Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill (Twelfth sitting)
Alex Cunningham ExcerptsThursday 10th June 2021
(3 years, 5 months ago)
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The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Chris Philp)
I trust that everyone has returned from lunch re-energised and refreshed. I want to respond to one or two of the points made prior to lunch by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton North. In moving the amendment, he argued that the diversionary caution should not have a rehabilitation period of three months from the date of the caution being given or, if earlier, the date on which the caution ceases to have effect because the conditions have been met.
I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point, but none the less I respectfully disagree with him, for the following reasons. First, the offences for which a diversionary caution might be given include offences of a certain degree of gravity. They are offences where there was sufficient evidence available to prosecute, and had that prosecution proceeded, a far more serious penalty, including a longer spending period, would have been applicable. There is a balance to strike between a desire to let the offender move on with their lives and public protection, and the relatively short spending period—only three months, which is not very long—aims to strike that balance.
Secondly, it is important that we distinguish between the diversionary caution and the community caution. One of the ways in which we do so is the fact that the diversionary caution has a three-month spending period until rehabilitation, whereas the community caution does not. Were we to remove that, it would diminish the difference between those two forms of caution. That sort of hierarchy, as I put it before lunch, is important, and we should seek to preserve it, reflecting the fact that diversionary cautions are more serious that community cautions.
There is also a third reason, which occurred to me during the shadow Minister’s speech. Given that the caution can be extinguished, in terms of the need to disclose it, the offender has an incentive to meet the conditions early within the three months. The conditions might include the need to attend a particular training course or to commence a treatment programme if they have a drug or alcohol problem. Saying that the offender has been rehabilitated at the point at which they meet the condition creates an incentive for them to meet it sooner rather than later. We should bear that in mind. Although I understand where the shadow Minister is coming from, for all those reasons I urge the Opposition to withdraw the amendment.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
I am a little saddened and disappointed that, for all he has said, the Minister does not recognise the real impact that disclosure can have on people, perhaps preventing them from getting a job or even resulting in them losing their job. That is a great sadness. He says that three months is not a very long time, but a person has to report a caution to their employer on the day they receive it, and it could result in their dismissal. Similarly, anyone applying for a job would have to disclose it to the employer, which may well result in them losing that employment opportunity and the chance to turn their life around. Moreover, if an officer is content that a caution is appropriate, why on earth is the additional punishment of a disclosure period being sought? I intend to press the amendment to a Division, simply because I think it is in people’s best interests and represents for the individual given a caution the best chance to change for the better.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Chris Philp
Clause 100 amends the criteria applied for when a court may depart from imposing a minimum sentence. Minimum sentences are rare in this jurisdiction, and generally speaking, but not always, they apply to repeat offences. These minimum sentences are not, technically or legally speaking, mandatory or completely binding on the court, but it is mandatory that the court must consider passing that minimum sentence. The court may depart from imposing that minimum sentence only by having regard to the particular circumstances of the offender and the nature of the case, so an element of judicial discretion is retained.
However, given that Parliament has legislated to set out these minimum sentences, we think it right that the court should depart from the minimum sentences specified by Parliament not by having regard to the particular circumstances of the case but only in exceptional circumstances. In effect, the clause raises the bar for when a judge can depart from these minimum sentences; it tells the judge that circumstances must be exceptional before the minimum sentence is disregarded, to make sure that Parliament’s will in this area is better reflected by the sentences the court hands down.
Clause 100 will cover four offences: threatening a person with a weapon or bladed article, which carries a minimum sentence of four years; a third offence in relation to trafficking a class A drug, which carries a minimum sentence of seven years; a third domestic burglary offence, which carries a minimum sentence of three years; and a repeat offence—a second or higher offence—involving a weapon or bladed article. The clause strengthens the minimum sentences in those cases and makes it harder for the judge to depart from the minimum, or reduces the range of circumstances in which such a departure might occur. Three of the four offences are repeat offences; the fourth is a first-time offence. They are fairly clearly defined offences for drug trafficking or domestic burglary, where Parliament clearly decided in the past that there was less necessity for judicial discretion.
Schedule 11 makes consequential amendments to existing legislation as a result of clause 11, to give effect to what we have just discussed. The amendments are to section 37 of the Mental Health Act 1983 and to the Armed Forces Act 2006.
These offences are serious. In the past, Parliament has taken a view that a minimum sentence is appropriate, particularly for repeat offences. It is therefore appropriate that we today make sure that the courts follow Parliament’s view as often as possible.
I asked for figures on how often judges depart from the minimum sentences. For the burglary offence, the data is a couple of years old, but it looks like the court departed from the minimum sentence in that year in about 37% of cases, so in quite a wide range of cases. It is on that basis—to tighten up the strength of minimum sentences—that we are introducing clause 100 and schedule 11 today.
Alex Cunningham
As the Minister said, clause 100 would change the law so that for certain offences a court is required to impose a custodial sentence of at least the statutory minimum term unless there are “exceptional” reasons not to. This is a change from allowing the court to impose a custodial sentence of at least the minimum unless there are “particular” reasons not to.
The offences and their statutory minimums are: a third-strike importation of class A drugs, with a seven-year minimum sentence; a third-strike domestic burglary, with a three-year minimum sentence; a second-strike possession of a knife or offensive weapon, with a six-month minimum; and threatening a person with a blade or offensive weapon in public, with a six-month minimum.
As the Minister has pointed out, the effect of clause 100 is relatively simple, although the Opposition are concerned that it will also be profound. The law currently allows for minimum custodial sentences to be handed down to those who repeatedly offend. As things stand, judges can depart from the minimum sentences when they are of the opinion that there are particular circumstances that would make it unjust not to do so.
Despite what the Minister says about judicial discretion, the proposition put forward by the Government seems to be that the Government are concerned that the judiciary has been too lenient when imposing minimum sentences, and therefore the law needs to be strengthened in this area. The Government’s solution is to change the law so that for certain repeat offences, a court is required to impose a minimum term unless there are exceptional circumstances not to. In a nutshell, clause 100 seeks to make it harder for judges to exercise their discretion and moves away from the statutory minimum sentence for a small number of offences.
Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)
My hon. Friend is making an excellent point. Judges know the case and the circumstances of it, so they are better placed to use their discretion, taking into account the particular set of circumstances, which we cannot know about when we are passing something that gives carte blanche on a particular sentence minimum.
Alex Cunningham
Yes, that is very much the case. These organisations all make the same point: we are limiting the judges’ discretion. We are limiting the discretion of the individual who best knows the case, as they have actually heard the case, so it is certainly worrying. In fact, in the sentencing White Paper, the Government note that “concerns have been raised”, and that some repeat offenders are receiving too-lenient sentences, but they fall short of naming a single body that supports that view.
In the same vein, rather than presenting the evidence for change, the White Paper highlights only a single statistic in relation to those convicted of a burglary who receive a sentence lower than the minimum three-year term. I am sure I do not have to remind the Minister that that is as single statistic relating to a single offence out of his list of four. I ask him a very simple question: what evidence has he brought to the Committee today to show that judges have been unduly lenient when sentencing repeat offenders in relation to the importation of class A drugs, possession of a knife or offensive weapon or threatening a person with a blade or offensive weapon in public?
The second of the Opposition’s concerns is how the proposed changes to clause 100 will further entrench the already shameful levels of racial disparity in our criminal justice system. As the Minister is all too aware, since the Lammy review was published in September 2017, racial disparity in the criminal justice system has got considerably worse. The statistics speak for themselves. Black offenders are 26% more likely than white offenders to be remanded in custody, while the figure for black women is 29% more likely. Offenders from black, Asian and minority ethnic backgrounds are 81% more likely than white offenders to be sent to prison for indictable offences, even when factoring in higher not guilty plea rates. Over one quarter—27%—of people in prison are from a minority ethnic group, despite the fact that they make up 14% of the total population of England and Wales. If our prison population reflected the ethnic make-up of England and Wales, we would have over 9,000 fewer people in prison—a truly staggering figure.
That is before we even begin to touch on disproportionality in the youth system, which is even more pronounced. For the first time, young people from a BAME background now make up 51%—over half—of those in custody, despite that group making up only 14% of the population. The proportion of black children who are arrested, cautioned or sentenced is now twice what it was 10 years ago, and the proportion of black children on remand in youth custody has increased to over a third.
When my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) was asked by the then Conservative Government to carry out his review, he did so in the belief that that Government, and successive Governments, would implement the recommendations he made. Sadly, that was not the case. At the last count, fewer than 10 of the 35 recommendations had been fully implemented. Perhaps the Minister will explain whether that is still the case today and, if so, why the Government have made so little progress on that in the last four years.
The picture emerging from this Government is that they do not care about reducing racial disparities in our criminal justice system, which is not an accusation I make lightly. Statement after statement recognising the disparities and promising change appears to be no more than lip service. Worse still, many of the measures in the Bill will further entrench racial inequality in the criminal justice system—one of them being the introduction of clause 100. It is abundantly clear that the clause will have a disproportionate impact on offenders from a black, Asian or minority ethnic background.
We know from a Government report published in 2016 that for drugs offences the odds of receiving a prison sentence were around 240% higher for black, Asian and minority ethnic offenders than for white offenders. Even the equalities impact assessment that accompanies the Bill acknowledges an over-representation of certain ethnic groups and the increased likelihood of their being sentenced to custody and given a longer sentence. It states:
“We recognise that some individuals with protected characteristics are likely to be over-represented in the groups of people this policy will affect, by virtue of the demographics of the existing offender population.”
Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)
The figures the hon. Gentleman quotes are of great concern. Is he suggesting that judges show bias and discrimination in the sentences they give?
Alex Cunningham
I am not. The point I am making is that the Government are driving an agenda that will result in more black, Asian and ethnic minority people ending up in the criminal justice system and suffering even greater sentences.
The Government’s own equalities impact assessment goes on:
“BAME individuals appear to have high representation in the Class A drug trafficking cohort and possession of or threatening with a blade… As a result, the proposal may put people with these protected characteristics at a particular disadvantage when compared to persons who do not share these characteristics since they may be more likely to be given a custodial sentence and serve longer sentences than before.”
The Minister could do no better than looking to America to see how three-strike drug laws have had a horrific impact on disproportionality rates in the criminal justice system. As he will no doubt be aware, the three-strikes crime Bill that was introduced by Bill Clinton in the 1990s has been roundly criticised by all sides of the American political spectrum. Democrats, Republicans and even Bill Clinton himself have spoken of how the Bill was a grave mistake that contributed to overpopulated prisons and a mass incarceration of BAME offenders in particular.
What makes this all the more astonishing is that this Government have gone to some lengths in recent times to state their commitment to reducing racial disparity in the justice system. In his foreword to the latest update on tackling race disparity in the criminal justice system, the Lord Chancellor made it clear that addressing the over-representation of people from ethnic and racial minorities was a personal focus for him—that was very welcome. Will the Minister explain, then, why the Government chose not to undertake a full equalities impact assessment of how measures in the Bill could have a detrimental impact on minority groups? Given that many of the measures in the sentencing White Paper involve serious sentence uplifts, it is absolutely critical that the Government fully understand how those from minority backgrounds could be disproportionately impacted. As I have explained, failing to do so runs the risk of further exacerbating the already horrendous disparities that we see in the system today. Is the Minister content to see such disparities widen even further, or will he outline today just what the Government will do to address this issue?
Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)
Does my hon. Friend agree that being against this kind of disparity is all well and good, but the only way one can reduce it, which I believe is the Government’s policy, is to be very careful—moving policy initiative by policy initiative, and change in the law by change in the law —that new measures take into account the impact of such changes on that disparity?
Alex Cunningham
I most certainly do agree with my hon. Friend. That is why we posed the question: why has there not been a full impact assessment of the impact of these measures on the BAME community? I would go so far as to challenge the Minister and his Government not just to outline the measures they will take to end these disparities but to set themselves some targets to end this injustice once and for all.
The final point I will touch on is how the Government came to a decision on which of the four offences they have included under the scope of clause 100. I remind the Committee that they are trafficking of class A drugs, domestic burglary, possession of a knife or offensive weapon, and threatening a person with a blade or offensive weapon in public. Although those are undoubtedly serious crimes, we have some concerns that focusing on such a small cohort of crimes risks missing the larger criminal forces that are at work in our country.
Take possession of a knife or offensive weapon, for example. All too often when we think of knife crime, the focus of our thoughts is on young men—often young BAME men from a disadvantaged background—carrying knives as part of a gang. Yet this image is deeply simplistic and misses the greater criminal forces at play. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham pointed out, most of the time knife crime is not being driven by youths but by a sophisticated network of veteran organised criminals. As he wrote in The Guardian so eloquently:
“Young people falling into the wrong crowd in Tottenham, Salford or Croydon know nothing about the trafficking of tonnes of cocaine across our borders every single year. They know nothing of the shipment routes from Central and South America that have made London a cocaine capital of Europe. They know nothing of the lorries, container vessels, luxury yachts and private jets that supply our nation’s £11bn-a-year drug market….This isn’t about kids in tracksuits carrying knives, it’s about men in suits carrying briefcases. It is serious criminal networks that are exploiting our young people, arming them to the teeth and sending them out to fight turf wars.”
Mr Goodwill
The hon. Gentleman makes some very valid points. Does he agree that this issue is also about middle-class people taking illegal drugs and fuelling this terrible trade?
Alex Cunningham
I certainly agree with the right hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby, and I have given his constituency its full title—how on earth could I ever forget Whitby, when it is one of my favourite destinations for a day out? I am sure he will understand why that is the case. For me, this issue is about how we tackle the guys with the briefcases and not just the young men on the streets? How do we make sure that we deal with organised crime? We have seen some great results recently in my own constituency and across the Cleveland police area, where there have been raids on individual houses and the police found large amounts of drugs. However, those drugs are finding their way in through Teesport and through the Tyneside ports as well. We are failing to get to the people who are driving the entire trade and we need to do much, much more to do so.
With the National Crime Agency currently prioritising cyber-crime, child sexual exploitation and terrorism, and the Serious Violence Taskforce having been disbanded recently, I would be grateful if the Minister could explain how anything in clause 100 will tackle serious organised criminality.
To conclude, the Opposition have deep concerns about the introduction of the power in clause 100. We worry that it has been introduced without an evidential basis, without consultation with impacted groups, and without a full equalities impact assessment. Even more importantly, we worry that it will further entrench the already shameful levels of racial disparity in our criminal justice system while failing to tackle the underlying causes of the crimes that we have been discussing. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response, which I hope will address the issues that I have raised.
Chris Philp
Let me respond to some of the questions and points that the shadow Minister raised in his speech. First, I should be clear that in forming the proposals the Government have considered carefully, in accordance with the public sector equality duty under the Equality Act 2010, the impact that these changes in the law might have on people with protected characteristics, including race. The full equality impact assessment was published alongside the draft legislation, and I can confirm that it is publicly available should anybody want to scrutinise it.
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 101, page 86, line 41, at end insert—
“(bb) the abduction, sexual assault and murder of a person not previously known to the offender,”.
The amendment would extend the whole life tariff captured by the clause to someone guilty of the murder, abduction and sexual assault of a stranger. Later in my speech I will provide substantial detail on why we should do that.
First, I want to demonstrate the Opposition’s support for what the Government are tyring to do with this particular clause. As the Minister will no doubt point out later, a whole life order is the most severe sentencing option available to members of the judiciary in England and Wales. Only a small number of criminals a year will ever be convicted of a crime so exceptionally terrible that it warrants such a punishment. The effect of a whole life order is as simple as it is final. Once sentenced, the offender loses any right of a sentence review. They will spend the rest of their lives in prison, without any possibility of hope or release. From the moment they are sentenced, they will never again set foot outside prison.
The decision to deprive someone of their liberty indefinitely is a daunting one, and I do not envy the enormous responsibility placed at the door of the judges who hear these types of cases. None the less, as an Opposition we are pragmatic. Although we are strong believers in the power and importance of rehabilitation, we accept that some offenders are so uniquely evil that even our greatest attempts to reform them would most likely be in vain.
One only has to consider some of the handful of offenders who have received a whole life order to realise the type of criminality we are dealing with. Ian Brady and Myra Hindley, the Moors murderers, were convicted of the torture and murder of three innocent children between 1963 and 1965. I was eight, nine and 10 years old during that time, and I actually remember the television reports. Dennis Nielsen was a former policeman who murdered and dismembered at least 12 young men and boys between 1978 and 1983. Rose West collaborated with her husband in the torture and murder of at least nine young women between 1973 and 1987, including her eight-year-old stepdaughter. Harold Shipman, the infamous GP, is thought to have been responsible for the murder of over 200 women who trusted him with their care and wellbeing. Peter Sutcliffe, the Yorkshire Ripper, murdered 13 women and attacked seven others in a killing spree that terrified the nation between 1975 and 1980—the list goes on. Each of those names will live in the consciousness of the nation for evermore. Each was found guilty of crimes so extraordinarily evil that their actions cannot, and should not, be forgotten.
Today, we have before us the question whether to extend the list of crimes for which a whole-life order can be handed down. Under the current sentencing framework, a whole-life order can be given only for
“the murder of two or more persons where each murder involves a substantial degree of premeditation, the abduction of the victim, or sexual or sadistic conduct… the murder of a child if involving the abduction of the child or sexual or sadistic motivation… the murder of a police or prison officer in the course of his duty… a murder done for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause; or… a murder by an offender previously convicted of murder.”
The clause will widen that list to cover the murder of a child if that murder can be shown to have involved a substantial degree of premeditation or planning.
In coming to a decision on whether that is a proposal the Opposition can support, we must first understand how many additional offenders the Government estimate will be caught by such a change in the law. The Government’s impact assessment acknowledges that whole-life orders are
“an exceptionally rare sentence, with fewer than 5 given out per year on average over the past decade.”
It goes on to note that the measure is expected to increase the number of whole-life orders handed out by
“a maximum of about 10 offenders per year”.
The Sentencing Academy response to the sentencing White Paper noted that the requirement of a substantial degree of premeditation or planning should mean that the number of offenders caught by that charge would be relatively small.
None the less, the Government must face the fact that widening the list of offences that can attract whole-life orders will naturally put an already overstretched prison system under even greater strain. As the Minister will have seen, only last week, an internal survey by the Prison Officers Association showed just how precarious the system is in our prisons. That survey showed that 85% of prison officers report feeling burned out; more than 40% of prison staff are suffering moderate or severe anxiety symptoms; and more than 80% feel that their mental and physical health have got worse during the pandemic. That is on top of what we already know—that our prisons are already overcrowded and understaffed, and are hotbeds of crime, as I said in my contribution to the driving offences debate earlier this week. Therefore, I would be grateful if the Minister today committed himself and the Government to ensuring that all the toughest sentences in the Bill—not just in the clause—will be properly resourced and funded. Can we have an assurance that whole-life orders will remain a sentencing option only for those who have committed the worst offences?
We must now consider whether the premeditated murder of a child is as heinous a crime as the other crimes that can attract a whole-life order. On that point, the Opposition are clear: it certainly is. The law allows for whole-life sentences to be handed down to those who murder a child following the child’s abduction, or if the murder involves sexual or sadistic motivation. However, the Opposition agree with the Government’s point that any murder of a child committed with a high degree of premeditation should also warrant a whole-life order. What we are talking about here is a purely evil act—killing someone in the prime of life, taking away their opportunity to go to university and to forge a career, and taking away their hopes of settling down and having a family.
For a whole-life order to be handed down, the current legal framework requires the killing of a child to involve abduction or a sexual or sadistic motivation. That raises the question, how can it be possible for the murder of a child not to involve a sadistic intention? When someone chooses to take the life of a child, they do so in the knowledge of the immense pain it will cause the loved ones of the victim for the rest of their lives. Thankfully, the number of offenders who commit the murder of a child with a high degree of premeditation is relatively small, but Labour fully agrees that those in that group of offenders deserve to spend the rest of their life in prison, not only to protect society, but to ensure that their sentence reflects the horrendous nature of their crime.
The Chair
Before we continue, can we be a little careful here? I have been in discussion with the Clerk and others, and I am not sure that we need to be careful, but let us be careful because there is still not a sentence yet. I am sorry—
Chris Philp
The shadow Minister has given a comprehensive and thorough introduction to the topic of whole-life orders, which I had intended to give the Committee myself. As he has laid out the background, I do not propose to repeat it. He accurately described how they operate and the categories of offender to which they apply. As he said, a whole-life order is the most severe punishment that a court can hand down, ensuring that the person so sentenced never leaves prison under any circumstances.
The shadow Minister illustrated the gravity and seriousness of such sentences by listing some of the terrible cases from the past 30 or 40 years, or indeed the past 50 years, in which whole-life orders have been imposed. The clause proposes to add to the small list of offences that qualify for a whole-life order as a starting point the heinous case of premeditated child murder—a crime so awful and appalling that I think all hon. Members agree it should be added to the list.
The murder of a child is particularly appalling, and whether we are parents or not, we all feel deeply, particularly when there is a degree of premeditation—when it is not just in the moment, but planned and intended for some time—that the crime is truly terrible and enormous. That is why the Government propose to expand the whole-life order. I think there is unanimity on that point.
The shadow Minister raised the important question of violence against women and girls, both in general terms and in the context of a particular case, which Sir Charles has asked us to be careful about because it is subject to live legal proceedings. The matter is not concluded before the courts, so of course we should be a little careful. Let me start with the wider issue of violence against women and girls.
For many years, the Government have had an unshakable commitment to protecting women and girls from the completely unacceptable violence and harassment that they all too often suffer at the hands of men. My hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle, the safeguarding Minister, has been at the forefront in recent years—introducing the Domestic Abuse Bill, which reached the statute book as the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 a short time ago, and leading and taking forward our work in this area. In the relatively near future—certainly in the next few months—we will publish a refreshed violence against women and girls strategy and a domestic abuse strategy, both of which will take further our work in this area.
A great deal of work has been done in the last five or 10 years, almost always with cross-party support. For example, banning upskirting started off as a private Member’s Bill and the measure was then passed by the Government. There are also recent measures on non-fatal strangulation, which are critical to protecting women, and work on the rough sex defence, which is part of the Domestic Abuse Act. We have introduced additional stalking offences over the last few years and increased sentences for such offences. A huge amount of work has been done, is being done and will be done to protect women and girls from attack. As the shadow Minister rightly said, women and girls have the right to walk the streets any time of day or night without fear. That is not the case at the moment, and we all need to make sure that changes.
In relation to the terrible crime of rape, it is worth mentioning, by way of context, that sentences have been increasing over the past few years. The average adult rape sentence rose from 79 months in 2010 to 109 months in 2020, an increase of approximately two and a half years—and quite right, too. However, it is not just the sentence that matters, but how long the offender spends in prison.
Via a statutory instrument that we introduced last year, and a clause that we will come to later in the Bill, we are ensuring that rapists spend longer in prison. Those sentenced to a standard determinate sentence of over seven years will now, for the first time, serve two thirds of their sentence in prison, not half, as was previously the case. It was wrong that rapists, when given a standard determinate sentence, served only half of it in prison. It is right that that is now two thirds, when the sentence is over seven years. The Bill goes further, moving the release back to two thirds of the sentence for those convicted of rape and given a standard determinate sentence of over four years, ensuring that rapists spend longer in prison.
I hope that gives the Committee a high level of assurance about the work that has been done already, is being done through the Bill and will be done in future in this critical area. We discussed that extensively in yesterday’s Opposition day debate, which the Lord Chancellor opened and I closed. Labour’s Front-Bench spokesman made the point, fairly and rightly, that rape conviction rates are too low and must get higher. The rape review, which I am told will be published in days not weeks, will propose decisive action to address that serious problem.
I hope that lays out the Government’s firm commitment on the issue and our track record historically—
Alex Cunningham
It sounds as though the Minister is about to wind up without addressing my specific points.
Chris Philp
No, I certainly was not planning to ignore the hon. Gentleman’s amendment. I was simply setting out the wider context and the work that the Government have done, are doing and will do.
I have a couple of things to say about the amendment. First, the offence it describes is obviously horrendous and very serious. It currently carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. Where the murder involves sexual or sadistic conduct, the starting point for the tariff—the minimum term to be served in prison—is 30 years, so a very long time. It is important to note, however, that judges have the discretion to depart from that tariff where they see fit and, if necessary, increase it, including by giving a whole-life order. It is important to be clear that the law already allows for such an offence to receive a whole-life order where the judge thinks that appropriate.
Secondly, the amendment refers in particular to strangers. It would essentially move the tariff’s starting point from 30 years to a whole-life order, the maximum sentence being life in both cases—it would not change the maximum sentence—but it aims that change in minimum sentence only at cases where a stranger has perpetrated the abduction, sexual assault and murder. It strikes the Government as surprising that that distinction is drawn, because the crime described—abduction, sexual assault and murder—is as egregious and horrendous whether committed by a stranger or by someone known to the victim.
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful to the Minister for his response. It is very easy for us all to determine our own shopping list of changes to the legislation. I take his point that crime committed by somebody who is known to the victim is not any less severe than crime committed by someone who is not known to the victim. However, rather than dismiss what the Opposition are saying, perhaps the Government should say that there is an opportunity here to look at whole life orders and some of the wider aspects. Perhaps other cases should attract a whole life order. The Government have quite a tight group currently, and there is a need for that to be reviewed.
Given the specific things that have happened in recent times, the amendment is about sending a message to women and girls that we are on their side and that we recognise the difficulties that they often face. We recognise their fear of walking home in the evening, particularly if they are on their own. Although society needs to do more to tackle the causes of this type of crime, we should still go ahead with the amendment and ensure that there is a clear message to strangers, or anybody out there, that if they abduct, murder or sexually assault a woman, they will face the full weight of the law. For me, that means the mandatory whole life order, except in exceptional circumstances.
The Chair
Minister, do you wish to come back? I saw you in discussions with another Minister, so I will give you the option. It is not normal to do this, but is there anything further that you would like to add in response?
Chris Philp
I will just say that we are always happy to talk to the Opposition about a matter of this sensitivity, but I remain of the view that we should not single out murders involving a stranger and exclude domestic cases from the Bill, because that would diminish those equally appalling offences in which the victim is known to the offender. It may even be a partner; it may even have happened in her house—yet that is not in the amendment. I ask that we think again about putting it to a vote. I am happy to sit down with the shadow Minister to talk about the issue and about the whole life order question, but I repeat the point that I made earlier.
Alex Cunningham
I appreciate that, but I still intend to divide the Committee on the amendment.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Chris Philp
Clause 102 relates to whole life orders, which we discussed fairly extensively a few moments ago. It will give judges the opportunity, in rare and exceptional cases, to use a whole life order on people who are convicted when they are aged between 18 and 20. At the moment, whole life orders can be imposed only on offenders aged 21 or over, but occasionally there are some very unusual cases in which offenders aged 18, 19 or 20 commit heinous offences and a whole life order might be appropriate. For example, an offence of murder, rape and abduction such as the shadow Minister described might be committed by someone aged 20. We think, as I hope the Opposition do, that the judge should be free to impose a whole life order; in fact, the shadow Minister himself made that case very compellingly a short while ago.
I will give an example in which a judge called for precisely that: the notorious, infamous case of Hashem Abedi, the brother of the Manchester Arena bomber. In sentencing him, the presiding judge, Mr Justice Baker, described the actions of the two bombers as
“atrocious crimes: large in their scale, deadly in their intent and appalling in their consequences.”
The judge said that he was satisfied that they had appeared to deliberately target the young audience in attendance at the arena’s Ariana Grande concert in order to heighten the risk of injury and death. He said in his sentencing remarks that
“If the defendant…had been aged 21 or over”
and if a whole life order had been available,
“the appropriate starting point…would have been a whole life order”,
given the seriousness of the crime.
I am sure that every member of the Committee, and indeed every Member of the House, will agree that for crimes as abhorrent as Hashem Abedi’s—murdering so many people in cold blood, many of them young—or in cases of the kind that the shadow Minister spoke about in our debate on clause 101, involving the murder, rape and abduction of a woman, where the offender is 19 or 20 years old, the whole life order should be available to the judge in those exceptional and thankfully rare circumstances.
I think that this extension to the whole life order regime is appropriate. On that basis, I urge that clause 102 stand part of the Bill.
Alex Cunningham
I am getting a little confused now with some of the things that the Minister has said in relation to the last debate and the imposition of whole life orders. I assume that he was referring to the fact that judges have that flexibility rather than being compelled to impose such a sentence.
Chris Philp
The shadow Minister is right. I was saying that, for the kind of offences that he described in the last debate, judges have the ability to impose a whole life order. For murders involving sexual assault and abduction, the starting point currently is a tariff of 30 years. However, the judge has the freedom to go up to a whole life order. But at the moment, the judge cannot do that if the offender is aged 18, 19 or 20. The clause will give judges that freedom.
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful to the Minister for his clarification. As he said, clause 102 will allow judges to impose, in exceptional circumstances, a whole life order on offenders who were aged 18 to 20 when the offence was committed. Currently, a whole life order can be imposed only on offenders who were aged 21 or over when they committed the offence; we both recognise that. The court will be able to impose a whole life order
“only if it considers that the seriousness of the offence, or combination of offences, is exceptionally high even by the standard of offences”
that would normally attract a whole life order for an offender aged 21 or over.
I start by paying tribute to those who lost their lives on 22 May 2017 at the Manchester Arena. That evening was supposed to be one of fun. Instead, a truly wicked act claimed 22 innocent young lives and left many more lives shattered. As the Minister said, it is only right that Hashem Abedi received the longest sentence in history for his part in the atrocity that night. It is also right that he will spend the rest of his life in jail. Neither of those points has ever been in doubt.
Labour’s overarching commitment is to keeping the British public safe and to ensuring that horrific terrorist attacks such as the one at Manchester Arena cannot be repeated. For that reason, Labour will support the introduction of clause 102. We do, however, seek assurances that the Government will think carefully about their approach to young adults when making sentencing changes in the future.
As the Minister explained, since 2003 the law has provided that whole life orders can be handed down only to offenders who were aged 21 or over at the time of their offence. Clause 102 will make an exception to that rule, so that in exceptional circumstances whole life orders can be given to those who were aged 18 or over but under 21 at the time they committed their offence.
In its briefing on the Bill, the Sentencing Academy indicated that the inclusion of clause 102 seemed to be a response triggered by the trial of Hashem Abedi for his involvement in the Manchester Arena bombing. As many people will know, Hashem Abedi was the brother of Salman Ramadan Abedi and was found guilty of assisting his brother to order, stockpile and transport the deadly materials needed for the attack. In total, he was found guilty of 22 counts of murder, attempted murder and conspiring to cause explosions.
In his sentencing remarks, Mr Justice Jeremy Baker indicated that Hashem Abedi’s actions were so grave that if he had been aged 21 or over, he would have sentenced him to a whole life order. Given that Hashem was under the age of 21 at the time of his offences, the judge was precluded from sentencing him to a whole life order. Instead, he was sentenced to at least 55 years—the longest determinate sentence in British criminal history. Mr Justice Baker made it clear that Abedi would leave prison only if the Parole Board was convinced that he was no longer a risk to society. Even then, he would spend the remainder of his life on licence, with the risk of being recalled to prison. In all likelihood, he concluded, Abedi could expect to spend the rest of his life in prison.
This, to a certain extent, represents the first concern that the Opposition have about clause 102. If the current sentencing regime already allows courts to sentence someone to almost certainly spend the rest of their natural life behind bars, what does clause 102 actually add to the law? As Mr Justice Baker pointed out, the only way Hashem Abedi could conceivably be released from prison is if the Parole Board deemed him no longer to be a risk to society. I am sure that the Minister will agree that after committing such a heinous and fanatical crime, and while refusing to show any remorse for his actions, the chances of his being deemed safe to be released are close to zero. Moreover, given that he will be at least 78 years old before his minimum sentence comes to an end, the chances that he will die before appearing before the Parole Board are considerable.
The other reason why we have concerns in this area was neatly summed up by the Sentencing Academy, which pointed out that, since the current sentencing regime for murder came into force in 2003, the issue of a sentencing judge being prohibited from imposing a whole life order on someone aged 18 to 20 arose for the first time only in 2020. For the avoidance of any doubt, the event referred to in 2020 is that trial of Hashem Abedi.
Chris Philp
I will be brief in my reply. On the need for the sentence, we have already discussed the Abedi case. We have seen that, in his case, it is conceivable that the whole-life order might have made a difference. He would be eligible for Parole Board consideration at the age of 78. In that circumstance, a whole-life order would make a difference because, under one, such a consideration would not take place.
The shadow Minister said that such cases are very rare because, by definition, people who are 18, 19 or 20 have many years of life ahead of them. None the less, they occasionally occur, and it is important that we give judges the ability to deal with that. The fact that we have whole-life orders illustrates that there are limited circumstances in which they are appropriate.
I thought that there was a slight inconsistency in the shadow Minister’s arguments. On the previous clause, he argued for the expansion of whole-life orders, and on this clause—I know he will support it, so I do not want to push this too hard—he raised doubts about the appropriateness of the expansion of whole-life orders. It struck me that there was a slight tension in those arguments.
Alex Cunningham
The Minister must not misunderstand or misinterpret what I was saying. We are fully supportive of what he is trying to achieve here, but we want to make sure the Government recognise that such orders should be used only in the most extreme cases, and maturity has to be an issue.
Chris Philp
We do recognise that. The orders are intended to be used in exceptional circumstances. The phrase “exceptional circumstances” is well established and well known by judges and in law.
On the shadow Minister’s point about accounting for maturity more generally, of course judges take it into account at the point of sentencing. At about this time last year, during the passage of the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021, we discussed extensively the use of pre-sentence reports when someone who is just over the age of maturity but still maturing is sentenced. The fact is that pre-sentence reports can comment on maturity, and judges can take that into account.
I can give the shadow Minister the assurance he asked for. First, the Government are mindful of the issue generally, and, secondly, we expect this to be rare and exceptional. I have a great deal of confidence that the judiciary will apply the flexibility that we are providing in a way that reflects that. As the shadow Minister said, I would not expect the power to be used in very many circumstances, but where terrible cases arise, such as the appalling Abedi case, or a case in which a 19 or 20-year-old abducts, rapes and murders a woman, the whole-life order might be appropriate. It is right that judges have them available to use. I am glad to have the shadow Minister’s support on this clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 102 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 103
Starting points for murder committed when under 18
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Chris Philp
We come now to the sentencing regime for children who commit murder. Thankfully, that is a very rare occurrence, but it does sadly happen. Clause 103 amends the sentencing code to replace the current 12-year tariff point for all children who commit murder, with a sliding scale of starting points. The sliding scale takes into account the age of the child and the seriousness of the offence. It means that the older the child and the more serious the murder, the higher the starting point.
Detention at Her Majesty’s pleasure is the mandatory life sentence for children who commit murder. Starting points are used by the judge to determine the minimum amount of time to be served in custody before the offender can be considered for release by the Parole Board. Judges can set a minimum term that is higher or lower than the starting point by taking into account aggravating or mitigating factors. Rather than having a flat 12-year starting point, as we have at the moment, which does not account for the age of the child—it could be 12 or 17—or the relative seriousness of the offence, instead we will have a sliding scale based on a more nuanced system.
The new starting points represent the approximate percentages of the equivalent sentence for an adult, which of course reflects the seriousness of the particular offence. If the child who has been convicted of murder is aged between 10 and 14, the tariff—the minimum amount to be served—will be set at half the adult equivalent. If they are 15 or 16 years old, it will be set at 66%, and if they are 17 years old—almost an adult but not quite—it will be set at 90%.
The introduction of this sliding scale recognises that children go through different stages of development and that a child of 17 is manifestly different from a child of 10. It seeks to reduce the gap in starting points between someone who is 17 versus someone who is 18, say, but increase it when the person is a lot younger. By linking it to the equivalent sentence for the same offence committed by an adult, it also seeks to reflect the different levels of seriousness that might apply.
This is a sensible and proportionate measure that reflects both age and seriousness. That is not currently reflected in the starting point, and we have to rely wholly on judicial discretion to correct that. This measure makes the provision a little more predictable and transparent, so that everyone can see how the system works.
Alex Cunningham
On 3 May 2019, Ellie Gould was murdered by her former boyfriend in the kitchen of her family home. She was strangled, and stabbed 13 times, in a brutal and frenzied attack. She was only 17 years old and was looking forward to university. Her whole life should have been ahead of her, but it was snatched away in the most horrendous way imaginable.
When Ellie’s former boyfriend was sentenced for his appalling crime, he received only 12 and a half years in prison, meaning he could be eligible for parole before his 30th birthday. If he had committed his crime a year later, after he had turned 18, he could have received a much longer sentence. As a dad and a grandad, I can only imagine the enormous life-changing pain of having a child taken away in such appalling circumstances, while knowing that the perpetrator will be released within a relatively short period.
On behalf of the Opposition and, I am sure, of the whole Committee, I praise the enormous fortitude and dignity that Carole Gould has shown amid such horrendous loss. It is thanks to her tireless campaigning for Ellie’s law that we are discussing the clause. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham made clear in the Chamber some time ago, there is no doubt that Thomas Griffiths received too short a sentence for the crime he committed, and Labour stands firmly behind the Gould family.
As the Minister pointed out, under the current sentencing framework, if a child commits murder before they turn 18, they are sentenced to detention at Her Majesty’s pleasure, with a starting point of 12 years, as opposed to the starting point of life imprisonment for an adult found guilty of the same offence. As such, the way that starting points are currently calculated means that a 17-year-old who, like Thomas Griffiths, commits murder, can receive a much shorter tariff than someone who has just turned 18, even if the crime is more serious.
Clause 103 would rectify that by replacing the 12-year starting point with a sliding scale of different starting points based on the age of the child, as the Minister outlined. The aim is to ensure that sentences given to children who commit murder are closely aligned to the sentences handed down to adults who commit the same offence.
As I set out at some length during the debate on clause 102, the Opposition are naturally cautious when it comes to the age of maturity and increasing the sentencing regime that applies to children. As I have said, that concern is held not only by the Opposition, but by the Justice Committee, which set out unequivocally that:
“Both age and maturity should be taken into significantly greater account within the criminal justice system.”
None the less, as I have said in the past, the Opposition are also pragmatic and recognise that on some occasions, such as the death of Ellie Gould, the sentences that are currently available do not properly reflect the severity of the offence committed.
As Carole Gould has described so movingly, the families of victims of these atrocious crimes often feel that they have faced two gross injustices: first, when the act is carried out, and secondly, when the sentence is delivered. Labour agrees with the Government that in the darkest days of grief, it is deeply unfair that the families of victims feel that they have been cheated of justice when a perpetrator receives a far shorter sentence because of an age difference of a matter of weeks or months.
That is why we, along with the Gould family, were quite appalled when the sentencing White Paper was published with proposals that would have seen Thomas Griffiths receive an even lighter sentence of only 10 years. I am glad that the Government have now seen sense and corrected that point, but not before Labour brought the anomaly to the Government’s attention back in October last year. Labour will support the Government on clause 103 today, but we feel that much more could be done in this area.
As Carole Gould has pointed out, clause 103 deals with the issue of older children being sentenced in a way that is closer to young adults. Another important issue, however, remains to be resolved: the sentencing gap which exists between those who murder within the domestic home and those who murder a stranger in the street. The point made by Carole is a poignant one:
“Why should a life taken in the home by someone you know be valued less than a life taken by a stranger in the streets?”
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move amendment 131, in clause 104, page 89, line 1, leave out “18” and insert “26”.
This amendment would make provision for minimum term reviews for those who are serving a sentence of detention at Her Majesty’s pleasure to continue to take place up to the age of 26.
As has been pointed out, the purpose of the clause is to alter the way in which sentence reviews are conducted for those serving detention at Her Majesty’s pleasure. As the law stands, a child sentenced to detention at Her Majesty’s pleasure may apply to the High Court to seek a review of their sentence once they have reached the halfway point of the sentence. The purpose of the review is to establish whether the offender has made sufficient progress while in prison for their sentence to be reconsidered. If the offender’s application for a review is unsuccessful, he or she may make a further application every two years until the sentence comes to an end.
The effect of the clause is twofold: first, those who have reached the age of 18 at the time of sentencing will no longer be entitled to a review of their sentence. Secondly, those who are entitled to reviews—in other words, those who were sentenced when a child—will be restricted to a single review at the halfway point and, if they have reached the age of 18 by that stage, they will be entitled to no further reviews.
In their White Paper, the Government set out that the intention behind clause 104 was to spare victims’ families the trauma of having to continually revisit the events that led to the loss of their loved one each time an offender applies for a review. Although we sympathise wholeheartedly with that sentiment, we are also mindful of the need to balance it with the right of young offenders to have their sentence reviewed in the light of good behaviour while in prison.
The Opposition’s first major concern with clause 104 is that we believe that those who commit an offence as a child should be treated as a child by the criminal justice system, irrespective of whether they turn 18 by the time they are sentenced. That view is widely held by stakeholders across the justice sector, as well as by Members across the House. As the Minister will be aware, the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Rob Butler) has promoted a ten-minute rule Bill to achieve just that.
The Labour party is clear that no child should be put at a disadvantage by turning 18 before being sentenced, especially if the delay has been caused by the record-breaking court backlog. That concern is shared by the Sentencing Academy, which notes:
“We have grave concerns about the removal of reviews from people simply because they have reached the age of 18 at the time of sentencing—particularly at a time when cases are taking so long to reach court due to the backlog of cases that has been exacerbated by the pandemic.”
Bambos Charalambous
Obviously, delays are not particularly satisfactory for anybody, particularly in the criminal justice system. Long delays are not fair for victims, either, or for young people. As the maxim says, justice delayed is justice denied. Does my hon. Friend agree that the criminal justice system needs more investment so that things are speeded up and young people do not end up being sentenced as adults?
Alex Cunningham
I understand exactly what my hon. Friend is saying. However, I know from discussions with the Lord Chancellor that he is very shy about addressing the issue of people receiving an adult sentence for crimes committed under the age of 18 because their case did not get to court until after they had turned 18. He does not appear to have any sympathy for that. I hope that over time we can work with the Government on what happens to children who commit crimes. They should not be disadvantaged by not having their case heard until they become an adult.
The concept of basing minimum term reviews on age at sentencing, rather than on age at the time the crime was committed, has also been rejected by the courts as contrary to the purpose and rationale of the sentence of detention at Her Majesty’s pleasure. As the great Lord Bingham set out in the case of Smith:
“The requirement to impose a sentence of HMP detention is based not on the age of the offender when sentenced but on the age of the offender when the murder was committed, and it reflects the humane principle that an offender deemed by statute to be not fully mature when committing his crime should not be punished as if he were. As he grows into maturity a more reliable judgment may be made, perhaps of what punishment he deserves and certainly of what period of detention will best promote his rehabilitation.”
With that in mind, what guarantees can the Minister provide that no child will be put at a disadvantage because of court delays caused by the huge backlog that has accrued on the Conservative Government’s watch? Similarly, does he agree that it would be hugely unfair for children to be worse off because of something completely out of their control?
The Opposition’s second concern with clause 104 is the cliff edge created by the offender turning 18. As I set out at some length during our discussion of clause 102, the Opposition are very mindful of the significant advances made during the past 20 years relating to the age of maturity. As the Minister is all too aware, it is now widely recognised that young adults are still developing their decision making and impulse control skills well into their mid-20s. As I have said before, that is acknowledged not just by the Opposition but by the Justice Committee, neuroscientists, criminologists and, until recently, this very Government. It is somewhat disappointing, then, that the Government have chosen to create a cliff edge whereby anyone who turns 18 suddenly loses the right to have the High Court review their sentence.
That concern is shared by the Sentencing Academy, which points out:
“The accompanying ‘factsheet’ justifies removing reviews from those aged 18 by the time of sentencing on the grounds that: ‘This is because their age and maturity will have been taken into account at their sentencing’. However, it is an accepted feature of sentencing law that the passing of an offender’s 18th birthday is not a cliff edge in terms of their emotional and developmental maturity.”
I must therefore ask the Minister why, when the Government have previously accepted that
“the system…should presume that up to the age of 25 young adults are typically still maturing”,
they have chosen to create this cliff edge at the age of 18. Not only does this seem unfair; it also seems counterproductive. By removing an offender’s right to a review of their sentence based on good behaviour, the Government are also removing any incentive for that offender to behave well in prison. As the Howard League points out, minimum term reviews are infrequent but important, as they
“offer a rare source of hope and can powerfully motivate young people to make and maintain positive change.”
The Sentencing Academy points out that since 2010 fewer than 10% of offenders serving detention at Her Majesty’s pleasure applied for a second review of their sentence. It says of the proposed change:
“this restriction will merely remove the opportunity of review from a small handful of cases in which exceptional progress has been achieved after the halfway point in the sentence”.
Is the Minister not worried that by removing the right to these reviews, he could be putting overworked prison staff at increased risk of harm?
Although we sympathise with the stated goal that the Government are seeking to achieve through clause 104—to prevent unnecessary distress to the families of victims of crime—in its present form we are unable to support it. Instead, we have tabled amendment 131, which we believe balances the need to protect the families of victims of crime from distress with preserving the rehabilitative benefits of being able to request a sentence review. The mechanics of the amendment are simple. Instead of ending the right to a sentence review at the age of 18, the amendment would make provision for minimum term reviews up to the age of 26, reflecting the widely held view that young adults are still developing in maturity well into their twenties, while also providing a powerful incentive to motivate young offenders to reform and rehabilitate while in custody.
I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
Chris Philp
Once again, the shadow Minister has helpfully laid out the context and the background to the clause. I will not irritate or detain the Committee—or perhaps both—by repeating the information that he has given.
These reviews provide an opportunity to look again at the minimum term handed down, but it is important to remember that we are talking about a cohort of people who have committed a very serious offence: murder. As the shadow Minister said, when sentence is first passed on a child, the judge passing the sentence will include in their consideration the maturity of the person at that point. There is an acceptance that further maturing may occur subsequently, which is why the review mechanism exists. Even with the reform proposed in clause 104 there can still be a single review once the individual is over 18; it is only subsequent reviews—a second, third or fourth review—that the clause would preclude. Given the likely length of sentences or of minimum terms, as well as the fact that most people receiving a first sentence will probably be in their mid or late teens, it is very likely that in almost all cases there will be one review after the age of 18. We are simply precluding those further reviews.
The shadow Minister says the clause might affect incentives. Once the minimum term has been reached, whether it has been reduced or not reduced, the Parole Board still has to consider whether release is appropriate, so even if the minimum term is not reduced, there is still an incentive to behave in prison and to engage in rehabilitation and so on, in the hope of getting the Parole Board release once the minimum term has been reached. So I do not accept the argument that the clause changes the incentives to behave well in prison.
On the point about people maturing beyond the age of 18, for first sentences, that is reflected in the sentence passed by the judge, informed by pre-sentencing reports. As I have said previously, the law as we propose to amend it will still allow—most likely in almost every case, or very many cases—a single review after the age of 18. That is analogous to the judge, when sentencing someone for the first time at the age of 20, 21 or 22, or even slightly older, taking into account maturity at the point of sentencing.
Alex Cunningham
I am sorry, but I do not accept the Minister’s argument. He himself talked about the small number of applications under the existing system, but he is choosing to remove that opportunity for all, with the exception of the one opportunity. I refer him again to the quote from the Sentencing Academy:
“We have grave concerns about the removal of reviews from people simply because they have reached the age of 18 at the time of sentencing—particularly at a time when cases are taking so long to reach court”.
The very fact that young people can be denied further reviews because they have reached the age of 18, and their case has not reached court through no fault of their own, is deeply unfair. For that reason, I will push the amendment to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Chris Philp
The clause will increase the amount of time that an offender sentenced to a discretionary life sentence will be required to serve in custody before they can be considered for release. A discretionary life sentence can be imposed for any offence that has a maximum period of life where the court believes that the high seriousness of the offending is such that a life sentence should be imposed, rather than a lesser determinate sentence. Such offences include manslaughter, rape, and grievous bodily harm with intent.
When imposing such a sentence, the court must set a minimum term, or tariff, that must be served in full in custody before the prisoner can be considered for release by the Parole Board. At present, when setting a discretionary life tariff, the sentencing judge will identify a notional determinate sentence that reflects the seriousness of the offence as well as time spent in custody on remand and the early release provisions that apply to that notional determinate sentence in order to calculate the tariff. In practice, the standard approach applied by the court is to decide what the notional determinate sentence would be for the offence committed and then calculate the tariff based on half that notional determinate sentence, reflecting the release provision requiring automatic release at the halfway point for prisoners sentenced to a standard determinate sentence.
That is no longer fit for purpose, because the Government have legislated to remove automatic halfway release for serious sexual and violent offenders serving a standard determinate sentence of seven years or more. In fact the next clause, 106, will extend that principle further to many standard determinate sentences of four years or more. That means—anomalously—that the most serious offenders given a standard determinate sentence will serve longer in prison and be released only after serving two thirds of their sentence, but the people I have just described with a discretionary life sentence will not. The Government’s proposal will align the automatic release point for serious offenders serving standard determinate sentences with the earliest possible point at which the Parole Board may direct release for those serving sentences of particular concern or extended determinate sentences, namely two thirds of the custodial term of such sentences.
For the most serious terrorist offences, through the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021 we brought in new provisions meaning that offenders must serve their custodial term in full. The clause will ensure that the approach to release for those serving determinate sentences for serious offences is reflected in the way in which minimum terms for those serving discretionary life sentences are calculated. They will be brought into alignment, avoiding any anomalies. Judges will, of course, retain discretion to depart from the starting point as they consider appropriate in the cases before them.
The clause will bring discretionary life sentences into line with the broader approach for dangerous offenders, so that the most serious offenders will serve longer in prison before they become eligible to be considered for release by the Parole Board, thereby ensuring that the punishment better reflects the severity of the crime. In effect, it introduces consistency between the discretionary life sentences release provisions and those we introduced in the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act this year, which we are expanding in the Bill. It is a measure that brings consistency and keeps serious offenders in prison for longer. I therefore hope that the Committee will agree to the clause standing part of the Bill.
Alex Cunningham
As the Minister said, the clause will change the way in which the minimum terms of discretionary life sentences are calculated. As the law currently stands, and has stood for quite some time, discretionary life sentences are calculated at one half of what the equivalent determinate sentence would be. The clause enacts a proposal in the sentencing White Paper to change the way in which life sentences are calculated, so that they are based on two thirds of the equivalent determinate sentence rather than one half.
The Government’s rationale is set out in the explanatory notes accompanying the Bill, which say:
“This change is necessary because most serious violent and sexual offenders who receive determinate sentences—including those who may receive an extended determinate sentence—are required to serve two-thirds of their custodial term before they may be released.”
That refers, of course, to other recent changes to release arrangements that mean that certain categories of offender must now serve two thirds of their sentence, rather than half, before they can be released.
Like the previous sentencing changes, the clause will make an already complicated sentencing regime even more complex by changing the way in which sentences have long been calculated. It is somewhat ironic that the Government on the one hand claim to want to make sentencing simpler, and on the other hand make a series of reforms that do the exact opposite. I will develop that point in more detail when we come to clause 106, but let me give a broad overview of what I mean.
In advance of the publication of the sentencing White Paper in September 2020, the Lord Chancellor set out in a column for The Times—sorry, for the The Sun on Sunday, which is quite a different paper—that
“Sentences are too complicated and often confusing to the public—the very people they are supposed to protect.”
The Lord Chancellor returns to this point in his foreword to the White Paper, stating that
“The system we have today can be complex and is too often ineffectual. Victims and the public often find it difficult to understand, and have little faith that sentences are imposed with their safety sufficiently in mind. The courts can find it cumbersome and difficult to navigate, with judges’ hands too often tied in passing sentences that seem to make little sense. The new Sentencing Code is a good start in tidying up the system, however we must be mindful not just of how sentences are handed down, but also how they are put into effect.”
The Opposition agree wholeheartedly with the Lord Chancellor’s sentiment, which is why we welcome the new sentencing code with open arms and why we are a bit puzzled by some of the measures in the Bill.
I am not from a legal background, so perhaps I am missing something here. Can the Minister explain in simple terms how the myriad changes to release arrangements for certain offences will make sentencing simpler, rather than more complicated? If the Government’s objective is to keep dangerous offenders in prison for longer, why do they not simply legislate for longer custodial sentences, rather than moving the date at which prisoners are either automatically released or released by the Parole Board? Not only would it be a simpler approach, but it would ensure that offenders still serve 50% of their sentence in the community, which we know will significantly reduce their risk of reoffending. Again, this a point that I will draw on further when discussing the next clause.
The other concern we have about clause 105 is that it fails to recognise the fundamental difference between discretionary life sentences and determinate sentences. As the Howard League sets out in its briefing:
“In contrast with the determinate serious sentences, a person serving a discretionary life sentence will be liable to detention until the day he or she dies and there is no automatic release date. The blanket increase in the punitive period therefore cannot be grounded in protecting the public as that is covered by the jurisdiction of the Parole Board: it is simply a hike in the punitiveness and there is no evidence to justify this in terms of reducing long-term harm or increasing public safety.”
In other words, the Government cannot rely on the rationale that clause 105 and the extension in the way discretionary life sentences are calculated is for the purposes of public protection.
When discretionary life sentences are handed down, the offender knows that he or she will be released from prison only if the Parole Board considers it safe to do so. This is a decision made by the Parole Board, regardless of whether it is taken at the halfway point or two-thirds point of a sentence. Instead, we are inclined to agree with the Sentencing Academy, which suggests the clause is all about
“solving a problem of the Government’s own making”
as a result of previous changes to the point of automatic early release.
To wrap up, the Opposition are concerned that the clause will make an already overcomplicated sentencing regime even more complicated, contrary to the Government’s desire for simpler system. It will also have no impact at all on the decisions made by the Parole Board, which remains the ultimate decision maker as to when somebody on a discretionary life sentence is safe to be released. For those reasons, we cannot support the clause.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill (Tenth sitting)
Alex Cunningham Excerpts(3 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Victoria Atkins
The custodial aspect has been increased from three months to six months in relation to organisers of public processions and assemblies who go on to breach conditions, as well as those who incite others to breach conditions. The sentence in relation to the fine is for those who breach conditions. They go in a different category from organisers and those who incite others to breach conditions.
I do not have any examples to hand immediately, but I imagine some will find themselves in my file in due course. We are looking at maximum sentences, but it is still for the independent judiciary to impose sentences in court on the facts of the case that they have before them. That is another safeguard and another check and balance within this legislation. It will be for the judiciary to impose individual sentences, but it is right that Parliament look at the maximum term.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
What evidence does the Minister have for the need for tougher sentences in this area? Are the judiciary saying that they are ill equipped to sentence people appropriately when they have been convicted of this type of activity?
Victoria Atkins
Again, I point to the disruption and to the tactics that have been developing over recent years, which have grown not just more disruptive but, in some cases, more distressing. There are examples of an ambulance being blocked from an A&E department and of commuters being prevented from getting on the train to go to work in the morning by people who had attempted to climb on to the train carriage. We are seeing more and more of these instances, so it is right that the maximum sentence is commensurate.
If protesters feel that such measures are disproportionate, they will presumably put that defence forward in court. It will be for the Crown to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and for their counsel to mitigate on their behalf. We are trying to show the seriousness with which we take these small instances, where the balance between the rights of protesters and the rights of the community that is not protesting is disproportionate within the checks and balances that we have already discussed in the course of this debate.
I turn now to the measures relating to noise. The provisions will broaden the range of circumstances in which the police may impose conditions on a public procession or a public assembly to include circumstances where noise may have a significant impact on those in the vicinity, or may result in serious disruption to the activities of an organisation. These circumstances will also apply to single-person protests.
The hon. Member for Rotherham asked whether the noise provision was London-centric, with the biggest protests happening in London. As I said earlier, one would not want to assume that some of the protests that we have seen on the news could not happen outside London, as with the “Kill the Bill” protests in Bristol. It is right that we have clarity and consistency in law across the country so that if a group of protesters behaved in the way people appear to have behaved in the Bristol protests—injuring many, many police officers who were just acting in the line of duty—one would expect the law to apply as clearly in Rotherham as in central London.
Victoria Atkins
The organiser in those circumstances would, of course, be liable to having a committed an offence only if they breached the order. Indeed, this is the important point. It is for the police to make that assessment. If the police have a conversation with an organiser and say, “We believe that using your very high-level amplification system in this residential street meets the criteria under subsection (3) such that we are going to impose a condition asking you to turn it down,” the organiser, or the person deemed to be the organiser, will have had that conversation with an officer, and I very much hope that they will abide by the condition. If they do not, that is where the offence comes in, and that is a choice for the organiser.
As is already the case with processions, those conversations will happen and it will be a matter for the organiser as to what course of action they choose to take. One hopes that they will take the advice and guidance of the police, adapt and therefore be able to continue with their protest in a way that meets the expectations of the local community or local businesses. I appreciate that the detail is incredibly technical, and I am trying to work through every set of factual circumstances. I understand absolutely why people want to work through those, but there are checks and balances that run throughout the Bill.
Alex Cunningham
First, does the Minister agree that we must therefore have specific training for the police? She has referred many times to senior officers making decisions, but senior officers might not be available in Stockton-on-Tees or Rotherham, and certainly not in the local village, when there is some form of demonstration. The local PC may well be the person who has to turn up and make some form of decision in this situation. Secondly, on the issue of noise itself, how can a police officer be fair and objective where there are different groups of people who will be suffering differently as a direct result of a demonstration? A bunch of teenagers standing on Whitehall might find the noise and the robustness of the conversation tremendously exciting, but the pensioners group that has gone for tea at the local café might be very distressed. How on earth does the police officer make a balanced decision in that sort of situation?
Victoria Atkins
I can help the hon. Gentleman on the officer point. Pre-procession—in other words, in respect of processions that are yet to happen—the conditions must be assessed, and if ordered, ordered by a chief officer. That is a chief constable outside London, and in London an assistant commissioner. That is the highest rank in a police force. Mid-procession, conditions are imposed by a senior officer, which is an inspector or above, at the scene. So I do not think that the circumstances that the hon. Gentleman describes will arise. It is another example of the checks and balances that we have tried to put in place throughout this part of the Bill to ensure that these decisions are taken by very experienced and specialised officers.
I have been given another example to help demonstrate the point. A noisy protest that lasts only a short time may not meet the threshold, so the 90 seconds of—I forget the piece of music—
Victoria Atkins
Exactly right. The police will first have to satisfy themselves and the CPS that a charge should be brought, and from that all the usual safeguards and standards that we expect in the criminal justice system will apply. For example, the CPS will have to apply the code for Crown prosecutors in relation to the public interest and evidential tests. We will then have the mechanisms in the trial process—perhaps a submission at half-time by defence counsel if they feel the evidence is not there. There are many mechanisms that apply in criminal trials up and down the country every single day, and those mechanisms will be available for offences under the Bill as they are for any other criminal offence.
I have been asked for clarification of the terms: annoyance, alarm, distress and unease. Many of those terms are already used in the Public Order Act 1986 and in common law. They are well understood by the judiciary, and the Law Commission—this is particularly in reference to the public nuisance point, which we will come on to in a moment—recommends retaining the word “annoyance”, as it provides continuity with previous legal cases and is well understood in this context. We understand the concerns about this, but as I say, through the introduction of these words, we are trying to be consistent with the approach that has long applied in the Public Order Act.
It is necessary to apply the measure in relation to noise to single-person protests because they can, of course, create just as much noise through the use of amplification equipment as a large protest using such equipment. Again, the police will be able to impose conditions on a single-person protest for reasons relating only to noise, not for any other reason.
Forgive me: I have just been corrected regarding the briefing I received about the rank of the officer at the scene. It is the most senior officer at the scene, so there is no minimum rank, but it is anticipated in the use of the word that it will be an officer of great seniority. Any protest on which it may be necessary to impose conditions is likely to have an officer present of at least the rank of inspector.
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful to the Minister for clarifying that point, but it does mean that the local sergeant or PC in a village or a town centre is going to have to make decisions about these matters. My point was that surely, this means that there needs to be some very specific training on how police should react to demonstrations or other activities of that nature.
Victoria Atkins
I would give the police some credit. First, if it is a protest of any serious size, or the organisers have contacted the police or the other way around, this can and should be dealt with ahead of the protest. In the event of a protest taking people by surprise in a quieter area than a huge metropolis, the police will react as they are very used to reacting in circumstances that need them to be flexible and move quickly, and I am sure they will have people on the scene very quickly who can assist with this. We want to ensure that the expectation is that a senior officer, and certainly the most senior officer at the scene, will be the one imposing these conditions.
I now turn to the parts of the clauses that set out that the Home Secretary will have the power, through secondary legislation, to define the meaning of
“serious disruption to the life of the community”
and
“serious disruption to the activities of an organisation which are carried on in the vicinity of the procession”,
or assembly or single-person protest. Again, to clear up any misunderstandings, this is not about the Home Secretary of the day banning protests. Opposition Members have understandably called for clearer definitions wherever possible, which is what this delegated power is intended to achieve. Any definition created through this power will need to fall within what can reasonably be understood as “serious disruption”. The threshold will be clarified, not changed: such definitions will be used to clarify the threshold beyond which the police can impose conditions on protests, should they believe them necessary to avoid serious disruption. This is about putting the framework in place to help the police on the ground.
The regulations will be subject to the draft affirmative procedure, which means that they must be scrutinised, debated, and approved by both Houses before they can be made. It will, of course, be for the police in an individual case to apply that definition operationally. They can apply that definition only if the criteria in the Bill are met. This is not about the Home Secretary outlawing particular protests or individual demonstrations; it is about setting a framework for a definition, to help the police operation on the ground to understand the criteria in the Bill. To assist in scrutiny of the Bill, we aim to publish further details of the content of the regulation before consideration on Report.
The clauses relating to protest, public assemblies, marches, processions and demonstrations, as well as other terms that have been used to describe this, represent a modest updating of legislation that is more than 35 years old. They do not enable the police or, for that matter, the Home Secretary of the day to ban any protest. Interestingly, we will come to debates in Committee on new clause 43, which relates to interference with access to or the provision of abortion services. That provision does, in fact, seek to ban such protests, so, again, there is a balancing act, or the grey area that has been referred to in this very debate.
Alex Cunningham
I am interested in what the Minister has to say about new clause 43. Is she indicating Government support for the measures that we are trying to introduce?
Victoria Atkins
No, I am drawing out an apparent contradiction. I do not say that in a pejorative sense. The hon. Member and others have expressed strong reservations and complaints about the Bill. I understand that they will vote against the measures, but it seems that discussions about freedom of speech and expression—that balancing act—will be part of the consideration of the Opposition’s new clause. I am not laying out a position either way; I am observing the difficulty in achieving that balancing act and an apparent contradiction. It is for individual Members to decide matters of scrutiny.
These clauses provide for a sensible alignment of police powers to attach conditions to an assembly or a public procession, and extend those powers to deal with particularly egregious cases of disruption due to unacceptable levels of noise. The measures are supported by the police, who will, as now, have to exercise the powers within the framework of the Human Rights Act. On that basis, and with that detailed analysis, I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Bambos Charalambous
One of the problems is that there is less local authority provision for Travellers to go to. That loss of provision, which is partly due to cuts to local government, has caused more problems, meaning that more people are on the road at any given time. However, this issue does not affect just the Traveller community, as the hon. Gentleman will see when I go on to make further points. It also impacts people such as ramblers, birdwatchers and others who want to stay out and sleep in their vehicles while enjoying countryside activities.
Alex Cunningham
My hon. Friend has made the point that there is a failure in our society to provide sufficient facilities for people from the travelling community, be they traditional Gypsies or people who choose to go on the road. Does he agree that the Government, rather than bringing in legislation such as this, should turn their attention to providing local authorities with the resources they need to provide facilities for travelling communities? Does he also agree that that should not be left just to some communities; communities across the country should take a share in providing such facilities so that Travellers can live with them cheek by jowl in a peaceful way?
Bambos Charalambous
My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. That was highlighted by the representative from the LGA in her evidence to the Committee.
As one of the respondents to the Petition Committee’s survey on the criminalisation of trespass put it:
“The criminalisation of trespass will simply exacerbate an already fraught relationship.”
Bambos Charalambous
As I have said, there is no excuse for criminality, and the Gypsy and Traveller community is already overrepresented in the prison population, but I do not think that the two issues are necessarily related to what the clause is trying to achieve. The hon. Gentleman is trying to say that the Gypsy and Traveller community is responsible for crime in Ashfield. I do not know the facts and figures in relation to that, but what the clause does is criminalise communities for being in vehicles on public land. While each Member has a concern about their individual constituents, we need to get back to what the Bill is focusing on, which is criminalising anyone in a vehicle, even on their own. I think that is what we need to focus on.
Alex Cunningham
In Stockton, we have had facilities for travelling communities for many years. I am sure my hon. Friend will agree that this is about having proper facilities. Perhaps I can point him to the example of the Appleby horse fair, which attracts thousands of people every year. We see them travelling up, and they stay on the byways and all sorts of places along the way, but when they get to the site they are properly catered for. There is proper rubbish removal, proper facilities for animals, toilets and all manner of facilities, and they are put in place to provide for that particular need. Perhaps if other local authorities across the country took that approach, we would not have the problems that Government Members have described.
Bambos Charalambous
Again, my hon. Friend makes an excellent point. He is right: if more facilities were provided, that would help to solve the problem.
Bambos Charalambous
Civil remedies would still be available for people who engage in antisocial behaviour, fly-tipping and so on. All we would be doing is criminalising a particular group of people. In my view, the civil remedies would still be there and the cost to the council would still be there if proper facilities were not provided. To me, just criminalising a particular group of people is wrong.
To continue, the NPCC witness said:
“Really, our point fundamentally as the NPCC group is that the issue here is the lack of provision that theoretically should be made, which means that we have this percentage of Travellers who are on unlawful spaces and you end up in the situations that we end up with. Our view is that the current legislation is sufficient to deal with that issue.”––[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 18 May 2021; c. 15, Q20.]
We have to ask: why are the Government determined to lock up Gypsies and Travellers, even against the advice of their own police? As Martin Hewitt clearly stated, existing legislation on police powers and unauthorised encampments is enough to tackle the problem. The police already have extensive powers to move on unauthorised encampments in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, and as of January 2020, just 3% of Gypsy and Traveller caravans—694—in England were in unauthorised encampments. Of those, 419 were on sites not tolerated and 275 were on tolerated sites. The police and campaigners tell us the evidence is not there that the new powers are necessary and that many more authorised encampment sites should be provided instead.
Alex Cunningham
I sometimes wonder whether the power to discourage Travellers from moving in is in the hands of communities. Travellers move around the country for work—to pick up scrap, to do all manner of gardening work, such as taking down trees for people, and so on. I have had many an argument with people living in communities who say, “We don’t want Travellers here,” but they put out their fridge or their scrap metal for them, they let them cut down their trees. They provide them with work and an incentive to be in the area. So perhaps people have it in their own power. Travellers will not come if there is no incentive for them.
Bambos Charalambous
My hon. Friend makes an interesting point, which is worthy of further discussion.
I will run through a series of points the Minister for Crime and Policing made when responding to a Westminster Hall debate on this question. On concerns about the right to roam being threatened, he said the measures will not affect anyone who wants to enjoy the countryside for leisure purposes, but many organisations, such as the Ramblers Association and CPRE the Countryside Charity, are concerned that although the Government might not intend to capture others enjoying the countryside, they could still do so. The legislation is so open to interpretation that it could easily be applied to anyone with a vehicle. For example, how do the Government propose to ensure that the police distinguish between a modified Transit van or Volkswagen camper used at the weekends and one that is lived in? How will they distinguish between a family going on a caravan holiday and a Gypsy or Traveller family with an identical caravan before stopping them and seizing their property because the police suspect that they might stop somewhere they do not have permission to do so?
The Minister for Policing and Crime also said that there is a high threshold to be met before the new powers kick in, but only one vehicle need be involved, whereas section 61 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act requires six vehicles. The bar seems to have been significantly lowered in the Bill. The police currently have discretion to decide whether to use their powers under sections 61, 62 and 62A to 62E, in the latter cases where a suitable alternative pitch is available, but under the proposals in part 4 of the Bill, police will be dutybound to act when they are informed that a criminal offence has taken place.
The term “significant distress” is highly subjective. Given the high levels of prejudice and hatred towards Gypsy and Traveller communities, we are likely to see countless reports of criminal offences being committed, based on someone saying that they are significantly distressed by an encampment. Marc Willers QC, of Garden Court Chambers, said in the evidence sessions:
‘It seems to me that a lot of the language used is vague and uncertain. There is a reference to causing “significant distress” as one of the conditions that could lead to the criminalisation of an individual who refuses to leave a piece of land. That, in itself, brings inherent problems, because a private citizen could very easily invoke the power and leave a police officer with a fait accompli—in other words, they have no option but to arrest an individual who refuses to leave land in circumstances where the occupier says, “I am being caused significant distress by the very fact that this individual is parking on land that I occupy.”’
Alex Cunningham
I am never happier than when I am in my own caravan—always on an official site—travelling around the country and into Europe. I have seen tremendous growth in the number of people driving motor homes, and I see them parked up all over the country, on private land, public land and elsewhere. Those people are also going to get caught up in this particular legislation, are they not?
Bambos Charalambous
Again, my hon. Friend makes a very good point. We want to make sure that people are free to enjoy the beautiful countryside we are lucky to have in the UK without fear of being criminalised in such a way.
Marc Willers QC went on to say:
“That distress can be engendered or underpinned by the prejudice that Gypsies and Travellers face in our society today. It is a widespread and long-standing prejudice, dating back to the first time that Romani Gypsies came to these shores in the 1500s… There may well be unwarranted and unjustified concerns on the part of the occupier, which could lead to the criminalisation of an individual who has nowhere else to go.” —[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 18 May 2021; c. 72, Q104.]
I draw to colleagues’ attention the fact that we have caveated damage, distress and disruption with the word “significant”. We have tried throughout the Bill to strike a proportionate balance between landowners’ and communities’ rights to the peaceful enjoyment of and access to property and land, and Travellers’ rights to lead a nomadic way of life in line with their cultural heritage. The qualifying condition of “significant” damage, disruption or distress means that a higher threshold must be met than under the existing powers for tackling unauthorised encampments in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, which clause 62 amends. Under the provisions of the 1994 Act, the test is simply causing damage, disruption or distress, so the higher threshold in the Bill helps to ensure that the offence and the powers of arrest, seizure or forfeiture are proportionate.
Alex Cunningham
The Minister places a lot of stock in the word “significant”. To play devil’s advocate—perhaps against myself—she may be holding out a false promise to some of the communities we have heard described today. If a gang of Travellers turn up with 10 caravans, move on to someone’s land illegally—or it would be illegal under the Bill—take their rubbish away and do the work they want to do in the area, they will not be caught by the provision because they will not have caused “significant damage”. Communities across the country think that the Conservative Government are about to deliver all-encompassing, “we can move the Travellers on” legislation, but it is simply not the case.
Victoria Atkins
In that scenario, the hon. Gentleman is right, in that we are addressing the behaviour that is set out in proposed new section 60C(4). In the event of a travelling community behaving as he describes, all the existing civil measures that a landowner can rely upon are there to move them on. We are trying to deal with behaviour that causes significant damage, distress and disruption where encampments are unauthorised. We are balancing things carefully because we want to address the serious scenarios that my hon. Friends have described in their constituencies.
As we have touched on in other contexts, the word “significant” is widely used in legislation, for example in section 14A of the Public Order Act 1986 on “Prohibiting trespassory assemblies”, which refers to “significant damage”. The criminal offence is committed only when a person resides or intends to reside on the land without consent with a vehicle. That avoids criminalising other forms of trespass, for example, the offence does not apply to a hiker, someone who is homeless or someone who inadvertently strays on to private land. I know that many colleagues of all parties have received communications from clubs, associations and people who have taken the time to write to their Member of Parliament or the Home Office on the issue and we very much hope that this will provide them with welcome reassurance. We all have the right to enjoy the beautiful national parks and green spaces that this great country has to offer and we will be able to continue to exercise that right.
The types of harms caught by the offence are defined in clause 61 and cover many of the problems we have been told that residents and landowners face through some unauthorised encampments. These include significant damage to land, property and the environment, as well as threatening behaviour to residents and landowners. Regarding distress, an offence is committed only if significant distress has been caused or is likely to be caused as a result of offensive conduct, which is then defined within the Bill. It is therefore not possible for an offence to be caught if a person is distressed by the mere presence of an unauthorised encampment on the land. That is where the civil measures I referred to earlier will come into play.
I was challenged with an example where a landowner is distressed and demands the police arrest someone. As with every other criminal offence, the police will only arrest someone if they are doing so in the course of their duties under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. They cannot and must not arrest someone just because a landowner or anyone else happens to demand it. It is important as we are discussing the Bill that we bear in mind the wider checks and balances within the criminal justice system and the wider principles that apply across all criminal offences.
If someone has met the previously mentioned conditions, to be guilty of the offence, they must fail to comply with the request to leave as soon as reasonably practicable and without reasonable excuse. The duties of the police in relation to safeguarding the vulnerable when taking enforcement decisions will continue to apply, as with any other criminal investigation.
The penalties are consistent with squatting legislation and existing powers to tackle unauthorised encampments. The offence is also accompanied by a power for the police to seize the vehicle and other property of the person committing the offence, which ensures that enforcement action is effective and could also have a deterrent effect. Seizure powers are already conferred on the police in relation to failure to comply with a police direction under the 1994 Act. It is right that the police should have equivalent powers in the context of the new criminal offence.
The seizure power is proportionate. Where possible, police decisions to arrest and seize vehicles should continue to be taken in consultation with the local authority which, where possible, would need to offer assurance that it has relevant measures in place to meet any welfare and safeguarding needs of those affected by the loss of their accommodation. The police will continue to undertake any enforcement action in compliance with their equality and human rights obligations.
The shadow Minister set out the police evidence on these new powers. The responses to the 2018 consultation showed a clear desire from the public for the police to be given more powers to tackle unauthorised encampments, but unauthorised Traveller sites require a locally driven, multi-agency response, led by local authorities and supported by the police. There are incentives in place for local authorities to encourage the provision of authorised Traveller pitches. Local planning authorities should continue to assess the need for Traveller accommodation and identify land for sites.
It is only right that the police are given the powers to tackle instances of unauthorised encampments that meet the conditions of proposed new subsection (4). We are very pleased that the Opposition are adopting the position that we should legislate for changes to police powers when requested by the police, because that gives us hope that they will support the measures in part 3, which we have just debated and which have been requested by the police.
This new offence is not targeted at any particular group. Rather, anyone who causes significant damage, disruption or distress in the specified conditions and who refuses to leave without reasonable excuse when asked to do so will be caught by the offence.
Section 61 of the 1994 Act is currently exercisable where any of the trespassers has caused damage to the land or to property on the land or used threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour towards the occupier, Under the amendments in clause 62, the relevant harms comprise damage, disruption or distress, including environmental damage, such as excessive noise and litter. The harms do not need to be significant for police to be able to direct trespassers away in the first instance. That will make it easier for the police to direct trespassers away where encampments are causing problems for landowners, communities or businesses.
We have also increased the period in which trespassers directed away from the land must not return, from three months to 12 months. That is designed to strengthen enforcement powers, acting as a greater deterrent in the first place, and to protect more proportionately the rights of landowners and local communities. We are also enabling the police to direct trespassers away from land that forms part of a highway, to ensure that directions can be given to trespassers on roads.
Our overarching aim is to ensure fair and equal treatment for Travellers in a way that facilitates their traditional nomadic way of life while respecting the interests of local residents and the settled community. We recognise that the vast majority of Travellers are law-abiding citizens, but unauthorised sites can often give an unfair negative image of nomadic communities, and cause distress and misery to residents who live nearby. We are equally clear that we will not tolerate law breaking.
Statutory guidance will be issued, as provided for in clause 63, and will outline examples of what might constitute a reasonable excuse for not complying with the request to leave. That guidance will be vital to support the police in discharging those functions and will help to ensure a consistent application of the powers across England and Wales. The police must have regard to the guidance when exercising the relevant functions. We envisage that the guidance will set out, for example, what might constitute significant damage, disruption and distress, and what might constitute a reasonable excuse, where someone fails to comply with a request to leave the land. It will be up to the police and courts to decide whether someone has a reasonable excuse for not complying, depending on the specific facts of that case.
We recognise the rights of Travellers to follow a nomadic way of life, in line with their cultural heritage. Our aim is for settled and Traveller communities to be able to live side by side harmoniously, and we hope that the clear rules and boundaries that we are putting in place will facilitate that. We remain committed to delivering a cross-Government strategy to tackle the inequalities faced by Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities. The planning policy for Traveller sites is clear that local planning authorities should assess the need for Traveller accommodation and identify land for sites. Local housing authorities are required to assess their housing and accommodation needs under the Housing Act 1985, including for those who reside in caravans. There is wider Government support for the provision of Traveller sites via the new homes bonus, which provides an incentive for local authorities to encourage housing growth in their areas, and rewards net increases in effective housing stock, including the provision of authorised Traveller pitches.
Alex Cunningham
Does the Minister have an idea what the Government’s plans are in terms of the number of sites that are likely to be created over the next three to five years?
Victoria Atkins
That is a matter for local authorities. We have the planning policy for Traveller sites, which is down to the local planning authority. In the hon. Gentleman’s area, I know not whether his local council agrees with him that there should be more sites, but it would be a matter for the local authority to address with local residents.
We remain committed to delivering the strategy to tackle the inequalities faced by the communities that we have discussed. There is the additional affordable homes programme for local authorities to deliver a wide range of affordable homes to meet the housing needs of people in different circumstances and different housing markets, including funding for new Traveller pitches.
We believe that we have struck the right balance between the rights of those who live a nomadic way of life and the rights of local communities to go about their lives without the significant damage, disruption and distress outlined in proposed new section 60C(4), which, regrettably, some unauthorised encampments cause. I therefore commend clauses 61 to 63 to the Committee.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Chris Philp)
It is, as always, a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe. The clause fulfils the Government’s long-standing commitment to increase the maximum penalty for the offences of, first, causing death by dangerous driving and, secondly, causing death by careless driving while under the influence of drink or drugs from, in both cases, the current maximum sentence of 14 years to life imprisonment.
As members of the Committee will know, in response to the consultation on driving offences and penalties some time ago, the Government proposed to take forward various changes in the law, including these, and all of them received overwhelming public support and support from other consultees. By enacting this clause we are delivering on the result of that consultation and on a long-standing commitment. That means that when sentencing people for these very serious offences, the courts can sentence up to life imprisonment if the judge sees fit.
Many hon. Members will have constituency cases where families have suffered the terrible trauma of a loved one being killed by a dangerous or careless driver who was driving when drunk. I have certainly encountered a number of such cases in the last six years as a constituency MP, as I am sure each and every Member here has. The criminal justice system can never adequately compensate for the grief caused by the loss of a loved one in such terrible circumstances, but these changes will mean that courts now have the power to make sure that the punishment truly fits the crime.
It is appropriate that the maximum sentences for causing death by dangerous driving and causing death by careless driving while under the influence are increased from 14 years to life imprisonment. I commend these measures to the Committee.
Alex Cunningham
I am pleased to offer the Opposition’s enthusiastic support for clauses 64 to 66, and particularly for clause 64, which will increase the maximum penalties for the offences of causing death by dangerous driving and causing death by careless driving while under the influence of drink or drugs from 14 years’ imprisonment to imprisonment for life.
I pay tribute to my hon. Friends the Members for Barnsley East (Stephanie Peacock) and for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis) for their committed work to increase the penalty for those guilty of causing death by dangerous driving to life imprisonment and for the Bill they have promoted and supported. My hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley East has worked alongside the family of Jaqueline Wileman, from Grimethorpe, who was 58 when she was struck and tragically killed by a stolen heavy goods vehicle in September 2018. I offer my sincerest thanks to the Wileman family for their tireless campaign for change, which they are now able to see become a reality.
Other families of victims of these awful crimes have also long campaigned to see these changes, such as the family of Violet-Grace, who died from injuries inflicted as a result of a car crash caused by individuals driving dangerously in March 2017. I hope that this change in the law, which they have fought to bring forward, will provide some small solace that dangerous drivers who kill will, in future, feel the full force of the law.
Work to address this important issue has been energetic on both sides of the House, and it was the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May) who introduced the Death by Dangerous Driving (Sentencing) Bill in July 2020, as a private Member’s Bill co-sponsored by my hon. Friends the Members for Barnsley East and for Barnsley Central. We are therefore fully supportive of the Government’s proposal to provide the court with a wider range of penalties to ensure that sentences are proportionate and reflect the seriousness of the offending.
The urgent need for this change is illustrated by the fact that, in 2019, over 150 people were sentenced for causing death by dangerous driving. Of those offenders, around 95% received an immediate custodial sentence, of which over 15 received a sentence of more than 10 years. If 10% of offenders are already being sentenced near the maximum threshold, it seems the time is ripe to provide the court with wider sentencing powers for these offences so that offenders are dealt with consistently and fairly.
Although we are fully supportive of these changes, I note that there has been some delay in introducing them. The Government committed to changing the law on causing death by dangerous driving following a review in 2014—seven years ago. As the Minster said, it has been a long-standing commitment. There was also a consultation in 2016, which the Government responded to in 2017, committing to the legislative changes that are now in the Bill. The private Member’s Bill brought forward by the right hon. Member for Maidenhead last year was a real nudge along to the Government, following a perceived dropping of the ball. I would normally say, “Better late than never,” but for a measure as serious as this, and with hundreds of families losing loved ones to dangerous drivers in the intervening years, I wonder what held the Government up for so long.
Speaking of delays, Cycling UK said that, although it cautiously supports these proposals, it fears they will do very little to address the many serious problems with the framework of road traffic offences and penalties. I understand that the Government promised a full review of the framework back in 2014, but it has never happened. I would welcome an update from the Minister on the wider review, which could look at the utilisation of driving bans.
We fully support the proposals in clause 65, which introduces the new offence of causing serious injury by careless or inconsiderate driving, and sets the maximum penalty for the offence on indictment at two years’ imprisonment.
Chris Philp
I have nothing further to add to my earlier answers. We keep these matters under continual review. There are no plans to make changes just at the moment, but we do of course keep an eye on these matters.
Chris Philp
I am afraid that I have no specific information on that, other than to say that we keep an eye on these matters on an ongoing basis.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 64 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 65
Causing serious injury by careless, or inconsiderate, driving
Chris Philp
This clause has a very similar intention to the previous clause, in that it introduces a new section 2C offence into the Road Traffic Act 1988 to fill a lacuna in the existing legislation. It does that by introducing a new offence of causing serious injury by careless or inconsiderate driving. There is currently no offence that covers this, so we are filling a gap that exists in the current legislation.
The new offence created by the clause is committed if a person causes serious injury by driving a car or another mechanically propelled vehicle on a road or public place without due care and attention or without reasonable consideration for other road users and, while doing so, causes serious injury.
The maximum custodial penalty for the offence on indictment will be two years’ imprisonment or a fine. The maximum custodial penalty on summary conviction will be 12 months or a fine. Until such time as section 224 of the sentencing code is commenced, the maximum penalty on summary conviction in England and Wales will be read as six months.
This is an important clause, which fills a gap in the current law and ensures that, where serious injury is caused by someone who is driving carelessly or inconsiderately, there will be an offence that can be prosecuted with an appropriate penalty—in this case, a maximum of two years if tried on indictment. I hope the Committee will agree that this is a sensible measure and will support the clause.
Alex Cunningham
As I prematurely said some minutes ago, we fully support the proposals in clause 65, which introduces the new offence of causing serious injury by careless or inconsiderate driving and sets the maximum penalty for the offence on indictment, as the Minister said, at two years’ imprisonment.
The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 and the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 made provision for new offences for dangerous and disqualified driving, but left the gap the Minister referred to in the law, relating to careless driving that results in serious injury. As I said before, we welcome the sensible proposal in clause 65, which fills that gap and will allow for a penalty that recognises the high level of harm caused by these incidents. As a result, the Opposition support clause 66 and schedule 7, which make minor consequential amendments as a result of clauses 64 and 65.
The Minister will hear me ask about the impact that many of the measures in the Bill will have on the prison system. I will start here. The Opposition would welcome further information from him about the impact on the prison system. I note that the impact assessment estimates that the changes to road traffic offences will result in about 1,300 offenders per annum receiving longer sentences. How does he see foresee that affecting prison numbers as a whole in the coming years? Can he say anything further about what sentence increases for those 1,300 offenders the Government are basing their modelling on? I raise that because the impact assessment estimates that the combined impact of the Bill’s sentencing provisions for adults will result in
Victoria Atkins
Clauses 69 to 74 and schedules 8 and 9 update the law in relation to the production and surrender of driving licences, so as to streamline the processes for the electronic endorsement of driving licences by removing the need for the physical licence to be produced. They also strengthen the rules for the surrender of driving licences where a driver faces disqualification.
The current legal requirement to produce and surrender the driving licence as part of the endorsement process is now outdated. In 2015, the paper driving licence counterpart, which previously recorded the endorsement, was abolished, and the information is now only recorded on Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency electronic drivers’ records. There is therefore no need for a physical driving licence to be produced and surrendered, or for an endorsement to be recorded on an individual’s driving record. The only need for a licence to be produced or surrendered is when the driver may be sentenced to disqualification or is actually disqualified. The clauses and schedules bring the law up to date, removing any need for individuals to deliver or post their licence before a hearing, and leaving only a duty to take their licence to court if there is a hearing and if they attend.
Clause 70 provides the Secretary of State—in practice, the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency—with the power to require the surrender of a driving licence to the agency where a court has ordered disqualification. Failure to do so would be a summary offence, carrying a maximum penalty of a level 3 fine—currently £1,000. Where an individual is disqualified, the court will notify the DVLA and forward the licence to it when it has been surrendered at court. When it has not been surrendered at court, the DVLA will follow up production of the licence with the disqualified driver using the new power.
The clauses also remove the need for the production and surrender of the driving licence and allow police constables and vehicle examiners to issue a fixed penalty notice without checking and retaining a physical driving licence.
Clause 75 is included at the request of the Scottish Government. Its objective is to make better use of police and judicial resources in Scotland. Currently, the police throughout Great Britain have the power to issue a conditional offer of a fixed penalty notice under sections 75 to 77A of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. The scheme was introduced in 1989 as an alternative to prosecution for certain low-level road traffic offences. Once a conditional offer of a fixed penalty is issued, an individual has 28 days to accept the offer and make payment. In Scotland, if the offer is not accepted or the recipient fails to take any action, the police will submit a standard prosecution report to the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service for consideration of whether a prosecution should take place.
Clause 75 grants the power to issue fixed penalty notices on the spot in Scotland for minor road traffic offences. That power is already available in England and Wales. In contrast to the position with conditional offers of fixed penalty notices, when the recipient of a fixed penalty notice fails to respond it simply becomes a registered fine at one and a half times the original penalty. That approach is attractive to the Scottish Government as a means of reducing the burden on the police, prosecutors and courts while preserving the recipient’s right to challenge a fixed penalty notice, should they wish to do so.
The clause will apply in the first instance to the police, but the Scottish Government want to be able to consider its potential extension to traffic wardens and vehicle examiners at their own pace and following further consideration.
I commend the clauses and schedules to the Committee.
Alex Cunningham
The Opposition also support the remaining clauses in part 5. They are sensible, helpful and well evidenced, and we are glad to offer our support for them. Currently, when a fixed penalty notice has been issued, a driver must surrender their licence to the relevant authority, but since the paper counterpart licence was abolished in 2015, there is no need for a driving licence to be produced for an endorsement to be recorded against a driver’s driving record.
Clauses 69 to 74 will finally remove the redundant requirement for a physical driving licence to be produced when a fixed penalty notice has been issued and they will also strengthen the rules for the surrender of driving licences when a driver faces disqualification.
Clause 69 will amend section 27(1) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 to provide that courts are no longer required to oblige licence production. Instead, the courts will be provided with powers that they may exercise at their discretion. This power will apply both where the court proposes to disqualify and where it disqualifies a licence.
Clauses 70 and 71 make further amendments to the 1988 Act, the effect of which, when taken together with clause 69, is to remove the need to produce a driving licence from the fixed penalty process. This streamlining is welcome and hopefully will in some small way reduce the administrative burden on our under-resourced and overstretched courts system, as it will no longer need to handle the physical licence where a driver faces endorsement, but not disqualification.
In recent years, attempts have been made to update the law in this area through private Members’ Bills, which have had Government support. The attempt made by the hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole (Michael Tomlinson) fell after its Committee stage because of the 2017 general election. The attempt made in the 2017-to-2019 Session by the right hon. Member for Dumfries and Galloway (Mr Jack) did not even manage to progress past its First Reading. I am glad that the Government are at last introducing the measure in a Government Bill in Government time.
We are also content with clause 75, which extends the police power that the police in England and Wales currently have to issue on-the-spot fines for certain moving traffic offences to police in Scotland. I am aware of the Department for Transport’s joint consultation with the Scottish Government on this topic from 2018. Doesn’t it take a long time for things to happen in law? The majority of the responses to the consultation supported the proposed changes and seemed to indicate the need for fixed penalty notice reform in Scotland for suspected road traffic offences, which the Government are sensibly introducing here.
Allan Dorans
I wish to confirm that the Scottish Government welcome the clauses that affect Scotland.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 69 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 70 to 73 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 8 agreed to.
Clause 74 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 9 agreed to.
Clause 75 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Tom Pursglove.)
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill (Ninth sitting)
Alex Cunningham ExcerptsTuesday 8th June 2021
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 View all Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 8 June 2021 - (8 Jun 2021)
Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)
Clauses 54 to 60 make up one of the most controversial parts of the Bill. We have seen fierce debates in Parliament and in the media, and protests up and down the country. Beneath the hyped-up culture wars is the very real issue that we will debate again today: what is the balance between our democratic right to protest and the rights of those around us? That is a legitimate question for the Government to ask.
How do we ensure that protests are peaceful? How do we balance the rights of others to go about their daily business? How do we, as parliamentarians, set the framework within which the police can do their jobs? The Opposition believe that the Government’s plans do not answer those questions and we reject the attempts to amend the Public Order Act 1986 with this loosely drafted legislation that would restrict democratic rights to peaceful protest.
Clause 54 imposes conditions on public processions, including powers for the Secretary of State to define serious disruption to the life of a community or the activities of an organisation carried out “in the vicinity” of a public procession, as well as powers for the police to impose conditions when they believe that noise might have
“a significant impact on persons in the vicinity”
or may result in
“serious disruption to the activities of an organisation”.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
We probably all have our favourite demonstration from our past. Mine was in the 1970s, when I was a student at Darlington College of Technology. It is lamentable that nowadays students do not spend more time on the streets demonstrating. I remember that day well, because we were going down the streets, shouting, “Heath out! Heath out!” That was the day that Heath resigned. We were very pleased with ourselves—a tremendous result from that demonstration. Does my hon. Friend agree that these restrictions could mean that students will feel even more inhibited about demonstrating in future?
Bambos Charalambous
My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. I remember going on the “grants not loans” demonstrations in the late ’80s. He clearly had incredible persuasion in the demonstration he went on, resulting in the desired outcome, and I congratulate him on bringing about that change.
Bambos Charalambous
My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. These are operational matters for the police. The police currently have the powers, and they have to be mindful of the impact of their powers on a demonstration and whether they will inflame the situation. Good policing will err on the side of caution on some occasions, but sometimes the police need to deal with a situation that they think will get out of hand. Trying to legislate for what is in the discretion of police officers is wrong, and we should actually trust the police in using their powers of discretion.
The clauses would also widen the types of conditions that the police could place on static protests. The clauses would significantly lower the legal test that must be met for the police to issue conditions on protests. The police would be able to issue conditions on protests where they are noisy enough to cause “intimidation or harassment” or
“serious unease, alarm or distress”
to bystanders. Before using their amended section 12 powers to issue conditions on a protest, the police would have to consider the “likely number of persons” affected by the protest, the “likely duration” of the impact, and the “likely intensity” of the impact. The clauses would also widen the types of conditions that police can issue on static protests to match their powers relating to protest marches. The police would also be able to issue any condition on static protests that they think is necessary
“to prevent…disorder, damage, disruption, impact or intimidation”.
Alex Cunningham
Has my hon. Friend had a chance to see the written evidence submitted by Zoe Everett? She describes herself as
“a member and supporter of ACORN for several years.”
In her written evidence, she said:
“Any peaceful assembly of members of the public, be they large-scale political demonstrations and marches, one-person protests, or local campaign actions by community organisations, are likely to be considered disruptive by those who are the intended object of the protest, be they state actors, private businesses and other organisations, or private individuals.”
The point that she makes in her submission is that these increased powers could drive more and more people directly into the criminal justice system. Does my hon. Friend agree that it would be lamentable if people who simply want to protest about something very close to their heart could find themselves criminalised as a result of this new legislation?
Bambos Charalambous
Again, my hon. Friend makes an excellent point. The people who want to impose these conditions are the very people who the protesters are trying to change; they do not like that, which is why they want to impose these conditions upon them. It is a suppression of people’s rights.
Bambos Charalambous
Again, I cannot comment on that individual protest, but the issue of climate change is a very important one; it affects us all, irrespective of where we live. The issue of a third runway may have also been about a wider issue that would have affected everybody, irrespective of where they live. As I say, I cannot comment on that individual protest, but we have to appreciate that certain protests have a wider significance than just the locality where they happen.
Alex Cunningham
The right hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby makes a really interesting point, because people were demonstrating in his constituency and it came to the notice of the local MP, so he has been directly influenced because of the demonstration that took place in his constituency, and he is the decision maker in relation to this particular issue.
Bambos Charalambous
Again, my hon. Friend makes an excellent point, and that demonstration is now going to be in the parliamentary record, so I think the person making the demonstration will have achieved her objective.
Bambos Charalambous
My hon. Friend makes an excellent point, which I will come to later. The Bill includes many ambiguous clauses that will no doubt cause lots of legal argument in the effort to define what they mean. That puts the police in an impossible situation.
A good starting point for this debate are the Peelian principles expressed by Sir Robert Peel when he set out ethical policing in the early 19th century:
“To recognise always that the power of the police to fulfil their functions and duties is dependent on public approval of their existence, actions and behaviour and on their ability to secure and maintain public respect. To recognise always that to secure and maintain the respect and approval of the public means also the securing of the willing co-operation of the public in the task of securing observance of laws. To recognise always that the extent to which the co-operation of the public can be secured diminishes proportionately the necessity of the use of physical force and compulsion for achieving police objectives.”
Alex Cunningham
I do not know what my hon. Friend’s postbag or email account has been like over recent weeks, but I have been inundated by emails from individuals and organisations asking me to oppose these measures proposed by the Government. Not one person or organisation has contacted me in favour of these measures. He talked of the importance of the police having the approval of the public for what they are doing, but the public do not want this change. Surely the Government do not have the approval of the people for this piece of legislation.
Bambos Charalambous
My hon. Friend makes a good point: policing is done primarily by consent. If the consent is not there and the police do not have the approval of the people, it is a recipe for more disorder. That tips the balance—
Bambos Charalambous
Again, my hon. Friend makes an excellent point. Good policing is done with discretion. What the Bill tries to do is to look at different ways of making the police do certain things that they may not want to do. I think that discretion is a great tool that the police have at their disposal, and they use it very well in what are often very difficult situations.
The Peelian principles are also:
“To seek and preserve public favour, not by pandering to public opinion, but by constantly demonstrating absolutely impartial service to law, in complete independence of policy, and without regard to the justice or injustice of the substance of individual laws, by ready offering of individual service and friendship to all members of the public without regard to their wealth or social standing, by ready exercise of courtesy and friendly good humour, and by ready offering of individual sacrifice in protecting and preserving life. To use physical force only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient to obtain public co-operation to an extent necessary to secure observance of law or to restore order, and to use only the minimum degree of physical force which is necessary on any particular occasion for achieving a police objective. To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police, the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence. To recognise always the need for strict adherence to police-executive functions, and to refrain from even seeming to usurp the powers of the judiciary of avenging individuals or the State, and of authoritatively judging guilt and punishing the guilty. To recognise always that the test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, and not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them.”
Every word of the Peelian principles holds true today.
It is our belief that the powers in this Bill threaten the fundamental balance between the police and the people. The most draconian clauses are not actually what the police asked for. We believe that these new broad and vague powers will impede the ability of the police rather than helping them to do their job, that these clauses put way too much power into the hands of the Home Secretary and that the powers threaten our fundamental right to peaceful protest. We know that hundreds of thousands of people are very concerned that their democratic right to protest is threatened by these new provisions on public order.
Alex Cunningham
Has my hon. Friend seen the written evidence submitted by Leeds for Europe? It addresses some of the points that he has just outlined. It says:
“The proposals risk making protests ineffective and…curtail fundamental rights of citizens in a democracy, which allow people to express their concerns about the government of the day or other issues that they feel passionately about.”
I am sure that my hon. Friend agrees that for the Home Secretary to have these new extensive powers proves that this objection is well founded.
Bambos Charalambous
Again, my hon. Friend makes an excellent point. This measure puts more power in the hands of the Home Secretary. The Home Secretary may have different views in the future and use the powers in an authoritarian way, which may have a further impact on people’s rights.
Bambos Charalambous
That is one way to protest, but elections only come every three or four years. In the intervening period, people have no way to exercise their right to protest via the ballot box and so have other means. The ballot box is also a vote on a whole range of things, while a protest might be for an individual issue not covered by an election.
A few weeks ago, we debated a petition signed by more than 250,000 people. The right to protest is a fundamental freedom and a hard-won democratic tradition that we are deeply proud of. Throughout our history, protests have led to significant changes for the better in this country. Suffragette protests put an end to the discrimination against women in our democracy. Historic trade union protests led to outlawing exploitative employment practices in factories, lifting health and safety standards for workers. Such protests have forced Governments to make the significant changes that we now recognise as fundamental parts of a civilised society.
If the public order provisions in the Bill had been in place when the suffragettes marched for the right to vote, would the women who shouted and screamed noisily for their future have been arrested? Does the Minister think that the marchers for the right to work or those on the anti-apartheid protests should have been stopped for causing annoyance or being too noisy? Do the Government want to stop the children who are shouting loudly for action on climate change or to prevent people across the country from marching to remind people in the establishment that black lives matter?
I support the police 100%; we in the Opposition listen every day to what they tell us. This is a most serious issue, but it is not quite as cut and dried as the Government would have us believe. Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services reported on public order measures in its inspection report, “Getting the balance right?” On public order legislation, the inspectorate called for
“a modest reset of the scales”.
By any measure, this is not a modest reset.
The support for new powers on public order was qualified support for the five Government proposals the inspectorate was asked to respond to. What Matt Parr’s report actually said was that the vast majority of police forces were happy with the existing legislation. It was mainly the Met that wanted new powers to deal with very specific events—mainly large-scale, peaceful, Extinction Rebellion protests. What the police have asked for, they have not been given.
In the evidence session, Matt Parr said:
“We were very clear in what we said that any reset should be modest. We also said that, because of article 10 and article 11 rights, some degree of disruption is not just an inevitable by-product, it is sometimes the whole point of the exercise of protest, and on that basis, it has to be encouraged.”
He went on to say that the proposal—these clauses—
“clearly aims to set a lower bar. Personally, when I reviewed it, I did not think the bar was necessarily the problem. There is just as much of a problem with educating and training the police officers and making sure they understand how article 10 and 11 rights can be properly tempered. It was a question of training and understanding as much as it was of where the bar was for disruption.”––[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 18 May 2021; c. 52-53, Q77.]
Alex Cunningham
I know this makes me a very old person, but I go back to the 1970s again and police and the exercise of their powers. I was a reporter at a sister paper of The Northern Echo, which had a strike that lasted for some 12 months. Eventually, the company managed to start producing a paper. We demonstrated outside every night and attempted to stop them getting the paper out of the building. It was very successful. The police were using existing powers to arrest many people, but there were very few, if any, convictions. Does my hon. Friend share my concern that the new powers here, which we do not really know how the police are going to interpret, could lead to more people being arrested and ending up in the criminal justice system?
Bambos Charalambous
My hon. Friend again makes a very good point. The Government clearly have a desire to imprison more people, because they are embarking on a prison-building programme—I do not know whether that is part of the reason why they are introducing these powers. Good policing is using discretion, dealing with each occasion as it arises and policing in a sensitive way. Arresting people should be a last resort, albeit one that the police should use when appropriate.
To quote Matt Parr further:
“I think there are dangers and, as ever, the bar for measuring what was significant or what was serious should be a high one. We all recognise that. It should not be done on the flimsiest of pretexts. Again, it would then be open to challenge, and I think police officers would only wish to use it when they were confident.”—(Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 18 May 2021; c. 53, Q77.]
Matt Parr made some important points that should serve as a reminder to Ministers of the problems with clauses 54 to 60. He did not want a lower threshold; he wanted more training for police officers so that they can better understand how articles 10 and 11 might be adhered to. However, the clauses widen the legislation significantly. Does that not make the job of the police in enforcing the legislation more complex?
Lochlinn Parker, the head of civil liberties at ITN Solicitors, said:
“It is going to be down to police officers to try and determine a highly nebulous idea: what is annoying? Everybody is annoyed when a protest takes over the street, but lowering that [threshold] significantly is creating a situation where, if minded to, there will be very little protest that would be lawfully allowed.”
He continued:
“Police will be asked, as they frequently are by the government and the press, why wasn’t more done to stop this protest which caused disruption and problems”.
He also said:
“The political pressure on the police, and potentially their own inclinations in terms of keeping control and order, is going to come to the fore.”
Bob Broadhurst was gold command for the policing of the 2009 G20 protests and now lectures at the London Policing College. Apparently, he choked on his coffee when reading the explanatory notes for the Bill. He said:
“They’re saying protestors are now using new tactics—they’re locking themselves in, they’re gluing themselves down, they’re blocking roads. They were doing that 30 years ago.”
He went on to say:
“None of these tactics are new.”
Clifford Stott, a professor of social psychology at Keele University and expert in protest and police behaviour, argues that, although he vehemently disagrees with the proposals,
“under the Human Rights Act, the police will not be able to enforce any elements of the legislation which interfere with Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights—freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association.”
Bambos Charalambous
I acknowledge the huge contribution that the suffragists made, but the suffragettes brought the campaign to prominence. The words displayed by the statue of Millicent Fawcett in Parliament Square are the words that she delivered in a speech about Emily Davison, who threw herself under the King’s horse in 1913, which was another act of protest.
Let me conclude what I was saying about the comments of Clifford Stott, professor of social psychology at Keele University. Professor Stott said:
“If then subsequently this government or a subsequent government scraps the Human Rights Act, then those protections”—
that is articles 10 and 11—
“would no longer exist, and the government and police could interfere with those protected rights.”
Furthermore, Matt Parr was clear in his recommendations. They are about training and resources, which he asked the Government to ensure were in place for policing.
Alex Cunningham
I want to quote again the evidence of Leeds for Europe because there is a real reputational issue here for our country and our Government:
“Such draconian laws seem to align E&W to regimes such as those in Turkey, Hungary and Belarus, rather than those that we were aligned with when part of the EU. The police will have scope to expand their powers against the citizens and to use more active intervention, which might result in more draconian measures… There is a significant risk that the police would be regarded as a hostile agency and individuals seen as enemies of the state rather than people with genuine concerns and causes that they want to promote.”
Surely my hon. Friend agrees that we do not want to be seen as a country that oppresses its people in such a way.
Bambos Charalambous
I thank my hon. Friend for his comments. Absolutely, we do not want to be a country that is seen to be oppressing its people. Those rights to protest are at first lost gradually, then quickly, so the transition from what is seen to be a democracy to authoritarian state happens very quickly and we need to be wary of that. We cannot go down that path.
Bambos Charalambous
Again, my hon. Friend makes an excellent point. We cannot be seen to be criticising other Governments for the way they suppress the right to protest when we are doing the same here. That weakens our global standing and we should not go down that path.
The College of Policing has authorised professional practice, or APP, that contains 30 tactical options to deal with public disorder and protest. It is out of date. It does not include recent relevant case law or information on certain new and emerging tactical options. The college is planning a review. The inspectorate states:
“By 30 June 2022, the College of Policing, through its planned review, should bring the public order authorised professional practice (APP) up to date and make arrangements to keep it current, with more regular revisions as they become necessary. It would also be beneficial to consolidate the APP, protest operational advice and aide memoire into a single source (or a linked series of documents).”
The inspectorate notes:
“We found that forces do not do enough to share legal opinion or case law on protest policing. And officers and staff rarely use Knowledge Hub’s ‘Specialist Operational Support—Public Order Public Safety’ group… By 31 December 2021, chief constables should make sure that their legal services teams subscribe to the College of Policing Knowledge Hub’s Association of Police Lawyers group.
By 31 December 2021, the College of Policing should ensure that all Public Order Public Safety commander and adviser students attending its licensed training are enrolled in the College of Policing Knowledge Hub’s Specialist Operational Support—Public Order Public Safety group, before they leave the training event…
In making decisions about how to respond to a protest, public order commanders need to consider domestic human rights legislation. And they must also consider a patchwork of European case law. These have established precedents on issues such as how long protests can reasonably go on for, and the level of disruption that protests can reasonably cause.”
The inspectorate stated:
“Examining the gold strategies and silver plans submitted as part of our document review, we found that commanders generally showed a grasp of human rights legislation. However, we did not see evidence that they consistently considered the wider legal picture.”
The inspectorate also recommended:
“By 30 June 2022, the National Police Chiefs’ Council, working with the College of Policing, should provide additional support to gold commanders to improve the quality of gold strategies for protest policing. This support should include the creation and operation of a quality assurance process; and/or the provision of more focused continuous professional development. The additional support should ensure that gold commanders for protest operations include an appropriate level of detail within their gold strategies. This may include the levels of disruption or disorder above which enforcement action will be considered…
By 30 June 2022, the National Police Coordination Centre should revise the national post-event learning review form so that it contains a section to report on the policing operation’s impact on the community…
Forces usually have good protest-related briefing processes and commanders’ decisions generally reach the front line effectively. However, gold strategies often do not set out the limits of acceptable behaviour from the protesters. Better explanations of these limits would help officers to understand what is expected of them and empower them to take appropriate action.
Non-specialist officers receive limited training in protest policing. As a result, they often lack confidence in using police powers. Some officers are anxious about attracting complaints and being filmed in protest situations. It is important that forces provide good-quality training and briefing before deploying officers into these situations.
Forces should make better use of community impact assessments to evaluate the impact of protests on those who live in, work in or visit an area. The process should include regular reviews and updates, so the police can respond to changing circumstances. Only seven of the ten forces we inspected submitted any community impact assessments for examination, and some of those we examined were of a poor standard”.
With the covid legislation, we have seen the difficulty that rushing through new police powers can bring for the police. They have managed to do a brilliant job of enforcing the new laws, but they have faced a number of difficult decisions owing to the loose drafting of the law, and they have received criticism where they have got it wrong. The new protest powers will force the police to make political decisions about which protests they deem unlawful. That is extremely concerning and will put the police and the public in a difficult position.
Why do the Government want to make the police the gatekeepers for public protests? The Government are choosing to ignore the many peaceful protests that go ahead and are attended by police. The public order measures in the Bill risk putting the police in a trying position more often, and they risk creating more disorder and disruption. The Government should be putting the police in a position whereby the rules are not too confusing or too broad. If they do not do so, that will only create more flashpoints.
It is clear that police support for the Bill is not what the Government are saying it is. The Metropolitan police want more clarity on ways to manage very disruptive protests that go on and on, and to make sure that emergency services can get through roads. That is understandable, but the police want more clarity and certainty, which is what they said in the evidence sessions. These provisions bring the opposite. Instead of a modest reset, we have in front of us clauses that significantly widen police powers on public order.
Clauses 54 to 60 mark a substantial change in the approach to policing protest, which has the potential to be applied disproportionately and could curtail article 10 and article 11 rights that the inspectorate of constabulary is keen to protect. The police already have the powers to break up protests that cause harm, serious public disorder, serious damage to property or serious disruption to the life of a community. Many of the country’s best lawyers are telling us that the Public Order Act 1986 and the many other powers on the statute book to police protests are enough.
Alex Cunningham
One of the things that troubles me most about the Bill is the stuff in relation to this place—this Parliament of ours, and this democracy—and the fact that people could be prevented from protesting on our doorstep and disrupting our lives. People should have a right to disrupt the lives of MPs and those who work in this place, in order to get their point across. Does my hon. Friend agree that, for all the things that the Government want to do with the Bill, one thing they should not deny the people is the right to protest at the seat of our democracy?
Bambos Charalambous
Again, my hon. Friend makes an excellent point. We are the decision makers in this Parliament. We are the ones who make decisions that impact on people’s lives, so if we do not hear and are not aware of the protests, how will that change be brought about?
Bambos Charalambous
My understanding is that the clauses will not affect people’s right to picket, but will the Minister provide reassurance that people’s right to picket or attend demonstrations will not be affected? There is also a penalty for someone who breaches a police-imposed condition on a protest when they ought to have known the condition existed. If someone attends a protest and the police have placed conditions on the number of people allowed to attend, how will the attendee know whether they are the 101st person to join a demonstration that has a limit of 100?
Alex Cunningham
I want to take my hon. Friend back to the issue of noise. Paragraph 546 of the explanatory notes to the Bill states:
“Where a senior police officer reasonably believes, having had regard to various factors, that the noise generated by a one-person protest may have a relevant impact on persons in its vicinity or may result in serious disruption to the activities of an organisation which are carried on in the vicinity of the one-person protest, the senior police officer may give directions imposing on the person organising or carrying on the protest such conditions as appear to them necessary to prevent such disruption or impact.”
The Government give us that explanation, but they still do not define what a disruptive noise is. It would be helpful if the Minister told us.
Bambos Charalambous
My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. It would be helpful if we had an idea of the definition of “disruptive noise”. If we are to pass the Bill, we should know what we are passing.
There have been problems when the police have not satisfactorily communicated conditions to protesters. Will the Minister provide the Committee with evidence to justify the proposed widening of criminal responsibility in clause 56? The HMICFRS report talked about a slight shift in the legal test on that, but what the Government propose goes way too far. Sir Peter Fahy, former chief constable of Greater Manchester police, said that the legislation includes “some really dodgy definitions” that the police are supposed to make sense of. The point of protest is to capture people’s and the Government’s attention. Sometimes protests are noisy and sometimes annoying, but they are as fundamental to our democracy as Parliament is and as the courts are.
On 6 October last year, I had the pleasure of witnessing an impressive and effective protest outside Parliament, which was organised by the Let Music Live campaign to highlight the plight of freelance musicians who received very little support from the Government during the coronavirus pandemic. The protest involved 400 socially-distanced musicians, all dressed in black, playing 90 seconds, or 20%, of Gustav Holst’s “Mars”. Not only was the demonstration eye-catching, but it used the sound and the loudness of Holst’s piece to convey the message.
The demonstration consisted of 90 seconds of sound building until it came to an abrupt stop. Would such a protest fall foul of clause 54? I fear it might, but who would be qualified to assess whether a 90-second blast of Holst’s “Mars” constituted noise that might have a “significant” or “relevant” impact on “persons in the vicinity”? The phraseology is so vague and devoid of precise meaning that it will be a legal nightmare for the police to determine what the terms “significant”, “relevant” and “impact” mean for the purposes of the Bill.
Bambos Charalambous
My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. This is going to be subjective. What one person considers noise might not be the same for another person. There may be a different view from different officers in the same force, which will lead to confusion.
Alex Cunningham
My hon. Friend makes an interesting point. There is the potential for the Bill to have unintended consequences. In my Stockton-on-Tees constituency, all the churches come together once a year in the parish gardens, although they have not been able to do that in recent times. They have loud music, guitars, drums and all manner of things going on. Backing on to the parish gardens is the Royal Oak pub. Under this legislation, people in the Royal Oak may think that the people demonstrating their faith in the parish gardens are a public nuisance and are getting on their nerves as they enjoy a pint, and they could complain to the police.
Bambos Charalambous
I do not know whether that would be captured by the legislation, but if it would be captured, that would be wrong. I mentioned the Let Music Live protest. Even if such a protest were deemed permissible, it would still cause many problems of interpretation for the police, who would have to use the Bill to define whether the protest had “significant” or “relevant impact.”
Aside from music, what about singing? Singing songs and chanting have been a feature of every protest or demonstration that I have ever been on. Would singing be captured by the clause? The hymn “We Shall Overcome” was adopted as an anthem and sung as a protest song. In 1963, the folk singer Joan Baez led 300,000 protestors in song as they sang “We Shall Overcome” at the Lincoln Memorial as part of the civil rights movement march on Washington. Some 300,000 people singing “We Shall Overcome” must have made a fair bit of noise. Imagine a crowd of 300,000 outside the Houses of Parliament singing “We Shall Overcome.” Who would determine whether that constituted noise having a “significant” or “relevant” impact on “persons in the vicinity”?
Sarah Champion
It is very obvious that this is a contentious topic, and the one that has gained the most media attention for this Bill. I am very grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate for making a very persuasive case. I must challenge my friend the hon. Member for Ashfield because I think his criticism was unjust, but it does highlight that what one person thinks is nonsense can be a very passionate thing for another, and we all deserve the right to protest.
I would like to start by making the argument, again, that the police already have wide powers to impose conditions on both static assemblies and marches, as well as broad discretion in how those powers are applied. Let me quote from the Liberty briefing:
“The cumulative effect of these measures—which target the tools that make protest rights meaningful – constitute an attack on a fundamental building block of our democracy.”
Liberty say that the clauses are fundamental block on our democracy. They say that these are draconian measures that impose disproportionate controls on free expression and the right to protest; measures that will have an unfair impact on black, Asian and ethnic minority people.
It is unfortunate that the amendments tabled by Labour have not been selected. I would like to state that Labour is very supportive of the measures that allow access for emergency services, but overall I personally think that the clauses go far too far, and I support my honourable colleagues in wanting to vote against this clause. It should not be in this Bill.
I am interested to hear from the Minister whether she agrees with the witnesses we heard from that the police already have sufficient powers to deal with protests. In the evidence session, Matt Parr said,
“there is quite a stark difference between London, which obviously gets a disproportionately large number of protests, and elsewhere.”
He said that senior police officers outside London
“tended to think they had sufficient powers”—[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 18 May 2021; c. 53, Q77.]
Again, I would be very interested to hear from the Minister if she thinks that these measures are actually London-centric, and not needed in places like Rotherham—I see the Minister grimace, and I share that—or if they are needed across the country. Furthermore, how will she make sure that police forces across the country handle them at the same level, and will there be training and support to enable them to understand exactly where to apply them?
I ask that because in Rotherham, after the scale of the child abuse in the town became known, the far right would come and basically put the town into lockdown every month. It was incredibly intimidating. It stopped businesses being able to trade and basically drove people off the streets and out of the town centre because they were too scared to go in. We then had a change in the police officer in control of the protests. He swiftly applied different measures on the route they could take—they could not meet in the centre of town—the level of planning and the level of security that the protestors had to put in place, and quickly the protests started to diminish to the point at which they stopped. It was clear to me at that point that the police do have the powers; it is about whether they know about them and have the ability and indeed the resources to enforce them.
Rotherham has a long and proud but also bloody history of protest. I think in particular of the battle of Orgreave, which was a pivotal event in the UK miners’ strike and has been described as a brutal example of legalised state violence. That was just one event of many in the mid-1980s that led to the Public Order Act 1986. Why has it taken from 1986 until now for Ministers to feel that we need new legislation? I also raise that because the brutal way in which the police dealt with those protestors has led to mistrust and suspicion towards our police forces and I really do not want to see this legislation, if it goes forward, building on that level of mistrust not just in Rotherham but across the country, because once trust is lost it is almost impossible to bring it back.
I turn to some of the key organisations that submitted written evidence or were witnesses and spoke against these measures. Liberty has said that
“the Bill drastically limits the right to protest.”
The Good Law Project said:
“The provisions threaten to neuter protests in ways that would render them ineffective—effectively taking away one of the only ways in which people can express their dissatisfaction in a democratic society.”
It went on to say:
“The Bill renders the UK an outlier when it comes to international human rights norms around the right to peaceful assembly.”
I find it really disturbing—not least as Chair of the International Development Committee—that we are stepping away from our international obligations and doing so on the right to protest, which I know the Foreign Secretary is really keen to uphold internationally. The movement we see in the Bill is disturbing.
Rights of Women said:
“The Bill is a further dangerous extension to police powers that exemplifies the rolling back of our human rights and ignores a history of violence against women at the hands of the police.”
A petition entitled “Do not restrict our rights to peaceful protest” in response to the Bill has more than 250,000 signatures. Two hundred and forty-five organisations signed a letter co-ordinated by Liberty and Friends of the Earth to the Government on 15 March, which said that the Government’s proposals were cause for “profound concern”. The organisations highlighted “draconian…police powers” to restrict protest. Organisations who signed the letter include Amnesty International, Greenpeace, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, Unite, Rights of Women, Inquest and the Northern Police Monitoring Project.
The Bar Council said:
“There are clear tensions between this section and the freedom of protest and expression (both protected under the European Convention on Human Rights). It gives expansive powers to the police, which encompass the arrest of one individual who is independently protesting. There are legitimate concerns that it would allow the Government to prevent protests with which it does not agree.”
That is one of my biggest concerns. Let us look at former and current Government Ministers who are against the proposals.
Alex Cunningham
The written evidence from Leeds for Europe quotes Mr Justice Laws saying that a margin must be given to protests. He also said:
“Rights worth having are unruly things. Demonstrations and protests are liable to be a nuisance. They are liable to be inconvenient and tiresome, or at least perceived as such by others who are out of sympathy with them.”
However, under the new powers in the Bill, if the Home Secretary is out of sympathy with a particular protest or protest group, she could ban them from protesting. Surely that is an affront to our democracy.
Sarah Champion
It absolutely is. My hon. Friend lays a very startling future before us. It might not even get to the Home Secretary—it might be an individual police officer who makes the call, or a chief constable or a police and crime commissioner. That is what concerns me.
By their very nature, protests are designed to be annoying, to be loud, to raise their views. When we look back at our history, where would we be without protest? It is inconceivable. This country has a proud history of protest—however annoying, however much of a nuisance protests are. That is what moves us forward as a democracy. To lose that, or to have it chipped away, is a very disturbing position.
That view is echoed by former and current Government Ministers. On 7 September 2020, the Minister for Crime and Policing, the hon. Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse), affirmed:
“The right to peaceful protest is a fundamental tool of civic expression”
and promised that protest
“will never be curtailed by the Government.”—[Official Report, 7 September 2020; Vol. 679, c. 384.]
What has changed in the intervening nine months?
The former Attorney General, Dominic Grieve QC, said that
“no new laws were required if the police used the substantial powers they already have”.
On Second Reading, the right hon. Member for Maidenhead said:
“I do have some concerns about some of the aspects of the public order provisions in the Bill. I absolutely accept that the police have certain challenges...but freedom of speech is an important right in our democracy, however annoying or uncomfortable that might sometimes be…Protests have to be under the rule of law, but the law has to be proportionate.”—[Official Report, 15 March 2021; Vol. 691, c. 78.]
We would all agree that protests have to be under the rule of law, but I think we would disagree on the proportionality.
Also on Second Reading, the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) said:
“Is the Bill perfect? No, it is by no means perfect. I hope that it will be corrected as it goes through. Will that happen? Certainly. I accept that there are issues around freedom of speech and the right to assemble, and I think that these will be dealt with during the course of the debate.”—[Official Report, 15 March 2021; Vol. 691, c. 90.]
I hope that that is true.
Let us turn to the ambiguities in the proposed legislation. Evidence given by witnesses in the Joint Committee on Human Rights session on the proposed police powers showed that the terms
“serious unease, alarm and distress”
are not sufficiently clear for protesters to predict when conditions might be imposed on demonstrations. I reiterate the call from my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate: the Minister needs to set out exactly what serious unease, alarm and distress is, as well as what serious noise is. Jules Carey from Bindmans LLP said the terms are
“too vague in law to have any meaningful impact or sensible interpretation. They also create a threshold that is too low.”
The Good Law Project says of the clauses that,
“the cumulative effect is likely to be deeply damaging”
because of their ambiguity, and because the police
“will have considerable scope to test the limits of their own powers.”
The Bar Council said:
“The present drafting is also vague and will require interpretation by the senior courts before the precise meaning of the law becomes settled. We consider this to be undesirable in legislation which limits fundamental civic rights.”
The Good Law Project, the Bar Council and witnesses from evidence sessions for the Bill Committee and the Joint Committee on Human Rights say the wording is too vague for protesters to interpret. How will the Minister ensure protesters will not get arrested at peaceful protests due to their understanding of current legislation?
In our evidence sessions, Matt Parr, Her Majesty’s inspector of constabulary, said:
“We were very clear in what we said that any reset should be modest.”
We seem to have drifted a long way from modest—most organisations who have given evidence have argued that the changes in this part of the Bill are not modest. He continued:
“We also said that, because of article 10 and article 11 rights, some degree of disruption is not just an inevitable by-product, it is sometimes the whole point of the exercise of protest, and on that basis, it has to be encouraged.”––[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 18 May 2021; c. 52, Q77.]
Councillor Caliskan, from the Local Government Association, said:
“In my experience, from having spoken to council leaders from across the country, the best way that peaceful protest is facilitated is planning in advance. That means the community and organisers having a good relationship with the police, and local forces working closely with local authorities”.––[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 18 May 2021; c. 60, Q92.]
That is another concern—that these parts of the Bill will undermine the good working relationships and trust, and that will go on to make it even more difficult to organise peaceful protests.
Maria Eagle
I do agree with that point. One might then have an argument with the organisers about whether the nature of those protests is appropriate. I still do not think that it is a reason to remove people’s fundamental right to protest just because some protests are inconvenient, annoying and noisy.
Alex Cunningham
I do not think that the provisions were covered by the European convention on human rights. We have a proud history of demonstrations being effective in this country. May I refer my hon. Friend to the Tolpuddle martyrs? In the 1830s, seven men were arrested for secretly signing up to a trade union, and were eventually transported to Australia. Thousands of people took to the streets across the country, and marched through London demanding that that unlawful conviction be overturned. The seven men who were transported to Australia were eventually pardoned and brought home. Demonstrations bring about change, and we must not interfere with them.
Alex Cunningham
But the Minister will accept that the provisions in the Bill will criminalise more people who participate in protests.
Victoria Atkins
Again—forgive me; I am tackling this as if I were prosecuting. The hon. Gentleman is making several leaps of assumptions before he arrives at that destination. I will go through the clause in great detail and lead him through it so that he understands the checks and balances in the legislation. There is an extraordinary leap in his assertion, which I hope to answer in due course.
Peaceful protest is absolutely fundamental to a free society. The right to peaceful protest will not be, and will never be, in question by this Government. The measures in part 3 of the Bill will not suppress the right to protest. To refer again to the European convention on human rights, the Lord Chancellor—as any Secretary of State must—has signed a statement to the effect that, in his view, all the provisions in the Bill are compatible with the rights under the convention. The Bill is about updating the Public Order Act 1986, which is some 35 years old, by enabling the police to impose conditions in careful sets of circumstances as set out in the Bill, which we are scrutinising.
We all stand up and share the value of free speech and freedom of assembly. However, under articles 10 and 11 of the convention, those are not absolute rights, as the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood fairly agreed. There is a balancing act between the rights and freedoms of protestors and of those who are not joining in the protest. We know, sadly, that in recent years some of the tactics used in the course of protests have chipped away at that balance. For example, some protestors delayed an ambulance reaching an A&E ward, putting lives at risk. Some protestors disrupted the transport system during rush hour, delaying hundreds of hard-working people.
Interestingly—this is where we see the real tension between competing rights—some protestors have blockaded printing presses, thereby disrupting the freedom of the press, which I am sure we all acknowledge is a fundamental right. We have been talking about protests with which we may not agree, and I am sure we are all familiar with newspaper articles or depictions in the media with which we may not agree, but it is the right of the free media in our country to report in accordance with that freedom and independence. In fairness to the Opposition, I know that they agree with that, because in the wake of the blockade of printing presses last year, the Leader of the Opposition said:
“The tactics and action of Extinction Rebellion, particularly blockading newspapers, was just wrong in my view and counterproductive.”
As the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood eloquently described, there is this grey, messy area in which we try to address that balance of competing rights between protestors and people who are not joining in the protests but may be affected by them. We know, however, sadly, that not every protest is peaceful. I would like to take a moment to reflect on the danger in which police officers can find themselves when they are policing a protest that goes wrong.
In recent months, we have seen protests outside London. The hon. Member for Rotherham rightly challenged me about this being London-centric, and a smile came to my lips because I was thinking, “We can never assume that the sorts of protests we see in central London will not happen elsewhere in the country.” Indeed, the great city of Bristol has in recent months seen for itself, through the so-called “Kill the Bill” protests, which apparently aim to bring this piece of legislation to a halt, the impact that protest can have on police officers, who are trying to do their job in balancing the rights of protestors and safeguarding the social contract to which I have referred.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill (Tenth sitting)
Alex Cunningham ExcerptsTuesday 8th June 2021
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 View all Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 8 June 2021 - (8 Jun 2021)
Victoria Atkins
The custodial aspect has been increased from three months to six months in relation to organisers of public processions and assemblies who go on to breach conditions, as well as those who incite others to breach conditions. The sentence in relation to the fine is for those who breach conditions. They go in a different category from organisers and those who incite others to breach conditions.
I do not have any examples to hand immediately, but I imagine some will find themselves in my file in due course. We are looking at maximum sentences, but it is still for the independent judiciary to impose sentences in court on the facts of the case that they have before them. That is another safeguard and another check and balance within this legislation. It will be for the judiciary to impose individual sentences, but it is right that Parliament look at the maximum term.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
What evidence does the Minister have for the need for tougher sentences in this area? Are the judiciary saying that they are ill equipped to sentence people appropriately when they have been convicted of this type of activity?
Victoria Atkins
Again, I point to the disruption and to the tactics that have been developing over recent years, which have grown not just more disruptive but, in some cases, more distressing. There are examples of an ambulance being blocked from an A&E department and of commuters being prevented from getting on the train to go to work in the morning by people who had attempted to climb on to the train carriage. We are seeing more and more of these instances, so it is right that the maximum sentence is commensurate.
If protesters feel that such measures are disproportionate, they will presumably put that defence forward in court. It will be for the Crown to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and for their counsel to mitigate on their behalf. We are trying to show the seriousness with which we take these small instances, where the balance between the rights of protesters and the rights of the community that is not protesting is disproportionate within the checks and balances that we have already discussed in the course of this debate.
I turn now to the measures relating to noise. The provisions will broaden the range of circumstances in which the police may impose conditions on a public procession or a public assembly to include circumstances where noise may have a significant impact on those in the vicinity, or may result in serious disruption to the activities of an organisation. These circumstances will also apply to single-person protests.
The hon. Member for Rotherham asked whether the noise provision was London-centric, with the biggest protests happening in London. As I said earlier, one would not want to assume that some of the protests that we have seen on the news could not happen outside London, as with the “Kill the Bill” protests in Bristol. It is right that we have clarity and consistency in law across the country so that if a group of protesters behaved in the way people appear to have behaved in the Bristol protests—injuring many, many police officers who were just acting in the line of duty—one would expect the law to apply as clearly in Rotherham as in central London.
Victoria Atkins
The organiser in those circumstances would, of course, be liable to having a committed an offence only if they breached the order. Indeed, this is the important point. It is for the police to make that assessment. If the police have a conversation with an organiser and say, “We believe that using your very high-level amplification system in this residential street meets the criteria under subsection (3) such that we are going to impose a condition asking you to turn it down,” the organiser, or the person deemed to be the organiser, will have had that conversation with an officer, and I very much hope that they will abide by the condition. If they do not, that is where the offence comes in, and that is a choice for the organiser.
As is already the case with processions, those conversations will happen and it will be a matter for the organiser as to what course of action they choose to take. One hopes that they will take the advice and guidance of the police, adapt and therefore be able to continue with their protest in a way that meets the expectations of the local community or local businesses. I appreciate that the detail is incredibly technical, and I am trying to work through every set of factual circumstances. I understand absolutely why people want to work through those, but there are checks and balances that run throughout the Bill.
Alex Cunningham
First, does the Minister agree that we must therefore have specific training for the police? She has referred many times to senior officers making decisions, but senior officers might not be available in Stockton-on-Tees or Rotherham, and certainly not in the local village, when there is some form of demonstration. The local PC may well be the person who has to turn up and make some form of decision in this situation. Secondly, on the issue of noise itself, how can a police officer be fair and objective where there are different groups of people who will be suffering differently as a direct result of a demonstration? A bunch of teenagers standing on Whitehall might find the noise and the robustness of the conversation tremendously exciting, but the pensioners group that has gone for tea at the local café might be very distressed. How on earth does the police officer make a balanced decision in that sort of situation?
Victoria Atkins
Exactly right. The police will first have to satisfy themselves and the CPS that a charge should be brought, and from that all the usual safeguards and standards that we expect in the criminal justice system will apply. For example, the CPS will have to apply the code for Crown prosecutors in relation to the public interest and evidential tests. We will then have the mechanisms in the trial process—perhaps a submission at half-time by defence counsel if they feel the evidence is not there. There are many mechanisms that apply in criminal trials up and down the country every single day, and those mechanisms will be available for offences under the Bill as they are for any other criminal offence.
I have been asked for clarification of the terms: annoyance, alarm, distress and unease. Many of those terms are already used in the Public Order Act 1986 and in common law. They are well understood by the judiciary, and the Law Commission—this is particularly in reference to the public nuisance point, which we will come on to in a moment—recommends retaining the word “annoyance”, as it provides continuity with previous legal cases and is well understood in this context. We understand the concerns about this, but as I say, through the introduction of these words, we are trying to be consistent with the approach that has long applied in the Public Order Act.
It is necessary to apply the measure in relation to noise to single-person protests because they can, of course, create just as much noise through the use of amplification equipment as a large protest using such equipment. Again, the police will be able to impose conditions on a single-person protest for reasons relating only to noise, not for any other reason.
Forgive me: I have just been corrected regarding the briefing I received about the rank of the officer at the scene. It is the most senior officer at the scene, so there is no minimum rank, but it is anticipated in the use of the word that it will be an officer of great seniority. Any protest on which it may be necessary to impose conditions is likely to have an officer present of at least the rank of inspector.
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful to the Minister for clarifying that point, but it does mean that the local sergeant or PC in a village or a town centre is going to have to make decisions about these matters. My point was that surely, this means that there needs to be some very specific training on how police should react to demonstrations or other activities of that nature.
Victoria Atkins
I would give the police some credit. First, if it is a protest of any serious size, or the organisers have contacted the police or the other way around, this can and should be dealt with ahead of the protest. In the event of a protest taking people by surprise in a quieter area than a huge metropolis, the police will react as they are very used to reacting in circumstances that need them to be flexible and move quickly, and I am sure they will have people on the scene very quickly who can assist with this. We want to ensure that the expectation is that a senior officer, and certainly the most senior officer at the scene, will be the one imposing these conditions.
I now turn to the parts of the clauses that set out that the Home Secretary will have the power, through secondary legislation, to define the meaning of
“serious disruption to the life of the community”
and
“serious disruption to the activities of an organisation which are carried on in the vicinity of the procession”,
or assembly or single-person protest. Again, to clear up any misunderstandings, this is not about the Home Secretary of the day banning protests. Opposition Members have understandably called for clearer definitions wherever possible, which is what this delegated power is intended to achieve. Any definition created through this power will need to fall within what can reasonably be understood as “serious disruption”. The threshold will be clarified, not changed: such definitions will be used to clarify the threshold beyond which the police can impose conditions on protests, should they believe them necessary to avoid serious disruption. This is about putting the framework in place to help the police on the ground.
The regulations will be subject to the draft affirmative procedure, which means that they must be scrutinised, debated, and approved by both Houses before they can be made. It will, of course, be for the police in an individual case to apply that definition operationally. They can apply that definition only if the criteria in the Bill are met. This is not about the Home Secretary outlawing particular protests or individual demonstrations; it is about setting a framework for a definition, to help the police operation on the ground to understand the criteria in the Bill. To assist in scrutiny of the Bill, we aim to publish further details of the content of the regulation before consideration on Report.
The clauses relating to protest, public assemblies, marches, processions and demonstrations, as well as other terms that have been used to describe this, represent a modest updating of legislation that is more than 35 years old. They do not enable the police or, for that matter, the Home Secretary of the day to ban any protest. Interestingly, we will come to debates in Committee on new clause 43, which relates to interference with access to or the provision of abortion services. That provision does, in fact, seek to ban such protests, so, again, there is a balancing act, or the grey area that has been referred to in this very debate.
Alex Cunningham
I am interested in what the Minister has to say about new clause 43. Is she indicating Government support for the measures that we are trying to introduce?
Bambos Charalambous
One of the problems is that there is less local authority provision for Travellers to go to. That loss of provision, which is partly due to cuts to local government, has caused more problems, meaning that more people are on the road at any given time. However, this issue does not affect just the Traveller community, as the hon. Gentleman will see when I go on to make further points. It also impacts people such as ramblers, birdwatchers and others who want to stay out and sleep in their vehicles while enjoying countryside activities.
Alex Cunningham
My hon. Friend has made the point that there is a failure in our society to provide sufficient facilities for people from the travelling community, be they traditional Gypsies or people who choose to go on the road. Does he agree that the Government, rather than bringing in legislation such as this, should turn their attention to providing local authorities with the resources they need to provide facilities for travelling communities? Does he also agree that that should not be left just to some communities; communities across the country should take a share in providing such facilities so that Travellers can live with them cheek by jowl in a peaceful way?
Bambos Charalambous
My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. That was highlighted by the representative from the LGA in her evidence to the Committee.
As one of the respondents to the Petition Committee’s survey on the criminalisation of trespass put it:
“The criminalisation of trespass will simply exacerbate an already fraught relationship.”
Alex Cunningham
In Stockton, we have had facilities for travelling communities for many years. I am sure my hon. Friend will agree that this is about having proper facilities. Perhaps I can point him to the example of the Appleby horse fair, which attracts thousands of people every year. We see them travelling up, and they stay on the byways and all sorts of places along the way, but when they get to the site they are properly catered for. There is proper rubbish removal, proper facilities for animals, toilets and all manner of facilities, and they are put in place to provide for that particular need. Perhaps if other local authorities across the country took that approach, we would not have the problems that Government Members have described.
Bambos Charalambous
Again, my hon. Friend makes an excellent point. He is right: if more facilities were provided, that would help to solve the problem.
Bambos Charalambous
Civil remedies would still be available for people who engage in antisocial behaviour, fly-tipping and so on. All we would be doing is criminalising a particular group of people. In my view, the civil remedies would still be there and the cost to the council would still be there if proper facilities were not provided. To me, just criminalising a particular group of people is wrong.
To continue, the NPCC witness said:
“Really, our point fundamentally as the NPCC group is that the issue here is the lack of provision that theoretically should be made, which means that we have this percentage of Travellers who are on unlawful spaces and you end up in the situations that we end up with. Our view is that the current legislation is sufficient to deal with that issue.”––[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 18 May 2021; c. 15, Q20.]
We have to ask: why are the Government determined to lock up Gypsies and Travellers, even against the advice of their own police? As Martin Hewitt clearly stated, existing legislation on police powers and unauthorised encampments is enough to tackle the problem. The police already have extensive powers to move on unauthorised encampments in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, and as of January 2020, just 3% of Gypsy and Traveller caravans—694—in England were in unauthorised encampments. Of those, 419 were on sites not tolerated and 275 were on tolerated sites. The police and campaigners tell us the evidence is not there that the new powers are necessary and that many more authorised encampment sites should be provided instead.
Alex Cunningham
I sometimes wonder whether the power to discourage Travellers from moving in is in the hands of communities. Travellers move around the country for work—to pick up scrap, to do all manner of gardening work, such as taking down trees for people, and so on. I have had many an argument with people living in communities who say, “We don’t want Travellers here,” but they put out their fridge or their scrap metal for them, they let them cut down their trees. They provide them with work and an incentive to be in the area. So perhaps people have it in their own power. Travellers will not come if there is no incentive for them.
Bambos Charalambous
My hon. Friend makes an interesting point, which is worthy of further discussion.
I will run through a series of points the Minister for Crime and Policing made when responding to a Westminster Hall debate on this question. On concerns about the right to roam being threatened, he said the measures will not affect anyone who wants to enjoy the countryside for leisure purposes, but many organisations, such as the Ramblers Association and CPRE the Countryside Charity, are concerned that although the Government might not intend to capture others enjoying the countryside, they could still do so. The legislation is so open to interpretation that it could easily be applied to anyone with a vehicle. For example, how do the Government propose to ensure that the police distinguish between a modified Transit van or Volkswagen camper used at the weekends and one that is lived in? How will they distinguish between a family going on a caravan holiday and a Gypsy or Traveller family with an identical caravan before stopping them and seizing their property because the police suspect that they might stop somewhere they do not have permission to do so?
The Minister for Policing and Crime also said that there is a high threshold to be met before the new powers kick in, but only one vehicle need be involved, whereas section 61 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act requires six vehicles. The bar seems to have been significantly lowered in the Bill. The police currently have discretion to decide whether to use their powers under sections 61, 62 and 62A to 62E, in the latter cases where a suitable alternative pitch is available, but under the proposals in part 4 of the Bill, police will be dutybound to act when they are informed that a criminal offence has taken place.
The term “significant distress” is highly subjective. Given the high levels of prejudice and hatred towards Gypsy and Traveller communities, we are likely to see countless reports of criminal offences being committed, based on someone saying that they are significantly distressed by an encampment. Marc Willers QC, of Garden Court Chambers, said in the evidence sessions:
‘It seems to me that a lot of the language used is vague and uncertain. There is a reference to causing “significant distress” as one of the conditions that could lead to the criminalisation of an individual who refuses to leave a piece of land. That, in itself, brings inherent problems, because a private citizen could very easily invoke the power and leave a police officer with a fait accompli—in other words, they have no option but to arrest an individual who refuses to leave land in circumstances where the occupier says, “I am being caused significant distress by the very fact that this individual is parking on land that I occupy.”’
Alex Cunningham
I am never happier than when I am in my own caravan—always on an official site—travelling around the country and into Europe. I have seen tremendous growth in the number of people driving motor homes, and I see them parked up all over the country, on private land, public land and elsewhere. Those people are also going to get caught up in this particular legislation, are they not?
Bambos Charalambous
Again, my hon. Friend makes a very good point. We want to make sure that people are free to enjoy the beautiful countryside we are lucky to have in the UK without fear of being criminalised in such a way.
Marc Willers QC went on to say:
“That distress can be engendered or underpinned by the prejudice that Gypsies and Travellers face in our society today. It is a widespread and long-standing prejudice, dating back to the first time that Romani Gypsies came to these shores in the 1500s… There may well be unwarranted and unjustified concerns on the part of the occupier, which could lead to the criminalisation of an individual who has nowhere else to go.” —[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 18 May 2021; c. 72, Q104.]
Alex Cunningham
The Minister places a lot of stock in the word “significant”. To play devil’s advocate—perhaps against myself—she may be holding out a false promise to some of the communities we have heard described today. If a gang of Travellers turn up with 10 caravans, move on to someone’s land illegally—or it would be illegal under the Bill—take their rubbish away and do the work they want to do in the area, they will not be caught by the provision because they will not have caused “significant damage”. Communities across the country think that the Conservative Government are about to deliver all-encompassing, “we can move the Travellers on” legislation, but it is simply not the case.
Victoria Atkins
In that scenario, the hon. Gentleman is right, in that we are addressing the behaviour that is set out in proposed new section 60C(4). In the event of a travelling community behaving as he describes, all the existing civil measures that a landowner can rely upon are there to move them on. We are trying to deal with behaviour that causes significant damage, distress and disruption where encampments are unauthorised. We are balancing things carefully because we want to address the serious scenarios that my hon. Friends have described in their constituencies.
As we have touched on in other contexts, the word “significant” is widely used in legislation, for example in section 14A of the Public Order Act 1986 on “Prohibiting trespassory assemblies”, which refers to “significant damage”. The criminal offence is committed only when a person resides or intends to reside on the land without consent with a vehicle. That avoids criminalising other forms of trespass, for example, the offence does not apply to a hiker, someone who is homeless or someone who inadvertently strays on to private land. I know that many colleagues of all parties have received communications from clubs, associations and people who have taken the time to write to their Member of Parliament or the Home Office on the issue and we very much hope that this will provide them with welcome reassurance. We all have the right to enjoy the beautiful national parks and green spaces that this great country has to offer and we will be able to continue to exercise that right.
The types of harms caught by the offence are defined in clause 61 and cover many of the problems we have been told that residents and landowners face through some unauthorised encampments. These include significant damage to land, property and the environment, as well as threatening behaviour to residents and landowners. Regarding distress, an offence is committed only if significant distress has been caused or is likely to be caused as a result of offensive conduct, which is then defined within the Bill. It is therefore not possible for an offence to be caught if a person is distressed by the mere presence of an unauthorised encampment on the land. That is where the civil measures I referred to earlier will come into play.
I was challenged with an example where a landowner is distressed and demands the police arrest someone. As with every other criminal offence, the police will only arrest someone if they are doing so in the course of their duties under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. They cannot and must not arrest someone just because a landowner or anyone else happens to demand it. It is important as we are discussing the Bill that we bear in mind the wider checks and balances within the criminal justice system and the wider principles that apply across all criminal offences.
If someone has met the previously mentioned conditions, to be guilty of the offence, they must fail to comply with the request to leave as soon as reasonably practicable and without reasonable excuse. The duties of the police in relation to safeguarding the vulnerable when taking enforcement decisions will continue to apply, as with any other criminal investigation.
The penalties are consistent with squatting legislation and existing powers to tackle unauthorised encampments. The offence is also accompanied by a power for the police to seize the vehicle and other property of the person committing the offence, which ensures that enforcement action is effective and could also have a deterrent effect. Seizure powers are already conferred on the police in relation to failure to comply with a police direction under the 1994 Act. It is right that the police should have equivalent powers in the context of the new criminal offence.
The seizure power is proportionate. Where possible, police decisions to arrest and seize vehicles should continue to be taken in consultation with the local authority which, where possible, would need to offer assurance that it has relevant measures in place to meet any welfare and safeguarding needs of those affected by the loss of their accommodation. The police will continue to undertake any enforcement action in compliance with their equality and human rights obligations.
The shadow Minister set out the police evidence on these new powers. The responses to the 2018 consultation showed a clear desire from the public for the police to be given more powers to tackle unauthorised encampments, but unauthorised Traveller sites require a locally driven, multi-agency response, led by local authorities and supported by the police. There are incentives in place for local authorities to encourage the provision of authorised Traveller pitches. Local planning authorities should continue to assess the need for Traveller accommodation and identify land for sites.
It is only right that the police are given the powers to tackle instances of unauthorised encampments that meet the conditions of proposed new subsection (4). We are very pleased that the Opposition are adopting the position that we should legislate for changes to police powers when requested by the police, because that gives us hope that they will support the measures in part 3, which we have just debated and which have been requested by the police.
This new offence is not targeted at any particular group. Rather, anyone who causes significant damage, disruption or distress in the specified conditions and who refuses to leave without reasonable excuse when asked to do so will be caught by the offence.
Section 61 of the 1994 Act is currently exercisable where any of the trespassers has caused damage to the land or to property on the land or used threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour towards the occupier, Under the amendments in clause 62, the relevant harms comprise damage, disruption or distress, including environmental damage, such as excessive noise and litter. The harms do not need to be significant for police to be able to direct trespassers away in the first instance. That will make it easier for the police to direct trespassers away where encampments are causing problems for landowners, communities or businesses.
We have also increased the period in which trespassers directed away from the land must not return, from three months to 12 months. That is designed to strengthen enforcement powers, acting as a greater deterrent in the first place, and to protect more proportionately the rights of landowners and local communities. We are also enabling the police to direct trespassers away from land that forms part of a highway, to ensure that directions can be given to trespassers on roads.
Our overarching aim is to ensure fair and equal treatment for Travellers in a way that facilitates their traditional nomadic way of life while respecting the interests of local residents and the settled community. We recognise that the vast majority of Travellers are law-abiding citizens, but unauthorised sites can often give an unfair negative image of nomadic communities, and cause distress and misery to residents who live nearby. We are equally clear that we will not tolerate law breaking.
Statutory guidance will be issued, as provided for in clause 63, and will outline examples of what might constitute a reasonable excuse for not complying with the request to leave. That guidance will be vital to support the police in discharging those functions and will help to ensure a consistent application of the powers across England and Wales. The police must have regard to the guidance when exercising the relevant functions. We envisage that the guidance will set out, for example, what might constitute significant damage, disruption and distress, and what might constitute a reasonable excuse, where someone fails to comply with a request to leave the land. It will be up to the police and courts to decide whether someone has a reasonable excuse for not complying, depending on the specific facts of that case.
We recognise the rights of Travellers to follow a nomadic way of life, in line with their cultural heritage. Our aim is for settled and Traveller communities to be able to live side by side harmoniously, and we hope that the clear rules and boundaries that we are putting in place will facilitate that. We remain committed to delivering a cross-Government strategy to tackle the inequalities faced by Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities. The planning policy for Traveller sites is clear that local planning authorities should assess the need for Traveller accommodation and identify land for sites. Local housing authorities are required to assess their housing and accommodation needs under the Housing Act 1985, including for those who reside in caravans. There is wider Government support for the provision of Traveller sites via the new homes bonus, which provides an incentive for local authorities to encourage housing growth in their areas, and rewards net increases in effective housing stock, including the provision of authorised Traveller pitches.
Alex Cunningham
Does the Minister have an idea what the Government’s plans are in terms of the number of sites that are likely to be created over the next three to five years?
Victoria Atkins
That is a matter for local authorities. We have the planning policy for Traveller sites, which is down to the local planning authority. In the hon. Gentleman’s area, I know not whether his local council agrees with him that there should be more sites, but it would be a matter for the local authority to address with local residents.
We remain committed to delivering the strategy to tackle the inequalities faced by the communities that we have discussed. There is the additional affordable homes programme for local authorities to deliver a wide range of affordable homes to meet the housing needs of people in different circumstances and different housing markets, including funding for new Traveller pitches.
We believe that we have struck the right balance between the rights of those who live a nomadic way of life and the rights of local communities to go about their lives without the significant damage, disruption and distress outlined in proposed new section 60C(4), which, regrettably, some unauthorised encampments cause. I therefore commend clauses 61 to 63 to the Committee.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Chris Philp)
It is, as always, a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe. The clause fulfils the Government’s long-standing commitment to increase the maximum penalty for the offences of, first, causing death by dangerous driving and, secondly, causing death by careless driving while under the influence of drink or drugs from, in both cases, the current maximum sentence of 14 years to life imprisonment.
As members of the Committee will know, in response to the consultation on driving offences and penalties some time ago, the Government proposed to take forward various changes in the law, including these, and all of them received overwhelming public support and support from other consultees. By enacting this clause we are delivering on the result of that consultation and on a long-standing commitment. That means that when sentencing people for these very serious offences, the courts can sentence up to life imprisonment if the judge sees fit.
Many hon. Members will have constituency cases where families have suffered the terrible trauma of a loved one being killed by a dangerous or careless driver who was driving when drunk. I have certainly encountered a number of such cases in the last six years as a constituency MP, as I am sure each and every Member here has. The criminal justice system can never adequately compensate for the grief caused by the loss of a loved one in such terrible circumstances, but these changes will mean that courts now have the power to make sure that the punishment truly fits the crime.
It is appropriate that the maximum sentences for causing death by dangerous driving and causing death by careless driving while under the influence are increased from 14 years to life imprisonment. I commend these measures to the Committee.
Alex Cunningham
I am pleased to offer the Opposition’s enthusiastic support for clauses 64 to 66, and particularly for clause 64, which will increase the maximum penalties for the offences of causing death by dangerous driving and causing death by careless driving while under the influence of drink or drugs from 14 years’ imprisonment to imprisonment for life.
I pay tribute to my hon. Friends the Members for Barnsley East (Stephanie Peacock) and for Barnsley Central (Dan Jarvis) for their committed work to increase the penalty for those guilty of causing death by dangerous driving to life imprisonment and for the Bill they have promoted and supported. My hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley East has worked alongside the family of Jaqueline Wileman, from Grimethorpe, who was 58 when she was struck and tragically killed by a stolen heavy goods vehicle in September 2018. I offer my sincerest thanks to the Wileman family for their tireless campaign for change, which they are now able to see become a reality.
Other families of victims of these awful crimes have also long campaigned to see these changes, such as the family of Violet-Grace, who died from injuries inflicted as a result of a car crash caused by individuals driving dangerously in March 2017. I hope that this change in the law, which they have fought to bring forward, will provide some small solace that dangerous drivers who kill will, in future, feel the full force of the law.
Work to address this important issue has been energetic on both sides of the House, and it was the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May) who introduced the Death by Dangerous Driving (Sentencing) Bill in July 2020, as a private Member’s Bill co-sponsored by my hon. Friends the Members for Barnsley East and for Barnsley Central. We are therefore fully supportive of the Government’s proposal to provide the court with a wider range of penalties to ensure that sentences are proportionate and reflect the seriousness of the offending.
The urgent need for this change is illustrated by the fact that, in 2019, over 150 people were sentenced for causing death by dangerous driving. Of those offenders, around 95% received an immediate custodial sentence, of which over 15 received a sentence of more than 10 years. If 10% of offenders are already being sentenced near the maximum threshold, it seems the time is ripe to provide the court with wider sentencing powers for these offences so that offenders are dealt with consistently and fairly.
Although we are fully supportive of these changes, I note that there has been some delay in introducing them. The Government committed to changing the law on causing death by dangerous driving following a review in 2014—seven years ago. As the Minster said, it has been a long-standing commitment. There was also a consultation in 2016, which the Government responded to in 2017, committing to the legislative changes that are now in the Bill. The private Member’s Bill brought forward by the right hon. Member for Maidenhead last year was a real nudge along to the Government, following a perceived dropping of the ball. I would normally say, “Better late than never,” but for a measure as serious as this, and with hundreds of families losing loved ones to dangerous drivers in the intervening years, I wonder what held the Government up for so long.
Speaking of delays, Cycling UK said that, although it cautiously supports these proposals, it fears they will do very little to address the many serious problems with the framework of road traffic offences and penalties. I understand that the Government promised a full review of the framework back in 2014, but it has never happened. I would welcome an update from the Minister on the wider review, which could look at the utilisation of driving bans.
We fully support the proposals in clause 65, which introduces the new offence of causing serious injury by careless or inconsiderate driving, and sets the maximum penalty for the offence on indictment at two years’ imprisonment.
Chris Philp
I have nothing further to add to my earlier answers. We keep these matters under continual review. There are no plans to make changes just at the moment, but we do of course keep an eye on these matters.
Chris Philp
This clause has a very similar intention to the previous clause, in that it introduces a new section 2C offence into the Road Traffic Act 1988 to fill a lacuna in the existing legislation. It does that by introducing a new offence of causing serious injury by careless or inconsiderate driving. There is currently no offence that covers this, so we are filling a gap that exists in the current legislation.
The new offence created by the clause is committed if a person causes serious injury by driving a car or another mechanically propelled vehicle on a road or public place without due care and attention or without reasonable consideration for other road users and, while doing so, causes serious injury.
The maximum custodial penalty for the offence on indictment will be two years’ imprisonment or a fine. The maximum custodial penalty on summary conviction will be 12 months or a fine. Until such time as section 224 of the sentencing code is commenced, the maximum penalty on summary conviction in England and Wales will be read as six months.
This is an important clause, which fills a gap in the current law and ensures that, where serious injury is caused by someone who is driving carelessly or inconsiderately, there will be an offence that can be prosecuted with an appropriate penalty—in this case, a maximum of two years if tried on indictment. I hope the Committee will agree that this is a sensible measure and will support the clause.
Alex Cunningham
As I prematurely said some minutes ago, we fully support the proposals in clause 65, which introduces the new offence of causing serious injury by careless or inconsiderate driving and sets the maximum penalty for the offence on indictment, as the Minister said, at two years’ imprisonment.
The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 and the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 made provision for new offences for dangerous and disqualified driving, but left the gap the Minister referred to in the law, relating to careless driving that results in serious injury. As I said before, we welcome the sensible proposal in clause 65, which fills that gap and will allow for a penalty that recognises the high level of harm caused by these incidents. As a result, the Opposition support clause 66 and schedule 7, which make minor consequential amendments as a result of clauses 64 and 65.
Victoria Atkins
Clauses 69 to 74 and schedules 8 and 9 update the law in relation to the production and surrender of driving licences, so as to streamline the processes for the electronic endorsement of driving licences by removing the need for the physical licence to be produced. They also strengthen the rules for the surrender of driving licences where a driver faces disqualification.
The current legal requirement to produce and surrender the driving licence as part of the endorsement process is now outdated. In 2015, the paper driving licence counterpart, which previously recorded the endorsement, was abolished, and the information is now only recorded on Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency electronic drivers’ records. There is therefore no need for a physical driving licence to be produced and surrendered for an endorsement to be recorded on an individual’s driving record. The only need for a licence to be produced and surrendered is when the driver may be sentenced to disqualification or is actually disqualified. The clauses and schedules bring the law up to date, removing any need for individuals to deliver or post their licence before a hearing, and leaving only a duty to take their licence to court if there is a hearing and if they attend.
Clause 70 provides the Secretary of State—in practice, the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency—with the power to require the surrender of a driving licence to the agency where a court has ordered disqualification. Failure to do so would be a summary offence, carrying a maximum penalty of a level 3 fine—currently £1,000. Where an individual is disqualified, the court will notify the DVLA and forward the licence to it when it has been surrendered at court. When it has not been surrendered at court, the DVLA will follow up production of the licence with the disqualified driver using the new power.
The clauses also remove the need for the production and surrender of the driving licence and allow police constables and vehicle examiners to issue a fixed penalty notice without checking and retaining a physical driving licence.
Clause 75 is included at the request of the Scottish Government. Its objective is to make better use of police and judicial resources in Scotland. Currently, the police throughout Great Britain have the power to issue a conditional offer of a fixed penalty notice under sections 75 to 77A of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. The scheme was introduced in 1989 as an alternative to prosecution for certain low-level road traffic offences. Once a conditional offer of a fixed penalty is issued, an individual has 28 days to accept the offer and make payment. In Scotland, if the offer is not accepted or the recipient fails to take any action, the police will submit a standard prosecution report to the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service for consideration of whether a prosecution should take place.
Clause 75 grants the power to issue fixed penalty notices on the spot in Scotland for minor road traffic offences. That power is already available in England and Wales. In contrast to the position with conditional offers of fixed penalty notices, when the recipient of a fixed penalty notice fails to respond it simply becomes a registered fine at one and a half times the original penalty. That approach is attractive to the Scottish Government as a means of reducing the burden on the police, prosecutors and courts while preserving the recipient’s right to challenge a fixed penalty notice, should they wish to do so.
The clause will apply in the first instance to the police, but the Scottish Government want to be able to consider its potential extension to traffic wardens and vehicle examiners at their own pace and following further consideration.
I commend the clauses and schedules to the Committee.
Alex Cunningham
The Opposition also support the remaining clauses in part 5. They are sensible, helpful and well evidenced, and we are glad to offer our support for them. Currently, when a fixed penalty notice has been issued, a driver must surrender their licence to the relevant authority, but since the paper counterpart licence was abolished in 2015, there is no need for a driving licence to be produced for an endorsement to be recorded against a driver’s driving record.
Clauses 69 to 74 will finally remove the redundant requirement for a physical driving licence to be produced when a fixed penalty notice has been issued and they will also strengthen the rules for the surrender of driving licences when a driver faces disqualification.
Clause 69 will amend section 27(1) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 to provide that courts are no longer required to oblige licence production. Instead, the courts will be provided with powers that they may exercise at their discretion. This power will apply both where the court proposes to disqualify and where it disqualifies a licence.
Clauses 70 and 71 make further amendments to the 1988 Act, the effect of which, when taken together with clause 69, is to remove the need to produce a driving licence from the fixed penalty process. This streamlining is welcome and hopefully will in some small way reduce the administrative burden on our under-resourced and overstretched courts system, as it will no longer need to handle the physical licence where a driver faces endorsement, but not disqualification.
In recent years, attempts have been made to update the law in this area through private Members’ Bills, which have had Government support. The attempt made by the hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole (Michael Tomlinson) fell after its Committee stage because of the 2017 general election. The attempt made in the 2017-to-2019 Session by the right hon. Member for Dumfries and Galloway (Mr Jack) did not even manage to progress past its First Reading. I am glad that the Government are at last introducing the measure in a Government Bill in Government time.
We are also content with clause 75, which extends the police power that the police in England and Wales currently have to issue on-the-spot fines for certain moving traffic offences to police in Scotland. I am aware of the Department for Transport’s joint consultation with the Scottish Government on this topic from 2018. Doesn’t it take a long time for things to happen in law? The majority of the responses to the consultation supported the proposed changes and seemed to indicate the need for fixed penalty notice reform in Scotland for suspected road traffic offences, which the Government are sensibly introducing here.
Allan Dorans
I wish to confirm that the Scottish Government welcome the clauses that affect Scotland.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 69 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 70 to 73 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 8 agreed to.
Clause 74 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 9 agreed to.
Clause 75 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Tom Pursglove.)
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill (Seventh sitting)
Alex Cunningham ExcerptsThursday 27th May 2021
(3 years, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 View all Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 27 May 2021 - (27 May 2021)
Sarah Jones
I completely agree. The issue of people having things on their phone that relate to their family or friends, which they feel it would be terrible for others to see, has not been thought through.
In the Bater-James Court of Appeal judgment, the judges were clear that there should not be speculative searches, and that there must be specificity based on a reasonable line of inquiry. The information should be extracted only in so far as it is strictly necessary and proportionate to the investigation, and the officer must be satisfied that there are no other, less intrusive means available to them of pursuing that line of inquiry. It is vital that the police can rely on “strict necessity” for law enforcement purposes from the perspective of data protection, but it is also vital that the victims agree to the download, meaning that they fully understand what is being sought, and that the agreement is freely given.
In an evidence session last week, we heard from Martin Hewitt of the National Police Chiefs’ Council that there is an ever-increasing
“volume of digital evidence that is required for almost every investigation.”
He said:
“That has created real pressure on the time limits of investigations and our ability to gather the evidence that we need to take an investigation forward. We have increased the capability. It is partly about equipment and having the right equipment to be able to extract digital evidence. It is also about having officers and staff who have the right capabilities to assess that evidence and produce it in an evidential form…However, the flip side and the really important point is making sure that what is being done is lawful, proportionate and necessary. Again, that side of the work is equally important…So we need the legal framework to allow us to do that properly and we then also need the resourcing and the capabilities to do it within the right time limits.”––[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 18 May 2021; c.16, Q21.]
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
My hon. Friend is making a very clear argument. She will recollect clause 36(10), which relates to the age of an adult. It suggests that in the context of extraction for information, an “adult” is someone who is 16 years old. Is it not all the more important that we have legal protections for children, if the Government insist that they are adults at the age of 16?
Sarah Jones
My hon. Friend makes a very good point, which was raised last week, and which I know the Minister has clocked. We have an amendment to shift the age from 16 to 18, but my hon. Friend is absolutely right to say that if the age remains that low, we need to make even more sure that we protect victims.
Police forces carry out digital data extraction from victims’ phones in kiosks. In the police forces that have kiosks—not all of them do—the police often have to queue and wait to download their information. Martin Hewitt’s point about time limits is crucial; the police clearly do not have the right equipment for the new power to be used in the way that the law says it should be used. The police do not have the technology to draw out specific information from people’s phones, and the risk of incriminating family or friends can prevent cases from going ahead. I know that the guidance from the College of Policing says that police must immediately delete all data that are not relevant, but there is a big problem, in that so many cases brought to them do not go ahead. Will the Minister provide assurances as to how the Government will provide the police with the resources and capacity that they need to enforce what they need to do with digital extraction?
In the evidence sessions, we also heard from Dame Vera Baird that
“The police have now done a lot of work to try to shift policy backwards, and this new power—which has no obvious nod, even, in the direction of the protection of complainants—came out of the blue from a different Department of the Home Office, and has absolutely none of the protections that, in policy terms, the police have been looking towards for quite some time.”––[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 20 May 2021; c.111, Q174.]
New clauses 49 to 53, on the power to extract data from electronic devices, would protect the rights of complainants under article 8 of the European convention on human rights, particularly in sexual assault and rape cases. They would more clearly define that “agreement” in the legislation means informed and freely given agreement, to avoid abuse of this power. The new clauses would ensure that alternatives were considered before a request was made to a victim, and that only specified persons could agree and provide a device on behalf of children, who must be consulted before a decision is made. The same would apply to adults without capacity. The new clauses would oblige the code of practice to address a number of points about exercising the power, in order to better protect the rights and experience of victims.
I will run through the issues that we are seeking to correct through the new clauses. The first is that there is no definition of “agreement” in the legislation. As we have said, police all too often seek the agreement of complainants of sexual violence in circumstances where they are not fully informed—sometimes they are being coerced—so it is really important that the primary legislation defines “agreement”, which means agreement that is informed and freely given. Linked to agreement is the need for the police to be specific about what data they are seeking. Only if the police are specific can the data owner give informed agreement to extraction.
The second issue is that a reasonable line of inquiry is not clearly defined in the legislation. It nods to that by using the word “relevant”, but material sought from a suspect or complainant for the purposes of investigating and prosecuting crime will be relevant only inasmuch as it is part of a reasonable line of inquiry. It is vital that that be clearly defined in the legislation. Without a clear definition, the legal hoop for police is merely reasonable belief and relevance. This risks further embedding a culture of wholescale downloads and intrusion into privacy.
Victoria Atkins
We have been working together on this. We must not not forget that the background to the legal framework has to take into account the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 and the more general disclosure rules, for example. But this has been very much a piece of work across Government, because we want this framework to give confidence and clarity to victims and to suspects, but also, importantly, to the police and the Crown Prosecution Service, because they are the ones who must administer and work within the legal framework and the code of practice.
If I may, Mr McCabe, I will take a bit of time, because this is such an important measure and I am mindful that there are questions about it, to set out some of the detailed thinking behind the way in which the clauses have been drafted. The current approach to the extraction of information from digital devices has indeed been criticised by some as feeling like a “digital strip-search” where devices have been taken as a matter of course and where, in many cases, all the sensitive personal data belonging to a device user was extracted and processed even where it was not relevant to the offence under investigation. We absolutely understand the concerns that have been raised in relation to that.
Alex Cunningham
I think this is an appropriate point for me to lay the challenge on the Government about the decision to classify children as adults at the age of 16 in clause 36(10). The Minister has just used the expression “digital strip-search”. Is it really appropriate for a 16-year-old girl, or boy for that matter, to have a digital strip-search, giving up all their little secrets and everything else, because the Government think that they should be classified as an adult and that adult factors should be applied directly to them?
Victoria Atkins
I will deal with that in detail in due course. Just so that colleagues understand how that age was settled upon, in the drafting we carefully considered people’s views, including the Information Commissioner, about the freedoms and the feelings of power and authority that users of devices have. We settled on the age of 16 because we understand that a 16-year-old is different from a 12 or 13-year-old, if their parents have allowed them mobile phones, although I am banning my son from having a mobile phone until he is at least 35, but there we go. A moment of lightness, sorry.
I will deal with the point in more detail later, because it is important, but there is a difficult balance to maintain between rights of victims, suspects and defendants but also rights of users, particularly under the European convention, so that has been the Government’s motivation in this. However, we are alive to scrutiny.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill (Eighth sitting)
Alex Cunningham ExcerptsThursday 27th May 2021
(3 years, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 View all Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 27 May 2021 - (27 May 2021)
Victoria Atkins
Before I explain the clauses, we should remind ourselves why the 2017 Act was passed. Colleagues may remember that in the first half of the past decade, there were several very high-profile investigations into very serious allegations of child sexual abuse and exploitation. There was an understanding that in some cases—not all—we had to look at bail conditions and so on to ensure that these complex investigations were carried out as efficiently and quickly as possible. That was the driving sentiment behind the 2017 legislation. We have listened to the police and to victims and survivors and charities that work with them. We want to improve the efficiency of the pre-charge bail system and encourage the use of bail where necessary and proportionate.
The hon. Member for Croydon Central explained the background to this clause and schedule and its reference to Kay Richardson, whose murder has already been described. When we scrutinised the Domestic Abuse Bill, I said that the experiences of individual victims and their families were behind many of the measures introduced to improve court processes, for example, and to help with services and refuges. This is such an example. Colleagues will understand that we wanted to take time to work through the measures in this Bill and this schedule in order to ensure they were as effective as possible in helping victims. It could not be included in the Domestic Abuse Bill, but I am pleased it is in this Bill.
The motivation behind Kay’s law is to provide better protection for victims through the anticipated increased use of pre-charge bail and to refocus the system, with victims at its heart. The hon. Lady’s amendments and new clause allow us to discuss two significant elements of this reform package: the duty to seek views from alleged victims on pre-charge bail conditions and the consequences for a suspect who breaches those conditions.
As with other measures in the Bill, our reforms to pre-charge bail put victims at the centre of the changes we are making, to help ensure that they are better protected and involved in decisions that affect them. The views of victims on bail conditions and how these can best safeguard them are vital to enable the police to build a full picture of all the relevant circumstances.
I hope we can all agree that this must be balanced against the need for operational flexibility within policing and the need to balance victims’ rights against those of the suspect. While I would expect officers to seek the views of victims in the vast majority of pre-charge bail cases, that may not always be practicable. For a variety of reasons, a victim may be uncontactable by the police. The duties imposed by the legislation must be proportionate within the investigation. It would not be right, and could be disproportionate, to require officers to hold a suspect in custody longer than appropriate until that contact is made. The current wording goes far enough to ensure that the duty is followed in all cases where it is practical to contact the victim.
We are not of the view that the Bill should be amended to require that officers discharge this duty in every case, unless there are exceptional circumstances. We need this change to work in practice for the benefit of victims and the wider public. I make it very clear that this is the expectation within this legislation, but we have to reflect operational practicalities and the balancing act of ensuring the rights of both victims and suspects.
Amendments 96 and 97 seek to provide that the personal circumstances of the victim are taken into account where bail conditions are varied. I agree with this view but believe that the drafting of the Bill as is, coupled with the current legislation in this area, already provides for this. When imposing or varying conditions, custody officers must take into account a number of considerations, including the need to ensure that the suspect does not interfere with witnesses or obstruct the course of justice, and that will include consideration of the victim’s circumstances and needs. The duty set out in the Bill also requires further consideration by the investigating officer to determine which of the bail conditions are relevant conditions—conditions that relate to safeguarding the victim. I anticipate that that will also require consideration of the victim’s personal circumstances and needs as part of this overall assessment.
Finally in this group, new clause 54 aims to create a criminal offence of breach of pre-charge bail conditions. I understand that there is a long-held concern about the sanctions available when a suspect on pre-charge bail breaches their bail conditions. We should remember that officers will, in the first instance, consider whether the behaviour or actions that breached the conditions amount to a separate offence, such as harassment or intimidation. Equally, there are civil orders that can be put in place, breaches of which constitute an offence. I am thinking of a sexual risk order, a stalking protection order and when in due course they are piloted, the new domestic abuse protection orders. I also have concerns around creating an offence without an understanding of the number of people that it would be likely to affect. I am pleased to say that data collection in this area is being improved, but we do not yet have a full picture of what the effects of such an offence are likely to be on suspects, victims and the wider criminal justice system.
To support the increased data collection around breaches, the Bill includes provision for a pause on the detention clock following arrest for breach of conditions to encourage the police to arrest in those instances. The issues raised by the amendments are all ones that we would expect the College of Policing to address in the statutory guidance provided for in the new section 50(b) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. In the longer term, across the board of Home Office policy, we will keep under review the case for any additional sanction where pre-charge bail conditions are breached as the reforms provided for in the Bill settle in and we have better data on which to make a decision. For now, however, I invite the hon. Member to withdraw her amendment.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 43, accordingly, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
On a point of order, Mr McCabe. The Opposition have an opportunity to respond to the Minister about whether to withdraw the new clause.
The Chair
I think you are just one step ahead of me, Mr Cunningham. We now come to amendments 95 to 97 for schedule 4, which have already been debated. Do you wish to press the amendments?
Alex Cunningham
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe, and I do recognise that you know what you are doing. I tend to have a big mouth at times, and I am often the first one to jump in, maybe a little bit prematurely.
I pay tribute to the Clerks of this Committee, just as my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon Central did. We all know that their professionalism is first class, but my greatest admiration is for their patience, which they have had to demonstrate daily in helping us prepare for this particular Bill. I also apologise to you, Chair, and to the Minister, the hon. Member for Louth and Horncastle, that I was a couple of minutes late to the Committee this afternoon. I gather that the Minister mentioned that she is going to address the issue of 16-year-olds being designated as adults in clause 36 of the Bill.
I am sure that Members on both sides of the Committee will join me in paying tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham for the tremendous amount of dedicated work she has done on child exploitation since arriving in this House. Her experience and ability to pull together Members from across the House not just to champion the rights of children but to help educate us on what is happening in our society, is admirable to say the least. Today, she has finally had that most important opportunity: the chance to propose a series of amendments to legislation to help address some of those issues and, above all, better protect young people from the predators who would ruin their lives.
As Members will have seen, we are supportive of what the Government are trying to do in this space, but it is important that we do not lose this opportunity to strengthen this work in the best interests of our children and young people. We hope that Ministers will remain in listening mode, ready to adopt the revisions that we are suggesting, in relation to not just clause 44 but the following clause 45. There is very little that I can add to the detail outlined by my hon. Friend, so I will address clause 44 and new clauses 39 to 41 in relatively brief fashion.
As has been said, clause 44 addresses the need to strengthen section 14 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, with subsection (2) extending the offence so that it covers acts preparatory to the offences in sections 5 to 8 of that Act: among other things, the rape of a child under 13, assault of a child under 13 by penetration, and causing or inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity. The proposed sentence changes are to be welcomed as a step in the right direction, and the new clauses proposed by my hon. Friend are designed to bolster what the Government are trying to achieve while, more importantly, demonstrating a much tougher approach to those who would commit the most heinous of crimes against children.
As outlined by my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham, new clause 39 will introduce aggravated offences to cover the most serious cases such as those involving particularly degrading treatment of a child, or where a family member or the family are involved in the contact abuse. This reflects landmark legislation that has been introduced in Australia, as my hon. Friend has set out in more detail. Each of the aggravating factors listed in this new clause—I am pleased that my hon. Friend read them out—is an example of the most depraved and horrifying offending that can be imagined. We strongly believe that these instances of extreme abuse and exploitation should be captured in legislation, and I am sure the Government agree that offending of this nature needs to feel the full force of the law.
New clause 40 will criminalise online communications or activity that are intended to enable sexual abuse and exploitation. As abuse moves online, it is so important that we ensure our legislation keeps place with emerging criminal activities so that these abusers are still held to account for their crimes. This new clause will address the initial steps taken by the sex offender who is intent on committing an offence, and will ensure that law enforcement has a framework through which it can tackle this horrendous behaviour at the earliest point possible.
Finally, new clause 41 will make it clear that offences of inciting, arranging, or facilitating child sexual abuse can take place in person or online, in the UK or in any other part of the world. My hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham spoke of the important work of the International Justice Mission. As she said, the IJM’s teams in the Philippines work with local and international law enforcement to address situations in which sex offenders pay to direct and livestream sexual abuse of Filipino children. Sadly, and to our shame as a nation, it is often sex offenders in the UK who are driving the demand for such abuse. The National Crime Agency believes that the UK is the third-largest consumer of livestreamed abuse in the world. The harm that the demand causes cannot be overstated. Many of the children whom IJM has assisted are very young: around half were under 12 years of age when they were helped to safety. The severity of the harm caused by online offenders here in the UK must be recognised.
Currently, UK offenders who directed and paid for the livestreamed sexual abuse of Filipino children will serve an average of just two years and four months in prison. Are the Government content with that? I would hope not. The new clauses will go some way to addressing the injustice and will help hold UK online offenders accountable for the abuse and trauma they cause. We need the abusers to know that they cannot hide behind their computer screens and access extreme material without knowing that when they are caught—modern technology is improving the chances of that tremendously —they will not just get a slap on the wrist but will go to prison for a considerable length of time. I hope the Government will support the amendments.
The Chair
No need for apologies, Mr Cunningham. It is important that the Bill is properly scrutinised and that the parliamentary procedure is complied with. I call Minister Philp.
Alex Cunningham
My mum is a wise older woman who will be 88 on 1 August. She has offered me many a statement, and sometimes direction, that has given me food for thought and helped me form opinions or even take action to work for change. One expression she would use in the past was, “We all come into the world the same way, and we all leave it the same way.” She knew, as we all do, that opportunities between and birth and death vary tremendously for our people. We need to work for equality wherever we can, particularly for our children and young people. We need to apply that work on equality to this Bill, to ensure that all young people are protected from adults in a position of trust over them and, where they are exploited, to ensure that the full weight of the law is felt by those who have betrayed that position and possibly ruined young persons’ lives.
The Opposition have worked for months with the police and policing and justice stakeholders from across the field in drawing together our various amendments. It has been extremely heartening that Ministers have already shown a great willingness to work together to improve the Bill. That has been extremely welcome thus far, and I hope it will extend to our discussion on clause 45.
This matter has strong cross-party support, and I am sure hon. Members join me in giving wholehearted thanks to my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham and those she paid tribute to earlier—the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford and Baroness Grey-Thompson—for their tireless work prosecuting the case and campaigning for wider protections for our children.
The proposed extension to the definition of “position of trust” is very much welcomed by the Opposition, but it is vital that we do not miss this opportunity to introduce a comprehensive solution that protects children from potentially abusive adults in positions of influence over them in all activities and settings. It is time to Close the Loophole, as the NSPCC has called its campaign.
Before I discuss the excellent amendment from my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham, on which she made an outstanding and meaningful speech, I would like to seek some clarity about who is covered by the definition currently in the Bill, to eliminate confusion. Can the Minister confirm that, with regard to sports, the current wording covers those adults who are instructing and training children in recreational physical activity that is not directly leading to a specific competitive event or display—for example, swimming lessons or dance classes? Can he also confirm that, with regard to religion, the current wording covers adults who are leading activities that have a religious ethos, or who are operating under the auspices of a specific religious organisation or denomination, but where the activities are not directly related to religious practice—for instance, a temple youth group, a church camp or outdoor activities? What happens there? I would welcome clarity on all those points. The possible confusion in the current wording, which has been pointed out by the NSPCC, means that the clause as it stands may not cover all sporting and religious activity.
The lack of clarity about the Government’s proposals goes to illustrate the issue at hand. Why are we excluding children from the protections of this clause in some settings, but not in others? I will repeat that point a few times. Why have the Government chosen to draw the line here? Why are some children being safeguarded and others left at risk? As it stands, the Government will be excluding children from this new protection in many settings, such as music, creative and performing arts, tutoring, cadets, driving lessons and youth clubs.
Sarah Champion
My hon. Friend is making a very strong point. I am thinking about this from a parent’s point of view. At the moment, they assume that everybody in a position of trust over their child, as they would see it, is covered by this legislation. It seems ridiculous that, when we are talking about a child in school—I will stay with the example of the maths teacher—the maths teacher would be convicted if they had sex with a 16-year-old, but if the child leaves school and goes to a maths tutor, the maths tutor could have sex with them and would not be prosecuted. The issue is just about getting clarity for everyone on this.
Alex Cunningham
I thank my hon. Friend for making that point. It illustrates exactly what we are about here, which is that everybody should be treated the same. Incidentally, I had an excellent maths teacher; I do not remember his first name, but he was Mr Fielding, and he was a first-class maths teacher.
I am sure that we all agree that extracurricular activities such as those that I have outlined are vital for children’s development. They provide opportunities for children to learn new skills, make new friends and develop self-confidence. But why should those young people not be afforded the same level of protection when doing them?
I discussed this issue recently with my hon. Friend the Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell), and she shared with me a number of horrendous cases of abuse by adults in positions of trust that have arisen in her constituency, yet the definition proposed by the Government would not cover these horrific abuses. I understand that she discussed one particular case in meetings with Justice and Home Office Ministers, so she was surprised, as I am, that no action was taken in this legislation to deal with people in similar situations in the future.
I am sharing details of the case here with my hon. Friend’s permission. She said:
“With regard to tutors, we had a dreadful case of grooming and then assault on a teenager who was a music student, by her private tutor.
She was groomed from the age of 14, was a rising talent, which he nurtured and there came a relationship of dependency in the light of this.
He then raped her when she turned 16.
The case went to the CPS but they did not proceed with the case despite the support of the local police.
It destroyed her.
Music lessons were conducted in private. He held her future career in his hands.
He was in a position of trust and abused that trust.”
Can the Government explain why they have chosen not to extend the positions of trust laws to cover all situations like this, where the adult holds the power to influence a young person’s future and is in close contact with the child? If we fail to close this loophole, we will fail young victims like the young woman in the case I just described.
Sarah Champion
Like my hon. Friend, I am somewhat perplexed. He is right: subsection (2) suggests that the Government recognise that additional careers may need to come under the legislation, now or in the future, so why are they closing the door now when they recognise that they will need to open it again in a year or in 10 years? NSPCC research on the cases it already knows have been prosecuted identifies—as well as the teaching professions, faith and sport—transport, youth work, scouts, cadets, charities and the performing arts as the most prevalent careers for cases. We know that there are more cases.
Alex Cunningham
Yes, and that seems so obvious. The briefings we have received from different organisations outline that the fact that this is the case across all the activity that my hon. Friend describes. How will the Minister determine what is to be added or removed in future? What criteria will be used to determine which child should be protected and which should not?
No doubt a robust mechanism will be required to monitor the implementation and to ensure that no child is placed at unnecessary risk, but the legal framework makes it difficult to collect comprehensive data on the scale of abuse by those in positions of trust. We have insight to the scale of the problem, and I thank the NSPCC for providing these figures and pay tribute to it. The NSPCC is probably one of the clearest about what it is trying to achieve; when it sends me a brief, I know exactly what it wants, and I trust it tremendously when it tells me things.
The NSPCC tells me that the Office for National Statistics has analysed child sexual abuse data from the Crime Survey for England and Wales, which asks people over 16 to report on their experiences of abuse in childhood. It found that in 9.7% of all contact child abuse cases, and in 4.4% of all non-contact child abuse cases, the perpetrator was an adult in a position of trust or authority over the child. For males—this actually surprised me—19% of contact abuse was by a person in a position of trust or authority.
In the data from the Crime Survey for England and Wales, the definition of a person in a position of trust or authority included positions currently included in the definition of positions of trust, such as teachers and social workers, and persons included within the Government’s proposals in clause 45, such as sports coaches and religious leaders, as well as positions that remain outside the Government’s proposals, including private tutors, youth workers and those leading music and creative activities, which we have covered.
Chris Philp
I thank the shadow Minister for giving way and for sharing those figures. Does he have, or was he provided with, a breakdown of them? On the 19%—I think that was the figure he gave—of males reporting contact abuse perpetrated by someone in a position of trust, does he have a breakdown of what proportion of those offences were committed by people who either met the current definition or who meet the definition as expanded by clause 45, as opposed to people who do not meet either of those definitions? That would be interesting information if he has it to hand.
Alex Cunningham
Indeed it would be good information to have to hand, but I do not know the answer to the question. Perhaps we can discuss the issue in a future debate.
If data on those instances of abuse is collected, even in the Crime Survey for England and Wales, why do the Government not think that the law should recognise the activity as criminal?
Sarah Jones
I worked for six months at Addenbrooke’s Hospital. That happened to be when things were coming to light about a doctor called Myles Bradbury, who had abused many, many children. Part of what I had to do was put together the plan for how we would go to the parents of children who had died of cancer, having been treated by that doctor. We will never know how many people he managed to abuse; he abused many children. He was an abuser. If he had not been a doctor, he might have been a driving instructor. If he had not been a driving instructor, he might have been a football coach. He was intent on abusing young people and he would always have found a position of trust to do so.
Does my hon. Friend agree that it makes no sense to list certain things and exclude others when we are talking about perpetrators who will find the means to do these things if they want to?
Alex Cunningham
Indeed I do. People say, “It doesn’t matter what laws you pass; people will find a way.” That is one of the terrible things in our society.
Having heard what both my hon. Friends have said, I reflect on the parents and the trauma that parents face when they realise that they have allowed their child—their daughter—to be tutored by a particular person to learn the piano, or entrusted them to a sports coach working with 20 children, who goes on to abuse them. The parents have that guilt—guilt they have to live with. It is not their fault, but they still have to live with the guilt.
We must strengthen the law as much as possible, so that if such cases come to light the perpetrators face the full force of the law, and we must not allow any loopholes whatever to protect any of those people.
The figures from the NSPCC that I mentioned come from a series of freedom of information requests on all local authority children’s services in England and Wales between 2014 and 2018. The NSPCC found that over a four-year period there were 653 complaints about adults who were not covered by the criminal law having sex with 16 and 17-year-olds in their care. That compares to 1,025 criminal offences of abuse of a position of trust of a sexual nature in the same period.
The NSPCC also asked local authorities to provide information about the fields of work of the referrals: 26% were cases in sport and leisure settings; 12% were in religious group settings; 11% were cases involving transport or involving drivers—my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon Central referred to cases involving driving instructors; 5.7% were in settings of voluntary or charity work; and another 5.7% were in cadet organisations. That is 653 cases where our law did not protect vulnerable young people.
We have a chance to extend that provision to protect children in those settings future and I urge the Government to take it—please do not lose the opportunity. Those figures are deeply disturbing, but statistics alone do not convey the impact that abuse of a position of trust has on children and young people, including the truly devastating impact when someone is told that what happened to them is not a criminal offence and nothing can be done about it. Too many young victims are being given the message that the adult who abused their position did nothing wrong and that to have prevented it from happening the young person should not have consented.
With support from the NSPCC, “Hannah”, whose name has been changed, and two other brave young women directly affected by that form of abuse wrote directly to the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice. “Hannah” told the NSPCC, “When I turned 16, ‘Jeff’, my swimming coach, began to comment on my appearance. He would tell me that I looked nice or that clothes looked good on me. No one had ever said these things to me before, and I wasn’t sure how to feel. Soon he started pushing the boundaries. Initially he would just give me a hug. Then one day he gave me a hug and put his hand on my bottom. ‘Jeff’ spent a long time making me feel comfortable. I remember the first time we kissed. After training, we started to be intimate in that way a couple would. After some time, we started having sex. This was my first sexual experience. ‘Jeff’ told me to keep this a secret. I was under the impression when ‘Jeff’ told me not to tell anyone that it would be for the best for my swimming, and this would develop into a proper relationship and we could tell everyone. I wanted to tell my friends, but I knew I couldn’t. When this relationship came tumbling down, I changed with it. I was left feeling really angry, I was a difficult person to be around. It took me a long time to trust friends and family, to let them hug me again.”
Hearing the devastating impact of that horrific abuse is absolutely heartrending. I want to put on record the great debt of gratitude that we as parliamentarians owe to the courageous young people, such as “Hannah”, who work with the NSPCC to lobby the Government on the issue. Their civic-mindedness in the wake of such dreadful abuse is so very admirable, and because of their work, alongside others, the law will be improved to protect more young people.
In the event that the Government do not support my hon. Friend’s excellent amendment, will the Minister say how the risks associated with positions that remain outside the definition—for example, private music tutor or cadet leader—will be monitored? The consistent collection and monitoring of data relating to the implementation and effectiveness of clause 45 are vital if it is to protect the full range of young people who may come into contact with personal abusers. If the Minister will not do what the Opposition consider the right thing, will he please provide clarity on the review mechanisms the Government will put in place to decide whether further extensions of the definition of “positions of trust” in clause 45(2) should take place?
I want to consider some of the Government’s previous objections to the extension of the ambit of the “positions of trust” definition. In March 2020, during a Westminster Hall debate on sports coaches in positions of trust, the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk), said:
“What is at stake here is a need to balance the legal right, as prescribed by Parliament, for young persons aged 16 and over to consent to sexual activity, with the proper desire to protect vulnerable young people from manipulation.”
Although I agree that it is not our place to deny age-appropriate rights as prescribed by Parliament, this is not an attempt to raise the age of consent by stealth. It is an attempt to offer extra protection to young people when they are specifically in a context where there is a disproportionate power imbalance.
Sarah Champion
I hear that the Government use that excuse a lot, and my rebuttal is always that it has not been an issue for the past 18 years when it has been in place for teachers, so why would it suddenly be an issue with different professions?
Alex Cunningham
Again, my hon. Friend makes it very clear that we are bamboozled by the approach that the Government are taking. Surely the figures that I mentioned earlier show that there is significant prevalence of abuse in such settings, and that Parliament should step in and offer protections to our young people. Later today, we will be talking about memorials. Apparently, the law could be changed, and one person extra might go to prison as a result of the new legislation, yet here is a serious situation whereby many people could be sent to prison for the abuse of young people, but the Government are not making the necessary changes. We hope that the Minister is actually listening.
In Westminster Hall, the hon. Member for Cheltenham said:
“Another complicating feature is the evolving case law in the area. In certain situations, the criminal division of the Court of Appeal has already been clear that supposed consent may be vitiated or even negated, thereby creating a criminal offence in any event… That is important because, as the Crown Prosecution Service now indicates in its charging decisions, in certain circumstances that ruling could apply where perpetrators were in a position of power in which they could abuse their trust over a victim. If we look at the CPS charging decision—in other words, when making a decision about whether there truly was consent in a relationship—one of the matters that has to be considered is:
‘Where the suspect was in a position of power where they could abuse their trust, especially because of their position or status’”—
including, as he said himself—
“‘a family member, teacher, religious leader, employer, gang member, carer, doctor.’”
He continued:
“The point is that it is no longer necessarily automatically good enough for the defendant to say, ‘Look, she consented’, if in fact that will was suborned in some way. That might well be a very proper reason why the CPS could conclude that there had been no consent.”—[Official Report, 4 March 2020; Vol. 672, c. 304WH.]
Chris Philp
I thank the hon. Member for Rotherham for introducing her amendment and the hon. Member for Stockton North for his thoughtful speech. I think we are all united in our horror and disgust at people who abuse positions of authority or trust to do the sorts of thing that we have been discussing—there is agreement on that. The debate is really about how we can best implement the solutions that we would like to see.
This is obviously a complicated and delicate area. As Parliament has legislated that the age of consent is 16, when we deviate from that by defining circumstances where the age of consent is effectively raised to 18, we need to be careful and ensure that we are doing it in a thoughtful and well-considered way. As the hon. Member for Rotherham said, the existing legislation—sections 16 to 19 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003—defines some very specific roles, such as teacher and social worker. That is the law as it has stood for the last 18 years.
The Government have listened to the campaigns of the hon. Lady, of my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford, and of many others, and we have decided to change the law in response to the very powerful case that has been made. However, in doing so, we have tried to be thoughtful, careful and proportionate. As Members will see from the drafting of clause 45, the Government propose to extend the current “positions of trust” legislation to cover where a person is coaching, teaching, training, supervising or instructing someone on a regular basis in either sport or religion, as then subsequently defined. To answer the shadow Minister’s question, the definition of sport in this context would certainly cover things like gymnastics, swimming and so on. Therefore, the case that he powerfully made out—the awful case of Hannah that he mentioned—would of course be covered by this legislation as drafted, because it was in the context of swimming, which is a sport. I hope that reassures the shadow Minister that that awful case would be addressed by this legislation.
Alex Cunningham
It does reassure me on that point, but I wanted the Minister to reassure me about the individual music teacher as well.
Chris Philp
I think that was the constituency case raised by the hon. Member for York Central. In that case, the victim alleged rape—she was saying that there was no consent—and in cases where there is no consent, it is obviously appropriate that it is investigated as rape and prosecution is sought for rape. The legislation we are discussing today deals with cases where there is consent. I do not know the particulars of the case—the shadow Minister said that it was not subsequently proceeded with—but that is a non-consent case. We are discussing cases where, even with consent, it is still held that an offence has been committed.
I think we are agreed about the need for reform. We have listened carefully to the cases that have been made, and have made these proposals. The shadow Minister and the hon. Member for Rotherham have raised a number of questions through their amendments and in their speeches, the first of which is, “Why shouldn’t this be much broader? Rather than specifying sports and religion, why not—as amendment 7 does—have a very broad clause that says
‘if A is regularly involved in caring for, training, supervising or being in sole charge of B’?”
That is an extremely broad set of definitions, and it is not completely clear from that very broad drafting who might or might not be included in them. The shadow Minister asked, “Why be specific? Why not be general?” The first reason for wanting to be specific rather than general—specifying these two roles, religion and sport, to start with—is so that people have certainty about which side of the line they are on. If the clause is drafted very broadly—“caring, training, supervising”—supervising is an extraordinarily broad term, so it would not be immediately obvious who is included and who is not included. One of the features of good law is that the people who might be subject to it have some pretty good degree of certainty about whether they are going to be affected or not. The Government’s concern about terms as broad as “supervising” is the question of what is covered by them. What is included, and what is excluded? There are a lot of things that could be covered by the term “supervising”.
Chris Philp
I pay tribute again to the work done by the hon. Member in this area over many years and the work done by her all-party parliamentary group. I am glad that we agree on the starting point, because she has called for it and the data of her all-party parliamentary group points to it as well. The question is how it is best future-proofed and whether one tries to do so with the general provisions in amendment 7, which would run the risk of giving us a lack of clarity and potentially inadvertently criminalising some situations that hon. Members may not feel appropriate, or with the other approach of starting with these two specifics—I think we agree they are the right starting point, because the evidence points there—and adding further positions as the evidence base develops. That is what proposed new section 22A(4) of the 2003 Act will do: it will give the Secretary of State power to add other specific roles as that evidence base develops.
Chris Philp
I will say a word on that because the shadow Minister asked about it. But, before I do, I give way to him.
Alex Cunningham
There is considerable evidence to cover some of the other categories of people in a position of trust. The Minister said that we may have a different interpretation of some of the statistics, but, even if I agree with his numbers, the Bill’s provisions cover only half the children, and half would still be at risk. Should I start drafting amendments for Report that say, “Let’s include people who provide home facilities for overseas students or, perhaps, cadet force leaders”? If anyone has a strong influence over a young person, it is a cadet force leader. Should we start coming up with a list based on evidence that he might accept on Report?
Chris Philp
There may well be evidence in those areas, but the shadow Minister does not need to draft amendments for Report, because, if the Bill in its current form is passed, it will not require primary legislation to add those other categories; it will simply require a statutory instrument. Therefore, once passed—if passed in this form—the Secretary of State will of course keep this under constant review.
It will then be open to anyone, including organisations such as the APPG or people such as the shadow Minister or anyone else, to make representations to the Department—the Department will also keep it under review—that there is evidence that group X, Y or Z should be added. The case might be that they have an unusual degree of influence, capable of being abused, and that an evidence base supports that, so they should be added to the list. By virtue of a statutory instrument under subsection (4), that can be done.
Alex Cunningham
Those reassurances are helpful, but will the Minister tell us what criteria we should apply if we are to bring forward suggestions of other groupings to be included in the legislation?
Chris Philp
The criteria are not specified in subsection (4), which simply says:
“The Secretary of State may by regulations amend subsections (1) and (2) to add or remove an activity in which a person may be coached, taught, trained, supervised or instructed.”
However, providing the profession or category of person being added is involved in coaching, teaching, training, supervision or instruction—provided they do one of those things—they are capable of being added.
On the criteria that might be applied, that would be for the Secretary of State and a Delegated Legislation Committee to determine. I suggest that what would make sense is for the criteria to consider two or three things: first, the degree of influence that the person has—that case has been met in the case of sports’ coaches and religious ministers or practitioners—and, secondly, that there is an evidence base to demonstrate that abuse of that position of authority is occurring. Again, that case has been made for sports and ministers or practitioners of religion, because the data that the APPG received shows that.
I suggest to the Committee—this is not in the legislation—that if those two criteria are met, it might be appropriate to make further additions, but that would be for the Secretary of State and a Delegated Legislation Committee to decide, case by case. I have no doubt that the hon. Member for Rotherham, the APPG and others will make that case. The mechanism is there to add things pretty quickly from month to month, or year to year, as the cases get laid out.
In conclusion, it strikes the Government that the provision is the best way of protecting vulnerable people—we have started with sports and religion—but we have also created the facility to expand the list quickly and easily by delegated legislation, as the case gets made by campaigners over time. On that basis, I hope that the Committee will be content to see clause 45 stand part of the Bill. I hope that the provisions that I have been explaining mean that amendment 7 does not need to be pressed to a vote.
Chris Philp
I will briefly introduce the clause. At present, when someone commits an act of criminal damage, where the value of that damage is less than £5,000, the matter is triable summarily only, with a maximum penalty of three months’ imprisonment or a fine of up to £2,500. The clause makes a change and says that where the item being damaged is a memorial, where it commemorates someone, the offence of criminal damage is triable as an either-way offence and potentially, although not necessarily, can be heard in the Crown court with a higher sanction.
The reason for that is that there are some occasions when criminal damage is committed against, for example, a war memorial and although the financial value of the damage may be less than £5,000, the symbolic damage to society is far higher. We have particularly in mind acts that desecrate war memories; memorials to people who have sacrificed their lives for our freedom—the ultimate sacrifice. We and, I think, most of the public take the view that where their memory is desecrated in that way, it is appropriate that the courts have open to them a higher criminal sanction. It does not mean the judge has to use it. We still have judicial discretion so the judge can make a determination based on the facts of the case, but we believe that things such as desecrating war memorials and dishonouring those who have sacrificed so much should, in some circumstances, be punishable by more than just a fine and three months in prison.
Alex Cunningham
I am absolutely gobsmacked that after the Government made such a tremendous fuss in the media, with announcements in Parliament and all manner of things, that the Minister has just dismissed his clause in a matter of a couple of minutes.
Alex Cunningham
The Minister did not dismiss it, but he addressed it for two minutes after everything that went before.
Chris Philp
A point is no less powerful for brevity. In fact, some of the most powerful points are brief.
Alex Cunningham
I will not reply to the Minister by applying brevity to my speech, because we need seek reassurances from the Government on several things. It is fair to say that clause 46 generated much discussion on Second Reading, and I am glad that we are now able to discuss it a lot more fully in this focused forum. I am sure it is no surprise to the Minister to hear that we have some serious reservations about the clause.
First, we do not believe that it in any way helpfully adds to the existing law on criminal damage. Much has been made by the Government about how those who vandalise statues will feel a greater force of law in relation to their actions and could face up to 10 years in prison. Speaking in support of the proposed changes, the Home Secretary said:
“My message today is simple: actions have consequences. I want vicious individuals held to account for the violence and criminality that they perpetrate.”—[Official Report, 15 June 2020; Vol. 677, c. 542.]
That sounds very serious indeed. However, the Government’s impact assessment states:
“No additional prison capacity needs to be built because the expected prison caseload increases are less than 1 place per annum. Prison construction costs are thus treated as negligible.”
If the legislation will result in less than one prison place a year, why bother changing the mode of trial at all?
The impact assessment goes on to say:
“The number of cases that will be sentenced for this offence every year range from 10 to 60, with a best estimate of 35…These figures are based on a mixture of published research and internal projections.”
Let us say that we do get 35 cases a year. We then need to know how many would be for damage worth less than £5,000. Then, within that even smaller subsection of cases, we need to work out how many cases it would really be appropriate to send to the Crown court for sentencing. Perhaps the Minister can tell us, but my guess is that it would probably be none at all.
Then there is the issue of the utter randomness of increasing penalties for some vandalism offences in this wide-ranging crime Bill—a Bill that completely omits to make changes in the criminal law to offer more protection to victims of other types of offences, victims who are actual living breathing people, whom we believe the public at large, and Members of the House, think pose a more pressing concern to legislators. Child criminal exploitation and sexual offences are just a couple of examples that spring to mind. As the Secret Barrister has noted:
“While in practice the maximum of 10 years would rarely, if ever, be imposed, the new cross-party consensus appears to be that displaying disrespect—not even quantifiable damage—to an inanimate object is worthy of a higher maximum sentence than inflicting grievous bodily harm, violent disorder, affray, theft, carrying knives, acid or offensive weapons, voyeurism, upskirting and causing death by careless driving, to name but a few offences that cause tangible harm to real people. It would inject criminal sentencing, which already suffers from wild incoherence and inconsistency between offence types, with another dose of gratuitous disproportionality.”
I agree with the Secret Barrister on all but one part of that: there is no cross-party consensus.
The Government have done much good work to simplify the vexed and confusing world of criminal sentencing by overseeing the implementation of the sentencing code last year. Yet in clause 46—and in so many other parts of the Bill—the Government seem enthusiastic to trample across the good progress that has been made.
I would particularly welcome some information from the Minister on what guidance will be used to quantify the level of sentimental and emotional impact necessary for the case to be sent to the Crown court. Whose emotions will be measured, and how? Surely clear guidance would provide at least some protection against the “gratuitous disproportionality” about which the Secret Barrister warns.
The Sentencing Council has already helpfully provided detailed sentencing guidance on that very topic. In fact, for the offences of
“Criminal damage (other than by fire) value exceeding £5,000”
and of
“Criminal damage (other than by fire) value not exceeding £5,000”,
the guidance refers to damage to
“heritage and/or cultural assets”.
It is, therefore, already covered in law. I am no lawyer, but I strongly presume that that includes war memorials and that the sentencing court should treat that as an aggravating factor when passing sentence.
I ask again: how does clause 46 helpfully add to the law? The Opposition’s position is that it does not. It goes way beyond the anticipated proposals to address protection for war memorials. Instead of working with us to address the concerns of their Back Benchers, the Government have tried to make this a wedge issue across the political divide, to the detriment of the law. We would have been happy to engage on provisions in relation to war memorials and protections for our communal symbols of such great national sacrifice and pride, but we are certainly not happy to do so on the wide scope covered by the clause.
The clause defines a memorial as
“a building or other structure, or any other thing, erected or installed on land (or in or on any building or other structure on land)”.
That is weird: “any other thing”. Why have the Government drafted the clause so widely? I would be grateful for guidance from the Minister on what type of serious offending the Government hope to catch with that capacious definition.
Proposed new section 2(11B) reads:
“For the purposes of that paragraph, any moveable thing (such as a bunch of flowers)”.
The Bar Council notes:
“This raises the prospect that the removal of a bunch of flowers could result in proceedings in the Crown Court.”
It goes on to say:
“Putting aside questions of whether one would need to get permission to remove old bunches of flowers, such an allegation could be sent to the Crown Court if either a magistrates’ court considered the offence to be particularly serious”—
I do not think that it would—
“and beyond their maximum sentencing powers of six months’ imprisonment, or if the defendant”
opted for trial by jury. That means that somebody who has removed a bunch of flowers from a graveside could opt for a trial at the Crown court.
I know that the following example is from Scotland, but it comes from my childhood. Let us imagine that an old bunch of flowers left for commemorative purposes at the memorial for a dog such as Greyfriars Bobby—a delightful memorial that is well loved in its community—is picked up and put in the bin. Does the Minister think that the person who put the flowers in the bin should end up answering a case in the Crown court? I am sure he does not. I am sure that the intention behind the clause is not to cover that type of incident, but the fact that we could even ask the question strikes me as absurd.
Chris Philp
Let me start by answering some of the points the shadow Minister has just made. First, he questions why the measures are necessary when the Sentencing Council guidelines already have, as aggravating factors, things such as “emotional importance”. In reading out those guidelines, he acknowledged their title:
“Criminal damage (other than by fire) value exceeding £5,000”.
The whole point of this new clause is that it addresses circumstances where the value is less than £5,000. That is precisely its purpose. There may be cases where the monetary value of the damage may be less than £5,000 and therefore not subject to the Sentencing Council guidelines that he read out, but the damage to our national discourse—our national state—is significant, because war memorials represent all of those hundreds of thousands of people who gave their lives for our freedom. Even if the value of the damage is less than £5,000, the disrespect and dishonour done to those who sacrificed and secured our freedom is a matter that this Government take seriously. I am disappointed to hear that that is not something that interests him.
Alex Cunningham
The Minister is relying on these war memorials again. He is talking about them, but this is an extremely wide provision, covering all manner of memorials and of places, from individual gravestones all the way through to the Cenotaph. How on earth will a prosecutor determine the emotional value of one crime against that of another? Is the emotional value of a small grave desecrated the same as the Cenotaph?
Chris Philp
First, it is not the prosecutor who makes that determination; it is the judge. Secondly, the judge makes such determinations the whole time. Indeed, judges already make those determinations under existing sentencing guidelines for the more serious either-way offences. It will be for the judge to decide whether the nature of the damage merits a higher sentence or a lower one. That is why we have judicial discretion. I have confidence in our country’s judiciary to be able to draw the distinction between desecrating the Cenotaph, which honours the memory of hundreds of thousands of servicemen and women, versus something else.
The point is that, at present, the judiciary do not have that discretion open to them, because where the value of the damage falls under £5,000, the matter is triable summarily only, with a very low maximum penalty. The clause gives the judiciary the discretion to take into account such considerations and to sentence as appropriate. The Government’s view, clearly, is that desecrating the memory of brave servicemen and women who have given their lives in defence of our freedom is something we should stand up against. This Government are standing up against it; I do not know why the Opposition are not.
Alex Cunningham
The Minister is being unkind. In no way are we against some of the things in the Bill. We do not want to be in a position in which we are not supportive, respectful and everything else. I think he should withdraw that remark.
Chris Philp
I will be happy to withdraw my remark when the shadow Minister joins us in supporting the clause. If he does so, of course I will withdraw it.
Chris Philp
My right hon. Friend makes a powerful point. That is exactly the purpose of the clause. The monetary value, the £5,000, does not reflect the profound emotional damage that can be caused when something like a war memorial is desecrated.
The shadow Minister asked how it will be decided whether a matter is heard in the Crown court or in the magistrates court. As he rightly said, the defendant always has the right of election for an either-way offence but, generally, the allocation decision is set out in the allocation guidelines of 2016. A decision is based on whether the anticipated sentence will exceed the magistrates’ sentencing powers—if the magistrates think that it might exceed their sentencing power, they will send up to the Crown court—or if the case is of unusual legal or factual complexity.
There is therefore a flexible system for deciding where a case is heard. Some of the cases might be heard in the Crown court and some in the magistrates court, depending on the facts of the case, so by no means does it follow that everything will end up in the Crown court. It is true that the number of anticipated offences is low— between 10 and 60 a year—but we are talking about acts that desecrate the memory of servicemen and women. I hope that that the Committee can agree on that in supporting the clause.
Alex Cunningham
Will the Minister confirm that all the offences captured in those statistics were against war memorials?
Chris Philp
The impact assessment covered all offences that might be caught by the clause, clearly many of which might well be war memorials. We have seen examples of war memorials being desecrated and the Cenotaph was attacked last July. A war memorial in the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Corby was desecrated—indeed, it was possibly even destroyed—and he led a campaign to get it replaced. Sadly, such things happen, and it is important that we as a House send out a message that we stand with our servicemen and women when their memory is attacked in that way.
Chris Philp
Clause 53 seeks to extend to prison escort and custody service officers the right to accompany prisoners in police stations, such as for the purpose of conducting video remand hearings. Owing to an historical anomaly, they are unable to discharge that function at the moment. It became clear during the coronavirus, where video remand hearings were used quite widely to avoid having to take a prisoner to court, that PECS officers did not have those powers, so we had to ask police officers to do that instead, which took up a lot of police time. The police did that, and I pay tribute to them for doing so, but that took up police officer time that could have been spent out on patrol arresting criminals.
The clause amends the Criminal Justice Act 1991 to provide PECS officers with those powers to have custody over prisoners in police stations, for the purpose of overseeing preliminary sentencing enforcement hearings by way of live links. It is a good operational improvement that I hope will make things more efficient where it is appropriate to use it.
Amendments 64 to 67 make some small technical amendments to the clause, because there were some references to a piece of legislation that is being repealed. They simply replace those reference with the correct ones.
Alex Cunningham
We understand what the Government are trying to achieve in this clause, but we have a number of concerns about what it will lead to in the longer term. I would welcome some ministerial assurances that those concerns will be considered.
Before that, I thank Transform Justice for its energetic scrutiny of the amendment, which I am sure will add much value to the debate. The Government’s fact sheet describes clause 53 as
“enabling legislation to ensure that any future VRH rollout is not reliant on police resource, which would be an ineffective and inefficient use of their training and skills”.
It also notes that the implementation plan for rolling out video remand hearings across police stations
“is being developed and not yet finalised”,
and that
“A solution to the long-term structural and resourcing issues is required”
to facilitate the roll-out. In that case, it does not seem necessary to include it in the Bill.
If there is so much work to be done to have proper functioning video remand hearings, why are the Government bringing that forward at this time? We take a similar position to that of the Law Society, which says that although it supports the use of prisoner custody officers to facilitate video remand hearings during the pandemic, it does not believe it should be a permanent feature of the justice system.
The rationale for legislating to increase the use of audio and video live links across the Bill seems somewhat confused. On the one hand, the need for covid-19 protection is mentioned; on the other, the measures are justified on the grounds of efficiency and modernisation. The covid-19 motivation is particularly confusing, given that the Bill will not be enacted for some time, when the covid safety of courts will, we hope, no longer be an issue. Can the Minister tell the Committee the motivation for video remand hearings beyond the pandemic?
Even more problematic is the lack of evidence to back up the functioning of the proposals. Even now that we have been living with the pandemic measures for a year, we still have no evidence beyond the anecdotal about the extremely significant changes to how we run hearings. This is one of a number of remand changes made during the pandemic for which we are seriously lacking detail. The other, more concerning, one is that in September 2020 the Government increased the length of time they are legally allowed to hold people on remand from six to eight months, a provision in place until 28 June 2021. While I am on the topic, I would welcome an assurance from the Minister that the custody time limit extension will lapse, and he will stick to his word in the SI Committee some months ago and it will not be extended again.
To go back to clause 53, before the pandemic very few police forces ran video remand courts. Where they did, defendants detained by the police post charge would not be taken to court for their first appearance, but would appear from police custody by video link, with their lawyer, the judge, the prosecutor and so on in the physical courtroom. When the pandemic hit, PECS contractors, who usually transport these remanded defendants to the court, said that courts and court cells were not covid-safe enough and refused to transport all the prisoners who needed to go to court, so police forces in almost every area agreed to set up makeshift courtrooms in police custody suites that would be video linked to the magistrates court. The police agreed to run these courts purely on an emergency basis and were not paid to do so by Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service. As the first wave eased and the courts implemented their own covid-19 safety procedures, police stopped running video remand courts and most areas reverted to the traditional arrangement.
We are not aware of any significant concerns with the traditional arrangement, so again I ask: why do we need this clause, which lays the groundwork for even more video remand courts in the future? There are significant cost implications to running the hearings in this way. The Government have published an economic impact assessment for the use of PECS staff in police custody. This shows a positive cost-benefit, but the assumptions need some further scrutiny.
To quote from the material provided by Transform Justice:
“PECS staff would only be used in custody if the police agreed to run video remand courts permanently. Despite the government stating ‘VRHs will indeed be rolled out at some point in the future’…no such agreement has been reached—police forces have given no commitment to running and hosting video remand courts. Given that most police forces are not running video remand courts currently, the installation of video remand courts nationwide would incur considerable costs for the police, including premises costs, IT infrastructure costs, costs of keeping defendants in cells for longer, and staff costs. During the first months of the pandemic the costs incurred by police in running emergency video remand courts were considerable—the Met had to use 45 staff to manage the process and estimated the operation cost the equivalent of £2 million a year. Though some police costs would be offset through the support of PECS, it would still cost police staff time to liaise with PECS staff and would incur the other costs. The ‘Do nothing’ option in the economic assessment assumes that the police costs of running video remand hearings have already been budgeted for by local forces—but this is not the case.”
I know it is a very long quote, Mr McCabe, but it continues:
“The economic impact assessment suggests that the PECS staff in police custody are in addition to existing PECS staff. PECS staff will still need to transport defendants from police custody to court and to supervise prisoners at court. Therefore, if PECS staff allocated to police custody for video remand hearings are additional, PECS costs will be greater, police will incur significant costs and the courts will still need to be able to accommodate some of those who have been detained by the police in court cells. We therefore suggest that the economic impact assessment does not encompass any of the costs associated with having PECS staff in police custody, so the cost-benefit cannot be judged.”
I would welcome the Minister’s comments on Transform Justice’s analysis because, as far as I can see, the economic justification for the measure goes to the root of why it is being proposed. Furthermore, will the Minister accept that the implementation of the PECS staff in police custody proposal should be contingent on a full cost-benefit analysis of video remand hearings versus the physical equivalents? If he is not prepared to do that, why not?
We have reservations about the impact that this change would have on justice. It is vital that changes to our justice system that would impact on the very principles that underlie it, such as the right to a fair trial, are properly tested before they are introduced. The stakes are too high for us to get it wrong, so will the Minister consider safeguards to make sure we get this right? These include that every defendant who may be assigned a video remand hearing should be subject to full health and mental health screening, and if necessary an assessment, by a health professional before the case is listed; that this screening information and needs assessments from police custody are made available to the bench or judge before that day’s court hearings start; that a simple system is set up to bring those defendants immediately to court whom the bench or judge deems need face-to-face hearings; and that all those who are deemed vulnerable—vulnerable adults and all children—should automatically be assigned a physical hearing.
We do not really see the need for the provisions in the clause, but I stand open to hear the Minister’s justification for it. If need can be demonstrated for it, we would welcome the Government’s commitment to the safeguards to access to justice that I have just raised, alongside the further cost-benefit analysis.
Chris Philp
I thank the shadow Minister for his speech, and for the thoughtful questions that he has posed in it. As he says, this is enabling legislation to create the option of using PECS officers this way in the future. We were rather caught by surprise during the pandemic when it transpired that these powers did not exist at a time when we wanted to use lots of video remand hearings for obvious, covid-related reasons. As the shadow Minister said, this Bill will hopefully receive Royal Assent some time after coronavirus has become a memory and is behind us. None the less, these enabling powers are worth taking, because it is conceivable that in future, even after coronavirus, we may want to use video remand hearings more than was done previously, which was essentially not at all.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill (Fifth sitting)
Alex Cunningham ExcerptsTuesday 25th May 2021
(3 years, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 View all Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 25 May 2021 - (25 May 2021)
Sarah Champion
My hon. Friend knows the issues intimately and has tried to address them in the past. She speaks with a great deal of experience and she is absolutely right. I was speaking to my district commander about the clause on Friday. He said, “The biggest problem we have is that the culture in the force is basically to deal with it, and we are weak if we try to raise concerns.” My response to him was that in the armed forces, particularly in the last 10 years, they have completely turned that culture around because there was the will and impetus to do that. I am incredibly impressed by the level of self-awareness, recognition and support that the armed forces have when people start to feel the impact of trauma.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
Further to what my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood said, the number of police officers who are off sick as a direct result of trauma and related activity demonstrates that the problem is huge. The evidence is there for the change that we propose.
Sarah Champion
This is what I do not understand: throughout my career in Parliament I have tried to focus on prevention, because it is cheaper. The bottom line shows that it is much better at the beginning to teach police officers or back room office staff how to identify trauma, how to deal with it and how to get help. That is why I say to the Minister that, within the covenant and with the opportunities she is given to follow through on her own’s party’s commitment to produce the covenant, we need trauma training and the necessary support in black and white in the police covenant.
Police forces have an organisational responsibility to support the wellbeing of their workforce. The College of Policing published a wellbeing framework, which outlines standards to benchmark their wellbeing services, but that is voluntary. The college has also issued specific guidance on responding to trauma in policing and psychological risk management. Let me offer some more facts and stats—people who know me know that I love a statistic. The 2019 police wellbeing survey identified some really worrying mental health data, finding that 67.1% of police officers responding reported post-traumatic stress symptoms that would warrant an evaluation for post-traumatic stress disorder. That is two thirds of the police. A Police Federation survey of 18,000 members found that
“Attending traumatic and/or distressing incidents”
was one of the top 10 reasons why respondents were having psychological difficulties at work.
Let me pick up on the phrase “psychological difficulties at work”. Such difficulties have an impact on the individual, their colleagues, and the public. I have done an awful lot of work with survivors, predominantly of child abuse but of abuse in general as well. The level of response and empathy that they get from that first police officer tends to dictate how the rest of that process goes and, ultimately, whether they are able to secure the conviction of the perpetrator. If that police officer has undiagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder and is unable to access support, what will that first interaction with the victim be? It will be poor. That is not the officer’s fault; it is our fault for not putting the support in place to enable them to identify the issue at the time.
Sarah Champion
I completely agree with the right hon. Gentleman. GCHQ has a large footprint in his constituency, so he has seen at first hand that correct identification and the provision of early intervention and support prevent these issues arising. Unfortunately, in the police force that is a voluntary duty. The police covenant gives us the opportunity to put in the Bill that that needs to be addressed. It is simple, it is cheap, and it involves an hour’s training and signposting to existing resources.
Some 23% of respondents to the Police Federation survey had sought help for their feelings of stress, low mood, anxiety and other difficulties. Let us contrast that with the 67% who were recognised as having undiagnosed PTSD: just 23% of the nearly 70% who had those symptoms sought help.
Alex Cunningham
My hon. Friend will remember that when she was questioning Assistant Commissioner Hewitt about the availability of support, he said:
“An issue that we undoubtedly have around wellbeing and the occupational health service provision is the restricted amount of capacity… In all circumstances, where we want to refer officers or staff for support, one of our frustrations is that it often takes quite a while to access that support.”––[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 18 May 2021; c. 6, Q3.]
Does she agree that if we had proper training up front, so that people were trained almost to expect traumatic experiences, the pressure on the system when they undergo them would be all the less?
Sarah Champion
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That is what I mean when I talk about recognition, a change of culture and early intervention. Members probably do not know that I trained and qualified as a psychodynamic counsellor. My very first client was a miner who had been buried alive—he was stuck underground. I was in my early 20s and he was in his mid-50s, and we looked at one another and both went, “Oh my God. This is what I have to deal with,” but as it was a post-traumatic stress disorder and he had come very soon after the event had happened, we managed to resolve the issue within four sessions.
With post-traumatic stress disorder, early intervention is key. If it is left for years—decades, in some cases—it becomes so embedded and ingrained in someone’s psychological make-up that it becomes a really big issue that affects every single aspect of life. It is important to recognise the early signs, which could be covered at the very beginning of training; it could even be an hour-long online training course. We need the police to be able to recognise it themselves. That is where we need to get to, and that is what the police covenant could do.
Returning to the survey, of those police officers who sought help 34% reported that they were poorly or very poorly supported by the police service. Of those with line management responsibility, only 21.8% could remember being given any training on how to support the staff in health and wellbeing.
Members of the National Association of Retired Police Officers have supplied me with examples of the sorts of incidents that they have to deal with. I apologise as they are shocking, but not unnecessarily so, I hope. This is the first case study:
“I served as a traffic sergeant. Part of the role was as a road death scene manager. I attended the scene of many deaths on the roads. I then went to a child abuse investigation, where I got promoted to DI. Whilst a temporary DI, my wife’s best friend and our neighbour hanged herself and I cut the body down. I got symptoms in relation to this straight away and things didn’t get better.
Now 11 years down the line, I have chronic PTSD, the side effects of which are severe depression, anxiety attacks and extreme mood swings. Now, it’s always at the back of my mind that if I’d had early intervention when I asked for it, maybe things would have been different.”
The following is case study 2:
“Operational experiences include attending suicides. For example, within my first few weeks of returning from training school, I attended a suicide where the victim lay on the railway tracks and was hit by a train. I assisted in the recovery of the remains of the victim.
Also, a man jumped off a tall office building and landed headfirst. I was the first on the scene to see the massive head trauma he had suffered.
They were all extremely distressing sights and I have difficulty getting them out of my head, even now.
These are just a few examples where I wasn’t offered any psychological support. I wasn’t even asked if I was okay. It was just seen by everybody as part of the job: suck it up and get on to the next thing.
I retired medically in 1999 as a result of injuries received on duty. I have suffered with complex PTSD and health issues ever since. I am currently waiting to receive further treatment from the NHS. I have received nothing from the police by way of support, even at the time of my retirement.”
Alex Cunningham
Another example comes from my personal experience. When I worked for the gas industry, I went to a gas explosion to handle the associated public relations. As went towards the building where the explosion had taken place, a fireman coming out the door said to me, “It’s not very pleasant in there.” I went in—I had to find out exactly what had happened—and there was the torso of a woman. That was 30-odd years ago, and it lives with me to this day. I got no support whatsoever—I did not even think about it. Perhaps that is all the more reason why we need to ensure that at least our emergency workers are getting the support they need as soon as possible.
Sarah Champion
Exactly. My hon. Friend used the phrase, “I did not even think about it” and that is what we have to change. The police covenant gives us the opportunity to turn that around and have a culture in which, if someone sees something traumatic, it will be automatic to check in on them to see if they are okay. If they are okay, that is good, and they can move on. Our police are suffering the most extreme trauma day in, day out. They do not know it when they get up in the morning but they have no idea what they will face when they open that door. Think of the stress that puts on their bodies—stress that can be alleviated.
Sarah Champion
I completely agree. Now is the perfect time for those reasons, and also because hopefully we are coming out of the pandemic. The service that the police gave during the pandemic was exceptional. We should recognise the personal trauma that caused to them, by ensuring that the need for trauma support is recognised in the police covenant. That would be the greatest respect we can show.
Alex Cunningham
When my hon. Friend questioned John Apter, the national chair of the Police Federation of England and Wales, she asked whether he supported this measure. He said:
“Absolutely, it needs to be meaningful and tangible, and it needs to have a benefit for those it is there to support—not only officers, but staff, volunteers and retired colleagues.”
He went on to say about training:
“I have had this conversation with the College of Policing, and part of that is the lack of ability or willingness to mandate particular aspects of training and support.”
The most important part of his evidence was:
“The covenant gives us a great opportunity to put in place mandated levels of psychological support and training from the start of somebody’s service to its conclusion and beyond.”––[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 18 May 2021; c. 20, Q30.]
I am sure my hon. Friend will welcome the fact that the Police Federation is fully behind the amendment.
Sarah Champion
I do welcome it, but it is not just the Police Federation, NARPO or the College of Policing that are saying that; it is what I hear when I speak to serving officers. I had a long conversation with my district commander about this on Friday, and he cited case after case of officers entering a building, having a traumatic experience, and then him trying to give them support. However, what tends to happen is that the support is not in place, the waiting list is too long and they then go off on long-term sick leave. While off on long-term sick leave, the issue is compounded so it becomes even more of an issue. I paraphrase, but basically he said to me: “When we are able to offer early intervention, the officer comes back and carries on serving. When we are not, we know that they are going to be off for a very long time, if indeed they come back at all.”
I say to the Minister that this amendment is a common-sense courtesy. It is a way for the House and the Minister to make a clear commitment to recognising mental health and trauma, and showing the respect and duty that we have to our police force.
Alex Cunningham
My hon. Friend will recollect the evidence given by John Apter during the evidence sessions. He quoted Martin Hewitt:
“You heard from Mr Hewitt that assaults on officers, staffers and other emergency workers have increased by 19% during the pandemic—some horrific levels of attacks—and very often, my colleagues say that they feel they are treated as a second-class victim.”––[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 18 May 2021; c. 21, Q33.]
Does my hon. Friend agree that, having seen that surge, what she is trying to achieve is all the more important?
Sarah Jones
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Throughout the period of covid, I have been talking to John Apter, Martin Hewitt and others. The impact on police staff—the exhaustion—of not being able to take leave for long periods of time and of those increased assaults has been significant. We need to reflect that.
As of March 2020, there were 2,578 police officers on long-term sick leave. More than half of long-term police officer absence is due to sick leave. In 2019, the national police wellbeing survey identified some worrying mental health data, which we have heard about. Some 18,066 police officers and 14,526 police staff responded to the survey, and 67.1% of respondents reported post-traumatic stress symptoms that would warrant an evaluation for PTSD. The average anxiety score for police officers was moderately high and their average depression score was moderate. They were not given the vaccine as a priority, so they were running into danger with that threat, and they have also had a pay freeze. This is an opportunity to show that we appreciate the work that they do, and to acknowledge that we can do better in giving them more support in the job that we ask them to do.
Sarah Jones
I agree. When we consider the severe and significant impact of such crashes and traumas, as well as the day-to-day experience, as my hon. Friend said, of trying to deal with people fleeing county lines or fleeing crisis, we need to ensure that the British Transport police are as strong as they can be in response.
British Transport police officers are often victims of assault when carrying out their duties. On average, 21.5% of British Transport officers and police community support officers—about one in five—are assaulted each year. In the previous year to date, there were 470 assaults on British Transport police officers and community support officers. In the last year, during covid, even though the number of people using the trains went right down, assaults increased marginally. I guess that is understandable given the nature of what those officers are trying to enforce: disputes over wearing face masks or coverings on a train. There have been several incidents resulting in spitting or coughing as a method of aggravation towards either the victim on the train or the British Transport police. The Opposition’s key argument is that the British Transport police’s service is no lesser just because it happens to sit with the Department for Transport. Surely we could bring them in as part of the covenant and give them the same status as those in other police forces.
In the initial conversations about why the British Transport police, the Civil Nuclear constabulary and the Ministry of Defence police were not included, we were told that it was not feasible to put them in the Bill because they sit in different Departments: the Department for Transport, the Ministry of Defence and the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. However, they are included in other parts of the Bill such as the clauses that refer to police driving standards. If we can include them there, presumably we could include them here.
The key point about the police covenant, which we heard in our evidence last week, is that we do not want it to be just warm words; we want it to make a tangible difference to the experience of those in the police service. It is possible to include all police forces in the Bill, and it is surely the right thing to do. I would be grateful for the Minister to confirm that she has heard and understands that and perhaps will take steps to address it.
I turn to new clause 44. We want our police to have proper mental health support, as we have heard, but we want local health bodies to have due regard to the principles of the covenant, instead of the Secretary of State reporting on these issues and presenting back to police forces. New clause 44 emulates part of what the Government have provided for the military in the Armed Forces Bill, which puts a legal duty on local healthcare bodies. The words, “due regard”, have previously been used in other legislation, such as the public sector equality duty contained in section 149 of the Equality Act 2010, which requires public authorities to have due regard to several equality considerations when exercising their functions.
We think it would be good to enshrine these measures into the police covenant and in law, particularly on an issue as crucial as health. By emulating the wording of the relevant section of the Armed Forces Bill, new clause 44 does not specify the outcomes but simply ensures that the principles of the police covenant are followed and that police officers, staff and relevant family members are not at a disadvantage. I am aware that this is one of many issues, but the stark figures that we have all been talking about this morning mean there is not really a reason why adequate healthcare support for police and retired police would not be included in the covenant.
Clause 1(7) says:
“A police covenant report must state whether, in the Secretary of State’s opinion”.
I want to pick up on that, because it is important to remember that the covenant should be about providing the police with support that has a meaningful impact on their situation. Chief Superintendent Griffiths put it well when he said at the evidence session last week that
“a police covenant is almost the sector asking the Government for additional support or assistance, or to rule out any adverse impact on police officers, and for the Government to play their role across all other public agencies to try to level the ground and make sure everything is fair and supportive for policing.”––[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 18 May 2021; c. 29, Q44.]
I hope the Minister will consider supporting new clause 44, which I am sure would have the full backing of the House.
Finally, I turn to amendment 77, which is absolutely crucial and goes to the heart of how the covenant should work going forward. The amendment would set up an oversight board for the covenant, with an independent chair and membership of police organisations that would review the annual report before it is laid before Parliament. The amendment would also allow the Secretary of State to appoint other people to the oversight board as they deem appropriate. In essence, the amendment would ensure that the covenant does not have Ministers marking their own homework. The point of the covenant is not for the Home Secretary to decide whether the police are doing what they should be doing; the point is that the police should be working with the Home Secretary to make sure the police are getting the support that they need.
Alex Cunningham
I always think of the expression, “do with”, rather than “do to”, and I am sure my hon. Friend agrees that working closely with the different organisations outlined in the clause will add considerable value to what the Government are trying to achieve. Better than that, it will have better outcomes for the police officers involved.
Sarah Jones
My hon. Friend is exactly right in how he describes what the covenant should be about and how it should work.
Alex Cunningham
The Minister will have heard me quoting John Apter earlier. Having talked to the College of Policing, he said that there is a
“lack of ability or willingness to mandate particular aspects of training and support.”—[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 18 May 2021; c. 20, Q30.]
Does she not think that it is time they were given that ability so that, were willing, they could alter the training to suit changing circumstances and the needs of police officers?
Victoria Atkins
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his question. He touches upon one of those imponderables, in that the police are operationally independent. There is always a balancing act, for Ministers of any Government, of any colour, in persuading, cajoling, directing and working with the police to ensure that their training meets both the expectations of the public and the needs of police staff. That is why the police want to come with us on this journey, because we are working together on this. I cannot be as directional as he is perhaps suggesting.
However, the fact that we are having these debates in Parliament is significant. We plan for the board to have its inaugural meeting during the scrutiny of this Parliament, and very senior people, who take what this House says very seriously, will be around the table. Having this debate will very much help them understand their responsibilities in this regard. I note that Paul Griffiths said in giving evidence last week:
“There is a need for consistency across occupational health standards, but I think that could be achieved through the programme management rather than through legislation.”—[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 18 May 2021; c. 20, Q30.]
That is really what we are trying to address in clause 1.
The hon. Member for Croydon Central kindly invited me to meet Sam from the Green Ribbon Policing campaign to discuss some of these issues, and I would be delighted to do so. We are very much in listening mode as to how we can improve our plans for this clause. We have kept the wording deliberately broad to ensure that there is room within the legislation to allow the Secretary of State to consider issues of importance as they arise, and the issues that have been raised here will be included in those considerations.
We have built flexibility into the clause through paragraphs (a) to (c) of subsection (2), to be addressed if considered appropriate. We very much want to strike the right balance, by directing the substance of the report without being too prescriptive. As the aim of the covenant is to focus on issues directly relevant to members or former members of the police workforce, we will be establishing a police covenant governance structure, along with key policing stakeholders, to feed directly into the police covenant report. This structure will support us in prioritising the most relevant issues to the police year on year, and ensure that the report reflects that.
Amendment 77 seeks to place the police covenant oversight board on a statutory footing. I hope that it is apparent from what I have said already that we do intend to establish such a board, albeit on a non-statutory basis, to drive the strategic direction of the covenant, to set priorities and to monitor progress, which will feed into the Home Secretary’s annual report to Parliament. The board will comprise key representatives from across policing, but we consider it appropriate for the board to be chaired by the Minister for Policing. As part of our plans to establish the board, we will ensure that its important work feeds into the police covenant report.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill (Sixth sitting)
Alex Cunningham ExcerptsTuesday 25th May 2021
(3 years, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 View all Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 25 May 2021 - (25 May 2021)
Sarah Jones
I thank my hon. Friend for allowing me to get a glass of water.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
I am really pleased that my hon. Friend has raised the issue of looked-after children. When I was the lead member for children and young people in Stockton, there was forever a group of young people whom we knew needed extra support, yet we found out that many of these young people ended up in the prison system later in life, which was a terrible tragedy. More power to her elbow, because we really need to tackle the problem early. I am sure she agrees with that.
Sarah Jones
I completely agree.
When we talk about violent crime, there is often a moral panic about what is happening, and we often see very polarised responses. Either it is all about more policing and more resources, or it is about tougher sentencing—throwing people in prison and throwing away the key. Actually, we need to have a much more grown-up conversation about the causes of these issues and what the solutions are. I hope, and I think we all hope, that this part of the Bill is a step in the right direction towards doing that.
Moving on to the amendments that we have tabled, having held roundtable discussions and spoken to policing organisations, charities and others, I am concerned that, as currently drafted, the Bill will not deliver the results that we intend. There is a lot of talk of the need for a public-health approach to tackling serious violence that seeks to address the root causes, and we welcome the Government’s acknowledgement of the need to shift the focus towards that. However, we do not believe that, as currently drafted, the proposals amount to a public health approach. We, along with several agencies, are concerned that there could be a number of unintended consequences for both children and the agencies involved if the statutory public-health duty is created without achieving the desired result of reducing the number of children who are harmed by serious violence.
A vision for tackling serious violence that does not also help to protect children from harm, does not include the full range of partners and interventions needed, and does not consider some of the more structural factors that contribute to violence, will not deliver the outcome that we want. We need a broader strategy that equips the safeguarding system and the statutory and voluntary services to protect children from harm, with the resources and guidance to do so. It should embed a response that takes account of the context in which children are at risk and that is trauma-informed, as we were discussing this morning. A duty for serious violence that presents these issues as distinct from wider safeguarding duties could lead to a more punitive approach to those children, which evidence suggests is inadequate to reduce violence. Of course, implementation of a new duty without additional resources will be difficult for services that are already tasked with rising demand and crisis management options, and have low staff retention.
Amendment 78, and the amendments to other clauses, make the specified authorities involved in the serious violence duty safeguard children at risk of or experiencing harm. In particular, amendments 80 and 86 refer to children involved in serious violence in the area as a result of being a victim of modern slavery and trafficking offences under the Modern Slavery Act 2015. The point we are trying to make is that the statutory duty to reduce violence cannot be effective on its own, without a statutory duty to safeguard children.
As an example, I met police from Exeter because there is a county line from London to Exeter, and the police had been working to tackle that issue. A senior police officer told me that there had been a number of occasions on which they had picked up a child at the coach station because they can quite often tell if someone is bringing drugs to the area, as they will get off the coach on their own with just a rucksack—the police pick up young children who are doing that. On several occasions, that senior police officer had to sit with the child in his office for hours because nobody would come to collect them. Perhaps the child is in foster care, which is very often the case, and because they have been found with drugs, the foster parents will not have them back. The local authority might not have any emergency foster carers and so cannot take the child back, and nobody will come to look after them. That child is committing a crime, but they are also a child who ends up sitting there playing computer games in a senior police officer’s office in Exeter because nobody has worked out how to join things together and look after them.
Sarah Jones
Yes, my hon. Friend is right. They all need to join up, but some organisations have asked questions about how such things will join up effectively to ensure that offshoots of activity are pulled together as one whole.
New clause 47 would ensure that the bodies under the duty collaborate and plan to prevent and reduce child criminal exploitation and safeguard affected children. The new clause takes the definition of modern criminal exploitation from new clause 17, tabled by my hon. Friend, which would amend the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to introduce this statutory definition of child criminal exploitation:
“Another person manipulates, deceives, coerces or controls the person to undertake activity which constitutes a criminal offence and the person is under the age of 18.”
The definition would cover activities such as debt bondage and GPS tracking by gang leaders of those coerced into running county lines. When I was in Birmingham a few weeks ago, I heard about very young gang members. Yes, they were scared, but they were so invested in their criminal gang leaders, whom they saw as their family, that they were prepared to commit crimes that would put them in prison for very small amounts of money. They genuinely believed that was the most sensible choice available to them. They were clearly exploited, but there is not necessarily a definition in place to respond appropriately to that.
As my hon. Friend said, children who are groomed and exploited by criminal gangs are the victims, not the criminals. Many different organisations have flagged, as witnesses said last week, the fact that the absence of that statutory definition makes it harder for agencies to have a co-ordinated and effective response to vulnerable children.
The serious violence duty is a unique opportunity to bring together all the relevant authorities for training and action at a local level. In the past decade, county lines drug dealing has been a major driver of serious violence across the country. I am afraid that since the National Crime Agency’s first county lines assessment in 2015, the Government have been slow to respond, and cuts across the public sector have made things worse. Sadly, county lines drug networks rely on the grooming of vulnerable children to act as drug runners. They are badly exploited, then abandoned when they are no longer of use to the gang leaders. The Children’s Commissioner for England has estimated that 27,000 children are gang members. Modelling done by crime and justice specialists, Crest Advisory, identified 213,000 vulnerable children.
Children and vulnerable young people experiencing serious violence require a different response from that given to adults, and being involved in violence is often an indicator that children are experiencing other significant problems in their lives, such as being criminally exploited. Despite growing recognition of child criminal exploitation, there are still concerns that many children and young people involved in exploitation are not being identified or sufficiently supported by statutory services. Too often, these young people only come to the attention of the authorities when they are picked up by the police, caught in possession of drugs or weapons, or through involvement in a violent assault.
I should also mention the important issue of young girls who are involved in gang activity. I met a young girl who had been involved and had been injured as a result. She was in a hotel room with several gang members, who had money and drugs. The police had raided the hotel and arrested all the boys, but told the girl to be on her way because they did not know how to respond to her. She was in danger and was being exploited, but the police response was not there because they were not used to dealing with girls in that situation. Presumably they thought they were being kind, but they were actually leaving a girl who had been exploited to potentially still be in danger.
Alex Cunningham
When I was a member of the Education Committee, we carried out an inquiry around support, particularly for girls, and we had an evidence session with young people. A 16-year-old girl, who had been a victim of exploitation, had been placed in an out-of-town YMCA somewhere in Kent, to live there until the authorities sorted out what needed to happen with her. She told stories of men braying at her door at night asking her to come and party. That is all the more reason why we need a multi-agency approach, so that girls like her are properly protected.
Sarah Jones
Sadly, that tale is probably not uncommon. I am sure that the response of agencies to girls is better than it was, but it is still not joined up in a way that provides the support that is needed.
Children and young people who are victims of child criminal exploitation and gang violence are not being identified in time to save their lives, literally, and to save other people’s lives, despite frequent opportunities to do so. Communications between agencies and the recording and sharing of data is often poor, and support for at-risk children is inconsistent. As the 2019 report on gangs and exploitation by the previous Children’s Commissioner found, only a fraction of children involved in gang violence are known to children’s services.
The experience of being criminally exploited is extremely traumatising to children, and it is unlikely they will be able to escape these abusive experiences and rehabilitate without significant professional support. The approach to tackling child criminal exploitation must combine effective enforcement with long-term safeguarding and support strategies that are focused on managing long-term risks as well as the immediate ones. Too often vulnerable children receive crisis-driven care, not the long-term trust that they need, which would be provided by preventative support.
As part of criminal exploitation, children may be threatened into carrying knives or perpetrating violence against rival groups. It is important to understand the underlying causes of why children might be involved in violence and for these underlying causes in a child’s life or in the lives of children within a certain area to be addressed. This would involve adopting a more universal understanding of how children are coerced, controlled and threatened into serious violence, taking disruption action against those who coerce and control children, and ensuring that the response to children is centred on addressing their needs, fears and experiences.
Alex Cunningham
I am just reflecting on the attitude of the professionals who do not actually understand or do not have a clear enough definition with which to work. What changes do they want to ensure clarity and that they can better protect people?
Sarah Champion
My hon. Friend is absolutely right to raise that. I am going off on a slight tangent, but The Times is tomorrow coming out with an article about child sexual exploitation. One of the key indicators of that is children going missing, and it cites the case of one girl who went missing 197 times, each time being reported to the police—this is recently—but the police still did not act. Just having the definition is not enough. This is about the issues that my hon. Friend the Member for Croydon Central described. It is about the training, public awareness, and all the agencies working together when they see that child. What I have found with the CSE definition is that having that hook does really sharpen and focus professionals’ minds around it. We have taken huge strides when it comes to child sexual exploitation, because we have that definition in place and because there is a level playing field when talking about it.
Alex Cunningham
I am interested to hear the Minister say that there is training to address local issues. I accept that that is a factor. Surely, though, there should be a consistent training programme across all professions to ensure that everybody is approaching these matters in the same way, albeit taking account of local factors as well.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill (Third sitting)
Alex Cunningham ExcerptsThursday 20th May 2021
(3 years, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 View all Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 20 May 2021 - (20 May 2021)
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
Q
Helen Berresford: I am happy to go first. You are right that we are concerned about the disclosure period. One of the other points that I would raise is that obviously the new proposal is for two tiers—a diversionary caution and a community caution. One of the things that we would really like to see from this is a growing use of out-of-court disposals to keep people out of the formal justice system, which we know has a positive impact. The more we can use them, the better. What we do not want to see with this new approach is more people being given the upper-tier caution as a result of it being two tier. We want to see more people coming into out-of-court disposals more broadly. We need to be aware of the risk of more people having the one that has more conditions attached to it, which makes it more difficult.
The second point is very much about the disclosure period. If we take the disclosure period out, we have much more of a chance to use out-of-court disposals in a positive way that does not put up additional barriers and gives people the chance to move on and not to get engaged with the formal justice system.
Sam Doohan: I entirely agree with Helen about the disclosure periods for the new upper-tier caution. That is certainly a problem; I will not re-tread that entirely. One of the other concerns that we have about the new cautions is that now, at least in the adult regime, there will only be conditional cautions, which require a fairly in-depth process of paperwork to set and monitor conditions and ensure compliance. There is now no other caution option available. Those cautions will be delivered largely on an individual officer level and by individual forces.
As a result, forces will be much more hesitant to use a caution. Whereas in the past, they might have been quite content to give a simple caution and send someone on their way with a formal warning or reprimand, now the force in question will have to take on the burden of monitoring, compliance and potentially re-arresting someone if they breach conditions. They will be forced either to go above the caution and see more cases through to prosecution, even though it would not necessarily be in the public interest to do so, or not to take action at all.
As we know with the criminal justice system as a whole, when we start having these slightly weighted decisions about who falls into what tier of disposal, those who are from disadvantaged backgrounds, along the lines of race and religion, almost universally fall into the harsher end, and those who are not do not. We are creating a system that incentivises busy working police officers to say, “Actually, I am going to make this the CPS’s problem, not mine, and I have the choice of who to do it to.” Is that going to lead to good criminal justice outcomes? We think it may not. We do not know yet—I stress that—because it has not been studied, but it does have the characteristics of a system that will not have the desired outcomes.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Campbell Robb: We do have that concern. The Government’s own impact assessment suggests that that might be the case, and that it was in the public interest to continue. We know that, at every stage, young BAME youths, in particular, are disproportionately likely to be stopped and searched, and to end up in the system in different ways. We do have that concern. We would like to see more evidence used to understand what the impact of the proposals might be. We know from previous proposals and reports, such as David Lammy’s, that the system is not working in the way that it could, and there is nothing in the Bill that will positively change that. We urge the Government to think about whether there is more that we could do on that through the passage of the Bill.
Sam Doohan: One important thing to keep an eye on is that the out-of-court disposal family is one that requires co-operation from the person who is receiving the disposal. That is fine if you have a community that is reasonably homogenous and where there is no tension with the police, because people are much more likely to co-operate. They may not see the police as being friendly, but they at least understand the interaction better.
Where there is less community cohesion and there are people from all manner of underprivileged backgrounds who historically do not have good relationships with the police and are less likely to be co-operative, that again puts us in a situation where the out-of-court disposals and their relatively lesser impact on someone throughout the rest of their life will end up going to people from relatively more privileged backgrounds, and those who end up being prosecuted and receiving full convictions will be people from disadvantaged backgrounds.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Helen Berresford: No, I think that is right. Sam has just explained that very well. I think that there is a risk. We can see across a number of the proposals and, as Campbell said, the Government’s impact assessment the impact on people from black and minority ethnic communities. Out-of-court disposals are a good case in point in terms of how we ensure that they do not discriminate. We can see it at every stage. We need to be looking at how we reduce the disproportionality in the justice system, and what actions we can take to do that. We can see that some of these proposals do the opposite.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Helen Berresford: We know from the evidence that community orders are more effective in reducing reoffending than short prison sentences, which are ineffective at doing that. We want to see much better use of community sentences where they are more effective. Community sentence treatment requirements are a really good example of how we can do that, ensuring that we also put in the drug treatments and mental health support that are needed alongside it. That is really important.
A lot of these orders have the potential sanction of being sent to prison if breached. We do not support that as a way forward. We do not think that that is effective. If a community sentence is not working, we already know that a short prison sentence is less effective, so it does not make sense that that is the penalty. There is evidence to show that continuing the support in the community, to ensure that we are actually dealing with the issues, is more effective. It is about ensuring that community sentences are not setting people up to fail, and that the conditions around them try to help with their different needs, such as alcohol and drug treatment, mental health treatment, and homelessness. All those different parts need to be addressed. That is where the focus is.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Sam Doohan: The one thing that needs to be considered with community orders and criminal records is that when a community order is given alongside another disposal and it becomes an ancillary order we have to be very careful about how long we set the orders for. At present, the full conviction does not become spent until the full ancillary order is completed or ended by the court. A lot of orders are given for three years or five years. Some are given for life. We need to be aware of that, so that we are using orders in a proportionate way that matches the intention of them. They should not be given out simply as a five-year ban from this location, say, which will in fact end up with someone taking six years before what is probably a relatively minor conviction is taken off their record.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Campbell Robb: It is one part. To isolate it solely as being effective on its own is not something— It can be a very useful method of keeping people out of prison, but it has to be wrapped around the probationary offer and the other offers available to the individual, so that they have meaningful engagement, either through unpaid work or training or development, and are in stable, suitable accommodation, so that they are not moving all the time. So, in and of itself, it can add some benefit, but it cannot be taken as a single thing.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Dame Vera Baird: What needs to happen is that section 28 needs to be the default option, so that rape complainants can finish with the trial while their memory is fresh and facilitate getting some trauma therapy, if that is what they need—section 28 and independent legal advice. I think it is fair to say to the CPS that if they require a level of data from phones and other places and they find something, however irrelevant, it may call the complainant’s credibility into question. There was a terrible case when I was a PCC in Newcastle, where it was put to a woman of 23 that she had always been a liar because she had lied by writing a letter to her school saying that she could not go to the swimming pool that day, and forging her mother’s signature. She was 12 when she did that. If something like that is found, the police probably think they have to disclose it to the other side, because they have a full duty to do so.
The point is not to look for ridiculously irrelevant material, or you are in pursuit of what I think victims think the police are looking for, which is the perfect victim. Of course, none of us would be a perfect victim in that sense, so that needs very much to be met by legal advice. It may be that once that material is found, there is no power in the CPS to do anything but disclose it. It is arguing at the beginning about what material should be sought.
It is absolutely clear that the Crown Prosecution Service has to start prosecuting rape. It now prosecutes around 1,700 cases a year, whereas for the best part of a decade, prior to a change in its approach to rape in 2016-17, it prosecuted 3,500 cases a year and got a corresponding number of convictions. Now it is prosecuting only half as many as that and getting convictions only in three figures, which is a terrific collapse. That approach, which changed, needs to be changed back.
There must also be good provision of independent sexual violence advisers. Anyone who comes to make a complaint, which is a very courageous thing to do given what they have gone through, the imbalance of power between them and the police and their complete lack of awareness of what the criminal justice system is like, needs a professional friend beside them to help them to cope. They may need to move house, if the rape was in the house, or move job, if the rape was connected with the job. At least a professional friend can help with those things, and you cannot expect a complainant to cope with that as well as with the criminal justice system. All that seems imperative. I am mindful of the Chair’s wish for brevity from me, so perhaps I will write to you with a longer list.
Alex Cunningham
Thank you very much for that. I think you have covered everything that I needed to cover.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Victoria Atkins)
Q
On the point about digital divides, do you accept that there is a need to clarify the law on this? At the moment, we have the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 and we have the Attorney General’s new guidelines, but presumably you accept that there is a need to set a framework in law in order to help and protect victims, and to protect the right of a free trial under article 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998?
Dame Vera Baird: I think national legislation to clarify the law about this is imperative, but it is just not this national legislation.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill (Fourth sitting)
Alex Cunningham ExcerptsThursday 20th May 2021
(3 years, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 View all Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 20 May 2021 - (20 May 2021)
The Chair
Well done, Mr Levy. Right, are there any more Back-Bench colleagues who would like to come in before I bring in the shadow Minister, who is champing at the bit? No? I call the shadow Minister.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
Q
Earlier, I believe that I heard you correctly when you were expressing a view on the proposed changes to the test for custodial remand. Did you say that you were concerned that it could lead to more children being remanded in custody?
Hazel Williamson: No, that is not what I said. I believe that the Bill could lead to more children receiving custodial sentences. In terms of remand, we are pleased that the Bill strengthens the conditions for remand and that remand will be seen as the last alternative. However, in the courts arena we would like to see the reasons for remand being made really clearly recorded, and the decisions about it.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Hazel Williamson: In particular, we are looking at mandatory sentences for some offences. What we have to understand is that the children and young people who we currently work with in the youth offending service are different from those we were working with 20 years ago. Youth offending teams have worked really hard to reduce the number of children and young people in the statutory youth justice system, and we have much lower numbers now. However, what we have is an increasingly complex group of children and young people, who have often experienced exploitation, in particular criminal exploitation, and significant trauma.
For me, what is a missed opportunity within the Bill is that join-up regarding how we work with children who are exploited by our serious crime gangs, and we need to be thinking about a much more welfare-based approach to how we work with our children and young people.
We are also concerned about the differences proposed for some of our 17-year-olds. We believe that, in terms of youth justice, they are a child until they get to 18. There is also lots of evidence about brain development, showing that it can take children until they are into their early or mid-20s to fully develop.
We believe that there is opportunity within the Bill for more custodial sentences and we are particularly concerned about our black and minority ethnic children, including our Gypsy, Roma and Traveller children.
Alex Cunningham
Q
“In this Chapter…‘adult’ means a person aged 16 or over”.
Do you think that generally—you have already alluded to some of this—the Bill gives sufficient consideration to research on maturity?
Hazel Williamson: I know that there is mention of neurodiversity in the Bill, but it does not go far enough. We should treat children as children until they are 18 and they should be sentenced as a child until they reach the age of 18. In an ideal world, we would look beyond that, because many people do not develop fully, in terms of brain development, until they are in their mid-20s. The cohort of children and young people we are working with have suffered significant trauma. We know that affects what would be the brain of a teenager who had not experienced trauma; the brain develops differently, if you have experienced significant trauma and abuse. Virtually all the children we work with in our system have experienced abuse to some level or degree.
So no, the Bill does not go far enough, in my view. That links to our earlier conversation about being more welfare and rights-based. We need to think about the rights of children. They should be treated as children until they are 18.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Hazel Williamson: If they have committed the offence as a child, they should be sentenced as a child. During covid, there have been some delays in court processes, which has meant some children being sentenced as an 18-year-old when they committed the crime as a child. Going back to our earlier conversation, we know that brain development does not change just at age 18. For me, if you committed the offence as a child, you should be sentenced as a child.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Hazel Williamson: We have talked about this as an association. We have concerns when there are not opportunities to have terms reviewed. What we know is that there will be significant changes. For example, the brain of a child who was sentenced to a long term at 17 will have matured significantly by the time they reach their mid-20s, so we should be enabling that review to happen along and through their sentence.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Hazel Williamson: What YOT managers say to me is that the biggest challenge is around funding. Youth offending teams have absolutely reduced first-time entrants; we have reduced children and young people going into custody. We are also reducing the reoffending rates for many of our children and young people. The assumption, therefore, is that youth offending teams do not need to be funded as much as they were previously.
However, youth offending team managers have been saying for some time that just because the numbers have reduced does not mean that we are not working with a complex group of children and young people. For many youth offending teams, the numbers they are working with have not reduced; it is just that the children are in a different space and place. For example, we might not be working with as many children on statutory orders, but we will be offering some kind of prevention and diversion to keep them out of the criminal justice system.
It is not always the case that because first-time entrants are reducing and the numbers of children involved in the criminal justice system are reducing, youth offending teams are not doing the same amount of work they have always done. Funding is really an issue, as is understanding the context and the numbers of children that YOTs are trying to work with across the country.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Chris Philp)
Q
Hazel Williamson: Absolutely, and we know that, but children and young people who commit those offences as children should still be sentenced as children. We can use the strength in our youth offending teams, because we have seconded probation staff working with us, so we can have quite a balanced report for those children and young people, and support them with the transition from youth offending teams into probation. Age and maturity should absolutely be considered across the whole system, but our children and young people who commit offences when under 18 should be sentenced as children.
The Chair
Would any other colleagues from the Back Benches like to participate? No. I call the shadow Minister.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Ellie Cumbo: That is another area of the Bill where, for the time being, we have chosen not to make significant comments. We comment on sentencing guidelines, but we view whether sentences should be tougher or softer as a political decision, and are slow to presume that our members would all have the same view.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Ellie Cumbo: I think I can safely say that criminal defence practitioners in particular worry about sentence inflation as a political trend in the long term, but I do not think that I could responsibly comment on the specific provisions of the Bill. As I say, I do not think that members’ views would all necessarily align.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Ellie Cumbo: Absolutely not, no. We are very clear on that.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Ellie Cumbo: I think it is worth saying that the absence of public consultation on that point is a cause for concern. Anecdotally—I am sure this is true for many of you as well—nobody I have spoken to in a personal capacity feels comfortable that such a change might be made. They certainly find that they want to know more about it, and the safeguards that would underly it. This is an area where, to me, there is an obvious need for public consultation, given the importance that we all place on the way that juries work, and the ability to be tried by a jury of your peers.
In relation to whether we have been consulted as the Law Society, we have had informal conversations. We were aware that the possibility of remote juries was under consideration at one point during the pandemic, but of course it was not then introduced, so the timing of putting it on the statute book now struck us as rather odd.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Ellie Cumbo: I think what is important is that we do not know. The problem with any change to the way juries work is the relative difficulty of having a baseline against which to compare changes. We do not know to what extent changes to the way juries operate would have an impact on fair trial rights and the justice of the outcomes.
One could only speculate about which particular categories of defendants might be impacted—the vulnerable, those who already have communication difficulties, and so on. I do not know how helpful that speculation is. The point is that you do not experiment with a decades-old system that is so important to ensuring our fundamental rights and freedom without significant evidence, including that there is a need for it and that it would in fact deliver additional capacity to the system, which has not been done yet. The evidence has not been produced that there would be a significant increase in capacity from the proposals.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Ellie Cumbo: Our preferred safeguard is that we do not do it. We are very clear on that. We do not believe it is appropriate to introduce remote juries, particularly at a time when demand for them is surely in decline.
Chris Philp
Q
Ellie Cumbo: As I said earlier, it has been a story of great success in many ways, enhancing the convenience of all parties, including solicitors, particularly in relation to those types of hearings—administrative hearings— where it is only legal professionals talking to each other. Why on earth should you not use a remote hearing for that?
But it is not just an innate conservativism that prompts those concerns about whether it is working well for all types of hearings and all types of people appearing in those hearings. This is a significant change that is difficult to analyse—in fact, I believe the MOJ itself is still in the process of evaluating its success. We are keen participants in those discussions and are keen that our views are heard. Our views are that where such hearings enhance the interests of justice, we are in favour of them and, where they do not, we are not.
Maria Eagle
Q
Dr Paradine: I am sorry to say that, no, we do not think that the current Bill does that. There are all sorts of ways in which the intent to reduce the number of women in prison radically and to divert women, and others, from the system is not played out in its provisions. For all the reasons that have been covered by the various members of the panel, it does not do that. Sadly, unless the Bill’s direction of travel is redirected towards rehabilitation and communities rather than prison and creating harsher sentences, any progress that has been made will unravel really quickly. The 500 prison places will sadly be the focus, rather than our hope that we could really transform the system in the way that it affects women, families and communities, and beyond that men and young people also.
There needs to be a really strong rethink of what the Bill is trying to do, and a focus on the real problem, which is community support services and the ways that we tackle the root causes of offending. There is very little in the Bill that convinces us that that is the focus, so we need a really strong rethink to focus on communities and not on prison. We know that victims want sentences that work. They do not want to see harsh sentences that do not work. Their interest is in stopping crime and reducing reoffending. Sadly, we do not think that the Bill as it stands achieves that ultimate aim.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Dr Bild: Yes I do. Of all the clauses, that is the one that I have the most concern about. I saw some of the discussion on Tuesday with Jonathan Hall, QC in relation to terrorism, but this is broader than terrorism, of course. It takes in a large number of offences that are violent, and certain sexual offences.
The problem I think it creates is twofold. First, there is an issue with the power being given to the Secretary of State. As I say, I saw the debate on Tuesday. I think it engages slightly different considerations than the changes that took place last year in relation to terrorism did. On this occasion, we are talking about the Secretary of State intervening on the sentence of an individual prisoner, which engages a slightly different debate to the Secretary of State changing the arrangements for everyone convicted of a certain offence. I would draw an analogy to the Home Secretary’s old role to set the tariff for life-sentence prisoners. That power spent about 20 years in litigation before the Home Secretary lost it. It is slightly different, but there is an analogy, I think, and I am not sure that it is an appropriate power for the Secretary of State to have.
There is also a real concern that the most dangerous people will come out with no supervision, no licence conditions and no support. In some respects, the more dangerous you are, the less you will be managed in the community. In terms of managing that—
Alex Cunningham
Q
Dr Bild: I am not sure that that will be a high-visibility issue for confidence in sentencing, to be honest. One of the huge problems we have is that we do not really know what goes on in magistrates’ courts. Magistrates’ courts themselves are very low-visibility things, so I do not think we should overstate the impact that these reforms will have on confidence.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Dr Janes: Yes. These minimum term reviews are very little understood, because they are rare, but I have done a number of these cases in my own practice, and it is a very unusual situation where we get to see the criminal justice system actually incentivising people to make consistent and genuine change. The current proposal pins that opportunity on the arbitrary date when you happen to be sentenced. All of us want to see the consequences of crime actually fit what happened, and we know that in the current climate, cases are delayed for all sorts of reasons beyond a young person’s control. That might be because of delays due to covid, or because extremely vulnerable young people have to have their sentencing delayed while they have psychiatric and psychological reports, so this proposal does not seem to have any rational basis. It seems to deprive the most vulnerable people of something we would want for them, which is to be incentivised to really change their lives around.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Dr Janes: That, I really cannot answer. As you say, the entire sentence is galvanised around the date of commission. As was said by the House of Lords in the Maria Smith case, that is because it is recognised—and has been for decades, and internationally—that children are less culpable than fully grown adults. There seems to be no rational rhyme or reason as to why the date of sentence would be chosen.
Alex Cunningham
Does anybody else wish to comment on that? If not, I will pass to Sarah.
Sarah Jones
Q
Nina Champion: Thank you for that question. We responded to the consultation on serious violence reduction orders to oppose them—well, we tried to oppose those orders, but there was no question to enable us to oppose it. That option was not given as part of the consultation; it assumed that these were going ahead before the consultation had actually happened. What we do know is that many respondents to that consultation said that one of their key concerns was the disproportionate impact of this provision, particularly on young black men.
We do not believe that serious violence reduction orders are needed, or that there is evidence that they will reduce knife crime. Of course, we all want to reduce knife crime, but rather than additional surveillance, we would rather see additional support for people convicted of these offences. We worry about these very draconian and sweeping police powers to stop and search people for up to two years after their release without any reasonable grounds. Reasonable grounds are an absolutely vital safeguard on stop and search powers, and to be able to be stopped and searched at any point is a very draconian move that, again, risks adversely impacting on those with serious violence reduction orders. For young people who are trying to move away from crime, set up a new life and develop positive identities, to be repeatedly stopped and searched, labelled and stigmatised as someone still involved in that way of life could have adverse impacts. It could also have impacts on the potential exploitation of girlfriends or children carrying knives for people on those orders. There could be some real unintended consequences from these orders.
In relation to your point about what could be done, if these powers were to go ahead, we would like to see a very thorough evaluation of them before they are rolled out nationally. I do not have much confidence in that, given that section 60 powers, which also allow suspicion-less searches to happen, were rolled out following a pilot after several months without any evaluation being published or any consultation. It is therefore absolutely vital that these powers are thoroughly evaluated. That could involve things such as looking at the age and ethnicity of those who were stopped and searched, the number of people stopped in the belief they were someone who had an order but did not—we might see increased stop-and-account of people who have got nothing to do with an order, in cases of mistaken identity for someone who is under one—or the number of times individuals were stopped.
We would like to see scrutiny panels given access to body-worn video footage of every stop-and-search that is done under these powers or in belief of these powers. It is crucial that the evaluation speaks to people who are directly impacted by these powers, interviews them and understands what the impact is. It should also interview and speak to the organisations working with them. Ultimately, it should also look at whether this has achieved its aim. Has it reduced knife crime within an area compared to non-pilot areas? Much could be done to ensure that the evaluation is thorough to avoid the roll-out of these powers, which we believe are not necessary and could have disproportionately adverse impacts. They are just not needed.