Strategic Defence and Security Review Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateNick Harvey
Main Page: Nick Harvey (Liberal Democrat - North Devon)Department Debates - View all Nick Harvey's debates with the Ministry of Defence
(14 years, 3 months ago)
Commons ChamberI commend the Backbench Business Committee for choosing this topic for debate today. After Afghanistan, which we debated last week, there is no more pressing business for the Ministry of Defence than preparing our armed forces for the future as part of the cross-departmental strategic defence and security review. As we debate today, we should keep foremost in our minds the 9,500 men and women of our armed forces currently operating at the sharp end in Afghanistan. Our armed forces are professionals who are fully aware of the risks of their job and they accept those risks to protect our country and its citizens. They do not choose where they are sent or what they are asked to do on our behalf. That is what makes their dedication and commitment awesome in the true sense of the word.
We should also keep in our minds those who have paid the ultimate sacrifice, including those who have recently died as a result of serving in Afghanistan, as set out by the Prime Minister in the House. Neither should we forget those who have been injured both in mind and body. I pay tribute to all those who are currently serving and those veterans who have served in the past; they do and have done so much to keep us safe and ask so little in return. That is why we in the House have a responsibility to ensure that when we take decisions on the future shape of our armed forces, we do so not only to ensure the safety of the country but to honour the commitment of our armed forces.
I want to ensure that hon. and right hon. Members have as much opportunity as possible to contribute to the debate, so I shall take Mr Speaker’s injunction to keep my remarks necessarily brief. We are at a crucial stage of the SDSR and although no final decisions have been taken, the tough choices that are required are now imminent. The Government will publish their findings from the SDSR later this autumn, in co-ordination with the outcome of the cross-governmental spending review. I am sure that Members will understand that I shall not be able to answer specific questions on equipment or force levels today, but this is an opportunity for those Members with concerns, whether they relate to a constituency or other interest, to articulate them in time for them still to be considered.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. He drew attention to Afghanistan. This debate takes place as soldiers from 16 Air Assault Brigade from Colchester garrison are being deployed to Afghanistan for the fourth time. The second recommendation in paragraph 11 of the Defence Committee’s report goes thus:
“The capacity of the country even to sustain current in-use capabilities and therefore current operations could well be put at risk by the proposed cuts of between 10% and 20%.”
Would he care to respond to that comment from the Select Committee, please?
I understand the concern that the Select Committee flags up and the reasons why my hon. Friend raises that point here today, but whatever else happens in the SDSR, the Government are absolutely committed to the priority for Afghanistan, and nothing will be done to undermine the efforts of our front-line troops there, nor the way in which they are equipped or supported. That is our paramount, top priority; it remains defence’s main effort and, whatever decisions are taken for the long term, none will be taken that will undermine in the short term the work that we are performing on the front line.
In a recent interview with The Press and Journal, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury said that the social and economic consequences of any base closures or rundowns would be taken into account. Will the Government publish those assessments?
The Government—the Treasury in particular, but all Departments—will take seriously the economic consequences of all the decisions that are taken in the comprehensive spending review. If there are consequences that need to be addressed, every possible effort will be made to put in place remedial measures. How precisely the Government Departments that are responsible for such measures will approach the matter will be explained in due course. It is not predominantly an issue for the Ministry of Defence. All the decisions that are made across all Departments will have consequences, and the Government as a whole will do their utmost to address those consequences.
The Minister will know that I am very concerned about Lyneham. While I, of course, accept what he says and understand that Departments are answerable for their decisions, does he accept that the communities that live around bases have given their wholehearted support to their base, so it is only reasonable that the Ministry of Defence—not other Departments—should be ready to say what it believes the economic consequences of a base closure will be and what it will do to support the communities thereafter?
My hon. Friend is allowing himself to go into the realms of speculation. We will have to await the decisions. He has known what is in the pipeline for RAF Lyneham for some time and of course any decisions that are taken will have economic consequences. My hon. Friend must keep his powder dry and see what exactly is decided about Lyneham, as other hon. Members will have to do about those bases or industrial issues that they hold most dear. Hon. Members have an opportunity to make these points today. We will listen; we will take them into account. However, despite the speculation in newspapers or elsewhere, it would be absurd for a Minister part way through a process to enter into some sort of running commentary on every twist or turn.
My hon. Friend said a few moments ago that we were all entitled to have our input into this process. On behalf of my constituents who are likely to be affected by the review I should like to know whether there is a cut-off date for our input into the process.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for raising that point. Let me say that a vast number of representations—almost 7,000—have been made by members of the public and the armed forces, industry, academics, Members of Parliament and others. There is a cut-off point, and it is the end of next week, so if he or his constituents have any further points that they wish to make, I urge them to do so in that time frame.
I recognise that many in the House have strong views about our armed forces, deep attachments and a pressing need to represent the best interests of their constituents, from reserves to regiments, from equipment to the industrial base. This is the strength of our parliamentary system—every citizen has someone here to fight for them. So we will take into account everything that hon. Members have to say. There will be a broad range of views, and they will be considered as decisions are made on how to deliver the future strategy for national security as effectively and efficiently as possible. Even at this late stage, we are still listening, and all the issues that are raised in the debate today will be given the consideration that they require.
The Foreign Secretary has set out in this House and in a speech yesterday the distinctive British foreign policy that the coalition Government will pursue. He set out our assessment of the nature of the world in which we now live. It is a networked world in which power balances are shifting, with new rising economies and new forms of diplomacy that are eroding the traditional influence that Britain has enjoyed in world affairs. This is happening at a time when the potential threats to our security are grave. So in particular we need to recognise that multilateral operation with allies and partners, underpinned by the rule of law and the pursuit of human rights, is the best way to achieve British interests. As my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary said:
“our interests depend on a world system based on law. We need states not to proliferate nuclear weapons, to respect the sovereignty of others, to abide by international treaties and to support legal sanctions by the international community.”
So we will look to enhance relations as well as develop new partnerships with others across all aspects of national security and areas that are of strategic importance to the UK. This is also at a time of serious constraints on our national resources. We have to work even harder as a nation to maintain the position of the UK economy. It is our economy that provides the prosperity of our citizens and in turn provides the resources for the pursuit of our national security.
I thank my hon. Friend for giving way. He mentioned the role of reservists. Will he confirm that the review will look at strengthening the Territorial Army, especially after the budget cuts under the previous Government and the closure of the TA base in Harlow?
I have made it clear that I do not intend to be drawn into speculation about the outcome of the review, but let me state for the record that the Government attach the greatest significance to the contribution made by our reserves. They are an absolutely vital part of our capability and will continue to be so for decades to come. We are determined that they should be able to do that from a position of maximum effectiveness.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way, and for those rousing words. In deciding what future there is and how much defence capability should be put into reserves, two things are crucial. The first is that we recognise how much cheaper they are and the second, equally important, thing is that it depends on the offer to the officers and NCOs. It has to be an attractive, interesting job if we want to get the right quality of leaders.
My hon. Friend makes a good point, as he always does on these matters, and I can reassure him that it will be taken into account.
I need to make a bit of progress, and I have a suspicion that my hon. Friend will want to come in a bit later.
The economic context of this security review is one that we cannot ignore. Next year the interest bill alone for the debt that Labour has left the nation will be more than £46 billion—more than the entire defence budget for the UK. Unfortunately, defence cannot be immune from the fiscal challenge that we face, especially when other Departments face strict cost management. As the shadow team knows, the specific challenges in defence are immense, and that is in no small part due to the fact that it bequeathed a forward defence programme with a £38 billion black hole between its commitments and the budget put in place to pay for them. They sat there making future commitments in a manner that resembled a child writing a Christmas wish list to Santa, and they had absolutely no idea how they were going to pay for it all. So on top of the deplorable economic legacy that the previous Government have left, specifically in defence they left a £38 billion black hole—a gap between their forward programme and the forward budget, and that is the size of the challenge facing the new Government.
If the hon. Gentleman is rising to apologise for that, I will happily give way to him.
No, I am not, and I am also not going to allow the hon. Gentleman to con the British public into thinking that that £38 billion is a debt that is there to be paid today. I find this a bit rich coming from the Conservatives, who in opposition, right up until the general election, were calling for a larger Army, a larger Navy, and extra expenditure. Will he be truthful with the British public and say that the figure he is quoting is actually spread over the next 10 years?
The figure is certainly spread over the 10-year period of this review. The gap between the commitments that the Labour Government made and the budget that was in place to pay for it is £38 billion. Before the election, both Opposition parties charged the Government with doing just this. We did not know the scale of it, and it turns out to be even worse than we had charged. We therefore have no choice but to face the gravity of that legacy and set about the task of trying to build future defences that are coherent and effective, but doing so against that budget background. We hear that different Government Departments are being asked to indicate what it would entail to make reductions in their budgets of a different size. Let me explain to the House that if the defence budget were to be cut by 10% in real terms, the defence programme would have to be cut by 19% in real terms in order to achieve that. That is the meaning of the black hole that we were left by the previous Government, and that is the scale of the task that the current Government are facing.
The Chairman of the Defence Committee summed up the situation very well at the beginning of his speech when he talked about speed and the issues that have to be determined about how the process is taking place. Let me make this perfectly clear. As I have said in interviews this week, the time scale of the review is a great deal brisker than we would have chosen in an ideal world, but this is not an ideal world—it is a world in which we have been bequeathed the financial situation that I have described, and that needs tackling as a matter of urgency. We have to ensure that the decisions that we take in the next few weeks in the SDSR are sustainable not only over the short and medium term but over the long term, and they have to proceed in parallel with the Government’s spending review. The alternative would have been just to sit back and allow the Treasury to dictate a spending envelope in which a strategic defence review that we might have conducted at a more leisurely pace would be obliged to fit itself, whereas by doing the work at the same time as the comprehensive spending review, we are able to fight our corner within the spending round having done the work involved.
The right hon. Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth) said that everybody involved in defence in the political community—he quoted my words from before the election—should kick up rough. My sense is that that is exactly what everybody is doing, and I am sure that he is happy to play his part in that process.
Everybody apart from the hon. Gentleman and the Secretary of State, perhaps.
The hon. Gentleman is aware that my predecessor as Secretary of State ordered the Gray report, that I published it, and that National Audit Office reports were published before that. He knew what the situation was. When did he or his Conservative now-friends call for cuts in defence to deal with it? When, prior to the election, did he ever do that? Did he ever do anything other than ask for more?
Every time there was a defence debate in this House in the two or three years before the election, Conservative and Liberal Democrat Members repeatedly quizzed Ministers about the apparent gap between the promises they were making, the plans they were laying down and the funds that they appeared to have at their disposal in order to fulfil them. Time and again, they stood there pretending that it all added up, and the fact of the matter is that it did not.
The right hon. Gentleman refers to the Gray report. That very telling report specifically identified the true situation on the procurement side. However, that was only half the story, because the black hole existed not only in the procurement budget but across the whole defence budget, and that is the scale of the challenge that now faces us.
Although I have great respect for the shadow Secretary of State and the work that he did in the Department, I think that my hon. Friend is equally entitled to ask him when he ever admitted to the scale of the crisis that his Department was facing—although he did have the honesty to come to the House and admit that he had started the process of raiding future capability in order to sustain current operations, which showed that our commitments had got wildly ahead of the resources that the Government had made available.
My hon. Friend is quite right. That was precisely the significance of the measures that the right hon. Gentleman had to take hastily—last December, I think—in order to make this year’s budget wash its face. That is a graphic illustration of the problem that had been allowed to grow up and which we are now having to tackle.
Of course, we could tackle this simply by cutting a bit off everything—the equal-pain option across the services—but that would not distinguish capabilities or assess real risk, and it would not reform our forces for the strategic challenges ahead. We cannot just fossilise what we currently do, and again fail the strategic test. Instead, we must look ahead to the end of this 10-year period and decide what we want our armed forces to look like at that time based on the foreign policy goals we have set, our assessment of the future character of conflict, and our anticipation of the changes in technology that we will need to incorporate.
The National Security Council has agreed that the overarching strategic posture should be to address the most immediate threats to our national security while maintaining the ability to identify and deal with emerging ones before they become bigger threats to the UK. This flexible, adaptable posture will maintain the ability to safeguard international peace and security, to deter and contain those who threaten the UK and its interests, and, where necessary, to conduct a number of different operations concurrently. It will also, crucially, keep our options open for a future in which we can expect our highest priorities to change over a period of time.
In order to set the record straight, does my hon. Friend remember that although the shadow Secretary of State takes credit for publishing the Gray report, that happened only after four months of the then Prime Minister trying to prevent it from being published, and only after I had put in a freedom of information request to demand that it should be published?
I congratulate my right hon. Friend on having winkled that out of Labour Members; I am very glad that I gave way to him. I knew that the report had sat on their desks for a long time, but I was not aware that that was precisely how it came out, so I take my hat off to him for doing that.
For all the financial constraints, this means that we have to take strategic decisions for the long term and invest in programmes that we will require to put defence on a sound footing for the years ahead.
The right hon. Member for Coventry North East raised the matter of Trident. He rightly pointed out that it had been subject to speculation and tittle-tattle, and then devoted about 10 minutes of his speech to responding to it as though it were all absolute gospel truth deserving of the most serious attention. Let me make it clear to the House. A decision on Trident has been taken. The position was set out in the coalition agreement, which makes it clear that we will maintain Britain’s nuclear deterrent and, in due course, replace it. The coalition agreement also makes it clear, however, that the successor programme should be scrutinised for value for money, and that is what is happening. However, I am not aware of any suggestion to delay either any decisions or, indeed, the procurement. The value-for-money study has yet to be undertaken at the National Security Council, and I cannot pre-empt any decision that it might make. It is perfectly possible that, in pursuing value for money, the council might look at the expenditure profile, but the key decisions and the timetable have already been decided, and nothing has changed that in any sense.
The right hon. Gentleman, the shadow Defence Secretary, will be aware that the initial gate decision was due last autumn, and that essentially technical phase has been delayed for largely technical reasons. We will reach it as planned, probably at the tail end of this year but, if not, in the very early part of next, and the timetable that pans out is as understood and as has been set out. I cannot pre-empt or speculate on what the value-for-money study will conclude, but there is no intention fundamentally to alter the programme that has been laid out.
Next month we will know exactly what the cuts are going to be. Surely the British public have a right to debate whether we have Trident or not, because that should be part of our debate.
The in-principle debate about whether to embark on the programme was held in 2007, and the final opportunity for the public, Parliament or anybody else to debate whether we pass the point of no return, as it were, on the successor programme is at main gate, and of course there will be debate about that. In terms of what is going on this autumn, the value-for-money study will feed into the SDR and the comprehensive spending review, and, if it is possible to get better value for money out of the programme, it is only right and proper that we do so.
I see the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness rising, and, in terms of the impact that the process might have, I must say that the points that have already been made about the impact on the industrial base, if there were to be an interruption, are well understood. They would be not only of industrial significance, but of military significance, so Members should not give way to the temptation to speculate on the basis of tittle-tattle in the press.
The Minister has just said that the decisions on the timetable have been taken and will not change, and that is very significant. If that statement is true, it will be very welcome in Barrow and Furness. However, is he aware that, as I understand it, the Prime Minister’s official spokesman, at his Lobby briefing this morning, gave a very different impression?
Let me say this again: the decision on Trident has been taken. It was laid out in the coalition agreement, which made it perfectly clear:
“We will maintain Britain’s nuclear deterrent”
and, in due course, replace it. The value-for-money study, which is currently taking place but has yet to arrive at any decisions, may well consider the expenditure profile, and the order in which we programme different parts of the work, but I cannot speculate on that. However, the initial gate decision is on course to be made later this year or, at the latest, in the early part of next. We know that under the timetable, main gate will be at the tail end of 2014 or, possibly, in the early part of 2015; that is already known and understood. But, as the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) pertinently pointed out in his intervention, if main gate happened to shift a few months, it would not make any difference in terms of either finance or, frankly, the impact on the industrial base. So, the issue involves complete speculation and does not have the significance that one or two people have suggested it might.
I welcome the Minister’s extremely reassuring remarks. In that context, I note the intensive press reports stating that the Treasury has pressed for the capital costs of Trident to be met from—presumably—the existing core budget of the Ministry of Defence. Is that the case, and, if we are to have both a conventional military and the independent nuclear deterrent, is it possible?
I rather agreed with the right hon. Member for Coventry North East, who said that that point is largely academic: the cost all comes out of the Treasury as a whole, and the particular line on which it is accounted is neither here nor there. We would want to be clear that the funds for Trident were on a separate line from that of the core defence budget. That is what the White Paper said, and as I understand it, that is still the position. However, where precisely it is accounted is neither here nor there; it is a completely semantic and academic point.
Ah! I had anticipated my hon. Friend wanting to come in, and this was the point at which I thought he would want me to give way.
And the Minister has done so very graciously. He is doing his best at damage limitation. What would reassure me even more would be to know from him that no one employed by the Government was responsible for the extremely damaging story that was leaked to the BBC last night.
I have absolutely no grounds whatever to think or believe that it was, and to the extent that I am able, I am happy to offer that reassurance. Obviously, I cannot account for every employee anywhere in government, which is rather a large thing, but I do not believe that that is what happened or think that there is any point in the House dwelling on any speculation about what happened.
If that is the case and we are meant to discount the story, will the Minister just confirm one thing? When he talks about possible decisions about main gate in the context of value for money, does he accept that no interpretation of a value-for-money assessment could result in a decision that the Trident replacement should not go ahead at all?
I do not think that that is within the scope of the study under consideration; the study is about how we might improve the existing programme’s value for money and delivery. Again, I cannot pre-empt the decisions that the National Security Council will arrive at shortly, when it addresses the value-for-money report, but my hon. Friend’s point is considerably wide of its scope.
The coalition agreement also said:
“Liberal Democrats will continue to make the case for alternatives,”
and the Liberal Democrats will. I shall continue to argue that in government; my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) will continue to argue the case for alternatives outwith government. But, the Government are proceeding with the programme, and that is the point that I wish to make clear today. The arrangements that the right hon. Member for Coventry North East left in place are those which the value-for-money report is studying, and to the extent that any better value for money can be squeezed out of the programme, that is the objective of the exercise.
When giving way, there is always a trade-off between allowing people to intervene and eating up the time that they could otherwise use to make their own contributions.
So, by way of conclusion, I simply say that the point has been made that we have not liaised adequately with industry. Industry has a regular dialogue with the Government, and we understand the industrial challenges and issues. We want and need a resilient defence-industrial base, and having a strong defence industry is a formidable strategic asset. It is a key part of our international security relationships, it obviously provides jobs, tax revenues and an improved balance of payments and its long-term prosperity rests also on offering good value for money to the British taxpayer.
We have difficult choices ahead of us, and the SDSR is a highly complex undertaking with many issues interwoven. As we pull the threads together and try to weave a better whole, we have to ensure that we get the balance right not only in defence but in other security services, foreign policy and international development. We must balance those matters with domestic concerns and investment in public services. I cannot say that the final decisions on defence will be pain-free, but that is the same across all Departments. I can say that we will strive to take those decisions based on what is right for the country and for defence as a whole, in the strategic and financial conditions in which we find ourselves.
With the leave of the House, Mr Deputy Speaker, I will reply. This has been a good debate. When the Backbench Business Committee decided on this subject for today’s debate, it would have been pleased to think we would get 30 speeches from the Floor of the House of such wide-ranging nature and all of a positive and constructive tone. As I said at the beginning, the SDSR has not yet made any of the big decisions, but it is just about to do so. This could not, therefore, have been a more timely moment for everyone who wished to put the points that they have made today to do so. I reaffirm our commitment to take away all the points made and give them the most serious consideration.
As ever in the House when we are discussing the armed forces, the debate has been informed by the personal experience, background and understanding of many Members. What has been most evident across the political divide is the respect shared by all Members of the House for the commitment and dedication of the brave men and women who serve in our armed forces. They are a credit to the country, and we are rightly proud of them.
As I anticipated, hon. Members from all parts of the country have rightly made the case for their local area, as is their responsibility. We have heard from places as far apart as the Outer Hebrides and Cornwall, and most points in between. Hon. Members with naval bases or a military or industrial footprint in their constituency all made points about the impact that any decision might have in their area. It is proper that they do so, but I hope they understand that it is not possible at this point in the process for me to respond or offer comfort on each and every point.
I will, but in the short time I have available, I do not want to make this a precedent.
This is very much in response to where the Minister is in his comments. Given that he has paid so much close attention to hon. Members who have spoken for the interests of their parts of the country, is he surprised that, given the importance of aircraft carriers, not one Labour Member from Glasgow or Fife has bothered to turn up or speak in the debate?
I suppose I am mildly surprised not even to have seen the usual suspects. In fairness, we have heard from them before very many times on these matters, so I think we can rest assured that their perspective is understood. The right hon. Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth) said, quoting me from before the election, that all parts of the political community interested in defence would need to get together to make our views clear to the Treasury—“kick up rough” was his expression.
It was my expression, which the right hon. Gentleman kindly elevated to make his point.
I say to all Members present that it is not at all unhelpful to Defence Ministers that we will be able to illustrate to the rest of Government the strength of feeling that has been expressed in this debate. I am grateful to all those who came to take part and put their point of view.
We are wrestling with very difficult issues. The financial background is that which I described earlier; I do not intend to repeat all that now. However, even if we were conducting a defence review at this time and there were no financial difficulties at all, we would still be making big and significant changes, and we cannot do that without some pain and collateral damage. It is not possible that everybody speaking from every part of the country and every part of the defence community will get what they want at the end of this process. We must acknowledge that and realise that if we are to reconfigure our forces to equip them for the challenges that we believe, in our best estimate, they are likely to face in the 21st century, then there will be change. Some capabilities will be less relevant in future than they have been in the past, and we will have to identify the new areas that will require additional investment to equip the forces in the way that we want them to be equipped.
Not all these decisions are self-evident. It is more than a decade—12 years—since the last formal review, and the world has changed immensely in that time. Furthermore, we have learned a lot from the operations that we have been involved in during that time. I very much agree with the right hon. Member for Coventry North East that the force density taking effect in Afghanistan now is having much more impact than we had on our initial entry into Helmand. The military have learned from these experiences, as have the Department and the NATO coalition. When we consider how we prepare force structures for the future, we have to learn those lessons. We cannot be exempt from the overall overhaul that we can see taking place across Whitehall. However, retaining effective defence will certainly be our priority, and we will not allow that to be undermined by the financial predicament in which we find ourselves.
Comments have been made about the speed of the review. As I said earlier, I have a great deal of sympathy with what the Defence Committee said in its report. It would not be from choice that anybody would conduct a review at this speed. I pay tribute to the previous Administration for the work they did last winter. The Green Paper process, with its cross-party nature and the involvement of an advisory panel that brought in a variety of interests, paved the ground for the work studies that took place prior to this stage of the review, which have in effect laid the agenda on the table and enabled the National Security Council to get to the point where it can decide the priorities and make the decisions.
Let me turn to some of today’s contributions. I should like to respond to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South West (Paul Uppal), which was picked up by Opposition Front Benchers. I take the point. The right hon. Member for Coventry North East—in a very level and, in no sense disloyal, way—encouraged new Ministers to question quite vigorously the information that we receive from officials and the military, and the point is taken. I will personally ensure that we do go away and have another look at that case.
Similarly, my hon. Friend the Member for Gosport (Caroline Dinenage) raised the issue of rest and relaxation and the fact that it ought to begin from the moment people get back home. I entirely agree that that is the most desirable way of doing it, and if in particular circumstances it proves, for operational reasons, not to be possible, we have guaranteed that we will add it on at the end, when people get back. That is a sub-optimal solution, but it may on occasions be necessary, for operational reasons, to handle it that way, and we will ensure at any rate that people do not lose out. My hon. Friend made a good point.
I re-emphasise that we are still listening to representations from a wide variety of interests and will continue to do so until the end of next week. If any hon. Members, even after having had the opportunity in the House this afternoon, have further points that they or anybody with whom they are in touch wish to make, the end of next week is the deadline for doing so. We have, as I said earlier, had almost 7,000 representations, so although the process has been brisk, the opportunity for a diverse range of interests to feed in their thinking has been there, and many have taken it up. We will do our absolute utmost to process all that and arrive at the best possible conclusion, if we can, in the light of it.
I think it was with some sadness that the House heard the right hon. Gentleman say from the Dispatch Box that this was probably his last contribution in his current capacity.
Maybe, he says. I should like to echo the words of the Defence Committee Chairman and others in paying tribute to the right hon. Gentleman for his work throughout his time in defence. He is very, very highly regarded inside the Ministry of Defence. He is remembered not only with affection, but with a great deal of respect, as somebody who was able to see the wood for the trees, take a decision quickly and get it right. He has earned a big reputation in that area, and it will go with him.
The right hon. Gentleman’s plea in mitigation that the gap between the programme and the budget—upon which I charged his party earlier—had shrunk during his tenure is possibly, just about, true, and to the extent that it is I commend him for it, but he served only to make the point that the mismatch between the programme and the budget had existed for a long time. Indeed, in all truth it dates right back to the strategic defence review of 1998, which set out boldly on quite a sensible and well regarded path, but it was underfunded from the first year and the gap continued to grow thereafter.
However, we wish the right hon. Gentleman well and thank him for the contribution that he made. He will be remembered by both the armed forces and the Ministry with a great deal of respect and admiration.
We will publish the SDSR later in the autumn, and I am encouraged by the fact that there is a degree of cross-party agreement on what we are trying to achieve. I hope that that will be sustained when it comes to understanding some of the tough decisions that we will inevitably have to make. The public and the armed forces will understand when we in this House seek to represent the interests of our constituents; what they will not understand or appreciate is if politics infects the response to the SDSR. We have to make incredibly important decisions and keep in mind at all times the shape and configuration of the forces that we think we will need in 10 years’ time, at the end of the period that the SDSR is considering; but we have to get ourselves from where we are today, in our financial situation today, to where we want to be then, and at the same time sustain in Afghanistan the operation that we are undertaking there. It is gaining momentum and genuinely advancing towards the objectives that we have set.
Nothing will be done to undermine the work of our forces on the front line, but those difficult decisions will, nevertheless, have to be made, and I am sure that we will return to them in this House in due course, when the decisions have been taken and the situation is understood for all to debate.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That this House has considered the matter of the Strategic Defence and Security Review and future of the UK’s armed forces.
I wish Members from all parts of the House a happy, fruitful and interesting conference recess.