Strategic Defence and Security Review

Liam Fox Excerpts

Monday 21st June 2010 Commons Chamber

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Dr Liam Fox)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the matter of the strategic defence and security review.

On this sad day when the House has heard the news of the 300th member of the armed forces losing his life in Afghanistan, our thoughts and prayers are with his family and friends, as well as with all those other service families who are mourning their losses. It is also appropriate to remember the families of the victims of violence from 9/11 to the present day. We did not initiate this cycle of violence, but we will certainly confront it.

I am pleased to open this debate on the Ministry of Defence contribution to the strategic defence and security review. All parties in the House committed themselves at the election to holding this review. The Green Paper from the previous Government, with its all-party approach, produced broad agreement on the need for fundamental reform, and I am sure that all Members will agree and reiterate that the defence of the nation should be above the worst excesses of partisan party politics.

In this review, we will need to challenge many preconceptions and think clearly about what we as a country want and need from our armed forces, and what we can afford. I want to ensure that we benefit from the expertise in the wider defence community, including partners in industry, academia, non-governmental organisations and the charitable and voluntary sector.

It is also essential that members of the House of Commons have a proper opportunity to make their views known on behalf of themselves and those whom we represent. In that light, Members submissions on the defence review should be made directly to me at the Ministry of Defence. Those in the other place with specialist interests will also be especially welcome to make submissions. Most importantly, the Prime Minister and I are determined that members of the armed forces and their families have an opportunity to contribute, and the service chiefs will set out shortly how that will be achieved. There has already been a lively debate about the choices that we face, and the MOD will continue to engage. Today, I shall set out the coalition Government’s broad approach to the defence review, an assessment of the financial backdrop, a description of the strategic environment and, finally, the way ahead.

Conducting a defence review while fighting a war in Afghanistan is rather like trying to build a ship while still at sea. Afghanistan must remain our priority, and as part of the international coalition of 46 nations we must prevail. None the less, after 12 years without a defence review, when our armed forces have at times been overstretched, with some current equipment overused or out of date, with programmes from the cold war that are of less relevance today, and in our dreadful economic and financial circumstances, it is clear that change must come. The review will need to provide a step change, not salami-slicing. We will have to bring defence policy, plans, commitments and resources into balance, confront the harsh facts of the economic climate in which we operate and make a clean break from the military and political mindset of cold war politics.

Let me give the House just one example. In the past, military might has been measured by conventional capabilities, such as tanks, aircraft and ships that we can inspect and review; but technology is already moving on at such a rate that there are new domains of warfare, such as cyber and space, where we will require capabilities in which the Government will have to invest but which the public might not be able to see. We also see the development of asymmetrical capabilities that serve to deny us the effectiveness of our conventional capabilities. It makes sense for any adversary to develop what are commonly referred to as area-denial or anti-access strategies in order to deny us the use of our conventional military capabilities without matching us tank for tank, ship for ship or jet for jet. We should not hope that our adversaries do not do so; we should expect and plan that they will; and it is vital that the review consider that point.

[Angus Robertson (Moray) (SNP)]

I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on his new position. Ministry of Defence statistics show that since the previous strategic defence review there have been more than 10,000 defence job losses in Scotland and an under-spend of more than £5.6 billion. What consideration will be given in this SDSR to ensure a fair and balanced defence footprint throughout the nations and regions of the United Kingdom?

[Dr Fox]

The point of the review is to ensure that we have the proper defence for the United Kingdom. We will have further things to say about the defence industrial strategy and how we will take that forward, not least because it represents high levels of employment in some economically less well-off parts of the United Kingdom, and we will come to the House with those proposals in the near future.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

I, too, welcome the right hon. Gentleman to his new post. I could make a similar point about St Athan with regard to Wales and, for that matter, more deprived areas of the country. However, that is not the point that I want to make about St Athan. Rather it is that, in the light of what the right hon. Gentleman said about the changing nature of warfare, technical training is far more important now than it was 30 or 40 years ago. Is it not absolutely vital that one of our highest priorities be to ensure that such training is improved for all our troops? Does that not mean that we should support and he should support—this is my submission—the St Athan defence training college?

[Dr Fox]

Given my experience of the hon. Gentleman, I would be extremely surprised if that were the end of his submission, and I look forward to an undoubtedly weighty document landing on my desk. I understand his points, and training is absolutely vital, particularly given the increasing professionalism in the armed forces and the increasing complexity involved. None the less, he will understand that, while that project is being considered as part of the SDSR, it would be inappropriate for me to give him even a hint of our position on it, but if he makes a personal submission, I shall certainly ensure that I read it—undoubtedly at length.

[Mr Tom Watson (West Bromwich East) (Lab)]

rose—

[Dr Fox]

I give way to the Labour party election godfather.

[Mr Watson]

I shall be polite to the Secretary of State even after that comment, Mr Deputy Speaker. The Secretary of State was always courteous to me during my short time as a junior Defence Minister, and I hope to return the courtesy over the next year or two.

Will the right hon. Gentleman say whether the review will consider the international conventions used for the engagement of advanced technology? I am thinking particularly of drone planes. Does he believe that such planes are within international law when they are used for the targeted extra-judicial killings of suspected terrorists?

[Dr Fox]

As the hon. Gentleman would expect, that issue will not be part of our review, but it is part of the sort of discussions that we need to have with our allies about the wider issues in respect of the conduct of warfare. I am sure that the Foreign Secretary and his colleagues, as well as Ministers and officials inside the MOD, will want to take on those discussions.

I thank the hon. Gentleman for what he said towards the beginning of his intervention. He was always extraordinarily courteous to the Opposition when he was in government. We shall endeavour to act in the same way, and I am sure that he will bring us up if we fail to do so.

[Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab)]

I thank the Secretary of State for giving way and, like others, I congratulate him on his appointment. In his opening remarks, he said something to the effect that he was going to do away with cold war thinking and look at problems of expenditure in that context. Britain’s development of nuclear weapons was entirely a product of the cold war. As I understand it, Britain’s possession of nuclear weapons and the Trident system will be ignored and not taken into account in the defence review. Has there been any change of thinking on that? Some of us would be astonished if defence policy could be reviewed without a review of nuclear weapons as well.

[Dr Fox]

A few years ago, we had an extensive debate in the House of Commons on what we thought, as a Parliament, was the best way to take forward Britain’s nuclear deterrent. The Conservative party, in opposition at the time, agreed with the Labour Government’s position then, and our position has not changed.

However, I say this to the hon. Gentleman. I said that we would have to get rid of some of the cold war mindset. It would be very nice if nuclear weapons had disappeared with the cold war, but when I look at what is happening in North Korea and Iran, I see that we will face the threat of nuclear proliferation in the future. Nuclear weapons are not simply a by-product of the cold war.

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

[Dr Fox]

I have given way a number of times and I shall give way again later.

I believe that at the beginning of this debate it is vital and useful to go back to first principles and remind ourselves about the purpose of defence. It bears repeating that the first duty of a Government is to provide security for our citizens. Although many arms of government are directed towards or contribute to that aim, the armed forces are central to the effort. Of course, our armed forces can do many things for the promotion of our national interest and to support Government policy more widely. But we must not lose sight of their primary mission—to maintain the capability to apply military force, when needed, so that political decision makers have the widest possible range of choices when making strategic decisions.

That has two aspects. First, our armed forces protect our citizens and territory by deterring and containing threats, preventing possibilities from becoming actualities. The nuclear deterrent is, of course, fundamental to our ability to deter the most extreme threats to the United Kingdom. As I just said in response to the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), in 2007 the Conservative party in opposition supported the decision to renew the Trident system based on the analysis set out in the 2006 White Paper, and we remain committed to continuous at-sea deterrence.

As the coalition agreement has made clear, we are scrutinising the Trident renewal programme to ensure that we get value for money, and my Liberal Democrat colleagues will continue to make the case for alternatives. However, we underestimate the value of deterrence at our peril and we do ourselves a disservice if we merely confine the concept to nuclear weapons. We know from historical experience that a declaration of peaceful intent is not sufficient to dissuade aggressors and that a weakening of national defences can encourage them. All our forces, including conventional forces, have a powerful deterrent effect, which we should seek to maximise. Recently, we have not recognised that as much as we should have. I want the SDSR to change that—to take a fresh look at what we are doing to dissuade aggression and at how we might do it better.

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

I happen to agree with the Secretary of State’s stance on nuclear weapons and Trident. Will he say a little more about the extent to which he regards Trident to be, as well as a deterrent, part of our obligations as a permanent member of the Security Council—as one of the P5, at the top table?

[Dr Fox]

It is not an obligation, but I certainly think that it adds credibility to our position as a member of P5. As I have said, our position on nuclear weapons is that in a dangerous world, when we are looking to 2050 or beyond, we cannot play fast and loose with Britain’s defences. We do not know what threats will emerge or what will happen in terms of future proliferation, and we are simply not willing to take a gamble.

[Sir Menzies Campbell (North East Fife) (LD)]

The Secretary of State began this passage of his speech by talking about returning to first principles. That allows me to take up an issue that he dealt with a moment or two ago, which is this: in determining the structure of our armed forces, in determining the location of bases, and in determining procurement decisions, must we not accept that the motivation has to be what is in the best interests of defence? If I may be excused for putting the matter pejoratively, we should not be using defence as some kind of job creation scheme.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Fox]

I have a degree of sympathy with what the right hon. and learned Gentleman says, but it is worth pointing out, at a time when the economy is going through a great deal of trouble, that the defence industry provides 300,000 manufacturing jobs—jobs that actually make and sell things to the benefit of this country’s balance of payments. The defence industry contributes a very high value to Britain’s exports, and it punches above its weight. It will be the aim of the Government to increase Britain’s defence exports, partly as a way of securing British defence jobs in the longer term, because the more markets we have, the less the British defence industry is dependent on the British domestic economic cycle.

[John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Lab/Co-op)]

I agree with the Secretary of State about industrial capacity. Before he moves on from the deterrent, will he clarify whether the value-for-money Trident review is solely considering the ballistic missile submarine system, or are alternative systems being considered?

[Dr Fox]

There are a number of elements in the Trident renewal programme, and we are looking for value for money in each of them, and trying to see where we can, if possible, get that capability for lesser cost. However, there is no question but that we will move ahead with a continuous, minimum, credible at-sea nuclear deterrent for the United Kingdom.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

[Dr Fox]

I will in a moment.

This brings me to the second aspect of the armed forces’ primary mission. Defence is also there for when everything goes wrong—when despite our best efforts, deterrence and containment have failed, diplomacy is exhausted, and, as a last resort, the use of lethal force is required. No other arm of government can deliver this or is designed for this purpose. So our armed forces must be structured, first, to deter; and secondly, to deliver the use of force in support of our national interest and to protect national security. We undertake this strategic defence and security review at a time when our armed forces are delivering on that primary mission in Afghanistan. We must have strategic patience and resource that mission fully, but it would be a mistake to base our future security on the assumption that future wars will be like the current ones. That is why we must maintain generic capability able to adapt to changing threats.

I now give way to my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis).

[Dr Lewis]

My right hon. Friend must have read my mind; perhaps that is not difficult to do. I congratulate him on taking up his post; it is a pleasure to see him there.

My right hon. Friend says that we cannot assume that future wars will be like current counter-insurgency campaigns, yet some very senior figures in the Army are asking us to make that very assumption. It cannot be safe for this country to plan on the basis that just because we are engaged in irregular warfare now, we do not have to worry about state-against-state conflict in future. Will he say, once and for all, that there is a danger that we could one day find ourselves opposed by a modern, well-armed, industrialised state, and that we have to be prepared for that terrible eventuality?

[Dr Fox]

I would never be so presumptuous as to believe that I could read the complexities and high intellectual level of my hon. Friend’s mind, but let us just say that having spent four years in opposition together, I have a fair idea of what he is likely to raise and when. He is absolutely correct, and I reiterate that it would be wrong, and fly in the face of everything that we have learned from history, to believe that future wars will be predictable or like the ones in which we are currently engaged. We must maintain generic capability that is flexible, adaptable and able to deal with changing future threats of a sort that we cannot possibly predict with any certainty.

[Mr Bob Ainsworth (Coventry North East) (Lab)]

I am struggling to understand at the moment how the Secretary of State plans to deal with the issue of the deterrent. I know what the coalition agreement said and what the Liberal Democrats’ position is, and I have heard him say various things, but will the value-for-money study be part of the strategic defence review, has it started, and how and in what forum will his coalition partners be able to pursue their separate views on the shape of the deterrent?

[Dr Fox]

The value-for-money study on Trident has begun, as has the SDSR, and it will be concluded long before the SDSR. I hope that it will be concluded before the summer recess.

I want to be as open as I can about the backdrop to the SDSR. To take one aspect, the defence budget itself, the future programme is entirely unaffordable, especially if we try to do what we will need to do in future while simultaneously doing everything in the way that we do it today. The legacy that the new Government have inherited means that even if defence spending kept pace with inflation, we would face a deficit of many billions of pounds over the life of this Parliament and more over the next decade. To make things worse, there are additional systemic pressures on the defence budget that exacerbate the situation, including the trend of pay increases above inflation. The previous Government’s approach was too often characterised by delay-to-spend rather than invest-to-save. The decision to slow the rate of the Queen Elizabeth class carriers in 2009, for example, increased the overall costs by more than £600 million at a stroke.

The bottom line is this: no matter how hard we bear down on the costs of administration and drive up efficiency, we cannot expect to bridge the gap by those means alone. The problem is structural, so the response must be structural to put defence on a stable footing. The Ministry of Defence, as a Department of State, must itself face wide-ranging reform. We intend to reorganise the whole organisation into three pillars: first, strategy and policy; secondly, the armed forces; and thirdly, procurement and estates. We intend to create a more efficient and leaner centre, in which everyone knows what they are responsible for and to whom they are accountable, with clear deadlines and budgetary discipline. Major reform of our procurement practices will be accompanied by a number of industrial consultations that I will shortly outline to Parliament.

As much as structural reform is required, however, I am equally determined that the armed forces be reconfigured to meet the needs of the evolving security environment and satisfy the expectations of this country. Although the SDSR is necessarily financially aware, it is policy-based, and I wish to set that policy out to the House.

[Mr Dai Havard (Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney) (Lab)]

I apologise for interrupting now, because what the Secretary of State has just said is hugely important, but may I go back to what he said about the review of the deterrent? May we be clear that the financial review of the nuclear deterrent is due to take place before the recess, that it is a one-off activity and that it will not be part of a continuing review at each of the various stages of the programme that has been outlined, including the main gate stage? Will the Secretary of State clarify that point?

[Dr Fox]

As part of the coalition agreement, we agreed that we would have a value-for-money study to examine the costs of the programme and see where we could achieve better value within it. That is the process that is now ongoing.

The Foreign Secretary has set out the new Government’s distinctive British foreign policy, which has at its heart the pursuit and defence of UK interests and a recognition that our prosperity and security is bound up with that of others. That will require the enhancement of diplomatic relations with key partners, using Britain’s unique network of friendships, bonds and alliances and working bilaterally as well as multilaterally. That does not mean that we must be able to do all things at all times. We will need to be smarter about when and how we deploy power, which tasks we can undertake in alliance with others, and what capabilities we will need as a result. That must be based on a hard-headed assessment of the current security environment and the growing threats to peace and stability.

We live in a period in which direct military threats to UK territory are low, but in which the wider risks to our interests and way of life are growing. Over the coming decades, we could face weak or failing states creating new focal points for exportable Islamist terrorism that threatens our citizens and our allies, as we have seen in Yemen and Somalia. We could also face a nuclear-capable or nuclear-armed Iran destabilising Shi’a-Sunni and Arab-Persian fault lines, as well as those with Israel and the rest of the world. That could create an uncontrollable cycle of nuclear proliferation and, at worst, the erosion of the post-Hiroshima taboo against nuclear use by both Governments and terrorists. Elsewhere, we could see the emergence of old or new regional powers and the return of state-versus-state competition and confrontation. More immediately, competition for energy and other resources, including fresh water, could take on a military nature.

It is conceivable that we will negotiate the next half century without confronting any of those risks—I certainly hope so—but it is equally possible that the UK could face security policy decisions relating to any or all such risks during the course of the next Parliament. That is the reality of the world in which we live, and we must break away from the recent habit of planning for the best-case scenario and then hoping the worst never happens. Unlike what happened during the cold war, we cannot be confident about how and how quickly such trends may evolve. I shall therefore conduct a thorough stocktake of our contingency plans in the months ahead.

Of course, responding to such events would not be for Britain alone. Britain’s relationship with the United States will remain critical for our national security; it is the UK’s most important and prized strategic relationship.

[Mark Lancaster (Milton Keynes North) (Con)]

Given the contingencies that my right hon. Friend outlines, is it not important for us to have a strategic reserve? What lessons can be learned from last year’s debacle, when the previous Government had to do a humiliating U-turn over cuts to the Territorial Army, to ensure that we do not make such mistakes again in the coming defence review?

[Dr Fox]

It is very clear that we require civil contingency in the UK, and as part of the wider SDSR, we are looking at the protection of the UK homeland. We cannot simply direct our armed forces at external threats while ignoring internal threats. That must be a raised priority, as it will be as part of the wider security review.

[Michael Dugher (Barnsley East) (Lab)]

I welcome the Secretary of State and his team to their positions. When in opposition, he was always steadfast and unwavering in his calls for a larger Army. Does he share my concern and that of my constituents that the review ought not to be used as a way of delivering major cuts to Army manning levels, which would be quite unwise and, indeed, dangerous?

[Dr Fox]

The defence review is not about predetermining the size or shape of the armed forces. In fact, the size or shape of the armed forces will be determined by the review. I can comfort the hon. Gentleman by saying that the service chiefs will each thoroughly defend their service in the review, as one might expect. I would be surprised—Opposition Front Benchers would be even more surprised—if that were not the case.

[Mr Ian Davidson (Glasgow South West) (Lab/Co-op)]

These are complex and difficult issues, and if they are to be approached thoroughly, they cannot be approached quickly. Does the Secretary of State intend to take any decisions that might pre-empt the results of the review? In particular, what are the implications for procurement contracts that are running? Does he intend to take any steps to halt, restrict or in any way constrain existing procurement contracts? He might be able to think of the one I have in mind.

[Dr Fox]

On this occasion it is rather easier to be a mind-reader. I am well aware of the project to which the hon. Gentleman is referring. We thought about making an interim statement to Parliament just before the summer recess about which programmes were likely to go ahead, but we decided that it might cause more instability than it was worth. We therefore intend to announce all the programmes that we believe give reality to the capabilities that we want when we reach the end of the review.

Having said that, let me tell the hon. Gentleman that we are acutely aware of the fact that it is unavoidable that there will be insecurity during the period of the review. He asked about the speed. The last defence review, in 1998, was an 18-month process. We have brought the process forward partly because, to be frank, most of us in the House who take an interest in such issues have a clear idea of the sort of choices that will need to be made, but also partly because we wanted to minimise that period of insecurity for the defence industry and those who work in it.

[Robert Flello (Stoke-on-Trent South) (Lab)]

rose—

[Mr Watson]

rose—

[Dr Fox]

I am going to make a little progress, as I know that a large number of Members wish to speak in this debate.

NATO will remain our first instrument of choice for responding to the collective security challenges that we face. In the past decade, NATO has moved outside its traditional geographic area, with European allies such as Germany deploying troops abroad in ways that would have been inconceivable a decade ago. Of course, NATO is not perfect, and we are keen to streamline command structures and decision-making processes. We began that process at the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels last week, making more progress than most of us expected. However, we must use every lever at our disposal—including the Commonwealth, the UN, the EU and other regional organisations—to protect our security in an uncertain, unstable and unpredictable world.

We will look to step up cross-Government overseas engagement. Defence co-operation is an important component of that, particularly with nations who share our interests and are prepared both to pay and to fight, such as France. We intend to ensure—and consequently fund—a defence diplomacy programme in the SDSR that can make an important contribution to our global influence. Clearly we need close consultation with our allies on the SDSR. I had a good opportunity to engage in early exchanges at the recent NATO ministerial meeting, and I will follow up with detailed discussions with our closest allies. In particular, I intend to visit Washington in the near future to take forward discussions already begun there.

[Nicholas Soames (Mid Sussex) (Con)]

I warmly welcome what the Secretary of State has said about defence diplomacy. Does he agree that, inevitably in an age of restraint, defence diplomacy is an extremely important and effective asset for this Government and something that this country has historically done well? Does he also agree that to pare back our work in defence diplomacy at this time would be to cut off our nose to spite our face?

[Dr Fox]

I agree 100% with my hon. Friend. Not only is defence diplomacy effective; it is cost-effective. It provides this country with great overseas influence at relatively little cost, compared with other elements of the defence budget. We are very foolish as a country if we ever ignore the fact that joint exercising, training and defence exports can achieve a great deal for this country at a relatively low cost. In recent years there has been too much penny-pinching in certain areas, which has had a disproportionately negative effect on this country’s influence, and a good deal too much short-termism, when we need to be looking at what we do well and doing it more often.

[Mr Julian Brazier (Canterbury) (Con)]

rose—

[Dr Fox]

I give way to my hon. Friend, and I apologise for keeping him waiting.

[Mr Brazier]

I am most grateful to my right hon. Friend, who has been making the most robust case possible for keeping a full range of military capabilities, despite the fact that we are engaged in an important operation. With his visit to Washington coming up, does he agree that it would be truly extraordinary if we alone continued to have 85% of our defence capability in expensive regular manpower, when the mightiest and richest country on earth has almost half its total defence capability in volunteer reserves?

[Dr Fox]

My mind-reading abilities seem to know no bounds today—no doubt like those of my colleagues. I pay a full tribute to the reserve forces of the United Kingdom. They make a tremendous contribution to our national security. If we ever fail to value them fully, we are making a profound mistake. I know that my hon. Friend would not expect me to go further, given that the structure of our forces is an unavoidable part of the review itself. Suffice it to say, I think it is very clear just how wedded is most of this House, and not least the Conservative party, to the well-being and existence of our reserves.

Let me sum up the Ministry of Defence’s approach to the strategic defence and security review. First, relevance: our posture and capabilities must be relevant to the world we now live in. This is our opportunity to dispense with much of the legacy of the cold war. Secondly, realism: resources are tight for the country as a whole, and defence is no exception. We cannot insure against every imaginable risk, so we will need to decide which risks we are willing to meet and which risks we are willing to take.

Thirdly, responsibility: as a nation, we have a duty to give the brave and capable men and women of our armed forces our full support in return for the selfless service and sacrifice they are prepared to make in our name. We must ensure that they have what they need to do what we ask of them, and that they and their families are looked after properly during and after service. There has never been a formal document setting out precisely what this means, which is why, for the first time, this Government will create a tri-service military covenant. It will be the foundation of the new Government’s far-reaching strategy for, and obligations to, our servicemen and women, their families, and veterans.

The National Security Council and the SDSR will consider defence interests in the round, along with other security risks and interests, including terrorism, cyber-security and civil emergencies. I have stressed the need for the review to follow a logical sequence. We must begin with our foreign policy priorities, reflecting our interests. The establishment of the National Security Council has allowed us to have a full debate and to ensure that departmental priorities will be aligned with our conclusions. The first stage is the development of the new Government’s national security strategy, which will be wide-ranging and draw on the work of all Departments concerned, including the Ministry of Defence.

We must understand the environment in which we will protect and promote those interests, in particular the threats and risks. Under the auspices of the NSC, the MOD is playing a full role in work to establish a prioritised register of those risks that will be a key element to the national security strategy. Decisions on the capabilities required will be based on this overarching strategy, but these decisions will need careful preparation.

I am determined to understand fully the operational and resource implications of the options. I have therefore directed the Department to initiate a range of detailed studies on specific capabilities and force structures. We will begin to move to conclusions as our strategic posture becomes clearer, and we can test our work against the agreed policy baseline to produce a synthesised force structure and risk assessment. I would expect to see the emerging conclusions in August, and the House will understand why I will not speculate on them today. They will then be discussed in detail by the NSC. We expect that the defence section of the SDSR will report in the autumn, which will coincide with the outcome of the comprehensive spending review.

I am also determined that we fully understand—and, where possible, mitigate—the risks we are taking and the assumptions we are making about future operations, from the partners we will work alongside to the tactics and adversaries we will confront. I have therefore directed the vice-chief of the defence staff to lead a detailed process of force testing, which will look at the effectiveness of possible future forces against a range of scenarios. I will receive updates in July and August to ensure that emerging findings can be reflected in our strategic choices; and a final report in September to ensure that I and the NSC can validate the decisions we are taking.

There will undoubtedly be difficult decisions ahead. We will have to confront some long-held assumptions. There will be competing priorities to assess, risks on which we will have to make judgments, and budgets to balance. It is inevitable that there will be the perception of winners and losers as we go through this process. I am determined, however, that defence as a whole will come out in a stronger position. The prize is a safer Britain, with secure interests and a sustainable defence programme able to address the needs of today and prepared for tomorrow. As I said earlier, providing security for our citizens is the primary and overriding duty of Government. The SDSR must become a national, not a party political, endeavour, and all in this House must have the political resilience, strength, will and resolve to see us through.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Fox]

As the hon. Gentleman agrees with the Government’s position on this, given his own experience will he enlighten colleagues as to why the previous Government came to the decision that Trident was the most effective and cheapest way of providing us with a continuous at-sea deterrent?

[Mr Jones]

Well, because it is, and we had the White Paper in 2006 that said that.

My hon. Friend the Member for Barrow and Furness raised an interesting point—the idea that we can play stop-go with the building of nuclear submarines is wrong; instead, we need to keep the skills base together. People must recognise that key point. That policy is what led to the problems we are currently facing with Astute. The options were looked at in detail and it was found that, in terms of the procurement of warheads and of the boats themselves, Trident is the most cost-effective way to proceed.

However, I must ask the Minister for the Armed Forces whether, in terms of the review, we are talking about basic principles or simple value for money? A yes or no answer will suffice. Alternatively, is this, as we all suspect, simply a bit of political posturing to keep the unilateralists in the Liberal Democrats on board while not scaring the cold war warriors in the Tory party such as the hon. Member for New Forest East?

Much was said in the debate about the covenant and the work on that—or lack of work, as the hon. Member for Corby (Ms Bagshawe) said. She should look at what we actually achieved in government, and it would be nice if she could support and build upon that.

On value for money, the Treasury will of course look in detail at whatever review takes place, and it is clear that the Secretary of State is also looking at that requirement. In the article that I mentioned earlier, he said that there might not be so much “fat in the system” as was previously thought, but that although the overall defence budget would be protected, dramatic savings would still have to be made. Between 1997 and 2008, Labour added an average £1 billion a year to the defence budget and there was the longest-sustained growth in defence expenditure ever in this country. It is important to get some clarity tonight. If the defence review says there is a need for more defence expenditure, will the Secretary of State argue for that or will he simply take an inflation increase, which would effectively be a cut in the defence budget?

The right hon. Gentleman knows that I was responsible for personnel issues within the Department. There has been much criticism in the past few weeks about bloated public sector pay and pensions. Armed forces personnel are public sector workers, although we do not see them as such, and it will be interesting to see whether he will exempt them from the pay restraint being suggested. Is he going to implement fully the recommendations of the Armed Forces Pay Review Body, as we did in the last Government? On pensions, will he exempt armed forces pensions from the review that is taking place? If he is looking for hopeful signs from the former Member for Barrow and Furness, Mr John Hutton, let me tell him that when I suggested that we should look into this, Mr Hutton was the one who scuppered it and then went against the permanent secretary who recommended that the issue should be looked at.

As my right hon. Friend the Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth) said earlier, we welcome the responsible way in which we will make a contribution to this debate. However, there is still confusion around what programmes are included in all this and about the finance. For five years, the Secretary of State has been going around promising larger Armies, bigger Navies, better accommodation and higher pay. Some of his Front-Bench team have even called for higher defence expenditure, although I notice that he has never offered a penny more in relation to any of those commitments. Will he now, with his party and its new Liberal Democrat friends, be straight not only with the armed forces but with the country? We need an effective strategic defence and security review not just to meet our commitments at home and abroad, but to do the right thing by the men and women who daily put their lives at risk on our behalf.