(10 years, 11 months ago)
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I pay tribute to the hon. and gallant Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), who has a long track record and experience in defence matters. I congratulate him on securing the debate and on outlining many thoughtful points, in particular relating to the littoral dimension, global strategic challenges, and interoperability and joint effect.
When considering future and current vessels, one must consider future and current maritime roles and taskings as an important starting point. I think that Members from across the House agree that naval forces are there to protect and patrol, to secure freedom of movement, to enforce the boundaries of territorial waters, to control exclusive economic zones, and to secure the environment—a significant consideration—renewables and critical infrastructure. That is particularly important when one bears in mind what is likely to happen in the decades ahead with offshore wind, tidal and wave power and the development of super-grid systems, which are likely to connect Iceland, the Faroe islands, Scotland, Norway and the rest of Europe. Other dimensions include subsea infrastructure and, of course, the trafficking of drugs and people. I had a quick look at the Royal Navy’s website before the debate and noted the five key current areas of maritime security, which were counter-piracy, counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, keeping sea lanes open and “around the UK”.
I join the hon. Member for Bournemouth East not only in praising UK personnel and those of other countries for their life-saving roles far from home—including, most recently, in reacting to the humanitarian catastrophe in the Philippines—but in acknowledging the importance of anti-piracy operations, and the maintenance of free-trade routes through measures such as Operation Ocean Shield, which is ably commanded from a Norwegian vessel, the Fridtjof Nansen.
It is the fifth and surely most important task in the Royal Navy’s list that I want to address in the context of future and current conventional naval vessels, capabilities and tasking: maritime domain awareness, or MDA, to use the Navy’s terminology, which we should understand. It is the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact on security, safety, the economy or the environment. I want to examine the issue in terms of recent developments close to home.
There is no better place to start than with an incident that happened two years ago and has close connection to my part of the world. The 65,000-tonne Admiral Kuznetsov anchored on the edge of UK waters off my constituency. Other Russian ships that also sought shelter in the Moray firth included the anti-submarine warfare ship Admiral Chabanenko, and the escort ship Yaroslav Mudryy. The vessels did not warn domestic authorities that they were going to come so close to the coast, and are believed to have blamed bad weather for making that approach. It was the first time the Kuznetsov, or a vessel of its size, had deployed near UK waters, and it was the closest in 20 years that a Russian naval task group had deployed to Scotland or anywhere else in the UK.
In previous years, Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft would have been loitering and would have been aware of the presence of a Russian deployment of that size. Of course, by 2011, the UK had no such aircraft; it is the only northern European military without them. Nevertheless, the Russians were there without any UK escort. At that stage, the Ministry of Defence was relying on Scottish fishing vessels to report developments, including fly-tipping by the visitors. When the MOD became aware of the Russians’ presence, a 30-year-old Type 42 frigate, the HMS York, was scrambled from Portsmouth, around 1,000 miles away. That distance, at 20 to 24 knots, takes more than 24 hours to travel. The responsibility that the HMS York was fulfilling was that of fleet ready escort, which means being the deployable and capable vessel in UK waters ready to perform emergency response tasks. The Kuznetsov case raises serious questions relating to current and future naval vessels, and I would be grateful if the Minister could address them. I know that he is well advised today, so I am sure that he will have time to respond to my points.
Is the availability of a fleet ready escort a mandated task of the Royal Navy? Will the Minister confirm that, owing to the unavailability of vessels, the fleet ready escort provision has been repeatedly gapped? Will he confirm that Ministers need to be informed by the Royal Navy every time such a gap exists? Will he confirm how many times over the last five years and for how long the fleet ready escort has been gapped? Will he confirm that offshore patrol and mine countermeasures vessels have been assigned for fleet ready escort duty during gapped periods? When considering future ships, it is important to understand the current state of play and what one might want to ensure does not happen in future.
Staying with recent experience, in May 2007, Tornado F3 jets from RAF Leuchars in Fife were sent to intercept two Russian aircraft spotted observing a Royal Navy exercise off northern Scotland. The jets were scrambled after the foreign planes were detected by radar in the skies over the western isles. They were identified as Russian Bear Foxtrot planes, commonly seen by RAF pilots during the cold war. In this case, they were intercepted and their return was escorted.
Although there have been recent developments, I do not want to explore in any detail in this forum the interest shown by some countries in subsea infrastructure, but I am sure that both the Government and Opposition Front-Bench representatives will understand its importance and the importance of its integrity. The examples that I have given underline that, with regard to the maritime domain awareness of future and current vessels, there are important tasks close to the UK that must be properly managed as a priority.
I want to raise the question of tasking in our immediate wider maritime region and, in particular, the contribution towards joint allied responsibilities and training. NATO has, as part of its immediate reaction force, standing NATO maritime group 1, which primarily operates in the eastern Atlantic. Similarly, standing NATO mine countermeasures group 1 operates in northern waters. They are relevant for future and current naval vessel provision, as they are standing operational commitments for allied nations, which provide destroyers, frigates and mine countermeasure vessels. It is notable that the UK has not provided vessels to either of the groups for several years.
Similarly, on joint training, there is a real issue of properly committing current and, hopefully, future vessels. Last month saw the largest NATO training exercise in northern Europe in nearly a decade. Some 6,000 troops from 20 allied and partner nations took part in Steadfast Jazz, which involved land, air, and sea elements. Of the 6,000 participants in the exercise, the UK contributed precisely 52 personnel aboard a single mine hunter. It followed a large-scale exercise with maritime dimensions in Norway, where the UK provided just one aircraft, which is more than has ever been provided to the NATO air policing commitments in Iceland.
When it comes to our immediate maritime backyard, the UK is sadly posted missing too often and is not taking its responsibilities seriously. The absence of any mention of the high north and Arctic in the most recent strategic defence and security review eloquently underlines my point.
This is all especially relevant to Scotland when it comes to current and future conventional vessels. Scotland is a maritime nation with a sea area five times larger than its land area. Our coastline is over 11,000 km long, and is longer than that of the People’s Republic of China and that of India. It constitutes 61% of the entire UK coastline, and there are more than 800 islands. Remarkably, however, there is not a single major, ocean-going, UK conventional vessel based in Scotland to perform the key tasks that I have outlined; no frigates or offshore patrol vessels are based in Scotland. That can and will change after a yes vote in next year’s independence referendum in Scotland. Last week, the Scottish Government published their White Paper, “Scotland’s Future”, which included plans for naval forces. I commend the White Paper to Members of all parties, although I understand that the print run has already been fully exhausted.
If the hon. Gentleman wishes to place an order, I am sure a copy will be sent to him. Of course I give way to him.
The hon. Gentleman is making an interesting case, but I point out that every proposal has been to ensure that the nuclear submarines remain up at Faslane, which is useful for employment in that part of Scotland.
This issue is close to my heart, and I would be happy to debate at great length the Scottish public’s overwhelming opposition to nuclear weapons being based in Scotland—something ignored, sadly, by the hon. Gentleman’s party and by the official Opposition in Westminster—but I am looking closely at the clock. In the White Paper, however, which I commend to him, the plans for Faslane are for a vibrant conventional naval base, and I am sure that most people would welcome that. I am delighted at the strong commitment in the White Paper to maritime capabilities, including frigates, OPVs, patrol boats, auxiliary ships and, crucially, newly procured maritime patrol aircraft.
UK assets and liabilities are key, and they must be a consideration for the Ministry of Defence, now and after a yes vote. Future vessels are very relevant. The referendum will have a significant bearing on issues relating to current and future vessels, but as yet we have had no indication from the Government as to their preferences on defence assets. According to the most recent UK asset register, published in 2007, MOD assets totalled more than £92 billion in value; on a population share basis, Scotland would be entitled to £7.7 billion in defence estate, equipment and vessels, or a financial offset. With regard to future vessels, that is important, because the UK Government have to date given no indication of the effect of a yes vote on their planning assumptions or procurement plans.
The MOD has projected the need for £160 billion of spending on defence equipment and support over the next 10 years; £13 billion of that spending is predicated on continuing guaranteed Scottish taxpayer support. With independence, Whitehall will need to work with the Scottish Government on joint procurement even to come close to those commitments. It is in the interests of both Governments to work together. The Scottish Government’s White Paper included the following commitment:
“This Scottish Government will take forward the procurement of four new frigates, to be built on the Clyde, preferably through joint procurement with the rest of the UK.”
That presents a good chance for massive procurement gain, with the potential to extend the production run of the Type 26 frigate. Unless the Government were to signal a further reduction in demand for frigate numbers, we could see more ships built rather than fewer, which is good news for the Clyde, good news for taxpayers across these islands, and good news for defence with appropriate conventional capabilities.
In conclusion, current and future naval vessels have essential tasks at home and further afield. I have stressed the importance of providing for necessary maritime territorial and regional defence, which is the core business of defence responsibility. Sadly, the UK Government have taken their eye off the ball, so I look forward to a sovereign Scotland taking those responsibilities seriously, and having the vessels and capabilities to do so.
The distinction that I achieved cannot be overemphasised: I advanced from probationer ordinary seaman to full ordinary seaman. I was very proud to be one, because even in those days—it was from 1979 to 1982, or thereabouts—I was too old to be an officer cadet. I feel the bus pass jingling in my pocket.
Yesterday, I took the day off and had the great pleasure of travelling to Southampton university at the invitation of Commander Chris Ling, commanding officer of Thunderer Squadron, which is the defence technical undergraduate scheme at the university, and Lieutenant Amie Jackson. She—I emphasise “she”—is the commanding officer of the warship HMS Blazer, which is attached to the university’s Royal Navy unit. It was wonderful to celebrate with them the opening of their new joint headquarters at the National Oceanography Centre. Looking at the fine young people who are coming through the system and having a first-class maritime education there, I could not help wondering how many opportunities they would have, and how many naval vessels would be available for them to serve in, in the years ahead, when they go on, as so many of them do, to professional careers in the Royal Navy.
I said that I would talk a bit about strategy. I have always acknowledged on a cross-party basis that the concepts of Labour’s 1998 strategic defence review were very sound. They recognised that we were no longer facing as our primary concern the cold war threat on the continent, and that if our forces were engaged, it would be in more far-flung theatres. As we were no longer an empire and no longer had a string of bases all over the world, it would be necessary to have a portable, movable sea base that we could use to take our joint forces to the theatre in which they were engaged. That seemed sound then, and it is sound today. That concept required two sorts of taskforce: one to allow air power to be projected from the sea, hence the aircraft carriers; and the other to enable military power to be landed from the sea, hence the amphibious taskforce. Broadly speaking, we have the central elements of those taskforces.
We know that the aircraft carriers are moving steadily forward, whatever financial peaks and troughs they have had in their chequered history, and that they will come to fruition. I would like to predict that the Government will bring both carriers into service, because it would be sheer madness to build one of the largest ships that the Royal Navy has ever seen and not deploy it.
The Albion, the Bulwark, and our Bay-class ships of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary Service form the core of the amphibious taskforce, and again, it would be interesting to know—although I do not expect an answer today—what plans there are to think about the next generation of assault ships to follow the Albion and the Bulwark. However, the point about the two taskforces, and the relevance to today’s debate, is that they will have to be protected against air threats, surface threats and submarine threats. As I said before, if we need a certain number of frigates—let us say as many as four to protect a taskforce, if it were in a serious regional conflict—given the roles that the frigates will have to perform in other areas, including ongoing and standing tasks, I find myself querying how the idea that we will generate a minimum of seven available anti-submarine warfare frigates from only eight out of the 13 will work.
I shall say a brief word about numbers. I start from the standpoint that we are simply not spending enough on defence. I know all the economic arguments about that, but the fact is that as a proportion of gross domestic product, defence spending has declined too far down our list of priorities. Spending was between 4% and 5% during the cold war years. When Labour came into office in 1997, it went from 2.9% to 2.6%, then to 2.8%. Then, in successive years, it was 2.7%, 2.7% again, 2.5%, 2.5% again, and so on. That looked fairly consistent, but the problem was that during that period, we were engaged in fighting two large regional conflicts, and the Treasury was not prepared to stump up the extra money to fund those conflicts in full. As a result, we found the core military budget being eaten away by the financing of current conflicts, and since then, under the present Government, the situation has not improved. I believe that we are down to something like 2.1% of GDP at present, and I feel that that is the root of the problem.
At the time of the strategic defence review that set out those concepts, the Labour Government proposed reducing the combined number of frigates and destroyers from 35 to 32. The admirals gritted their teeth and accepted that, but it quickly emerged that 32 had actually gone down to 31, and the then Secretary of State, Geoff Hoon, formulated what I later dubbed the “Hoon excuse”, which was, “It doesn’t really matter that we have lost an extra frigate, because they are more powerful than they used to be, so 31 ships can do what 32 used to do.” That, I am afraid, was the start of a very slippery slope.
The next bite taken out of the total by the Labour Government took the number down from 31 to 25. I remember standing up in the House of Commons at the beginning of 2007 waxing eloquent about persistent rumours that the Government intended to mothball, if not permanently dispose of, another half a dozen frigates to take the total down to 19. In the end, that gradually slipped away, but a couple of Type 23 frigates were paid off, and effectively the total went down to 23 from 25. It took the Conservative-led coalition coming in before we went down to 19 in the 2010 SDSR, yet the concept set out in 1998 remained basically sound: we needed to be able to fulfil certain standing tasks, to protect a mobile base, and to escort an amphibious taskforce or an aircraft carrier taskforce. I do not see what doctrinal developments since then justify such a radical reduction in the numbers.
That leads to me to my final point, about the design concept, which my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Bournemouth East mentioned. It is about whether it might be worth looking at the other five more general-purpose hulls that are proposed to bring the total number of frigates up to 13, and whether it might be worth considering doing something simpler to get more hulls in the water from which we can regenerate the surface fleet. Back in February 2005, in putting forward that concept, I was unwise enough to say that, really, the replacement general-purpose frigates ought to be “as cheap as chips”, which is not the sort of phrase that a proud Navy wants to hear. However, the point is based on an important development that I referred to in my opening questions—the idea of plug and play.
When the Type 45s were designed and put into service, they had a very large gymnasium. Why? Because they were designed in such a way that at a future stage in their life cycle, when we could afford it, we would be able to plug into that large space a module of land attack cruise missiles, which would hugely increase the ships’ power, even though we felt that we could not afford to do so at the beginning. It is perfectly possible to design ships that are relatively simple, but that have that capacity; I am extremely glad to see the hon. Member for Moray (Angus Robertson) nodding in agreement. We are very capable of upgrading those ships in their lifetime, and adding to their capacity. Perhaps it is too late now—I do not know—but we could at least try to keep the number of hulls a bit larger and lessen the complexity a bit; we would then have the basis for upgrading the quality of the vessels during their lifetime.
I suggest that the hon. Gentleman looks closely at the royal Danish navy’s StanFlex system, which does exactly that.
It is very much one of the examples that I have in mind. Those vessels are extremely economical, but they are out there in good numbers, and as was said by my hon. Friend the Member for Gosport (Caroline Dinenage), who had to leave, they are exportable.
I think that the Chamber has heard more than enough from me on these matters. I very much look forward to hearing the wind-ups and, in particular, answers to some of the questions I posed. If I cannot have them all just now, perhaps I can have some of them in writing.
(11 years ago)
Commons ChamberI do not accept that. New clause 3, which the right hon. Gentleman will have read, seeks to examine the viability and cost-effectiveness of the reforms that are being put before of the House. We want the House then to assess them. He should have a bit of confidence in them, because if they are working, Parliament will be keen to accept them.
I welcome the hon. Gentleman to his new role, as this is the first opportunity I have had to do so. May I reinforce the point that he has just made? Surely if the Secretary of State were confident that his plans were on track and that they were going to work in the time scale he has proposed, he should have accepted not only new clause 1—and it is a good thing that he has—but new clause 3 too. Everybody on both sides of the House would then be in total agreement.
I agree with the hon. Gentleman. The Secretary of State should have the confidence to put his reforms before Parliament. Is it not reasonable, when the Secretary of State and the Minister say at the Dispatch Box that they will publish recruitment figures for the reserves, that they should do so?
On 16 July, the Secretary of State told the House:
“I will be transparent about recruitment and trained-strength targets.”—[Official Report, 16 July 2013; Vol. 566, c. 958.]
Last month, the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, the hon. Member for Ludlow (Mr Dunne), told the Committee:
“We intend to publish the figure for the quarter to 1 October next month.”––[Official Report, Defence Reform Public Bill Committee, 22 October 2013; c. 434.]
That was due last week. As we have since found out, that has not happened and will not happen until next year. Why? The UK Statistics Authority states that the Government’s figures are not robust enough so there must be some delay in their production.
We do know that the overall trained strength of the armed forces reserve has fallen by 160 since last year and that time is slipping away, with the Secretary of State’s own 2018 target less than five years away. The last figures that were published showed that the Government were failing even to reach a quarter of the number of reservists they said they needed to recruit to meet their own targets.
(11 years ago)
Commons ChamberFunnily enough, I anticipated the possibility of that question from my hon. Friend. I can assure him that nothing that I have announced today will have any direct impact on Plymouth.
I thank the Secretary of State for giving me advance sight of his statement, and commend him for making it today. It was originally to be made tomorrow, but I think it right for the shipyard workers and their families to have certainty, and I know that he has done the right thing.
I am sure that the Secretary of State’s thoughts are with all shipworking families, many of whom are learning just a few short weeks before Christmas that their jobs are on the line. Earlier today, BAE Systems stated that the appropriate place for frigates to be built was Glasgow. Does he agree with that?
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, because his question has prompted me to acknowledge that my statement was made today in response to media stories which had created speculation that needed to be dealt with. I apologise to the Opposition for having to make the statement on an Opposition supply day.
I am obviously not responsible for the statement made by BAE Systems, but the company’s judgment, on the basis of value for money, is that the Clyde is the best place in which to build the Type 26 global combat ship, and the MOD concurs with that judgment.
(11 years ago)
Commons ChamberThat will, indeed, be one of the issues we look at in some detail in the context of the next SDSR. As my right hon. Friend is the Chairman of the Select Committee on Defence, he will be well aware that there were serious problems with the previous programme, because it was way over budget and, unfortunately, technically did not ultimately work. Perhaps I may remind the House who was in government for most of the time that that programme was running; it was not us.
To reinforce the point made by the Chairman of the Defence Committee, the UK’s armed forces are unique among those in northern Europe in having not a single fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft. Given the time scale that the Minister has talked about for this review, what is the earliest date by which the UK may have maritime patrol aircraft?
As I have explained to the House, we will be looking at this in the context of the next strategic defence and security review. The hon. Gentleman asks me for early dates, so perhaps he can share with the House the earliest date by which the Scottish nationalists will tell us how they will afford the defence programme that they envisage. We are all dead keen to know.
(11 years, 2 months ago)
Ministerial CorrectionsTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many redundancy letters in each tranche have been delivered to personnel stationed at (a) RAF Lossiemouth, (b) RAF Leuchars, (c) HMNB Clyde, (d) RM Condor, (e) Headquarters 2nd Division, (f) Headquarters 51 Brigade, (g) Redford Barracks, (h) Dreghorn Barracks, (i) Kinloss Barracks, (j) Fort George Barracks, (k) Glencorse Barracks, (l) Crombie Defence Munitions Centre, (m) Beith Defence Munitions Centre, (n) Glen Douglas Defence Munitions Centre, (o) HMS Gannet, (p) Royal Naval Armament Depot Coulport, (q) MOD Hebrides Ranges, (r) British Underwater Training and Evaluation Centre, (s) Loch Ewe Fuel Depot, (t) Garelochead Defence Fuel Depot, (u) HMS Caledonia, (v) Rosyth Defence Estate and (w) West Freugh Training Ranges.
[Official Report, 1 July 2013, Vol. 565, c. 399-400W.]
Letter of correction from Mark Francois:
An error has been identified in the written answer given to the hon. Member for Moray (Angus Robertson) on 1 July 2013.
The full answer given was as follows:
The information requested about numbers of redundancy letters is set out in the following table:
Location | Tranche 1 | Tranche 2 | Tranche 3 |
---|---|---|---|
RAF Lossiemouth | 40 | 50 | 0 |
RAF Leuchars | 30 | 20 | — |
HMNB Clyde | 20 | — | 0 |
RM Condor | 20 | — | 0 |
HQ 2 Div | 0 | 0 | 0 |
HQ 51 Bde | — | 10 | 10 |
Redford Barracks (Bks) | — | 10 | 30 |
Dreghorn Bks | — | 20 | 30 |
Kinloss Bks | 70 | 20 | 70 |
Fort George Bks | — | 10 | 30 |
Glencorse Bks | — | 10 | 20 |
Crombie Defence Munitions Centre (DMC) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Beith DMC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Glen Douglas DMC | 0 | 0 | 0 |
HMS Gannet | 0 | 0 | 0 |
RN Armament Depot Coulport | 0 | 0 | 0 |
MOD Hebrides Ranges | 0 | 0 | 0 |
British Underwater Training and Evaluation Centre | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Loch Ewe Fuel Depot (FD) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Garelochead Defence FD | 0 | 0 | 0 |
HMS Caledonia | — | 0 | 0 |
Rosyth Defence Estate | 0 | 0 | 0 |
West Freugh Training Ranges | 0 | 0 | 0 |
— = less than 5. Note: When rounding to the nearest 10, numbers ending in “5” have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 20 to prevent systematic bias. |
(11 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am grateful to my hon. Friend for that question. He will be aware of the Northern Group. Within both NATO and the European Union it is important to identify groups of like-minded countries, such as the Northern Group, with which we can work particularly well. It seems to me to be expedient to work with the grain of such countries in order to lever in effect. My right hon. Friend the Defence Secretary will discuss that shortly in Vilnius.
On defence sharing, the UK provides military training to senior military officers from countries around the world. The MOD has confirmed to me in parliamentary answers that over recent years that has regularly included senior army officers from the Assad regime. Does the Minister regret that?
I cannot really comment because I just do not know. I would be very surprised if that was the case, but we can certainly look into it. The hon. Gentleman is right that we provide training and exposure to a wide range of countries, looking all the while at the probity and integrity of their regimes. Clearly nothing is perfect in this world, but we put huge effort into ensuring that those who benefit from our training courses go back to their countries and use the information they have gained to good purpose and in a way that we in this House find acceptable.
(11 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberOrder! I cannot take points of order in the middle of a statement.
The shadow Secretary of State is his own best adviser. He has material, he is a dextrous fellow, and I suggest that he will wish to continue.
First, I am indeed embarrassed by what appears to have just occurred. As you would expect, Mr Speaker, I will be investigating precisely what has happened and I will write to you to let you know what has gone wrong this afternoon. I understood that copies of the statement and copies of the spreadsheet would be distributed as soon as I sat down, and I apologise for the fact that that did not happen.
My right hon. and learned Friend is, of course, right to say that a statement in itself, or a White Paper in itself, does not deliver the solution. But I am not coming to the House today presenting a set of ideas that we will now begin to implement; many of these ideas and processes are already under way and beginning to have effect. I have given commitments previously, and I will give them again, to keeping the House updated through the publication of both recruitment figures and trained strength figures as we turn the corner with the Army Reserve.
The Secretary of State will be aware that today is the first anniversary of the Moray Firth Tornado crash tragedy, in which Flight Lieutenant Adam Sanders, Squadron Leader Samuel Bailey and Flight Lieutenant Hywel Poole and a seriously injured fourth serviceman were involved. RAF Lossiemouth, friends and families are remembering them today, as I am sure everybody does in the House.
On the statement, there has been a discourtesy to not only Members of the House, but to the parties in this House. Some hon. Members may not be aware that all political parties in this House—the Labour party and the parties of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland—receive an advance copy, and we were not provided with the appropriate information either. That is a huge discourtesy. It is unprecedented—I have never experienced it in my 13 years in this House—and it is unacceptable. Frankly, it is a dog’s breakfast and the MOD should be ashamed of itself.
As we know, in recent years there have been disproportionate cuts to personnel, to basing, to spending and now even to the Territorial Army in Scotland. In the absence of providing the list in detail and on time, will the Secretary of State please confirm that six of our 38 Army and Navy reserve sites are to close? That is 16% of the total and it represents twice Scotland’s population share, so the disproportionate cuts continue.
The approach to dealing with the estate and the rationalisation of structure has not been territorial but was based on the structure of the Army. Some new major units are relocating to Scotland. To answer the hon. Gentleman’s specific questions, there are 52 reserve sites in Scotland. Seven will be vacated and a new site will reopen, which means a net loss of six. According to my calculation, that is a 12% reduction in site footprint. I accept that the hon. Gentleman does not have ready access to the information, so he cannot know this, but some of the sites in Scotland are so incredibly poorly recruited that I think that even he would struggle to argue for their retention. There are sites with an establishment of 30 or 40 and a recruited strength of six, seven, eight or 10. We clearly cannot deliver a proper offer to Scottish reservists unless we consolidate on to sites that will deliver a critical mass at the sub-unit level for training.
(11 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberI will comment on that a little later. It is an important point. The Regular Army is being cut to about 82,000 and the reservist force is being doubled to about 30,000. It is crucial for our country that that is done in the right way. The issue is partly about how the Government interact and explain the benefit of having reservists in the workplace. I shall come back to that a little later.
I hope that Armed Forces day, in recognition of all those who have fallen, will be a reflection of the emotions that we feel—a commemoration of loved ones lost and a celebration of all they achieved and their comrades can continue to achieve; I am thinking not just of their deeds in the armed forces, but the love they gave, the friendships they built and the memories in which they are held.
The covenant is a statement of collective purpose, as my hon. Friend the Member for Corby (Andy Sawford) said. Its principles cut across classes, sectors, regions and nations of the UK. Businesses, local communities, central Government and local authorities all have a responsibility to deliver the highest possible levels of care and support to the service community. Of course we operate within financial constraints, but a pooling of our commitment and imagination can lead to better policy and meaningful results. That is why we have urged local authorities to have veterans champions—a dedicated person at each council to develop support for service leavers to help them to resettle into civilian life. On return from the front line or in departing the forces, many service leavers struggle with the transition from military to civilian life.
I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman will join me in praising all of Scotland’s local authorities for signing the covenant. On pooling, does he think that there is a useful model in understanding the work of Veterans Scotland, which brings together 53 veterans’ organisations to work with the Scottish Government and the UK Government to ensure that veterans have the appropriate policy delivered at a Scottish and a UK level?
It is a rare occasion when the hon. Gentleman and I are in full agreement on defence matters, because we have an entirely different vision for the future of UK defence. He makes a very important point. It is a cause for some celebration that all 32 of Scotland’s local authorities have community covenants. Of course, there is an issue of scale in England, but achieving 100% in Scotland is a remarkable achievement. I would like to put on record the whole House’s congratulations to all those local authorities.
(11 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am grateful to my right hon. Friend and I think both issues are important. It is important to be clear that in the medium to long term we must expect NATO members who want to benefit from the advantages of membership to pay the subscription price, as it were, in the form of adequately resourced defence budgets. In the shorter term, reality dictates that we focus on turning the budgets we already have into real, deliverable military capability. There is enormous headroom between what is delivered now with the £200-odd billion of NATO European defence expenditure, and what could be achieved if it were properly organised.
Will the Secretary of State confirm that northern European NATO allies such as Denmark, Norway and Iceland believe that the challenges of the Arctic and the high north are extremely important? Will he also confirm whether the Ministry of Defence has any plans to take part in air policing for NATO from Reykjavik?
We have no plans at the moment to take part in air policing operations from Reykjavik, but we recognise the importance of the high north, not least because such a large proportion of Britain’s primary energy resources now come from the Norwegian sector of the North sea. The MOD is currently undertaking a review of the strategic significance of the polar regions, both north and south, and that will be part of the evidence that informs the 2015 strategic defence and security review.
(11 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberIf doing so was within the remit given it by the Secretary of State, it would have that power. I need to be very clear about this. The point of hiring a commercial partner is to deploy its commercial expertise. There is no point hiring it and then constraining it so tightly that we do not get any benefit from it. On the other hand, it will be very clear, and I am very clear, that it will always operate within the framework of strategic direction that has been given by the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of State will retain a power to intervene and specifically direct it on a specific point within its management of a programme if necessary.
I thank the Secretary of State for advance sight of his statement. Will he clarify that should one go down the GoCo route he has no objection in principle to the winner of a GoCo contract, should that be the preferred outcome, being headquartered in the United States, Europe or further afield?