(1 year, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am pleased to hear my noble and learned friend say that he has changed his position since we met in Grand Committee because I recall that, during those debates, he was strong in his view and mildly critical of those of us who had brought forward amendments.
I have two amendments in this group, Amendments 125H and 125J. I will speak to them but, before I do, I join my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier in welcoming the amendments tabled by my noble and learned friend the Minister. I am very pleased to see them; they go a long way to addressing the concerns that my committee—I declare my interest as chairman of the Communications and Digital Select Committee—has raised in our hearings on this topic over the past 12 months. As has been acknowledged, those amendments are confined to economic crime but that is because this is a Bill about economic crime, so I am happy to accept them as far as they go.
None the less, I want to highlight something that my amendments, the same amendments that I tabled in Committee, refer to—the power of deterrence with regard to the solicitors who represent those who bring forward these forms of legal action. I listened very carefully to my noble friend Lord Faulks introducing his amendment. Unlike my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier, I find his arguments quite compelling, but at this point I am pleased with what we have here. The importance of deterrence and the link between the Solicitors Regulation Authority’s new fining powers, the tactics employed by those who bring SLAPPs and the new dismissal mechanism are where I want to focus my comments.
As we have heard, the Government’s amendments bring much-needed legal clarity about the definition of a SLAPP case. The new strike-out clause includes a likelihood test but not a requirement for the case to be shown to have merit. That is a bit of a gap. It suggests that well-to-do law firms could still threaten journalists with a defamation case that has no merit and force the journalist to deal with huge legal costs. As we have already heard, as long as the lawyers toe the line and are not too aggressive in their tactics, they are unlikely to be thrown out under the early dismissal mechanism, but just because a case is not thrown out at the start, that does not mean everything is fine.
Most SLAPP cases never make it to a court, as we have heard. They succeed by intimidating critics into dropping their investigation at a very early stage. In these circumstances, the early dismissal test will not even come into play. One of the best defences probably lies with the solicitors’ regulator. The SRA needs to have confidence that these amendments tabled by my noble and learned friend the Minister will give it a sufficiently robust basis to penalise solicitors and law firms that pursue SLAPPs.
I understand that the SRA has powers to take action against individuals and law firms for misconduct or failing to comply with the rules. I would be grateful for clarification from my noble and learned friend the Minister that the SRA’s new unlimited fining powers, which are already in the Bill, could definitely be used to deter and punish law firms facilitating SLAPP cases, even if the case is not thrown out by the early dismissal test or does not make it to court. Let us not forget that the lawyers are making huge amounts of money from this. They know exactly what they are doing and can be very clever about getting away with it. We need confidence and assurances that the regulator will be able to take robust enforcement action, as we in Parliament need to be able to set a clear expectation of the regulators that they will be proactive in asking people to come forward with concerns, process complaints speedily and investigate high-risk firms to put them on notice.
Above all, the SRA needs to enforce the spirit of the law, not just the letter, by demonstrating zero tolerance for those profiting from flagrant abuses of our legal system. From my noble and learned friend the Minister, I am looking for clarity at the Dispatch Box that the fining powers that the SRA now has in the Bill and this new definition of SLAPPs empower it to act against law firms if it considers it appropriate to do so because they have breached its codes and so on. We are not looking for a situation in which it is possible for the SRA not to do what is properly expected of it just because it has not been spelled out in words of one syllable in the Bill.
In my view, it is really important for any regulator or regulated sector to understand that the members of it and those who are regulating it have a responsibility to uphold the reputation of that sector. That is done by the way in which they conduct their business. It is important that that is made very clear if the Government bring forward this definition of SLAPPs, as they have, to try to prevent further use of this aggressive and abusive form of legal action, which is doing so much to undermine the Government’s overall intention to reduce economic crime.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister and I welcome the amendment he has put forward. I want to make three quick points.
First, it is clear that the will of the House is that something should be done quickly. The remedy should be speedy, inexpensive and flexible. This leads to my second point. The right course is to allow the rule committee to develop this, but the rules must be flexible and must allow for the development to be made judicially, rather than prescribed in rules. That, in my experience, has generally been the way forward; we have tried this in relation to other matters and know that it is impossible to lay down too many detailed things in rules. Thirdly, I hope that the Government will make available the necessary resources to the judiciary, so that this can be dealt with by a High Court or other senior judge. Speed, effectiveness and determination will show whether this is a means that will work or whether we will have to resort to that which was suggested by the first amendment that was debated.
My Lords, I add the thanks of our side to Ministers and their teams for the access that they have given us.
I will not say much more; we have had a full discussion and response to the concerns that were raised at Second Reading and in Committee. I believe that we are in a much better place than we were, as has been outlined by many of these contributions.
I have a few points to highlight. I honestly believe that providing the courts with powers to strike out SLAPPs would be a huge, ground-breaking step forward. We have to regard what is before us as a positive start. It is also positive that a robust threshold test has been introduced and that the profile of the defendant is not prescribed, which enables it to be used by anyone—journalists, whistleblowers, activists and academics—as we have heard.
We have to acknowledge the problems that other noble Lords have highlighted around the definition of what constitutes a SLAPP and where we will achieve that clarity. The proof will come as we move ahead, but I agree that we need to make sure of this in the rules and know when they will be available for us to consider. Perhaps the Minister can respond to this.
I want to press the Minister on an answer to when the Government expect to extend the use of protections against SLAPPs beyond the definition of economic crime as outlined. That would be very helpful for us all.
In conclusion, while limited, this is a promising framework. As I have said, the Government have committed to expanding the scope, and we all ask for this to be done speedily. I do not want to get into competing quotations from famous rock stars, but there are several we could follow. I hope that
“watch out, you might get what you’re after”,
from Talking Heads, is not one of them.
(1 year, 7 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I will have more to say shortly on Amendments 91 and 94, but I will make some brief points on the Government’s proposed offence. I also take this opportunity to thank the noble Lord, Lord Browne—in case he is not here later—for his support not only for the committee but for Amendment 94.
Like others, I welcome the Government’s proposed offence. As we have heard, it is a long-overdue step in the right direction. My noble and learned friend Lord Garnier set out quite how long he and others have been calling for such an amendment. In looking at this, I was drawn to the fact sheet on the failure to prevent offence published by the Government on GOV.UK, which rightly says:
“Fraud is the most common offence in this country, amounting to 41% of all crime”
in England
“in the year ending September 2022”.
That is absolutely right, but the trouble with this amendment—to introduce a new point, which is quite good, rather than repeating and supporting what everybody else has said—is that, as we found in the inquiry, the 41% referred to in the fact sheet would not, on the whole, be caught by it. That is because the government amendment requires the company whose employee has committed the fraud to have benefited from it. As we will discuss later, the vast majority of frauds are not committed in a way that benefits the company, which often is the platform used to perpetrate a fraud on innocent victims.
My noble friend the Minister mentioned the forthcoming fraud strategy, which I am sure he will be as relieved as the rest of us finally to see, not least because we will all stop asking him when it will be published. I understand that “imminently” really does mean quite imminently, but we are all dependent on the Downing Street grid. However, it is important that we see it before Report, because it will be difficult for the Government to resolve these issues in a way that will keep both Houses happy—as we have heard, the House of Commons wants to see change on this—without seeing that strategy, which will provide part of an answer as to how this country will tackle fraud.
I have talked about why the drafting of this proposed offence is insufficient in requiring an employee or associated person to benefit the company. We have heard much from noble Lords about the small companies exemption. I support the queries raised about why that has been introduced. When listening to my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier, it occurred to me that part of the problem, and perhaps the reason why the Government think it is acceptable to have this exemption and others do not, is that, as we found in the inquiry, there is a total lack of research into who is committing these frauds—the types of companies involved and how big they are—who is benefiting and the size of those companies. The Government need to commission far more research into this whole area.
As we have heard, this offence is about driving cultural change. That is needed in companies of all sizes, not just the very largest. I was struck by my noble friend Lord Agnew’s comment about the significant number of law firms that would be exempted if this exemption were to take place. Speaking as a former solicitor, I think that he is absolutely right. Most solicitors’ firms are tiny; we know that they and others can be enablers of fraud and other economic crime, so to exempt them makes absolutely no sense.
I add my support to calls for, if not reform of the identification doctrine, at least commissioning to look seriously at how this might be changed. The trouble with this offence is partly that in proposing it many years after it was first called for, the Government are late in solving this problem and therefore late in realising just how much corporates have changed. The lack of a directing mind in corporate bodies is much harder to discern in the 21st century than it would have been in the 19th century.
May I just briefly make four points? First, as regards exempting small companies, as a director of one or two small companies that are charities, I can see no reason at all why we should exempt them. Your accountant always goes through what measures you have in place to prevent fraud, and it is extraordinarily difficult to understand what the costs are.
Secondly, from the way in which the Bill is drafted, it plainly means a single body corporate. There is a whole host of good reasons why you would structure your corporate activities over a host of different companies. It is critical that, if you are to have a limit, it must include all associated companies. You can see a good illustration of the way this is done in the provisions of the Building Safety Act 2022 that deal with remediation in relation to cladding. The Government dealt with it there because so many SPVs—special purpose vehicles—are used in the property industry, and you simply cannot permit them to be treated separately. Certainly, there are extremely good reasons sometimes to structure your partnerships as a whole lot of separate partnerships, partly to limit your liability for negligence. However, it should not apply in relation to fraud.
Thirdly, dealing with two out of three tests is not sensible. Looking at the way in which you suggest fines be imposed on companies, if you are to go down this route, the variety of the ways in which companies operate is so enormous that if you are to have an exemption, you should catch as many as possible. Again, if you do not have a structure that brings in everyone, the position is more complex.
Lastly, I will say something about the reform of the doctrine of corporate responsibility. Of course, I agree with my noble and learned friend, and former colleague, Lord Etherton that we need to be very careful. However, we are trying to tackle economic crime, and there is therefore a special case to be made for dealing with that. If we say that we have to wait until we have the whole of the criminal law sorted out, although one or two people in this Room may see it in their lifetime—I see that the Minister has a young team behind him—the law moves with incredible slowness in reforming criminal justice, and if we do not go through with this in this Bill, I doubt whether even the young members of the team will see any change, not merely during their time at the Home Office but in their lifetimes. We ought to move now.
My Lords, against the extraordinarily high rate of fraud offending, we have to set the fact that fraud is the most under-prosecuted offence within this jurisdiction. There is no doubt about that, and no doubt that people in the country understand it, are aware of it and are extremely angry about it, particularly victims of this crime. I would hazard a guess that virtually everybody present knows at least one person who has been the victim of a fraud that has not been prosecuted; I know several. That is a lot of people who are not getting justice—on both sides of the transaction, I might say. I therefore welcome this amendment but I am disappointed that SMEs have been carved out, largely because, on the Government’s own figures, no less than 99.9% of businesses in the UK are SMEs. That is a significant statistic when we are considering the size of this carve-out and the impact it is likely to have on the Government’s objectives.
Some comparisons have been made with the Bribery Act 2010, specifically Section 7, and the “failure to prevent” offence in that legislation. Similar arguments about SMEs were made during the debates that led to that legislation, including the claim that if SMEs were included within it then that would impact on their ability to export. I am sure these are the sorts of arguments the Government have in mind when excluding SMEs from this legislation—that somehow it would be too burdensome for SMEs, some of which, to most of us, are very large companies indeed. So it is germane that in 2015, the government survey of SMEs and the impact of the Bribery Act on them found that nine out of 10 had no concerns or problems whatever with the Act, and that 89% felt it had had no impact on their ability to export.
As the Committee has heard, when your Lordships’ House undertook post-legislative scrutiny of the Bribery Act, it concluded that there was no need for any statutory exemption for SMEs from the Act. The Law Commission similarly received submissions arguing that SMEs should be excluded from corporate liability reform. It disagreed and did not recommend any statutory exemption for SMEs. Furthermore, government research on SME adoption of preventive procedures in relation to the Bribery Act found that the average cost for an SME was £2,730, with medium-sized enterprises spending an average of £4,610. These are tiny figures that could not conceivably justify exclusion of SMEs from this legislation on the basis that it would be too burdensome for them. Points have already been made about the extent to which the Government are encouraging the placing of public procurement contracts with SMEs, and that is also highly significant.
Since the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, has raised the question of prosecutorial discretion—it seems only yesterday that he was Solicitor-General, but that may be a sign of my age as much as his— I say in support of him that the amendment as drafted places a great deal of discretion at the disposal of prosecutors. The defence set out under new subsection (3)(b) is:
“It is a defence for the relevant body to prove that, at the time the fraud offence was committed … it was not reasonable in all the circumstances to expect the body to have any prevention procedures in place”.
That is a potential carve-out that would deal with any problem or concern the Government have that the amendment’s impact might be disproportionate on SMEs. For all the reasons I have set out, I do not believe that it would be. I believe the real effect would be to leave whole swathes of business activity completely unaffected by this legislation so that, in effect, fraud would continue—disgracefully, in my view—to be an under-prosecuted offence.
(1 year, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I thank my noble friend the Minister for providing this opportunity to consider the Motion that the 2013 draft code of practice for the Forensic Science Regulator, laid before the other place on 26 January, be approved. I warmly welcome the Forensic Science Regulator’s code of practice as an important further step in ensuring the quality, consistency and integrity of our forensic sciences across England and Wales. The code builds on the non-statutory codes of practice and conduct issued by the previous regulator and incorporates much of their content.
I particularly welcome the code’s recognition of the importance of accreditation against internationally recognised standards in driving quality improvement, trust and confidence in the critical services of forensic providers. Technical competence and consistency across the mixed economy for the provision of forensic science services should be a vital part of a fair and functioning criminal justice system. This code of practice will help achieve that.
I should declare an interest as the chair of the United Kingdom’s national accreditation body, UKAS, which is the sole national body recognised by government for the accreditation of organisations against nationally or internationally recognised standards. Accreditation provides assurance of the impartiality and competence of providers, which we can all agree are imperative in the criminal justice system. UKAS and the Forensic Science Regulator have been working closely since the FSR role was first created; together, we have achieved consistent success in improving standards through the accreditation of forensic science providers in both the private sector and police forces. UKAS will continue to work closely to deliver the vision of the Forensic Science Regulator with respect to compliance with standards and, through the accreditation of forensic providers, the demonstration of the appropriate competence of the practitioners undertaking this critical work.
I believe that this code of practice will support and encourage a culture of improvement and a commitment to quality, competence and impartiality across forensic science provision. I am delighted to add my support to its approval.
My Lords, I, too, warmly welcome this code of practice. As the Minister so eloquently pointed out, we have one of the best five forensic science services in the world and have made enormous strides in getting forensic science set on a course of absolute science, rather than old wives’ tales or police lore. That is a huge step forward, which this country has been instrumental in taking.
However, it is right to say that there have been several serious miscarriages of justice—I have sat on several of them—where forensic scientists have not behaved with competence or integrity or have gone beyond what they are qualified to speak about. I therefore warmly welcome the work of the two non-statutory regulators, Andrew Rennison and Dr Gillian Tully, and now the statutory regulator, Mr Gary Pugh, in all they have done to try to eliminate the problems that have caused difficulties in such cases.
The noble Earl, Lord Lindsay, has spoken eloquently about accreditation, which is key. Also key is the fact that, within organisations, there must be a senior appointed individual who can be made responsible for lapses that occur. I regard as the most important part of the code the part that sets out standards of impartiality and integrity. As I have said, there have been cases where this has not always been so. Much to my regret, in some cases, there has been a lack of professionalism. One must remember that forensic scientists are often put under a great deal of pressure; standards of integrity to resist pressure, particularly from police officers who are anxious to secure a conviction, are therefore essential. The record of what has happened is well known so I need not go into it.
Secondly, it is important to stress the duty of the court. Thirdly, I very warmly welcome—it may be due to Mr Gary Pugh’s personal integrity and experience—the duty to guard against miscarriages of justice.
It is also important that the code goes into detail. There have been serious problems in relation to footwear analysis, DNA and fingerprinting, and it is good to see those now firmly covered by standards. There has also been worry about the way evaluative opinions have been formed. Many experts—not merely forensic experts—stray outside their sphere of expertise and seek to act more as advocates than as independent experts, relying on matters to which the code refers. I am very glad, therefore, that there is a firm steer for evaluative opinions.
The strength of the code can be seen by the fact that it deals with infrequently consulted experts, making it clear that, although they are not subject to accreditation, they must abide the standards of the court. It is surprising to see the spheres in which expert evidence is often needed, and from people who will never have given expert evidence before, or where the court may never have had expert evidence. Therefore I see this as a landmark in trying to make certain that we buttress our outstanding reputation as a nation in forensic science and strengthen that position for the future.
I will ask two questions of the Minister. First, what is to be done to ensure that the code is publicised and enforced? Secondly—I have spoken on this on many occasions—is the Home Office really getting to grips with other issues in forensic science and taking forward the need to keep forensic science ahead of the game, particularly in digital forensics?
My Lords, I thank the noble Earl and the noble and learned Lord who have contributed to this important if short debate. They said that this is an extremely important step forward by the Government, and we welcome it as well.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, for his introduction. I also thank my friend in the other place, Darren Jones MP, and indeed my colleague and noble friend Lord Kennedy, who would be most upset if I did not mention that he was part of the Private Member’s Bill effort which became the Forensic Science Regulator Act in 2001. That was an important step forward and shows how sometimes Private Members’ Bills can make a real difference. As noble Lords realise, the Act required the regulator to produce a statutory code of practice so that all those doing forensic science activities uphold and maintain proper standards, which both the noble Earl and the noble and learned Lord said is so important, and which indeed many forensic scientists do.
This statutory instrument is the new code of practice. It builds upon non-statutory codes of practice and integrates much of their content. Upholding good forensic science standards is absolutely vital to our criminal justice system. The code applies to all those carrying out forensic science activities: individual practitioners, academics, private and public sector organisations, or indeed forensic science units.
With those general comments I have a few questions for the Minister. A report by His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services showed that, when it came to digital forensics, the police have not kept pace with the scale of the challenges they face. The report said that, in some cases, they simply did not understand what digital forensics meant. It found, in the words of the inspectorate,
“delays … so egregious that victims were being failed”.
Could the Minister give us any indication of what progress has been made following the recommendations of that report?
The Home Office also considered an impact assessment on the Forensic Science Regulator in 2013, but it has not been updated since. With this new regulator and statutory code, has an internal impact assessment from 2021 been made? There was a deadline of October 2022 for all police laboratories to be accredited. Can the Minister give an update on whether that target was reached?
(1 year, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, has done a service to the House in focusing such clear attention on the Delegated Powers Committee report, and the issue that it raises. I simply want to pursue one of the points that he mentioned, which is one of the features of the guidance to which this power relates:
“guidance about identifying persons in respect of whom it may be appropriate for applications for serious disruption prevention orders to be made”.
What does the Secretary of State know that the police do not know about who it would be appropriate to make serious disruption prevention orders about? On what basis does the Secretary of State know what the police do not know and therefore have to be advised about?
The only basis I can think of is not a helpful one for the Government. It is that there is a political reason here and that what the Government want to do is say, “Never mind those people who are protesting about this, go after those people who are protesting about that.” This is the very kind of power which we have always tried to avoid giving, in the form of direction to the police, to anybody, including police and crime commissioners. There has been a very necessary reluctance to have the police directed in a way which could become political, and in which the choice of where to deploy resources was based on whom the authority concerned—in this case, the Government—disliked and wanted to see penalised in some way.
I cannot see any respectable argument for the Secretary of State saying to the police “You do not realise what I realise; this is the guidance I am giving you about identifying appropriate persons.” It is the sort of thing that even the affirmative procedure would not give us a very good chance to deal with, because you cannot amend statutory instruments, even under the affirmative procedure. But to leave it simply to the negative procedure, which is so limited and so inadequate, particularly in the other Chamber, is simply not satisfactory. The Government’s response to the Delegated Powers Committee has been wholly inadequate so far.
My Lords, I wish to make one or two brief observations in respect of the way these amendments tie together. The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, which I support, sees a good precedent in what Parliament sometimes does, which is to pass successive pieces of legislation without having in mind all the complexities of the earlier legislation. We saw this most clearly in my experience in relation to search warrants of premises, and I will come back to that in a moment. There is a huge advantage in having up-to-date guidance, and the best people to produce it are those who have practical experience—namely, the police institutions—so I warmly welcome that.
But its importance goes to Clause 30, because the question I ask myself is: why is Clause 30 there? Why can it not be dealt with in two other ways? One is the use of guidance given by independent police to other police, to get uniformity; and secondly, do not forget these are applications to a court, so can we not do what we did in relation to search warrants? That is, to provide in detailed form, through the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee, working closely with the police and other organisations, the information that needs to be put before a court to make the decision on the order. Now, if the Home Secretary feels that there are areas that you need to specify—for example, about the kind of person who should be asked to supervise or do something—why can the detail of what is required, the kinds of considerations, not be put properly and openly through an independent process of rules and forms? This worked for search warrants.
We ought to bear in mind the experience of ASBOs. It is not the time at this hour of night to go back to that rather unhappy chapter, but trying to supplement un-thought-through legislation of this kind with guidance is not the way forward; there are better mechanisms.
It seems to me, when one looks at Clause 30, one asks oneself, “What is it for?” In Clause 30(2)(c), the guidance is about
“providing assistance to prosecutors in connection with applications for serious disruption prevention orders.”
Is the intention that somehow the Home Office believes that the police do not help prosecutors? What guidance do they need? These are independent people and their independence should not be called into question. In most countries, the independence of the prosecution service, as in our country, is critical, and so is the independence of the police.
I do not want to go into the constitutional points under Clause 30, because I entirely agree with what has been said. I think one ought to look at this from a practical experience point of view to say that the clause is completely unnecessary. It should be possible to deal with the practical consequences of these orders in a way that takes into account experience. This is a criticism of the way in which the modern Civil Service is structured. There are probably few people in the Home Office who remember what I have just gone through. I thought a few grey hairs might remind people that there is a better way forward than this constitutional aberration, constituted by Clause 30.
My Lords, we support Amendments 126 and 144 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. As recommended by His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, consolidated public order guidance should be published, to include minimum training standards, clear information on relevant law and operational best practice. We must ensure that existing law and practice are used effectively and that police can then be held to account against that consolidated guidance.
The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, talked about ensuring that the police had excellent training. I go back again to my own experience: the Metropolitan Police were world leaders in public order policing and the training was extensive and excellent. Other forces used to come to the Metropolitan Police and engage in training with it and in that way good practice was shared.
Does the Minister know what the impact of cuts to police budgets has been on the quality and amount of training in public order policing—the involvement of other forces in training with the Metropolitan Police, for example? My understanding is that special constables, who are part-time volunteers, are now being trained as public order officers. This is a very difficult, sometimes dangerous, skilled area of policing. One would question whether part-time volunteers are the right officers to be used in that sort of situation, requiring knowledge of public order legislation that is getting longer and more complex as we go on.
What has been the impact of the police cuts on the number of public order trained officers? Before the Minister stands up and talks about the uplift in the number of officers, I point out that across 16 constabularies, the number of police officers over the last 12 months has gone down rather than up and the Metropolitan Police has given notice to the Government that it will not reach its target of the uplift of an additional 30,000 officers.
HMICFRS talks in its public order report about the lack of regular officers volunteering to be public order officers because it involves increased weekend working—which is not popular—an increased risk of complaints, and the increased risk of being verbally and physically abused. What steps are the Government taking to mitigate these factors, which are working against having highly trained, highly skilled public order officers in sufficient numbers to be able to handle protests?
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chelmsford. Noble Lords will recognise this speech in style and content as the work of my noble friend Lord Hendy, of Hayes and Harlington, who is unable to be in his place this evening. I speak in his place on Amendment 131.
Clause 20 is wholly objectionable because it enables the imposition of criminal penalties in respect of conduct for which the defendant has not been convicted of any criminal offence, as we have heard from all around the Chamber. However, assuming the clause is to stay in the face of opposition from various parts of the Chamber, there is another defect.
The conduct at which it is aimed clearly comprehends picketing in the course of an industrial dispute. There will not be much effective picketing in the course of a trade dispute which does not offend against the description in Clause 20(2)(a)(iii), which refers to
“activities related to a protest that resulted in, or were likely to result in, serious disruption to two or more individuals, or to an organisation, in England and Wales”.
The very purpose of picketing, as legitimated in Section 220 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, is to attend a workplace for the purpose of “peacefully persuading any person” not to work. If effective, this will seriously disrupt those so persuaded and their employer and will render nugatory the right to picket
“in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute”,
contained in Section 220 of the 1992 Act. That right has been statutory in this country since the Conspiracy, and Protection of Property Act 1875. The right was subject to offences created by the 1875 Act such as “watching or besetting” and an array of other potential offences such as obstructing a public highway or an officer in the exercise of his duty, or more serious offences.
Since 1875, the right to picket has been regulated and restricted by many amendments to the relevant law, the latest being several requirements imposed by the Trade Union Act 2016, now found in Section 220A of the 1992 Act. Yet the right remains. This clause would destroy it altogether. It is also a right protected by Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the right to freedom of association, and, in particular, the right to be a member of a trade union for the protection of one’s interests. It is likewise protected by ILO Convention 87, Article 6(4) of the European Social Charter, and many other international instruments that the UK has ratified.
What is needed is protection against this provision for those who are acting
“in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute”,
to use the time-honoured phrase, which is now found in Section 244 of the 1992 Act. The Government have used this protection in relation to Clause 6 to provide such protection against the offence there created. This modest amendment seeks its protection in relation to this new provision.
My Lords, I entirely support the analysis so eloquently made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and supplemented by the points made by my noble and learned friend Lord Brown. It is easy to think of ways of making these clauses, chipping here and chipping there. However, the approach of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, was plainly correct. The Government have got themselves into the mess of putting this into legislation without understanding the context of where these orders were made in the past and what they are seeking to do now.
Being a lawyer, I always go back to precedent. You look at it and copy it all out, but at the end of the day you have to sit in your chair and think. There are two things the Government ought to think about. First, can they achieve what they want to do by something that is much more sensible?—to which the answer is plainly yes—and, secondly, what is the consequence of what they are doing? When you are dealing with people who carry knives, with terrorists, or with people who engage in activities that disrupt neighbourhoods, people gathering together, and violence in a social context, that is one thing. But here we are dealing with people who genuinely believe that they are fighting the existential threat to the planet—or they may be fighting for trade union rights, or for liberty. If you treat those people, who have a noble cause as they see it, in the way that you treat terrorists, what do you do for justice? You can only damage it severely. I therefore humbly ask the Minister to sit back in his chair and have a good think about the wisdom of this.
(2 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I, too, congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, on obtaining this debate, and on his speech, and I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Bach, on his. They clearly illustrated that there are serious problems with the current regime of the governance of the police, but there is nothing new in this. The governance of the police has always been difficult. In the middle of the last century the chief constable of Worcester was jailed for fraud. There were terrible problems with watch committees. We set up a royal commission on the police, and it pointed, in some very wise words, to the issues: that the police should be powerful but not oppressive; they should be efficient but not officious; and they should form an impartial force in the body politic, and yet be subject to a degree of control by persons who are not required to be impartial and who themselves are liable to police supervision. That encapsulates, as only royal commissions can do, the difficult issues.
However, since the police authorities regime was reformed under the guidance of that royal commission, two things have happened which transformed the position and necessitated change in the form of the introduction of police and crime commissioners. The first was the enormous growth in the power of the chief constable. This, like all changes that do not occur through legislation, occurred imperceptibly, and there is no doubt that by the early part of the current century chief constables were too powerful and needed a more effective body than the police authorities. Secondly, there had been a change in the power of the police. It used to be our view that the police ought to have just a little bit more power than the ordinary citizen. I am afraid that, with the Criminal Law Act 1967, we departed from that very long tradition of our constitution and gave the police enormous powers.
So, these two forces required reform. I do not want to criticise the change that was introduced by the introduction of police and crime commissioners. In the period where I dealt quite extensively with them, they did, on the whole, a very good job. But we have never really stood back, and this is why I so much welcome what the noble Lords, Lord Lexden and Lord Bach, have said.
There are now enough problems that we ought to have a proper review. I know that the Home Secretary has many other matters on her mind, but what about an independent review? I dare not suggest a royal commission—those are so wholly out of fashion; I just raise a number of points that require us to look at them again. First, is the way the office of police and crime commissioner is set up sensible? Not being a politician, I have always thought that the genius of our system was that politicians had a permanent office behind them that provided a degree of guidance: that there was some institution that could ensure continuity. Should not the police and crime commissioners have some sort of established office that supports them, and that has the protection of a permanent Civil Service?
Secondly—we have not thought about this enough—the police now have extensive powers to impose sanctions. They started with police cautions. Then, penalty notices were introduced, which were fine for things such as speeding, but no one has reflected properly on the extent of the problems of accountability. There was a public investigation by the police into very senior civil servants and Ministers, and yet the decision was made by the police, in an unreasoned way, as to what they did or did not do. It epitomises the growth in the use of the police as a punishing body—a body entitled to decide issues of justice—that we do not have a mechanism of accountability.
As I tried to point out during consideration of what I call the “police et cetera” Act—the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022—one of the defects is that there is nothing to provide a mechanism for supervising the penalty notices. Then, there is the problem of who holds the chief constable to account for operational matters, in so far as you can distinguish that from policy. Then, there is the whole question of the use of the police and crime commissioners in relation to criminal justice boards. I could go on and on. Of course, there is also the problem of Wales but I will not go into that tonight; that is too complicated an issue for police and crime commissioners.
All I am saying is that there is plenty of evidence that we need to look at this again, but we need to think of broader issues than these particular cases; they are the symptoms. We need to do everything with a proper regard to our constitutional rights, and acknowledge that the governance of the police is an intractable and difficult issue that has lived with us for a very long time.
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberAmendment 114C would place a statutory duty of candour on members of the police workforce. It would create a duty on law enforcement to act at all times in the public interest and with transparency, candour and frankness, and to assist in court proceedings, official inquiries and investigations where the activities of members of the police workforce, including omissions, may be relevant. The issue was discussed at some length in Committee and I certainly do not intend to repeat all that was said then.
In his 2017 report on the pain and suffering of the Hillsborough families, Bishop James Jones proposed a duty of candour to address
“the unacceptable behaviour of police officers—serving or retired—who fail to cooperate fully with investigations into alleged criminal offences or misconduct.”
In June 2021, the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel, which I believe took eight years to report, found:
“There was not insignificant obstruction to the Panel’s work … the Metropolitan Police did not approach the Panel’s scrutiny with candour, in an open, honest and transparent way”.
The panel recommended
“the creation of a statutory duty of candour, to be owed by all law enforcement agencies to those whom they serve”.
The chair of the panel, the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, said in this House that
“the creation of the duty of candour in matters such as this is vital for the integrity and effectiveness of policing”.—[Official Report, 22/6/21; col. 134.]
Last June, the Government told us in this House that they were still considering the duty of candour in response to Bishop James Jones’s report four years earlier. We now have before us a flagship home affairs and justice Bill from this Government, which prioritises new offences against those who protest but is silent on the failures of justice highlighted in the Bishop Jones report and by the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel and the resulting call, both in the report and by the panel, for the statutory duty of candour provided for in this amendment. It is time for action and a decision, and an end to this seemingly never-ending continuing government consideration of this issue. I beg to move.
I have added my name to this amendment for four reasons. First, the need is clear: we need complete protection of victims and the public interest, and to make certain that recalcitrant are no longer able to delay. Secondly, the duty of candour is clear: there is no doubt about what it entails. Thirdly, the remedies provided in the proposed new clause are extensive and proportionate. Finally, there can be no reason for delay. Why does it need consultation? It does not. The proposed new clause and the need are clear; we should pass this amendment.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Paddick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, for tabling this amendment.
Briefly, a duty of candour would bring about a change of mindset and culture by requiring openness and transparency about what has happened in investigations. It would lead to a more efficient deployment of resources, which would have a beneficial impact on the public purse. It could very much help to contradict allegations of police corruption and will grow confidence in the leadership of the police service because there would be a statutory obligation of openness and transparency, and therefore an assumption there would be compliance with the law rather than a suspicion of cover-up or, even worse, corruption. The amendment is framed to protect all necessary matters but to enable a different positive approach to the delivery of policing. I support the amendment.
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I add my wholehearted support to this amendment. I am very grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Ramsbotham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, for their continued commitment to women in the criminal justice system. As bishop to prisons and president of the Nelson Trust, I am acutely aware, as I have said so often, of the need for a gendered approach to justice. The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, has just put that very powerfully.
While men and women need to be treated with equal justice, equality is not about sameness. Women are caught up in a criminal justice system that has been designed around men, and there needs to be a gendered lens. As we have heard already, many, many women are more likely than men to be primary carers or victims of abuse or exploitation. When they are given a prison sentence, they are more likely to be given a very short one, often far from home. I do not want to repeat things that have been said so many times in Committee and on Report but, having lost the amendment on primary carers earlier on during Report, I am very grateful to noble Lords for bringing forward these amendments, which will go a long way towards ensuring that we get the same outcomes. I am therefore wholeheartedly glad to support these amendments.
I rise briefly to add my voice in support of the amendments. I accept that the Youth Justice Board has been an enormous success, and that is primarily because it addresses two separate problems to deal with youths. One is the causes and reasons why they offend and the other is the need for their rehabilitation into society. Although, for reasons that are necessary for the trial of youths, they need a separate system, the underlying reason for the Youth Justice Board applies equally to women, in that there are specific causes of offending, the particular vulnerability, the particular issues they have with mental capacity in certain areas, the specific crimes to which they have been subjected and, above all, domestic abuse.
Moreover, it is plain that the kind of rehabilitation that women need is different. They need much more support in integrating them into the community, but they also need not to be treated or dealt with at centres. I warmly welcome what the Ministry of Justice has done and set forth in its strategy. The difficulty is that although there have been numerous reports about what is required—the report of the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, for example, and the many reports of the Prison Reform Trust—what is needed is delivery. Delivery is key to this, and that is why I warmly support this amendment.
(3 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will speak to Amendments 320 and 328, which would repeal the Vagrancy Act. This 197 year-old Act does nothing to tackle and resolve homelessness, and nor does it prevent antisocial behaviour. In fact, by criminalising rough sleepers, it prevents them accessing vital services to support them to move off the streets. This is important in the context of people trafficking—modern slavery. Its victims are those likely to end up sleeping rough on the streets to escape danger. They need our help. Criminalising rough sleeping marginalises the most vulnerable and may mean that rough sleepers move away from, not towards vital support. It does not address the underlying causes.
The Act now has only two effective provisions. Section 3 makes it an offence in any public place to beg or cause a child to beg. An offender can be locked up for one month. Section 4 addresses what we call rough sleeping. It also encompasses those who are in enclosed premises for an unlawful purpose. This is used to deal with people who are thought to be “up to no good”. The fact is that there are perfectly good ways of dealing with all those people both within and without the criminal law. Indeed, on 9 March the then Secretary of State said in answer to a Parliamentary Question that the Act should be repealed. In this amendment, we offer a fully drafted way forward. If minor changes are needed, they can be made—there is no problem there.
The number of convictions for rough sleeping and begging have fallen consistently in the past 10 years. Indeed, in 2019—the most recent year for which figures are available—only one person received a custodial sentence for begging, and only 16 received a custodial sentence for being in enclosed premises for an unlawful purpose. The numbers are tiny. Let us throw away the sledgehammer. The police, local authorities and other agencies have ample powers.
Let me explain very briefly. The Highways Act 1980, Section 137, makes it an offence wilfully to block free passage along the highway. That is punishable by a fine. The Public Order Act 1986, Section 5, makes it an offence to use threatening or abusive words or behaviour. That, too, is punishable by a fine. Moving to civil measures, the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 introduced a wide range of measures to deal with the different types of anti-social behaviour. Recourse can properly be made to those measures for people who are repeat nuisances. They are all available under the 2014 Act.
Taking it very summarily in the short time available, there are civil injunctions to prevent nuisance and annoyance. Breach of those civil injunctions gives rise to civil contempt, with all the remedies available for that—up to 2 years’ imprisonment for the worst offenders, but it is done properly. Secondly, there are criminal behaviour orders. These can impose requirements as well as prohibit certain activities. Thirdly, there are community protection notices. These can be issued by the police, a social landlord or a local council if behaviour is detrimental to the quality of life of a local community. Fourthly, there are dispersal powers, under which a local council, following consultation with the police, may issue a public spaces protection order to place restrictions or impose conditions on activities that people may carry out in the designated area.
In respect of that, since 2014 the Home Office has issued statutory guidance under the 2014 Act, recently updated this January. Our amendment, as noble Lords will see from its terms, will strengthen that. We propose a co-ordinated package. Where something has to be done, the police and local authorities have the powers to do it. We ask the House to act now to put an end to this prehistoric, unjust and inappropriate law. I commend the amendments.
Briefly, I entirely support the repeal of the Vagrancy Act, and there is no point in repeating what have been compelling, eloquent and, I believe, unanswerable points. Long experience has shown that arguments do not get better by repetition.
What I wanted to do, however, was to make four quick points from my experience in support of Amendment 292J in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath. First, the category of person dealt with is easy to identify. Therefore, that is not an answer. Secondly, the evidence of the risk of future offending is compelling. That in relation to Wales is set out—I need not repeat it—in the report of the Commission on Justice that I chaired and there is masses of such evidence. Thirdly, the proposal is plainly value for money. One has only to look at the cost of what it takes to deal with those who have gone wrong. Fourthly—surprisingly, some may think—the proposal would have enormous public support. When we canvassed views about it, and when I did so as a judge, one always found that the overwhelming majority felt that these people deserved a chance and support.
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Thornhill has spoken comprehensively on these amendments, so I can be brief. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Blake of Leeds, for introducing the amendment. She rightly points to the failure of the current legislation to adequately deal with this problem on the basis of the facts that she presented. Something clearly needs to be done to ensure that the police play their part. If South Yorkshire Police can do it, why cannot every force? We support this amendment.
I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, for his Amendment 292J. Noble Lords may have seen the ITV “News at Ten” last night on how young people are increasingly being exploited, particularly by drug dealers. That is in addition to a 6% increase in reported domestic violence during lockdown, when many more children would have become vulnerable. There is too much emphasis on the criminal justice system as a way to deal with these vulnerable young people, rather than there being a statutory duty on local authorities, the NHS and the police, as this amendment suggests. We support it.
The noble Lord, Lord Best, introduced Amendments 320 and 328. I remember being told as a young constable about the antiquated legislation—the Vagrancy Act 1824—introduced to deal with soldiers returning from the Napoleonic wars. That was in 1976—not the Napoleonic wars, when I was a young constable; they were a bit earlier. People should not be criminalised simply for begging and sleeping rough. There is adequate alternative legislation to deal with anti-social behaviour and the Vagrancy Act is now redundant. As the explanatory note says, these amendments would require police officers
“to balance protection of the community with sensitivity to the problems that cause people to engage in begging or sleeping rough and ensure that general public order enforcement powers should not in general be used in relation to people sleeping rough, and should be used in relation to people begging only where no other approach is reasonably available.”
On that basis, we support these amendments as well.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, for moving this amendment. I had not realised, until he mentioned it, his own critical role in the constitution of the UK as it is now through the evidence that he gave to the Kilbrandon royal commission, rightly described as important. Now we know where to look when we see problems in relation to the constitution.
I wholeheartedly agree with the underlying point that drives the way the noble Lord put his case. The criminal justice system is in a terrible mess. He described the position of the prison system, which is also a terrible mess and is not delivering on its aims, particularly to protect the public from crime and reoffending. However, it does not just go to imprisonment; the whole range of sentencing is now in a terrible mess. It goes even beyond that, to the way that the criminal justice system operates in terms of both its procedures and its effectiveness. Surely the time has come for a long hard look to be taken at the criminal justice system.
This is not remotely a criticism of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, because a royal commission is a worthwhile thing, but I can imagine no more profound exercise in futility than a royal commission promoted by your Lordships’ House, moved by the marvellous noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, and the wonderful noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames. Can your Lordships imagine this Government —the Government who approximately an hour and a half ago wagged their finger at us and told us we had to finish the consideration of this Bill by the end of tonight, no matter what time it ended—listening to a royal commission’s proposal for an objective look at sentencing? My own judgment is that, sadly, although the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, makes a very powerful point, the same finger of this Government would be waved at the royal commission and no attention would be paid to it. I share the noble Lord’s feeling and analysis but I fear that, because of the nature of this Government, it would be a waste of time.
May I add a more hopeful note? It has been wonderful to see this Government bring forward Professor Ormerod’s work on the Sentencing Code and bring it on to the statute book, and in this Bill—this is a good point—the code is being amended rather than there being any new proliferation of legislation. So one ought to say thank you for that.
However, the Sentencing Code shows the problem. I do not know how often the Minister looks at it but it is a fiendishly complicated set of sentences that we have accumulated over the years. Although we have seen a lot of criticism of the 2003 Act, I would say in its defence that an awful lot of thought was given to it. It may not have been quite right, and there was one area which has gone badly wrong. As I complimented one side, I now compliment the other: when we looked at the 2012 reforms to sentencing, a huge amount of thought went into that. A lot of sentences that were thought to be apposite were brought forward or modified, but at least there was some thinking.
We have now reached a stage where we need—on, I hope a nonpartisan basis—to think again. Is it too complicated? The answer must be yes. Have we got the sentencing regime right in terms of its outcomes and, equally importantly, its cost and whether the money can be spent better? There can be no better mechanism for that than a royal commission. I would hope that the initial thoughts of those who drafted the manifesto could be taken forward, at least in that respect. I would hope, though maybe I am being optimistic, that when it was all laid out what an awful state our sentencing regime is in, logic would prevail and we would see some reform. However, that is just an expression of hope by a person who is not a politician.
My Lords, I support the amendment. My support goes back to the time when I served as chairman of the Justice Committee in the House of Commons. I became utterly convinced that the absence of a coherent strategy or policy for the use of custody and other disposals was extremely damaging and distorted the use of resources in the criminal justice system to an amazing extent, leading to unsatisfactory outcomes in reducing reoffending and many other respects.
If I had not been so convinced, even during the passage of this Bill we have seen further examples of an incoherent approach to sentencing. In the course of the Bill, it was announced in the press, but by a Minister, that there would be a mandatory life sentence for the manslaughter of emergency workers. The Daily Mail reports today that that provision will be included in the Bill, although it is not clear to me how that can be accomplished—it is not even in the government amendments tabled for today—but that would be a very significant change.
We are also told that the Government intend to provide for an offence of the theft of a pet animal with a sentence of up to five years’ imprisonment. So you could get up to five years for stealing your neighbour’s cat by putting out a dish of milk and some bread because the cat seems a little underfed because your neighbours do not look after it as well as you think you would. It is absurd that we should get into that situation of sentence inflation—and there will be sentence inflation, as my noble friend referred to, because then you have arguments where legitimate organisations come to us and say, “There should be at least seven years for this offence because you get five years for stealing your neighbour’s cat.” That is how the parliamentary and political side of sentence inflation works. My noble friend has pointed to how it influences the judiciary as well, when minimum sentences cast—I was going to say “a shadow” but, rather, a particular colour of light on decisions about offences that fall short of the maximum sentence.
The reason I think a royal commission would be appropriate—notwithstanding the belief of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, that no one in government would take any notice of what it said, whoever had appointed it—is that there are different kinds of issue that need to be considered. Some are philosophical issues and issues of principle while others are practical, but they all affect sentencing and all lead to the misuse of custody, either in its extent or, in some cases, in its use at all, when other disposals could be more effective in preventing crime and dealing with offenders.
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will attempt to address three short points in the hope that I can push a little on an open door.
On the first point, relating to abstraction from mobile phones, the door has already been opened by the Minister. This problem has bedevilled the criminal justice system for at least nine years, and the opportunity has now come to deal with it comprehensively. The Bill does not do so. My noble and learned friend Lord Judge admirably put the change in the mores in a way which I could never match, but there is an area on which I can perhaps add a bit—the change in technology and the advent of programmes that can be used to assist has greatly changed things. I hope, therefore, with the indications given by the Minister, that we can look for a comprehensive piece of work, in a code or in statutory provisions, that will deal with this subject comprehensively.
The second area I want to turn to briefly is the use of out-of-court disposals. They play an essential part in the criminal justice system; I wish to say nothing about the specific changes put forward. However, with the growth in the use of out-of-court disposals over the past 15 years, there has been the need to ensure consistency, transparency and accountability. Attempts have been made by the judiciary, in conjunction with the magistracy, the police and the Government, to try to set up some form of accountability, particularly through panels of magistrates. I have no time to go into the details of that but a lot of it is summarised in a report by Cerys Gibson of Nottingham University, published by the Sentencing Academy in February. What is needed, if the confidence of victims and the public is to be maintained in this very extensive use of sentencing powers, is proper scrutiny. This will ensure consistency so that one force does not vary from another; we cannot have a postcode lottery. We also want to be sure that the police carry this out fairly and appropriately. I hope that the Minister will be prepared to explore this area, which needs dealing with comprehensively.
Thirdly, Clause 109 concerns a much more specific but important point. For the past 20 or so years, it has been a hallmark of our justice system that matters dealing with the sentencing of individuals are dealt with utterly independently and that people are not put, or kept, in custody for longer other than through a judicial or Parole Board process. The power under Clause 109 may be needed to deal with high-risk offenders in respect of certain individuals, but it is a power referred to the Parole Board by the Secretary of State. I very much hope that we can do two things: first, ensure that the clause is drafted in such a way that the risk of political pressure is removed; and, secondly, ensure that no one is kept in prison for longer than is necessary and that the decision to keep someone in longer is that of an independent body. As I read the clause, as it is currently drafted, it is possible—by a very late reference by the Secretary of State—for someone to be kept in custody without any judicial determination. I hope, therefore, that the clause can be looked at carefully and amended, because I am sure that no one wants to see us go down the road of terms of imprisonment being extended other than by an independent judicial body. It may be a small point, but the two hallmarks of our system require independence from political interference and decisions on custody being totally in the hands of independent bodies.
(3 years, 7 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, it was a great privilege to have been co-opted to this committee for this inquiry, and a privilege, pleasure and education to serve under the wise and far-sighted leadership of my noble friend Lord Patel.
During the course of the evidence, it was sad to hear that the respect in which the leadership the UK had shown in forensic science had declined so rapidly. Only a few years before, that leadership had been celebrated at a conference organised by the Royal Society, which demonstrated that the UK was then significantly ahead of several states and of the leaders in the field, which are acknowledged to be Australia, Switzerland, the Netherlands and the United States. I had hoped that this report would provide the opportunity for the UK to regain that lead, particularly as a result of serious issues relating to forensic science that had arisen in the United States under the leadership of its then President.
The report concluded that the failings in the system were due to three matters: lack of high-level leadership, lack of funding, and insufficient research and development. The noble Lord, Lord Patel, gave a perfect overview, and I join him in tributes to those who advised the committee. Other noble Lords have dealt with other issues, in particular the market, AI and miscarriages of justice. I will confine my remarks to leadership, and to research and development. I appreciate that the criminal justice system’s focus over the last year and a half has been on dealing with the problems brought about by Covid-19, but forensic science is essential to justice and nothing can excuse a failure to plan ahead now to restore its position.
I therefore turn first to the need for high-level leadership. I tried to find out what has happened since the Government’s response to the report in July 2019. The criminal justice board publishes its minutes. The minutes of July 2020—the last I was able to find—said this. They are short, so I can quote them:
“Forensics: Stocktake 2020 … The LORD CHANCELLOR spoke about the importance of forensics within the CJS and was pleased to receive an update from the Forensics Sub-Group to the CJB which is jointly chaired by the Ministry of Justice and Home Office.
BARONESS WILLIAMS OF TRAFFORD noted that the Sub-Group had identified the need for the Forensic Science Regulator to become a statutory body.
The LORD CHANCELLOR thanked the Sub-Group for all their work and invited Board members to provide further comments, outside of the meeting, on the paper presented.”
If I may respectfully say so, I am afraid that is not very informative as to progress over a year.
More seriously, the criminal justice board has much else to do. In the years I served on it or went to its meetings, which was shortly after its formation until I retired as Lord Chief Justice, it was not the kind of body, nor was any sub-group, that was effective on the detailed issues that require great expertise and knowledge of science and the law with which this issue is concerned. However, more serious is the problem that the work on forensic science needs to be independent and accountable. The minutes show how unaccountable it is because there is no explanation of what it does, and it cannot be regarded as independent. Forensic science needs to serve the police, the prosecution, the defence and the interests of justice. It is very difficult to see what the criminal justice board sub-group has done on that first issue.
The second thing, which is about to happen, is putting the Office of the Forensic Science Regulator on a statutory basis. Dr Gillian Tully was an excellent regulator. She retired two months ago—she was a pleasure to work with and achieved a great deal. Her most recent achievement was dealing with the very difficult subject of standards for evaluating opinions, which play such a large role in the evaluation of forensic evidence. There is an interim regulator, but when is the new regulator to be appointed? When will the Government look seriously at its powers? That is the key issue. Although the regulator’s role is key, it is not that of leadership. It is to ensure quality and accreditation, and that the market functions efficiently. It is not independent and it cannot provide the holistic leadership of scientific research required in our system.
I look forward to hearing that much more may have been done, but I could not find it. Maybe that is due to my inability to trawl the records in sufficient detail, but I could find no explanation elsewhere. I very much look forward to what the Minister can say about progress. The UK needs to be back at the top of the league, and it can do that only with holistic leadership of the kind set out in the report.
The second aspect I briefly refer to is the need for proper funding of independent forensic research. Again, I refer to just two areas: digital and DNA. It is clear from the evidence received by the committee and from evidence I received when chairing the Welsh Government’s Commission on Justice in Wales that digital forensics remains a major issue. Indeed, it has been an issue for the last nine years. Two things have gone hand in hand: the increased power of mobile devices and their ability to store so much, and the increased use of them to communicate in permanent record things that would never have been recorded before, which comes as a surprise to many. They are therefore essential to the administration of justice—not only for establishing guilt but for showing that conduct that may be complained about was innocent.
The use of digital forensics is important to the deterrence of crime through successful prosecution, the confidence of victims in the system, as assurances about the way information is contained in phones is critical, and, equally importantly, the proper use of police time. For example, in commercial litigation, increasingly sophisticated and independently reliable software has made a very significant difference. It extracts and searches properly and reliably. As far as I can ascertain, there are still serious issues with what needs to be done to tackle these matters—extraction and particular searching—so that something reliable is available to the police, the prosecution and the defence, which is so critical to the three issues to which I have referred. There are other aspects, including AI, facial recognition and deepfake, about which the noble Lord, Lord Mair, has spoken and which underline the urgent need to address an area that requires significant leadership and investment.
DNA has been essential to the criminal justice system since the 1990s. It has made a significant contribution to the conviction of the guilty and, equally importantly, the exoneration of the innocent. It has been a journey not without its problems: low-template DNA brought about serious miscarriages of justice in the way in which it was first used, and mixed and partial profiles and transfers have been a real problem. Much has been done; the Royal Society has led with a primer on this subject, which is parallel to the one spoken of a short while ago. But as I understand it, there are issues with mixed and partial profiles and transfers, and much more needs to be done. These are but two examples of the need for development and research—and it is development and research that are both scientifically independent and not dependent on police budgets.
The forensic science budget, to the extent that it is now largely in the hands of the police, must be looked at again. As the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, stated, I very much hope that the Minister is able to tell us a bit more about what UKRI has been doing, what advice it is taking and what it is going to do to bring investment to these vital areas.
Let me look at a way forward. I hope that the way forward will be by government action. In March 2011, the Law Commission produced an excellent report on expert evidence and draft legislation. Two years later, the Government said they would not bring forward a Bill and, therefore, made it clear that it was up to others—leave the law as it is, or look for change. All the reforms envisaged by the Law Commission were then brought about by the Criminal Procedure Rules, much to the benefit of the criminal justice system, and they worked.
The report we have been speaking of is the 10th in 10 years. As far as I can ascertain, nothing much has happened, although I hope the Minister will be able to tell us otherwise. It may be that it is because structures are not devised to be accountable or informative. However, forensic science is essential to justice, as the speech of each of your Lordships has shown, and it is essential to keep the UK at the forefront of world leadership in science and the law.
I trust that Her Majesty’s Government will not fail in restoring the position, but if they do, I hope that we will be able to find an example similar to that which was taken in relation to the report of the Law Commission and find another way to put into operation this excellent report, if Her Majesty’s Government feel unwilling or unable to do so.