Exiting the European Union (Sanctions)

Alan Duncan Excerpts

Tuesday 9th April 2019 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Europe and the Americas (Sir Alan Duncan)]

I beg to move,

That the Burma (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I., 2019, No. 136), which were laid before this House on 31 January, be approved.

[Mr Speaker]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Motion 3—Sanctions—

That the Venezuela (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I., 2019, No. 135), which were laid before this House on 31 January, be approved.

Motion 4—Sanctions—

That the Iran (Sanctions) (Human Rights) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I., 2019, No. 134), which were laid before this House on 31 January, be approved.

Motion 5—Exiting the European Union (Sanctions)—

That the Republic of Guinea-Bissau (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations (S.I., 2019, No. 554), which were laid before this House on 15 March, be approved.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

As you have said and with your permission, Mr Speaker, I think the House will appreciate it if I consider the four statutory instruments together. In speaking to the Burma (Sanctions) (EU Exit) regulations, I will also speak to the Venezuela (Sanctions) (EU Exit) regulations, the Iran (Sanctions) (Human Rights) (EU Exit) regulations and the Guinea-Bissau (Sanctions) (EU Exit) regulations. These regulations provide the required details of these four sanctions regimes, but they do not set out which individuals or entities will actually be sanctioned under them. In a no-deal scenario, we will publish on exit day the full list of those we are sanctioning under our UK legislation.

Hon. Members will be well aware of the importance of sanctions. They are a key element of our approach to our most important international priorities. They help to defend our national interests, support our foreign policy and protect our national security. They also demonstrate our support for the rules-based international order. The UK has been a leading contributor to the development of multilateral sanctions in recent years. We have been particularly influential in guiding the EU’s approach and, when we move the EU’s sanctions regimes to the UK in a no-deal scenario, we will carry over their policy effect. I will say more about that in just a moment.

We are committed to maintaining our sanctions capabilities and leadership role after we leave the EU. Hon. Members will recall that the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 provides the UK with the legal powers to impose, update or lift sanctions after we leave the EU. This was the first major legislative step in creating an independent UK sanctions framework.

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

I am pleased that the Minister has said that the EU sanctions list will, in effect, be rolled over. At this early point in his contribution, notwithstanding that we are talking about sanctions on three specific countries—plus the EU one at the end—will he give the House an assurance that there is no immediate intention to change the sanctions list from the one we will adopt from the EU?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I can confirm that there is no such intention. Indeed, the intention and the expectation is that the existing regimes in the EU sanctions regime will be lifted and shifted, and put into ours. However, having scrutinised the individual elements of these, we will have to make sure that they all meet the threshold of evidence and justification that our own autonomous Act of Parliament requires. It is possible that something may not be carried over, but the expectation is that everything will be.

[Mark Pritchard (The Wrekin) (Con)]

The Minister mentioned the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill. While we are talking about specific countries, that Bill, which is now an Act, did include the Magnitsky amendment. He referenced a list should the United Kingdom leave without a deal, and that general list would no doubt include other countries as well. In that regard, what is the current position of the Government on individuals named on a sanctions list in relation to the Magnitsky amendment, which is now part of an Act?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I say to my hon. Friend that I will come on to that in just a second. I will answer the question raised in his intervention, but let me complete the introductory logic of what these four statutory instruments are intended to do.

While the Act set out the framework needed to impose our own independent sanctions, we need statutory instruments to set out the detail of each sanctions regime within that independent framework. Such statutory instruments set out the purposes of our regimes, as well as the criteria under which the Secretary of State may designate individuals and entities within the framework, and the types of restrictive measures imposed. I am grateful to the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments for its close and helpful scrutiny of these and other statutory instruments relating to sanctions regimes.

On the Magnitsky element of the Act of Parliament passed last year, that sanctions Act provides powers for the UK to impose sanctions to provide accountability for or to deter gross violations of human rights, and to promote compliance with international human rights law and respect for human rights. These powers are what is colloquially known as the Magnitsky amendment. The Government’s focus so far has been on ensuring that we have the necessary secondary legislation in place to continue to implement existing EU and UN sanctions should we leave the EU without a deal. The statutory instruments we are debating today are part of this preparation.

[Mark Pritchard]

Will the Minister give way?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

No. Let me just take my hon. Friend through this, and then he can come back again if he wishes. I need to explain quite where the Magnitsky element fits in.

As a member of the EU or during an implementation period, EU sanctions will apply in the UK. We will look to use the powers provided by the sanctions Act to the fullest extent possible during this period, but there will be some limitations on the measures that we can impose autonomously. In order to impose national sanctions for human rights—the Magnitsky element—we will need to design and draft a statutory instrument and ensure the associated processes and structures are in place to be able to implement and manage a sanctions regime.

It is important that we set up a regime correctly to ensure sanctions meet the legal tests set out in the sanctions Act. As soon as the secondary legislation and associated structures are in place to ensure the continuation of EU and UN sanctions in the UK, we will turn to the consideration of UK national sanctions, including for human rights.

[Mark Pritchard]

The Minister is being very generous. May I ask him why not a single individual Russian is on any sanctions list at the moment? It is rather odd that the Government’s position seems to be that the justification for no Russian being on any list is that we cannot do this until we leave the European Union, despite the fact that all the Baltic states have individual Russians on a sanctions list. If we are going to remain de facto within the European Union, surely the justification for taking action is going to continue.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

First, I say to my hon. Friend that this is not just against Russians. If people have violated human rights anywhere in the world, they could come within the scope of the Magnitsky clause I have been describing. I say again that the reason why we have not yet applied the Magnitsky elements of the sanctions Act is that the statutory instrument making it a bespoke part of that Act within UK autonomous law has not yet been made, and it that was done too rapidly—he will appreciate that we have had about 3,000 statutory instruments to get through this House because of EU exit—there would be a high risk of constant legal challenge, which we would like to avoid.

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

I am a bit confused about the Government’s attitude. The permanent under-secretary gave one reason why we could not have these sanctions in place already, the Foreign Secretary has given three different versions of why it could not happen and now the Minister has given yet another version of why it could not happen thus far. Part of it seems to be that the Government are not yet ready, which feels a bit like foot dragging to me, because I remember that the Government did not want this amendment in the first place, but the House insisted on it. The Government still seem to be arguing that we cannot do this because we are still a member of the European Union. In fact, Estonia and Lithuania have exactly those provisions, and nobody has thought to strike them down. There are 49 Russians listed in both those countries. Why can we not do it?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

What the hon. Gentleman says is not consistent with our legal advice. We have to make sure that any application of the Magnitsky legislation fits legally and properly within any implementation period that might exist. It would be easier and quicker, as it happens in this case, if we were to leave with no deal—that is perhaps the only advantage of so doing that I can think of straight off the top of my head, but we will not go down that route.

[Joan Ryan (Enfield North) (Ind)]

Can the Minister therefore confirm—this is what I think he is saying—that all the individuals and entities currently sanctioned by the EU will remain sanctioned by the UK under these regulations? Given that the UK has less capacity than the EU collectively, what resources are being put in place to ensure that the UK continues to update the list of sanctioned individuals and groups, or will we simply mirror any updates made by the EU?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I perhaps feel a little prime ministerial when I say that I refer the right hon. Lady to the answer I gave some moments ago, but the answer is the same: our intention is to transfer the EU sanctions, but because we have our own autonomous regime, the evidential threshold must be met. Therefore, everything is being studied closely to confirm that it fits within the evidential requirements of the sanctions Act.

[Mike Gapes (Ilford South) (Ind)]

indicated dissent.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

The hon. Gentleman is shaking his head. He is welcome to intervene and say why, but I can assure him that that is exactly the position as I understand it at the moment.

[Mike Gapes]

I did not seek to intervene, but I am happy to. I am unclear. Is the Minister saying that, where there are currently sanctioned individuals, all of them without exception will continue to be sanctioned in the event of a no-deal Brexit, or that because the evidential requirements of the UK, acting autonomously, may be different from those that apply while we are in the European Union, some of those individuals will no longer, or could no longer, be sanctioned?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

As I said earlier, it is possible that, in exceptional circumstances, a person or an entity might not be transferred, but we do not expect that to be the case often, if at all. The intention is, wherever possible, to transfer the operation of the existing regime into our own autonomous legislation.

[Chris Bryant]

I think the Minister is saying that one reason why it will not be possible is that there are so many SIs that it is difficult to get the SI in place to deal with Magnitsky. I just wonder when he hopes the provisions will be available to the House and be able to be implemented.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

All I can say is that the timeline of many things at the moment is difficult to forecast, so I hope the hon. Gentleman will forgive me if I do not attempt to say exactly.

[Chris Bryant]

Just say when.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

As soon as we are practically able to do so.

[John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

Our American allies have a disagreement with our European allies about the extent of sanctions against Iran and how best to handle the difficulties with Iran. What thinking has the Foreign Office given to an independent UK policy on this? Are there any merits in the American approach, or are all the merits with the European approach?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

If we are looking at individual cases such as that, we are straying slightly outside the terms of this debate, which is about the framework for the operation of sanctions in these four areas. We work closely with our European allies on the operation of the joint comprehensive plan of action, and we will continue to do so. However, we will of course look at all sanctions under the terms of the Act that we passed last year.

The four statutory instruments under consideration transfer into UK law the EU sanctions regimes on Burma, Venezuela, Guinea-Bissau and Iran—the human rights element of Iran, rather than the anti-nuclear side. In each case, the instruments seek to substantially mirror the measures in the corresponding EU regime, which include financial, immigration and trade measures.

These SIs were laid on a contingent basis to provide for the continuation of sanctions should we leave the EU without a deal. This would ensure that we have the necessary powers to impose sanctions on the countries in question from the date of exit. If we reach a deal, sanctions would continue to apply under EU law during any implementation period, and these SIs would not immediately be needed.

As I said at the beginning, should we leave the EU without a deal, we will publish the list of those sanctioned under these SIs and all our new sanctions SIs on exit day. We will seek to transfer EU designations in each case, but as I said earlier these decisions will be subject to the legal tests contained in the sanctions Act. Any EU listings that do not meet the tests would not then be implemented.

Hon. Members may recall that review and reporting requirements were incorporated into the sanctions Act. Hence, alongside these statutory instruments, we have published reports on the purposes of each regime and the penalties contained in them—these are known respectively as section 2 and section 18 reports. These reports, plus an explanatory memorandum for each SI, are available in the Vote Office should Members wish to read them in detail. The Government will also review each sanctions regime on a regular basis.

I would now like briefly to describe the purposes of each regime. The Burma sanctions regulations seek to encourage the Burmese security forces to comply with international human rights law and to respect human rights. The corresponding EU sanctions were established in their present form in April 2018, in response to systematic human rights violations by Burmese security forces since the summer of 2017.

The EU sanctions regime designates members of the Burmese security forces who were involved in human rights violations or abuses, or in the obstruction of humanitarian assistance activity or an independent investigation into the atrocities in Burma.

[Mike Gapes]

I am extremely grateful to the Minister for giving way. Is there any evidence that, since the imposition of those sanctions in 2018, the behaviour of the Burmese military towards the Rohingya or other minorities in the country has in any way improved?

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Alan Duncan]

Again, I think that is straying into detailed analysis of the working of the sanctions, which is not the subject of these statutory instruments.

[Jo Stevens (Cardiff Central) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. He will know that, since the implementation of those sanctions, the International Criminal Court has launched an investigation into the Burmese atrocities. What does he know about the status of that investigation? Does he anticipate an increase in the sanctions on Burma when this instrument comes into effect?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

Again, the purpose of this debate is not to look at the way the sanctions are working; it is merely to set up the legal framework in which they can be allowed to work under our autonomous regime.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. I do not think we are straying too far. I think it will help people to make up their mind and make a good judgment. Just opening the envelope a little does not take anything away from what we are trying to achieve.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I am not as keen as you, Mr Deputy Speaker, to open the envelope quite so far, because I do not actually deal with Burma. However, if the hon. Member for Cardiff Central (Jo Stevens) has a really good question on Venezuela, I can give her chapter and verse. The responsibilities of Ministers are geographical in some respects and thematic in others. As she knows, I am in charge of sanctions law, rather than the operation of all geographical sanctions. I do not want to risk in any way giving the House information that is inaccurate or ill-informed.

[Jo Stevens]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. Perhaps he could ask his colleague who is in charge of Burma relationships whether he could write to me to let me know the answer to my question.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I would be delighted to put that obligation on him—it causes me no difficulty whatever. Of course I will do that. In Foreign Office questions and in Westminster Hall, we have many discussions about issues of that sort—indeed, I encourage them, and we like to participate in them by giving as much information as we possibly can in response to any motion moved.

[Chris Bryant]

In relation to the situation in Venezuela, there has obviously been massive concern on both sides of the House about the massive number of people fleeing from Venezuela to other countries in Latin America. How does the Minister feel that the sanctions regime is working now, and is it likely to produce significant change?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

The answer is that we wish there was clearer evidence that they are working. I was at the meeting of European Foreign Ministers yesterday in Luxembourg, where Venezuela was the main topic over lunch. The hon. Gentleman is quite right that 3.6 million people have fled Venezuela. The latest forecast is that the collapse in Venezuela’s economy will exceed that of Zimbabwe’s economic collapse all that time ago and that it will collapse by over 25% this year. We are being very careful to make sure that we target individuals around President Maduro and President Maduro himself, rather than the people who are suffering enough. He will appreciate, as I think the whole House does, that it is a massive challenge to design sanctions that hit the right people and do not hit the wrong people, who are, as I say, suffering enough. Any brilliant ideas he has would be willingly received, but we are working very closely with the EU and the Lima Group to ensure that any properly targeted sanctions we can possibly apply will be applied at the earliest opportunity.

[Conor McGinn (St Helens North) (Lab)]

rose—

[Matt Rodda (Reading East) (Lab)]

rose—

[Sir Alan Duncan]

At the risk of turning this into a general debate on Venezuela, I will give way to both hon. Gentlemen.

[Conor McGinn]

Given what the Minister has said, does he envisage an increase or a reduction in sanctions in relation to Venezuela when the UK has full autonomy over its sanctions policy?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

It is possible that we could do some things on our own and increase sanctions in that way. We have particular focus, through the City of London, on financial matters where we might have, if you like, the lead. However, it would be our wish and our intention to work in close harmony with the EU and the Lima Group of countries, the immediate neighbours of Venezuela, to make sure we all speak with one voice, rather than President Maduro being able to take advantage of there being a number of different voices around the world acting against him or commenting.

[Matt Rodda]

The Minister speaks very eloquently about the discussions that are currently under way. How does he feel the UK’s very important traditional leadership role in pressing for sanctions against human rights abusers would be harmed by the prospect of a no-deal Brexit?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

It is a very fair question to ask whether, given the influential role we have had within the EU by being part of it, it will have a detrimental effect on the united front that sanctions offer to the world against those who need to be sanctioned. I think that because of our diplomatic network and diplomatic reach, and our dominance of financial markets through the City, instead of wanting to turn their back on us, should we leave the EU in that way members of the EU27 will still want to work with us very closely. I think we will continue to share in common the objectives we hold to bring the worst people to book through the workings of sanctions. We have made it very clear to the EU that we really hope that whatever happens we can continue to work together, hence our wish to fold existing EU sanctions regimes into our own legislation after we have left the EU. I will give way one more time and then I will just rattle on, if I may.

[Joan Ryan]

I am not in any way opposing the regulations, but if we are going to continue, and we should, to work closely with the EU—I agree with what the Minister said about a united front on sanctions, otherwise they are pretty useless—we need to be clearer for the EU to understand where we will just be rolling forward its sanctions and where we might be doing something different. The question has been put two or three times, but I do not think the answer is very clear. I am worried that we hear a lot less about the purpose and the way in which they will be applied. I do not see how we can be expected to make a fully informed decision when we cannot have full information about the countries in question.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I think the right hon. Lady may have misunderstood my answers. She is right that the question has been asked three times and I have answered three times, but this is not actually the moment we are announcing individual designations or decisions. What we are looking at today in the four statutory instruments is, in lay language, the framework within which any such designations can fit. I say once again, I think for the fourth or fifth time, that it is our intention to lift the EU sanctions regimes that exist at the moment and put them into our own regime once it is up and running, but we will follow the law to ensure there are no issues where we could unnecessarily be taken to court and be challenged. We will have rigorous standards, but we do not envisage our not transferring EU regimes. We do not envisage that happening very much, if at all. It would be quite rare.

I should just answer one point about whether the Foreign Office will have the resources to manage this regime. I think the answer is yes. We have increased the number of staff working on sanctions quite considerably, and we are confident that we will retain and increase the UK’s capacity and capability after Brexit.

[Gavin Robinson (Belfast East) (DUP)]

Will the Minister give way?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I will let the hon. Gentleman slip through the net.

[Gavin Robinson]

I am very grateful to the Minister. I do not want to flog the issue, but in circumstances where there is an EU sanction proposed and it does not fit with our legislative test—that is quite right, given the framework he outlines—does he envisage those issues being brought before Parliament through a report or a ministerial statement? Will there be parliamentary engagement around that decision to not comply or follow through with the sanction that has been agreed at EU level?

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I am not sure it would quite work in that way, but I am very happy to write to the hon. Gentleman with our understanding of what we think the parliamentary engagement would be in any such decision to either list or not to list. Given that this is the early stage of our implementing the Act, I hope he can accept that as my commitment to him for the time being.

Having mentioned the Burma sanctions, the Venezuela sanctions, which we have been debating a bit, will: encourage the Venezuelan Government to abide by democratic principles, if only they would; respect human rights and the rule of law; refrain from the repression of civil society; and bring about a peaceful solution to the political crisis in Venezuela. The Iran human rights regulations are designed to encourage the Government of Iran to comply with international human rights law and to respect human rights. The EU sanctions regime emerged partly in response to the Iranian Government’s treatment of protestors in demonstrations against election fraud in 2009. The EU sanctions regime targets those who have been involved in the commission of serious human rights violations or abuses in Iran. The EU sanctions regime on Guinea-Bissau was established in 2012 and targets those who played a leading role in its 2010 mutiny and 2012 coup. It is designed to curb actions that undermine the country’s peace, security or stability.

Hon. Members will note that human rights are a significant focus of the sanctions regime under consideration today. I hope I have adequately explained how the human rights element of the sanctions Act, the Magnitsky clause, will fit into the statutory instruments before us today. The four statutory instruments transfer into UK law well-established EU sanctions regimes that are in line with the UK’s foreign policy priorities. They encourage human rights compliance, the rule of law, and security and stability in very difficult environments. I re-emphasise the importance of putting them in place. If this does not happen before exit day in a no-deal scenario, the UK would not be able to continue to properly implement the measures they contain. Therefore, Mr Deputy Speaker, I commend the regulations to the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Helen Goodman]

I am very grateful to you, Mr Deputy Speaker.

First, why was £80,000-worth of weapons material, which could be used for internal repression, authorised by the Government in 2016-17? That seems to be a breach of the current sanctions regime. [Interruption.] To Venezuela. Secondly, we do not believe that the oil sanctions that have been imposed by the Americans have been helpful in the current situation. This is precisely the point that hon. Members made earlier: the object of the sanctions should be to punish the politicians who are in charge of creating a bad situation and not the whole population.

I also want to ask the Minister about the gold that the Bank of England holds for the central bank of Venezuela. It was reported in November last year, before the Government had recognised Juan Guaidó as the leader of Venezuela, that the Bank of England had frozen 1,125 gold bars. I asked Her Majesty’s Treasury through a written parliamentary question what the legal basis for that was. It told me that it was a matter for the Bank of England, so I wrote to the Governor to ask what the legal basis for the decision was and his response was somewhat opaque. I have read suggestions in the press that the American Government put pressure on the British Government, who leant on the Bank of England directly not to release these gold bars when the bank of Venezuela requested them. I would like to know from the Minister whether that is true.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for giving way, because this deserves an immediate answer. The Foreign Office has not at any stage put any such pressure on the Bank of England. Any decision about whether or not to transfer gold that it holds is entirely a matter for the Bank of England, and it does so without political pressure from us.

[Helen Goodman]

I am interested to hear the Minister’s response, because if the Government wish to tighten the sanctions regime, he and the Foreign Office will have the opportunity to do so, and they might well succeed in that. However, what is not acceptable is pursuing a tighter policy without a clear legal base; I suggest that that would not do much for our reputation.

I want to pick up on the point that was made about Iran by the right hon. Member for Wokingham (John Redwood). EU sanctions were introduced in the case of Iran in 2011, in response to violent crackdowns against street protests. In view of the continued serious human rights abuses in Iran—notably, extensive use of the death penalty, including for juveniles; torture; the repression of women and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender activists; and the detention of Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe three years ago and the denial to her of access to medical treatment—we believe that these sanctions are justified. They cover in particular goods and technology used for repression, and we believe that that is right.

However, we believe that the American decision to lift the trade sanctions against Iran, which was taken as part of the international community’s joint comprehensive plan of action—JCPOA—nuclear deal, was also right. Sanctions have been an effective tool and they will continue to be effective if we impose them when things go badly and lift them when things go better. The Trump Administration’s decision to reimpose those trade sanctions and to withdraw from the JCPOA is mistaken. The JCPOA does not cover ballistic missiles or regional aggression—the arguments the Trump Administration put forward for reimposing sanctions. The decision further destabilises the region. That is a problem in foreign policy terms—it is unhelpful.

I would also be interested to know what the Government have done about the impact on European and British businesses and banks. Our businesses and banks are in an extremely difficult situation, whereby trade and investment under European law is completely legal, but under American law is completely illegal. There is an extraterritoriality effect of American law. I therefore have two questions for the Minister. First, will he hold to the current position in a post-Brexit scenario and not shift to the American position? Secondly, what has been, is and will be Government action to support British businesses and banks that wish to trade with and invest in Iran?

Finally, I come to Guinea-Bissau. The European Union imposed sanctions, which cover 20 individuals, in 2012 following an attempted coup. Guinea-Bissau is an extremely poor country with a lot of cocaine trafficked through it. There were some elections in March, and I ask the Minister what the Government are doing to improve governance in Guinea-Bissau. What are they doing to reduce drug trafficking via Guinea-Bissau? Does the Minister anticipate the UN Security Council changing its posture on sanctions?

--- Later in debate ---

[Peter Grant]

rose—

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I refer the hon. Gentleman, courteously but firmly, to the speech I made at Chatham House outlining what I believe to have been the real reasons over the past 30 years for the collapse of the Venezuelan economy. It was an attempt to be as impartial and intellectual as possible. I think that he should withdraw the suggestion that we have no concern for the people of Venezuela, as that is what motivates our entire policy, which I am pleased to say is very much a cross-party policy, and it is one that he should support rather than criticise.

[Peter Grant]

I stand absolutely by my statement that there have been occasions in this House when Members on the Government Benches have used the failure of the economic policies of the Chávez Government as a direct jibe against the Leader of the Opposition, and those comments have been welcomed on the Conservative Benches. [Interruption.] I will now move on.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I am grateful to hon. and right hon. Members for their contributions, which spread quite widely but show the passions raised by this topic.

I take my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton South (Andrew Lewer) to task for saying that Venezuela is not a Foreign Office priority, which I find difficult to swallow, to put it politely, when it is very much a priority. I went to the United Nations Security Council, at a few hours’ notice, for an emergency debate, and I went to the Ottawa meeting of the Lima group. I spoke yesterday at the meeting of European Foreign Ministers, and I have given a considered lecture on Venezuela at Chatham House. So I would politely ask him to revise his view of where he thinks our priorities sit.

On the issue raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Finchley and Golders Green (Mike Freer), the IRGC is already sanctioned by the EU, but it comes under the EU’s Iran nuclear sanctions, rather than the ones that we are discussing today. When it comes to giving notice of who we might include in any EU sanctions that are transferred—

[Mr Speaker]

Stick to 3.40 pm and you will be all right.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

Very good.

We will do that at the eleventh hour, as it were, to avoid asset flight by not giving prior notice to those who might be affected. As I said, the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 enables sanctions to be imposed for a variety of purposes, including responding to or deterring gross violations of human rights, or otherwise promoting compliance with human rights law or respect for human rights. After we transpose existing EU sanctions regimes into UK law—that must be the first priority—the UK will continue to take action against human rights violators and abusers. There is already a strong human rights element in all our sanctions. [Interruption.] Do I take it, Mr Speaker, that you are urging me to speed up?

[Mr Speaker]

Yes.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

In which case, having covered so much already, I commend these regulations to the House.