therefore, have been a more timely moment for everyone who wished to put the points that they have made today to do so. I reaffirm our commitment to take away all the points made and give them the most serious consideration.
As ever in the House when we are discussing the armed forces, the debate has been informed by the personal experience, background and understanding of many Members. What has been most evident across the political divide is the respect shared by all Members of the House for the commitment and dedication of the brave men and women who serve in our armed forces. They are a credit to the country, and we are rightly proud of them.
As I anticipated, hon. Members from all parts of the country have rightly made the case for their local area, as is their responsibility. We have heard from places as far apart as the Outer Hebrides and Cornwall, and most points in between. Hon. Members with naval bases or a military or industrial footprint in their constituency all made points about the impact that any decision might have in their area. It is proper that they do so, but I hope they understand that it is not possible at this point in the process for me to respond or offer comfort on each and every point.
I will, but in the short time I have available, I do not want to make this a precedent.
This is very much in response to where the Minister is in his comments. Given that he has paid so much close attention to hon. Members who have spoken for the interests of their parts of the country, is he surprised that, given the importance of aircraft carriers, not one Labour Member from Glasgow or Fife has bothered to turn up or speak in the debate?
I suppose I am mildly surprised not even to have seen the usual suspects. In fairness, we have heard from them before very many times on these matters, so I think we can rest assured that their perspective is understood. The right hon. Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth) said, quoting me from before the election, that all parts of the political community interested in defence would need to get together to make our views clear to the Treasury—“kick up rough” was his expression.
(14 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberIt is vital for the UK clearly to identify our sovereign capability requirements and to pursue them rigorously. That is why we will publish a consultation document later in the year, asking for full consultation on the process to ensure that we have the industrial capability, skills base and regulatory framework to ensure that what my hon. Friend has outlined is made possible.
Since the last strategic defence review, more than 10,000 defence jobs have been lost in Scotland. Bases have been closed and regiments amalgamated, and there has been a mammoth defence underspend of £5.6 billion. Will the Secretary of State tell us how the Ministry of Defence will take these facts into account and ensure that consideration and fairness is given to defence spending in all the nations and regions of the UK?
The priority in the defence review is to ensure that the UK has at its disposal what it needs for its wider national security and that the industrial implications of that are taken into account. I intend to have discussions with the devolved Administrations over the coming weeks to be fully apprised of their concerns about the industrial implications of the SDSR. Ultimately, in a constrained financial environment the No. 1 procurement priority is to ensure that the armed forces have what they need when they need it at a reasonable cost to the taxpayer.
(14 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberMost certainly they do, and I accept that it is our job to question everything. The problem is that we have made some fundamental mistakes. I am not blaming anyone, but we made mistakes in 2006 when we dissipated our forces so they were in platoon houses and were not within the envelope. That meant that they could not have protection from artillery, and we had to use air power instead. The air power protecting them knocked out houses around them and killed local people, turning the people against our forces. In 2007 and 2008 we had gone back to counter-insurgency tactics—taking, holding, building—and our gallant troops went in to take, but they could not hold. They had to withdraw. Perhaps Members remember those pictures of helicopters flying with men strapped aboard to try to bring troops back. We could not hold the ground. Also, of course, our enemy came in and put devices on the ground that caused real problems, and they continue to do so to this day.
We now have a situation in which there is an increase in the number of soldiers on the ground, principally from the United States, and the principles of counter-insurgency are, in fact, beginning to work. They are protecting the people, and the key is whether the Afghan people feel protected and safe and can live a decent life.
I am going to keep going, because I do not have much time left.
We all know that we have a real problem in Afghanistan. We have a military aim, which is probably relatively simple: to make sure that Afghanistan never threatens us again. We also have a political aim, which is, fundamentally, that we want Afghanistan to have a decent lifestyle and to take its part in the international community, and also that we do not want to allow groups such as the Taliban to return to the country, and thereby threaten us. The job our troops are doing is very difficult; I am clear about that.
I want to conclude by talking briefly about what we can do. The fact of the matter is our soldiers require our support. I accept the point that they have a problem with understanding the nuances of people saying, “We support our troops, but we don’t support the war.” When we talk to them, they say, “Come off it, we’re out here doing a mission; support us! Don’t just say, ‘We support you.’ We don’t quite get that.” One of them said to me, “Are you smoking dope?” [Interruption.] I was not, actually; I never have smoked dope, and if I had, I would have been chucked out of the Army. Another one said to me about the strategic situation and the tactical decisions made, “Isn’t it strange, Bob, that in this country we penalise our soldiers for losing a rifle more than we penalise our generals for losing a war?” We have not made some decisions very well thus far.
There is now great optimism that we will be able to reach the endgame, and get to a situation where our troops can come home and feel that John Sanderson and 333 other young men—and one woman, I think—have given their lives for something worth while. That is terribly important. I pay great tribute to what our armed forces are doing, of course, and I want them all to come home soon—as soon as possible, and before 2014 if that is achievable—but the only way they can come home quickly is if we get it right, give them what they require and understand that we are fighting a war. Let us imagine what would have happened if there had been reductions in the defence budget when we were at war in 1940. I know that our country has a big economic problem, but we have to make sure that those people who are running huge risks on our behalf are given everything they require and our support. I therefore ask the House to support the motion.
The situation now is that the Taliban are not in power because of al-Qaeda, as the Taliban well know. The Taliban already control at least half the country, and al-Qaeda has not been allowed in. There is no problem here; this is a false argument. We have created this myth that, somehow, if we pull out, al-Qaeda will have an area in which to operate. It already has Pakistan in which to operate, and Somalia and Yemen.
I take the point about how our soldiers will perceive what is said in the House, however. I, like most Members, have had the torment of trying to say to constituents who have lost loved ones that they died in a cause that was just and honourable. It is no reflection on the quality and bravery of our troops to say that this war has been, certainly since 2006, a grave error. There were people in this House and in the military—one military person resigned over this—who said in 2006 that our going into Helmand then was stirring up a hornet’s nest. At that point only two British soldiers had died in combat, but now the figure is 334 and the rate is accelerating; the 200th soldier to die, who came from Gwent, died last August. The bloodiest year so far for British troops in Afghanistan was 2009, but if things continue as they are, 2010 will be far worse. The rate at which British soldiers have been killed in Afghanistan is now four times that of our United States counterparts.
The whole operation is continuing and there is no possible outcome that will be just and honourable. Both Governments have been in denial. We have heard optimism, and nothing but, year after year and in debate after debate, when they have told us that we have turned the corner. The Deputy Prime Minister used the same expression the other day, saying that things are going well now and we just have to hang on. We have turned so many corners that we have been around the block half a dozen times in Afghanistan, but we are still in hell and the situation is still getting worse. We believe in the possibility that the Afghan national army can take over, but it is mainly drug addicted and it routinely oppresses its own people. In one incident, 300 members of the Afghan army were guarding a convoy when they were attacked by seven members of the Taliban and they fled, with their commander saying, “Why should they sacrifice their lives and kill fellow Afghans in order to defend a corrupt leader from a different clan and to promote the policies of a foreign country?” Indeed, one is entitled to ask that.
The Afghan police service routinely extorts money from its own citizens. When the police went into the village of Penkala, the local elders came forward and said, “Last time they came here, they practised bacha bazi on our young boys.” That refers to the routine ritual sexual exploitation of young boys. They also said, “The Taliban were here before. They were wicked people, but they were people of principle.” The Afghan police are a criminal police service. Many of them are not paid, so they are expected to get their money in this way.
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that in addition to all those problems, massive challenges are affecting the Afghan Government and Afghan authorities at a national level? Those organisations are the ones that we are supposed to be supporting. A financial scandal is currently engulfing Afghanistan, and it involves the elites around President Karzai. Is the hon. Gentleman content that our brave young servicemen and women are dying in support of those elites?
No, I am certainly not, and the hon. Gentleman is right in what he says. Minister after Minister has said, “We are going to tackle corruption; the corruption is impossible and we must do something about it.” When we ask them what we must do, nobody has the slightest idea. What we are doing, and what we are trying to do, is fight corruption with our sort of ethical corruption; we have taken corruption and bribery and put it on an industrial scale. The Americans are moving in with pallets piled high with bubble-wrapped stacks of $100 bills; our way of working in Afghanistan is based on our own variety of corruption.
Afghanistan is a country where there is not going to be a happy ending. We are never going to get the tribal groups to work together and we are not going to get the warlords to behave reasonably. These warlords have committed atrocities and they now have their members sitting in the Afghan Parliament. We went in with this idea that there was a simple solution, possibly a military one, but we know that that is not possible.
On the question raised by the hon. Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart), may I say that although we praise the bravery of the troops and weep for their sacrifices, especially in respect of those who receive little attention—those who have been maimed in battle and will suffer the wounds for the rest of their lives—that is no excuse for saying that as so many have been killed, more should be killed to justify those deaths? Those deaths were avoidable and the fact that this House did not oppose the expedition into Helmand province in 2006 is responsible for them; this is not down to anybody else. We should have said at that time that it was not plausible to suggest that we can go into Helmand—that is so for the very reasons that the Afghans say. They are fighting us because we are the ferengi: we are foreigners. Every generation of Afghans has fought against foreigners.
In 2001, a member of the Russian Duma slapped me on the back and said, “Oh, you Brits have succeeded in capturing Afghanistan, very clever. We did it in six days and we were there for 10 years. We spent billions and billions of roubles, we killed 1 million Afghans and we lost 16,000 of our soldiers. When we ran out, there were 300,000 mujaheddin in the hills ready to take over, just waiting their turn. It will happen to you.” It has happened throughout history; no army has gone into Afghanistan, conquered it and occupied it. The task is impossible.
I completely agree. In fact, that issue is discussed even more widely—not just in the United Kingdom but throughout the coalition. One of the issues we discussed at the recent defence ministerial summit was how to improve strategic communication and how to maintain the resilience of our operation by maintaining the support of our publics, recognising that one of the problems is that the Taliban do not have to maintain the democratic support of anybody at all. Communication is a strength but also a potential weakness and it is correct that the right strategic narrative is essential in maintaining support and resilience.
We need to be clear about where successes are occurring, and part of that communication is telling people about successes. Less than six months ago, Afghan national army strength stood at about 107,000 trained soldiers, with a target of reaching 134,000 by October 2010. The Afghan Government met that target two months early. The Afghan national police force has grown to more than 115,000. I am the first to admit that challenges remain with its capability, but notable successes have been achieved, even over the past few weeks, such as the interdiction of bombers in Logar province just last week. Good things are happening, and we must not allow ourselves to believe that there is a non-stop tale of failure, as some would like to portray the situation.
In Helmand, the Afghan national army and police, working side by side, with minimal ISAF support, led on the planning and conduct of Operation Omid Do, which has extended security into former insurgent safe havens in northern Nahr-e Saraj. Increasingly, ISAF patrols operate jointly with the ANA as partnering is rolled out. Of course, there are risks associated with partnering and we are trying to reduce them to a minimum, but partnering is the quickest, most effective, and so the safest, way to build a capable Afghan national security force—the key to bringing our forces home.
Failure would not only risk the return of civil war in Afghanistan, which would create a security vacuum; we would also risk the destabilisation of Pakistan with significant regional consequences, as the hon. Member for Ilford South (Mike Gapes) correctly pointed out. The second reason why we must not fail is that it would be a shot in the arm to jihadists everywhere, re-energising violent, radical and extreme Islamism. It would send the signal that we did not have the moral resolve and political fortitude to see through what we ourselves have described as a national security imperative. Premature withdrawal of the international coalition would also damage the credibility of NATO—the cornerstone of the defence of the west for more than half a century. Our resolve would be called into question, our cohesion weakened, and the alliance undermined. Our influence over the region and our contribution to wider stability would be severely diminished.
Will the Secretary of State confirm that the central policy for the intervention in Afghanistan is still based on support for Afghan institutions and their ability to govern in Afghanistan? If so, why has he not mentioned what is happening at present, which is the wholesale collapse of that country’s financial system around a coterie associated with the President of Afghanistan we are supposed to be supporting? Why has he not mentioned that so far?
I shall come to a number of issues about the wider political element, but as the hon. Gentleman has raised it, I will say that the prime reason for being in Afghanistan is our national security: to ensure that the territory is not used again as a base for training and attacks by terrorists, the likes of which we saw on 9/11. It is to ensure that we degrade the threat, so that the Afghan security forces are able to deal with it themselves, without having to refer to the international community.
The second audience listening today is our armed forces and the wider defence community. They need to know that they have our support, not just for who they are, as my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) said, but for what they are doing and for the sacrifices that they are making. They need to know also that the ISAF coalition is providing all that they need to succeed in their mission. Our armed forces know that there is no such thing as a risk-free war, a casualty-free war or a fatality-free war. They accept that. They are professional people and volunteers every one. That is what makes them truly special. They want our support, not our sympathy. They want to be victors not victims.
In July, the Government agreed to a request from ISAF to deploy temporarily about 300 additional troops from the theatre reserve battalion in order to supplement the UK force of more than 9,500 troops and ensure that the progress being made in Operation Moshtarak was consolidated and exploited. The TRB will enable the redeployment of US forces in Sangin and of UK forces to central Helmand.
On 2 August, two additional RAF Tornado GR4s arrived in Kandahar, again in response to a request from the commander of ISAF for an increase in air support. Those aircraft joined the eight Tornados that have already been provided in order to support the multinational pool, not just our forces, and they have boosted the available flying hours by 25%, or an extra 130 flying hours per month. We announced extra funding for base protection and close-combat equipment and more counter-IED funding. All that will enable UK forces to consolidate the hold in central Helmand as the force there thickens, and to partner the Afghan security forces more effectively. It demonstrates our commitment to the coalition and to the ISAF strategy for Afghanistan.
The third audience who will be listening today are our allies and partners. They should be assured of Britain’s commitment to the shared strategy, and of our determination to play our part in protecting not only our national security but that of our international partners. There are now more international forces in Afghanistan than ever, and that is allowing real progress on governance and development. However, just as a more secure Afghanistan will not come about without military means, it will not come about by military means alone, as my hon. Friend the Member for Colchester (Bob Russell) said.
At the Kabul conference in July, the international community supported the Afghan Government’s vision of progress on security, governance, economic growth, the rule of law, human rights, countering corruption and reconciliation. There is a very long way to go on many of those fronts, and the Afghan Government themselves must understand that they need to make progress on many of them in order to take advantage of the improved security situation that the international coalition is bringing.
That political track, which runs alongside training the Afghan army and the military surge, is vital. In order to progress it, an Afghan high peace council will oversee a process towards a political settlement for all the Afghan people, underpinned by the $150 million peace and reintegration trust fund.
On 18 September, just a couple of weeks away, Afghanistan will hold its first parliamentary elections since the 1960s to be run entirely by Afghans themselves. The elections will not be perfect, and none of us should expect them to be, but they represent progress. Progress is being made on security and governance. It is hard and it is slow and it is very variable, but it is real, and as Afghan sovereignty grows, so the nature of ISAF’s operations and the role of our forces will evolve.
What is clear to me, what was clear to the previous Government and what must be clear to our allies in ISAF is that, as responsibility for security is transferred to the Afghans, any draw-down in force levels must be done coherently by the alliance. It must be done by an international coalition, not by individual nations. The issue is about phasing out, not walking out.
We also need to strengthen the training mission even further. Some countries might have political or constitutional problems with sending combat troops. We are not happy about that, and we never have been, but we understand it. However, there is absolutely no reason why any NATO country cannot do more to help train the Afghan national security force; it is a measure of our commitment and resolve as an alliance.
The fourth audience listening to our debate today will be our opponents and enemies: insurgent groups, the Taliban, al-Qaeda and the violent extremists who support them. Some have claimed that, by talking of our determination to succeed within the time scale set out in the counter-insurgency strategy, we give succour to our opponents. That is not the case, and let me explain why.
Over the past few years the strategic position of the insurgency has begun to crumble. Pakistan is taking the threat seriously, and the safe haven that used to exist in that country is gradually being squeezed by the Pakistani security forces. Pakistan, too, is making substantial and significant sacrifices, among its civilian population and its military, as they hunt down al-Qaeda and violent extremists in their own country. We would do well to recognise that sacrifice.
(14 years, 4 months ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I am pleased to have secured this debate on Ministry of Defence regional and national statistics, because as we speak the strategic defence and security review, which is looking at the shape and role of United Kingdom conventional defence policy, is under way in the MOD. Given the extreme financial constraints, we expect to learn about radical changes to the UK armed forces when the SDSR reports before the end of this year. The Royal United Services Institute expects a 20% reduction in manpower and a budget cut of between 10% and 15%. In that context, MOD statistics and facts relating to UK defence are key in informing the SDSR, as well as in holding the MOD and UK Government to account.
Although it is essential that the SDSR be driven by defence, foreign and security policy priorities, it must also be relevant to consider what defence footprint there has been and what there will be in the future. I fear that the SDSR will lead to large parts of the UK having no defence infrastructure, with fewer bases, reduced units and manpower, and severely imbalanced defence spending.
There are reasons to believe that Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and some English regions will come off worst. That worrying prospect is supported by past regional and defence statistics issued by the Ministry of Defence. In recent years, the MOD has confirmed that more than 10,000 defence jobs have been lost in Scotland and that there has been a defence underspend in excess of £5.6 billion. The defence underspend statistics for Wales and Northern Ireland in the same period are £6.7 billion and £1.8 billion respectively. No doubt, if the MOD provided regional breakdowns for the English regions those would show that other areas have also been badly disadvantaged.
Most shocking of all in an advanced modern democracy is that the UK Government have decided that, rather than explain the impact of their policies, manpower cuts and spending disparities, they will simply stop providing the statistics. I should point out that regional and national defence statistics are available in other countries. With a mouse click, one can access such information down to state level in the United States. In Canada, a nation with close parliamentary and military links to the UK, the Department of National Defence produces similar statistics, both at provincial and constituency level. Those and other countries think that it is right and proper to confirm their employment and spending decisions, and that clearly impacts on their policy thinking. Until recently, that was also the case in the UK, where the Ministry of Defence answered questions relating to regional defence employment and regional spending.
The MOD has confirmed that there are now 10,480 fewer people employed in defence jobs in Scotland than in 1997, which amounts to 1,880 fewer services personnel and 4,600 fewer civilian jobs in addition to the loss of 4,000 jobs that were supported by defence expenditure. Those are MOD statistics. That leaves the current uniformed contingent in Scotland roughly at around 11,000, which is less per head of population than the armed forces of the Irish Republic.
A series of parliamentary questions on defence spending has, until recently, been answered by the MOD making estimates of how much it has spent in each nation of the UK. That has been broken down by service personnel costs, civilian personnel costs, equipment expenditure and non-equipment expenditure, such as utilities and maintenance, and so on.
There is a complete MOD data set from 2002 to 2008 that shows a significant and widening structural defence underspend relative to population in Scotland: it has increased from £749 million in 2002-03 to £1.259 billion in 2007-08, which represents a 68% increase in six years. Between 2002 and 2008, the underspend in Scotland totalled a mammoth £5.6 billion. Between 2005 and 2008 there was a drastic real-terms decline year on year in the defence spending in Scotland: in total, the previous Labour Government slashed defence spending by £150 million in those years. There was a 3% cut in defence spending between 2006-07 and 2007-08 in Scotland. Those are MOD statistics. Widening the statistics to include Wales and Northern Ireland, in the six years from 2002 to 2008, there was an accumulated underspend of £14.2 billion. Looking at the overall trend, in Scotland and Wales in each of the past six years the underspend figure has gone up faster than the overall budget of the MoD, highlighting a situation that is getting progressively worse, squeezing each country more each year.
Although the MOD budget has not increased every year in real terms, figures on the percentage change from 2002 to 2008 show that its budget increased by 24%, but the underspend increased by more than 50%. In each of the past five years, the amount spent in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland combined has been less than the UK spends overseas. Money spent overseas does not include current operations, such as Afghanistan, and the like. For example, a larger contingent of troops is stationed in Germany than is based in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland combined.
These facts are shocking and they pose problems for the MOD to answer. Hansard shows that despite numerous attempts to get Ministers and Prime Ministers to explain the underspend and jobs cuts, no explanation has been forthcoming. Instead, the MOD hit on the novel idea of simply not answering the questions any more. In 2009, tucked away in a report, the MOD confirmed that:
“Ministers have agreed that after this year (2009) the Ministry of Defence (MOD) will no longer compile national and regional employment estimates because the data do not directly support MOD policy making and operations.”
On 6 April, the then Secretary of State for Defence provided what turned out to be the last parliamentary answer on defence expenditure in Scotland. He explained:
“Since 2008 the MOD has not collected estimates of regional expenditure on equipment, non-equipment, or personnel costs as they do not directly support policy making or operations.”—[Official Report, 6 April 2010; Vol. 508, c. 1200W.]
Rather than provide the information, which is readily available in the Ministry of Defence, the decision was taken just to stop providing it. Of course, that decision was taken under the Labour Government. I hope that the rhetoric in the public pronouncements about transparency and new politics by the incoming Government is matched by their openness.
On page seven of the coalition agreement, the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister say:
“we are both committed to turning old thinking on its head and developing new approaches to government. For years, politicians could argue that because they held all the information, they needed more power. But today, technological innovation has—with astonishing speed—developed the opportunity to spread information and decentralise power in a way we have never seen before. So we will extend transparency to every area of public life.”
Section 16 of that agreement, which is entitled “Government Transparency”, says:
“The Government believes that we need to throw open the doors of public bodies, to enable the public to hold politicians and public bodies to account.... Setting government data free will bring significant economic benefits”.
Two specific commitments are mentioned. The Government say that, first:
“We will require full, online disclosure of all central government spending and contracts over £25,000”;
and secondly:
“We will create a new ‘right to data’ so that government-held datasets can be requested and used by the public, and then published on a regular basis.”
That is good. Given those clear, unambiguous commitments, I was delighted to hear similar claims of openness from the new Defence ministerial team during the House of Commons debate on the strategic defence and security review a few weeks ago. Hansard records that the new Armed Forces Minister, whom I welcome to the Chamber, said:
“Hon. Members—and everybody else—have the opportunity to contribute and make whatever representations they wish to make. If there are hon. Members who feel that they are under-informed, and want more information to inform representations that they might make during the review, they need only let us know. Ministers have an open-door policy, and Members are welcome to any further information that they feel they need.”
That prompted me to intervene, saying that the previous Government had provided this information and asking whether the new coalition would do so. He replied:
“Yes. Whatever information right hon. and hon. Members need in order to make representations to the review”.
I intervened to make doubly sure, asking,
“Is that a yes?”
The Minister answered unambiguously,
“That is a yes. Hon. Members need only ask for any information that they need.”—[Official Report, 21 June 2010; Vol. 512, c. 132.]
Naturally, I was delighted and impressed, and I wrote a grateful letter to the Minister. I received a reply on the same day. In the blink of an eye, he wrote:
“I regret that I may have given you a misleading impression on what information the Government can provide… I am sorry to send you what I know will be a disappointing response”.
In an instant, the Ministry of Defence reneged on its promise to the House of Commons and, by extension, the Government reneged on their coalition agreement on openness and transparency.
There are other vital clues that should make everyone who is concerned about a defence footprint across the UK examine the matter closely. Apparently, the UK Government believe that there is
“no clear defence benefit to be gained”
by collating statistics by region. Apparently, national and regional data do not directly support MOD decision making. Frankly, that is code for there being no benefit to the Government from being open, honest and transparent about their policy decisions and how they impact on the nations and regions of the UK.
In recent years, UK Governments have cut back manpower, amalgamated regiments and closed facilities in Scotland. Since the last strategic defence review, defence jobs in Scotland have been cut while numbers have risen elsewhere in the UK. A mammoth multi-billion pound defence underspend has opened up and we hear from the SDSR that serious cuts are pending. Despite Scotland having fewer airbases and aircraft than our Scandinavian neighbours of comparable size, the SDSR is considering base closures. Despite only three Army battalions being based in Scotland, there are fears that Scottish-recruited units could be further cut and barracks closed. Despite the reduction in the number of conventional naval craft to a handful of minesweepers on the Clyde, there is an option to cut them still further.
The hon. Gentleman clearly knows his material and will be aware that published Ministry of Defence statistics show the vital role that the shipbuilding and refitting industry plays in many regions in Scotland. He will know the devastating impact that cancellation of the second aircraft carrier would have on the Scottish economy. Will he join me in congratulating the Labour and Scottish National party leaderships on Fife council, who have put aside their political differences, such is the importance of the shipbuilding and refitting industry to Fife and elsewhere?
I am delighted that SNP-led Fife council and the Labour Opposition are working as colleagues, because the matter is one of concern in Fife and on the Clyde, as well as in other parts of the country where a defence footprint remains. That is all the more reason why we need as many facts and figures as possible to understand the current situation and what it might be in future. The areas that I have mentioned are not the only ones to be affected; there are also questions involving military command functions that have recently been downgraded in Scotland, and apparently a further downgrading is being considered.
A real danger in the defence review is a further geographical concentration of the UK defence footprint away from Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and some English regions. Hon. Members should look where the current service headquarters are, where the main operating bases and garrisons are, where the main training facilities are, and where the defence budget is being spent, and ask whether the trend of geographic concentration will continue.
The Government may believe that they can hide the consequences of their centralising priorities and policies by refusing to publish key statistics, but it will be hard to avoid the facts on the ground. UK Governments have been content to recruit young men and women from across these islands and often to send them into harm's way. At some point soon, the MOD must ask itself whether it is acting in the interests of the whole UK. Defence policy is not just about strategic and foreign policy considerations, which must of course drive any review; it is also about the defence footprint, about where our personnel are stationed and about where defence resources are spent.
The UK Government must end the secrecy on regional and national defence statistics and the SDSR must consider the impact of its deliberations on the nations and regions of the UK. If it is good enough for other countries to do, it is good enough for the UK Government to do; if it is what is in the coalition agreement, it is what they should deliver on; and if it is what was promised in the House of Commons, it should not be reneged on.
(14 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe Government recently made a commitment to publish regional and national defence expenditure statistics and then, within days, reneged on it. Does the MOD have any commitment to equitable defence spending throughout the UK?
If Scotland accepted the case for the nuclear deterrent, the hon. Gentleman’s argument would be a lot more impressive.
(14 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move,
That this House has considered the matter of the strategic defence and security review.
On this sad day when the House has heard the news of the 300th member of the armed forces losing his life in Afghanistan, our thoughts and prayers are with his family and friends, as well as with all those other service families who are mourning their losses. It is also appropriate to remember the families of the victims of violence from 9/11 to the present day. We did not initiate this cycle of violence, but we will certainly confront it.
I am pleased to open this debate on the Ministry of Defence contribution to the strategic defence and security review. All parties in the House committed themselves at the election to holding this review. The Green Paper from the previous Government, with its all-party approach, produced broad agreement on the need for fundamental reform, and I am sure that all Members will agree and reiterate that the defence of the nation should be above the worst excesses of partisan party politics.
In this review, we will need to challenge many preconceptions and think clearly about what we as a country want and need from our armed forces, and what we can afford. I want to ensure that we benefit from the expertise in the wider defence community, including partners in industry, academia, non-governmental organisations and the charitable and voluntary sector.
It is also essential that members of the House of Commons have a proper opportunity to make their views known on behalf of themselves and those whom we represent. In that light, Members submissions on the defence review should be made directly to me at the Ministry of Defence. Those in the other place with specialist interests will also be especially welcome to make submissions. Most importantly, the Prime Minister and I are determined that members of the armed forces and their families have an opportunity to contribute, and the service chiefs will set out shortly how that will be achieved. There has already been a lively debate about the choices that we face, and the MOD will continue to engage. Today, I shall set out the coalition Government’s broad approach to the defence review, an assessment of the financial backdrop, a description of the strategic environment and, finally, the way ahead.
Conducting a defence review while fighting a war in Afghanistan is rather like trying to build a ship while still at sea. Afghanistan must remain our priority, and as part of the international coalition of 46 nations we must prevail. None the less, after 12 years without a defence review, when our armed forces have at times been overstretched, with some current equipment overused or out of date, with programmes from the cold war that are of less relevance today, and in our dreadful economic and financial circumstances, it is clear that change must come. The review will need to provide a step change, not salami-slicing. We will have to bring defence policy, plans, commitments and resources into balance, confront the harsh facts of the economic climate in which we operate and make a clean break from the military and political mindset of cold war politics.
Let me give the House just one example. In the past, military might has been measured by conventional capabilities, such as tanks, aircraft and ships that we can inspect and review; but technology is already moving on at such a rate that there are new domains of warfare, such as cyber and space, where we will require capabilities in which the Government will have to invest but which the public might not be able to see. We also see the development of asymmetrical capabilities that serve to deny us the effectiveness of our conventional capabilities. It makes sense for any adversary to develop what are commonly referred to as area-denial or anti-access strategies in order to deny us the use of our conventional military capabilities without matching us tank for tank, ship for ship or jet for jet. We should not hope that our adversaries do not do so; we should expect and plan that they will; and it is vital that the review consider that point.
I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on his new position. Ministry of Defence statistics show that since the previous strategic defence review there have been more than 10,000 defence job losses in Scotland and an under-spend of more than £5.6 billion. What consideration will be given in this SDSR to ensure a fair and balanced defence footprint throughout the nations and regions of the United Kingdom?
The point of the review is to ensure that we have the proper defence for the United Kingdom. We will have further things to say about the defence industrial strategy and how we will take that forward, not least because it represents high levels of employment in some economically less well-off parts of the United Kingdom, and we will come to the House with those proposals in the near future.
The defence review inevitably involves, as we have heard this afternoon, the consideration of abstracts and concepts, but the 300th death in Afghanistan is eloquent reality. As the shadow Defence Secretary indicated a moment ago, for every one of those people, 300 families are in mourning. We have a brief acknowledgement of the sacrifice, but for those families, the sacrifice goes on for as long as they live. Particularly when we see the montages of the 300 people who have lost their lives, we must think about the promise, discipline and service that have been cut down by the fact of their deaths. That is why on these occasions we should think more than in a perfunctory way about what it costs to defend our country and the sacrifice that, sometimes painfully, must be made.
Iraq and Afghanistan have skewed our priorities, but more than anything else, they have breached the assumptions of the 1998 defence review. They have put an intolerable financial burden on the Ministry of Defence, and indeed on the Government’s Contingencies Fund. I spend a little time referring to Iraq and Afghanistan because neither the duration nor the intensity of either was anticipated by the 1998 defence review, which was none the less regarded as a successful operation. Indeed, if I may pick up a point that the shadow Defence Secretary made, part of that success was due to the degree to which there was consultation, and the degree to which people were invited in—not asked to make written submissions, but actually allowed to sit face to face with John Reid and George Robertson, and to argue the case with them. If that is not to be possible on this occasion, the Government will, in a sense, be restricting themselves, and perhaps shutting off a degree of help, assistance and contribution that would enable the conclusions of the defence review to be well founded.
The principles of a defence review are easy to articulate. One must establish the foreign policy objectives or baseline; assess what military capability is necessary to enable one to achieve those objectives; and finally allocate the resources. In 1998, the Government never published their foreign policy baseline, but if they had, it would not have included the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, because that came after 1998, in a speech made by Prime Minister Blair in Chicago. However well founded and well regarded it is, it is an element of British policy, with military consequences, that was not embraced by the 1998 review.
The review envisaged one short-term, high-intensity conflict going on at the same time as a medium-term operation such as peacekeeping, but in fact we had two hot wars being fought simultaneously, plus Sierra Leone—a notable success of Prime Minister Blair’s, in my view, and, of course, there was Kosovo, where, it has to be acknowledged, he was responsible for holding the feet of the rather reluctant American President to the fire, thereby producing an outcome that all of us regarded as the best possible.
In spite of the success attributed to the 1998 review, there was a continuing argument about resources and, in particular, helicopters. The reason that I point to that is that we imagine that there is some kind of immaculate conception of a defence review, but the truth is that it is based on assumptions and judgments, and the unexpected will almost certainly be part of the terrain that defence has to cover in the next 20 or 25 years.
There is an element of rush about the review. When one considers the complexity of the issues at stake, setting a time limit of a few months is unwise. I would like the foreign policy baseline to be not only published, but the subject of debate in this House, because it is on that baseline that subsequent decisions will rest. If there is not unanimity, or at least general consensus, on the foreign policy baseline, what comes thereafter will undoubtedly be regarded by some as flawed.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman is generous to give way. Does he appreciate that it is not simply carrying out the strategic defence review within the time scale that is problematic, but the fact that the comprehensive spending review and the Ministry of Defence’s planning round 11—PR11—are all happening at exactly the same time?
Indeed. During earlier exchanges, the thought occurred to me that, if there were any Treasury Ministers looking in on the debate, they certainly were not getting any encouragement about a willingness on the part of anyone in any part of the House to give up any capability or programme, or any installation or base that happened to be in their constituency.
It is an honour to follow the hon. Member for Fylde (Mark Menzies), who, in the finest tradition of maiden speakers, was gracious towards his predecessor and agile in the promotion of the beauty and attributes of his constituency and constituents. He may not be aware of this, but we have a shared interest: the Nimrod aircraft, which is based in my constituency at RAF Kinloss. No doubt he will develop a strong interest in Nimrod and in all the other industries in his constituency. On the Nimrod link, and on this day, having heard about the 300th casualty in Afghanistan, I, too, pay tribute to all those brave servicemen and women who have made all the ultimate sacrifice—while not in any way losing sight of the pain and suffering of their families, 14 of whom are related to service personnel who died aboard Nimrod XV230, which was based at RAF Kinloss.
The strategic defence review is long overdue, and it is correct for foreign policy, defence and security considerations to be the drivers of such an exercise. But, it is important that during the process we do not lose sight of achieving a balanced and fair defence footprint throughout the nations and regions of the UK. I make an appeal to Ministers on the Treasury Bench on that subject, because I shall return to it repeatedly. We cannot overlook or underplay the fact that the financial drivers behind this SDR are massive, and the consequences of decisions will be significant for many parts of the UK. We know that, because the Royal United Services Institute—RUSI—estimates a likely defence budget cut of between 10% and 15% over the next six years, and a 20% personnel cut over the same period. If that were applied in Scotland, it would result in 2,400 job losses.
Many Members may not be aware that there are already fewer service personnel based in Scotland pro rata than in the defence forces of the Irish Republic. If RUSI’s expected reduction is realised, Scotland will have fewer service personnel in real terms than the Irish Republic. That is not a surprise if we try to understand what has happened in recent years, but if we do not do so the SDR will run away with itself, leaving Scotland—and, incidentally, other parts of the UK—with such a denuded footprint that there will be very serious consequences.
Since the previous SDR, the number of defence jobs in Scotland has gone down by about 10,000. That includes 1,880 fewer service personnel, 4,600 fewer civilian personnel and 4,000 fewer jobs associated with the defence sector. All those numbers come from the Ministry of Defence.
Does the hon. Gentleman share my surprise at the fact that the Liberal Democrats do not seem to care about the closure of RAF Leuchars, which would have a devastating impact on the Fife and Tayside economy?
The hon. Gentleman is a new Fife Member, and I welcome him to his place. He is very alive to the risks in Fife, as I am to those in Moray and others are to those in their constituencies. I am very surprised by the fact that the right hon. and learned Member for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell), who is not now in his place, did not seem to acknowledge that it would be important if there were cuts at RAF Leuchars.
This is not just about jobs, but about defence expenditure, and again, using MOD statistics, we can understand that under the previous Government there was a significant defence underspend—the difference between Scotland’s population share and the amount of money that the MOD spent in Scotland. That underspend ranged from £749 million in 2002-03 to £1.2 billion in 2007-08, representing a 68% increase over the period. Between 2002 and 2008 the defence underspend in Scotland totalled a mammoth £5.6 billion, and the largest recorded underspend in one year was £1.2 billion, between 2007 and 2008. Those things should be taken into consideration.
I said in passing that this has impacted not only on Scotland, but on Wales and Northern Ireland in exactly the same way. When Scotland had an underspend of £5.6 billion, the underspend in Wales was a staggering £6.7 billion, while in Northern Ireland it was £1.8 billion. Some might ask themselves whether cyclical factors are involved, and think that defence contracts have simply come and gone—but when we look at the numbers we see that that is not the case: there is currently a structural underspend.
All that has happened over a period when there have been job losses across all three services the length and breadth of Scotland. The list is long. At RAF Lossiemouth in my constituency, one announcement revealed that 340 service jobs were being terminated, and then there was another announcement that 700 service jobs were being terminated. As has been mentioned, 160 service jobs were terminated at RAF Leuchars. At RAF Kinloss, which is in my constituency, 180 service jobs were terminated.
Does the hon. Gentleman not accept that if he had his way and there were an independent Scotland, there would be no UK defence jobs and no UK defence contracts in Scotland at all?
Perhaps the hon. Lady will concede that if we spent our population share on defence, we would have significantly more service personnel; more would be spent on procurement and as part of the defence sector in Scotland than is spent now. I do not know whether she was listening at the start when I said that the UK already has fewer service personnel pro rata in Scotland than the Irish Republic does.
The hon. Lady obviously did not want to listen to the litany of further closures that took place under the Labour Government. HMS Gannet lost 245 service personnel and hundreds of jobs were lost on the Clyde; incidentally, there are fewer shipbuilding jobs on the Clyde now than when Labour came to power. RAF Stornoway was closed, as was the mooring and support depot at Fairlie. The royal naval storage department in Rosyth was closed, while RAF Machrihanish was passed to Defence Estates. The Army depot at Forthside in Stirling was also closed, as was RAF Buchan.
The list goes on and on. I should like those on the Treasury Bench to understand that the strategic defence and security review cannot take place without an understanding of what has happened to the defence footprint across the United Kingdom. If there is not such an understanding, the review will be severely denuded. We had only to open one of Scotland’s best selling quality newspapers this weekend to learn that, apparently, areas slated for closure include RAF Kinloss, RAF Lossiemouth, 45 Commando, Fort George, the Queen Victoria school at Dunblane and the 2nd Division at Craigiehall. There are concerns about procurement projects, including carriers on the Clyde and in Rosyth.
At the start of this debate, I asked the Secretary of State what consideration he would give to the concept of the defence footprint at the end of the review. He said—I paraphrase—“We will be considering these matters as part of the defence industrial strategy.” With the greatest respect, this issue is much bigger than the defence industrial strategy. It is about the location of bases and the companies that produce for the major contracts—about what is left open and what closes. I repeat that, of course, the driver in an SDSR must always be defence and foreign policy considerations. That is understood; everybody understands that.
I am running out of time, and I want to conclude by saying this. Unless those issues are considered at the MOD now, they will be lost as the different services interplay and trade off the different things that they will lose as part of the SDSR. Somebody needs to take charge and ask themselves what will come out of the situation and what will be left of the defence footprint around the UK. What will be the impact on the nations and regions? If that does not happen, I predict that there will be big losers and virtually no winners.
The simple answer is that the Government have promised a new approach to mental health services to support the armed forces. The Prime Minister has asked the hon. Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison) to establish the most effective way of improving the care that we provide. On mental health screening, clinical experts have advised that further research is necessary before any new plans are put in place, so we are looking into the matter, but we will come back to the hon. Gentleman and the House on that subject in due course.
A number of hon. Members have, understandably, raised various points of local interest in their constituency, or matters of particular interest to themselves, and that is entirely right. That, after all, is the point of devoting an entire day’s debate to the strategic defence review. I was completely baffled to hear an Opposition Member ask when Parliament would get the opportunity to debate the strategic defence review; he was saying that in the middle of a full day’s debate on it.
Let me say to the hon. Members for Portsmouth North (Penny Mordaunt) and for Plymouth, Moor View (Alison Seabeck), who made points on behalf of the Navy; to the hon. Member for Fylde (Mark Menzies), who referred to Typhoon; to the Scottish National party spokesman, the hon. Member for Moray (Angus Robertson), who talked about the situation of Scottish industry; to the hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife (Thomas Docherty), who raised the issue of the carriers; to the hon. Member for Filton and Bradley Stoke (Jack Lopresti), who talked about the important aerospace industries in his constituency; to the hon. Member for Lancaster and Fleetwood (Eric Ollerenshaw), who talked about the Territorial Army in his constituency; and to the hon. Member for West Dunbartonshire (Gemma Doyle), who talked about the ship industry, that we quite understand why they made the points that they did. I cannot offer any promises or any comfort to anybody at this stage. We are just embarking on a genuinely comprehensive review. Nothing is completely safeguarded from it, but equally, no decisions have yet been taken that should give any of those Members specific cause for alarm. We are embarking on a comprehensive piece of work. It is right that they should articulate their concerns, but we cannot arrive at the conclusions at this stage, when we have not embarked on the piece of work.
On the time scale, which Opposition Members are asking about, the work streams are now in place. Hon. Members—and everybody else—have the opportunity to contribute and make whatever representations they wish to make. If there are hon. Members who feel that they are under-informed, and want more information to inform representations that they might make during the review, they need only let us know. Ministers have an open-door policy, and Members are welcome to any further information that they feel they need.
During the previous Parliament, the Labour Government provided statistics on employment and expenditure throughout the nations and regions of the UK. Will the new coalition Government give a commitment to continue producing those statistics?
Yes. Whatever information right hon. and hon. Members need in order to make representations to the review—
That is a yes. Hon. Members need only ask for any information that they need.
A variety of Members, including the shadow Defence Secretary, raised the issue of Trident. I think that I should clarify as best I can, because there seems to be some confusion—or perhaps I should say that some people seem moderately determined to be a little confused—about the value-for-money review of the existing plan for the Trident successor. It is a value-for-money study of the existing plan. If the study were to conclude that a particular aspect of the existing plan did not represent good value for money, it might start looking at different ways of doing things, but I have to stress that it is not a review in which we look at all the possible alternative ways in which we might provide a successor, and see which works out the cheapest. It is a progress report on the work taking place on the Trident successor project. The Ministry of Defence work on that should be completed by roughly the end of next month. The report will then go to the Cabinet Office, and ultimately these things will be decided by the National Security Council.
This afternoon we heard eight or nine maiden speeches, to which it is my happy duty to respond. If I have missed any, I can only say, with great apologies to those who made them, that they spoke with such aplomb and assurance that I did not recognise them as maiden speeches. The hon. Member for Fylde told us, among other things about his constituency, that Blackpool players tend to live in his patch. I congratulate them on reaching the premier league, and I wish them every success next season, as I wish him success in his seat. The hon. Member for Lancaster and Fleetwood discussed the neglect of rural areas and the decimated fishing industry. I certainly recognise those problems, and I am sure that we will hear a lot more from him about them. The hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport (Oliver Colvile) gave us an account of Plymouth’s naval history, and discussed the work of Combat Stress and others in dealing with the human fallout. He asked whether Ministers would come to Plymouth, and I can reassure him that I am going there this weekend as part of the Armed Forces day celebrations, so it is not being ignored.
The hon. Member for Filton and Bradley Stoke told us about the importance of defence industries in his constituency. He told us that he had served in Helmand, and he promises to be a strong advocate for troop welfare. The hon. Member for Portsmouth North (Penny Mordaunt) stressed her naval heritage by pointing out that she had been named after a naval cruiser—that will take some beating. She urged us not to be sea-blind, and I can assure her that we will not be. Her point about the exportability of new naval craft was extremely well made, and it is something to which the Government are committed.
The hon. Member for Redditch (Karen Lumley), as was said, made the place sound quite idyllic. I acknowledge her tribute to her predecessor. The hon. Member for South East Cornwall (Sheryll Murray) gave a charming account of her constituency, and made a generous tribute to her predecessor Colin Breed—I thank her for doing so—and to Bob Hicks, the Member before that, whom we all remember fondly. The hon. Member for Winchester (Mr Brine) gave us a geographical tour of his constituency, with which I am familiar. He told us how Chandler’s Ford and Hiltingbury had moved from one constituency to another. As a native of Chandler’s Ford, and indeed Hiltingbury, I am aware of that change, and I wish him well in his representation of the seat. The hon. Member for Castle Point (Rebecca Harris) gave us a worthwhile reminder of where Constable country is.
I should like to respond to the points made by the shadow Defence Secretary, which I did not think were justified, about the departure of Sir Jock Stirrup as Chief of the Defence Staff. I remind the right hon. Gentleman that Sir Jock Stirrup himself said that it had always been his wish to retire at the end of the strategic defence and security review, which was
“an obvious point at which to make the transition.”
I quite understand that, while it was thought that that review would last until the middle of next year, it might have been assumed that that was the point at which he was going to resign. However, given that, in fact, it will be concluded at the end of October, that is the natural point for him to go. He has no hard feelings about that; it is a perfectly civilised departure, and we thank him for his very fine service. [Interruption.] Any suggestion that he has been picked out as a result of sympathies for the previous Government must come from people who have not met him. Sir Jock Stirrup is about the least likely closet socialist anyone would ever come across—[Interruption.]