Alex Cunningham
Main Page: Alex Cunningham (Labour - Stockton North)Judicial Review and Courts Bill (Second sitting)
Alex Cunningham ExcerptsTuesday 2nd November 2021
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 2 November 2021 - (2 Nov 2021)
Antony Higginbotham
Q
Richard Leiper: I could not agree with that more. I think it is exactly the right concept to have. It will help litigants. There is provision so that those who do not have the means of doing things online would have the alternative of doing so through more traditional mechanisms, but I completely agree with the process because it should simplify the system to enable people to access justice more freely.
I could not agree more with the underlying concept. It is more a matter of ensuring that the infrastructure is in place to carry that through, so that it can become effective. That has two parts. First, it means having a properly composed committee with the expertise that can be brought to it and, secondly, having the infrastructure behind it so that it is not just a rule committee setting what needs to happen on high, but it gets the buy-in of everyone who will implement it and of how it will operate.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
Q
Richard Leiper: I am not one for large committees, which can be counterproductive, but we are talking about an enormous amount of work that will need to be undertaken across a wide range of practice areas. I suggest that the composition was akin to that of the civil procedure rule committee and of family law, so having more judges and more practitioners. The committee has only one person who can bring the knowledge of the lay-advice sector, whereas I think both the civil procedure rule committee and the family procedure rule committee each have two lay members. It needs a wider composition akin to those of the existing rule committees—which seem to operate perfectly successfully—where people are able to bring together the knowledge and direction of what they want to achieve through the online rule committee, but also bring particular practice or individual knowledge to the development of those rules.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Richard Leiper: I guess that the biggest risk is of technological failure of some kind, because this is wholly dependent on having the underlying technology operating successfully. If there is a failure, then it could lead to disaster. It is about ensuring that there is the funding and knowledge behind it to be able to support a process that would need to be implemented in a small area at first—I would think—ensuring that it was successful, and then gradually broadening it so that one could have confidence in its effectiveness. It is about having the comfort that there is going to be the technological and financial support behind it to ensure that it works.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Richard Leiper: I suppose there are two answers to that. One is yes. The other, which is my personal view, is that it seems to reflect the processes that are already in place into the existing procedure rule committee. This appears to have been the accepted approach since about 2005, and it seems to be replicating that. It does seem to give a substantial power to the Lord Chancellor in this regard, which I personally find surprising. However, it seems to be the way that things have operated for some time.
Dr Caroline Johnson (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)
Q
André Rebello: Perhaps I misspoke. When a coroner sits alone, the coroner still hears evidence, and witnesses still come to court. It is just that there is no representation for any of the interested persons; the coroner hears evidence and makes finding and determinations. There is a real issue, though, with remote hearings in that, although many people have found advantages with them, the coronavirus easements did not apply to coroners’ courts. Coroners’ courts have only been able to work through remote hearings by using rule 17 to receive video evidence.
The provisions in this Bill are to bring coroners’ courts in line with other courts. However, there is a real issue in regard to the Equality Act 2010; not everyone can participate in the rule of law and in open justice through remote hearings. Any judge presiding has to be very careful to make sure that everyone can participate. I suspect there are more disadvantages in remote hearings than in having everyone in court, where you can fully appreciate how people are following the proceedings. In the 95% of cases where there is no representation, the coroner still hears evidence. It is not as if the coroner is just reading statements; evidence is still heard.
The Chair
Three questioners wish to be called a second time. I will call them in the order in which they indicated.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Richard Leiper: I should not. I sit as a recorder in the Crown court, but I would not hold myself up as having the necessary expertise.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Richard Leiper: Again, that is an issue for the Crown court section of your discussion, rather than the civil side of things.
Dr Johnson
Q
André Rebello: Actually, there are many. With the easements in the Coronavirus Act, we are just about keeping our heads above water in the coroner service. Under the Coronavirus Act, any doctor could have treated the patient—it does not have to be the doctor who certifies the death, provided that the other doctor sees the body after death—and we have been able to get medical examiners and other doctors to issue death certificates. These are all deaths from natural causes, which should not ordinarily be reported to the coroner. Hopefully, the statutory medical examiner service will alleviate quite a lot of the deaths that come the coroner’s way, which cause a lot of concern for bereaved families. Unfortunately, a lot of deaths are reported to the coroner unnecessarily. At the moment—gosh—probably 20% or 30% of deaths being reported now do not need to be reported. Doctors could issue, but for whatever reason, the deaths are being reported—I suspect that doctors are busy trying to get back to normal and see patients.
I have concerns about the coronavirus easements lapsing before we bring in the new death certification and medical examiner provisions. I raise this on the record to flag that I can see a storm brewing in, probably, April of next year.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Stephanie Needleman: There are two provisions in the Bill that we are concerned about in terms of safeguards. There is the new allocation procedure for online pleas, for adults in clause 6 and for children in clause 8. While the Government have said that this will be accessible only through the common platform, which as I understand can currently only be used by legal professionals, there is nothing in the Bill that would guarantee that a defendant would only be able to enter an indicator plea or trial venue with access to legal advice. We would like to see something in the Bill that guarantees that.
We oppose the use of the procedure by children. We do not think that even with a safeguard of access to legal advice that it is an appropriate procedure for use by children. The criminal justice system considers children to be inherently vulnerable, and there is a whole process in place in the youth criminal justice system that recognises their rights and works to guarantee them, and this system would allow that whole system to be bypassed.
Alex Cunningham
Q
“has attained the age of 16”
rather than the usual age of 18? Could that be covered?
Stephanie Needleman: Clause 4 is not something that we have looked at in particular detail. As I understand it, the automatic online conviction process in the Bill is only available to 18-year-olds. The single justice procedure that it builds on is also only available to 18-year-olds, and the section 12 procedure in clause 4 is available to 16-year-olds, and that does appear to be an inconsistency that is unjustifiable.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Stephanie Needleman: The same concerns as we have with using the new online allocation procedure for children. There is a whole system set up to protect vulnerable children within the criminal justice system, and those safeguards are being bypassed.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Stephanie Needleman: That is not a clause we have looked at in particular detail, unfortunately.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Stephanie Needleman: Yes, we are very concerned about the disproportionate impact of the AOCSSP—a catchy acronym. That builds on the single justice procedure, and there are clear issues with that that have not been addressed by the Government. There has been some research by Appeal, which shows that the vast majority of those being prosecuted under the single justice procedure are women for non-payment of television licences.
We are concerned about the impact on ethnic minorities. Racial disparities permeate the criminal justice system, and we are concerned that a disproportionate number of ethnic minority individuals will also be unduly criminalised through the automatic online conviction process, as well as those with mental health conditions or neurodivergent conditions who may have particular difficulties understanding the process or the implications of going through the process, pleading guilty and receiving a conviction.
As it stands, there is nothing within the process that would screen for any vulnerabilities, and there has also been no assessment by the Government, as far as we can see, of the equalities impact of the Bill. Back in 2017, these measures were originally floated in the Prisons and Courts Bill, and there was an equalities statement which recognised the potential adverse impact on people with protected characteristics. There has not been an update to that equalities statement as far as I have seen. As it stands and given the issues with the single justice procedure that it builds on, we think that the procedure should not be in the Bill. However, it definitely should not proceed without a review of the current evidence available in terms of what impacts it might have on those groups with protected characteristics and vulnerabilities.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Stephanie Needleman: Absolutely. That is also a concern of ours in terms of people understanding what the process involves and, importantly, what the outcome of that process is going to be. Obviously, with the automatic online conviction, that outcome is a criminal conviction. We are worried that the process encourages people to go through it and plead guilty without properly understanding what impacts that can have later in life. I know it is currently only for summary and non-imprisonable offences, but those can still have serious implications—a criminal record, increased insurance costs, loss of employment and educational opportunities. This is not just for trivial offences that will not have an impact on people’s lives. Similarly, with the online plea, understanding the implications of where a case is heard—and the seriousness of going to the Crown Court and having the greater sentencing powers available there—is incredibly important. There should be provisions built in to ensure that defendants understand those. Having legal representation in the context of the allocation procedure goes some way to dealing with that.
Alex Cunningham
You have anticipated the rest of my questions. I do not know if either of your colleagues wish to comment. No.
Sir John Hayes
Q
“challenges to legislation on the grounds of discrimination are becoming increasingly common in the UK, usually brought by campaigning organisations which lobbied unsuccessfully against the measure when it was being considered in Parliament, and then act as solicitors for persons affected by the legislation, or otherwise support legal challenges brought in their names, as a means of continuing their campaign.”
They are assisted in that, are they not, by the principle of proportionality, which confers on courts a broad discretionary power that risks undue interference of the courts in the sphere of political choices. That is very bad, is it not, both for a democratic society and for the role and reputation of courts, because the separation of powers—well, I do not need to lecture witnesses on the separation of powers. They know what it means. We have a problem that needs to be solved by legislative means. The Bill is a welcome start in that respect, is it not?
Alex Cunningham
Main Page: Alex Cunningham (Labour - Stockton North)Judicial Review and Courts Bill (Third sitting)
Alex Cunningham ExcerptsThursday 4th November 2021
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 4 November 2021 - (4 Nov 2021)
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
Can my hon. Friend think of any reason why a Government or any other body should be afraid of the judicial review process if they think that they got it right in the first place?
Andy Slaughter
I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who makes exactly the right point. He did not hear me paying tribute to him when he was temporarily detained elsewhere. I am pleased that, as an experienced shadow Minister, he is on the Committee.
People in charge of public authorities should welcome judicial review, which, like many court and tribunal processes, is a way to scrutinise and improve decision making either directly through a challenge or because they want to avoid such a challenge. In my humble way, I remember the 10 years or so when I was running a local authority, and unless other members of the Committee were also in that position—there may well have been—I have probably been subject to more judicial reviews than anyone on the Committee. I must say that while we can take a view on the merits of an individual case, the process is generally beneficial for the authority. As my hon. Friend said, what have they got to hide?
Alex Cunningham
In his evidence to the Committee, Sir Stephen Laws said:
“In my submission to the independent review of administrative law I drew attention to what I thought were the beginnings of a breakdown in trust between the political world and the judiciary, and the political salience of the issues around judicial review is evidence of that.”––[Official Report, Judicial Review and Courts Public Bill Committee, 2 November 2021; c. 14, Q8.]
Does my hon. Friend agree that it is lamentable that even those who were called by the Government to give evidence have reservations about current relationships between the courts and politicians, and how they could be worsened in future?
Andy Slaughter
It is not unique to this Government to be found wanting or to be challenged by the courts in such a way. Other Governments have not found favour with the courts and may have resented their intervention, but on the whole those Governments have sucked it up, if I can put it that way. However, this Government seem to take the view—we have recent evidence of this—that if they do not like the way that proceedings are going or tribunals are conducted, they can simply change the rules or change the tribunal.
I agree with my hon. Friend. I do not want to be overly dramatic, but these are worrying times. The Ekins view, which I described in the evidence sessions as tit for tat—a decision is taken and if the Government do not like it, they have a ready-made power to change it—is bad enough, but tinkering with the court process is worse.
Alex Cunningham
There was much discussion in the evidence sessions about tit for tat, or whichever expression one wishes to use, and it is lamentable. Surely the Government have always been able to address issues that have embarrassed them, and they do not have to take this broad-brush approach to negate that possibility in the future.
Andy Slaughter
Much of the evidence suggests that the public are quite sophisticated about this. They see that all Governments make mistakes, get caught out and have to change their minds. In the end, the public make a judgment about a Government’s overall record. It is quite wrong for Governments to be, as this one is, so thin skinned that any criticism requires not just a response but, effectively, a punishment of the person or body who does the criticising.
What are the consequences of the changes that clause 1 of the Bill makes to the Senior Courts Act 1981, to provide for quashing orders either not to take effect until a specified date or to come into force without any retrospective effect? As has been said, the usual practice is that the quashing order comes into force immediately and operates as if the decision that has been ruled unlawful had always been null and void. Remedies in judicial review are discretionary and will often result in a declaration that the act was unlawful, with remedial action left to the public body. However, when a court decides to issue a quashing order, it is right that the unlawful decision should stand no longer and that those affected should have proper redress. Because a court can make this remedy after finding that a public body acted unlawfully, the quashing order renders the unlawful act null and void; the act never had any legal effect, and therefore its consequences must be unwound.
Whereas quashing orders have hitherto been made by the courts to confirm that a decision by a public body is of no legal effect, the Bill provides that the effect of such orders may be suspended until a prescribed time, potentially subject to conditions—temporarily validating a decision that has been judged unlawful. In deciding whether to suspend an order or make it prospective-only, the courts must have regard to a range of factors, including any detriment to good administration that may arise from its decision. The Bill requires a court that has decided to make a quashing order to suspend the order or to limit its retrospective effect if doing so offers
“adequate redress in relation to the relevant defect”,
unless the court
“sees good reason not to do so.”
Thus clause 1 would limit the effectiveness of quashing orders.
The quashing order is a powerful tool that ensures that unlawful Government decisions can be overturned, and that those who have suffered the consequences can obtain real redress. The courts have the power to suspend the effect of quashing orders, although the power is rarely exercised. Although the case law on this is not absolutely certain, it is reasonable to argue that courts already have this power. Suspension operates like a time lock on the unlawful action, meaning that the court can delay the effect of its ruling and give the public authority time to sort out its mistake. Limiting the retrospective effect ensures that the remedy has effect only on the date that it is made, rather than affecting things that have already been done. If the court suspends the quashing order or makes it prospective-only, things done before the suspension or things done in the past are treated as if they are valid. The current law strikes the right balance in reserving this remedy for exceptionally rare cases.
As I have said, it is important to remember that all remedies in judicial review are discretionary. In exercising their remedial discretion, the courts will consider a range of factors and will take into account the impact of quashing on certainty and the needs of good public administration. Where significant administrative disruption or chaos could result from a quashing order, the courts have the power to issue a declaration instead, and they often do. Often, the court will simply make a finding that a public body has acted unlawfully and leave it to the public body to determine what action should be taken in response to that finding.
Research by the Public Law Project shows that, in challenges to statutory instruments, a declaration rather than a quashing order is the most common remedy following a successful judicial review. That practice shows that the courts deal very well at the moment with all those circumstances, and it calls into question the need for clause 1. In any event, there are already limitations on a court’s ability to grant quashing orders. For example, section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 requires the High Court to refuse a remedy if it appears
“highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different”
if the public authority had not acted unlawfully, unless there are
“reasons of exceptional public interest.”
Section 31(6) of the same Act also allows the Court to refuse relief on the grounds of undue delay
“if it considers that the granting of the relief sought would be likely to cause substantial hardship to, or substantially prejudice the rights of, any person or would be detrimental to good administration.”
Claimants’ access to quashing orders is therefore already strongly regulated. However, an immediate and retrospective quashing order is an important tool for righting injustice and ensuring that the Executive acts only within its legal powers. Combined with the existing controls on quashing orders, the proposed reforms weigh the scales of justice too heavily in favour of the Executive. Prospective-only quashing orders would invalidate an unlawful act only from the point of the court order onward, leaving past conduct, including conduct complained of by the claimant, untouched.
Clause 1 goes significantly further than the recommendations made by IRAL. The IRAL panel recommended legislating for a discretion to make suspended-only quashing orders. It did not recommend legislating for prospective-only quashing orders, and it recommended against a presumption of limiting the effects of a quashing order in this way. Subsection (9) of proposed new section 29A, inserted by clause 1, creates a presumption that these weakened quashing orders “must” be made where to do so would provide “adequate redress”—absent good reasons. Such a presumption not only goes against the Government’s stated intention to provide flexibility for judges, but risks encouraging the use of these new orders in circumstances where it would be unjust and unfair to do so. As the Government acknowledge in their consultation response,
“Presumptions were not recommended by the IRAL Panel and generally met with scepticism from respondents to the consultation.”
However, it does not appear to have had any effect.
Suspended and prospective-only quashing orders undermine the rule of law, which requires that no person should be subject to unlawful action and that individuals have access to an effective judicial remedy against unlawful measures. Article 13 of the European Convention of Human Rights further protects people’s rights to an effective remedy. Although the Bill requires that the court considers whether a provision offers adequate redress before making a suspended or prospective-only quashing order, it does not preclude the possibility of an order being made without adequate redress. We are concerned about the potential for suspended or prospective-only quashing orders to impact third parties affected by an impugned human rights or equality decision and the implications for their ability to access legal aid. It is unclear whether cases likely to result in suspended or prospective-only orders would meet the test of sufficient benefit to the individual, and therefore justify a grant of legal aid.
Most concerning of all is the prospect that either or both types of orders could be mandatory for the judge, as the clause contains an apparent presumption that they will be made where there is “adequate redress”. The Bill does not specify who for, but one of our amendments deals with that. The Bill as it stands will reduce judicial discretion to give an appropriate remedy. I will say more about that later.
Clause 1 risks undermining individuals’ ability to hold the Government to account. The provision could also mean that individuals are found guilty of offences made under unlawful regulation or are unable to be compensated for the impacts of unlawful state action. The point of judicial review is to ensure good decision making by public bodies. It is concerned not with the result in itself, but that the right procedures are followed and that the body is operating within the law. Within the separation of powers that forms our political system, it is an important check by one branch on another, acting in the interests of the public. The Bill does nothing to improve the decision making of public bodies; in many ways it will have the opposite effect. Making challenges harder to bring and remedies less effective may make things easier for Government, but at a cost to the general public.
I will give two or three examples of previous cases. I remind the Committee that the Government’s own election manifesto promised to
“ensure that judicial review is available to protect the rights of the individuals against an overbearing state”
and to secure access to justice for ordinary people—laudable aims. These new remedies will not, however, uphold that promise. I will demonstrate that with a short synopsis of some case studies.
In the case of the British Medical Association, the Health Secretary issued the National Health Service Pension Schemes, Additional Voluntary Contributions and Injury Benefits (Amendment) Regulations 2019, which tried to introduce a power to suspend or withhold payments of NHS pensions, where an employee had been charged with an offence. There was no right of appeal from that power, and the suspension did not come to an end when the employee was acquitted or where proceedings were withdrawn.
At the time of the case, that power had never been exercised. The British Medical Association brought the case as a matter of principle: that potentially innocent medical staff could be denied a pension simply for being charged with an offence that they did not commit. Finding the regulations to be unlawful, the judge granted a quashing order.
Given that the case did not relate to an actual use of the power or an individual who was a victim of the power, the judge might have regarded a suspended or prospective-only order as adequate, meaning that under the Bill, the judge would have been expected to suspend the effect of the order or make it prospective-only. However, in the time that it took the Health Secretary to consult on the draft and lay new regulations, there would have been nothing to prevent Ministers from exercising the unlawful powers, as doing so would have been valid under proposed new section 29A(3) to (5) of the 1981 Act, which makes otherwise illegal uses of power legal.
Alex Cunningham
My hon. Friend is giving a series of good examples as to why the Government’s proposals are flawed. In his evidence to the Committee on Tuesday, Dr Morgan said:
“I would take the presumption out altogether. I think what this clause is doing—certainly what it should be doing—is enlarging the power of the courts to tailor relief in a way that they see fit, and removing the obstacle that the Supreme Court laid in their path in Ahmed v. HM Treasury (No. 2). Thus, I just do not see why it is there. The Government say that it is to encourage the courts to use this remedy, but I do not see why we should try and push the courts in a particular direction.”
He went on:
“I also think, if subsection (9) is taken out, subsection (8) could be taken out as well.”––[Official Report, Judicial Review and Courts Public Bill Committee, 2 November 2021; c. 24, Q23.]
So there is clearly support for the line that my hon. Friend is taking.
Andy Slaughter
I am grateful for that quote from Dr Morgan, which is far more learned and eloquent than anything I can come up with. His evidence was very measured and showed nothing other than looking at the Bill with a fresh pair of eyes. On some of the decisions he supported the Government, and in some cases he could not see any point or purpose.
There is grave concern about the impact of any changes to the law of judicial review on children and young people with special educational needs and their families. Children and young people with special educational needs often rely on legal remedies such as judicial review to ensure that they receive the special educational provision and wider support to which they are legally entitled. Judicial review is an essential remedy in cases where there is no other way that a complaint can be resolved—for example, by complaining directly to the public body concerned or the local government and social care ombudsman. Any changes to the law on judicial review should take account of the particular factors relating to children and young people with special educational needs.
I will give a few examples of situations that arise quite commonly; Members may well have been involved in some such cases. Local authorities may fail to comply with statutory timescales for issuing or amending an education, health and care plan for a child or young person, resulting in the child or young person missing special educational provision or schooling. A local authority may fail to make the provision set out in a child or young person’s EHC plan, resulting in the child or young person missing education; fail to comply with the order of the first-tier tribunal; or decide to stop providing the home-to-school transport to which a child or young person is entitled, meaning that they cannot get to their place of learning. A school governing body may refuse to admit a child or young person despite the school’s being named in the child’s EHC plan, where there has been no formal exclusion. Those are just a few examples of how judicial review can be used to ensure that children and young people receive the special educational provision and support to which they are entitled by law. It is essential that it remains a meaningful option for them and their families.
The measures, if enacted, will weaken the effectiveness of the remedies available to the courts and will deny an essential remedy to children and young people with SEND and their families. The Bill will deter people from using judicial review as a way of righting unlawful decisions by public bodies. Any change to judicial review should encourage access to justice, not limit it. It will also limit claimants’ access to legal redress for unlawful actions, which will take away any accountability of Government or agencies for unlawful action that has already taken place.
I will make some very specific comments on the first group of amendments. The lead amendment is amendment 12, which is the only one I will press to a vote. Amendments 40 and 41 are contingent on amendment 12.
Proposed new section 29A(1)(b) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 allows for quashing orders to be made including provision
“removing or limiting any retrospective effect of the quashing”—
in other words, a prospective-only remedy. For prospective-only orders, despite a state decision or action’s being found unlawful, the order quashing it would be forward-looking, leaving the individual who brought the case without proper redress for what has already happened to them and, potentially, with no change in their circumstances at all.
Proposed new subsections 29A(4) and (5) set out the implications of that change. The decision or act in question is to be treated as valid and
“unimpaired by the relevant defect”,
for all purposes, for the period of time before the prospective effect of the quashing order. As has been expounded countless times by the courts, the rule of law requires that those exercising public power should do so lawfully. However, the Government would be under absolutely no legal duty to address the injustices caused by the unlawful measure, and there would be no scrutiny as to the effectiveness of such remedies. We do not consider that to be an appropriate or principled solution.
In issuing a prospective-only quashing order, the courts would be determining that an unlawful measure should be treated as if it were lawful retrospectively, which is problematic for many reasons. First, it undermines the rule of law, which at its core dictates that all are subject to the law, that no person should be subject to unlawful action, and that individuals have access to an effective judicial remedy against unlawful measures. Prospective-only orders entail a direct rejection of those principles, allowing unlawful executive acts to stand and, therefore, preventing individuals who were previously impacted by them from challenging them. As recognised by the consultation, that could lead to severe unjust outcomes. By introducing prospective-only remedies, the Government are making another concerted effort to insulate themselves from accountability at the cost of those who have been let down by a public body and anybody who may be in the future.
Prospective-only remedies have the potential to create opportunities for injustice in individual cases, to weaken the rule of law and to introduce unnecessary layers of complexity into an already functioning system. This is another example of the Government wasting time and resources on fiddling with an area that works well, while many other areas of the justice system cry out for attention.
Alex Cunningham
Main Page: Alex Cunningham (Labour - Stockton North)Judicial Review and Courts Bill (Fourth sitting)
Alex Cunningham ExcerptsThursday 4th November 2021
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 4 November 2021 - (4 Nov 2021)
Andy Slaughter
This third and final group of amendments deals with one specific point that causes us concern, but it is a matter on which I can be relatively brief. I give notice that, subject to what the Minister has to say, we will seek a vote on amendment 15, which is the substantive amendment.
Proposed new section 29A(5) provides that
“Where…an impugned act is upheld”—
either until the quashing takes effect in respect of a suspended quashing order, or retrospectively in respect of an prospective-only quashing order—
“it is to be treated for all purposes as if its validity and force were, and always had been unimpaired by the relevant defect.”
We have significant concerns about the impact of that provision on collateral challenge, which this group of amendments would address.
Ordinarily, where a court has found a measure unlawful, even if it has not been quashed, it is possible to rely on that finding of unlawfulness in other proceedings—that is called “collateral challenge”. A person who has had to pay a tax under unlawful regulations, for example, would normally be able to bring a claim against HMRC to be refunded the money. However, new section 29A(5) requires an unlawful measure to be treated as lawful. That would preclude relying on the unlawfulness of a measure in other proceedings. That raises the possibility of people being charged with a criminal offence under unlawfully made delegated legislation, for example, but not being able to raise as a defence the fact that the legislation was subsequently found to be unlawful. As IRAL recognised, that position would leave the law in a “radically defective state”. A further subsection should be included to protect collateral challenge and third- party rights and defences where a remedy under new section 29A(1) is ordered.
New section 29A(5) states:
“Where...an impugned act is upheld by virtue of subsection (3) or (4), it is to be treated for all purposes as if its validity and force were, and always had been, unimpaired by the relevant defect.”
Imagine if one of the statutory instruments issued by the Health Secretary during the coronavirus crisis, which created imprisonable criminal offences, were declared illegal by a court. If a court granted one of the new remedies, this subsection would make it as though that imprisonment were always legal. A person could therefore not argue as a defence in the magistrates or Crown court that the statutory instrument was invalid, because this subsection requires a judge to pretend that it was valid.
As IRAL noted in paragraph 3.66 of its report:
“We readily acknowledge that the law would be in a radically defective state if such collateral challenges to the validity of administrative action were impossible.”
We agree and believe that collateral challenges should be expressly preserved in the Bill.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
Successive Tory-Lib Dem coalition and Tory Governments have made much of wanting to do away with red tape and simplify the law, but we have seen quite the opposite in practice. Does my hon. Friend agree that the legislation is yet another example of that? The sentences that he has just voiced are perhaps the best illustration of it. There will be all sorts of consequences to these particular measures. They are actually making things more complicated, less clear, and will provoke further litigation in time.
Andy Slaughter
My hon. Friend makes a very good point, and makes it better than I did. When one starts down this tinkering route—as the Government have in the Bill—and starts trying to nudge judges one way, putting in lists of qualifications and conditions with matters that have to be taken into account, altering the time period over which orders will take place, there are bound to be consequences. We have already said that there is likely to be uncertainty and satellite litigation, but genuine harm could also be caused in this way. I agree, as well, about red tape. It is all very well to try to cut through in that way—and it sounds very good when Ministers say it at the Dispatch Box—but unfortunately it leads to tragedies such as Grenfell Tower. Without the protection given by legislation and regulation on issues such as health and safety, the public are put at risk.
Even where a case has been brought and a decision has been found unlawful, the Bill stands to threaten the ability of people to bring collateral challenges. Proposed new section 29A(5) states that when a prospective-only or suspended quashing order has been made, the unlawful act is
“to be treated for all purposes as if its validity and force were, and always had been, unimpaired by the relevant defect”,
either retrospectively or until the quashing comes into effect. That situation, in which the court pretends that an unlawful decision was valid for a period of time, would appear to inhibit the ability of the person to rely on its unlawfulness in other proceedings. In other words, a person could be arrested under a regulation ruled unlawful by a court, but they would not be able to use that in their defence. The IRAL report quotes Professor David Feldman, whom we heard from, on the “intuitive revulsion” felt against that state of affairs, and concludes:
“We readily acknowledge that the law would be in a radically defective state if such collateral challenges to the validity of administrative action were impossible.”
Clause 1 fails to protect the ability of individuals to rely on the finding of unlawfulness of a measure in other contexts—for example, as a defence to criminal proceedings. A further subsection should be included to protect collateral challenge and third-party rights and defences where a remedy under proposed new section 29A(1) is ordered. The possibility of collateral challenges should be expressly protected by proposed new section 29A(5A), which is what amendment 15 seeks to do by ensuring that if a prospective-only or suspended quashing order is made, the illegality of the delegated legislation can be relied on.
That is really the only point I need to make on this group of amendments; of course, the other amendments are consequential on amendment 15. I hope that the Minister has taken the point. I ask him, in responding, to say first whether he supports amendment 15; if he cannot, as I say, we will press it to a vote. Would he then accept that this is an issue that needs to be dealt with? It clearly is. It may be unintended, but it is nevertheless a consequence of what the Government have set out to achieve in clause 1. Before the Bill comes back, it really needs to be dealt with.
Alex Cunningham
I am glad my hon. Friend is going to get on to costs. In the evidence session earlier this week, the Minister spoke about having the privilege of attending the Lord Chancellor’s swearing in. He said:
“One of the things he swears is that he will ensure that resources are provided to the judiciary. This is not just about public money per se; it is about time”.––[Official Report, Judicial Review and Courts Public Bill Committee, 2 November 2021; c. 30, Q32.]
Should cash get in the way of justice, as it is here?
Andy Slaughter
Everything has a cost—it is a question of whether it is a reasonable cost. Unfortunately, we have seen the justice system of this country and every aspect of the budget of the Ministry of Justice cut more than any other Department in the last few years. Even the much heralded uplifts over the next few years will take us not much further than restoring half of the money that has been cut. I think it sits rather ill in the Government’s mouth to start talking about money, having done so much damage.
There is not an infinite amount of money, although the Government seem to discover various money trees around the place, and it is a legitimate factor to consider. What I am going on to look at is whether, in the case of Cart, the cost is a justifiable cost, either because of the remedy it provides or per se.
As I have said, Cart judicial reviews are used in cases where no other right to appeal exists. This type of judicial review is a crucial safeguard against errors in the tribunal system in decisions of significant importance for the people concerned, which often involve the most fundamental rights. It is usually used in asylum and human rights cases, in which the stakes are extremely high. In many cases, these are life-or-death decisions. It is unacceptable to insulate such decisions from judicial scrutiny.
In most cases, it is true that these are asylum and human rights cases, but not all of them are. One of our witnesses—Dr Morgan, perhaps—mentioned that Cart itself was not an asylum and immigration case. It would be wrong to categorise Cart judicial reviews as being for asylum and human rights cases. There are others as well.
Clause 2 would severely restrict Cart judicial review. The Government have not made the case for removing this vital safeguard against serious errors in the tribunal system in cases of the utmost importance. With this clause, the Bill would set a precedent for removing certain cases or areas from the scope of judicial review.
The desire to get rid of judicial oversight in any area should be of the utmost concern to those who care about the rule of law and the separation of powers. There is simply no evidence that judicial review is currently so prejudicial to good administration that it needs to be significantly restricted, and there was no conclusion to that effect in the Government-sponsored independent review. That is wholly unsurprising. That Governments find judicial review at times to be inconvenient is no justification for attempting to avoid judicial scrutiny, in this or other areas. It is particularly concerning in this specific instance.
The Bill will largely extinguish the power of the High Court to oversee decisions of the upper tribunal relating to permission to appeal first-tier tribunal decisions. This will affect all four chambers of the upper tribunal, and individuals will no longer be able to apply to the High Court. The removal of this safeguard is likely to impact some of the most vulnerable people in the system, taking away their protection from errors made by public authorities. These include refusals of asylum and, where human rights are engaged, decisions to deport someone, including where that person may have lived in this country for much, most or even all of their life.
It is important to understand that removing the normal supervision of the High Court in this area is particularly problematic given the existing constraints in the asylum and immigration system for the tribunal, and in the context of the Nationality and Borders Bill, which threatens to exacerbate those constraints. The danger is that those passing through this system will be at heightened risk of failing to receive a fair and full hearing of any appeal whatsoever. If so, the administrative decision to refuse asylum to, or deport, a person will go without any effective or independent oversight. That will be exponentially harmful, because it will tend to insulate the original administrative decision making from the degree of scrutiny that is necessary to have any prospect of improving and maintaining its quality.
The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that public bodies make lawful decisions. The provisions in this Bill would do nothing to improve that, such as by ensuring access to high-quality legal representation from an early stage in proceedings, or by improving guidance. Instead of reducing need, the Bill simply removes access to Cart judicial review, which allows individuals to challenge decisions to refuse them a right of appeal where those decisions are made unlawfully. Doing so narrows access to justice and means that people who are subject to unlawful decisions have less opportunity for redress. Cart judicial review is a vital remedy of last resort for people subject to unlawful decision making, and should be defended.
Turning to the statistics and costings, unlike prospective-only remedies or a presumption in favour of suspended quashing orders, it is right to say that reversing Cart was a recommendation of the independent review of administrative law. The counter-argument in favour of clause 2 is primarily said to be the cost of Cart cases and the use of valuable judicial resources. The costs of Cart JRs are described as a “disproportionate and unjustified burden” on the system. The Bill’s impact assessment estimates that between 173 and 180 High Court and upper tribunal sitting days will be freed up each year through clause 2, representing savings of between £364,000 and £402,000 a year. That figure is not high—it is less than some Members can pick up in their alternative jobs over a period of a few years—especially when considering the important role of Cart JRs in preventing serious injustice and ensuring that key decisions of the upper tribunal are not insulated from challenge.
A High Court judge can consider at least five applications for Cart judicial review in a single sitting day, an assumption that may be overstating the time taken to consider a single case. That figure of £364,000 to £402,000 is also inflated, because it considers the costs of the upper tribunal rehearing the case. That will occur because an unlawful upper tribunal permission decision has been identified by the High Court, so including those costs in the impact assessment is to include savings that result from allowing unlawful decisions to stand. That position cannot be acceptable.
Further, the average number of hours per Cart judicial review in the High Court that the impact assessment provides is 1.3 hours—again, that means up to five Cart JRs per day, which could easily be overestimating the time it takes a High Court judge to consider a single Cart judicial review case. That is especially true because there is a specific streamlined procedure for Cart JRs, which includes that if permission for the Cart JR is granted, unless a substantive hearing on that judicial review is requested, the court will automatically quash the upper tribunal’s refusal of permission. Moreover, that figure is inflated because it includes the cost of the upper tribunal rehearing the appeal in a successful case. That would constitute a cost saving resulting from allowing unlawful decisions to stand: those costs would only be saved because the upper tribunal’s unlawful refusal of permission to appeal was immunised from challenge.
There is already a high threshold for the use of Cart judicial reviews. In order for permission to be granted, the case must be shown to be arguable with a reasonable prospect of success. Lawyers must also show that there is an important point of principle under consideration, or another compelling reason for the appeal to be heard. Applications for Cart judicial review of a decision must be submitted within 16 days of the initial decision having been sent, instead of the usual three months available in other types of judicial review. Unlike other judicial reviews, there is no right to an oral hearing: Cart judicial reviews are dealt with by paper application only, thus requiring minimal judicial resources.
As we have already touched on, IRAL’s recommendation to reverse Cart judicial review was based on the 0.22% figure, but I think it is now generally accepted that that figure was seriously flawed. The criticism of that figure attracted the support of the Office for Statistics Regulation, and the Government have now accepted it: their own analysis suggests that at least 3.4% of cases are successful, a figure 15 times higher than IRAL originally estimated. However, that figure is also not universally accepted, with the Public Law Project estimating that success rates for Cart JR are considerably higher. I know that there are a number of figures flying around, but I think quite a persuasive case was made for the figure of around 5%. I think the variation stems from IRAL’s misunderstanding of how to calculate success in Cart JRs, as well as procedural complexities that mean that they are rarely accurately reported.
Further, the Government’s definition of success does not reflect the purpose of Cart JRs and is unduly narrow. The analysis in the consultation response and impact assessment adopts an unduly narrow definition of success, which artificially deflates the success rate and artificially increases the projected cost savings. The Government define success as not only success in a judicial review, but also a finding in favour of the claimant at a subsequent substantive appeal in the upper tribunal. That is because the Ministry of Justice assumes that a Cart JR is successful if not only the upper tribunal’s refusal of permission to appeal is overturned, but permission to appeal is granted and the appeal against the first-tier tribunal’s decision is allowed.
That excludes all the cases in which Cart judicial review played a vital role in correcting an error of law in the upper tribunal’s refusal of permission to appeal, but the subsequent appeal was dismissed. That is not the normal approach to defining success in judicial review. It ignores the benefit that flows from a case that meets the Cart criteria being heard in the upper tribunal, allowing that more senior tribunal to consider important points of principle or practice and opening up the possibility of appeal to the Court of Appeal, thus preventing the upper tribunal from being insulated from the general courts system.
A Cart judicial review should be regarded as successful if it results in the refusal of permission to appeal being overturned. If we adopt that definition, the success rate is more like 5.5% or 6%, which is some 25 times higher than the IRAL panel thought and means that more than one in 20 cases are successful. That might be regarded as a reasonable and appropriate success rate for challenges to decisions by a senior tribunal, but that view is surely fortified by the nature of the issues at stake.
In any full assessment of the proportionate use of judicial resource, account needs to be taken of the weight of the interests. In the administrative appeals chamber, many appeals concern access to benefits that are designed to prevent destitution and homelessness, or to meet the additional living costs of disabled people. In the immigration and asylum chamber, almost all cases involve asylum and human rights appeals. The potential injustices at stake concern the most fundamental rights and may literally be a matter of life and death. The cases that succeed in a Cart judicial review will also, by definition, involve important points of law or practice, which would otherwise not be considered, or compelling reasons such as the complete breakdown of fair procedure.
Cart JRs have several purposes, including the identification of errors of law in upper tribunal permission decisions where important issues of principle or practice are raised. That will be achieved if the upper tribunal’s refusal of permission to appeal is quashed. The impact assessment states that of a total of 92 cases, out of 1,249 applications, 48 were remitted to the upper tribunal for permission to appeal decisions. That is in the context of immigration Cart JRs for 2018-19, minus cases pending an appeal decision in the upper tribunal. Therefore, based on those figures and a more accurate definition of success, which still does not account for settlement, the success rate is 7.37%—more than double the 3.4% that the Government now rely on, and more than 30 times the original figure cited by IRAL. In addition, there is required to be an arguable case that has a reasonable prospect of success.
In short, the streamlined procedure for Cart judicial reviews, together with the high test for permission in Cart cases, provides a proportionate means of achieving the aim, which the Government commend, of ensuring some overall judicial supervision of the decisions of the upper tribunal in order to guard against the risk that errors of law of real significance slip through the system. An entirely appropriate and proportionate amount of judicial resource is used in identifying and correcting errors of law that would have potentially catastrophic consequences for the individuals concerned.
As I have said, it is not just the number of cases but their nature that is concerning. Many relate to immigration and asylum. Many of the remainder concern access to benefits for the disabled and others facing destitution. The result of these appeals may decide whether someone has the means to live and to be housed, or whether they may be deported, separated from their family and face potential mistreatment, and the Government are not unaware of that.
Alex Cunningham
As we are looking at this whole issue of scrutiny, which is so important, I cannot quite understand why the Government or anybody else would not want greater scrutiny of what they do on a day-to-day basis. Does my hon. Friend understand my feelings on that?
Andy Slaughter
I do understand, and I think that quite a lot of our witnesses understood that as well and could balance the relatively small numbers and the particular provision for Cart, which the Supreme Court upheld, against the very serious nature of these cases. I will go on to outline some cases. I will not do all 57, but I will give a handful of cases that will perhaps indicate the variety and the seriousness of the cases that we are dealing with here. It is very easy to deal with the law in the abstract, but we need to look at the type of individual who is affected and at the profound effect that it has on their life.
In addition to the equality implications, the fact that Cart JRs primarily relate to immigration and asylum decisions means that the human rights consequences may be particularly severe, impacting the right to life and the absolute right to freedom from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, which are protected by articles 2 and 3 of the European convention on human rights, as well as the right against return to persecution, which is protected by the refugee convention. An unchallenged, erroneous tribunal decision could also lead to long-term family separation, engaging article 8 of the ECHR, on the right to respect for a private and family life. Cart JRs prevent serious injustices. The Government recognised in the consultation that the removal of Cart JRs “may cause some injustice”. Almost all the cases in the immigration and asylum chamber of the first-tier tribunal relate to asylum and human rights appeals, which engage the most fundamental rights, including, in some cases, the difference between life and death.
I mentioned the 57 cases that were cited by ILPA, and there were also 10 cases identified by IRAL. Each involved a person’s fundamental rights and the upper tribunal incorrectly applying the law. Those examples included: parents’ applications for their child to be reunited with them; a child’s application to remain in the UK to receive life-saving treatment; the asylum claim of a victim of human trafficking and female genital mutilation; and many other deportation and asylum decisions where, if deported, the individuals faced persecution, their lives were at risk and/or they would be separated from their families. So let me briefly go through a handful of the cases that were cited.
In one case, the right to a Cart appeal saved a humanist asylum seeker who would have been wrongfully deported to Egypt to face state-sponsored persecution and vigilante violence. He relied on Cart to demonstrate that the tribunal judge erred in his case. It is also worth noting that the Home Office conceded his claim before it went to a full hearing at the Court of Appeal, which meant that his case will not show up on official statistics regarding Cart. Then we have the case of Nadeem, a young Afghan man who came to the UK as an unaccompanied minor and was in the care of social services. He was tortured by the Taliban as a child. His case was dismissed because, even though it was accepted that he was at risk in his home area, no medical evidence had been obtained to show that he was traumatised as a result of that torture. The trauma he had experienced and its impact on him made it unreasonable for him to relocate to Kabul. His brother, who had come here in the same circumstances, had that medical report, and his appeal was allowed. The day after Nadeem’s appeal decision was sent out, the country guidance showing that it was possible to safely relocate to Kabul was ruled unlawful by the Court of Appeal. Nadeem was urgently referred to the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, which used Cart JR to enable him to bring his appeal. This appeal was subsequently allowed on the basis that the original decision was irrational. He was then recognised as a refugee and is starting to build his life in the UK with his brother, safe from the Taliban.
Then we have the case of Tania, who was a child victim of trafficking. Her asylum appeal was dismissed by the first-tier tribunal, which found that she was not trafficked and would not be at risk on return. She was 15 years old when she was transported to the United Kingdom to work with the family in question. Permission to appeal to the upper tribunal was sought, because, as a question of law, she could not “voluntarily” undertake such work as a minor. As a victim of trafficking, and given her profile, the objective evidence demonstrated that she would be at risk of persecution on return. Permission to appeal was refused by both the first-tier tribunal and the upper tribunal, but a Cart JR of this decision was successful, with the judge finding that the tribunals had failed to address the fact that Tania was a child victim of trafficking in their reasoning. The decision of the upper tribunal to refuse permission to appeal was quashed and permission to appeal to the upper tribunal was granted. Tania was subsequently recognised as a refugee and is no longer at risk of trafficking and forced labour, thanks to the successful intervention by way of Cart JR.
Alex Cunningham
Main Page: Alex Cunningham (Labour - Stockton North)Judicial Review and Courts Bill (Sixth sitting)
Alex Cunningham ExcerptsTuesday 9th November 2021
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 9 November 2021 - (9 Nov 2021)
The Chair
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Clause 3
Automatic online conviction and penalty for certain summary offences
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 45, in clause 3, page 4, line 29, at beginning insert—
“(1) Before this section may be commenced, the Secretary of State must—
(a) commission an independent review of the potential impact, efficacy, and operational issues on defendants and the criminal justice system of the automatic online conviction and penalty for certain summary offences as set out in Clause 3 of this Act;
(b) lay before Parliament the report and findings of such independent review; and
(c) provide a response explaining whether and how such issues which have been identified would be mitigated”.
This amendment would require a review of Clause 3 of this Bill before it is introduced.
Good afternoon, Sir Mark. It is, as ever, a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. I would like to take this opportunity to welcome my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith back to his place on the shadow Justice Front Bench. It was my privilege to serve as Parliamentary Private Secretary to our wonderful Mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, when he was shadow Lord Chancellor and my hon. Friend was a shadow Minister. I was pleased to learn from him then, and continue to do so today. It is also good to welcome the Minister to his place as we face each other across the room formally for the first time. I hope that this will be the first of many such opportunities.
I do not underestimate the job that the Minister has taken on, given the crisis in our courts, the record backlog in the Crown court and elsewhere, and a Justice Department stripped of resources over the last decade. Just in case he tries to rely again on the covid pandemic as an excuse, let me point out that it was all in a terrible mess long before covid and long before he arrived in his post. Just one of the facts that I have picked up is that in 2010 there were 152,791 Crown court cases, which took an average of 391 days to complete; in 2019, there were 107,913 Crown court cases, which took an average of 511 days to complete. Clearly, the Minister has his work cut out. We wish him well with it and will be happy to offer our contributions and advice along the way.
I also pay tribute to the Committee Clerks for their, as ever, first-class professionalism and support as we prepared for this Committee stage.
My final thanks go to stakeholders outside the House, including Justice, Fair Trials and Transform Justice, among others, for their energetic and constructive scrutiny and input, which have been of great assistance in identifying potential concerns about the Bill’s practical implications.
Given the amendments we have tabled—the first of which I shall speak to in detail shortly—it will be no surprise to the Minister that the Opposition have reservations about clause 3. However, we do very much recognise the need for, and indeed the benefit of, potentially moving some court processes online, so I will share our concerns in the hope that the Minister can provide reassurances to quell them.
The clause will create an automatic online conviction and standard statutory penalty procedure, which will provide automatic online convictions as an alternative to the single justice procedure. Through this process, a defendant could opt to plead guilty online, which would result in an automatic conviction without the need for a hearing. The Bill’s explanatory notes state that, to begin with, the procedure will apply only to offences involving
“travelling on a train or tram without a ticket and fishing with an unlicensed rod.”
It is critical to note that secondary legislation approved by the affirmative procedure may make additional offences eligible.
As currently drafted, the clause has limitations. For instance, the defendant must consent to use of the process, so they retain the right to opt for an in-person hearing instead. Furthermore, the procedure is only available in respect of non-imprisonable summary offences where the accused was aged 18 or over when charged. Although we agree that these limitations, such as they are, are appropriate, there are a number of areas in which we think the safeguards built into the procedure need to go further.
The proposal to introduce online pleas was first made in the Prisons and Courts Bill in 2017. Transform Justice noted:
“It had not been subject to any public consultation then and still hasn’t.”
The assumption behind the clause, as with the expansion of written pleas, which we will come to in a later debate, is that a plea hearing is a straightforward and purely administrative hearing. It assumes that people will straightforwardly know whether they are guilty and will need no direction, assistance or support in pleading guilty to a criminal offence. I said earlier that this procedure is an online alternative to the single justice procedure, but there is an important difference. The single justice procedure allows defendants to choose to enter a plea in writing or online for the same types of offences that the automatic online conviction and standard statutory penalty will apply to—that is to say, summary or non-imprisonable offences.
Those who plead guilty and do not request a hearing under the single justice procedure are convicted and sentenced by a single magistrate on the papers before them, and the defendant has the chance to submit mitigating factors to inform the magistrate in writing. If a defendant fails to respond to the letter setting out the charge within the 21-day time limit, the single magistrate will hear the case without any input from the defendant or prosecutor. However, the Bill’s explanatory notes make clear that under the AOCSSP—is there a way of pronouncing that? I do not know—cases could take place entirely online and without the involvement of a magistrate.
Under the single justice procedure, the magistrate can decide that a case is not appropriate to convict under said procedure, which provides at least a minimal level of safeguarding within the process. However, under the AOCSSP, as Justice notes, there is
“no independent judicial (or indeed, human) oversight whatsoever. Moreover, defendants who use the AOCSSP procedure will face a binary choice, with no opportunity to submit mitigating factors if they plead guilty, unless they choose to decline”
the procedure and take the single justice procedure route instead.
The complete lack of human involvement in the process worries me. As a consequence, the Opposition have tabled amendments that seek to build into the process at least some level of safeguards. Although we agree completely with the Government that any online procedure should be optional, I also share Transform Justice’s scepticism, in that the defendant may not feel that they have much of a choice at all. How does the Minister think those pitfalls can best be communicated to the defendant?
The current introductory letter to the single justice procedure notice does not mention the option of pleading in court at all; it is only on page 3 of the following document that it comes up. To be honest, if I received one of these notices, even as the shadow Minister for such matters, I am not sure I would understand from the document that I had a genuine option to make my plea in a physical court hearing, rather than online or by post. Even when defendants understand that such a choice is available to them, I do not think that the information accompanying the note enables them confidently to make the best decision in their case. Some legal expertise is clearly required to know the benefits of pleading in court as opposed to pleading online. Again, I admit that even as the shadow Minister—I do not have any legal training at all; I am a journalist by profession—I would not be able appropriately to weigh the benefits of one course of action against the other. I hope the Minister understands what I mean. I am not trying to be obstructive or frivolous, but I think that the lay person receiving such a notice is currently not particularly well equipped to make a decision about their plea.
Transform Justice’s briefing calls on the Government to
“conduct and publish research on defendants’ understanding of the concept of viable defence and of mitigation, and of the factors to be taken into account in waiving the right to a ‘fair and public hearing’.”
That is an important point. The briefing also notes:
“The European Convention on Human Rights requires that in the determination of a criminal charge ‘everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law’. It also guarantees specific minimum rights for those charged with a criminal offence, including the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to defend yourself in person, and to have the assistance of an interpreter. The right to a fair and public hearing can be waived by the defendant, but only if they fully understand the charge and the implications of waiving their entitlement.”
Experiences of the single justice procedure suggest that many defendants will not fully understand the charges and the implications of waiving their entitlement to a public hearing. Research into such experiences could be an interesting and productive piece of work for the Department. I would welcome his thoughts on it, or, if his Department has considered the matter already, I would be grateful for more information about its work.
Another concern that has been raised about the expansion of the use of online pleas is that it may inadvertently drive an increase in the number of defendants without legal representation.
Janet Daby (Lewisham East) (Lab)
Given the significant changes that are taking place in how people plead—online, by post and so forth—does my hon. Friend think that the Government should conduct a public consultation? From what I have read, that is not happening.
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for her intervention. She is correct, and she makes exactly the point that many of the people working in the sector are saying to the Government: we need better data and more examination of the data to drive the best legal system that we can possibly have.
There is a possibility that the expansion of online pleas may inadvertently drive an increase in the number of defendants without legal representation and, importantly, and as a consequence, worse outcomes for defendants. That concern was specifically raised by Transform Justice, which worries that encouraging defendants to plead online
“will lead to more defendants representing themselves … since the process of ‘doing it yourself’ may appear easy.”
I note that the current single justice procedure notice encourages the option of pleading online over the postal option. Pleading online, the defendant is told, is “quick and easy”. They are informed that they will receive a confirmation email, so that they know their plea has gone through—just like buying something from Amazon. The notice warns:
“You need to pay correct postage and allow enough time for delivery”.
That is helpful advice, but I worry that we are already seeing a push towards online pleas marketed as justice made easy for the defendant when that is not necessarily going to be the case. It may be easy, but it may deny them proper justice.
In fact, entering a plea can be a very complex decision. Transform Justice’s research on unrepresented defendants in the criminal courts found that entering a plea was one of the times when defendants without legal representation were most disadvantaged. As they note in their briefing,
“Unrepresented defendants did not understand when they had a viable defence and should plead not guilty, but also pleaded not guilty when the evidence against them was overwhelming, thus losing credit for an early guilty plea if convicted.”
I am aware that the explanatory notes to the Bill suggest that online pleas will be able to be entered only if the defendant has legal advice, and I understand that it is the Government’s intention that that would be done through the common platform. That would mean that the defendant would need to engage the services of a legal professional. However, I am concerned that that safeguard has not been put into the primary legislation. I will speak about that more fully in the debate on amendment 48 later this afternoon.
Even more worrying is the fact that paragraph 59 of the Bill’s impact assessment seems to suggest that that safeguard will be available only to those accused of more serious offences. As the Minister knows, the implications of a guilty plea, even for minor offences, can be significant, including a criminal record for life that can detrimentally impact employment prospects, among other things. I would be grateful for reassurances from the Minister that the online system will include information that ensures that the defendant is aware of all the possible impacts of choosing to enter a guilty plea. Again, I will speak to that point more fully in the debate on amendment 50.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (James Cartlidge)
That’s not much, though, is it?
Alex Cunningham
That depends how much beer a journalist drinks these days; I think we used to put away many more pints than desk-bound journalists tend to now.
The process makes it easier for offenders to escape notice. [Interruption.] I hear the Minister acknowledge that that is the case and I look forward to hearing his proposals to ensure that we have the open justice we all strive for. He has said that he takes issues of transparency and open justice seriously, and I do not think this is an intentional consequence of the Government’s proposals, but it is potentially serious. Will he confirm that some measure of external scrutiny will still be possible under the AOCSSP? Will listings for all cases and their outcomes at least be made available to all? If not, it will be a serious blow to open justice.
I would be grateful for the Minister’s thoughts on the suggestion that the AOCSSP could form a barrier to effective participation in the justice system. As Transform Justice notes,
“All online conviction processes will start with a postal charge. These charges are sent through ordinary mail and there is no proof of their receipt”—
no proof whatsoever. It continues:
“The fact that two thirds of defendants do not respond by submitting a plea indicates that any criminal process which relies on defendants responding to a postal charge seems to present significant barriers to effective participation.”
Janet Daby
The postal charge raises significant concerns. I know of constituency cases where people have changed address and their benefit letter has gone elsewhere, so they have ended up with frozen benefits. There will be huge problems ahead if things are sent by post and end up in somebody else’s postbox, or if people move and do not receive letters. I am particularly concerned about people with mental health issues and vulnerable people who, even if they do receive a letter, may not be able to interpret it.
Alex Cunningham
My hon. Friend is correct and gives excellent examples. I had an example a few weeks ago of a constituent who found out that he was likely to be locked up because he had not paid his television licence. He had not received the letter because he was no longer at that address. I know that he had a responsibility to inform people that he had moved on, but the fact that nobody tried to find him before it got to the point of court bailiffs turning up at the previous property to take goods away to pay his fines and court costs is a nonsense. Clearly, that can happen.
Paula Barker (Liverpool, Wavertree) (Lab)
Does my hon. Friend agree that the Government’s equality impact assessment does not recognise the issues that he has eloquently raised about the postal charge?
Alex Cunningham
Almost certainly. Our hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham East talked about people with mental health problems or disabilities who are all disadvantaged by these proposals, because no adequate system seems to be in place to ensure that they properly understand what they are doing and what is happening to them. If they do not understand, they may choose to ignore it and end up with a conviction and a criminal record, which has terrible ramifications for employment and all manner of other things, including even entering another country. If they have a criminal charge against them, they may not be able to go on holiday to some countries.
Janet Daby
I find all this deeply concerning. I wonder whether the Government actually want the postal charge system to work.
Alex Cunningham
The last thing I expect from my hon. Friend is cynicism. I am sure the Government want the justice system to work correctly, so it is time they looked carefully at this. As I develop my arguments, I will talk about the need for research and data, which is absent. We have asked for it in the past, but no specific data exists on why people choose to ignore or do not even respond in any shape or form to postal charges.
We do not know why so few people respond to postal charges. It does not seem sensible to expand the use of postal charges until we have more data on the issue. One reason that has been suggested is that many defendants do not even receive the letter. I have already talked about that; it might be sent to an old address, for example. Perhaps the person does not even understand the letter that they have received. The defendant, as we have discussed, might have a mental health condition or a neurodivergent condition that presents a barrier to understanding.
Although phone calls for someone on benefits are now on a freephone number, the initial calls to the HMCTS assisted digital advice on how to fill in a physical online form are charged at local rates. Yesterday I received from the Minister the answer to a written question on support for some vulnerable defendants. I asked what training prosecuting authorities who use the single justice procedure, and who are not the CPS, receive on disability and neurodivergent conditions. The response stated:
“The Ministry of Justice is not responsible for training prosecuting authorities and thus cannot speak to whether they receive training on disability or neurodivergent conditions. In response to the Neurodiversity in the Criminal Justice System: A review of the evidence report, the Ministry of Justice is taking a whole system approach and are working with HM Courts and Tribunal Service, HM Prison and Probation Service, Home Office, Department for Health and Social Care and the Welsh Government to”—
here is the key word for me—
“consider neurodiversity training for all frontline staff within the Criminal Justice System.”
Surely, Minister, it should not be “considered”. It should be a case of deciding how we ensure that it happens and that people across the criminal justice system are fully equipped and trained to deal with people in these circumstances.
For people on low incomes, I worry that the proposals present a significant and unnecessary barrier to engaging with the process. Does the Minister have any thoughts on remedying that? Earlier I looked at the AOCSSP, which seems to disproportionately affect those on low incomes. In a normal court hearing and under the single justice procedure, defendants sanctioned with a fine are asked to state their means, to enable the judge to adjust the fine if necessary. Under the online conviction procedure, everyone would be made to pay the same fine, because there would not be any information on which to base a different decision.
I understand that the equality impact assessment suggests that defendants on low incomes will be made aware of the option to opt for an in-person hearing instead, so that their financial position can be taken into account. I have already spoken about my concern that defendants would not understand that there is a real choice to opt into an in-person hearing, so I am not sure that this is a sufficient safeguard for those on low incomes. Does the Minister have any thoughts on any additional safeguards to protect those on low incomes from being further disadvantaged, since that is identified in the Government’s own impact assessment? Under the AOCSSP, could it be made much clearer that it would be preferable for someone who needs their financial situation to be taken into consideration to opt for an in-person hearing? Is the Minister aware of any existing data relating to whether those who have pleaded under the single justice procedure and the automatic online conviction process have been the recipients of heftier fines than those who attended in-person hearings?
Another possible barrier to effective engagement could surface for defendants with disabilities. The Equality Act 2010 requires public bodies to make reasonable adjustments for people with disabilities. I struggle to see how the AOCSSP will be able to support the use of reasonable adjustments. The Bill makes no provision for screening to see whether defendants will need reasonable adjustments to be made. I will speak to that point more fully in the debate on amendment 57, but it is important to consider the issue briefly at this point. Under the current process for a single justice procedure, defendants are asked to tick on the form if they have a disability. What if their disability has prevented them from opening the letter or understanding the form? How does the Minister think we can address that barrier to participation?
Alex Cunningham
I am glad the Minister is pleased. The amendment would mandate the Secretary of State to commission and lay before Parliament an independent review of the potential impact of the AOCSSP on defendants and the criminal justice system, its efficacy and operational issues.
I have spoken at some length about the numerous concerns raised about the procedure, and sought the Minister’s reassurance on many of them. The most appropriate form of reassurance would be an independent report into the impact of the procedure. The procedure marks quite a significant shift in the way we handle criminal cases and would establish the principle for all summary and non-imprisonable offences to be automated through an online plea, conviction and penalty website. The Opposition recognise the need to explore how we can deploy technology in the criminal justice system, but we do not agree that it can be done without a robust evidence base, especially when we are dealing with changes that potentially pose a threat to defendants’ rights, access to justice and the principle of open justice.
As JUSTICE has noted, the evidence base for the procedure is poor and none of the reports that the Government refer to in the Bill documents—Sir Robin Auld’s 2001 “Review of the Criminal Courts”, Sir Brian Leveson’s 2015 “Review of Efficiency in Criminal Proceedings” and the Government’s own 2016 consultation, “Transforming our Justice System”—explores the real world consequences and risks inherent in the procedure. Furthermore, the 2016 Green Paper, in which the Government first proposed the introduction of an online conviction system, stated that the system should be using three offences before any decision was taken to make it permanent. It noted:
“We propose to test the system with a small number of summary, non-imprisonable offences in the initial phase of introducing the online conviction and fixed fine scheme, which would be: Railway fare evasion; Tram fare evasion; Possession of unlicensed rod and line. If this initial phase is successful, we plan to bring other offences, particularly certain road traffic offences, into the system in future.”
Andy Slaughter (Hammersmith) (Lab)
It does seem to be a bit of a feature of this Bill. When we were dealing with clause 2, we heard that the abolition of the Cart judicial review was to be a template for other offences, and the same is happening here. Does my hon. Friend agree with me that it is slippery slope? [Interruption.] I hear the Minister snorting from a sedentary position—
Andy Slaughter
Even with the offences my hon. Friend has named so far—offences in which honesty is a factor—it is very important that the questions that he is asking are answered before we approve the Bill, especially if we are to get the number of offences increased through secondary legislation.
Alex Cunningham
My hon. Friend is entirely correct. That is why we have tabled the amendment, which would require data and proper research to be conducted, so the Government have something by which to measure their success or otherwise in introducing the procedure. My real concern is that future offences may well just come through the secondary legislation route, where the amount of scrutiny is somewhat limited. The Government propose using the procedure in the Bill initially for these offences, but nothing in the Bill suggests that the testing procedure the Government committed to in 2016 will actually be used to assess the procedure. Can the Minister confirm otherwise? That would be welcome.
As Transform Justice has pointed out, there is no evidence in the public domain about the online motoring conviction system, which was introduced in 2015. There is no public access to the postal charge paperwork, nor to the online form. There is no public data on how many people respond to the postal charge—we covered that point already—or how many complete the form online. There is also no data on how many people plead guilty or not guilty, or on the sanctions received.
The Government consulted on the automatic online conviction proposal in 2016, and many of the respondents raised concerns. None have been allayed in the interim. Indeed, the single justice procedure, which the procedure builds on, had only been in use for one year when the Government consulted on the online procedure. Since then, much more information about the workings and indeed failings of the single justice procedure has come to light. The Government have not explained how the current issues with the single justice procedure would not simply translate across to the AOCSSP procedure, or even be exacerbated, given the removal of any human oversight. JUSTICE has also said that it is not aware of any similar system deployed in other jurisdictions from which any advantages or disadvantages could be studied.
For those reasons, the Opposition believe that amendment 45 is vital. Significant changes to our justice system should be evidence based, and making evidence-based decisions now will save the Government and the justice system a lot of problems further down the line. I appreciate that I have sought rather a lot of information from the Minister thus far, but we are very keen that we go down the route where we get it right. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s thoughts.
James Cartlidge
It is a pleasure to have you back in the Chair, Sir Mark, after your brief absence. That was a very important set of questions. Obviously, I am speaking particularly to amendment 45. Other amendments have been tabled to the clause and I think we will end up covering everything. I will try to answer the main questions, but hopefully by the time we get to stand part we will have broadly covered all the key questions.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his welcome, and wish the same to him. He has a different style and approach from the hon. Member for Hammersmith, but they make an interesting pair, and I look forward to further jousting and deliberations on the Bill. The hon. Member for Stockton North said that it is not all the pandemic. He is right: most of the difficult decisions about funding criminal justice had to be made in the 2010-15 Parliament. There is a good reason for that. It was not a pandemic; it was inheriting a catastrophic economic position because of the mismanagement of the previous Government.
James Cartlidge
I am talking about 2010. The hon. Gentleman knows full well that there is no parallel universe in which difficult decisions did not have to be made. Had Labour stayed in power in 2010, they would have made significant cuts to the Ministry of Justice. That is a fact, but we are here today and looking to the future, and the future is digital. Digitalisation offers many ways to improve and streamline justice, but of course we must ensure that safeguards are in place. I will come to a few of the specific questions, and then to the amendment.
Probably the most important question is what happens if the defendant does not receive notification of the charge or conviction. How will they respond? What do we do? We may be confusing two procedures. There is the single justice procedure, and there is the new procedure—I simply call it the automatic procedure. The hon. Gentleman is right: even the acronym is impossible to remember, let alone the full name. In the SJP, it is worth stressing that defendants who have no knowledge of proceedings brought against them via summons or requisition until after a magistrates court has begun to try the case will be able to make a statutory declaration to restart the proceedings—that is, for example, if the correspondence was sent to the wrong address. To reassure all colleagues, in the automatic procedure, the person considered has to opt in. If they do not receive notification, that procedure will not be used. It is fairly straightforward, and an important safeguard.
Alex Cunningham
I am interested in the issue of people having a day in court or saving a day off work. Many people will make the wrong decision when they come into contact with the justice system in that way. Is there not a real concern about individuals who do not know what they are doing, who may have mental health problems or other disabilities, and who cannot make the right decision? A day off work would not actually matter.
James Cartlidge
To be clear, I am not talking about a day off work. If they go into court, the issue is not having the income—for example, if someone is self-employed. It may be less of an issue for someone who is permanently employed; it depends on their contract. I think it is important for people to have the option, particularly if they are time poor. I stress that it is a choice.
James Cartlidge
Hang on, there were simultaneous interventions. I will give way to the hon. Member for Blaydon.
James Cartlidge
If I address that, I will be straying into the territory of future amendments. If the hon. Gentleman will forgive me, I should say that we will cover those issues in considerable detail.
I will now crack on with the remainder of my comments about amendment 45, which is about a review. I appreciate that this is a very new type of procedure for dealing with certain minor offences and that we cannot be certain of its impacts. However, we are committed to reviewing the operation of the procedure, which is why we are proceeding with caution.
Only three offences have initially been proposed for prosecution under the new procedure: failure to produce a ticket for travel on a train; failure to produce a ticket for travel on a tram; and fishing with an unlicensed rod and line. As part of this initial implementation phase, we will carefully monitor and review the potential impacts of the procedure before we consider whether to extend it any further. The procedure has a number of safeguards, which I will set out in further detail when we discuss the next group of amendments and during the stand part debate. I want to stress that the procedure is entirely optional and that it will remain the defendant’s choice whether they wish to proceed with an automatic online conviction or opt for a traditional hearing in court.
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful to the Minister for his response and recognise that there are other issues to cover, which I mentioned in my speech; there are other amendments as well.
I am pleased to hear the Minister commit to carrying out a proper review of the procedure, as that is what the amendment sought. I see no need to press it to a vote. I thank him for his input and look forward to developing some of these issues during debates on the remaining amendments. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move amendment 46, in clause 3, page 4, line 29, at beginning insert—
‘(1) Before this section may be commenced, the Secretary of State must publish—
(a) an equalities assessment concerning the impact the automatic online conviction and penalty process will have on individuals with protected characteristics, as defined in the Equality Act 2010; and
(b) an impact assessment on the effective participation for defendants with vulnerabilities, and must lay such assessment before Parliament.”
This amendment would mandate the Secretary of State to publish assessments regarding the impact of Clause 3 on individuals with protected characteristics as defined in the Equality Act 2010 before its commencement, as well as those with vulnerabilities.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 47, in clause 3, page 4, line 29, at beginning insert—
‘(1) Before this section may be commenced, the Secretary of State must publish statutory guidance which sets out how prosecutors should provide and explain to defendants any information contained within the required documents in an accessible way.”
This amendment will mandate the Secretary of State to publish guidance for prosecutors on how to ensure that defendants fully understand the information provided to them.
Amendment 48, in clause 3, page 5, line 32, at end insert—
“(e) the prosecutor is satisfied that the accused has engaged a legal Representative”.
The amendment would provide that the accused cannot be convicted online via the AOCSSP procedure without legal assistance.
Amendment 57, in clause 3, page 5, line 32, at end insert—
“(e) the prosecutor is satisfied that the accused does not have any vulnerabilities and disabilities that impede the ability of the accused to understand or effectively participate in proceedings, having undertaken a physical and mental health assessment.”
This amendment would require that all accused persons considered for automatic online convictions are subject to a health assessment, and that only those who do not have any vulnerabilities or disabilities are given the option of being convicted online.
Amendment 50, in clause 3, page 6, line 6, at the end insert—
“(d) a document in clear and accessible language which—
(i) explains the consequences of agreeing to an automatic online conviction and penalty; and
(ii) directs the accused to legal advice and information.”
This amendment would include further information about the consequences of engaging with the automatic online conviction process and a signpost to legal advice within the required documents that are sent to the defendant.
Alex Cunningham
I thank Justice and Fair Trials again for their helpful input into these amendments. As a set, the amendments all deal with the need for safeguards in the procedure—we know the procedure that we are referring to—both by identifying possible issues before the procedure is used and by building in safeguards to the procedure itself. The Minister may think that he has covered the bases, but I want to help him to ensure that the belt and braces are in place, to best support justice.
Amendment 46 would mandate the Secretary of State to publish assessments on the impact of clause 3, before its commencement, on individuals with protected characteristics as defined in the Equality Act 2010, as well as on those with vulnerabilities. I have just spoken at length about amendment 45 and the need for the provisions in clause 3 to be well evidenced before they are implemented; amendment 46 addresses that point further. I am aware of the equalities impact statement, published alongside the Bill, which states that, in relation to the criminal procedures section of the Bill:
“we do not expect these changes to have a negative impact on any particular group, as the majority of these measures are designed to make the criminal court process easier for all court users by offering additional ways in which people can engage with the court that will significantly improve user experience and reduce user costs.”
Some may think that that’s all right then, but it certainly is not. The Government’s equality impact assessment deals with the impact of the procedure in two paragraphs and only discusses issues relating to income levels. However, there is evidence, predominantly from the single justice procedure, that suggests that the new procedure may disproportionately impact individuals with protected characteristics.
Stephanie Needleman, the acting legal director of Justice, shared such concerns with the Committee in the evidence session last week. She mentioned women as a group of concern, as the existing single justice procedure disproportionately targets women. APPEAL’s Women Justice Initiative notes,
“the vast majority of those being prosecuted and convicted of TV licence evasion are women.”
Its research shows what can happen in the absence of sufficient safeguards, with women facing criminal records despite not having received a letter, or where the letter was sent to the wrong address. Although there are issues that can affect anyone who receives a postal charge, the fact that women are more likely to commit certain so-called low-level offences means they are impacted to a greater extent. The Government’s impact assessment does not recognise that, and therefore does not suggest anything to address the issue. It is important that this disparity is recognised and is not replicated in this procedure. Stephanie Needleman he also raised concern about the potential impact on disproportionate representation of ethnic minorities in the criminal justice system, particularly as the new procedure has such minimal safeguarding built in.
The Opposition believe it is vital that further research is done to ensure that disproportionate numbers of ethnic minority individuals are not unduly criminalised through procedures that contain weaker safeguards than are currently provisioned under the single justice procedure. We are also concerned that the impact assessment makes no attempt to look at whether the new procedure will have a disproportionate impact on neurodivergent individuals or others living with mental health conditions and other disabilities. Justice’s report “Mental Health and Fair Trial” notes that criminal justice processes often do not account for an individual’s particular needs, which may hamper their ability to understand what is happening. This concern is then amplified within the single justice procedure where there is lack of opportunity to screen for health conditions or vulnerabilities and assess whether the process is suitable.
Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)
The hon. Gentleman is making a compelling case. I agree with a lot of what he says and I know the Minister will too, because he has been very sensible about the need to review this and consider it carefully before it is extended. In addition to the groups that the hon. Gentleman identifies, there are simply older people—people who do not have the wherewithal to navigate systems. They may not be people with mental health issues, although I take the point about that. They may simply be people who are not comfortable with online transactions. I would rather see far fewer things put online, by the way—I would like a move in the opposite direction in life and in the provision of public services generally, but the hon. Gentleman is not pressing for that; I am far more radical than him, I can tell. I hope he would include in his assessment, and I hope the Minister will too, those people who may simply struggle with online services.
Alex Cunningham
The right hon. Gentleman makes my case for me. I am most grateful to him. My dad is 90 and my mother is 88; she sadly has dementia but my dad still looks after her. As someone who is on the ball, I think he would really struggle in this sort of situation. I would not want that.
I am encouraged by the Minister’s very positive response to the first amendment. I am sure he is moving in my direction and I am very grateful. Perhaps when we come to a vote, the right hon. Gentleman will join me in saying, “Aye!” at the appropriate moment.
Alex Cunningham
Some might say he had gone a long time ago.
We are worried that the issue will only be further exacerbated by the new procedure, with the removal of any form of human oversight and involvement in the process at all. As I said in my earlier speech, the new process may represent a significant shift in our justice system as we look to increase the use of technology to maximise efficiency, but it is important that we do not take the step without knowing what it will entail for all types of defendants and place appropriate mitigations in place. The Government’s assessment further states:
“However, as is the case more generally across England and Wales, there is over-representation of certain people in the criminal justice system with protected characteristics”,
which will affect some of the proposed measures.
It sounds to me like the Government are simply accepting disproportionality as an inevitable consequence of our criminal justice system. That is simply not good enough, and that is why we want the Minister to go further with all these protections. It is also why the Opposition would like to see a more detailed equality impact assessment of clause 3 before it is commenced, as that will allow the Government to address the issues now rather than waiting until disproportionality is further exacerbated—when they say that they are committed to reducing it.
Paula Barker
Does my hon. Friend agree that not having the appropriate checks and balances in place, as the amendment suggests, could lead to further litigation down the line from those who are charged?
Alex Cunningham
Indeed, that is very much the case. The Minister talked about how a conviction made by a magistrate in the absence of a defendant can always be challenged down the line. I do not see where that fits with respect to this, and I hope the Minister will explain it.
I stress that I do not think that this is the ideal safeguard for identifying individuals with vulnerabilities—legal professionals are trained primarily in the law, not to identify issues relating to vulnerabilities. I have already said that that is not their responsibility and I do not want the Government to think that the Opposition are advocating placing that safeguarding burden on the legal profession. We are certainly not doing that. We are, however, in favour of more safeguards being built into the system. This is an important safeguard for all defendants, not just those with vulnerabilities.
As I said earlier, I am aware of the Government’s intention for online pleas to be entered via the common platform, which I understand might seem to address the concerns we express here. As it is not in the primary legislation, however, we do not feel sufficiently reassured, which is to say nothing of the ongoing issues with the common platform—I understand the senior presiding judge has told Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service to halt the roll-out until it has been stable for at least three weeks.
I appreciate that the Government have looked at the matter, but I want to ensure that this works in some way, even if we do not agree with the method. I would therefore welcome the Minister’s thoughts on strengthening the safeguards in the legislation.
James Cartlidge
I will come to the specific amendments, but, once again, some wider points have been made. An interesting one, made by my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings, was about whether the broad thrust of policy should be somehow to regress towards being more paper based than online.
That was a serious point. It was interesting that, in evidence, Aidan O’Neill from the Scottish Law Society—I asked him about the Scottish experience of the pandemic and use of technology, although my right hon. Friend will know of other areas of his expertise—made some positive observations about how technology had in many ways enabled access to justice to be maintained during the pandemic, precisely because people who would otherwise not be able to appear in court or take part in tribunals or other cases were able to do so because of the technology.
My view is that, while we have to have safeguards—I therefore totally agree with the hon. Member for Stockton North that we should go through the details of the safeguards—in principle we should never discount the sense in which technology gives more access to justice. After all, a generation of people do not have printers—they work not off paper, but off their phone. They might even feel slightly excluded if they cannot do things online.
That might seem like a strange point and, as my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings said, some older generations might find that extraordinary. To be clear, however, someone could be not even analogue, but completely paper-based in how they work. My parents are pretty much like that if I am completely honest. These offences obviously exist in the single justice procedure, which is paper based. Or, as I have said throughout, people could simply opt to have their case heard in court in the traditional way.
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful to the Minister for his response. We have tabled these amendments because we want to be helpful—we are not trying to be difficult. We want to ensure that there is fair justice with fair access, and that justice is done for everyone at the end of the day.
I accept much of what the Minister said, but I still have real concerns about the information provided and the systems for providing that information. He has referred to what is included in the Bill, but I am still very concerned about how people will get the right information from the right person in order to make the correct decision, and I am most concerned about the vulnerable.
The other issue, raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Blaydon, is about what the next tranche of offences could be. Will we get to a point where more serious offences will fall under that process and will be recordable offences, which will have all the impacts on employment that we described earlier?
James Cartlidge
To be clear, I think the next amendment is very specific on that point, and I will definitely cover it.
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful to the Minister. On that basis, I will withdraw amendment 46, but will press amendment 47 to a Division. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 47, in clause 3, page 4, line 29, at beginning insert—
“(1) Before this section may be commenced, the Secretary of State must publish statutory guidance which sets out how prosecutors should provide and explain to defendants any information contained within the required documents in an accessible way.”—(Alex Cunningham.)
This amendment will mandate the Secretary of State to publish guidance for prosecutors on how to ensure that defendants fully understand the information provided to them.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move amendment 49, in clause 3, page 5, leave out lines 33 to 35 and insert—,
‘(4) An offence may not be specified in regulations under subsection (3)(a) unless it is—
(a) a summary offence that is not punishable with imprisonment; and
(b) a non-recordable offence, which excludes any offence set out in the Schedule to the National Police Records (Recordable Offences) Regulations 2000/1139 (as amended).”
This amendment would exclude any offences which are recordable from the automatic online conviction option.
I come to the Opposition’s final amendment to clause 3, although we have already strayed into the territory that this covers. Amendment 49 would exclude any offences that are recordable under the new procedure. I understand that the Government intend the procedure to apply only to summary or non-imprisonable offences, but we think that this needs to be further restricted.
Examples of recordable offences that the new procedure could cover include the offence of failing to provide for the safety of children at entertainments under section 12 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 or the offence of exposing children under 12 to the risk of burning under section 11 of that Act. Others are the offence of drunkenness in a public place under section 91 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 and the offence of selling alcohol to a person who is drunk, under section 141(1) of the Licensing Act 2003.
Particularly topical, given that the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill is in Committee in the other place, are the offence of failing to comply with conditions imposed on a public procession under section 12(5) of the Public Order Act 1986 or the offence of failing to comply with conditions imposed on a public assembly under section 14(5) of the Public Order Act 1986. The threshold for committing these offences will become significantly lower upon the introduction of part 3 of that Bill, where individuals could inadvertently commit an offence by causing “serious unease” or “noise”. Yet more examples relate to the sale of alcohol to children under the Licensing Act and a range of football offences, including the use of missiles and the chanting of racist language.
Those are just some illustrative examples. I do not believe that these sorts of offences are really appropriate for the new procedure, mostly because, as I have mentioned in my earlier speeches––it is important, so I stress it again––the consequences of conviction can still be extremely serious. The Government’s apparent justification for removing any human oversight in the procedure is that it will apply only to minor offences where the defendant faces no risk of imprisonment. But as Fair Trials points out,
“The absence of the risk of imprisonment should not, on its own, be a justification for trivialising criminal justice processes. Criminal convictions, even for minor offences (other than certain types of traffic offences), can have far-reaching and very serious implications on people’s lives and opportunities. The existence of a criminal record can, for example, seriously undermine someone's chances of finding employment, especially in certain sectors and professions (including nursing, social care, child-minding and teaching), accessing educational and training opportunities, obtaining certain types of insurance, or the ability to travel to certain countries. For those who are non-UK citizens, criminal records can affect the right to remain in the country.”
The Opposition believe that it is crucial that the procedure applies only to those offences for which convictions are unlikely to have these impacts on individuals’ rights and opportunities.
Justice has noted that it is likely that the new procedure
“as it currently stands, would act to incentivise individuals to plead guilty out of convenience, regardless of whether they have an arguable case. Without legal advice, this risk is all the more profound [and]… many will not fully appreciate the impact a conviction could have on their lives and future prospects.”
By limiting the new procedure to non-recordable offences only, we would ensure that automated convictions are limited only to the most minor offences, which do not appear on most criminal record checks. That would be a vital safeguard in the online conviction procedure.
I do not think we will be overly limiting the use of the new procedure if we include that further limitation. Between 40% and 45% of all criminal offence convictions each year are for non-recordable offences, so a significant proportion of cases could still be dealt with. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s thoughts.
James Cartlidge
This interesting amendment covers some of the questions from earlier. Clause 3 provides that only certain non-imprisonable and summary-only offences can be specified as eligible for the new automatic online procedure. Amendment 49 would restrict it further to non-recordable offences. That is straightforward enough.
I reassure the hon. Gentleman that the initial three offences proposed under the new procedure—failure to produce a ticket for travel on a train, failure to produce a ticket for travel on a tram, and fishing with an unlicensed rod and line—are non-recordable offences. In fact, the vast majority of eligible offences in scope are non-recordable, with only a couple of exceptions. There is currently no intention to extend the procedure to any recordable offences. Once we have reviewed how it operates, we might consider extending to other similar non-recordable offences, such as certain road traffic offences—for example, low-level speeding and driving without insurance. Clause 3 enables us to do so.
However, for an offence to be appropriate, it would have to be relatively straightforward and simple to prove, with no complex grounds and a high degree of consistency in sentencing. Prosecutors would also have the discretion, based on the individual facts of any given case, to not offer the option of the procedure for an eligible offence if they felt it would not be suitable. Furthermore, any extension of the procedure to additional offences would be subject to the affirmative procedure and done by regulations, which would have to be approved by Parliament.
Alex Cunningham
That was a very interesting response. I think the Minister was confirming that what is in the amendment will, in fact, be the case going forward and that the Government will not seek to introduce any offences that would be recordable in the scenario I described. I ask the Minister why he does not accept the amendment if that is the Government’s intention. I invite him to intervene on me.
James Cartlidge
That is very kind of the hon. Gentleman. In this situation it is very standard to have a Bill with what is effectively a pilot. I would not quite say that it is formally a pilot, but it is effectively trialling these three non-recordable offences and will be reviewed.
However, as I said, any extension of the procedure to additional offences would be subject to the affirmative procedure and done by regulations that would have to be approved by Parliament. That is a very standard way of operating. We think that is more flexible. I do not want to invite a conspiracy that says there is a clear plan to move very soon to including recordable offences. As I say, there is currently no intention to extend the procedure to any recordable offences. We think that this way of legislating is perfectly standard. The amendment is not necessary.
Alex Cunningham
I am afraid that although I accept that the Minister is an honourable man, I would like to see this measure nailed in legislation so that a future Government cannot start to introduce recordable offences. There is no guarantee from what the Minister said that that will not happen. New Ministers can change things. The amendment will ensure that they cannot go beyond the guarantee that the Minister has offered today, and I intend to press it to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Nick Fletcher (Don Valley) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Mark.
I will move on from what I said this morning about dealing with my constituents. Again, I go back to what people say to me about these things on a daily and weekly basis: the law is only any good if it is enforced. The one thing that people see time and again is that somebody is caught in the act of doing something, yet it can take months to get them to court and to get them dealt with. That is bad for two reasons: it says a negative thing to law-abiding citizens, but it also means that charges are held over somebody’s head for a long time, which is no good. It is no good for people to have cases hanging over them. Punishment should be quick, cases should be dealt with, and people should move on very quickly, especially with small misdemeanours. The whole point of the clause is to clear the backlog in the courts. I have mentioned fly tipping, which is a real issue, and I know there have been backlogs with getting such offenders into court and dealing with them. The clause will expediate the court process and get swift justice to those who need it.
Before I was elected to this place, I got paid when I turned up to work. Other Members have referred to builders, plumbers and electricians, who do not have the luxury that a lot of people have. If they do not turn up for work, they can lose a day’s pay, which can be hugely costly to them, especially in these times. If they have made a small error, being able to deal with it very quickly online, maybe when they get in in the evening—saving them a day in court, which would increase anxiety for people—will be welcomed.
Alex Cunningham
I will be brief and will not repeat the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith on open justice and the requirement for safeguards. I have two points to make, which relate to our previous debate. First, although I feel my trust in the Minister building this afternoon as time goes on, sadly I do not trust a future Conservative Minister who may well decide to use the powers that the Minister is attempting to take to himself to do things that I would hope none of us would approve of, through having a series of online cases that could lead to recordable offences. That could have an impact on people’s lives. For that reason, it is important that we do not support the clause.
Secondly, there is the issue about the information that defendants have. The Minister was at some pains to point out what is already in the Bill. The fact that vulnerable people may not get the support, or not even be identified if they use this particular system, is of great concern. That is the second reason, in addition to those that my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith mentioned, why we will not support the clause.
James Cartlidge
Again, some very interesting points have been made. I was only appointed not much more than a month ago—
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move amendment 51, in clause 4, page 9, line 34, leave out “16” and insert “18”.
This amendment would raise the age of eligibility for written procedures for entering guilty pleas from 16 to 18.
I will be relatively brief on clause 4, which extends the existing “pleading guilty by post” scheme in section 12 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980. Under the provisions in the Bill it would apply to defendants who have been charged with a summary offence at a police station. If the defendant chose to make use of the written procedure, the court would then be able to try the case as if the defendant had pleaded guilty in court, but without the defendant—or the prosecution—having to attend. From 1957, when it was introduced, until 2015, the section 12 procedure was used by all police forces to prosecute mostly traffic offences, although it was also used for some other minor offences. Around 50% of all court cases were dealt with under it. Following the introduction of the single justice procedure in 2015, the section 12 procedure became relatively rare; it is still used for some cases that are not eligible to be prosecuted under the single justice procedure, for instance because the prosecuting body is not eligible to use it or there is a victim involved in the case. Given its current rarity and the limited likelihood of its future use now that the single justice procedure is available, I cannot really see the benefit, or indeed the point, of the extension of section 12, but the Opposition are not necessarily opposed to it.
Amendment 51 is straightforward; it would simply raise the age of defendant for which the procedure can be used from 16—that is, when the defendant is a child—to 18, when the defendant is an adult. I understand that under section 12, children aged 16 to 17 can be prosecuted in the youth court for summary-only offences under the section 12 procedure. Furthermore, under the same legislation, children under 16 can also be prosecuted for summary-only offences under the section 12 procedure, but only if there is an adult co-defendant in the case. However, I believe that the procedure has never actually been used in this way. Just because in 1980 it was decided the section 12 procedure should be able to apply to 16 and 17-year-olds, it does not mean that we have to extend that provision 40 years later. Just as the Government have decided not to extend the provision for children under 16 when there is no adult co-defendant, it could also remove 16 and 17-year-old children from the process altogether.
As it is drafted in clause 4(3), proposed new section (2A)(b) of section 12 allows for a magistrates court not only to accept guilty pleas from children aged 16 and 17 in writing, but to try, convict, and sentence them on papers. Following the accused child’s guilty plea, it would allow the court to sentence them at a court hearing in their absence. Other parts of the Bill, namely clauses 3 and 6, recognise that remote procedures are available only for accused adults—that is, those aged over 18—taking into account the fact that children need additional support and assistance to ensure effective participation. In addition, I understand that the provisions under clause 13, which mandate the involvement of a parent or guardian in proceedings involving a child, will not apply to the entry of a guilty plea by post by a 16 or 17-year-old under section 12. That also strikes me as odd, and I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify the reasoning behind it. To us, it is not clear why the threshold must remain at 16 for this clause.
James Cartlidge
I should point out for the record, as I spoke to him privately, that I did discuss that intervention from the Chair of the Justice Committee, and explained to him what I am about to explain now.
Amendment 51 would raise the age of eligibility for the section 12 procedure—often referred to as “pleading guilty by post”—from 16 to 18 years of age for cases where the defendant is charged at a police station. The section 12 procedure has been available as a suitable means of summary-only prosecution against defendants aged 16 and over since 1957, as I believe the hon. Member for Stockton North rightly said. I am not aware of that having raised any particular issues of concern for child defendants during that time. In a case where the defendant is summonsed or charged by post and intends to plead guilty, the section 12 procedure provides the option to do so by post rather than having to attend court. The subsequent hearing will still take place in open court and the defendant can still attend if they wish, so this is not about online procedure as such.
This procedure is primarily used for minor offences, such as driving without due care or littering, and has seen a sharp decline since the introduction of the single justice procedure. Once again, the hon. Gentleman noted that point. The purpose of clause 4 is to ensure that prosecutors can also offer that long-established procedure for suitable cases where a defendant is charged in person at a police station. That will maintain the same age criterion that exists for prosecutions initiated by summons or postal charges for 16 to 18-year-olds. Prosecutors will decide whether it is appropriate to provide a defendant with the option to proceed with the section 12 procedure, and summons and postal requisitions served on children will always be sent to their parent or guardian, which will include details about the section 12 procedure if it has been offered.
When a child is arrested and held in police detention, existing primary legislation also requires that a parent or guardian must be notified of that as soon as possible, and legislation will continue to enable a youth court to require a parent or guardian to attend during all stages of the subsequent proceedings at court where that is deemed appropriate. The amendment would create confusion by applying different rules to a well-established procedure simply because the defendant is charged in a different way. It also ignores the safeguards in place to ensure that the rights of children are protected. I therefore urge the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful to the Minister for his response. I make no apology for always raising every issue in relation to children when the Government are trying to convert them into adults. There are many more serious examples of that in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill, which is going through in the other place. The Minister will not be aware of this, but I spoke at length in the Committee on that Bill against the creation of adults from children. While I accept what he says about this being a relatively minor example in comparison to elsewhere, it is important that the Government recognise that children are children, and not adults. I worry at times that we will see childhood further eroded in matters of justice going forward.
James Cartlidge
Just for clarity—this is what I explained to the Chair of the Justice Committee—I can quite understand that, at face value, it looks from the Bill as if this is uniquely being set at the age of 16 compared with the automatic procedure, which is set at 18. Of course, they are very different things, so I hope the hon. Gentleman appreciates that it is purely a consistency matter within a well-established procedure—although admittedly, within the Bill next to the other part, it is easy to see why these questions have been raised.
Alex Cunningham
That is exactly the reason why I will not push the amendment to a vote, but I make the point again that we cannot go forward in this country’s justice system moving more to converting children into adults when they are 16 or 17 years of age. I worry that we will see further proposals that will be far more damaging to young people in the future, so I will continue to prosecute this matter, and the Minister will get very bored of me over the coming months as I do so. In the circumstances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
James Cartlidge
I will give a short exposition, because it is important to clarify the point that I emphasised in my last intervention. Section 12 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 is a long-established procedure, providing defendants with the option to indicate a guilty plea in writing to a summary-only offence. In such cases, defendants can also agree to be tried, convicted and sentenced to a fine at a court hearing, which neither they nor the prosecution have to attend. However, a magistrates court cannot impose a custodial sentence without bringing the defendant before the court. Nor can they impose a driving disqualification in the defendant’s absence without adjourning the case and giving the defendant an opportunity to attend a hearing.
Under the existing law, the procedure can only be applied to defendants whose prosecution is initiated by way of a summons or postal requisition. Clause 4 will change that, so that it can also apply when a defendant is charged in person at a police station and bailed to attend court for their first hearing. In circumstances, for example, where a defendant decides to plead guilty by post without having to attend the hearing, clause 4 also provides the court with a power to discharge the defendant from the need to surrender on bail. That means that prosecutors will be able to apply the procedure to suitable cases that would have otherwise been excluded simply because of the way in which the prosecution was initiated.
In all cases, opting to plead guilty in writing and be convicted and sentenced in absence will continue to remain entirely voluntary for defendants. The police and other prosecutors will continue to have the discretion to decide whether it is appropriate to apply the procedure to any case. Furthermore, all the current restrictions on the imposition of custodial sentences and driving disqualifications will still apply. Therefore, a defendant’s appearance at a traditional court hearing will always be available where necessary, or if the defendant desires it. Clause 4 is one of a number of measures the Government are bringing forward in the Bill to simplify criminal procedures and make our courts more efficient for its users.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5
Extension of single justice procedure to corporations
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Alex Cunningham
We have already had a number of debates on our concerns about the extension of some of the powers. I have talked about the single justice procedure in detail, but it is now appropriate to give more direct and constructive criticism of that particular procedure. It is no good recognising the problems of the procedure in discussions of other clauses without any recourse to try to make improvements to the procedure.
I have become quite interested in the workings and failings of the single justice procedure in recent months, as I am sure the Minister is aware. I have raised my concerns with his predecessor at the Dispatch Box in Justice questions and requested a meeting with his predecessor to discuss the use of the procedure for covid offences, which the Minister’s private office has assured me is still in the works once his diary settles down a bit.
I thank Transform Justice, Fair Trials, and Big Brother Watch for the interesting and helpful briefings and discussions we have had on the topic in recent months, and I thank APPEAL and others who have researched and raised the alarm about elements of the SJP. For those who are not familiar with the procedure, APPEAL helpfully outlines it in its briefing “Conveyor Belt Justice”, which I will quote from at length to help Members better understand it:
“Summary offences which are not punishable with imprisonment may be tried by a single magistrate, with a legal adviser available, under what is known as the single justice procedure…Relevant offences include common assault and battery, truancy, non-payment of TV licenses and, from July 2020, offences under emergency Coronavirus legislation. Legal aid is not available to people charged with these offences.
In 2020, SJP prosecutions accounted for 47% of all criminal prosecutions in England and Wales.
Those prosecuted under the SJP receive a notice in the post and are asked to submit their plea within 21 days online or by post.
If someone receives a notice and does not respond, or if they respond and plead guilty, they are automatically convicted on the papers, in closed court. If no evidence is submitted of their financial circumstances, they are assumed to be able to afford the standard fine and costs, which can amount to hundreds of pounds.”
I am sure my fellow Committee members will agree that is a useful summary.
The new clause would require the Secretary of State to undertake a review of the single justice procedure and lay it before Parliament. The review would have to consider a number of issues with the procedure that have been raised by organisations working in the justice sector over the years.
The first issue the review would have to consider is how the SJP complies with open justice, which we knocked around a bit earlier in the day. In an earlier speech, I referred to the difficulties that Tristan Kirk has had accessing information on such cases. In its inquiry on covid-19 and the criminal law, the Justice Committee said that a lesson learnt from the use of the single justice procedure in relation to covid-19 offences was
“that the Ministry of Justice should review the transparency of the single justice procedure and consider how the process could be made more open and accessible to the media and the public.”
I know the Minister has commented on that, but I hope he can go a little further. The Opposition would echo that particular call. With almost half of criminal cases going through the procedure, the Government need to do more to ensure that justice is still seen to be done.
The second matter that needs to be looked at is prosecution errors under the SJP and what redress the victims of those errors have. In the last year, the error rate in the SJP was around 10%, according to a written answer that the Minister recently gave to my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), in which he said:
“A review of Single Justice Procedure…cases dealt with between 1st September and 30th October 2020 showed that legal advisers and justices identified errors in 10% of cases. The errors are not caused by the type of proceedings; work done over the summer of 2020 suggested that the primary cause was the volume of regulations and the constant amendments, combined with the speed of introduction and the conditions in which officers issuing fixed penalty notices had to work. In the autumn of 2020, work was done with police forces and justices’ legal advisers to reduce the errors. Anecdotally, and from limited data, the error rate with the new round of SJP proceedings appears to be lower than last year. As the regulations ceased in the summer, the numbers of Covid SJP cases are set to decline.”
I share the Minister’s hope that the error rate will decline. An error rate of 10%, when almost half of all the criminal cases in the country are being dealt with under the SJP, is quite something. It certainly is not justice at its best.
James Cartlidge
The hon. Gentleman is engaging—he is an engaging fellow and I am engaging with him. I am more than happy to do that. I understand his request for a meeting. I would be more than happy to meet him to discuss some of the questions he has raised about the single justice procedure. If I do not answer them in my reply, I hope that we can go into them at that juncture. That is important.
The new clause would require a review and report into the effectiveness of the single justice procedure before the Act could be commenced. The single justice procedure is a more proportionate way of dealing with straightforward, uncontested, summary-only non-imprisonable offences, which almost exclusively result in a financial penalty. Previously in such cases, defendants tended not to engage at all and trials often went ahead without them. Many of these cases reach the court simply because the defendant has ignored other more informal ways of resolving the matter, such as a fixed penalty notice. We introduced this more accessible procedure as a way of encouraging defendants to engage with the court process.
It is a matter for prosecutors to decide whether it is appropriate to prosecute a defendant under this procedure, but various safeguards are built into the process. All defendants can veto the procedure and choose a hearing in open court. In addition, the magistrate can decide to refer the case to open court if they think that it cannot be dealt with appropriately using the procedure. Defendants who choose to use the procedure have access to support throughout the process, either by telephone or face to face. The single justice procedure written notice and online process have been designed with input from users and a wide range of organisations at public user events. Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service is constantly working to improve the documentation and has developed a clearer and more concise single justice procedure notice and information pack, copies of which I will share. That was recently piloted and is now being implemented.
There is a specific question relating to disability and accessibility needs in the form. To my knowledge, the single justice procedure does not in practice disadvantage any particular group. Defendants who choose to opt into the single justice procedure will be carefully guided through the process and will have access to both telephone and face-to-face support. For those who decide to proceed with a hearing, the necessary adjustments will be made at court in the usual way.
I am aware that concern has been raised that the single justice procedure lacks transparency. However, the criminal procedure rules oblige courts to give certain additional information on cases upon request from the media and other interested third parties. This applies to single justice procedure cases as well. To improve transparency arrangements, a list of pending SJP cases is published each day on a common platform that is available to the public online.
I am also aware that concerns have been raised about errors, as they were by the hon. Gentleman. Errors can occur in any system and there are processes in place to correct them. I am not aware of any evidence to suggest that the error rate is higher under the single justice procedure than under ordinary court procedures. As with all types of cases that magistrates courts deal with, if an error is made by the court, whether upon conviction or sentence, the court will always notify the defendant and correct it, following the case being reopened. Similarly, the defendant has the automatic right of appeal to the Crown court against conviction and sentence. If a defendant was unaware of the proceedings, they are entitled to make a statutory declaration that revokes the conviction and recommences the proceedings.
Given the safeguards in place and our commitment to continually review and improve the single justice procedure processes––
Alex Cunningham
The Minister appears to be coming to the end of his remarks and I want to press him on the unlawful convictions under the coronavirus legislation. Is the Department moving to ensure, or at least to encourage, proactivity in getting these people’s convictions removed?
James Cartlidge
One reason that I am more than happy to meet is that we can go through more detail. There are a range of issues here that I would need to discuss with the hon. Gentleman.
On the new clause, I can see no reason for a formal evaluation and certainly not one that would delay the implementation of all provisions in the Bill. I therefore urge the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the new clause.
Clause 5 makes it clear in law that the single justice procedure can be used to prosecute legal persons such as corporations as well as individuals. Often, corporations are charged with offences that are suitable for the single justice procedure, such as lorry overloading. The clause ensures that a corporation can benefit in the way that an individual can from the speed and convenience of having such cases dealt with under this procedure.
Alex Cunningham
I appreciate the Minister’s response on new clause 1. We can all accept that the SJP is not perfect. We are trying to persuade him of the need to look at data and consider how well it is working, when it is not working and where the problems are. I have illustrated where I think some of them are. The Minister is only a month into his role and is doing a grand job so far. It is important that these issues are explored and not just shoved to one side. I am grateful for his offer to meet and I am sure that will happen.
I will just make one final point on transparency. It needs to be better. There are some good things happening already, but the Minister recognises that transparency is an issue and I look forward to seeing the changes that he might make in the future. I have already covered the issue of unlawful convictions.
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for those comments. Sometimes, it seems that we end up talking about the same things in every single Bill Committee when it comes to justice. I remember well the days on the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill Committee, when my hon. Friend was leading for the Opposition. There were so many places where we felt that more information or data needed to be recorded to ensure that the justice system was working correctly.
However, as I said, on this occasion I am content not to press the new clause, and I look forward to working with the Minister in the future.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 6
Written procedure for indicating plea and determining mode of trial: adults
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move amendment 52, in clause 6, page 11, line 10, at end insert—
“(c) the court has been provided with a physical and mental health assessment of the accused confirming that the written procedure will not impede their ability to understand or effectively participate in proceedings”.
This amendment would require that all accused persons whose cases are considered for the written or online procedure are subject to a health assessment, and only those who are considered not to have vulnerabilities or disabilities are able to indicate their pleas remotely.
The Chair
With this, it will be convenient to discuss amendment 56, in clause 6, page 18, line 5, at end insert—
“(4) The Secretary of State must, before the changes to the written procedure for indicating plea and determining mode of trial are introduced, conduct a pilot in two police force areas to evaluate the impact of the changes on effective participation in the justice process. The evaluation should include—
(a) the proportion of defendants with disabilities affected by the changes;
(b) the impact on the effective participation of all defendants including those with disabilities; and
(c) the effectiveness of reasonable adjustment measures”.
This amendment would require the expansion of online pleas and online indication of pleas to be piloted in two areas of England and Wales, and the pilot evaluated with published results, before any further changes are introduced.
Alex Cunningham
Clause 6 adds new sections to the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 that enable defendants to engage with the plea before venue and allocation procedures in writing, rather than in court. The new sections apply in cases involving a defendant aged 18 or over who has been charged with an either-way offence. This effectively creates a new pre-trial allocation procedure, whereby an individual will be able to indicate a plea in writing for all summary-only, indictable-only and triable either-way cases. This would remove the need for a defendant to attend an allocation hearing in person, as is currently required. The provisions under the clause are not mandatory and a defendant could attend a physical hearing if they wished to do so.
As with other measures in the Bill, the Opposition are not necessarily completely opposed to clause 6, but we need further reassurance from the Minister and possibly amendments that would introduce safeguards into the procedure. That is because, as the Minister will be aware, deciding how to plead and deciding where a case may be heard can have significant consequences for a defendant. One example would be if a defendant chooses to proceed to the Crown court in a triable either-way offence. They may receive a harsher sentence than in a magistrates court, because of the greater sentencing powers of the Crown court.
Decisions regarding plea and the venue of criminal trials are crucial ones that determine the course of the trial and have serious implications for the rights of the defendant, which can be extremely difficult to reverse. Fair Trials states:
“In particular, pleading guilty amounts to a waiver of the accused’s right to a trial, and all the defence rights that are related to trial processes. Although the Bill purports to enable accused persons to only make an ‘indication’ of their plea, which can later be revoked, Fair Trials has doubts that many defendants would do this, unless they benefit from effective legal assistance.”
I will speak further about legal assistance when we discuss amendments 53, 54, and 55.
Fair Trials goes on to say:
“Moreover, the right to a public hearing with the presence of the accused person is of fundamental importance not only to the defence, but also to the public. First appearances in court are crucial stages of the criminal justice process, where important decisions regarding criminal cases and the rights of the accused are made. Clause 6 will mean that many of these hearings will effectively take place in secret....it is crucial that there are sufficiently strong safeguards to ensure that defendants entering their pleas online, or via written procedures make adequately informed decisions.”
The Bar Council believes that hearings that involve indicating plea and determining mode of trial should remain as in person. It explained in its briefing ahead of Second Reading:
“Moving to a written procedure would ultimately impede access to justice for defendants who are often vulnerable due to a range of additional needs, and a disproportionate number of whom (relative to the overall population) have literacy issues, and some of whom may not speak or read English as a first language… Any criminal charge is serious, an either way offence self-evidently so. Moving to a written procedure for an indication of plea and mode of trial increases the probability of defendants, even if entitled to legal advice, suffering a disadvantage. Consequently, there is good reason to question the fairness of such written procedures and we do not believe therefore that it would be in the overall interests of justice or efficiency to adopt such a new approach... Further, the early plea and mode of trial hearings are some of the most procedurally complex in the criminal justice system. In order to ensure that defendants are able properly to navigate the various issues which such hearings present, it is essential that they are able to secure representation at the moment at which they are required to make—and inform the court of—key decisions.”
The Bar Council also referred to the crucial role that criminal solicitors and junior barristers often play in the magistrates court in referring vulnerable defendants to support services that can offer them help. That possible moment for intervention is clearly lost when such hearings are no longer in person.
That is a serious catalogue of concerns levelled against the clause. I appreciate that it is not the Minister’s intention to cause those potentially extremely adverse consequences, but the reality is that potentially many thousands of defendants will face those and suffer worse case outcomes.
The Opposition understand the concerns and share the reservations of Fair Trials and the Bar Council, but we first seek assurances from the Minister that appropriate safeguards will be put in place. Amendment 52 would require that all accused persons whose cases are considered for the written or online procedure are subject to a health assessment, so that only those who are considered not to have vulnerabilities or disabilities are able to indicate their pleas remotely. That is for the same reasons that I outlined in my speech on amendment 57 to clause 3, so I will not rehearse all the arguments again. We are again concerned that the Bill does not address the risk of vulnerable defendants indicating pleas with insufficient knowledge and understanding of the implications. We therefore seek some form of screening safeguard to be put in place.
Amendment 56 would require the expansion of online pleas and online indication of pleas to be piloted in two areas of England and Wales, and the pilot evaluated with published results, before any further changes are introduced. Transform Justice’s briefing notes suggest that
“encouraging online pleas could act as a driver to lack of legal representation, worse outcomes, and exacerbates efficiency issues encountered later in the justice process such as difficulties obtaining full disclosure from the prosecution.”
The Equality and Human Rights Commission said in its briefing that the provisions for pleas in writing
“risk the ability of people with certain protected characteristics to effectively participate in criminal proceedings”.
Given those serious concerns about the impact of the proposals on effective participation in the justice process, the changes should be piloted in two police force areas and an evaluation of the costs and impact of the changes, including on disabled people, should published before wider roll-out is considered. I am interested to hear what safeguards the Minister has considered for the new allocation procedure for adult defendants. As I have said, plea and allocation hearings can have major impacts on case outcomes, and I am sure he agrees that it is vital that we get the procedure right before it is rolled out across the country.
James Cartlidge
The amendments relate to vulnerable defendants using the provisions in clause 6 that allow adults to indicate a plea online. To be clear, I share the concern of the hon. Member for Stockton North to ensure that vulnerable defendants, including those with disabilities, are able to engage effectively with online procedures. That is why we have built a number of safeguards into all the criminal procedure measures in the Bill, including this one.
Amendment 52 would ensure that a court cannot invite a defendant to indicate a plea online unless it has been provided with a physical and mental health assessment indicating that the online procedure will not impede the defendant’s ability to effectively participate in proceedings. It will be a matter for the court, in any case, to decide whether it is appropriate to invite the defendant to indicate a plea online before their first hearing. Not all defendants will be offered the option of engaging with the court online before their first hearing, and the courts will do so only where they consider it appropriate. Defendants will be under no obligation to accept an invitation to proceed online and can choose to discuss these matters at a traditional court hearing if they so wish.
Where a defendant fails to engage online, the proceedings will simply default back to existing court-based procedures. Those who do choose to indicate a plea online will be given information about the procedures available, how they work, the consequences if followed, and the need to obtain legal representation. They will only be able to enter a plea and allocation decision through their legal representative. As they do currently, legal representatives can help to identify if the defendant has any vulnerability that would mean that they cannot understand the process. Furthermore, any online indication of plea will remain just that—an indication. A defendant will be able to withdraw it. They still have to appear before a court to enter a binding plea where the court will be able to assess the extent to which they are making an informed decision. The court can set aside earlier steps in proceedings where it decides that a defendant has not made an informed decision when indicating a guilty plea online, and that indication of guilt cannot then be admitted as evidence against them in later proceedings.
Amendment 56 would require a pilot of the online indication of plea procedure to be undertaken and evaluated before the procedure is implemented to assess the impacts on defendants and, in particular, vulnerable defendants. I share the concerns of the hon. Member for Stockton North about impacts on defendants but do not agree that a pilot is necessary. We have undertaken an equality impact assessment and have built a number of safeguards into the online procedures to protect vulnerable defendants. As with all criminal procedures, the operation of this new procedure will be closely monitored by the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee. I have already set out the safeguards we have built into these procedures so that defendants will not be disadvantaged by engaging with the court in this way, and to ensure that any impacts are positive in minimising the stress of having to attend court unnecessarily. I therefore urge the hon. Gentleman not to press the amendments.
Alex Cunningham
The crux of this matter is the defendant making an informed decision. The Minister referred to that. Coupled with that is the need for appropriate legal advice. The Minister also alluded to that. I do not know how we ensure that the person understands that they need to seek legal advice before participating in this process. However, given what the Minister has said, I am content and beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move amendment 53, in clause 6, page 11, line 10, at end insert—
“(2A) Subsection (3) only has effect where a magistrates’ court is satisfied that the accused has engaged a legal representative, who is responsible for responding to the charge and giving any written indication of plea.”
This amendment would mean that defendants must be legally represented in order to indicate a plea in writing.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 54, in clause 6, page 11, line 29, after “plea” insert “and consequences of pleading guilty”
This amendment will require that an accused person informed about the practical consequences of pleading guilty, such as gaining a criminal record and what that may mean for the defendant.
Amendment 55, in clause 6, page 11, line 36, at end insert—
“(4A) The prosecutor must obtain proof of receipt by the accused of the information outlined in subsection (3)”.
This amendment would require prosecutors to obtain proof of receipt of the information relating to written pleas sent to defendants.
Alex Cunningham
Amendment 53 would mean that defendants must be legally represented in order to indicate a plea in writing. As I said in my previous speech, early plea and mode of trial provisions are among the most procedurally complex in the criminal justice system. The Opposition therefore agree with the organisation Justice that, as a minimum safeguard, defendants must have the opportunity to receive legal advice and assistance prior to indicating a plea or trial venue. Allocation decisions can currently be taken at court with the assistance of a duty solicitor.
As Justice set out in its 2016 response to the Government consultation, “Transforming Our Justice System”, in a physical court there is a network of informal assistance available for people that can help explain procedure and guide towards legal assistance where necessary—from the usher, to the justice’s clerk, the barrister waiting for their case to be called, or the magistrate if the case appears before them. This informal assistance can act as an important safeguard and support mechanism for those going through the often difficult and confusing process of being engaged in our justice system, and would be unavailable, on the face of it, for those able to engage in the new allocation procedure remotely.
The Opposition welcome the clarification from the Government, in the courts fact sheet accompanying the Bill, that defendants will
“not be able to access the online procedure for indication of plea or trial venue allocation decision directly”,
because submissions would be made through the common platform, for which defendants
“will need to instruct a legal representative to act on their behalf who will of course ensure they fully understand the process and will be able to identify any vulnerabilities.”
I am glad that the Minister recognises how crucial legal support and advice are for decisions concerning whether to indicate a plea before venue and deciding where the case should be heard, either in a magistrates court or the Crown court.
James Cartlidge
The amendments would all add further safeguards to clause 6, which allows adults to indicate a plea online. As I have said, I share the concerns of the hon. Member for Stockton North that defendants can engage effectively with online procedures. In the previous group of amendments, I set out the numerous safeguards included in the provision, which also apply here.
Amendment 54 would require that defendants who are given the option to provide an online indication of plea for an either-way offence are informed about the real-world consequences of pleading guilty to a crime at court and what it could mean to get a criminal record. The hon. Member for Stockton North is right that the prospect of a criminal record is not something that should be taken lightly. Clause 6 already ensures that the court must provide important information about the consequences of giving or failing to give an online indication of plea. I must stress again that this is an indication of plea and is not binding. That means that a defendant will have to appear at a subsequent court hearing to enter a binding guilty plea before they can be convicted. The court will need to be satisfied that the defendant has made an informed decision.
Defendants will also be able to withdraw an indication of guilty plea, and that previous admission of guilt cannot be used against them. They will require a legal representative to engage online, who I would fully expect to explain the serious implications of pleading guilty at court and getting a criminal record. If the courts decide that it would be appropriate to provide any additional information to defendants invited to plea online, the legislation enables this to be done under the criminal procedure rules. The Criminal Procedure Rule Committee was created by Parliament precisely for the purpose of making detailed rules of procedure for criminal courts in a flexible way. Delegation to the Committee is widely accepted as appropriate for this sort of secondary legislation.
Amendment 53 would provide that a court cannot invite a defendant to indicate a plea online unless the court is satisfied that the defendant has engaged legal representation. It is our intention to ensure that defendants seek legal representation at the earliest opportunity in all criminal proceedings. As I have said, they will already require legal representation in order to indicate a plea online. That is because the online procedures are made possible through the common platform, which is not accessible to defendants.
Amendment 55 would require prosecuting agents, such as the Crown Prosecution Service, to obtain proof that a defendant had received all the necessary information sent to them by the court about the new written procedure for indicating a plea online for an either-way offence. There are already procedures in place to ensure that information is sent by the court securely and to the correct correspondence address of the intended recipient. These procedures will continue to be followed as normal. I appreciate that there may be occasions when an invitation does not reach the recipient, but that will not disadvantage any defendant. After all, it is up to a defendant if they want to provide an indication of plea online. If they do not—because they choose to ignore the invitation or never received it in the first place—the proceedings will simply begin, as they do now, at the scheduled first hearing. The absence of a response will not be held against them.
I remind the hon. Member for Stockton North that it is also our intention to ensure that defendants seek legal representation at the earliest opportunity in all criminal proceedings. They will need to do so in order to indicate a plea online. Their legal representative will be qualified to ensure that they understand the procedure, have all the information they need to make an informed decision and understand all the consequences that come with it. It would be disproportionate and inefficient to mandate the prosecutor to obtain proof of receipt for each and every invitation that was sent by the court, especially when we have all these safeguards in place, paired with the fact that some defendants will have absolutely no intention of engaging online, opting for a traditional first hearing instead.
Alex Cunningham
I have a simple question about receipt of the charge. Through the post office, people can have a recorded delivery and actually sign for a letter. Why are the Government resisting that? They would know that the person had definitely received the charge, because there would be a signature saying that they had.
James Cartlidge
There are pluses and minuses to that approach. To repeat the point I made earlier, if they never received the notice in the first place, the proceedings would simply begin, as they do now, at the scheduled first meeting. In that sense, there is not a fundamental difference. I think I have covered all key points on this group of amendments and I urge the hon. Member not to press them.
Alex Cunningham
I will not detain the Committee long. I listened carefully to what the Minister said about doing everything possible to make sure that the defendant accesses legal support. I would prefer to see that on the face of the Bill to make sure that it definitely happens, so I will push amendment 53 to a vote but not press amendment 54 or 55.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Alex Cunningham
Main Page: Alex Cunningham (Labour - Stockton North)Judicial Review and Courts Bill (Seventh sitting)
Alex Cunningham ExcerptsTuesday 16th November 2021
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 16 November 2021 - (16 Nov 2021)
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Rosindell. As the Minister said, the clause creates a new pre-trial allocation procedure similar to that of clause 6, whereby an individual would be able to indicate a plea in writing for all summary-only, indictable-only and triable either-way cases, but this time it is for children. Thus far on the criminal procedure changes in the Bill the Opposition have tried to work with the Government’s proposals to find a workable solution through amendments; however, that is not the case with clause 8, as we believe that it is wholly inappropriate for remote proceedings of this kind to be used in cases with child defendants. The law rightfully affords children additional protections and safeguards to reflect their inherently vulnerable nature, and propensity to plead guilty notwithstanding the evidence or potential defences, as shown, for example, in the evidence-based Justice Lab report on incentivised legal admissions in children.
The Minister outlined the theory of what will happen with this set of measures, but sadly the implementation of it could prove to be very different. The Bar Council opposes the provisions too, saying:
“We do not accept that a written procedure for indicating plea or determining mode of trial in the case of children will do anything other than impede access to justice for the most vulnerable cohort of defendants within the criminal justice system.
It has long been the position of the Criminal Bar Association and the Bar Council that the prosecution of children and young people requires wholesale overhaul to ensure that they only enter into the criminal justice system as a very last resort, if diversion and other interventions are unsuitable.
Representation of children and young people, and the courts that administer youth justice, need to be properly funded, regulated and restructured in order to be fit for purpose.”
The Bar Council goes on:
“At present, these courts are not fit for purpose, and all too often act as a gateway for vulnerable youths into more serious offending. It follows that moving to a written procedure will compound the situation, limiting the opportunities for lawyers working under a legal aid system to meet with vulnerable defendants and their families, signpost interventions by other appropriate agencies and identifying children and youths with additional needs. It will also impede the child and youth’s understanding of the seriousness of the process into which they have entered.”
I very much agree with the Bar Council’s assessment. There is much wrong with the youth justice system, and the provisions of this clause would exacerbate the existing issues rather than do anything to improve them. I would also like to seek further clarity on whether the provisions of this clause would allow online pleas for children, which would be seriously concerning. I emailed the Minister about it last week, and he responded with a note from officials. However, I wonder if he could provide some more specific guidance about it on the record.
Although it is not within the Bill itself, paragraph 181 of the explanatory notes states:
“Clause 8 inserts new section 24ZA of the MCA 1980 that enables a child or young person under 18 years who is charged with a triable either-way offence to be provided with the choice to indicate a plea in writing/online, without the need for a youth court hearing.”
We are opposed to the introduction of a written procedure for indicating plea or determining mode of trial in the case of children in any way, but have even stronger objections to an online procedure being introduced directly for them.
I share the concern of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, which says:
“The Commission is concerned that children as young as ten could be engaging with the criminal justice system through an online process insufficiently adapted to their needs and with minimal engagement from a parent or guardian. Children are already more likely to struggle to understand and engage with legal processes. Youth Court hearings provide an important opportunity to respond to the specific and additional needs of children. This is particularly important in light of recent evidence indicating that children are more likely to enter a guilty plea when they are not guilty.”
While the Bill provides that a parent or guardian should be aware of proceedings where they take place online, the Opposition are not convinced that that is sufficient to mitigate against the risks posed to children. As the EHRC briefing notes:
“The law currently provides that, where a child under sixteen is charged with a criminal offence, a parent or guardian must attend all proceedings save where it would be unreasonable to require them to do so. For cases where a plea is entered by a child under sixteen in writing or any part of the proceedings is to be conducted on the papers, the Bill only requires the court to ascertain whether a parent or guardian is aware that proceedings are taking place and where necessary provide that information.”
That is in new section 34A(1B) and (1C) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933.
Janet Daby (Lewisham East) (Lab)
My concern about children above 10 years old being able to make an online plea is that when children use a computer and everything is very much virtual, it is a different level of interaction and can seem like a game. I agree with my hon. Friend’s point that their understanding of the process or their experience of making an online plea will be of a less serious nature. I also support his view that children are more likely to say that they are guilty because they are used to apologising, or they want to get out of the situation quickly. This is not the appropriate way forward.
Alex Cunningham
Yes, computers may be learning tools for children, but they are also their game world. Those of us who have families or grandchildren know that to be very much the case. It is so easy to press buttons and tick boxes, and I am really concerned, as is my hon. Friend, that young people may well think, “Let’s take the easy way out. Let’s just tick the box, and let’s get this over and done with. Then I can forget about it.” Unfortunately, they cannot forget about it, because they can end up with a criminal record, even if they are not guilty of the offence of which they have been accused. That is all the more reason why we need to review this clause in some considerable detail.
Of course, the issues applying to children under 16 do not apply to 17-year-old children. Furthermore, article 40(2)(b) of the convention on the rights of the child sets as a minimum standard the right that a child hearing be held in the presence of legal or other appropriate assistance and, unless not in the best interests of the child, his or her parents or legal guardian. In addition, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child recommends
“that States parties explicitly legislate for the maximum possible involvement of parents or legal guardians in the proceedings”.
This clause does the direct opposite. We do not believe that it makes adequate provision to protect the rights of children in the justice system. It is not appropriate that the important safeguards that exist for children should be watered down in that way through the provisions in clause 8. As such, we will oppose the inclusion of the clause in the Bill.
James Cartlidge
I appreciate where the hon. Members for Stockton North and for Lewisham East are coming from, in the sense that of course we have to be careful in matters involving children. It is fair to point out, however, that these are not revolutionary changes of procedure. In my view, there will certainly be cases where, particularly for vulnerable people, the online environment is more suitable in many ways, because after all they will have legal representation.
I will explain clearly exactly what the clause does, what the safeguards are and where the discretion lies, to try to ameliorate some of the concerns. At the moment, there would be the plea before venue and allocation decision procedures for children of 10 to 17-years-old, which can be completed only at a court hearing. The Bill enables those procedures to be completed in writing online via the common platform without the need for a hearing, as is clear.
On the safeguards, defendants will need a legal representative to proceed with online plea and allocation. That is an important safeguard that will remain firmly in place due to the accessibility restrictions created by the common platform and the stipulations in secondary legislation under the criminal procedure rules. Courts will need to provide information explaining the written procedure, the choices available to defendants and the effects of those choices. If a defendant fails to engage with an invitation to proceed in writing or online, the court will default back to a traditional first hearing. Clause 13, which we will come to, applies with regards to requiring and enabling the court to ascertain whether the parent or guardian is aware, and if they are not, to provide them with the relevant information.
Finally, in terms of discretion, it is the defendant’s discretion to proceed with online indication of plea and allocation in writing or online, so they can still have a traditional hearing. It is also the court’s discretion to withhold or disapply online indication of plea and allocation in writing, if it thinks that is appropriate in the circumstances. There are significant safeguards in place.
It means that we will have greater consistency, but I accept what the hon. Member for Stockton North is saying, which is why we have been keen throughout the debate on these clauses to stress the important safeguards and discretions that exist. I hope that, on that basis, hon. Members can support the clause.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
James Cartlidge
I have tabled these amendments to correct some errors in the Bill, which would prevent this measure from having the desired impact. When it comes to triable either-way offences, the procedures for plea and allocation are invariably completed in immediate succession of each other in the same court hearing. The primary purpose of clause 9 is to enable the court to complete preliminary pre-trial proceedings in the absence of a defendant in a wider range of circumstances than the law currently allows. That will help to ensure the timely progression through the criminal justice system of cases that would have otherwise stalled indefinitely where a defendant deliberately disengaged.
As currently drafted, clause 9 does not afford the same extended set of circumstances to proceed in absence for the plea procedure as there will be for the subsequent allocation procedure. That will in effect act as a legislative roadblock that prevents the courts from being able to make use of the new powers that clause 9 provides. Therefore, these amendments will ensure that the court has the same powers to proceed in the absence of a defendant for both the plea and the allocation decision procedures. Where the court decides that it is in the interest of justice to proceed in a defendant’s absence, it will be assumed that the defendant has pleaded not guilty, and the court will allocate the case for a trial.
A further amendment rectifies a drafting error in clause 9 to ensure that it remains consistent with current law, whereby there is no requirement for the presence of a legal representative when a court decides to proceed with allocation, having removed a disorderly defendant from the courtroom.
These amendments will allow the clause to work as intended, maximising the benefits for the criminal justice system. Clause 9 will continue to ensure that the court cannot proceed in absence unless it is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to do so.
Alex Cunningham
I thank the Minister for his explanation of the need for a raft of amendments to his own Bill.
Clause 9 will introduce additional circumstances in which the magistrates court could continue with the proceedings in the defendant’s absence in triable either-way cases. This applies to adults, and there are similar provisions for children. I will speak on our general concerns in the debates on the Opposition amendments.
I again thank Justice for its assistance in highlighting potential concerns in this area. Currently, the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 provides that the process for triable either-way cases begins with a plea before venue, where an adult defendant is required to appear in a magistrates court to indicate whether they wish to plead guilty or not guilty. Thereafter, if the defendant pleads not guilty or refuses to state a plea, the case proceeds to the allocation hearing. That involves deciding whether the case should be tried in the magistrates court or the Crown court. The defendant is required to be present for both the plea before venue hearing and the allocation hearing. However, in both scenarios there are two circumstances where the court can proceed in the defendant’s absence: where the defendant has legal representation and the court considers that, by reason of the defendant’s disorderly behaviour, it is not practicable for the proceedings to be conducted in their presence—the legal representative will of course act on the defendant’s behalf—or where the defendant gives consent via their legal representative for proceedings to take place in their absence.
Clause 9 would introduce additional circumstances where the magistrates court could proceed with the allocation proceedings in a defendant’s absence in triable either-way cases. In its current form, the Bill does not introduce any changes to the way plea before venue hearings are conducted for triable either way cases. In addition to the two existing circumstances that I have mentioned, clause 9 would empower the magistrates court to now proceed and allocate the case without the defendant’s input in cases where the defendant does not engage in writing or does not appear at their hearing without an “acceptable reason”, provided that the court is satisfied that the defendant has been properly served. The allocation decision would be made on the basis of an assumed not guilty plea—the Minister said that—and the court would proceed to allocate the case to the magistrates court or Crown court. Defendants, however, will continue to have an opportunity to elect for a trial in the Crown court until the start of the summary trial.
Government amendment 2 will now allow a magistrates court to continue with the proceedings in cases where the defendant does not appear at the plea before venue hearing in a wider range of circumstances. The circumstances mirror those proposed for allocation hearings as set out in clause 9(3), including where a defendant does not appear at the hearing without an acceptable reason. The amendment proposes changes to section 17B of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980, which currently empowers magistrates courts to proceed with the plea before venue hearing
“in the absence of a disorderly but represented accused”—
one of the two exceptions to the general rule mentioned earlier.
However, the amendment does not include any requirement for a defendant’s legal representative to be present, which is currently provisioned in the Bill for the allocation hearing, although the Government propose removing it through amendment 3. A number of other circumstances in which the plea can go ahead in the defendant’s absence also do not require the defendant’s legal representative to be present.
Janet Daby
Does my hon. Friend agree that children in particular are vulnerable, and that they should always have legal representation in any plea or pre-plea situation?
Alex Cunningham
I most certainly do. My hon. Friend knows that I will talk about children in the justice system forever, if I need to. It is absolutely critical that they are given every support. Not every parent is capable of offering the appropriate advice, so it is very important that legal representation is in place, in particular in the absence of parents.
Although the Bill previously expanded the circumstances in which an allocation hearing could take place in the defendant’s absence, it at least required that where the defendant was absent due to disorderly conduct, their legal representative would need to be present for the hearing to continue. However, the amendment removes the need for their legal representative to be present; instead, it empowers the court to proceed with the allocation hearing in cases where both the defendant and their legal representative are absent. I do not at all see the need for the removal of that important safeguard, and the Minister’s comments thus far have not convinced me. I wonder how many cases he expects those provisions to be used for.
Government amendment 4 would allow a magistrates court to move straight to the allocation stage if, under the provision inserted by amendment 2, it decides at the plea before venue stage to proceed in the absence of the accused or their legal representative, without needing to consider the merits of the proceedings in the absence of the accused. The court could therefore proceed with an allocation decision in the defendant’s absence, in which case the defendant would be deemed to have indicated a not guilty plea. Justice states that the amendments represent
“a significant alteration of the status quo”,
which permits plea before venue hearings and allocation hearings in the absence of the defendant only for reasons relating to the defendant’s disorderly conduct, or where the defendant consents via their legal representative to proceedings taking place in their absence.
The Opposition share Justice’s concern that clause 9 as a whole—especially with the Government amendments—may remove essential safeguards put in place for the accused’s effective participation in the proceedings, and instead prioritise alleged court efficiency over a defendant’s right to a fair trial. I do mean “alleged” court efficiency—as I will discuss in our next debates, I have concerns that some of the measures the Government are seeking to introduce to improve efficiency may in fact have the opposite effect. I am concerned that the Government amendments would expand the scenarios in which the court could proceed in the absence of a defendant’s legal representative at both the plea before venue stage and the allocation hearing.
I really do not understand why this is at all necessary. Plea and allocation decisions can have significant consequences for an individual and their liberty. It is right that every effort be made to ensure that defendants are properly engaged in their proceedings. The Minister knows that we are all too keen to support the Government in improving the efficiency of our courts, but it is important that the measures we introduce have a genuine evidence base and are not obviously detrimental to the rights of defendants and due process, and I think these amendments would fail both criteria.
The Opposition want an efficient court system every bit as much as the Minister does. However, I worry that if we get it wrong the measures will have the opposite effect. That said, we will not oppose the amendments at this stage, but instead will offer the Government an opportunity to improve the clause through our own series of amendments, to which I hope the Minister will be as accommodating as we have been to his.
Amendment 2 agreed to.
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move amendment 80, in clause 9, page 23, leave out lines 15 and 16 and insert—
“(b) the accused has given a reason that the court does not consider to be an acceptable reason for their failure to attend”.
This amendment would ensure that the defendant is given the opportunity to provide a reason for their non-attendance and avoid the court speculating as to what that reason might be.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 81, in clause 9, page 23, leave out lines 22 and 23 and insert—
“(b) the accused has given a reason that the court does not consider to be an acceptable reason for their failure to attend”.
See Explanatory Statement for Amendment 80.
Amendment 82, in clause 9, page 23, leave out lines 27 and 28 and insert—
“(b) the accused has given a reason that the court does not consider to be an acceptable reason for their failure to attend”.
See Explanatory Statement for Amendment 80.
Amendment 83, in clause 9, page 24, leave out lines 36 and 37 and insert—
“(e) the accused has given a reason that the court does not consider to be an acceptable reason for their failure to attend”.
See Explanatory Statement for Amendment 80.
Alex Cunningham
I begin by thanking Justice for its detailed briefing on the clause, which was extremely helpful for identifying potential issues of concern. As the Minister has outlined, clause 9 introduces additional circumstances in which the magistrates court can proceed with the allocation proceedings in a defendant’s absence in triable either-way cases. That applies to adults, and the clause contains similar provisions for children. A magistrates court would now be able to proceed and allocate the case without the defendant’s input in cases where the defendant does not engage in writing or appear at their hearing without an “acceptable reason”, provided that the court is satisfied that the defendant has been properly served.
The allocation decision would be made on the basis of an assumed not guilty plea and the court would proceed to allocate the case to the magistrates court or the Crown court. Defendants, however, will continue to have an opportunity to elect for a jury trial until the start of the summary trial. That would represent quite a significant expansion of current practice, which only permits allocation hearings in the absence of the defendant for reasons relating to the defendant's disorderly conduct—we have discussed that already—or where the defendant gives consent via their legal representative for proceedings to take place in their absence.
I note that the Law Society expressed some concern with the clause. In its Second Reading briefing, it said:
“If the court decides the defendant’s case should be tried in the magistrates’ court, the defendant will only subsequently be able to elect a jury trial if the court agrees that it would be in the interests of justice to reopen the question of the mode of trial. This would effectively result in the defendant losing their right to a jury trial without their consent. In our view a defendant should only lose the right to elect a jury trial if they have expressly waived that right.”
Will the Minister outline a couple of illustrative examples of he imagines a magistrate would consider it in the interests of justice to reopen the matter of allocation, so we can understand how stringently it is intended to be imposed?
Justice also considers clause 9 to be problematic for three reasons. First, it is concerned that the measure would significantly impair the ability of defendants to engage in their proceedings. It notes that
“At present, the defendant has a right to choose the trial venue in cases of triable either way offences. Clause 9, however, empowers the Magistrates to determine the trial venue in cases of triable either way offences in the defendant’s absence, where the defendant does not engage in writing or appear at their hearing without an “acceptable reason”, for which no definition is provided in the Bill or in the Explanatory Notes.”
I agree that it is therefore difficult to assess how it would operate in practice when magistrates would be given a wide discretion to proceed and allocate the case in the defendant’s absence. Indeed, if a defendant has not appeared at the allocation hearing and has not been able to instruct or inform their counsel as to the reason for their non-appearance, it would be impossible for the magistrates to know whether an “acceptable reason” exists or not. Moreover, should the magistrates allocate the case to a court that is different from the one the defendant wants, that could result in the case returning to the allocation stage: they could make a statutory declaration under the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980, stating that they did not know of the summons or the subsequent proceedings. That would result in both being void. As Justice explained,
“This will cause delays and additional expenditure of resources, contrary to the aim of this provision, which is to ‘provide the court with an important means of progressing cases which would otherwise stall creating uncertainty and lengthy waiting times’.”
I would welcome the Minister’s thoughts on that point. We certainly do not want to pass measures aimed at increasing efficiency in the system if they will have the opposite effect in reality. In an attempt to avoid those issues, the Opposition have tabled amendments 80, 81, 82 and 83, which all do the same thing, and together would ensure that the defendant was given the opportunity to provide a reason for their non-attendance and avoid the court speculating as to what that reason might be. I am also interested to hear whether the Minister has any further thoughts on how such speculation by the court can otherwise be avoided.
Alex Cunningham
I appreciate the Minister’s explanation outlining again the safeguards in place. I do not believe the safeguards are sufficient and I hope that, over time, the Government will look again at the issue.
I accept wholeheartedly that we do not want people to deliberately slow down their cases for time immemorial, but it is important to recognise that the people we are concerned about are those who have a genuine reason for not having been in touch with the court. Even if we get to the point where they can opt for a trial at a later stage, an awful lot of time and resource are wasted in the interim period. I accept what the Minister says for now and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendments made: 3, in clause 9, page 23, leave out lines 33 and 34
This amendment allows a magistrates’ court to carry on with an allocation hearing in the absence of the accused if the accused disrupts the hearing, even if the accused is not legally represented.
Amendment 4, in clause 9, page 23, line 41, at end insert—
“(1G) This section also has effect where a magistrates’ court determines that section 17B(5) applies and proceeds straight away to a hearing in accordance with section 18(1).”—(James Cartlidge.)
This amendment allows a magistrates’ court to move straight to the allocation stage if (under the provision inserted by Amendment 2) it decides at the plea-before-venue stage to proceed in the absence of the accused or a representative, without fresh consideration of the merits of proceeding in the absence of the accused.
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move amendment 58, in clause 9, page 23, line 41, at end insert—
“(1G) In a case within subsection (1A)—
(a) the accused may, at any time before the taking of a plea in the summary trial, apply to the court for the question of the mode of trial to be reopened;
(b) the court may, if it considers it in the interests of justice to do so, accede to the application and arrange a hearing under paragraph (c);
(c) if a hearing takes place under this paragraph and the accused appears at it, the court is not to proceed to summary trial by virtue of subsection (1A), but is to proceed in accordance with subsections (2) to (9) of section 20 above.”
This amendment would allow defendants to reopen the allocation process and elect for jury trial up to the point of taking a plea in a summary trial if the court considers it in the interest of justice to do so.
I will be very brief. Members will understand why we tabled amendment 58—simply to introduce another safeguard for the use of the new powers under clause 9. The amendment provides defendants with an additional opportunity to reopen the allocation process and elect for a jury trial where this provision is used. That would save the summons or proceedings from being void should a defendant have to make a statutory declaration under section 14 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980. It does not go as far as the Law Society suggests in keeping the matter of electing for a jury trial open unless the defendant has explicitly waived that right, but it at least provides an additional opportunity for the defendant to reopen the matter. It is critical that we do everything possible not just to protect the integrity of the new way of working but to ensure that justice is done. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
James Cartlidge
As the hon. Gentleman says, the amendment would enable an adult defendant to apply to a magistrates court to re-open an allocation decision taken in their absence to try an either-way offence summarily and thus provide the defendant with another opportunity to elect for a jury trial. Such an application could be granted provided it was done before the start of the summary trial and the court considered that it was in the interests of justice.
Clause 9 already provides that important safeguard, albeit with two minor differences. First, the amendment will not explicitly require the court to consider the reason why the defendant failed to appear at the allocation hearing when considering whether it is in the interests of justice to re-open the allocation decision. That is an important provision: it recognises that there will be legitimate reasons why a defendant fails to appear—if they were gravely ill in hospital or were genuinely unaware of the proceedings against them, for example. However, it also recognises that allowing defendants to deliberately hold up proceedings by absconding on bail or refusing to leave their cells does not serve the interests of justice.
Secondly, the amendment gives absent defendants who were represented by a legal representative at their allocation hearing the opportunity to make an application to re-open the allocation decision. Clause 9 already ensures that if a legal representative is present at the allocation hearing but is unable to signify an absent defendant’s consent to a summary trial, the case must be sent to the Crown court for jury trial anyway. This amendment would simply provide defendants with a further means of deliberately delaying proceedings.
The amendment undermines the purpose of clause 9, which aims to tackle deliberately obstructive defendants who are intent on denying victims justice, while protecting the trial rights of those who are genuinely unaware of proceedings. I therefore urge the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.
Alex Cunningham
Again, the Government concentrate on the people who are difficult in the system rather than those who might have a genuine reason for seeking change. I accept the Minister’s explanation and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move amendment 84, in clause 9, page 24, line 21, leave out subsection (4).
This amendment would remove cases involving children and young people from the provisions of Clause 9.
Again, I will be relatively brief. I remain surprised, given what we have discussed already, that the new proposed procedures for adults will, through clause 9(4), apply to children. Given our debate on previous clauses, it will be no surprise to the Minister that this causes me and the Opposition some considerable unease. It introduces a power for the court to proceed with allocation proceedings in a child’s absence. Children are considered inherently vulnerable. While the Bill recognises children’s increased vulnerability and additional requirements, it is not specified how their rights will be appropriately safeguarded.
The Opposition have tabled amendment 84, which would remove subsection (4) and thus limit the provisions of the clause to cases not involving child defendants. I am interested in the Minister’s thoughts as to why the procedure needs to be extended to cases involving children at all. I imagine the number of cases to which it would apply would be relatively few in number anyway, although the Minister may have some data to show otherwise. If so, I would like to hear of it and gain some understanding as to why, once again, the Government want to apply adult criteria to children. Without sufficient reassurances from the Minister, I intend to press the amendment to a vote.
James Cartlidge
The amendment would prevent clause 9 from applying to cases involving children. I do not have those statistics to hand, but I will see if I can endeavour to find them for the hon. Gentleman.
I want to start by acknowledging the hon. Gentleman’s concerns about the application of the clause when it comes to children. As I said before, I recognise the sensitivities here, which is why we have emphasised safeguards, and I fully agree that it is vitally important that we protect the interests of children in the criminal justice system.
Subsection (4), which the hon. Gentleman proposes to remove, has been specifically drafted for children. It takes into consideration that defendants under the age of 18 have an extremely limited role to play when it comes to allocation hearings, given that they do not have the same rights as adults to elect for a jury trial at the crown court. It recognises children’s increased vulnerability in the criminal justice system and provides additional safeguards. For example, the additional new circumstances that will enable the allocation of children’s cases in their absence are far more limited than those provided for adults. In addition to the existing exception of disorderly conduct, the clause specifies that the court can only proceed to allocate in a child’s absence where the child has been invited, but failed, to provide an online indication of plea and either the court is satisfied they were served with a notice of the hearing or the child has already appeared at court on a previous occasion to answer the charge. The court must consider whether there is an acceptable reason for the child’s absence and must be satisfied it would not be contrary to the interests of justice for the hearing to proceed in the child’s absence.
The provision must be viewed in the context of existing safeguards in primary legislation. When a child is arrested and held in police detention, the law requires that a parent or guardian must be notified as soon as possible. If a summons and postal requisition is served, it will always be sent to their parent or guardian. When the case is then brought before a youth court, the law will continue to enable the court to require a parent or guardian to attend during all stages of the subsequent proceedings where that is deemed appropriate.
James Cartlidge
My right hon. Friend makes a very good point. It is difficult to have specific clauses for children in care in that sense, but I will give consideration to that important point and provide him with further information.
Courts also have a statutory duty to have regard to the welfare of children. They will always have the discretion as to whether to proceed to allocate in a child’s absence. We recognise that in the majority of cases, the courts may not deem it appropriate to proceed if a child is absent from the plea and allocation hearing. However, the clause provides the court with an important means of progressing a case involving a child where it is in the interests of justice to do so. I therefore urge the hon. Member for Stockton North to withdraw the amendment.
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful to the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings for raising the issue of looked-after children. He helps to illustrate further why subsection (4) is inappropriate and why we support its removal. The Minister talked about the court being satisfied that notice has been served on the child. I am not sure how the court determines that, because children can always spirit things away and parents do not always find out until much later down the process.
Sir John Hayes
I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s remarks, but I took from what the Minister said that he is going to go away and think about that. When a combination of a diligent Opposition and a brave Government Back Bencher raises an issue and the Minister has given—I will not say concession—that acknowledgement, the wise thing for an Opposition to do is to take that as a win and withdraw their amendment.
Alex Cunningham
I think the right hon. Gentleman almost makes my argument for me. The Minister does not actually know how the subsection will apply to a particularly vulnerable group of young people, those in care. Perhaps it is the Minister who should support the amendment.
James Cartlidge
Just to clarify the point about our not knowing, we are talking about primary legislation setting out the core changes. The most important part, as always, is that there is discretion in the courts and that is inherent in almost all aspects of proceedings in the courts. I have great faith in the judiciary in these matters. The courts have discretion over whether to apply these—and other clauses that we have been talking about which have similar measures—to children and so on. Whatever the detail in respect of the most vulnerable children—I think I have answered some of that—the most important part is the discretion that exists which is inherent in our legal system.
Alex Cunningham
I too have tremendous confidence in our judiciary, but this is an additional power that it does not require. I suspect if it was consulted, it would not particularly want it either, unless the Minister has evidence to the contrary. I maintain that it is totally unnecessary.
James Cartlidge
The hon. Gentleman will know that the judiciary will not set out explicit views on proposed legislation. Of course, we have the Law Society, the Bar Council and other important stakeholders, and we feel that there has been significant consultation on these matters. I would add that there is detail to come in the normal way through the procedure rules which is then agreed by negative resolution. I will write further to my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings and happily share that with the hon. Gentleman if he so wishes.
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful for that, but again, the impacts on different groups of vulnerable children have not been fully thought through. It does not take into consideration what happens when a child fails to appear and perhaps nobody is aware that the child has been charged. I remain very concerned about the amendment and we will press it to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move amendment 85, in clause 9, page 25, line 5, at end insert—
“(5) If the court proceeds with the allocation decision procedure in the absence of the accused, the accused must continue to have the opportunity to plead guilty at any time before the start of the summary trial and still receive the full credit had he pleaded guilty at the first stage of the proceedings.”
This amendment would ensure that the accused is entitled to the full credit that they would have received had they pleaded guilty at the first stage of the proceedings.
Another area of concern is that the Bill could remove the potential for any credit or reduction in sentence to which the defendant would have been entitled for pleading guilty. That is because magistrates would be able to proceed to allocate the case on the basis of an assumption that the individual wishes to plead guilty. Currently, courts have the power to reduce a sentence if a defendant pleads guilty. A defendant who pleads guilty at the first stage of proceedings, defined as up to and including the allocation hearing, can benefit from a maximum reduction of one third of the sentence that would have been imposed if the case had progressed to a trial.
Justice notes:
“It is therefore beneficial to seek engagement from the defendant as to how they would like to plea rather than make it easier for Magistrates to assume based on the uncertain criterion of an ‘unacceptable reason’, since the measures may result in cases progressing whereas they otherwise may not have. This is counterproductive and may in fact result in cases being disposed of in a less efficient manner. This would therefore represent a significant disadvantage to both defendant and the criminal justice system.”
If we want a more efficient system, we should make sure that the measures will actually deliver one. For these reasons, the Opposition have tabled amendment 85, which would ensure that the accused is entitled to the full credit they would have received if they had pleaded guilty at the first stage of the proceedings, but where the court proceeds in their absence and presumes a non-guilty plea and they later affirmatively plead the contrary.
I would welcome the Minister’s assurances that full credit for a guilty plea would still be available in these circumstances. As we know, where appropriate, a defendant pleading guilty at an early stage saves the court time and money and can save the alleged victim and their family the stress and difficulty of a trial. We would not want to disincentivise appropriate pleas because the credit would be reduced due to the proposals in the Bill.
James Cartlidge
Amendment 85 seeks to ensure that a defendant, whose case is allocated in their absence, is still entitled to the full reduction on their sentence that they would have otherwise received had they appeared at court and pleaded guilty at the first available opportunity. The location of the amendment in the new legislation means that it would only apply to children. However, as the hon. Gentleman’s explanatory statement makes reference to all “accused” persons, I hope that I have correctly understood that the amendment was intended for both child and adult defendant alike.
The safeguard that the hon. Member’s amendment intends to implement is already provided for under the existing Sentencing Act 2020 and the Sentencing Council’s guidelines for both child and adult defendants. The early guilty plea provisions of the guidelines are intended to support the efficient administration of justice and the early resolution of cases. The key difference is that the existing guidelines take into account the reasons why the defendant’s plea was delayed—which I believe is the right approach—rather than reducing the sentence irrespective of why they failed to appear.
Currently, where a defendant fails to appear at a plea and allocation hearing, the case stalls until the defendant appears; under the new provisions a case can progress. Defendants who fail to attend for allocation and then later plead guilty will create inefficiencies in the system; the court and prosecution will expend time and effort preparing for a trial that is not required, and victims and witnesses—who we should not forget—will be caused anxiety and inconvenience because they are told to attend court. In such circumstances, it is right that defendants should not always be entitled to the full reduction of one third off their sentence.
Alex Cunningham
The Minister just used the phrase “not always”. Could he expand on that, please?
James Cartlidge
The existing law and Sentencing Council’s guidelines provide that magistrates’ courts must consider whether there are particular circumstances which otherwise made it unreasonable to expect a defendant to have indicated a plea at an earlier stage in the proceedings. This means that defendants who fail to appear at the plea and allocation hearing for legitimate reasons will continue to be entitled to the full reduction of one third off their sentence—just to be clear. I therefore urge the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.
Alex Cunningham
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
James Cartlidge
As I have said, this is an important clause. We have considered the amendments, and I understand the motivations of the hon. Member for Stockton North, but just to remind us, under the current law, a magistrates court cannot reach a decision in the absence of an adult defendant about whether to allocate a triable either-way case for summary trial at magistrates court or jury trial at Crown court.
Until that decision is made, the case cannot progress any further. The only exceptions to the rule are if the defendant has agreed, through their legal representative, that the court can proceed in their absence or if the defendant’s disorderly conduct in the court means that it is not practicable to proceed in their presence.
That means that the timely progression of cases through the criminal justice system can stall indefinitely when defendants deliberately disengage from the proceedings—for example, by absconding on bail or refusing to leave their cell when held on remand. That can have serious negative impacts on victims and witnesses and cause serious delays to justice. In some cases, it may lead to witnesses withdrawing their support for the prosecution, causing cases to collapse and allowing perpetrators to go unpunished.
Clause 9 will enable magistrates courts to decide mode of trial for such cases in the absence of defendants in a wider range of circumstances than the law currently allows for, where the defendants fail without good cause to appear at court for their allocation hearing. Any decision to allocate in absence will be subject to the interests of justice test.
Adult defendants will retain the right to elect for a jury trial at Crown court up until the start of any subsequent summary trial, depending on why they failed to attend the allocation hearing. Defendants with legitimate reasons for failing to appear will get another opportunity to elect before the start of a summary trial allocated in their absence.
Although defendants under the age of 18 do not have the same right as adults to elect for a jury trial at Crown court, there are still occasions when a court will need to reach an allocation decision in a child’s absence. The current law only provides one exception that allows for this: where it is not practicable due to a legally represented child’s disorderly conduct before the court. Subsection 4 provides additional new circumstances—albeit far more limited than those provided for adults—that will enable the allocation of children’s cases in their absence in a way that acknowledges their increased vulnerability and provides additional safeguards to those already in the youth justice system.
Alex Cunningham
Briefly, the Minister has heard our arguments in relation to children throughout this. That, of course, remains our principal concern around this clause. I would ask that—whether for children or adults—the Government look again at the various safeguards that are in place, to see if there are opportunities for them to be improved. Again, the Government are concentrating on the difficult defendants rather than the wider range of defendants within the court system, even if they do have an opportunity at a later stage to elect for that particular type of trial. Despite our reservations about children, we will not oppose the clause, but we hope that the Government will reflect on the many things we have said, particularly on young people.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 9, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 10
Sending cases to Crown Court for trial
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
James Cartlidge
Measures in this Bill will clear away obstacles in current legislation standing in the way of the courts carrying out more of their administrative case management outside of the courtroom. Clause 10 will help to deliver that by removing the legal requirement that defendants charged with indictable offences must first appear before a magistrates court to be informed that their case is being sent to the Crown court.
Under existing law, where a defendant has been charged with an indictable-only offence, such as conspiracy to defraud, and there is no other reason to hold a hearing—for example, to consider issues of bail—then a court hearing is surely superfluous. The defendant will be sent to the Crown court for trial regardless of his or her consent.
Similarly, in triable either-way cases, where a defendant has engaged with the court in writing or online and elected for a Crown court trial, equally there would be no need to hold a hearing. This provision will help to streamline criminal procedures by reducing the need for physical appearances in the magistrates court and removing unnecessary hearings. However, this is a discretionary power. A magistrates court will only exercise that power where it considers it appropriate and in the interests of justice to do so and no issues, such as bail, need to be considered.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 11
Powers of Crown Court to remit cases to the magistrates’ court
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
James Cartlidge
Clause 12 amends existing legislation relating to the power of the youth court to return defendants who have turned 18 before the start of trial to the adult magistrates court or to send them to the Crown court. Although the power is already operationally possible, the clause makes the process for exercising it much clearer. It also enables such decisions to be made other than in open court where appropriate, provided that the youth court serves certain documents on the defendant.
The clause also provides that, where the youth court proposes to remit a person to the adult magistrates court for an offence triable either way, the court must give the defendant the opportunity to elect for a jury trial. It also provides that the criminal procedure rules should set out the circumstances when joined cases or co-defendants are to be sent to the Crown court along with the main offence.
The clause aims to ensure that new provisions for adults, which enable cases to be sent to the Crown court without the need for a hearing, are replicated in the youth court system.
Alex Cunningham
As the Minister outlined, clause 12(3) inserts proposed new subsection (1D) in section 47 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, empowering the youth court to transfer the proceedings without an in-person hearing if the accused turns 18. Organisations that campaign on youth issues have raised several concerns about this cliff-edge clause.
Moving into the adult courts system can have a number of knock-on impacts on sentencing and the spending periods associated with convictions. It is therefore significant, and it is important that the accused is involved in the hearing. I am not convinced that it is appropriate to proceed with such a hearing in the absence of the accused via a written procedure. As the backlog continues to grow, more youths are likely to cross the significant age threshold while their case is still travelling through the justice system.
The Minister will be as concerned as I am by the backlogs in the youth courts, although they are not as significant as those in the adult system. The Minister of State, the hon. Member for Louth and Horncastle (Victoria Atkins), confirmed in her answer to my written question No. 58390 that the average time taken to deal with youth cases had doubled recently from 52 days in April 2020 to 102 days in June 2021.
Sadly, no up-to-date figures are available. I suspect, given inaction and the pandemic, that the period of time for youth cases to be heard will have grown along with others. If it is taking months on end to get youth cases into court, it follows that more and more young people could be transferred to the adult courts. With the magistrates court backlog as it is, there could be further delay in getting the case to court, with young people being forced to lead their lives on hold, not knowing their fate. That is all the more reason why the Minister should think again about the new measure he wants to introduce.
I would welcome the Minister’s thoughts on how we can mitigate the cliff edge at the end of the youth justice system. It seems to me that simply proceeding with this jump on paper, without engaging the defendant, does the opposite. Yes, the person may be an adult by the time they get to court, but they were children at the time of the alleged offence. I repeat what I said about clause 9: we must do everything possible to ensure that justice is done and that children are properly protected.
James Cartlidge
I stress an important point to colleagues about children. I am afraid that it is a fact that they can commit very serious crimes. Although, in all aspects of the justice system that deal with younger people, we have to be cognisant of vulnerabilities, they have to face justice as well under our system as it is configured.
Let me deal with the point about whether the provision would lead to more cases of a defendant who has turned 18 after committing the offence being sent to the adult system. As the power already exists, the provision is not intended to result in any such increase. Alongside the provision to enable the Crown court to remit cases back to the magistrates court, the clause aims to ensure that courts have the discretion to ensure that cases are always heard in the most appropriate venue.
Alex Cunningham
Will the Minister make a statement on the record about his view of children being transferred from the youth court to adult courts, having committed the crime as a child? What is his position on those transfers?
James Cartlidge
The hon. Gentleman knows that this is not a new matter. When that is the case, when it comes to sentencing, the court will have to take into account the age at which the offence was committed. That is the most important point we need to remember.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 12 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 13
Involvement of parent or guardian in proceedings conducted in writing
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
James Cartlidge
Under the current law, when a defendant under 16 years old is charged with a crime, or is for any other reason brought before a court, the court must require a parent or guardian to attend court at all stages of the proceedings, unless it would be unreasonable to do so. When a defendant is 16 to 17 years old, the court may require a parent or guardian to attend.
The purpose of the provision is to ensure that this important safeguard applies to the new written and online procedures in the Bill—for example, when a child is invited to indicate a plea online, or receives a written notification that the court has decided to send their case directly to the Crown court.
Clause 13 provides that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, the court must ascertain whether the parent or guardian of a child under 16 years old is aware of any written or online proceedings and, if not, to provide them with information about the proceedings. The court may do this for children aged 16 to 17 years old. Where it is appropriate to make a parent or guardian aware, the clause also requires the courts to provide them with information explaining the new written and online procedures, including the choices available to the child, and the effects of those choices.
Alex Cunningham
Given what I have already said about the need for full and proper safeguards for child defendants involved in the criminal process, I am sure it will be no surprise to the Minister that the Opposition are minded to oppose the clause. I will not go over again matters debated on clauses 8 and 12, but I wish to share the additional concern of the Bar Council, which says:
“Many parents of children coming into the criminal justice system have literacy issues and are often themselves vulnerable adults. Securing their involvement in writing, as a ‘safeguard’ for a child or youth, who is also to be dealt with by way of a written process, is an insufficient safeguard for the administration of criminal justice.
Face-to-face hearings that require the attendance of the parent, guardian or responsible adult mark the gravity of the proceedings. They also allow for further opportunities for appropriate intervention by relevant agencies on behalf of vulnerable children and youths, or in support of parents or guardians that need help and guidance, for which the legal representative is often the point of referral.”
I agree with that entirely, and clause 13 contributes to the watering down of the vital safeguards for child defendants. We are therefore unable to support it.
James Cartlidge
To be fair to the hon. Gentleman, he is being entirely consistent. He will appreciate that it would be odd and inconsistent if we were to keep the other clauses and remove this clause, given that it has safeguards in relation to those clauses. Notwithstanding the fact that he has some overarching concerns, he will appreciate that it would be odd for us to remove it in those circumstances.
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move amendment 86, in clause 18, page 34, line 38, leave out “require online procedural assistance” and insert “are digitally excluded”.
This amendment would require regard to be had to the needs of persons who are digitally excluded when making Online Procedure Rules.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 87, in clause 24, page 41, line 30, leave out “require online procedural assistance” and insert “are digitally excluded”.
This amendment would require the Lord Chancellor to have regard to the needs of persons who are digitally excluded when allowing or disallowing Online Procedure Rules to be made.
Amendment 88, in clause 27, page 42, line 31, leave out “require online procedural assistance” and insert “are digitally excluded”.
This amendment would require the Lord Chancellor to arrange for the provisions of appropriate and proportionate support for persons who are digitally excluded.
Amendment 89, in clause 31, page 44, leave out lines 11 to 15 and insert—
““persons who are digitally excluded” means persons who, for reasons including their inability to access the internet or digital devices, lack of basic digital skills, or problems with confidence and motivation, experience difficulty in engaging with computers or online processes”.
This amendment inserts a new definition of “persons who are digitally excluded”.
New clause 2—Online Procedural Assistance—
“(1) Online Procedural Assistance, must be made available and accessible to any party or potential party to proceedings governed by Online Procedure Rules that requires it. In delivering this duty, the Lord Chancellor must have due regard to the intersection of digital exclusion with other factors, such as age, poverty, disability and geography and deliver support services accordingly.
(2) It must include assistance to enable such a party or potential party to have a reasonable understanding of the nature of the proceedings, the procedure applicable under Online Procedure Rules and of how to access and navigate such procedure. To this effect, it will provide both advice and technical hardware, as appropriate, and will provide assistance to such individuals throughout the course of their proceedings.
(3) Anyone who requires Online Procedural Assistance must have the option of receiving it either via remote appointments or in-person appointments at a site local to them.
(4) Online Procedural Assistance must include, for a party or potential party whose first language is not English, assistance, by interpretation or translation as appropriate, in a language that is familiar to the party or potential party.
(5) The delivery of Online Procedural Assistance must be evaluated at yearly intervals by an independent evaluation team. To assist in these evaluations, data must be routinely collected relating to the protected characteristics of those using the service, outcomes of cases that used Online Procedural Assistance and the frequency and location of the appointments provided. This must also be made publicly available.”
This new clause clarifies the nature of online procedural assistance.
Alex Cunningham
We now move to part 2, chapter 2 of the Bill, which sets up powers to make online procedure rules for specified proceedings in civil, employment, family and tribunals to be started, conducted, progressed or disposed of by “electronic means”. The Opposition recognise the importance of expanding the use of online procedures in our court processes, and its role in making the system more efficient and cost effective, and so are broadly supportive of the provisions of this chapter.
However, we seek some reassurances about the provisions for digitally excluded individuals in the Bill. Research by Lloyds Bank shows that 16% of the UK population lack basic digital skills and are unable to
“participate in a digital society.”
It is vital that these people are not left behind by the provisions in this Bill.
The amendments aim to introduce further safeguards and accountability and scrutiny mechanisms at points we think may be appropriate, so as to ensure the measures do not preclude practical access to justice. I look forward to hearing what the Minister thinks of them.
The amendments relate to the parts of the Bill that refer to
“persons who require online procedural assistance.”
I thank Justice and the Public Law Project for their assistance and input. This phrase is used at a number of points in the Bill, including at clause 18(3)(a), which requires
“Powers to make Online Procedure Rules…are to be exercised with a view to securing…that practice and procedure under the Rules are accessible and fair,”.
Clause 18(4) states:
“For the purposes of subsection (3)(a), regard must be had to the needs of persons who require online procedural assistance.”
Clause 24(4) states:
“In deciding whether to allow or disallow rules,”—
made by the Online Procedure Rule Committee—
“the Lord Chancellor must have regard to the needs of persons who require online procedural assistance.”
Clause 27 places a duty on the Lord Chancellor to arrange for support that is
“appropriate and proportionate for persons who require online procedural assistance.”
Such persons are defined in Clause 31, which states
“‘persons who require online procedural assistance’ means persons who, because of difficulties in accessing or using electronic equipment, require assistance in order to initiate, conduct, progress or participate in proceedings by electronic means in accordance with Online Procedure Rules;”.
The Bar Council’s briefing for Second Reading noted:
“It is unclear if “persons who require procedural assistance” is a socio-economic, physical, mental or other difficulty.”
It also recognises that this
“seems to raise potential equality and diversity issues.”
Justice is also concerned that the definition is “unduly narrow and unclear”. Although the Opposition support the inclusion of the duty to arrange support for persons who require online procedural assistance, we share the concern that the current definition of such persons undermines the effectiveness of the duty. Justice explains that people may be able to access or use electronic equipment but may still be unable to effectively engage with or participate in online proceedings for other reasons—for example, people who speak English as a second language, people with learning difficulties, cognitive or sensory impairments, and those who require different modes of communication, such as braille or sign language. Furthermore, digital exclusion can be situational, because people
“who might normally be confident online may struggle with online services when faced with crises such as divorce or debt which reduce people’s confidence and capability.”
Those are some of the findings from Justice’s excellent 2018 report, “Preventing Digital Exclusion from Online Justice”, of which I am sure the Minister is aware. Justice also notes that it is unclear whether the definition as currently drafted would include people who are able to use electronic equipment but do not have access to the internet—for example, because they cannot afford the data, as opposed to the equipment, such as a phone, tablet or computer. Will the Minister please provide some clarification on this point? I hope the intention is that the definition will cover such scenarios.
In its 2018 report, Justice argued for the need to provide effective support to those who are digitally excluded, in order to realise the full potential of online justice services and improve access to justice for many people. In the report, Justice used the term “digitally excluded” to describe people who, for reasons such as
“an inability to access the internet or digital services, lack of basic digital skills, or problems with confidence and motivation”,
experience difficulty in engaging with computers and online processes. We think reflecting that meaning in the legislation would ensure that the duty to provide support to those who need it would be most effective and would encompass all those who may need assistance. To that end, amendment 89 inserts a new definition into clause 31, stating that
“‘persons who are digitally excluded’ means persons who, for reasons including their inability to access the internet or digital devices, lack of basic digital skills, or problems with confidence and motivation, experience difficulty in engaging with computers or online processes.”
Amendments 86, 87 and 88 insert the phrase
“persons who are digitally excluded”
in the place of
“persons who require online procedural assistance”
at the points I mentioned previously. The Opposition and Government have the same intention here: to provide support to those who need it, so that no one is precluded from accessing justice. I hope the Minister can see where we are coming from and will look favourably on the amendments.
I turn now to new clause 2, which is another approach to dealing with some of the concerns. It simply clarifies the nature of online procedural assistance, and I would be grateful if the Minister could address each of its subsections and tell the Committee whether they are matters that he and his team have already considered, and whether he envisions that the Bill as drafted would cover them. Does the duty on the Lord Chancellor currently include consideration of other factors that intersect with digital exclusion, such as age, poverty, disability and geography? The right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings was helpful on these issues in an earlier debate, when he spoke up for older people. I am sure that he, too, will want answers to our questions and, I hope, a few of his own.
Will the assistance cover both advice and technical hardware, and will it be available throughout the proceedings? Will persons receiving the assistance be able to do so via either a remote appointment or an in-person appointment at a site local to them? For those whose first language is not English, will assistance be provided through interpretation or translation, as appropriate, in a language that is familiar to the party or potential party? Will the assistance be monitored and evaluated at regular intervals? If so, how and by who? We want to be able to offer the Government keen support for the proposals, so I look forward to the Minister’s response to the concerns we have raised.
James Cartlidge
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving us the opportunity to talk through the issues of digital exclusion. These are important issues. As colleagues know, much of the Bill, particularly once we go beyond the judicial review clauses, relates to digitisation and I feel very strongly that digitisation has many benefits.
Colleagues will remember the evidence from the Scottish Law Society. One of its most interesting points was how, in Scotland, its experience had been that the use of video technology and so on had kept justice going during the pandemic. That has certainly been the case in England and Wales. I appreciate that the hon. Gentleman is not saying otherwise—he is looking at those who are excluded. In principle, in many ways digitisation can enhance access to justice. In the greatest collective challenge to access to justice that this country has seen for many decades—the pandemic—digitisation maintained access to justice when otherwise many more cases would have been stuck and the backlog would have been even worse.
I have two points to make on a personal note. I am not a lawyer by background, but I spent my year off as an outdoor clerk in the High Court, carrying bundles of paperwork around the Royal Courts of Justice, from window to window. Some were shut in my face, because it was not the right window or the person was going off for lunch—it is quite common, actually. There has always been an enormous amount of paperwork in the system, as the hon. Member for Hammersmith, who I believe was a barrister, will know. Trying to reduce those bundles will take time. In the Crown court in particular, we will still see large bundles of papers. We will still have large paper packs for the jury to look at; in many ways, that is still the most effective method. Stripping out the paperwork and increasing digitisation will have its moments of frustration for practitioners and staff. It will have its downsides. The system will never be perfect, but in general and in principle digitisation enhances the system.
The second personal point is about my business idea. Mr Rosindell, you will know about house prices in London. The idea was to enable groups of friends who were renting to buy property together. It was for flatmates to buy and was called “Share to Buy”. Once we had come up with it and had approached a lender, who was supportive, we realised that the problem was how to get people to apply. We decided that the only way to do it was online. At that time, there were not really online mortgage applications. We thought at great length about what to do if people do not have internet access and want to make a paper-based application. Obviously, that scheme is not as significant as the legal system, but the same principles apply. I am a great believer in the ability of the digital sphere to enhance accessibility, to increase people’s access to important things, alongside having the appropriate safeguards and support, which are the two key words.
We recognise that those who are digitally excluded may need assistance in starting or progressing their case online. Therefore, HMCTS has set up a digital service that is designed with and for users to help navigate the justice system. It will be supported through HMCTS user contact functions, who will issue guidance and help on the journey through the service over the phone and related call-centre channels, such as web chat. As I said in discussion on earlier clauses, HMCTS recently awarded a national contract to deliver positive and practical solutions to support users and break down barriers to digital inclusion across civil, family and tribunal jurisdictions.
Although the measures seek to direct as many users as possible through primary digital channels, some users may have problems accessing digital services. The hon. Member for Stockton North made some quite specific points about geography, age and disability. We recognise that some users may have particular problems. As I noted in the previous discussion, paper forms will remain available, and work is ongoing to review and simplify those forms. HMCTS will ensure users receive equal service no matter what channel they use to engage.
Amendment 86 would require regard to be had to the needs of persons who are digitally excluded when making online procedure rules, changing, as a number of the amendments would do, the terminology “require online procedural assistance” for that of being “digitally excluded”. Amendment 87 would require the Lord Chancellor to have regard to the needs to persons who are digitally excluded when allowing or disallowing online procedure rules to be made.
The duty to have regard to the needs of those who may be digitally excluded is addressed in clause 27, which requires the Lord Chancellor to make provisions for those who require additional support. Through that measure, court users will be supported through their online journey in person and remotely. When considering whether to allow or disallow rules, the Lord Chancellor must have regard to those who require online procedural assistance.
Amendment 88 would require the Lord Chancellor to arrange for the provision of appropriate and proportionate support for persons who are digitally excluded. The measures already seek to ensure appropriate and proportionate support for persons who are digitally excluded or who, in the Bill’s terms,
“require online procedural assistance”
so that they are able to engage with online procedures. That includes assistive technology, such as a screen reader, and simplifying language to ensure that users understand what they are required to do.
Andy Slaughter
I am going to impress the right hon. Gentleman even more in a moment by making a 180° turn and joining his critique of the Minister.
There may well be times when Zooming is more efficient and appropriate, but there will be many times when face-to-face meetings are more appropriate, including meetings with constituents. During the long debates that we had on the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, I cautioned many times that it moved too quickly to exclude people from the system in the name of efficiency. There is a danger that we will do that here.
The Minister fairly said that we must proceed with caution and be aware of some people’s digital limitations. It is easy to say that, but it is more difficult to ensure that it happens, because the same people who struggle with matters online are those who cannot make their voices heard, and they just disappear from the system. We have excluded people even though it was not intentional.
A second important category—coroners—was touched on. I will not say much now because I expect that we shall come on to the plans to move those online when we come to that section. The Minister will remember that Mr Rebello, senior coroner for the Liverpool and Wirral coroner area and secretary of the Coroners Society, said that he liked to have everybody in the room. He was not saying that for its own sake, but because there are times, when evidence is being heard or judicial decisions are being made rather than in administrative hearings, when it is important for people to be present. Although doing things remotely may have been the best that we could do during covid, that will not always be the case.
I simply caution that if justice is to be properly done, we should be cautious before we throw out the methods that have served us not just for decades but for centuries in assessing the quality of evidence, in advocacy and in ensuring that we get to the best result we can in every case. I hope that we will be as modern and efficient as we can, and use as much technology as we can, but not at the price of excluding people or of not seeing justice done.
Alex Cunningham
I appreciate the Minister’s sharing information about his past career; it is fascinating to find out what people have done in their previous lives. Perhaps one angle of his business could have been encouraging people to move to the north where, instead of buying a share in a house for £150,000, they could buy a lovely three-bedroom semi-detached house in Stockton; have access to our wonderful newly opened Globe theatre; and be 30 minutes from the Yorkshire moors, 40 minutes from the Yorkshire dales and only an hour from the Northumberland coast.
James Cartlidge
Very quickly, because it is incredibly relevant, I assure the hon. Gentleman that our business was entirely national. The reason that it was able to operate nationally, in every part of the country, is because it operated online.
Alex Cunningham
That is why we welcome the way that we can move forward, even in the world of justice. We can move online as much as possible, but the Minister knows how much we have been pressing on the issue of safeguards.
The right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings was concerned that some people in his area, as in other areas of the country, might not have access. When he talked about face-to-face meetings and the importance of community, it struck me that he said that he did not want us to underestimate how important that is and to undermine those personal relationships. I have maintained throughout my contributions to the Committee that we do not want justice to be undermined as a result of moving online.
The Minister spoke about the Scottish experience. It did keep it going, but for those who had access to systems. He acknowledged the need for appropriate support and recognised that more detail must be provided. We look forward to seeing that detail in future.
My real concern is that some of the language in the Bill is a little on the soft side. I would rather see it more clearly defined and nailed down, to ensure that the people who are most likely to be excluded from digital services are given all the support they need, which might even mean providing them with the data that they require to use the systems that are available to them.
In the light of the debate, however, I do not intend to press any of the amendments to the vote, but I say again that some of the language is soft. We need that detail and I hope that there will be no devils in it. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Scott Mann.)
Alex Cunningham
Main Page: Alex Cunningham (Labour - Stockton North)Judicial Review and Courts Bill (Eighth sitting)
Alex Cunningham ExcerptsTuesday 16th November 2021
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 16 November 2021 - (16 Nov 2021)
The Chair
Before we begin, I have a few preliminary announcements. I remind Members that they are expected to wear a face covering except when speaking or if they are exempt, in line with the recommendations of the House of Commons Commission. Please give each other and members of staff space when seated and when entering and leaving the room. I remind Members that they are asked by the House to have a covid lateral flow test twice a week if coming on to the parliamentary estate. That can be done either at the testing centre in the House or at home.
Hansard colleagues would be grateful if Members could email their speaking notes to hansardnotes @parliament.uk. Please switch electronic devices to silent. Tea, coffee and other beverages are not allowed during sittings.
Clause 18
Rules for online procedure in courts and tribunals
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 59, in clause 18, page 35, line 9, after “that” insert—
“(a) a person may choose to participate in a hearing by non-electronic means, and
(b) “
This amendment would allow a person to choose to participate in a hearing by non-electronic means.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 90, in clause 18, page 35, line 11, at end insert—
“(7A) Online Procedure Rules must require a person to participate in a hearing by non-electronic means if a physical or mental health assessment of that person confirms that online proceedings will impede their ability to understand or effectively participate in proceedings.”
This amendment would ensure if someone had a physical or mental condition that would prevent them from understanding or effectively participating in online proceedings then the Online Procedure Rules must allow them to participate by non-electronic means.
Alex Cunningham
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Mark.
As I mentioned in my previous speech, clause 18 provides for the creation of online procedure rules. The online procedure rules must require that proceedings of a kind specified in regulations made by the Lord Chancellor, per clause 19(1), are to be initiated by electronic means. Paragraphs (l)(b) and 1(c) of clause 18 allow for the online procedure rules to either authorise or require that specified proceedings are conducted, progressed and disposed of by electronic means, and that parties to the proceedings participate by electronic means.
The Courts and Tribunals (Online Procedure) Bill provided participants with a choice to initiate, conduct, progress or participate in proceedings by non-electronic means. That choice is retained for those without legal representation in relation to the initiation, conduct, progression or participation other than by a hearing. However, a person is currently unable to choose to participate in hearings by electronic means, and may do so only at the direction of the court or tribunal.
As JUSTICE explain:
“A myriad of issues, including health conditions and disabilities, may make it difficult for individuals to follow or engage with a virtual hearing and those same issues may make it difficult for them to explain to the court or tribunal why they would prefer to attend in person.”
Amendment 59 would allow a person to choose to participate in a hearing by non-electronic means if that is appropriate for them. Amendment 90 would ensure that if someone had a physical or mental condition that would prevent them from understanding or effectively participating in online proceedings, the online procedure rules must allow them to participate by non-electronic means.
Amendments 59 and 90 share the same aim, and together their impact would be to ensure that court users who may have vulnerabilities or particular conditions are able to access the type of hearing most appropriate for them, which research suggests may often be in-person hearings. I am sure that the Minister agrees with me that as we progress with changes to court processes, we must not negatively affect access to justice for any group of court users with particular needs. I would welcome his thoughts on how we can ensure that does not happen.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (James Cartlidge)
It is good to have you back in the Chair, Sir Mark. I hope that we will make diligent progress this afternoon.
As the hon. Member for Stockton North said, both amendments would provide options for a person to participate in a hearing via non-electronic means. Amendment 59 would give those participating the option, while amendment 90 would require someone who had a physical or mental condition preventing them from understanding or effectively participating in online proceedings to participate in a hearing via non-electronic means.
The online procedure rule committee will make simple and consistent rules that provide simple processes that can be followed by the average court user. We have seen an increase in online proceedings in response to the pandemic—I will say more on that when speaking to clause stand part. Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service is moving towards digital services being the default, but we absolutely understand that not everyone will choose to participate in a hearing by electronic means.
I will emphasise specific clauses. In many ways, it is a disappointment that my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings is not here, because he would have been greatly reassured by the clauses. He has obviously struggled to get here for an in-person sitting—perhaps we could have held it online, but unfortunately that option is not available at the minute, which is a shame for my right hon. Friend. I have no doubt that he has a good reason for being absent.
Clause 18(6) states:
“Where Online Procedure Rules require a person—
(a) to initiate, conduct or progress proceedings by electronic means, or
(b) to participate in proceedings, other than a hearing, by electronic means,
Online Procedure Rules must also provide that, if the person is not legally represented, the person may instead choose to do so by non-electronic means.”
The key thing is that the rules reply entirely to civil cases—civil, family and tribunals. Those are the jurisdictions to which those particular rules apply. It is not obvious how there would be a situation where someone who had legal representation would not be able to participate online given that practitioners should, for obvious reasons, be able to participate online.
Furthermore, subsection (7) states:
“Where Online Procedure Rules require a person to participate in a hearing by electronic means, Online Procedure Rules must also provide that a court or tribunal may, on an application or of its own initiative, order or otherwise direct that person, or any other person, to participate by non-electronic means.”
Well—[Interruption.] My right hon. Friend has duly arrived, and I say to him that one of the downsides of physical sittings and in-person hearings is that one is subject to the whims of chronological events, to put it bluntly, and unfortunately he has missed a great bit of the Bill, which I read out not just for him but primarily because it is relevant to the amendments from the hon. Member for Stockton North, the Opposition spokesperson. The Bill shows that where one is represented, one would be able to request a physical or in-person hearing.
There could be a number of reasons why someone would chose to participate in a hearing by a means other than electronic. Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service provides a support service over the phone as well as more intensive face-to-face support for those who might require it, such as vulnerable users who might not otherwise be able to participate in proceedings effectively or those who are digitally excluded. HMCTS has also awarded a national contract to deliver positive and practical solutions to support users and break down the barrier of digital exclusion across civil, family and tribunal jurisdictions. Through this contract, support will be available in person and remotely through a network of delivery partners who are experienced in supporting users of justice services. As per the specification, the services will be delivered across different channels to ensure that all those who require them can access them. Those channels would include local-centre support in more than 300 physical sites, over-the-phone support, remote video appointments with those who have access but need support in navigating the service, and in-home face-to-face support with necessary equipment. HMCTS has considered forms of support that can be provided to the user throughout their online proceedings.
I recently visited Isleworth Crown court where the citizens advice bureau was actively involved in providing services to witnesses. It is conceivable that the physical roll-out of these support services could be provided on a sub-contracted basis by a range of organisations. The point is that that is precedented and it works to provide effective support on the ground to vulnerable users.
Most importantly, as I have said, the measures in the Bill also ensure that paper form will remain available for citizens participating in proceedings, so an offline option will always be available for those who need it, not least my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings.
James Cartlidge
Of course—and the needy. They are both important. Given the safeguards in place and the fact that an offline option is already available, I do not think the amendments are necessary. I therefore urge the hon. Member for Stockton North to withdraw them.
Alex Cunningham
The theory is all well and good. I hope that, in practice, the service is delivered to the standard the Minister believes is possible. He has had our demands for quality support and flexibility for vulnerable people ringing in his ears for several days now. The right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings—who I thought had acquired a red box earlier this afternoon, but it is not quite the right colour—has joined the fray in championing vulnerable people, and I welcome the reassurances he has received from the Minister.
I want to expand slightly and talk a bit about the citizens advice bureaux and the tremendous support they give not only in courts across the country, but to people in my constituency in Stockton. I am interested to know how the services will be designed for the future. The Minister has talked about 300 hubs; he has talked about the CAB and others, as well. How will those services be delivered to ensure that people are properly covered with the necessary support? The comments from the Minister are clear and the theory is clear. We just want to see it in practice. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to consider that schedule 3 be the Third schedule to the Bill.
Alex Cunningham
There is no doubt that electronic systems have already made a great difference within our Courts and Tribunals Service and I am sure that they will continue to do so in the future. However, as the Minister well knows, it is a case of ensuring that those at the margins—the vulnerable and the excluded—do not lose out in terms of justice as we go forward. Given the crisis in our courts, there is no doubt that we desperately need solutions, and the electronic solutions are part of that process, but again we want to ensure that the support within the system for everybody is correct and that justice is done.
The Minister has talked about various organisations that will be engaged in the process, but we look forward to seeing the system operating—perhaps he and I could go together when it is—to listen to people about its operation and make sure that what we have delivered in this new legislation is practical and that the most vulnerable people are still being looked after.
James Cartlidge
When we meet to discuss the single justice procedure—a meeting that I was more than happy to agree to—we can talk about how we can look at things. There will obviously be ongoing reviews. It is important that we get this issue right—by ensuring that it has been through a tender, for example.
James Cartlidge
I can absolutely confirm that to my right hon. Friend. At the moment, we are talking about civil cases; he is absolutely right that those people could be witnesses in those, of course.
I stress that the matter would be at the discretion of the courts, without a shadow of a doubt, but I think there will be far more cases of vulnerable witnesses where technology assists the process. The obvious example is section 28 proceedings, in which evidence can be recorded in advance of the actual in-person hearing; they have become a very important part of the justice system. The Secretary of State has set out his desire for them to be rolled out more broadly. In a way, my right hon. Friend makes the point for me: technology in such cases can be of great assistance, and we are applying it to intimidated witnesses as well.
Alex Cunningham
The Minister mentioned section 28 proceedings and the recording of evidence. During consideration of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill, the Opposition tabled a number of amendments in that particular area, to expand the use of the process. Given that the new Minister is a fan, will he look at the issue with his colleagues in the Lords to see whether there are ways in which we can expand the service to the benefit of the sorts of people who the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings just spoke about?
James Cartlidge
There are two points to make on that. First, the specific point about the Bill’s progress in the Lords is a matter for Lord Wolfson, who is an excellent Minister; I effectively shadow him on the areas for which he is responsible. However, the hon. Gentleman should be assured of the Lord Chancellor’s commitment to section 28 proceedings following his comments in media interviews. There is widespread support for them among the relevant victims’ groups and charities.
Of course, there are practical issues that we need to consider, but, as I have said, there is widespread agreement about this issue. Using such technology can be very important in enabling and assisting vulnerable witnesses.
Alex Cunningham
I am in danger of drifting back to the other Bill that I mentioned, but we were also talking about how potential witnesses, in some circumstances, would be interviewed. For example, at the moment they may be interviewed by a non-legal person; in other words, there might not be a legal representative, either for the prosecution or the defence, carrying out the interview in those circumstances. Would the Minister be prepared to look at that?
James Cartlidge
With respect, I think that does stray too far into the specifics of the measure. It was a nice try, but I was setting out the principle that technology has assisted access to justice in the context of those who are vulnerable—the sorts of people who we would have in mind in discussing precisely these provisions.
I agree about the importance of in-person proceedings where it matters most. The most obvious example for all of us is that, like my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings and others on this side of the Committee, I passionately wanted Parliament to return to its normal ways of working at the earliest safe moment, because we could not intervene on each other when we were on a TV screen.
It is not democracy when arguments are not challenged. It gives me a great thrill to take an intervention from the Opposition side that I have to try to answer. That is how we thrash out and debate an argument. It is sub-optimal to have it online and optimal to have it in person, but there will be many aspects of life, and many aspects of legal proceedings, that can be perfectly competently and satisfactorily conducted online.
By maximising those aspects, we maximise the in-person resource for the things that really matter. On the criminal side, that is clearly criminal trials, particularly jury trials in the Crown court. On the civil side, that could be complex cases, such as family cases, that need to be heard in person. By maximising the use of technology, we liberate more of that resource, so it is important to support the measure.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 3 agreed to.
Clause 19
“Specified kinds” of proceedings
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move amendment 28, in clause 21, page 37, line 28, leave out “(3)” and “(4)” and insert “(3), (4) and (4A)”.
This amendment is consequential to Amendment 29.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 60, in clause 21, page 37, line 38, at end insert—
“(c) one person who is an ‘authorised court and tribunal staff member’ as defined by the Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018.”
This amendment would require the Lord Chief Justice to appoint an authorised court and tribunal staff member to the Online Procedure Rules Committee.
Amendment 61, in clause 21, page 38, line 5, leave out “one person who has” and insert “two people who have”.
This amendment will expand the membership of the OPRC to include two IT experts.
Amendment 29, in clause 21, page 38, line 6, at end insert—
“(4A) The Lord President of the Court of Session is to appoint one person with experience in and knowledge of the Scottish legal system.”
This amendment would require the Online Procedure Committee to include a person with experience in and knowledge of the Scottish legal system, appointed by the Lord President of the Court of Session.
Amendment 62, in clause 21, page 38, line 6, at end insert—
“and;
(d) one person who has experience representing the views of people who are digitally excluded.”
This amendment will expand the membership of the OPRC to include someone with experience representing the views of people who are digitally excluded.
Amendment 91, in clause 21, page 38, line 6, at end insert—
“(d) one person who has experience in, and knowledge of, accessible service design”.
This amendment would increase the membership of the Online Procedure Rule Committee by requiring the Lord Chancellor to appoint a person with expertise in accessible service design.
Amendment 64, in clause 21, page 38, line 25, at end insert—
“(9A) In making appointments under subsections (3) and (4) above, the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice must have due regard to the ethnic and gender balance of the Online Procedure Rules Committee.”
This amendment would require the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice to have due regard to the ethnic and gender balance of the Online Procedure Rules Committee when making their appointments.
Alex Cunningham
I move the amendment on behalf of the hon. Member for Glasgow North East, who is unable to be here this afternoon.
Clause 21 sets out the membership of the online procedure rule committee and makes other provisions—for the Lord Chancellor to reimburse expenses of members appointed to it, for example. Under the clause as it is currently drafted, the online procedure rule committee would have just six members. Three of them would be judicial appointments made by the Lord Chief Justice and would include the chair of the committee. The other three appointments would be made by the Lord Chancellor and drawn from elsewhere in the legal profession, the lay advice sector and those with professional experience of online portals.
I understand that the number of committee members and the qualifications and experience that they must have can be modified. As the Bill is currently drafted, that would be done by regulations under the negative procedure, although regulations cannot be made until the agreement of the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals has been secured, and only after consulting other specified members of the senior judiciary. Even though the Bill contains a provision to change the rules governing the committee’s membership, I think the initial set-up as provided for by clause 21 is very unusual for its small size and, as a consequence, the limited amount of experience that would be covered by the committee.
I recall the evidence of Richard Leiper from two weeks ago. I am going to quote him at length because he captures in a few sentences what is wrong with the Government’s proposals. He said:
“The current composition of the committee is a total of 6 people. That is in contrast to the civil procedure rule committee, which has 18 members. The family procedure rule committee has 18 members. To me, given the potential breadth of the rule that could be set by this committee, having one senior judge, a couple of other judges, one practitioner, one layperson and one computer person is simply not enough. That is partly because the scope for the procedures would be trespassing on areas which it is likely that no member of the committee would have any knowledge of.
For example, I have no knowledge at all about family court proceedings—how they begin, how they proceed, or what the interests of the various parties would be. Yet, if there is just one practitioner, who could be a barrister, a solicitor or a legal executive—each of whom have different perspectives on how the system operates, how it impacts on clients, other parties and so forth—there will not be the wealth of knowledge, even with consultation with people who do know, to enable effective online rules. The composition of the committee is my single greatest concern.”––[Official Report, Judicial Review and Courts Public Bill Committee, 2 November 2021; c. 37, Q41.]
That is clear and wise counsel, I would say. The concern that Mr Leiper expressed is shared by many in the sector and, indeed, by the Opposition. I thank the Public Law Project, JUSTICE and the Legal Education Foundation for their expertise and constructive assistance in scrutinising this clause. This set of amendments looks at the membership of the online procedure rule committee, mostly with a view to expanding it to include additional professionals with relevant experience. I would be interested to hear from the Minister in relation to each amendment whether it represents the kind of regulation change that he anticipates may be brought in via the negative procedure.
Amendment 60 would require the Lord Chief Justice to appoint an authorised courts and tribunals staff member to the online procedure rule committee. JUSTICE has recommended that the OPRC should feature an authorised courts and tribunals staff member, as defined in the Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018. The effect of that 2018 legislation is to allow individual rule committees to delegate functions that were traditionally judicial in nature to non-judicial court staff.
For example, in the context of the online court, JUSTICE understands from HMCTS that the pilot of legal advisers within that service will allow them to make various procedural determinations, including case progression directions, for defending claims. Given the extent to which procedural functions in online courts are to be delegated to authorised courts and tribunals staff and the concomitant need for those staff to understand and apply relevant procedural rules, would it not be prudent to include their voice in the drafting of the relevant rules? The Opposition agree that that would be a very sensible addition to the OPRC, and I hope the Minister will agree.
Amendment 61 would further expand the membership of the OPRC to include two IT experts, where now it only includes one. As it stands, the Bill places significant responsibility on a lone information technology expert. As the Public Law Project puts it,
“To imply that there is one information technology expert who can be the source of truth for digital procedure is incorrect as there are lively debates in that sphere.”
Limiting the committee to only one information technology expert presents a risk that a particular view of the capability and role of information technology in the justice system will take precedence. We think that expanding the Committee to include a wider range of expertise in information technology and internet portals would be a valuable contribution to ensuring that the online procedure rules are suitably futureproofed.
Amendment 62 would again expand the membership of the OPRC—this time, to include someone with experience representing the views of people who are digitally excluded. Currently, the online procedure rule committee does not include any members who would be able to represent the views of digitally excluded people or have expertise in the specific challenges that digitally excluded people might encounter if they needed to be a party to proceedings under the online procedure.
I spoke about this issue in our debate on clause 18, but I will stress the point again. In making the online procedure rules, it is important that we do not negatively impact access to justice for those with vulnerabilities or conditions, or who are digitally excluded for any reason. I think this would be a most important voice on the committee and I hope that the Minister will agree with me that it would add great value to its work.
Amendment 91 would increase the membership of the online procedure rule committee by requiring the Lord Chancellor to appoint a person with expertise in accessible service design. Again, we believe this would be an extremely valuable perspective to include on the committee.
I know the Minister wants these reforms to have a positive impact on justice; including a professional with experience in accessible service design would ensure that the online procedures can be used by the widest range of persons possible, which is surely an aim that the Government share with us. As I said earlier, I am keen to hear from the Minister on whether his Department has considered the addition of any such members to the Committee. If not, is it something he foresees being introduced under the negative procedure as outlined in the Bill? If the latter is true, I suggest that an easier route would be to include them now in the primary legislation.
Amendment 64 is slightly different. It would require the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice to have due regard to the ethnic and gender balance of the online procedure rule committee when making their appointments. I understand that in Committee and on Report in the Courts and Tribunals (Online Procedure) Bill, Lord Beecham tabled an amendment, introducing a requirement that
“The Lord Chancellor must ensure that gender balance is reflected on the Online Procedure Rule Committee.”
Amendment 64 is tabled in that spirit, but goes further, adding that the racial diversity of the committee must also be considered.
JUSTICE’s working party report, “Increasing Judicial Diversity”, found that reducing homogeneity in the legal system is important for both legitimacy and quality of decision making. Ensuring gender balance in the creation of new rules committees would serve as a positive step towards that aspiration. However, the Opposition agree that there is no reason why that should be prioritised any more than racial diversity, especially given the dreadful disparities in the legal profession.
A recent report by the race working group of the Bar Council found that barristers from ethnic minority backgrounds, particularly black and Asian women, face systemic obstacles to building and progressing a sustainable and financially rewarding career at the Bar. Indeed, they found that a black female junior barrister with the same level of experience as a white male junior bills £18,700 a year less on average, and an Asian woman £16,400 less. That is clear evidence that addressing racial diversity within the legal profession must be an urgent priority for the Government. The amendment provides one opportunity to address some of these disparities, and I hope the Minister will take it.
James Cartlidge
The amendments in the group all relate to the membership of the new online procedure rule committee. The Bill provides for a committee of six members, of whom three are judicial members appointed by the Lord Chief Justice and three are non-judicial members appointed by the Lord Chancellor. The range of members will ensure that the new committee will have expertise in the law and the provision of lay advice and information technology. That will equip it to produce straightforward, easily understood court rules, which will support the online procedure.
When the committee comes to develop rules for courts and tribunals, it will be able to consult or seek advice from those with relevant qualifications, and create working groups including persons with relevant experience and expertise, such as in service design or representing those who are digitally excluded. That is in line with how existing rule-making committees work.
The committee is specifically designed to be small and agile in its decision making. Adding additional members at the outset will detract from that. Any need for additional expertise to inform the committee’s decision-making process that may become apparent through experience can be addressed through the power in clause 23, which enables the Lord Chancellor to amend clause 21 to change the required membership of the committee. I suggest that a more flexible approach would be preferable to adding the additional members proposed in amendments 60 to 62 and 91.
Amendments 29 and 28 would require the online procedure committee to include a person of experience and with knowledge of the Scottish legal system appointed by the Lord President of the court of session. The OPRC will be responsible for making rules across civil and family courts in England, Wales and the specified tribunals. The vast majority of the committee’s work, certainly at the outset, is likely to concern procedure for online court proceedings in England and Wales for which a dedicated member of the committee specifically with expertise in Scottish law would, with respect, not be so well equipped to contribute.
When the committee comes to develop rules for tribunals, which would currently include Scottish employment tribunals, it will be able to consult or seek advice from those with relevant qualifications, and to create working groups including persons with relevant experience and expertise. This is in line with how existing rule-making committees work. The need for a distinct Scottish contribution in the decision-making committee through membership can be addressed through the power in clause 23, which enables the Lord Chancellor to amend clause 21 to change the required membership of the committee. That is a better solution than requiring a Scottish member at the outset, since work is continuing towards the devolution of tribunals for Scotland.
Amendment 64 would require the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice to have due regard to the ethnic and gender balance of the online procedure rule committee when making their appointments. We can all agree that, as the refreshed public appointments diversity action plan states, drawing public appointees from all aspects of the society that they serve
“will improve the quality of our public services overall.”
I do not, however, consider it necessary to include the specific duty embodied in this amendment in the appointment process for this rule committee alone. Compared with the other committees that, like the online procedure rule committee, are covered by the action plan and the governance code for public appointments under the supervision of the Commissioner for Public Appointments, the OPRC is designed to be small and agile to address rules that can be updated quickly, keeping step with technology changes to meet the expectations of 21st century court users.
The OPRC requires a range of expertise to complement new technology and online working. When making appointments to the OPRC, the Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice will follow the standard process in line with the civil procedure rule, family procedure rule and tribunal procedure rule committees.
I hope I have reassured the hon. Gentleman about the proposed membership of the committee, and that the Bill has built in significant flexibility should its expertise not be sufficient. I therefore urge the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful to the Minister for his response and for addressing the Scottish amendments. I attached some notes on that to the end of the wrong speech, but I was going to speak briefly to it because our Scottish colleagues—I am Scottish myself, of course—from the SNP made the point that there was no real representation of the Scottish legal profession. The Minister has, however, already addressed that.
I am disappointed that the Minister does not recognise how such a small committee may not have the length and depth of expertise that is required to carry out the jobs that he requires of it. To have one IT expert and just one appointed judge strikes me as totally inadequate in the circumstances. While we will not press the amendment to a vote, the Minister needs to take that away and think again. I have not come across anybody within the sector who does not think that this committee is potentially weak, and will not be able to do the job that it is required to do. We hope that the Minister will take this issue away and look at it again in the spirit that we intend.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move amendment 63, in clause 21, page 38, line 14, at end insert—
“(6A) Before appointing a person under subsection 3(c) the Lord Chief Justice must—
(a) consult the Lord Chancellor, and
(b) obtain the agreement of the Senior President of Tribunals.”
This amendment makes the appointment of the authorised court and tribunal staff member to the Online Procedure Rules Committee subject to consultation with the Lord Chancellor and agreement of the Senior President of Tribunals, mirroring the current requirements in relation to judicial appointments to the Committee.
I will be briefer in dealing with this amendment than I have been on anything else. This straightforward amendment relates to amendment 60, and would make
“the appointment of the authorised court and tribunal staff member to the Online Procedure Rules Committee subject to consultation with the Lord Chancellor and agreement of the Senior President of Tribunals, mirroring the current requirements in relation to judicial appointments to the Committee.”
As I said in my previous speech, the Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018 allows individual rule committees to delegate functions that were traditionally judicial in nature to non-judicial court staff. Therefore, we think it would be appropriate to appoint this member in line with the process for the members appointed under subsection 3(b) of clause 21.
James Cartlidge
This amendment would make
“the appointment of the authorised court and tribunal staff member to the Online Procedure Rules Committee subject to consultation with the Lord Chancellor and agreement of the Senior President of Tribunals, mirroring the current requirements in relation to judicial appointments to the Committee.”
As I said when we discussed the previous group of amendments, the committee is to be comprised of six members: three are judicial members, to be appointed by the Lord Chief Justice, and three are non-judicial members, to be appointed by the Lord Chancellor. To alter the composition of the OPRC, the Lord Chancellor is required to consult the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals. That requirement is in line with the existing rule-making committees. The reason for including this power is that, as the scope of the online procedure rules increases, it may be necessary to expand the committee’s membership or widen its expertise in order to assist in making rules for different online procedures. I therefore urge the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.
Alex Cunningham
I am pleased to hear the Minister talk about the possibility of the committee being expanded in future, and the process for doing so. That is heartening: it is certainly something that needs to be looked at. In those circumstances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
James Cartlidge
To recap, clause 21 provides for the membership of the online procedure rules committee and its powers. It also includes the procedure for appointing members. The committee is to comprise six members, of whom three are to be appointed by the Lord Chief Justice: one person who is a judge of the senior courts of England and Wales, and two persons, each of whom is either a judge of the senior courts of England and Wales; a circuit judge or district judge; a judge of the first-tier tribunal; a judge of the upper tribunal; an employment judge; or a judge of the employment appeal tribunal—a fair selection. The Lord Chancellor is to appoint the committee’s non-judicial members: one person who is a barrister in England and Wales, a solicitor of the senior courts of England and Wales, or a legal executive; one person who has experience in, and knowledge of, the lay advice sector; and one person who has experience in, and knowledge of, information technology related to end users’ experience of internet portals.
Before appointing a person, the Lord Chief Justice must consult the Lord Chancellor, and must also consult the Senior President of Tribunals or—in the case of a person to be a tribunal judge member—secure the agreement of the Senior President of Tribunals. Similarly, the Lord Chancellor must consult the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals and, in the case of a practitioner member, must also consult the relevant authorised body. The range of members for which this clause provides will ensure that the new rule committee will have expertise in the law, the provision of lay advice, and information technology. This will help equip it to produce straightforward, easily understood court rules, which will support the online procedure, which, as far as possible, will be embedded in the online software.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 22
Powers of the Online Procedure Rule Committee
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
James Cartlidge
Clause 22 provides that the online procedure rules committee has the same rule-making powers that are available to the civil, family and tribunal rule committees. It will therefore have the full range of powers appropriate to any proceedings for which it may make online procedure rules. The committee may also apply any other rules of court. That is to ensure that any rule that is included in the current civil, family and tribunal rules and other rules of court may be used and modified as appropriate to ensure that the online procedure may operate as intended. It does not, however, enable the committee to make procedure rules for procedures that are not subject to the rule-making powers specified in the clause. For example, it may not make online Court of Protection rules because the clause does not give it power to do so.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 22 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 23
Power to change certain requirements relating to the Committee
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move amendment 92, in clause 23, page 41, line 14, leave out subsection (5) and insert—
‘(5) Regulations under this section are subject to affirmative resolution procedure (see section 45(3)).”
This amendment would make regulations under clause 23 subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 93, in clause 24, page 41, line 38, leave out subsection (7) and insert—
‘(7A) A statutory instrument containing Online Procedure Rules is subject to affirmative resolution procedure (see section 45(3)).”
This amendment would make SIs containing Online Procedure Rules subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.
Amendment 65, in clause 25, page 42, line 5, at end insert—
‘(1A) The written notice under subsection (1) is subject to the concurrence requirement (see section 30(1)).”
This amendment would make the Lord Chancellor’s power to require the Online Procedure Rules Committee to make rules to achieve a specified purpose subject to the concurrence requirement.
Amendment 68, in clause 26, page 42, line 20, leave out subsection (3) and insert—
‘(3) Regulations under this section are subject to the concurrence requirement (see section 30(1)).”
This amendment would make the Lord Chancellor’s power to make amendments in relation to the Online Procedure Rules subject to the concurrence requirement.
Amendment 94, in clause 26, page 42, line 25, leave out “that amend or repeal any provision of an Act”
This amendment would make all regulations under clause 26 subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.
Amendment 95, in clause 26, page 42, line 27, leave out subsection (6)
See Explanatory Statement for Amendment 94.
Amendment 66, in clause 30, page 43, line 17, after “regulations” insert “or notices”
This is a consequential amendment to include a notice given to the Online Procedure Rules Committee to make rules to achieve a specified purpose within the concurrence requirement.
Amendment 67, in clause 30, page 43, line 21, after “regulations” insert “or notices”
See Explanatory Statement for Amendment 66.
Alex Cunningham
Members of the Committee may be relieved to learn that this will be my final speech on chapter 2.
Clause 23 makes provision for how certain changes relating to the online procedure rules committee can be made. Concern has been raised that the breadth of powers provided to the Lord Chancellor by the online procedure rules provisions in the Bill as drafted is vast, and that there is therefore a danger of a democratic deficit.
Currently, the Lord Chancellor has the power to specify which proceedings will be made subject to the online procedure rules under clause 19; designate exceptions or circumstances where proceedings may be conducted by the standard procedure rules rather than online procedure rules under clause 20; appoint OPR committee members under clause 21; change the composition requirements of the OPR committee under clause 23; allow or disallow online procedure rules made by the OPR committee under clause 24(3); require online procedure rules to be made under the terms of clause 25; and under clause 26(1) the Lord Chancellor may
“by regulations amend, repeal or revoke any enactment to the extent that the Lord Chancellor considers necessary or desirable in consequence of, or in order to facilitate the making of, Online Procedure Rules.”
That is quite a raft of powers for the Lord Chancellor.
The Lord Chancellor’s powers under clauses 19, 20 and 23 are subject to the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice or the Senior President of Tribunals, depending on whether the regulations relate to proceedings in the courts or tribunals. This is the “concurrence requirement”. However, the power in clause 26 is subject only to a requirement to consult the Lord Chief Justice and Senior President of Tribunal, while the power to require OPRs to be made in clause 25 is subject to neither a consultation nor a concurrence requirement.
Clause 26 has caused particular concern to some. I note that Joshua Rozenberg has observed that this clause differs in this Bill from its earlier forms in the Courts and Tribunals (Online Procedure) Bill and the Prisons and Courts Bill, in which there were more stringent limits on the ability of this power to be used to amend future Acts of Parliament. Mr Rozenberg described the refinement of the drafting as “Henry VIII mission creep”. He said:
“Let's imagine that parliament passes new legislation of some sort in 2030. There is a change of government in 2035 and the new lord chancellor thinks the 2030 legislation gets in the way of procedural rules that the incoming government wants to introduce. Using legislation passed in 2022, the lord chancellor will have power to sign an order in 2035 which, if all goes to plan, will repeal legislation made by parliament in 2030. It’s no excuse to say that this is very unlikely to happen — and the clauses are simply included just in case. Having got a foot in the door, ministers are pushing it a bit further open every time they try. Soon, they'll be pushing at an open door. If they really need to amend or repeal an act of parliament, ministers should take the trouble to bring forward legislation in the normal way.”
I certainly agree.
In our evidence session, I asked Richard Leiper about this democratic deficit, and he said that yes, there was something of a democratic deficit, but that his personal view was that
“it seems to reflect the processes that are already in place into the existing procedure rule committee. This appears to have been the accepted approach since about 2005, and it seems to be replicating that.”
He went on:
“It does seem to give a substantial power to the Lord Chancellor in this regard, which I personally find surprising. However, it seems to be the way that things have operated for some time.”–[Official Report, Judicial Review and Courts Public Bill Committee, 2 November 2021; c. 39, Q45.]
For me, that does not make it right, even if it does go back to 2005 and a Labour Government.
I appreciate that clauses 25 and 26 mirror the approach taken with other procedure rule committees. I would say that is no reason not to get it right first time.
Even the Government have recognised that the broad powers provided to the Lord Chancellor in this part of the Bill could have a significant impact on access to justice, and have therefore decided that some of those powers should be subject to the requirement to obtain the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice and Senior President of Tribunals. Indeed, the concurrence requirements in clauses 19 and 20 were brought forward by the Government in the Courts and Tribunals (Online Procedure) Bill, on Report, to address concerns that the Bill conferred broad powers on Ministers in particular to limit oral hearings in an extensive range of cases.
The amendments that the Opposition have tabled make provision for two additional mechanisms in this process, allowing for greater scrutiny and accountability of decisions that the Lord Chancellor makes. The first mechanism is covered by amendments 65 to 68, which would make the Lord Chancellor’s power to make rules to achieve a specified purpose and to make amendments in relation to the online procedure rule subject to the concurrence requirement—that is, the powers covered by clauses 25 and 26.
As Lord Judge pointed out when the Courts and Tribunals (Online Procedure) Bill was at Report stage, it is inconsistent with clauses 19 and 20 of this Bill, which are subject to the concurrence requirement, that the power to require OPRs to be made in clause 25 and the broad Henry VIII power to make consequential or facilitative amendments in clause 26(1) are not also subject to the concurrence requirement. Clauses 25 and 26, taken together, give too much power to the Lord Chancellor: they enable the Lord Chancellor to, as Lord Judge put it,
“overrule the very rules which were made with the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice”.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 24 June 2019; Vol. 798, c. 956.]
The Opposition’s amendment is a simple extension of a safeguard that the Government already recognise is appropriate for these types of powers, so I hope the Minister can support our aim here.
The second mechanism is covered by amendments 92 to 95, which would make regulations made under the powers of clause 23 and statutory instruments containing online procedure rules subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, rather than the negative resolution procedure, as the Bill currently allows for. This will provide a different type of safeguard, in that it would allow for greater parliamentary scrutiny of the online procedure rules. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful to the Minister for his response. As I outlined at the beginning of my speech, this is a huge power grab by the Executive.
Alex Cunningham
The Minister laughs and shakes his head, but it is a huge power grab by the Executive, which is all the more reason why we need to ensure that there are protections in the Bill for people within the system. I also say to the Minister that, as I pointed out in my speech, there is a lack of consistency in the approach in different parts of the Bill. I suspect that the Government may well have to repeat some of the work that they have done on the online procedure rule committee, so they might have to correct that on Report. I will leave the Government to do that.
In trying to persuade the Minister that we should apply the affirmative procedure in a much greater way, I do not believe that, as he says, there is sufficient scrutiny by Parliament through the processes that he proposes in the Bill. Far greater powers are passed back to Parliament with the alternative procedure, but I have listened to what the Minister has said and can possibly look forward to amendments on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
James Cartlidge
To recap, clause 23 enables the Lord Chancellor to alter the composition of the online procedure rules committee in the future, but only with the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals. The Lord Chancellor must also consult the head of civil justice, who is Sir Geoffrey Vos, the deputy head of civil justice, who is currently Lord Justice Birss, and the President of the Family Division. Any changes are made by negative resolution.
This is an important provision, because it allows the committee to change, vary or extend its membership as circumstances change and online provisions develop. It also reflects the powers available to existing rule committees. This power is useful, in that it will allow the committee to extend its membership as circumstances change. The power is precedented in other rule committees— for example, it has been used to ensure that the Civil Procedure Rule Committee and the Family Procedure Rule Committee include a judicial member with particular experience of proceedings in Wales. I recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Alex Cunningham
Briefly, and with reference to what I said before, we believe that the clause leads to a democratic deficit. It is a power grab by the Executive, but we look forward to seeing how it progresses at later stages of the Bill and in the other place.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 23 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 24
Process for making Online Procedure Rules
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
James Cartlidge
Clause 24 outlines the process for making online procedure rules, which mirrors the process by which civil procedure rules, family procedure rules and tribunal procedure rules are made. The clause requires the committee to hold a meeting before making or amending rules, unless it is inexpedient to do so, and to consult any persons that it considers appropriate. Before being submitted to the Lord Chancellor for approval, rules drafted by the committee must be signed by at least three members, with one of the signatories being the Chair, or by a majority of members. The Lord Chancellor may disallow any rules, but must give written reasons for doing so.
This safeguard reflects similar powers available to the Lord Chancellor in relation to civil, family and tribunal rules. The powers have never had to be used, but it is none the less right that an equivalent power is available in relation to the online procedure rules. It would be interesting to know whether the hon. Member for Stockton North would still think they are a power grab if they are never used. I recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 24 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 25
Power to require Online Procedure Rules to be made
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Alex Cunningham
Main Page: Alex Cunningham (Labour - Stockton North) Judicial Review and Courts Bill
Alex Cunningham ExcerptsTuesday 25th January 2022
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 25 January 2022 - large print - (25 Jan 2022)
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
Let me first thank the Minister and other colleagues on the Bill Committee for their kind comments on the last day. Sadly, I was unable to join them because I had tested positive for covid Double vaccinations protected me well, and I got off lightly. I am also grateful to the Minister for his helpful engagement with many of our concerns in Committee.
The Opposition understand the need to modernise our court and tribunal proceedings, and we appreciate the potential of online and digital procedures to increase the efficiency of our courts for those who use them and work in them. However, we also recognise that alongside any innovative changes, appropriate safeguards must be introduced to ensure that access to justice and engagement in our justice system are not inadvertently hampered for anyone. I am concerned that the criminal procedure and online rules procedure sections of the Bill as drafted do not sufficiently safeguard access to justice, particularly for young people and children and people with vulnerabilities.
On Second Reading, the Lord Chancellor said:
“Physical hearings will always be available for those who need and want to use them, so that those who are uncomfortable or cannot access the digital and online applications will not be prejudiced.”—[Official Report, 26 October 2021; Vol. 702, c. 195.]
While I welcome that commitment from the Lord Chancellor, I do wonder why the Government would not go so far as putting such safeguards in the primary legislation, instead choosing to vote down every Labour amendment that tried to secure the rights of young and vulnerable individuals to engage with the justice system in the way most suitable for them. Today we are giving the Government a second chance, and I hope that the Minister uses it well and supports the amendments we have tabled.
Before I come on to the Opposition amendments, I will address new clause 1 and its consequential amendments, as we were not able to scrutinise these proposals in Committee. At this stage, I join the Minister in praising the work of our magistrates up and down the country. They do a grand job, often in very difficult circumstances. However, I do not understand why we did not have the opportunity of full legislative scrutiny of these proposals in Committee, rather than their being tabled at this late stage. Indeed, in response to an intervention from the hon. Member for Warrington South (Andy Carter) on Second Reading, the Lord Chancellor confirmed that the proposals were already being considered at that time.
Ministers have explained that new clause 1 is intended to provide additional capacity to help decrease the burgeoning backlog of cases in the Crown court. In the Ministry of Justice’s own statistics, released just last week, it has been revealed that delays in the criminal justice system have hit a record high. It takes an average of 708 days from the commission of an offence to the completion of a criminal case in the Crown court, so we need action. The Opposition want to see dramatic decreases in these numbers, and will support the Government in measures that will genuinely contribute to a reduction in the backlog. However, I seriously doubt that increasing sentencing powers of magistrates will have the measurable impact that all those involved in the criminal justice system are crying out for.
According to the Government, the measures could
“save 1,700 sitting days in the Crown Courts by enabling 500 jury trials to be switched to magistrates”.
It appears, however, that that estimate presumes that defendants will not exercise their right to opt for a jury trial. Will the Minister tell the House on what basis the Government have made this presumption? It strikes me that one of the primary reasons for not electing for a trial in the Crown court is in fact the lesser sentencing powers of magistrates, but as this cap is increased, I imagine that a trial by jury may seem a more appropriate option for more defendants and so they will still end up in the Crown court. Even if all defendants did choose not to exercise their right, the Government’s plan would represent a tiny saving overall.
I see that Jo Sidhu QC, chairman of the Criminal Bar Association, has also suggested that the increase in magistrates’ sentencing powers will not have the effect that the Lord Chancellor hopes, as it will lead to more cases being appealed in the Crown court, thereby potentially increasing rather than reducing the workload.
James Daly
That assessment is completely at odds with my 16 years of working in this field. When a case is committed to the Crown court, it is on the basis of the maximum sentence that could be imposed in the circumstances. The increase in sentencing powers will bring many more cases—burglary, affray, first-time offenders—back into the magistrates courts and avoid the ridiculous situation whereby straightforward cases that can be dealt with in a magistrates court are committed to the Crown court for no reason.
Alex Cunningham
I am not saying that we oppose the proposal—Labour legislation first put it on the statute book—but people in the magistrates courts will get higher sentences and may well feel the necessity to appeal, so we will potentially have more appeals.
Andy Carter (Warrington South) (Con)
Following on from my hon. Friend the Member for Bury North (James Daly), one of the main reasons for cases going to the Crown court is that magistrates refuse jurisdiction and send them there. There is no certainty that higher sentences will be given to individuals who are found guilty. They may well get exactly the same sentence in a magistrates court as they would get in a Crown court. The hon. Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham) is confusing the issue. The fact that magistrates can now keep a case in their court without having to refer up to a higher court will reduce the backlog in Crown courts.
Alex Cunningham
We believe the potential is there, but we want to understand the statistics on which the Government have based the proposal. However, I will move on now.
Have the Government taken into account the potential increase in appeals? I imagine that could quickly offset the 1.6% saving in sitting days. The increase in sentencing powers is interesting in the context of existing provisions in the Bill, particularly in relation to the new allocation procedure.
As Justice points out, there is a risk that more serious cases
“could proceed without defendants being physically present for a hearing, and as such without the defendant’s informed input as to whether the case should be heard in the Magistrates’ or Crown Court.”
It is also important to consider the proposal in the light of clause 9, which will allow hearings to take place in the absence of the defendant in many circumstances. Can the Minister share any assessment that the Department has made of the potential impact on appeals to the Crown court of introducing the increase in sentencing powers at the same time as the new allocation procedure and clause 9?
As the Minister outlined, new clause 1 will enable the Government to switch off and back on the maximum custodial term that a magistrates court may impose for an either-way offence—in other words, he is taking the power to reverse these new sentences when it suits the Lord Chancellor. I am interested to hear in what circumstances the Minister would want to reduce magistrates’ sentencing powers in future. Will that be triggered by the backlog reaching a certain level, or does he think there is a high risk that there will be unintended consequences, such as those that the CBA, Justice and I have described?
The whole approach suggests that the Government are not too confident that the proposal will be the success that they hope. Until Ministers address the shortages in judges, criminal practitioners and appropriate court space, victims and defendants will continue to suffer excessive waits until their cases are concluded.
I will now move on to the Opposition’s amendments and new clauses, which, as I explained earlier, aim to introduce a number of safeguards into the Bill to ensure that access to justice is not hampered in the drive towards efficiency that online and remote processes can offer.
Clause 3 creates an automatic online conviction and standard statutory penalty procedure, which will provide automatic online convictions as an alternative to the single justice procedure. Through this process, a defendant could opt to plead guilty online, which would result in an automatic conviction without the need for a hearing.
The process rightly already has some limitations. For example, the defendant must consent to use of the process, so they retain the right to opt for an in-person hearing instead. Furthermore, the procedure is only available in respect of non-imprisonable summary offences where the accused was aged 18 or over when charged. The Opposition agree with those limitations, but we think they need to go further. Amendment 20 would require that all accused persons considered for automatic online convictions, as introduced by clause 3, are subject to a health assessment, and that only those who do not have any vulnerabilities or disabilities are given the option of being convicted online.
The Equality and Human Rights Commission has recognised that remote justice is unsuitable for disabled people, such as those with learning difficulties, cognitive impairments or mental health conditions. The commission identified that remote proceedings reduced chances to identify a court user’s additional needs and make the appropriate adjustments. I know the Minister will share my anxiety that further roll-out of remote processes without the right safeguards may compound those inequalities even further. A recent criminal justice joint inspectorates report emphasised the need for default screening of all criminal suspects and defendants for disability, including neuro-disability. That proposal was supported by the former Lord Chancellor, who promised action on this issue. I sincerely hope his successors will uphold his promise by supporting this amendment.
I am aware that it is the Government’s intention for online pleas to be entered via the common platform, which potentially provides at least one instance where a court user’s needs can be identified so that adjustments can be made. However, the ongoing chaos with the common platform demonstrates why that would not be a sufficient safeguard in this regard. The pilot and early adopter sites have established that in its present form, at least, the common platform is not fit for purpose. The experience of the pilot courts has been widely reported to the Public and Commercial Services Union as disastrous. Their members have been working late into the evenings in an attempt to record case outcomes, with work often disappearing into thin air. Case outcomes that took a matter of seconds to record in a paper file are now taking in excess of an hour to record, provided the system is even working. Although Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service has taken steps to address slowness and instability since the intervention of the senior presiding judge in pausing the roll-out last year, PCS does not accept that those steps have addressed the fundamental design flaws. Results still routinely disappear from the court record.
I am told that confidence in the common platform at the Crown Prosecution Service—the common platform was initially a joint CPS and HMCTS venture—is so low that the CPS has retained its case management system and is using that in preference to the platform. Given the low level of confidence in the system among the professionals who use it, I am sure the Minister can recognise why I do not believe it should be relied on as a safeguard as more remote justice procedures are introduced and rolled out. Instead, he should listen carefully to the EHRC’s findings and introduce meaningful screening measures.
I turn to amendment 21, which would introduce a further safeguard to the automatic online conviction and standard statutory penalty procedure by excluding recordable offences from its purview. When I raised my concerns in Committee about the application of the AOCSSP to recordable offences, the Minister confirmed:
“There is currently no intention to extend the procedure to any recordable offences.”––[Official Report, Judicial Review and Courts Public Bill Committee, 9 November 2021; c. 228.]
The Opposition welcome the Minister’s words, but we would prefer to see that confirmed in primary legislation. The Bill already limits the use of the procedure to summary and non-imprisonable offences, but the consequences of a recordable conviction, even for such an offence, can still be serious. Many people will not understand the impact that a conviction can have on their lives. For example, it can have a detrimental impact on employment prospects in certain sectors.
In its current format, it seems as though the AOCSSP will incentivise people to plead guilty out of convenience, regardless of whether they have an arguable case. I am sure the Minister will agree that it is vital that no one is adversely impacted by pleading guilty without recognising the full impact. If the Government agree with that point, I hope the Minister will confirm that support by limiting the procedure in primary legislation to non-recordable offences.
I now consider amendment 22, which would remove children from the provisions of clause 9. Again, in Committee the Minister provided me with additional briefing on this point, for which we were very grateful. It was not, however, enough to quell my concerns about the fact that courts will be able to proceed if a child defendant is absent from a plea and allocation hearing. In Committee, the Minister confirmed that he recognises that
“in the majority of cases, the courts may not deem it appropriate to proceed”––[Official Report, Judicial Review and Courts Public Bill Committee, 16 November 2021; c. 271.]
in the absence of the child. Given that, I do not know understand why the Government insist on keeping the provision in the Bill. I have spent much time in this role trying to unpick Government proposals that treat children more and more like adults in the justice system, in both this Bill and the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill. It is extremely worrying to me that here we have yet another example of the Government failing to treat children in an appropriately distinct way. It is the position of the Opposition that they should be removed from the scope of the clause entirely.
Alex Cunningham
The Chairman of the Justice Committee, as always, talks very clear sense. If we are going to have all these training programmes, attract people to the magistracy and everything else, we will need resources, so will he join me in encouraging the Lord Chancellor to go banging on the door of the Treasury to say that it is time that we took this matter seriously?
Alex Cunningham
This has been an interesting Bill in process, although we still do not really see the need for many of the sweeping changes that the Government are proposing. I reiterate that the Minister has worked collaboratively with us, but sadly could not agree the changes that we proposed, which would have vastly improved this largely unnecessary Bill. I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith (Andy Slaughter) for partnering me through the Bill, and my hon. Friends the Members for Lewisham East (Janet Daby), for Liverpool, Wavertree (Paula Barker) and for Luton North (Sarah Owen) for helping to hold the Government to account. Thanks, too, to all the others who were involved in the process.
Let me be clear: there is simply no need to change the judicial review process. The Ministry of Justice is trying to fix something that is not broken. The Government should instead be spending their time tackling the record backlog and protecting victims of serious crime. The Government’s changes to judicial review will have a chilling effect on justice, deterring members of the public from bringing claims against public bodies and leaving many other victims of unlawful actions without any redress.
The proposed reforms go beyond what was recommended by the expert panel set up to advise us, with no evidence to back up this overreach. The proposals are also based on figures that the Government have accepted were completely inaccurate. With the Government’s review of the Human Rights Act on the horizon, this is only the latest proposal to make it harder for ordinary members of the public to hold public institutions to account.
It is always useful to have a current example to illustrate what the impact of the Government’s draft legislation is likely to be. This afternoon—I hope the Minister is aware of this—there was a judicial review result, after disabled people challenged the Work and Pensions Secretary for failing to properly consult on the national disability strategy. The Government lost—yet again, another judgment lost. Does the Minister wish to intervene on me and tell me whether that particular challenge, and correction of an injustice, would have been possible if the provisions in the Bill had been in play today? Clearly, the Minister does not want to intervene.
We had high hopes for the coroner aspects of the Bill, but sadly it does not address the existing problems with the coroner service. Even more sadly, the Government have missed the opportunity to introduce automatic support for bereaved families at inquests where the state is represented. That is not justice; it is justice denied. On Report, I talked about the Government’s drive to apply more and more processes originally intended for adults, to children and young people. They set a precedent in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill, failing time and again to safeguard one of our most vulnerable groups.
More generally, I cannot for the life of me understand why the Government are fighting shy of protecting vulnerable people from the provisions of the Bill. The Government have refused to instigate health checks and other measures to ensure that, when people do engage with online justice, they know exactly what they are doing and the potential consequences. Again, that is not justice.
We did not want to stand in the way of improving our courts system—we know it needs massive improvement—but overall, this is a bad Bill and we shall vote against it.