Army: Recruitment
Angus Robertson Excerpts(9 years, 9 months ago)
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Angus Robertson
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will estimate the (a) monthly and (b) total additional cost to date for paying Capita as if it was meeting quantity and quality standards for recruitments in the Recruiting Partnering Project.
[Official Report, 23 June 2014, Vol. 583, c. 86W.]
Letter of correction from Anna Soubry:
An error has been identified in the written answer given to the hon. Member for Moray (Angus Robertson) on 23 June 2014.
The full answer given was as follows:
Anna Soubry
Between its launch in March 2012 to 31 March 2014, the Army has paid Capita £100.380 million for the Recruiting Partnering Project. The Recruiting Partnering Project remains within the overall agreed cost of £1.360 million.
The Secretary of State for Defence, my right hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Mr Hammond), set out on 14 January 2014, Official Report, column 716, the cost of Capita providing a new Information Technology platform as part of the Recruiting Partnering Project. At the time, these costs were expected to be around £47.7 million directly linked to the change of hosting provision. Since this statement, these costs have reduced to around £42.9 million.
As previously stated by the Secretary of State on 14 January, there has been an additional cost of around £1 million per month to run the Capita system. This includes costs for additional manpower.
The correct answer should have been:
Oral Answers to Questions
Angus Robertson Excerpts(9 years, 11 months ago)
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Mr Speaker
As the hon. Member for Moray (Angus Robertson) just had the finger rather distinctly pointed at him, I rather thought that he might be pricked into responding.
Mr Dunne
I am very grateful to my hon. Friend for referring to the Farnborough air show, which I attended this morning for the Prime Minister’s opening. He was highlighting at Farnborough, not just to the British defence supply chain, but to representatives of the international supply chain who were present and to the international delegations visiting from abroad, just what a high-quality defence industry we have in this country, and as he pointed out, we cannot have a secure economic growth plan without a secure national security plan.
Angus Robertson (Moray) (SNP)
As we know from the recent services inquiry of the Military Aviation Authority, three of my constituents died aboard colliding Tornado jets above the Moray firth in 2012. Among the contributory factors may have been the absence of a collision warning system. When will we see a collision warning system installed in Typhoon aircraft?
Mr Dunne
As the hon. Gentleman knows, because he called an Adjournment debate on this subject last week, at which he asked that very question and I gave him the answer, at present we are investigating the introduction of a system on Typhoon, and at this point it is not appropriate to give him a timetable or a cost for that introduction.
RAF Fast Jets
Angus Robertson Excerpts(9 years, 11 months ago)
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Angus Robertson (Moray) (SNP)
I am grateful for the opportunity to highlight the safety of Royal Air Force fast jets, a subject that concerns the safety of RAF personnel, civilian air traffic and all those who use it, as well as communities under the flight paths of RAF fast jets.
At present the RAF operates three types of fast jet: the Hawk trainer, which flies from RAF Valley on Ynys Môn, or Anglesey; the Tornado, which flies from RAF Marham in Norfolk and RAF Lossiemouth in my constituency of Moray; and the Typhoon, which is operating from RAF Lossiemouth and RAF Coningsby in Lincolnshire. In the near future, the RAF and the Royal Navy will operate the F-35 Lightning from RAF Marham.
As anybody who has seen any of those aircraft in flight will attest, they operate at incredible speeds, which can reach over 1,000 mph. The cost of a single fast jet ranges from around £20 million each for a Hawk to around £100 million each for an F-35. RAF personnel are trained to exceptionally high standards over a long and sustained period and on an ongoing basis throughout their entire career. I have had the good fortune while representing Moray to get to know a great many of those personnel, and I hold them in the highest regard, both personally and professionally.
There are many aspects of fast jet safety that I could highlight, but in the time available this evening I will concentrate my remarks on the risk of mid-air collision. Sadly, air proximity risks are all too common in UK airspace. Official statistics from the UK Airprox Board show that between 1998 and 2013 there were 361 airprox events involving Tornado jets, of which at least 46 were in the most dangerous “Risk Category A”, meaning that a risk of an actual collision occurred, and of those at least eight involving two Tornadoes. Data on airprox incidents between 2000 and 2012 reveal that the number of airprox incidents involving Tornado jets was higher than for all other types of aircraft, both civilian and military, and that Tornadoes have been involved in 12% of all incidents.
Of course, there have also been airprox incidents involving other types of fast jet. One year ago, there was a detailed report on Wales Online about a near collision between Hawk jets above Aberystwyth. The pilots had the benefit of a collision warning system—also known as a traffic collision avoidance system—on board their aircraft, which alerted them with the warning, “Traffic, Traffic,” and the collision was averted. That example shows that the CWS or TCAS is installed in Hawk jets. It is mandatory on commercial airliners and it is installed across most of the RAF fleet, but not on Tornadoes or Typhoons.
Last week was the second anniversary of the 2012 collision of two Tornado fast jets from RAF Lossiemouth above the Moray firth. Three brave, dedicated and professional personnel were killed in the collision—Flight Lieutenant Hywel Poole, Squadron Leader Sam Bailey and Flight Lieutenant Adam Sanders—and a fourth was seriously injured. We pay our tributes to them today and I am sure that the thoughts of everyone in this Chamber are with their families, friends and colleagues at RAF Lossiemouth and elsewhere. The death of service personnel in accidents, especially if they are avoidable, is particularly painful.
Just prior to the anniversary last week, the Military Aviation Authority’s service inquiry report on the 2012 Tornado collision was published. It concluded that there were 17 contributory factors, including the absence of a collision warning system, which, as I have said, is mandatory on civilian aircraft and is installed across most of the RAF fleet, but not on Tornadoes or Typhoons.
The inquiry reported that the need for a collision warning system was highlighted within the Ministry of Defence 24 years ago, following a collision in 1990. Through the dogged research of air safety campaigner Jimmy Jones, who worked as an RAF Nimrod engineer, and from freedom of information inquiries and parliamentary questions answered by the MOD, we know that in the early to late 1990s there was an extensive collision warning system development programme that led the MOD to believe it was feasible. The report highlights the inclusion and feasibility at paragraph 1.4.6.468.
For the sake of clarification, will the Minister confirm in his summing up that an extensive collision warning system development programme was started in the early 1990s and that it led the MoD to believe that it was feasible? That start date is essential in understanding what I believe followed and what is an extremely serious charge: a series of negligent MOD decisions that may have led to the deaths of RAF personnel and the risk of many others.
The requirement for a CWS was made in the 1998 strategic defence review of the then Labour Government:
“Improving the Tornado GR4 bomber and its deployability—deployment packs to assist rapid deployment on operations, additional support manpower, engine and avionics spares packages; portable engineering and hanger accommodation; and”—
critically—
“a collision warning system to improve safety for man and machine”.
As we can see, without any ambiguity, the MOD was formally committed to such a collision warning system—a commitment that has still not been fully delivered to this day.
The report says:
“Although a specific Strategic Defence Review commitment, Secretary of State did not declare the funding to be non-discretionary; therefore Collision Warning System was prioritised and funded as part of the normal planning process (meaning it could be delayed by Central Staffs and the profile of implementation altered during its development”.
The Secretary of State at the time was George Robertson, now the noble Lord Robertson of Port Ellen. Given what we know about the delays that followed, it would be good to hear from Lord Robertson why spending on this life-saving technology was not protected.
What we go on to learn from the service inquiry report about CWS procurement is truly shocking. It states that
“it has suffered from numerous delays, cancellations and deferments without a coherent audit trail, which has made it difficult for the SI Panel to gain a complete picture of decision making. However, we know that, following numerous accidents, the 1998 SDR instigated the development of a CWS for the Tornado GRl/4 to be fitted ‘early next century’. Over the next 14 years the programme was subject to five deferrals, re-programming prioritisation, deletion in 2010 and eventual resurrection in 2012 on direction of the Secretary of State for Defence following elevation of the Tornado mid-air collision risk”.
The report goes on to highlight a number of particularly noteworthy milestones along the route of delays, cancellation and reinstatement. In 2004, the director of Air Staff said that
“it is difficult to defend the non-equipage of the Tornado and successor fleets with a Collision Warning System”,
including
“our belief that the CWS provision for Tornado is overdue and find it increasingly difficult to maintain the line we have taken with the CAA”
—the Civil Aviation Authority—
“that progress on introducing CWS is being made.”
In 2005, the Tornado collision warning system initial gate business case estimated how many aircraft would be lost if it was not installed, stating that
“historical data suggests there is a statistical probability of losing another 9 Tornados and 5 civilian aircraft before the Out of Service Date.”
That very same year, however, the MOD deferred CWS, and maintained a grotesque “Yes Minister” formulation that although there was funding in place for a 2010 in service date,
“it was not misleading for external communications”
to continue their line, knowing fine well that it would be installed only for 2014. The report found that:
“The lack of a CWS fitted to Tornados GR4s by 2012 is a direct consequence of Short Term Plan 2005 activity”,
and that there was
“no explanation why Defence Management Board were not told of the reality of the likely deferral on the In Service Date”.
I ask the Minister to confirm whether this is correct.
Does the Minister agree with the SI report that in 2010 the then Secretary of State for Defence, the right hon. Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox), cancelled the collision warning system for Tornado? Does he agree with the report when it pointed out that that was not in line with established procedure? Does he agree with the report that
“fitting a CWS to the Tornado GR4 is assessed to reduce the risk of collision from 1 in 3 to a 1 in 6 before its Out of Service Date”?
Does he agree with the warnings that the catastrophic risk of collision with a commercial airline
“gives rise to the strongest societal concerns.”
That societal risk, as outlined by the then Under-Secretary, was talked about at length in the next section of the report. That section highlighted comments by the director general of the Military Aviation Authority, stating that the fact that the Tornadoes would be out of service soon was
“unlikely to be accepted as compensation for the apparent failure of the Dept to implement the programme hitherto—herein lies the very significant ‘societal risk’ that the Dept is viewed publicly as having been derelict in its duty of care to both its personnel and the public at large.”
What was warned about has come to pass, and three of my constituents died above the Moray firth when their Tornadoes collided.
It is taken six months since the completion of the service inquiry for the report to be published. Its contents are damning. There are many elements that I do not have time to go into, including the loss of key documentation by the MOD in relation to the CWS issue. The report makes it clear that not all relevant documentation was available to the service inquiry, including the report of the Tornado airworthiness review team.
Before I sum up, I want to ask the Minister a series of questions about the decisions of Defence Ministers in his and past Governments, which I hope he will be able to answer. Why did the then Secretary of State for Defence, George Robertson, having identified the collision warning system in the 1998 strategic defence review as a system that would
“improve safety for man and machine”,
allow it to fall into discretionary spending, which meant that it could be delayed repeatedly? Why did the then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State and Minister for Defence Procurement, Lord Drayson, accept the advice of officials that if it appeared that the MOD was funding a collision system for Tornado, it was not misleading to suggest it would be installed by 2009, when he was briefed that the date was actually 2014?
After repeated warnings from the risk holders and the director general of the Military Aviation Authority that it would not mean Tornado risk was as low as reasonably practicable—ALARP—why did the then Defence Secretary, the right hon. Member for North Somerset, cancel the CWS programme? After holding the societal risk for a mid-air collision involving a Tornado for only six days, why did he reinstate the programme? Why were proper procedures not followed after the risk was no longer tolerable and routine flying operations stopped? What happened to the Under-Secretary’s order to deliver a review into the planning and programming situation that led to CWS being deleted? The report was due to be done in August 2011. It is missing. Where is it? Was it ever completed?
Why were key documents such as the Tornado airworthiness review team report not available to the service inquiry? Did the SI board consider the 1996 TART report? Why was publication of the service inquiry report delayed for so long? The Government issued a statement last week accepting liability for the 2012 Tornado collision. I understand that settlements may not yet be completed with all the victims’ families and that for legal reasons that may constrain what the Minister can say. However, on what basis have the Government accepted liability?
God forbid that there are any further collisions, but on the basis of MOD legal advice will the Government accept liability for any future mid-air collision involving a Tornado without a collision warning system?
What about Typhoons, which are currently in service and also operating without a CWS? Only last month, a German Luftwaffe Typhoon crashed with a Learjet near Olsberg in North Rhine-Westphalia. The Learjet came down near a populated area killing both people aboard. Remarkably, the Typhoon of the Taktisches Luftwaffengeschwader 31 landed safely at Nörvenich airbase near Cologne after the collision. The incident illustrates the risks of mid-air collision involving Typhoon aircraft. Now is the time for the MOD to explain why it is so far behind with the evaluation and installation of a collision warning system for Typhoons.
On 13 May, I received a written parliamentary answer to the following question:
“To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what collision warning system is currently being tested on Typhoon aircraft; when he expects testing to be completed; when a decision will be taken to install such a system; and what the estimated total cost is.”
The Under-Secretary, who is replying to this debate, said:
“Analysis is currently underway into potential collision warning system capability for Typhoon. A system has not yet been fitted on a Typhoon aircraft for testing.
It is not possible at this stage to provide a timetable for the development of this capability, or for the decision on whether to install such a system on the aircraft. Similarly, it is too early to estimate the likely cost of such a system.”—[Official Report, 13 May 2014; Vol. 580, c. 444W.]
Given that, will the Minister confirm why it is not possible at this stage to provide a timetable for the development of this capability? Why has there not been a decision on whether to install such a system? Why is it too early to estimate the likely cost of such a system?
I have asked many questions this evening and I hope that the Under-Secretary will answer them all. I have no reason to doubt his best intentions, but I fear that he will not answer a great many of them. I believe that the brave RAF personnel who fly fast jets deserve the answers. I believe that service families deserve the answers and that there is a public interest in fully understanding what has happened and, more important, what has not happened when it comes to RAF fast jet safety.
I believe that there is public interest in who made the decisions to delay, cancel and reinstate the installation of a collision warning system and why. We should know why it was acceptable in the Ministry of Defence to mislead about the time scale on a CWS for Tornadoes and to allow this to drag on for so long.
Given what we have learned from the service inquiry by the Military Aviation Authority, the time has come for these questions to be properly answered, under oath in a fatal accident inquiry.
Oral Answers to Questions
Angus Robertson Excerpts(10 years, 1 month ago)
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Dr Murrison
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The Scottish Government tell us that they would have 12 Typhoons, which means four that are operational at any one time. That is no substitute for the Royal Air Force, and neither does it come close to what is provided by the allies, which the Scottish Government like to pretend they will match: Norway has 57 jets and Denmark has 30. The Scottish Government have also made no provision for air-to-air refuelling, without which the scope for covering Scotland’s extensive air space will be dramatically reduced.
Angus Robertson (Moray) (SNP)
The Ministry of Defence is responsible for ensuring that Scotland is a maritime nation with no maritime patrol aircraft and no ocean-going vessels. The MOD is also responsible for the closure of two out of three air bases in Scotland and the disproportionate cut to personnel and spending, while at the same time committing to Trident, which the majority of people in Scotland oppose. May I appeal to the Minister and the Secretary of State to come for more day trips to Scotland so that people can contrast the appalling reality of MOD decisions in Scotland with the ludicrous scaremongering of the UK Government?
Dr Murrison
The hon. Gentleman says that there are no ocean-going vessels, but he has forgotten the submarine service, which, for a Scottish MP, is a huge omission. He talks about maritime patrol aircraft, but he says nothing about how he would analyse the data that maritime patrol aircraft are designed to collect. He talks about two warships, yet he tells us in his White Paper that the only way he can refuel them, and thus extend their scope, is by relying on the Royal Navy.
Defence Reform Bill
Angus Robertson Excerpts(10 years, 1 month ago)
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Alison Seabeck
The Minister is quite right to make that point. It is deeply frustrating for Back Benchers and for the public to see legislation being rushed through Parliament. There are lessons that Members on both sides of the House can learn—
Alison Seabeck
We can learn the lessons without hectoring from colleagues from Scotland. Full and public debate, and full and open scrutiny, are a sign of strong government, and it is something that we should all try to achieve in the House.
My noble Friend Lord Rosser said:
“If a future Government adopt the same approach”
and seek to run Defence Procurement via a GoCo
“the report on the effectiveness of the new DE&S-plus-plus organisation will be crucial, as will be the objectivity of that future Government’s assessment of DE&S-plus-plus”—
as it was referred to in the House of Lords—
“and their case for believing that the GOCO option would be more successful.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 2 April 2014; Vol. 753, c. 966.]
The report for which this amendment provides will ensure that we can have real oversight as to the effectiveness of the new-look DE&S. However, as I have said, it still falls a bit short of what we would like. We are being asked to allow a measure to proceed that has been fraught with difficulty, at considerable cost to the taxpayer. According to the Minister, in a written answer to me on 18 December 2013, in running the tendering process the Government had
“spent £7.4 million supporting the work on the GoCo option”—[Official Report, 18 December 2013; Vol. 572, c. 636W.]
However, according to a parliamentary answer on 11 February 2014 to a question from my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), the total for the concept and assessment phase was almost £29 million. What is the final total, and has the Minister assessed the costs of running a similar exercise if a future Government opted to go down the GoCo route?
The Opposition very much hope that the changes that have been made—sadly, many of them are still not in the public domain—will make a difference, bolstering those areas within DE& S that need additional expertise or which have been hollowed out by changes to the overall size of the civil service. As we are discussing this part of the Bill, will the Minister kindly explain why, as of yesterday evening, the corporate plan and framework document for DE&S were not in the Library or on the Ministry of Defence website? In a written answer to the hon. Member for Mid Worcestershire (Sir Peter Luff), a former Defence Minister, and to me on 7 April, an assurance was given that that would happen. Certainly, in discussing the need for openness and for the full and proper scrutiny of the proposed measures, as well as consideration of the Lords amendments, having sight of this document would be helpful.
It was noted in the other place that a future Government, having made up their mind that they wanted to go down the GoCo route, might be tempted to try to rush through the affirmative order. That was acknowledged by the Minister as a potential problem. Lord Rosser pointed out:
“I cannot help but recall that this Government, in declining to withdraw Part 1, argued that there might in future be a need to bring in the GOCO option with a minimum of delay—an odd argument, bearing in mind that the Government themselves had just had to delay their intentions on the GOCO option by at least two or three years, but nevertheless an indication of a Government’s thinking that they might seek to make the change as quickly as possible at the possible expense of proper scrutiny.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 2 April 2014; Vol. 753, c. 966-67.]
That was enough to cause Opposition Members concern. Any decision that could have such a major impact on the safety and performance of our heroic servicemen and women must be subject to the necessary scrutiny, and Parliament should be allowed time to undertake that scrutiny. We also have at the back of our mind debates about conflicts of interest, intellectual property protection and so on, which will need, should a new proposal be introduced, to be addressed properly and transparently. A rushed scrutiny period would be unsatisfactory and it would not inspire public confidence.
In conclusion, I am concerned that simply expecting the DE&S-plus proposition to become match-fit as a public sector comparator for future market testing of the GoCo is hardly a vote of confidence in the hard-working staff of that organisation or, indeed, of those businesses that have been encouraged to tender to become strategic partners, which is why stronger scrutiny would help. The Minister mentioned significant concessions, but he also referred to an uncertain future. The measure, as it stands, could do with a little more certainty and scrutiny. Sadly, he has failed to persuade us that our amendment is unnecessary, so we will be pressing it to a vote.
Oral Answers to Questions
Angus Robertson Excerpts(10 years, 2 months ago)
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Mr Dunne
Of course defence, and therefore defence procurement, is not a devolved matter and therefore the work the Ministry of Defence does is primarily with industries right across the country. I have undertaken events in Scotland and I am looking forward to an event in Wales in due course later this year.
Angus Robertson (Moray) (SNP)
May I wish you a very happy St Patrick’s day, Mr Speaker, and no doubt MOD Ministers will be pleased to put on record their appreciation for the increasing co-operation with the Irish defence forces?
In a parliamentary answer on 3 October 2011 the MOD admitted that out of 6,000 SME contracts with the MOD, only 50 contracts were in Scotland, which is 0.83%, just under 10 times less than Scotland’s population share. When will the MOD answer my question on SME spending across the UK by region, which was tabled in January?
Mr Dunne
As I have said to the hon. Gentleman previously, we do not believe it is relevant to look at the location of where we procure equipment. We want to procure the best equipment for our armed forces from the best place. Scotland of course has a significant share of much of our spending, not least through the aircraft carrier contracts, which I saw for myself last week, and much of that defence work would be at risk were Scotland to vote yes in the referendum in September.
Oral Answers to Questions
Angus Robertson Excerpts(10 years, 4 months ago)
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Mr Hammond
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The fact is that we have very cordial relationships with the Russians and good working relationships with the Russian armed forces, but we should not lose sight of the fact that we cannot be confident that our strategic interests will always align with those of Russia. We should therefore engage and work together with them when we can, but, frankly, we should recognise that our strategic interests may differ at times.
Angus Robertson (Moray) (SNP)
The arrival of the Russian navy off the Scottish coast was the second time in two years that this has happened, yet the Royal Navy does not have a single frigate or destroyer based in Scotland for such eventualities. Last week, the Ministry of Defence confirmed that the fleet ready escort has been gapped for 37 days in recent years. Why has there been a gap to the fleet ready escort?
Armed Forces Restructuring
Angus Robertson Excerpts(10 years, 4 months ago)
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Mr Hammond
My hon. Friend observes that we shall have the smallest Army for a number of years when we have completed this restructuring, but we might also remind ourselves that we still have the fourth largest defence budget in the world and, on any fair and objective assessment, the second most capable expeditionary armed force capability in the world after the United States. The public can rest assured that our armed forces will do their duty and protect this country wherever, whenever and however called upon to do so.
Angus Robertson (Moray) (SNP)
I thank the Secretary of State for giving me advance sight of his statement. The UK Government have acknowledged that personnel reductions in Scotland have been disproportionate. The right hon. Gentleman’s predecessor confirmed that there would be cuts of 27.9% in Scotland, compared with 11.6% across the UK. Will the Secretary of State confirm that personnel numbers are at a record low in Scotland, at around 11,000? That is significantly lower than the level of 15,000 planned by the Scottish Government for after independence.
Mr Hammond
I was thinking about how to answer the hon. Gentleman’s question, but he has just given me the solution. The Scottish Government’s so-called plans for the future Scottish defence force exist in cloud cuckoo land. Their numbers simply do not add up, and our analysis shows that they would require about 30% more than they are proposing to spend to deliver the full structure that they have outlined in their White Paper. I look forward to coming to Scotland in due course and deconstructing, yet again, the rubbish coming out of the Scottish National party.
Oral Answers to Questions
Angus Robertson Excerpts(10 years, 6 months ago)
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Anna Soubry
There is the community covenant, but I would be more than happy to make a phone call if it might help in any way.
Angus Robertson (Moray) (SNP)
I am sure the Secretary of State is concerned, as are many people, about the new statistics on near air misses involving fast jets. The Ministry of Defence committed in 1998 to installing collision warning systems on Tornado aircraft, but it has not yet done so. Does the Secretary of State regret that? Will he also confirm that the Typhoon does not have a collision warning system installed? Are there plans to do so and when will that happen?
Mr Speaker
I am sure those four questions will be pithily replied to by the Secretary of State, who is dexterous in these matters.
Defence Procurement
Angus Robertson Excerpts(10 years, 6 months ago)
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Mr Hammond
There were two questions there. First, my hon. Friend is absolutely right to point out that for a customer-supplier interface to work, we need skills on both sides. This is not just about upskilling DE&S; simultaneously, we are also carrying out a project within the MOD that will continue to upskill the customer side to ensure that we can be an intelligent customer. On accountability, of course Ministers will be accountable to Parliament for DE&S’s activity, but as I have announced, the chief executive will be an accounting officer with a direct line of accountability, via the Public Accounts Committee, to Parliament.
Angus Robertson (Moray) (SNP)
The long-standing inability of the MOD properly to manage procurement continues with this debacle, but what concerns me is not just the project or financial management of procurement, but the delivery of often life-saving equipment to our service personnel. Does the Secretary of State agree, therefore, that whatever emerges from this shambles, we cannot allow a situation where the MOD recommends potentially life-saving equipment, such as anti-collision systems for Tornado jets, but then does not deliver it for 15 years?
Mr Hammond
This is probably not the time for a discussion about anti-collision systems, which I know is a subject the hon. Gentleman has raised recently and no doubt will want to raise again. Hon. Members must understand the distinction, however, between failures of the procurement process and the difficult prioritisation of spending decisions. The latter is the responsibility of Ministers and cannot be derogated or laid off on to any other organisation; Ministers have to make those difficult prioritisation decisions, and we then have to hope for an organisation that can execute them efficiently. Today, we are essentially talking about the execution part of the process.