Public Order Bill

Lord Beith Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 142A from the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, and his Clause 30 stand part. He has set out the concerns of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee pretty clearly. Noble Lords will be pleased that I will therefore speak briefly, but I will consider Clause 30 in the political context.

Having been a member of the Delegated Powers Committee for a full term, I am acutely conscious of the increasing tendency of the Government to avoid adequate parliamentary scrutiny of powers delegated to Ministers. Clause 30 is of particular concern, because the delegated powers enable Ministers to increase the already unacceptable police powers under SDPOs. I am very interested in this Bill, even though I have not been able to be involved until now.

As has been extensively debated in this House, it is extraordinary that these orders can apply to people who have not been convicted of any offence and who are not considered to be at risk of offending; that orders can last for up to two years and be renewed; and that a breach of any requirement under an SDPO can lead to six months in prison—for somebody who has not been convicted of an offence. As things stand, such powers do not sit comfortably in a democratic state, in my view. But with Ministers able to extend those powers and further interfere with citizens’ liberties, with only minimal parliamentary involvement—and if, as the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, said, they stick with the negative procedure—this Bill feels much more suited to a country such as Iran or China. I have never said such a thing about a piece of legislation in this House before, but this goes way beyond the pale. A few years ago, Clause 30 would not have been included in this Bill; I just do not think it would have happened.

In the DPRRC’s recent report, Democracy Denied?, we express our concern about

“an increase in the number of occasions on which ministers have been given power to supplement primary legislation by what is, in effect, disguised legislation”

—things such as guidance, which is not a delegated power in the normal sense—that is,

“instruments which are legislative in effect but often not subject to parliamentary oversight”,

being, as in this case, subject only to the negative procedure. That is one way of doing things.

Democracy Denied? expresses further concern about guidance where there is a requirement “to have regard” to it, which the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, also referred to. Although there is an element of choice, a requirement to have regard to guidance carries with it an expectation that the guidance will be followed unless there is a cogent reason for not doing so. In the context of this Bill, such guidance is completely unacceptable.

I very much hope that this House will deal with Clause 30 on Report. Our Delegated Powers Committee recommends that the guidance should be subject to the affirmative procedure. It would probably have been ultra vires for the committee to have gone further than that, but speaking personally, and not in the context of being a member of the Delegated Powers Committee, I really hope that the House considers removing Clause 30 from the Bill at the next stage.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, has done a service to the House in focusing such clear attention on the Delegated Powers Committee report, and the issue that it raises. I simply want to pursue one of the points that he mentioned, which is one of the features of the guidance to which this power relates:

“guidance about identifying persons in respect of whom it may be appropriate for applications for serious disruption prevention orders to be made”.

What does the Secretary of State know that the police do not know about who it would be appropriate to make serious disruption prevention orders about? On what basis does the Secretary of State know what the police do not know and therefore have to be advised about?

The only basis I can think of is not a helpful one for the Government. It is that there is a political reason here and that what the Government want to do is say, “Never mind those people who are protesting about this, go after those people who are protesting about that.” This is the very kind of power which we have always tried to avoid giving, in the form of direction to the police, to anybody, including police and crime commissioners. There has been a very necessary reluctance to have the police directed in a way which could become political, and in which the choice of where to deploy resources was based on whom the authority concerned—in this case, the Government—disliked and wanted to see penalised in some way.

I cannot see any respectable argument for the Secretary of State saying to the police “You do not realise what I realise; this is the guidance I am giving you about identifying appropriate persons.” It is the sort of thing that even the affirmative procedure would not give us a very good chance to deal with, because you cannot amend statutory instruments, even under the affirmative procedure. But to leave it simply to the negative procedure, which is so limited and so inadequate, particularly in the other Chamber, is simply not satisfactory. The Government’s response to the Delegated Powers Committee has been wholly inadequate so far.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I wish to make one or two brief observations in respect of the way these amendments tie together. The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, which I support, sees a good precedent in what Parliament sometimes does, which is to pass successive pieces of legislation without having in mind all the complexities of the earlier legislation. We saw this most clearly in my experience in relation to search warrants of premises, and I will come back to that in a moment. There is a huge advantage in having up-to-date guidance, and the best people to produce it are those who have practical experience—namely, the police institutions—so I warmly welcome that.

But its importance goes to Clause 30, because the question I ask myself is: why is Clause 30 there? Why can it not be dealt with in two other ways? One is the use of guidance given by independent police to other police, to get uniformity; and secondly, do not forget these are applications to a court, so can we not do what we did in relation to search warrants? That is, to provide in detailed form, through the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee, working closely with the police and other organisations, the information that needs to be put before a court to make the decision on the order. Now, if the Home Secretary feels that there are areas that you need to specify—for example, about the kind of person who should be asked to supervise or do something—why can the detail of what is required, the kinds of considerations, not be put properly and openly through an independent process of rules and forms? This worked for search warrants.

We ought to bear in mind the experience of ASBOs. It is not the time at this hour of night to go back to that rather unhappy chapter, but trying to supplement un-thought-through legislation of this kind with guidance is not the way forward; there are better mechanisms.

It seems to me, when one looks at Clause 30, one asks oneself, “What is it for?” In Clause 30(2)(c), the guidance is about

“providing assistance to prosecutors in connection with applications for serious disruption prevention orders.”

Is the intention that somehow the Home Office believes that the police do not help prosecutors? What guidance do they need? These are independent people and their independence should not be called into question. In most countries, the independence of the prosecution service, as in our country, is critical, and so is the independence of the police.

I do not want to go into the constitutional points under Clause 30, because I entirely agree with what has been said. I think one ought to look at this from a practical experience point of view to say that the clause is completely unnecessary. It should be possible to deal with the practical consequences of these orders in a way that takes into account experience. This is a criticism of the way in which the modern Civil Service is structured. There are probably few people in the Home Office who remember what I have just gone through. I thought a few grey hairs might remind people that there is a better way forward than this constitutional aberration, constituted by Clause 30.