Commission on the “West Lothian” Question
Mark Harper Excerpts(13 years, 3 months ago)
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The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Mr Mark Harper)
The coalition programme for government set out our commitment to
“establish a commission to consider the ‘West Lothian question’”.
I can now give the House more details on how that commission is to proceed.
The Government are clear that the commission’s primary task should be to examine how this House and Parliament as a whole can deal most effectively with business that affects England wholly or primarily, when at the same time similar matters in some or all of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are lawfully and democratically the responsibility of the separate Parliament or Assemblies. The commission will not examine financing, which is being dealt with separately through various processes led by Treasury Ministers, nor does it need to look at the balance of parliamentary representation, given that Parliament addressed historic imbalances in representation between the constituent nations of the United Kingdom in legislation earlier this year.
Given the commission’s focus on parliamentary business and procedure, the Government believe that the commission should be comprised of a small group of independent, non-partisan experts with constitutional, legal and parliamentary expertise. We will also wish to consult with Mr Speaker and other parliamentary authorities on how the commission can best address this. We will also ensure that there is a full opportunity for the parties to have their say following the completion of the commission’s work.
We will bring forward formal proposals, including the terms of reference for the commission, after the conclusion of this short process of consultation and further deliberation. I expect that this will be in the weeks after the House returns in October.
Prisoner Voting Rights
Mark Harper Excerpts(13 years, 3 months ago)
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The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Mr Mark Harper)
In November 2010, the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Greens and MT v UK found that the UK’s ban on prisoners voting was in breach of article 3 of the First Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights (the right to free and fair elections). In the judgment the Court prescribed a timetable for the introduction of legislative proposals to amend the blanket ban, namely a period of six months from when the judgment became final (which was 11 April 2011). The Government have since been considering the appropriate course of action in order to respond to the Greens and MT judgment.
In July, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights accepted a referral in the case of Scoppola (No.3) v Italy. A hearing before the Grand Chamber has been scheduled for 2 November. The legal issues which arise in Scoppola under article 3 of the ECHR are analogous to those which arose in Hirst v UK and Greens and MT.
Given the close relationship between the cases, the Government have sought leave to intervene in the proceedings before the Grand Chamber in Scoppola. The Government also requested an extension to the deadline set in Greens and MT to enable it to take account of the Grand Chamber’s judgment. The Government were notified on 31 August that the Court has granted an extension of six months from the date of the Scoppola judgment, and on 5 September that the Government will have the opportunity to express our views on the principles in the Scoppola case.
The Government welcome the decision of the Court and believe it is right to consider Scoppola and the wider legal context before setting out the next steps on prisoner voting.
Boundary Commission for Wales
Mark Harper Excerpts(13 years, 3 months ago)
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The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Mr Mark Harper)
On 22 June, the Welsh Government published an independent report into the recent work of the Local Government Boundary Commission for Wales (LGBCW). On the same day the Welsh Government Minister for Local Government and Communities announced that the appointments of the LGBCW commissioners were to be terminated, in light of the report’s conclusions.
Two of the LGBCW commissioners also serve as commissioners on the Boundary Commission for Wales (BCW), which makes recommendations to the UK Government on the determination of Westminster parliamentary constituency boundaries.
At my invitation, the commissioners concerned made representations about their positions on the BCW. They also set out their views on the termination of their appointments as LGBCW commissioners, insofar as it affected their positions as BCW commissioners.
The commissioners have both offered to resign from the BCW in order to ensure that it is best able to complete the important task that Parliament entrusts to it. I welcome the commitment of the commissioners in this regard and on that basis their resignations have been accepted.
Ministers have begun the process of making replacement appointments, following the code of practice published by the Commissioner for Public Appointments. The replacements will be made swiftly and the Government will take the necessary steps to ensure that there is no risk to the deadline set by Parliament for the completion of the parliamentary constituency boundary review that is currently underway.
Election Petitions
Mark Harper Excerpts(13 years, 5 months ago)
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The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Mr Mark Harper)
I congratulate the hon. Member for Bassetlaw (John Mann) on securing the debate. It is not the first time we have heard from him this evening, but no less the worse for that.
The Government want to improve public confidence in all aspects of our electoral system. I am sure that all hon. Members would agree that it is important that the conduct of all elections to this House, and to local authorities and the European Parliament, are beyond reproach. I agree with the hon. Gentleman when he says that we want elections to be decided through the ballot box and not in the courts, but some remedies should be available to deal with cases of corrupt or illegal practices by candidates or agents. There should be clear and robust mechanisms for challenging the results of elections, and he is right to say that they should include appropriate, proportionate and accessible safeguards. The Government’s view is that that is the case under the Representation of the People Act 1983.
The hon. Gentleman raised several issues of cost, including the overall cost, and made a specific point about a court’s ability to apportion costs. My understanding is that courts have a wide discretion under section 154 of the Act to apportion costs. He raised a specific case that I will endeavour to look at after the debate and consider what he said in the light of it.
The hon. Gentleman also made a point about proportionality. Although there may be technical reasons why a returning officer may have declared a particular result, revoking the election of somebody is a significant step and should not be done lightly. Although the hon. Gentleman suggested cases in which it might be considered only an administrative matter, if we think a little more about it we realise that those of us who have been elected would not want our elections to be overturned by some relatively straightforward process. It should be difficult to overturn an election, and we need to strike a balance in the level of proportionality.
Notwithstanding the relatively recent case of Phil Woolas, it is also worth saying that the election petition device—certainly for parliamentary elections—is rare. There have only been seven petitions issued against the results of UK parliamentary elections since 1997, and only two of those have been successful. Hon. Members on both sides of the House would agree that it would not be healthy if we had regular challenges.
The hon. Gentleman mentioned appeals. The High Court in the Woolas case confirmed that section 144 of the 1983 Act said that decisions of the electoral courts were final insofar as matters of fact were concerned. The hon. Gentleman was right about that, but I do not agree that that was a misconsolidation of the 1983 Act. If he goes back to the 1868 Act—I will not go as far back as the 400 years that he suggested—he will see that it was also clear that matters of fact were final decisions that the election court could take. In the Woolas case, the High Court made it clear that the decisions about the application of the law were judicially reviewable—
Mr Harper
I shall come on to that point in a moment. I just wished to make the distinction clear between matters of fact and the application of the law, which—to be fair—the hon. Gentleman did. The High Court made it clear that it was possible for judicial review of how the election court had applied the law.
On the basis of that decision, I do not think that the law needs to be changed to clarify the decision that matters of law can be appealed, although there was confusion in the reports of the case about whether Phil Woolas was appealing or requesting judicial review.
It is for Members to weigh up the issues, taking into account the hon. Gentleman’s point that we never know when we might be the subject of one these petitions. However, we must balance against that the need for a level of speed in the process. When Phil Woolas sought a judicial review, the High Court concluded on the justification for finality on fact:
“Election petitions must be determined with urgency. Finality in the determination is of great importance for not only must the electors have a representative in Parliament, but in times when majorities are small, the absence of a Member can be significant.”
A balance needs to be struck in this process between getting the right decision and getting it quite speedily. He raised several points about that matter. The Government keep it under review, but at the moment we are not persuaded by his arguments.
At the end of his remarks, the hon. Gentleman raised a more general issue about party funding. He will know that the coalition Government have made a commitment to deal with party funding—hopefully, on a consensual basis. We are waiting for the Committee on Standards in Public Life to publish its report. The committee might make proposals that we can take as a basis for conversations between the parties and that might deal with some of the issues he has raised. He also made a point about the danger of political arguments being used to try to overturn elections. I think that the High Court made clear the distinction between false statements of fact about a candidate’s personal character or conduct and their political or public position—a statement had to be one or the other, but could not be both. Members when approving literature and others when thinking about challenging us should bear it in mind that it is not about running off to court every time someone says something about someone’s political position.
The hon. Gentleman made a point about things that get authorised by us. The legislation makes it clear that candidates should be liable to have their election voided only if they or their election agents—not lots of other people, but specifically they or their election agents—have authorised or consented to those illegal practices. That should ensure that election candidates and their election agents are careful about what they authorise and approve the spending of money on. They should perhaps be careful not to delegate that responsibility to others. It is not the case that anybody involved in a campaign can put out pieces of paper—if they are not approved by the candidate or election agent, they cannot lead to what happened in the case of Mr Woolas.
In conclusion, the Government agree that there should be proportionate and accessible procedures for challenging elections. We will keep the current position under review, and I will consider the specific issues that the hon. Gentleman raised, particularly on costs, and come back to him one way or the other.
Question put and agreed to.
Co-ordinated Online Record of Electors
Mark Harper Excerpts(13 years, 5 months ago)
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The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Mr Mark Harper)
The previous Government legislated for the co-ordinated online record of electors (CORE) in the Electoral Administration Act 2006 and the Political Parties and Elections Act 2009. CORE was intended to provide a single source of electoral registration information for authorised users, principally to provide political parties with a system that would help them meet their donation reporting obligations. The CORE service was to be managed by a new public body, a corporation sole, established for the purposes of being the “CORE keeper”.
The cost of building the CORE system was estimated to be £11.4 million and £2.7 million per annum to run thereafter.
The Government have decided not to pursue the project. We do not believe that establishing this system is proportionate, cost-effective or consistent with the Government’s policy on databases and reducing the number of non-departmental public bodies. We will continue to consider more cost-effective ways to improve the processes and procedures for political parties to report donations.
Electoral Administration Provisions
Mark Harper Excerpts(13 years, 5 months ago)
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The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Mr Mark Harper)
I am announcing today the publication of draft legislation on three electoral administration provisions for pre-legislative scrutiny.
The draft legislation is intended to form part of a larger package of measures which will also include draft legislation on individual electoral registration (IER) which has been published separately for pre-legislative scrutiny.
The draft legislation addresses particular issues that have been raised by MPs and peers, and by electoral stakeholders, and proposes practical and sensible changes that will help to deliver more effective electoral administration.
The draft legislation includes provisions which extend the timetable for UK parliamentary elections from 17 to 25 days and similarly extends the timetable for UK parliamentary by-elections. The existing timetable for UK parliamentary elections and by-elections is considerably shorter than the electoral timetable for all other UK polls. The very limited time available for the postal vote process compromises effective participation in elections by certain types of voter, particularly overseas and service voters. Moreover, the existing timetable puts considerable pressure on administrative processes by compressing a large number of tasks into a short period, which represents significant risks to the effective conduct of elections.
Extending the timetable for UK parliamentary elections and by-elections will bring benefits for voters and administrators, as well as adding to the robustness and integrity of the electoral process. The Government propose that, within this extended timetable:
the deadline for parties to nominate candidates should continue to be six days after the start of the timetable, so parties will have the same time as now to put forward candidates to stand for election. In practice this will now be 19, rather than 11, days before the date of poll, which will allow administrators to begin printing ballot papers further in advance of polling day;
provision should be made for updated versions of the electoral register to be created at an earlier point in the timetable to allow postal votes to be distributed to new registration applicants earlier than is currently possible.
We also propose to address an oversight in existing legislation passed during the previous Government’s time in office which allows a candidate standing for a single party in a UK parliamentary election to use an emblem on their ballot paper, but does not allow jointly nominated candidates to do so. This issue has primarily affected candidates standing on behalf of the Labour party and the Co-operative party. The proposal will ensure that electoral law is consistent on this issue.
The draft legislation also makes changes to the existing system for reviews of polling districts and places in Great Britain for UK parliamentary elections to bring them in line with the five-year cycle for UK parliamentary boundary reviews implemented by the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Act 2011 and the proposed cycle of parliamentary terms under the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill.
I am today sending the draft legislation to the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee for pre-legislative scrutiny.
A Command Paper setting out the draft legislation and associated explanatory notes will be laid before the House.
Fixed-term Parliaments Bill
Mark Harper Excerpts(13 years, 5 months ago)
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The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Mr Mark Harper)
I beg to move, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 1.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
With this we may take Lords amendments 2 and 9.
Mr Harper
I should like to make it clear that I am proposing that the House disagrees with their lordships on amendments 1, 2 and 9, and I shall set out the reasons for that. For the benefit of Members who have not had the chance to study the amendments in detail, they provide that the provisions in this excellent Bill be subject to a sunset clause after the next general election. Each subsequent Parliament would have the choice of whether to be a fixed-term Parliament or not. The Government want to oppose the amendments because we think that they fundamentally undermine the purpose of the Bill, which was welcomed by, among others, the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee of this House. I see a member of the Committee, the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent Central (Tristram Hunt) sort of agreeing with me on the Opposition Benches.
In bringing forward the Bill, we are seeking to put in place a provision that we hope will become an established part of our constitutional arrangements—namely, that fixed-term Parliaments for this UK Parliament become the norm, just as they are for local government, for the devolved legislatures and for the European Parliament. Two of the most important things in the Bill—in the form that the Government would like it to take—are, first, the proposal for an ability to deny the Executive the ability to choose a date for a general election to suit their own ends and to ensure that the Prime Minister gives up that power for the first time, and, secondly, to deliver certainty on how long a Parliament will last, which will benefit not only parliamentarians but the public.
Tristram Hunt (Stoke-on-Trent Central) (Lab)
Was the Minister disappointed, as I was, that their lordships did not seek to alter the limit for the fixed-term Parliament from five years to four years, which seems to be what the majority of the British public would like?
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
Order. We must stick to the amendments.
Mr Harper
I will give way in a moment.
If the Lords amendments were accepted, the electorate would have no certainty as to how long the Parliament that they will elect on 7 May 2015 would last. Such certainty, and the principle behind the Bill, have been welcomed by many electoral administrators and by members of the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
Order. It would be helpful if the hon. Gentleman could let us know which part of the amendment he is referring to.
Mr Harper
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his intervention. The polling that has been carried out suggests that the public support fixed-term Parliaments. Indeed, if we think back to the previous Parliament, there was a general sense, both in the House and among the public and commentators, that the “will he, won’t he” debate about whether the right hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Mr Brown) would call an election on becoming Prime Minister was not helpful to good Government or to good democratic accountability. It will be helpful to have greater certainty, as that will benefit us all. Let us ask ourselves this question: if the Bill became law, and fixed-term Parliaments became the norm, would any Minister realistically be able to come to the Dispatch Box and suggest with a straight face that we should change the position and give the power back to the Prime Minister to hold an election at a time of his choosing to suit his political party? Would anyone take that proposition seriously? I suggest that they would not.
Mr Cash
Has it occurred to the Minister that part of the problem with this wretched Bill is that it is trying to organise things to suit the requirements of this coalition? Decisions on the future should actually be down to the public at large, and if they want to get rid of a Parliament, they will do so in their own way. That is where the question of a confidence motion starts to kick in.
Mr Deputy Speaker
Order. We are not dealing with the whole Bill; we are dealing with the amendments. I am sure that the Minister will take that into account in his answer.
Mr Harper
To be fair to my hon. Friend, Mr Deputy Speaker, he was speaking to the amendments that we are discussing. He made the assertion that our proposals would suit this particular Government during this particular Parliament, but that is simply not the case. If the Prime Minister wanted to ensure that this Parliament ran for the full five years and that the general election took place on 7 May 2015, he would need to do only one thing—namely, not approach Her Majesty the Queen to seek a Dissolution before that date. We could thereby achieve a five-year Parliament for this Parliament, but we want to make a change to our constitutional processes—I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) does not agree with it—to remove from Prime Ministers the ability to choose the date of a general election.
The second part of my hon. Friend’s question effectively suggested that a sunset provision would be a good thing. Under our democratic system, the public elect Members of Parliament for a term. At the moment, they do not have a choice about when the general election will be; the sole decision about that sits with the Prime Minister. The Bill seeks to give that power to Members of this democratically elected House. I would have thought that my hon. Friend, as a champion of parliamentary control of the Executive, would welcome that proposition.
Mr Cash
I can assure my hon. Friend that the real question is not whether the Prime Minister wants to call a general election, but what the state of the country is and whether there is a sense of urgency among the public at large. That can force a general election, irrespective of whether a Prime Minister wants to pull the plug.
Mr Harper
I am afraid that my hon. Friend is simply not right. That is not the current constitutional position. The current position is that for a period of time during which a Government have the confidence of this House, the only person who decides whether there should be a general election—assuming that we have not reached the end of the Parliament—is the Prime Minister, who seeks a Dissolution from Her Majesty the Queen. Members of Parliament, unless they vote down the Government on a vote of confidence, do not have that power. The general public certainly do not have that power.
Mr Richard Shepherd (Aldridge-Brownhills) (Con)
The Minister’s proposition was a much disputed one. It was thought at one stage that Mr Major, when Prime Minister, was prepared to call a general election during the difficulties surrounding Maastricht. The argument put by people such as Robert Rhodes James was that it was a matter for the Cabinet as a whole to give the Prime Minister the authority to go to the Queen—a more collective approach. The coarse person, the Back Bencher on the streets—or rather the Benches here—would argue that the Cabinet at the time would have thrown themselves in front of John Major’s car if he went to Buckingham palace, as the last thing the Conservative party could bear at that juncture was a general election. It is a process; that is what my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) is talking about. The Prime Minister is not the only person who can determine a general election. That is the ebb and flow of real politics, which is what this House is about. That is why, as I am sure the Minister will understand, there is opposition to some of the propositions in the Bill.
Mr Harper
I am not sure that I want to conjure up visions of Cabinet Ministers throwing themselves in front of prime ministerial cars, which is not a happy thought—[Interruption.] Some of the comments from Opposition Members are unworthy of them. Let me explain what I do not understand about my hon. Friend’s point. He is arguing, I think, for decisions about the timing of general elections to be a more collegiate effort, rather than just the choice of the Prime Minister—but that is exactly what the Bill does. It takes away from the Prime Minister the power to call a general election by asking the Queen for a Dissolution and gives that power to Members. Two thirds of them can choose to have an early election for any reason, including general concerns about the state of the country, which deals with the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone. Having this Bill in place would allow that to happen, which cannot be done today. The other way of bringing about an election is the Government losing a vote of confidence. That is why the Government believe that the Bill should be in place; it should not be up to each individual Parliament to decide whether the Bill should remain in force. That is why we oppose these sunset clauses.
We think that the real threat presented by the amendments is that they could create a scenario in which political parties, and specifically the Government party, could choose in each Parliament, even at its beginning, whether that Parliament should be a fixed-term one. As the Bill is currently drafted, both Houses would have to vote in favour of the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill kicking into place at any time during the Parliament. I simply do not think that that is a very sensible proposition. It would mean that Governments would have a way of manipulating the timetable. We should think it through. If both Houses have to vote in favour of a motion for a fixed-term Parliament to be in place, a Government with a majority could simply refuse to pass that motion—and we would effectively have given back to the Prime Minister the ability to call an election. That would not be a positive step forward.
It is important to note that when this House and the other place were legislating for the fixed terms of the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Ireland Assembly, it was not thought appropriate to have sunset clauses. We did not give those legislatures the opportunity to pick and choose each time how long their terms of office should be. I do not believe that doing so makes sense now.
Mr Harper
That is not an analogy I would make with the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Ireland Assembly. When this House made decisions about setting up those bodies, we did not think it appropriate to give them the power to pick and choose their term of office. We set it out in the legislation that set the bodies up.
I am curious to know what the supporters of the Lords amendment think would happen if the next Parliament decided that it did not want a fixed term. It is not very clear from the amendments, how exactly the mechanisms would work. I shall take Members through the Lords amendments shortly and explain how I think they would work.
It has been suggested that a sunset clause would ensure that the issue of fixed-term Parliaments and the merits of this particular Bill would be subject to post-legislative scrutiny. That is not necessary, however. This legislation has already been scrutinised by four Select Committees: the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, the Lords Constitution Committee, the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. I am sure that any one of those Select Committees or another Select Committee will subject the Bill to some form of post-legislative scrutiny, which is something that the Government would welcome. I do not think that these sunset clauses, however, would lead to that type of sensible scrutiny.
I said that I would look at the effect of the Lords amendments on the working of the Bill. Lords amendment 9 talks about a resolution having to be
“approved by each House of Parliament”.
That is fairly straightforward. The most unclear provisions relate to clause 7(4), stating that a number of parts of the Bill will have effect
“only until the first meeting of the… Parliament”,
which would then decide whether to bring those provisions in. The provisions on early elections and confidence votes would not be clear and it would not be clear how Parliament would be dissolved. The schedule, which has a number of consequential amendments, would also not be in force. The schedule, which repeals the Septennial Act and a whole load of other provisions, would effectively cease to be in force and, presumably, all the repeals and amendments would be unrepealed and unamended. We would then end up with a very complicated constitutional proposition.
Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)
Unless I misheard the Minister, he referred to clause 7(4) of the Bill. I cannot find a clause 7(4).
Mr Harper
I am looking at the copy of the Bill as amended on Report from the House of Lords, which does have a clause 7. It is the final provision clause. It is the bit that is dealt with by one of the Lords amendments that we are debating. I think that the amendment will be confusing. It will make many of our constitutional provisions unclear. I do not believe that those who tabled the amendments and voted for them in the other place have fully thought through how they would work in practice.
Another important issue is the relationship that would be created between this House and the other place if the amendments stay in the Bill. The importance of establishing the primacy of this House came out clearly in our debate on the Government’s proposals on House of Lords reform. The amendments would give the House and the other place the ability to vote on whether we have a fixed-term Parliament, without going through the normal legislative process. That could lead to an unfortunate scenario in which this House voted overwhelmingly in favour of the motion that we have a fixed-term Parliament and that the provisions of the Bill, if passed, come into force, while the currently unelected House failed to vote for the motion, so we would not have a fixed-term Parliament. Important decisions about elections in this country, fixed-term Parliaments, the confidence procedures and the ability to trigger early general elections would effectively be made by the unelected House, and that would diminish the power of elected Members.
Chris Bryant
The Minister’s example is completely wrong. If this House voted—on the basis of the Government’s and, therefore, the Prime Minister’s majority—for a fixed-term Parliament, and the other place did not vote for a fixed-term Parliament, whether there would be an early election would be in the hands of the Prime Minister. The will of this House would always have carried.
Mr Harper
The hon. Gentleman confuses the will of the House and the will of the Prime Minister. The scenario that I set out stands. If the other place had chosen not to vote for fixed-term Parliaments, we would not have a fixed-term Parliament, despite this House having voted in favour, and that would give back to the Prime Minister the ability solely to decide whether there should be an election. We would have taken powers away from Members of this House who had voted, perhaps overwhelmingly, to ensure that the Bill was in force. We would have been thwarted by their lordships. Given the importance to Members of the primacy of this House, that effectively moves power in the opposite direction, which Members will find unwelcome.
Mr Harper
That is not what I said at all. My specific point is about the relative powers of the two Houses, but the point stands that if we do not have a fixed-term Parliament, we give back to the Prime Minister the power to call an early election. To repeat my example, the amendments would mean that both Houses must vote positively in favour of resurrecting the provisions of the Bill. I want the other place also to be elected—I know that my hon. Friend does not—but under the amendments the elected House, despite having voted by an overwhelming margin, could be thwarted by the unelected House, and the provisions of the Bill would not be in force. The will of the House of Commons, having said that it did not want the Prime Minister to have the power to call an early election, and that it wanted that power to be held by Members of this House, would have been thwarted by the other place. I am sure that my hon. Friend would not agree with that.
Mr Cash
I am grateful to the Minister for engaging in dialogue on this question, but the assumption, at any rate in the mind of the Deputy Prime Minister, is that proposals for reform of the House of Lords will go through by the end of this Parliament. The arguments to which the Minister refers, therefore, will effectively expire when the arrangements for this fixed-year Parliament come to an end.
Mr Harper
I disagree with my hon. Friend. Even if we successfully push our proposals through in their current form, and we have the first set of such elections in 2015, most Members of the other place will still be unelected. Secondly, regardless of how many Members of the other place are elected, we are talking about primacy. Effectively, the amendments would move power away from this House to the other place. Whatever one’s views about House of Lords reform, I picked up clearly from our earlier debate that most Members of this place want it to be clear that this place has primacy over their lordships’ House. The amendments, perhaps inadvertently, would lead to a different situation.
Mr Robert Syms (Poole) (Con)
Under the Bill, a large number of Members of the House must vote for a Dissolution. The person who decides whether there is a general election is, therefore, the Leader of the Opposition, because if the Government and the Opposition want a Dissolution, it happens. Under the amendments, the House of Lords would effectively be taking power away from the Leader of the Opposition, who would be in a position to provide the numbers for a Dissolution.
Mr Harper
I agree. The fact remains that we are taking powers away from this House and giving them to the other place. It has been clear to me from our earlier debates that that view is not widely shared in this House, and indeed, interestingly, it does not appear to be widely shared in the other place. As I observed from careful reading of the report of the debates there, many speakers were very concerned about the primacy of this House, which was good of them. They said that they did not want to damage it in any way. Plainly their support for the amendments was inadvertent; they may not have thought through the consequences fully. I therefore think it would be sensible for this House to disagree with their lordships, and to give them an opportunity to reconsider their decision and return the Bill to the form in which it left this House.
Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)
I recognise the strength of the Minister’s arguments. The effect of the amendments, surely, would be to leave us with not a Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, but a Fixable-term Parliaments Bill. We could get into a constitutional “fix” in trying to “fix” the term, with an elected Chamber voting one way and an—in all likelihood—still unelected Chamber voting another way. If that happened, what would be the default position?
Mr Harper
I agree. The hon. Gentleman has put it very well. Under the Bill as the Government want to see it—this House having disagreed with their lordships, and their lordships having accepted that the Bill should remain as it is—its provisions would be in force unless and until a future Parliament changed them. It would be this House that would determine whether an early election should take place if two thirds of Members, that is, a broad consensus, were in favour of it—which returns us to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone about what would happen if there were a general view that the state of the nation was such that there should be an early election—or if the Government no longer had the confidence of this House. The other place would have no role in that process at all, which I think is right.
As the hon. Gentleman pointed out, if the amendments were in force there would be a “fix” in each Parliament: each Government would effectively be able to choose whether to have a fixed-term Parliament, because they could block the motion passed by this House. Worse, it would not be a choice that the Houses took at the start of a Parliament, because the amendments make no provision for that. At any point during the Parliament, the two Houses, if they passed the motion, could suddenly convert the Parliament to a fixed term. That would be likely to lead to the position described by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone, with people putting a fix in place to suit a particular short-term need.
Mark Durkan
Does any provision in the Lords amendments or the Bill specify or restrict who can table such a motion in either House, and when or how many times it could be tabled again if whoever tables it does not succeed on the first occasion?
Mr Harper
The hon. Gentleman has put his finger on it. The provisions are completely silent about that. They do not say who would table the motion, or whether the same question could be continually repeated.
The amendments are not very well drafted. I think that they are wrong in principle, because under the normal procedure legislation that is passed stays in force unless it is changed by a future Parliament, but even if we liked the concept of a sunset provision, such a provision ought to be much better drafted and much more effective. This House can choose only between accepting the amendments and disagreeing with them, and I think I have almost made my case that we should disagree with them.
It has been argued that we are trying to bind future Parliaments. That is not what we are trying to do at all. We are merely trying to re-establish the normal constitutional position. We are passing legislation which we hope will become the established position, but if a future Parliament, perhaps the next one, decides that the fixed-term Parliament experiment—an experiment that is common to many countries around the world—has not been successful and has not led to better government, it will be perfectly free to pass another piece of legislation that repeals these measures either in full or in part. We do not have an arrangement whereby we “sunset” every piece of legislation, and an incoming Government then find that the rules are unwritten and they can choose what those rules should be. That would not be a very sensible constitutional position.
Mr Cash
Without going into all the questions relating to judicial supremacy and the claims of ultimate authority by certain members of the judiciary, I am afraid to say that through this measure and a number of others the Government have opened the door to the possibility—indeed the likelihood, as Lord Bingham made clear—of certain members of the Supreme Court interpreting legislation in a way that suits their ultimate authority, as they claim it.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)
Order. We are straying quite a long way from the amendment. I am sure the Minister was about to point that out.
Mr Harper
I am grateful for your guidance, Madam Deputy Speaker. My hon. Friend’s points are probably more relevant to the next group of amendments, when we will talk about adding some specific provisions to the Bill, so he might want to raise them then. If he does so, I shall be able to address them in an orderly way.
The Opposition supported the sunset provisions in the other place, and I anticipate that they will do so again today, so I want to point out why I think they would be wrong. Effectively, the sunset provisions drive a coach and horses through the principle of the Bill. On 24 November last year, the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) said:
“I want to reaffirm our commitment”
—the Labour party’s commitment—
“to fixed-term Parliaments. That means we have to lay down in statute that it is for the House, not the Prime Minister, to dissolve Parliament.”—[Official Report, 24 November 2010; Vol. 519, c. 328.]
I agree, but under these sunset provisions at the end of this Parliament we would give back to the Prime Minister the power to dissolve Parliament by seeking a Dissolution from Her Majesty the Queen. I do not think that that is in accordance with what the hon. Gentleman said then.
There are a number of other useful quotes. The Labour party manifesto of last year stated that
“we will legislate for Fixed Term Parliaments…We will let the people decide how to reform our institutions and our politics: changing the voting system and electing a second chamber to replace the House of Lords.”
I do not agree with the first, but I do agree with the second.
“But we will go further, introducing fixed-term parliaments”.
Furthermore, the right hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath said that a vote for Labour was a vote for fixed-term Parliaments.
I accept that Labour did not win the election, but it seems to me that if the hon. Member for Rhondda is going to carry out the spirit of that commitment, all the people who voted Labour at the last election will expect him to vote in favour of fixed-term Parliaments. If he does not agree to disagree with their lordships, he will not be carrying out that manifesto commitment.
Graham Stringer (Blackley and Broughton) (Lab)
I have not read the Conservative party manifesto recently, but so far as I remember it did not contain a commitment to fixed-term Parliaments. Therefore, if the hon. Gentleman were to take his own advice, he would withdraw his support for the Bill.
Mr Harper
The hon. Gentleman sets me up very nicely for my final quotation. In this Bill’s Second Reading debate—which took place a long time ago, on 13 September 2010, which goes to show that the Bill has enjoyed leisurely progress through both Houses with proper scrutiny in both Chambers—the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) said:
“I have long been in favour of fixed terms. I could dig out correspondence I had with Margaret Thatcher in 1983 about fixed terms. The Labour party committed itself to fixed terms in the 1992 election. What typically happens—this is why I welcome the measure and why I wanted that commitment in our manifesto—is that parties in opposition that are in favour of fixed terms go off the boil on them when they come into government.”—[Official Report, 13 September 2010; Vol. 515, c. 645.]
Interestingly, we have done the opposite. We were not very keen on them in opposition, but we have become keener on them in government, and this was in our coalition agreement.
Mr Shepherd
I am startled by my hon. Friend’s line of argument. I did toil through our election manifesto, and I saw no pledge or undertaking at all to have a fixed-term Parliament, and least of all a fixed-term Parliament for five years, so what is his line of argument?
Mr Harper
My hon. Friend rightly says that we did not have a commitment to do this, but equally we had not promised not to do it. The case was made to us that there was a good case for fixed-term Parliaments, provision was made for them in the coalition agreement and we brought the measure before the House. When good arguments are made, wise Governments listen to them and introduce these very sensible measures. They do not contradict anything that we had in our manifesto. It is usual for Governments to introduce proposals that were not in their manifesto when sensible arguments are made for them. That is a perfectly sensible proposition.
Mr Harper
I would not characterise the relationship like that at all. A good case was made, and on this particular issue the Prime Minister has demonstrated tremendous leadership. He is the first Prime Minister to give up the power—a power that was his personally—to seek a Dissolution from Her Majesty the Queen. That improves our arrangements, because we now know the date of the election and so for the last year of this Parliament we will not have the “will he, won’t he” proposition, where everyone is trying to second-guess when the election will be and people are arguing about when the best time is for the party or parties in government. That is an incredibly powerful step forward and it is very welcome.
Mr Walker
The current system has served us pretty well for 350 years. The Minister cites other Parliaments around the world that have been established for perhaps 20 or 30 years at best. Perhaps they would be best advised to follow our example, as opposed to our following their example.
Mr Harper
As I said at the beginning of my remarks, I do not believe that the general public support the exercise that we go through in the run-up to the end of a Parliament, where we enter the “will he, won’t he” argument. We all know—this came out clearly in the debate in the other place from some who had been close to these decisions—that the decision that is taken, perfectly honourably, is about how best the Prime Minister can choose the date to maximise the chance of their party being re-elected. I simply do not think that that is a good basis on which the decision should be made, and I think that our approach is an improvement.
Mr Angus Brendan MacNeil (Na h-Eileanan an Iar) (SNP)
I support the Minister’s point. Even if it is Parliaments around the world that are only 20 or 30 years old that have adopted fixed-term Parliaments, it is interesting that they did not adopt the system that we have here, despite its longevity. They probably saw the errors in our system and were not going to start from here when deciding how to run their parliamentary terms.
Mr Harper
The hon. Gentleman is right. As I said, when this House decided to legislate to set up the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Ireland Assembly, it did not think that it was right to have variable terms; it decided that it was sensible to have fixed terms. If this House thought that that was good enough for them, it should be good enough for us.
Let me finish by reading out the following quote from the right hon. Member for Blackburn. [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent Central rightly says that I have already read out the quote, but I wanted to set out the conclusion that the Labour party should draw from it. The right hon. Gentleman said that
“parties in opposition that are in favour of fixed terms go off the boil on them when they come into government.” —[Official Report, 13 September 2010; Vol. 515, c. 645.]
The Labour party is in danger of doing the opposite. It is in danger of being committed to this proposition when it was in government and then going off the boil on it when in opposition. The party should reconsider. In the time before the House is asked to make a decision on this, I hope that the Labour party will decide that we should disagree with their lordships on this group of amendments.
Chris Bryant
I am afraid that the Minister did not impress me with his arguments. In particular, he referred to the fact that the Conservative manifesto did not contain anything about introducing fixed-term Parliaments and then said that when good arguments come along people should bow to them. As far as I can see, the only good argument that came along was that the Liberal Democrats would not support the Government unless there was a fixed-term Parliament element in the coalition agreement. So the only reason why we have this Bill, particularly in its current form, is because of the attempt to create the coalition and then to keep it going for five years.
The Minister then tried to tease me a little with the idea that the former Prime Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Mr Brown), said that he wanted people who voted for Labour to be voting for fixed-term Parliaments. This amendment would allow us to vote in every Parliament for fixed-term Parliaments, so it gives more opportunities for people to vote for them, rather than fewer.
Chris Bryant
I think I agree with that, but I am not entirely sure. The bit I agreed with was in feeling sympathy for those on the Government side of the House.
The three amendments we are discussing come as a package. In essence, they are all there to do the same thing: to say that the present arrangements will remain, so that the coalition gets to hold itself together until 2015, but that after the next general election and at any subsequent creation of a new Parliament, unless other legislation is brought in, there would have to be a vote in both Houses for that system to remain in place. I shall come to the issue of both Houses in a moment.
Chris Bryant
I was going to come to that matter in a few moments, but if the Minister wants me to come to it now I will of course give way.
Mr Harper
I wanted to question something the hon. Gentleman said. He says that at the start of each Parliament there would have to be such a motion, but that is not what the amendments say. They leave it completely open for that to happen at any point during the Parliament, and I think that would be deeply unsatisfactory.
Chris Bryant
The Minister is absolutely right. That was a small slip of mine and the vote could happen at any time. Any Government worth their salt would without a doubt table such a motion at the beginning of the Parliament so that there was clarity.
We should also know that Lords amendment 1 was not tabled by the Labour party. It was tabled by Lord Pannick with the support of Lady Boothroyd, Lord Butler and Lord Armstrong. Their arguments carried quite a lot of weight with the House—clearly, they carried enough weight to win the vote. Lord Pannick said when moving the amendment:
“The purpose of the amendments is to address the deep unease on all sides of the House, as expressed at Second Reading and in Committee, as to whether it is appropriate to confine the circumstances in which a general election may be called within a five-year term.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 10 May 2011; Vol. 727, c. 822.]
There has been that level of discomfort and unease in this House, too, although it was more marked down the other end. Lord Pannick also referred to the “constitutional damage” that all this might create and called the whole Bill an “unhappy Bill”. I have some sympathy with him.
It is true that I have previously commented—and I stand by those comments—that the Labour party is committed to fixed-term Parliaments. However, we think the right way to introduce legislation on something as constitutionally significant as changing the way in which a general election is called is to engage in consultation with all the parties in this House before tabling a Bill and to introduce pre-legislative scrutiny of that Bill. If the Minister had chosen to go down that route, he would have had a great deal of co-operation from Opposition Members and we would have ended up with a better piece of legislation. One issue that we might have been able to address in such circumstances is whether it is right to make the change through legislation or Standing Order, which might well have saved us from the danger of the question of calling a general election at any time being justiciable in the courts. Lord Pannick also made that point. He said that, as there had been no pre-legislative scrutiny, it was important that after a future general election there was an opportunity for each House to consider the matter again.
Mr Shepherd
I agree with a lot of the points made by the hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan). I am conscious that this a Bill to fix a Parliament: that is the purpose behind it, plain and simple. The difficulty that the House of Lords faced and that we face in this House—it is the reason I voted against the Bill on Second Reading and otherwise—is the incoherence of the constitutional change that these amendments, to some extent, address.
We are embarked on almost reckless constitutional change with no overall coherent view of what we want. I know what I want, and I rather suspect that the hon. Member for Foyle knows what he wants—a democratically elected, accountable House of Lords. That raises all sorts of subsidiary questions as to which has primacy and which does not. We have here a fix, without any view as to what the constitution is going to be, that has involved nothing other than the coalition partners bringing forward a Bill that contains certain propositions that do not relate. I appreciate that we have had all the debates about four years as opposed to five years and the rhythm of the process. We have had the AV referendum, which was again unrelated to how the constitution was going to look.
That is why the Lords tabled these amendments. In a sense, they are not serious amendments—serious in the sense of how they prick this process and bring in a wider consideration of what the constitution should be, to whom is it accountable, and how we make these changes. Essentially, this fixed-term Parliament proposal is “back of the envelope”. Do we really want a five-year fixed term when we might have had only four years? I think that that was the position of the Labour party in its manifesto, and the position of the Liberal Democrats. The joyous thing about it is that we did not have a view, other than against, in our election manifesto.
Mr Harper
Yes, forgive me—it was the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) who said it was a fag packet. This Bill was introduced in July last year. It was fully debated in this House and in the other place, and it is now almost a year later. One cannot in any sense agree with my hon. Friend’s proposition that the parliamentary debate on and scrutiny of this Bill has not been thorough and well thought through.
Mr Shepherd
I am sorry, but my point was not as the Minister so kindly describes it. My point was that we are talking about a constitution. The problem for everyone, not only in this Chamber but out there too—the people—is what are the forms and proper norms by which we should conduct our business, electorally or otherwise.
Now these piecemeal bits are coming forward whereby the Lords make the absurd proposition that it should have a role, as an unelected House, in determining when an election should be. That is clearly absurd, and to that extent I am sympathetic to the Government. However, I am very opposed to a five-year Parliament. There has been no testing on that. A parliamentary majority in this House will now determine that we have a new form of constitution that the hon. Member for Foyle is apparently happy about on the basis that it is only temporary and we might have a different, and therefore proper and better, version at a later stage. We have to deal with where we are here and now. We want a proper constitution, I would argue. I think that that is the position of the Labour party. I know that a good many Government Members also want a constitution that stands the test of time. No one from outside has really been invited into the supposed consultation.
The Deputy Prime Minister has not even come to argue for his position. That truly trivialises the whole process. I have gone on about that before. However much I am thrilled with the presence of the Minister, it is absurd that those who make these propositions cannot come here and argue for them.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)
With this we may take Lords amendments 5 to 8.
Mr Harper
These amendments were moved in the other place and I want the House to agree to them, but I shall take a little time to explain why. One of them is particularly significant, because it replaces clause 2 with a completely new clause 2. Hon. Members will remember from our earlier debates that clause 2 is particularly significant because it contains all the provisions for early elections, in the context either of two thirds of the House choosing to hold one or of a vote of no confidence. It is therefore worth explaining to the House what we are proposing.
Lords amendment 4 deals with the powers in the Bill for the Prime Minister to alter the date of an election in an emergency—[Interruption.]
Madam Deputy Speaker
Order. I am sorry to interrupt the Minister, but I am finding it rather difficult to hear him, because there are a lot of private conversations going on. I ask Members to listen to the Minister. The sooner we deal with this business, the sooner we can move on to the next.
Mr Harper
I am grateful to you, Madam Deputy Speaker.
Lords amendment 4 leaves out the “earlier or” provision. When we considered the Bill originally, it contained provisions for the Prime Minister to vary the date of an election, by moving it either forward or back by two months. In our debates in the Commons, many Members identified instances in which moving the date back would make sense, such as the outbreak of foot and mouth in 2001, but no one could think of any good reasons for moving an election to an earlier date. Similar points were made in the other place and amendments were tabled to remove the provision to move an election to an earlier date. We think that that is sensible. If there were a general consensus that we needed to hold an election at an earlier date, we could of course use the provisions in clause 2 and the House could vote to enable that to happen. The power to move an election forward therefore seems unnecessary, and Lords amendment 4 deals with that.
Lords amendment 5 also deals with clause 1(5) of the Bill. The Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee recommended that, when seeking to vary the date of an election under the power in clause 1(5), a Prime Minister should lay a statement before both Houses setting out the reasons for proposing the variance of the date. The Government accept that that recommendation would enhance the transparency of the exercise of that power, and the amendment would implement the Committee’s recommendation.
Lords amendment 6 is the most significant in the group. It was supported by the Government in the other place, and it was tabled following consultation with two former Speakers of this House: the noble Baroness Boothroyd and the noble Lord Martin of Springburn. It also had support from Labour Back Benchers and from Cross Benchers. It is significant because it substitutes an alternative version of clause 2, setting out the exact forms of motions of confidence and no confidence for the purposes of the Bill. The amendment retains the original architecture of the clause, and the two triggers for an early general election—namely, that the House may vote for an early Dissolution with the support of two thirds of all Members, and that a vote of no confidence may ultimately trigger and early general election.
We had much debate of an important topic at an earlier stage of the Bill and earlier today when my hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr Shepherd) suggested that what we were doing was changing the constitution. It is worth reminding the House that following a vote of no confidence in a Government, there is currently a dual convention—that the Prime Minister either resigns or calls a general election. That dual convention was set out in a recent book of Professor Vernon Bogdanor, who Members who have attended these debates will remember was my tutor. On many occasions, Professor Bogdanor has been quoted against me; he and I have not always agreed. In this particular case, I am pleased to be able to quote him in support of my arguments.
Mr Harper
My hon. Friend is simply not right. We have had this debate before. It is important because it relates to the revised clause 2, brought about by one of the Lords amendments, which refers to a 14-day period. I know that the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) supported it strongly when we debated it in Committee and on Report. Indeed, the Opposition supported our proposition when we voted against an amendment that I believe my hon. Friends had tabled.
Two alternatives can take place. I know this 1924 example goes back a bit, but it is one of the scenarios that can happen. Of course, that did not happen in 1979, but that was because we were at the tail-end of a Parliament, so the general election took place. If a vote of confidence were lost early in a Parliament, the situation I described could occur.
Another important issue came up here and in the other place when the rationale for clause 2 was debated. The 14-day period is not mandatory; it is the maximum period that can apply. If the Government had lost a vote of confidence and there were a general consensus that the country should move immediately to a general election, there would be nothing to stop the Government putting down a motion for an early Dissolution. A vote on it could happen and the general election could be triggered immediately. I am not sure that that argument came out strongly in the other place; that is why it is worth putting it on the record.
We listened carefully to the concerns expressed in the other place about clause 2. We also conducted meetings with the two former Speakers, as I mentioned. We listened and made the amendment. Opposition Members will be pleased that the amendment has been made. The hon. Member for Rhondda said that as we were abolishing the Prime Minister’s right to dissolve Parliament, and placing that right in the hands of Parliament, it would be better to state in the Bill, in clear language, what constitutes a motion of no confidence, so that there can be no doubt.
Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)
Will the Minister explain a couple of things? First, is there another example in legislation of a motion being laid down for Parliament to follow, or is it an innovation? Secondly, who will determine whether the motion has been passed in the correct form? Will it be a matter for the courts?
Mr Harper
Let me develop my argument, and I will cover the points raised by my hon. Friend. The concern in the other place about the original drafting of clause 2 was raised particularly by the two former Speakers, who felt that not having specific motions laid down, and requiring the Speaker to certify that votes of no confidence had been lost, would draw the Speaker into controversy. This House and the other place were happy that there was no issue about privilege and the courts trespassing into decisions of the House, but it was felt that there was a risk of the Speaker being drawn into controversy. The Government accepted the other place’s view that the language of the motion should be set out clearly.
Mr Tom Watson (West Bromwich East) (Lab)
On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. I apologise to the Minister and to you, but given the seriousness of the matter I wish to raise I must do so urgently. The Guardian newspaper has just issued a statement saying:
“The prime minister’s account of why he failed to act on the information we passed his office in February 2010 is highly misleading.”
Have you had notice of an urgent response from the Prime Minister so that he can put the matter right at the Dispatch Box?
Madam Deputy Speaker
Comments that are made outside the House are not the responsibility of the Chair. If the hon. Gentleman is suggesting that there is a question of privilege, I would advise him that he must write to the Speaker. It is not a matter for me now.
Mr Harper
I am grateful, Madam Deputy Speaker.
The new version of clause 2 set out in the amendment spells out the exact wording of motions of no confidence, motions of confidence, and motions for an early Dissolution. Whether the conditions have been met would therefore be plain for everyone to see, and it would be clear from the Votes and Proceedings and the Journal, and the Speaker would not need to be drawn into certifying whether the motions had been passed. That was the reason why the amendment was supported by the former Speakers, the Opposition and the other place. The amendment delivers what we had originally intended—that the power to trigger an early Dissolution should lie with this House—but adds clarity and does not risk drawing the Speaker into controversy.
Amendments 7 and 8 are very important, especially for those Members who represent parts of the United Kingdom with devolved legislatures. When the Bill left this House, I told Members that we were in discussions with the parties in the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly about how to deal with the coincidence of elections in 2015. I wrote to the Presiding Officers of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly on 17 February, and proposed that if they passed a resolution with the support of at least two thirds of their Members, ensuring that there was consensus across the parties, we would agree to legislate to move the dates of the 2015 Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly general elections up to one year later. The Scottish Parliament passed a unanimous motion on 3 March confirming that it wished the UK Government to bring forward a provision to defer the 2015 election to 5 May 2016, and a similar motion was passed by the Welsh Assembly on 16 March.
We have said that if the House accepts the amendments, in the longer term we will conduct a detailed assessment—this issue arose during the debate on the earlier group of amendments—of the implications of the two sets of elections coinciding at a later date. Once we have conducted that assessment, if we think that there is a case for changing the cycle of elections, we will carry out a public consultation in Scotland and Wales on whether the devolved legislatures should be subject to permanent five-year terms.
Mr Cash
Does the Minister not agree that, whether we adopted the original proposals in the Bill or the proposals of the former Speakers and others, the matter would be justiciable? The Speaker would indeed be drawn into controversy, but there would also be a risk of the whole question being adjudicated by the courts.
Mr Harper
We debated the issues of privilege, justiciability and whether the courts would seek to intervene in these matters at length in Committee and on Report, and they were also debated in the other place. I think that the general view was that the risk of intervention by the courts was very slight. It did not seem to concern Members of either House, although I accept that my hon. Friend still has concerns about it.
Mr Cash
The Clerk of the House, in his careful consideration of the issue, took the view, very strongly, that it would lead to justiciability. That is not just the view of one humble Back Bencher; it is also the view of the Clerk of the House, to whom fulsome tributes were paid yesterday for his wise advice.
Mr Harper
I recognise that. The Government set out our reasons for disagreeing with that view, and I believe that their case was accepted by Members of both Houses. We have already debated the matter at length, and I do not think that there is a feeling that we should resurrect that debate now.
In Northern Ireland, there will be consultation with the Northern Ireland Executive and all the political parties, which will begin when the Northern Ireland Office has received reports from both the chief electoral officer and the Electoral Commission on the May 2011 polls, which involved three combined elections. The chief electoral officer’s report has just been received and is being examined by officials, and the report of the Electoral Commission is expected to be received shortly.
Given that the amendments were accepted in the other place and there was a fair degree of consensus, I urge Members to agree with the Lords.
Chris Bryant
I broadly agree with what the Government have said. I would point out, however, that the Government, and the Minister himself, have developed a rather irritating habit of opposing measures at this end of the building and then agreeing with them at the other end. That is bad for the way in which we conduct our business in this House. It applies particularly to the replacement for clause 2, in Lords amendment 6. All the changes in these amendments were contained in amendments that we tabled at this end of the building—
Chris Bryant
I will not give way to the Minister, I am afraid.
The Minister chose to oppose the amendments in this House, and then accept them in the other Chamber.
Chris Bryant
I am not going to give way to the Minister. He has spoken plenty.
This is the second occasion on which the Minister has done that today. This morning he tabled a written ministerial statement that basically consisted of an amendment that he voted against during our debates on the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill. I wish he would stop doing it.
All I will say to the Minister about the improved clause 2 is that part of it, the “two-thirds majority” provision, remains foolhardy. Requiring a special majority to secure something constitutes a complete change in the practices of the House. It is also completely unnecessary, because it is almost inconceivable that on any occasion on which the Government tabled a motion for an early general election, the Opposition would not agree with it. There would always be a two-thirds majority. Let me say to Liberal Democrat Members who may think that that would protect them if the Prime Minister opted for an early general election before the planned date for the next general election, that it will do no such thing.
Lords amendment 4 agreed to.
Lords amendments 5 to 8 agreed to.
Lords amendment 9 disagreed to.
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83H), That a Committee be appointed to draw up Reasons to be assigned to the Lords for disagreeing to their amendments;
That Mr Mark Harper, Mr Philip Dunne, Chris Bryant, Jonathan Reynolds and Mr Mark Williams be members of the Committee;
That Mr Mark Harper be the Chair of the Committee;
That three be the quorum of the Committee.
That the Committee do withdraw immediately.—(Mr Goodwill.)
Question agreed to.
Committee to withdraw immediately; reasons to be reported and communicated to the Lords.
Oral Answers to Questions
Mark Harper Excerpts(13 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Mr Mark Harper)
The Fixed-term Parliaments Bill has been debated almost fully in both Houses. We have received representations from the public, and I feel sure that, very shortly, another will emanate from the hon. Gentleman.
Nic Dakin
Leading constitutional expert Vernon Bogdanor said:
“If we are entering a world of hung parliaments, there is no reason for dissolutions to be made more difficult.”
Is the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill designed to serve short-term, coalition political interests rather than the long-term interests of the British people?
Mr Harper
Not at all. I know the opinions of Vernon Bogdanor very well, because he was my tutor. He and I disagreed while we were at university, and we continue to do so on many matters now. The Bill is very much in the interests of Parliament, and of having a stable situation in which the Prime Minister, for the first time, has given up the power to call an election to suit his political party. That is a huge constitutional improvement.
Simon Kirby (Brighton, Kemptown) (Con)
3. What steps he is taking to increase the completeness and accuracy of the electoral register.
The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Mr Mark Harper)
My hon. Friend will know that last Thursday the Government published their White Paper and draft legislation on individual electoral registration, to improve both the accuracy of the electoral register and its completeness.
Simon Kirby
Does the Minister agree with me and the many people in Brighton Kemptown who believe that accuracy and completeness are very important if fraud and malpractice are to be avoided?
Mr Harper
I very much agree with my hon. Friend. We made it very clear in our proposals that we are interested in reducing the vulnerability of our electoral register to fraud and in ensuring its accuracy. We are also interested in ensuring that it is as easy as possible for anyone who is eligible to vote to get on the register. To that end, we are taking part in some data-matching pilots to improve that situation.
Mr Graham Allen (Nottingham North) (Lab)
Does the Minister accept that not only registration but counting the votes properly is important? Is he aware that in most constituencies there are a handful of spoilt papers, whereas in mayoral elections there are sometimes more than 1,000? On two occasions at least, the number of spoilt papers has been larger than the majority of the election winner. Will he take that up with the Electoral Commission?
Mr Harper
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, who chairs the Select Committee on Political and Constitutional Reform, which will look at our individual elector registration proposals and carry out pre-legislative scrutiny. He has raised that question with me before, and I can confirm that I will ask officials to look into that matter. I will come back to him and the House in due course.
Priti Patel (Witham) (Con)
Specific to the electoral register, will the Minister provide precise details on the Government’s plans to extend the franchise to prisoners? Will proposed legislation on that come to the House, or will he defy Europe and uphold the will of the House?
Mr Harper
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for her question—this is a subject on which she is pursuing Ministers relentlessly both in the House and in written questions. The Prime Minister was asked a similar question at Prime Minister’s questions, and I can do no better than to say that the Government do not want to enfranchise prisoners, but there has been a clear decision by a court to which we have signed up. The Prime Minister said that the Government will ensure that any legislative proposals are as close as possible to the House’s decision earlier this year.
Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)
On 26 October last year, I asked the Deputy Prime Minister how he was going to ensure that everyone forced to move out of central London because of the changes to housing benefit would be enfranchised and end up on the register. He pooh-poohed that at the time, saying it was not going to happen. Now we know that the Department for Communities and Local Government believes that up to 40,000 people are going to have to move. How are Ministers going to ensure that those people are enfranchised?
Mr Harper
The hon. Gentleman will know that the Department does not say that at all—it is not what is stated in the impact assessment that Ministers have signed up to. I do not believe either that that is what the article in the newspaper said. On enfranchisement, we are very clear: our proposals will make it easier for people who are entitled to be registered to be registered. He will know that we are carrying out data-matching pilots across the country, and we will take forward and roll out any lessons from that to make it easier for people who are eligible to be registered.
Greg Mulholland (Leeds North West) (LD)
5. What recent progress he has made on the reform of party funding; and if he will make a statement.
Michael Connarty (Linlithgow and East Falkirk) (Lab)
6. What steps he is taking to increase voter registration.
The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Mr Mark Harper)
The hon. Gentleman will know that it is the individual responsibility of electoral registration officers to improve registration rates, but the Government are committed to helping them. He will know that the local council in his area is taking part in one of our data-matching pilots. I hope that that will have a positive effect on driving up registration rates, and then we can see whether it has lessons for rolling out such a system across the country.
Michael Connarty
Although it gave me great pleasure that Iain McKenzie was elected comfortably as the Labour candidate in the Inverclyde by-election—I was doubly joyous that the Liberal Democrats lost their deposit—I was concerned by the number of people I met who did not have an electoral registration card and were somewhat confused. Will the Minister assure me that the data-matching that he mentioned will be followed up by the Government, so that the responsibility, and the blame, is not left to electoral registration officers? It is a Government responsibility, if they want equal votes of equal value, to ensure that everyone is on the register.
Mr Harper
I very much agree with the last sentiment that the hon. Gentleman expressed. My officials are working closely with all local authorities that are looking at matching electoral registers with other existing government databases, to see whether we can identify people who are eligible to vote, but not on the register, and to follow them up. The evidence from the pilots will be looked at not just by the Government but by the Electoral Commission, and if the pilots prove successful we will look at rolling them out across the country. I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s support for that initiative.
Mr Gary Streeter (South West Devon) (Con)
Given that a key issue in increasing voter registration is the performance of electoral registration officers in every locality, which we know can vary enormously, is it not time that the Government gave the Electoral Commission the power to direct, and not just to issue advice?
Mr Harper
My hon. Friend, who answers very ably for the Electoral Commission in this House, will know that it has made that point strongly to the Government. We will look at the analysis of the referendum this year, when the head of the Electoral Commission, as the chief counting officer, had that power of direction. We will look at how that worked in practice and then take a view on whether it makes sense to consider it for elections more widely.
Penny Mordaunt (Portsmouth North) (Con)
T1. If he will make a statement on his departmental responsibilities.
Individual Electoral Registration
Mark Harper Excerpts(13 years, 5 months ago)
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The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Mr Mark Harper)
I am announcing today the publication of draft legislation on individual electoral registration (IER) for pre-legislative scrutiny. The draft legislation is accompanied by a White Paper which sets out the proposals for how this will be implemented.
An electoral register that is secure and trusted, and as complete and accurate as possible, is a key component for our democracy. It is widely recognised that the current system of electoral registration, which has been in place since the early twentieth century, is outdated and requires change. It is also clear that, although proven electoral fraud is relatively rare, there is widespread concern about electoral fraud in this country.
In the coalition programme for government we said we would
“reduce electoral fraud by speeding up the implementation of Individual Electoral Registration”.
I announced on 15 September 2010 our intention to legislate to speed up the move to IER by introducing it into Great Britain fully during this Parliament, in 2014. Individual electoral registration will bring greater protection against electoral fraud and modernise our electoral system. IER will ask each person to register themselves, rather than by household, and provide information which will be cross checked by registration officers before a person is added to the electoral register.
Learning from the experience in Northern Ireland we have put in place arrangements to help people manage the transition to the new system. Any electors who do not respond to the initial invitation to register under IER in 2014 will be carried forward unless the registration officer has concerns the registration is ineligible. An individual registration would be required for new registrations and for any elector who wishes to use an absent vote.
The White Paper also considers how else the system of electoral registration could be modernised, making it easier and more convenient to register to vote. Reforming the system also provides the opportunity to take steps to tackle the problem of under-registration. The UK’s registration rate compares well internationally but evidence suggests that a significant number of people are missing from the register. This year data-matching pilots will allow registration officers to compare their electoral register with other public databases to identify people missing from the register or entries on the register that are inaccurate or fraudulent. If data matching proves effective, we will consider rolling it out more widely across the country.
It should be made absolutely clear that no new national databases will be created and that no additional information will be placed on the electoral register as a result of the changes to the system.
We are committed to ensuring there is sufficient funding for implementation, with £108 million allocated over the course of the spending review period. We have also sought to reduce costs where possible and have already cut £74 million of the costs of the previous Government’s plans by dropping the voluntary phase.
In developing the proposals in the draft legislation and the White Paper we have worked closely with and listened to the views of stakeholders. I thank those who have already provided valuable input into the development of the proposals, and welcome input during the pre-legislative scrutiny period from those and others who have not yet had the opportunity to engage with us.
Copies of the White Paper and draft legislation have been placed in the Libraries of both Houses.
Memorandum of Understanding (UK Government and the Devolved Administrations)
Mark Harper Excerpts(13 years, 5 months ago)
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The Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office (Mr Mark Harper)
A meeting of the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC) of Ministers from the UK Government and the three devolved Administrations took place at 10 Downing Street on 8 June 2011. With respect to the Memorandum of Understanding between their Administrations, the Ministers agreed, first, that amendments should be made to the memorandum; and, secondly, that the secretariat to the JMC should initiate a technical review of the memorandum which should report to the domestic and/or European sub-committees of the JMC in due course.
The amendments to the memorandum focus on the dispute-resolution protocol contained in annex A.3. The purpose of the amendments is to allow for the possibility of an independent third-party providing an analysis of an inter-administration dispute where all four administrations agree that independent analysis would be helpful.
A copy of the memorandum has been placed in the Library of the House and can be found in the Vote Office and on the Cabinet Office website, www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk.