Justice and Home Affairs: United Kingdom Opt-Outs

Lord Taylor of Holbeach Excerpts

Thursday 17th July 2014 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

That this House has considered the United Kingdom’s Justice and Home Affairs Opt-Outs.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)]

I hope that noble Lords will excuse me while I change horses. I am here to update the House about negotiations on the so-called 2014 decision. Before I do so, I begin, once again, by expressing my gratitude for the work of this House in scrutinising these important matters. This Government are extremely grateful that this House—the EU Committee in particular—has undertaken to look at this issue in such detail. We consider it important that Parliament is given every opportunity to consider this matter fully.

Last July, the Government explained that we had decided to exercise the opt-out, and we have now done so. However, we were also clear that we had listened carefully to the views of our law enforcement agencies and prosecutors. We concluded that a number of measures subject to the opt-out add value in the fight against crime and the pursuit of justice and that it would therefore be in our national interest to seek to rejoin them. This House considered the matter in full and endorsed the Government’s decision to seek to rejoin the measures set out in Command Paper 8671.

Before opening formal negotiations with the European Commission, the Council and other member states, the Government listened carefully to the views of noble Lords and considered thoroughly the excellent reports of the EU Committee of the House. Those reports reached well considered conclusions that the Government took into account during negotiations. Good progress has been made in these negotiations and I am pleased to be able to report that we have reached an “in principle” deal with the Commission on the non-Schengen measures that fall under its purview. We have also made good progress on the Schengen measures, with the outline of a possible deal now clear. This matter was discussed at the General Affairs Council on 24 June, but some technical reservations still remain. Discussions continue with the aim of allowing those reservations to be lifted. Negotiations are still ongoing but the Government have been clear throughout this process that we would update Parliament as appropriate and I am honouring that commitment today.

I am acutely aware that the EU Committee of this House has said that Parliament was not involved early enough in the process. While I would not entirely agree with that sentiment, it is something I hope noble Lords will understand the Government are seeking to address by holding a debate on the issue today.

On 3 July the Government published Command Paper 8897, which includes the full list of measures that were discussed at the General Affairs Council, and impact assessments on each of those measures. That fulfils the Government’s commitment to provide those impact assessments and further demonstrates our commitment to parliamentary scrutiny of that matter. However, noble Lords might find it helpful if I set out exactly what changes have been made to the list of 35 measures between the opening of negotiations and now.

Two measures originally on the list of 35 that the Government wished to rejoin—one relating to CEPOL, the European Police College, and the other to freezing orders—have been “Lisbonised” by the new CEPOL measure and the European investigation order respectively. As a result, those measures are no longer subject to the opt-out and fall off the UK’s list.

The UK will also no longer seek to rejoin the European Genocide Network, but will instead rejoin the European Judicial Network. That follows submission of further evidence from the Lord Advocate in Scotland, Frank Mulholland, the Crown Prosecution Service and other member states on the operational benefits of the measure and practical examples of its use in tackling crime. I also know that the EU Committee felt strongly that we should rejoin this measure, and I hope that it is pleased with this outcome.

The UK will not rejoin the Schengen handbook, as other member states consider that measure to have been superseded by other measures. However, we will rejoin the SIS II networks measure—a technical measure others consider linked to our participation in SIS II. As recommended by the EU Committee of this House, the Government will also rejoin three Europol implementing measures.

Finally, the UK will no longer seek to rejoin the special intervention units measure. The Commission considers that measure to be linked to the Prüm decisions, which the UK will not seek to rejoin. We have neither the time nor the money to implement Prüm by 1 December, so it would be senseless for the United Kingdom to rejoin it now and risk being infracted. Despite considerable pressure from the Commission and other member states, that remains the case.

We all want to see the most serious crimes—such as rapes and murders—solved and their perpetrators brought to justice. In some cases, that will mean the police comparing DNA or fingerprint data with other European forces. When 30% of those arrested in London are now foreign nationals, it is clear that that is an operational necessity. Therefore those comparisons happen already, and must if we are to solve cross-border crimes.

The Government would be negligent in their duty to protect the British public if that issue were not considered carefully. We cannot rejoin Prüm on 1 December and will not seek to do so. However, in order that Parliament can also consider that matter carefully, the Government will produce a business and implementation case and run a small-scale pilot, with all necessary safeguards in place. We will publish that by way of a Command Paper and bring the issue back to Parliament so that it can be debated in an informed way. We are working towards doing that by the end of next year.

The Government will also not seek to rejoin the probation framework decision. As the Government have made clear, the measure has not yet been used, and there are serious questions about how it might work. Of course, we have no principled objection to sending prisoners back to serve their probation or community sentence in their home country, and we have taken into account the potential of this measure as indicated by the EU Committee. We have therefore indicated to the Commission that we will take another look at the measure when there is enough evidence of it working and of its impacts to see whether there would be benefits to the UK from taking part. To support that decision, we will publish for Parliament an assessment of the potential impacts in due course.

I know that many were sceptical that a deal could be done. However, I am proud to say that we have very nearly done it, and the Government are clear that this is a good deal for the United Kingdom.

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[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, for the kindnesses he has shown, particularly in his last remarks. He made a number of comments about the current political scene. I have very long memories of this issue in politics, so I do not think that it is necessarily very productive to go down other, party-political routes. In fact, we have a tradition in this House of trying to deal with these matters on their merits. I think that the way we handle these debates is very much to our credit.

I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. A lot of points have been raised, which is hardly surprising, as this is a broad subject—even though it is confined to the JHA opt-out matters, there is a lot of detail. I am going to do my best to reply to points that have been raised, but I hope that noble Lords will be happy if I write one of my usual commentaries on the debate. I find that a very useful way of informing the House. Indeed, in considering this matter, I know that it is nice to have things on the record, but it might be something for those who keep the official records to make a note of letters sent by Ministers, or at least to make them available on the website and not just in the Library, so that noble Lords can be aware of those things for the future. I suggest that as a modernising idea, as it is frequently the case that Ministers need to write in order to provide a proper answer that cannot be given in a debate.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, for his chairmanship of the Select Committee and the leadership that he shows on these issues in the House. The noble Lords, Lord Judd and Lord Kennedy of Southwark, both raised the question of transitional arrangements with the Commission and what is going to happen on 1 December. It is not the intention to have a gap between the date on which the opt-in will take effect and the point at which the UK can rejoin the measures. We place a great deal of importance on the issue and believe that it is in everyone’s interest to try to eliminate any operational gap between our opt-out taking effect and our continued participation in the measures that we formally apply to rejoin. If it is necessary to use transitional measures, we consider that transitional arrangements could be used to preserve the legal effects of measures that the Government have said they will rejoin, where there is a short operational gap.

The noble Lords, Lord Bowness and Lord Foulkes, asked when we think that the negotiations will conclude. I think that that is a matter that all noble Lords are aware of—that is, we have made good progress on these negotiations. An in-principle agreement has been reached with the Commission on a package of 35 measures. I say, “a package” because it is not the original package, as was rightly pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay. However, negotiations with member states are continuing and we are confident of concluding a deal ahead of 1 September so that this operational gap will not occur.

[Lord Bowness]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for giving way and I apologise for being troublesome. While he is dealing with this point, perhaps he could tell the House—and I understand the difficulty with negotiations—whether in fact discussions are taking place about transitional arrangements in parallel with the main negotiations. Were we to get much closer to 30 November, it would then be rather late to start putting those transitional arrangements together.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

This is a wise Government and all these matters are considered. That is not our ambition. Our ambition is to achieve agreement by that time. There will be an update. We have updated Parliament up to now and we will continue to give Parliament opportunities for scrutiny of the process in future.

The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, again raised the question of whether this was part of the Prime Minister’s promise to start repatriating powers from the EU. It is a decision that flows from the existing treaty and its protocols that were set in place by the Lisbon treaty, negotiated by the previous Government. If we had done nothing with regard to the opt-out, the default position was that the UK would become subject to Commission enforcement powers and the full jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. The decision to opt out means that a much smaller set of measures will be subject to ECJ jurisdiction and Commission enforcement powers. We believe that that is what the British public would expect us to do, given that the negotiations conducted by the previous Government led to Protocol 36.

The noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, whom I congratulate on stepping into the shoes of the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, asked whether there was a list of measures subject to the opt-out. We are currently working on producing a full consolidated list of measures that the Government consider subject to the opt-out, and we will provide that shortly.

My noble friend Lord Bowness asked: if the majority of these measures are defunct, in no way harmful to the UK or positive, why bother exercising the opt-out at all? I hope that I have given him some idea of why we thought it was important to deal with this. The ECJ should not have the final say over matters concerning substantive criminal law or our international relations in matters like extradition. That is why the Government will not rejoin over 20 minimum-standards measures on sensitive matters such as racism and xenophobia, or the EU/US extradition agreement. I am clear that our Parliament should have the final say over our laws on these matters, and the Government should be able to renegotiate bilateral arrangements as we think fit.

A number of noble Lords asked why the Government had produced an impact assessment for only 35 measures, not for the full list. The Government have been consistently clear that we will provide Parliament with impact assessments on those measures that we will seek to rejoin. I remember saying that in previous debates. Command Paper 8897 is the fulfilment of that commitment. The UK will not be bound by the rest of the measures from 1 December, and there is therefore no need for an impact assessment.

There was some consideration of the European arrest warrant. As noble Lords will know, we have decided to opt back into the European arrest warrant. We have listened to our EU partners and the UK law enforcement and prosecution agencies, as well as the view of Parliament and indeed our European committees, on this. Critics of the EAW have come to a balanced conclusion on how the EAW can be improved and retain its obvious practical and law enforcement benefits but provide better safeguards for people subject to EAW law. We are satisfied that the reforms made to the EAW will help to address these concerns. My noble friend Lord Stoneham asked whether EAW amendments to domestic law are compliant with EU law. We are confident that they are compliant and are happy to provide more detail by way of the letter I will be sending. We will be able to elaborate and I hope that that will be to the benefit of noble Lords generally.

My noble friend Lord Sharkey said that many of the measures that the Government want to withdraw are more likely to be susceptible to negative ECJ judgments. As I have said throughout this process, the Government are concerned about the risk that the court could make unexpected adverse decisions on the interpretation of pre-Lisbon measures. Given the prospect of an unexpected judgment, and concerns about the drafting of measures and the difficulty of altering EU legislation, we believe that minimising the possibility of an adverse judgment is a sensible and pragmatic approach. It is only correct that the Government consider carefully whether to accept the formal jurisdiction of the ECJ before seeking to rejoin measures. We accept that there is always a risk attached in terms of ECJ jurisdiction if we decide to participate. However, in certain cases it will be in the national interest for the UK to participate and the Government will accept that risk, given the wider benefits of the instrument in question. That is the judgment that rightly rests with the Government in these cases.

My noble friend Lord Sharkey also asked about the special intervention units and whether we wish to rejoin in order to maintain participation in an operational police network at the EU level, called Atlas. We now know that we can continue working through Atlas even if we do not participate in the special interventions unit. This has been confirmed by the Commission, so we will lose nothing by not joining that measure. My noble friend Lord Bridgeman was concerned about whether the UK would rejoin Europol and whether it could force national police forces to act. We confirm that Europol will not be able to force national police forces to act.

A number of noble Lords, including my noble friends Lord Sharkey and Lord Stoneham of Droxford, the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar, and the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, asked what steps were taken at EU level to resolve the problems with the probation measure and what is the timetable for our reconsideration of this? This is quite a complex issue but I think that I have time to address it, because noble Lords will be interested. As the Government set out, it is not in the national interest to rejoin the probation measure at this stage. It is unclear how it would work in practice and we have no evidence to demonstrate that the benefits to the UK outweigh its risks.

We did, indeed, discuss these issues with the Commission. However, we were not able to resolve them. One key issue is that only 14 member states have so far implemented it—and to date it has never been used within those 14 member states. Therefore, we have no practical illustrations of how it would work. We were unable to determine the likely impact of rejoining the measure. In due course, once the probation measure has been used and implemented more widely, and there is sufficient evidence to analyse it, we will reconsider participation after making a full assessment of its impact. I will keep noble Lords informed on progress on that particular measure.

My noble friend Lord Bowness asked about transitional measures and I sought to answer him. I have had a supplementary note to the effect that, in case transitional measures are needed, the matter is being considered in a working group in Brussels; this is parallel to the wider negotiations. Our aspirations are that these transitional measures will not be necessary, but they are being discussed.

That concludes my contribution to the debate today. I thank noble Lords for again presenting the views of the European Union Committee and of this House on an important subject. I will be writing a commentary and look forward to continuing dialogue on these issues. I understand that we have a debate on Tuesday on aspects of the Stockholm agreement. This is not going away. It is a live issue as far as I am concerned, as I am sure it is for other noble Lords.

Motion agreed.

Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Bill

Lord Taylor of Holbeach Excerpts

Thursday 17th July 2014 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

That the Bill be read a third time.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the officials who have supported me during the course of this Bill on behalf of all Members of the House. It has been a testing time for them but they have done it in an exemplary fashion.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)]

My Lords, it has been a difficult process on this Bill and I thank the Minister for his customary courtesy in ensuring that we have had access to information and in being prepared to meet with Members across the House. I thank his officials, who have made themselves available to us beyond the call of duty. I also thank the officials of your Lordships’ House, who have had to work in double-quick time on the amendments that have been tabled and have all done so with courtesy and great kindness to Members.

Child Abuse

Lord Taylor of Holbeach Excerpts

Thursday 17th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)]

My Lords, with the leave of the House, I shall now repeat a Statement made in answer to an Urgent Notice Question in the House of Commons by my right honourable friend Mrs Theresa May, the Home Secretary. The Statement is as follows.

“The sexual abuse of children is an abhorrent crime which this Government are absolutely committed to stamping out. In my Statement to the House last week, I addressed two important public concerns: first, that in the 1980s the Home Office failed to act on allegations of child sex abuse and, secondly, that public bodies and other important institutions have failed to take seriously their duty of care towards children. As I informed the House on 7 July, the whole Government take these allegations very seriously. That is why I announced two inquiries last week.

The first is a review led by Peter Wanless, the chief executive of the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, with the support of Richard Whittam QC, of the original investigations which Mark Sedwill, the Permanent Secretary at the Home Office, commissioned last year into suggestions that the Home Office failed to act on allegations of child sex abuse in the early 1980s. Peter Wanless and Richard Whittam will also look at how the police and prosecutors handled any related information that was handed to them and examine another recent review into allegations that the Home Office provided funding to an organisation called the Paedophile Information Exchange. Mr Wanless and Mr Whittam are both in post and work on that review has begun. Its terms of reference were placed in the Library of the House last week and I expect the review to conclude within eight to 10 weeks.

More widely, I also announced last week an independent panel inquiry to consider whether public bodies and other non-state institutions have taken seriously their duty of care to protect children from sexual abuse. The Home Office has appointed the head of secretariat for the panel inquiry, which will begin its work as soon as possible after the appointment of the chairman.

As the House will know, I asked Baroness Butler-Sloss to act as chairman of the panel, and she agreed to do so. However, having listened to the concerns raised by victim and survivor groups, and by Members of this House, Lady Butler-Sloss subsequently came to the conclusion that she should not chair the inquiry. I was deeply saddened by Lady Butler-Sloss’s decision to withdraw but understand and respect her reasons. She is a woman of the highest integrity and compassion and continues to have an enormous contribution to make to public life.

Work is ongoing to find the right chairman, and other members of the panel, to do just that. An announcement will be made as soon as possible so that this important work can move forward. I am sure that honourable Members will agree that it is also very important that the terms of reference for this inquiry are considered carefully. That is why it is right that we should wait until we have appointed a new chairman and a full panel, and discussed them with them.

I want this inquiry to leave no stone unturned in getting to the truth of what happened and making sure we learn the necessary lessons to protect children and vulnerable people in the future.

Members will be aware of the outcome of the National Crime Agency’s operation, reported in the media yesterday. That operation signifies this Government’s relentless commitment to pursue those who engage in online child sexual exploitation. The operation is unprecedented in its degree of co-ordination, with the NCA leading and co-ordinating law enforcement efforts which involve 45 police forces across England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. It has been ongoing for the past six months. People from all walks of life have been identified, including those in positions of trust.

In the mean time, I can assure the House that work to tackle this reprehensible crime continues. That is why, in April last year, the Government established the national group to tackle sexual violence against children and vulnerable people, which is led by my honourable friend the Minister for Crime Prevention. This cross-government group was established to learn the lessons from some of the recent cases which have emerged, and the resulting reviews and inquiries. As a result of its work, we now have better guidance for the police and prosecutors, new powers for the police to get information from hotels that are used for child sexual exploitation, and better identification of children at risk of exploitation through the use of local multiagency safeguarding hubs.

The Government are also committed to tackling the threat to children online. That is why the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Bill, which is currently before Parliament, will ensure that our law enforcement agencies continue to have access to another vital tool—communications data. Without access to communications data—the who, where, when and how of a communication but not its content—public authorities’ investigative capabilities in relation to online child abuse would be significantly damaged and vital evidence would be inaccessible.

The CEOP command of the National Crime Agency works with police forces to investigate child sexual abuse and has access to specialist officers who could be called upon to assist in complex cases. CEOP is already providing support to forces in the robust investigation of child sexual abuse, as the arrests reported yesterday make clear.

Child abuse is an abhorrent crime which can scar people for life and the Government are determined to stamp it out. We are working across government to ensure that victims of historical child abuse who come forward in response to our overarching inquiry get the support and help they need. We have ring-fenced nearly £40 million for specialist local support services and national helplines, including more than 80 independent sexual violence advisers.

So our message is clear: the Government will do everything they can to allow the full investigation of child abuse—whenever and wherever it occurred—to support the victims of it and to bring the perpetrators of this disgusting crime to justice”.

That concludes the Statement.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, there is indeed no hiding place. We do not know the actual total but we know that it is a large number. We are certainly determined that all those who have been involved in this will be dealt with by the law, as they should be.

The noble Baroness asked about the DBS. As noble Lords will know, the Protection of Freedoms Act encouraged that people who were not working with children should no longer automatically face being disbarred. That was the decision Parliament made in that respect. I agree it is an area that will be examined to see whether there has been any adverse effect, but I do not see that as being the primary cause of this problem. The barring service, in which I have a great deal of confidence, still ensures anybody working with and in contact with children is barred from employment if there are grounds to suspect that they are involved in this sort of activity. That will continue and that is, I am sure, the policy that this House would wish to see continue.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew (LD)]

My Lords, given the unfortunate circumstance that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, is no longer to chair the inquiry, is the Minister aware that there are seven extremely distinguished, female members of the Court of Appeal, Lady Justices? Is he aware that the appointment of any one of those seven would be extremely welcome to most Members of this House, and that a number of them, like the noble and learned Baroness, have special experience in dealing with issues concerning family law?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I have expressed the views of the Home Secretary and the disappointment that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, will not be taking this inquiry. The House has shown its feelings on that matter. I do not doubt that we will find a competent person to take the chairmanship and that, in turn, we will find people to join that person in forming the panel that will lead the inquiry.

[Lord Laming (CB)]

Does the Minister agree that the inquiry that was to be conducted by my noble and learned colleague Lady Butler-Sloss needs to have precise terms of reference? Does he agree that hours spent on refining the terms of reference are important because they could avoid months of challenge?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I understand what the noble Lord is saying. The terms of reference will be decided in conjunction with the chairman. Only the chairman can determine where the inquiry should go. We need to have no closed minds on this issue but we have made clear that, while it is not a statutory inquiry, it can become one if the chairman and the panel believe that that is necessary for them to continue with their work. There is no reason why the inquiry cannot make interim reports on matters considered to be essential for the Government to take action on immediately. None the less, I think I made clear in the Statement that I repeated here on Monday 7 July that the whole point is that the inquiry should be deliberative and thorough so that we make sure that the Government can deal properly with an issue that is of concern to the House and to the country as a whole.

[Lord Richard (Lab)]

My Lords, I echo what people have said about the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. It is a great shame that she is not doing the inquiry. I have great admiration for her, which goes back a very long time, and she would have done it beautifully. However, I have some problems with the inquiry itself. The Government speak of an overarching inquiry, which I understand. The expectation seems to have arisen that this inquiry will name names—that people will be named in the inquiry and that somehow there will be an exposure of people who are supposed to have committed these dreadful crimes. The inquiry is not a court of law and cannot deal with a defendant as a defendant. It is not a police force, so it will not have the resources of the police and the Home Office to investigate these matters. How do the Government see the inquiry dealing with the issues when names are named, which, as I understand it, the Government want them to be?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

It is for the police to deal with the apprehension of offenders and to act on information that they have available. It is not the purpose of the inquiry to deal with individual cases. It will be important to make sure that the inquiry separates the police operations from its own investigations and does not, in the process of making its findings known, jeopardise police officers or the proper administration of justice.

[Baroness Walmsley (LD)]

My Lords, I welcome all the Government are doing to bring the perpetrators of child abuse to justice, but will they do more to prevent it happening in the first place? Hundreds of thousands of people go online and access child pornography on the internet. Some people seem to take the view that, if that is all they do, it does not matter too much. But, of course, every such image of a child on the internet is a child who has been abused, and the people accessing those images are complicit in that crime. There is some overlap between those who access child pornography on the internet and those who go out to contact children and abuse them physically. There is a great deal of controversy over how big that overlap is. Will the Government do more research to look into the overlap between accessing child pornography on the internet and physically abusing children? Will they do more to support those charities that do wonderful work with people who accept their inappropriate urges and want not to offend physically? Organisations such as the Lucy Faithfull Foundation struggle for resources to do this very important work to prevent children being abused in the first place.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I could not agree more with the premise of my noble friend’s questions; it is important to support charities. I also agree that viewing images of children online is not a harmless pursuit. It is damaging to those who have been involved in sexual abuse to provide those images, but it also leads individuals on to sexual abuse. That is why we are right to take this view. We have open minds about how the Government should deal with this over time, but I agree with my noble friend that the numbers coming forward suggest that this problem has been made worse by people’s ability to view these images online.

[Baroness Howarth of Breckland (CB)]

My Lords, it is quite clear that the Government intend not only to look at historical abuse during this inquiry but to ensure that what is happening here and now is firmly within the sights. I hope that the Minister can reassure me on that point. The police officer who dealt with the issues yesterday said clearly that we cannot arrest our way out of this situation. It is absolutely crucial that we get the right programmes in place, as the noble Baroness opposite said, with the present and well defined research that is going on, rather than looking back and getting it wrong.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

The noble Baroness is quite right. What is the use of the study of history if it does not help us deal with the here and now and the future?

Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Bill

Lord Taylor of Holbeach Excerpts

Wednesday 16th July 2014 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

That the Bill be read Second Time.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)]

My Lords, when I repeated the Statement of my right honourable friend the Home Secretary last Thursday, I outlined to the House the urgent need for this legislation. I am sure that noble Lords will agree with me that it is essential for both the Government and this Parliament to ensure that law enforcement, and the security and intelligence agencies, have the powers they need to do their duty. Those powers are now at risk. If we do not take urgent action, lives could be lost. As your Lordships’ House has already heard, the situation is pressing. The timetable for this legislation is, accordingly, inevitably very tight, and I will talk about the reasons for that.

However, it may be helpful to the House if I make clear that Members who wish to table amendments for the Committee stage of the Bill are now able to do so. Amendments for the Marshalled List may be tabled up until the rising of the House, at which point the Legislation Office will produce a Marshalled List in the normal way. Members will also be able to table manuscript amendments for the Committee stage of the Bill tomorrow morning. Arrangements for tabling amendments for subsequent stages of the Bill will be announced in due course.

Perhaps I may turn to the legislation itself. I should like to take a moment to reassure the House. This Bill does not provide any new powers. It does not alter or amend existing powers. It simply provides a clear basis, in respect of both data retention and investigatory powers, for the exercise of existing powers. Crucially, and quite rightly, the legislation is sunsetted. Its provisions will be repealed at the end of 2016. The intention—Clause 7 has been amended in the Commons to provide an explicit legal basis for this—is that we will have time in the interim for a proper debate about what powers are required in the future. There will be a review, led by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, David Anderson QC, into what powers and capabilities might be required in the future, considered in the full context of the threat. That review will consider capabilities but it will also consider safeguards to protect privacy, the challenge of changing technologies, issues of transparency and oversight, and the effectiveness of current legislation.

David Anderson’s work will be far-reaching. It will provide a robust, independent basis for the subsequent work of a Joint Committee of Parliament, to be established following the general election. There will be a public debate and Parliament will have the necessary time to consider legislation on these important and complex issues. I know that some noble Lords have questioned the timing of the sunsetting provision. I hope now that the Government’s intentions behind that timing are clear.

Noble Lords will also be aware of the wider package of measures, announced by the Prime Minister last week, which will strengthen safeguards and reassure the public that their rights to security and privacy are equally protected. We have now published terms of reference for the various measures, including the privacy and civil liberties oversight board. Following ongoing discussions with the Opposition and consideration in the Commons, we have amended Clause 6 to ensure that the independent Interception of Communications Commissioner will now report every six months. I am sure that your Lordships will agree that these measures will help to ensure a better-informed public debate.

I now turn to the purpose of the Bill and the matters before us today. Communications data—the who, where, when and how of a communication, but not its content—can be used to piece together the activities of suspects, victims and vulnerable people. They can prove or disprove alibis, identify links between potential criminals, tie suspects and victims to a crime scene, and help find vulnerable persons at risk of imminent harm. Only this morning, noble Lords will have seen the news that the National Crime Agency has made more than 600 arrests as part of a six-month operation targeting people accessing child abuse images online. Senior officers are clear that, without access to communications data, many of these investigations would hit a dead end.

Those data are held by communications service providers for their business purposes and where they are required to do so by law. They are then accessed by law enforcement, subject to stringent safeguards, where it is necessary and proportionate to do so for a specific investigation. But, as I explained last week, a recent judgment in the European Court of Justice has put into doubt the legal basis on which we require service providers in the UK to retain communications data. As a result, we run the risk of losing access to data that are vital to a wide range of investigations. This could be devastating. It would seriously undermine the ability of the police, the National Crime Agency, the intelligence services and others to prevent and detect crime, catch terrorists, and safeguard and protect children and others at immediate risk of harm.

The Bill also deals with investigatory powers and, specifically, the interception of communications. The content of a communication—the text of an e-mail or a telephone conversation—can play a critical role in the work of law enforcement and the intelligence agencies. The majority of the Security Service’s top priority counterterrorism investigations use interception in some form to identify, understand and disrupt the plots of terrorists. The police and the National Crime Agency rely on interception to prevent and detect serious crimes, including drug trafficking, human trafficking and child sexual abuse.

The House will know that interception can take place only if there is a warrant authorised by a Secretary of State and that can happen only where he or she considers it necessary and proportionate and where the information sought cannot reasonably be obtained by other means. The legislation that provides for interception—the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 or RIPA—obliges telecommunications service providers to give effect to interception warrants. This Government, like our predecessors, have maintained that this obligation applies to companies with customers in the UK, irrespective of where those companies are based. Given the increasing reliance of suspects in the UK on internet-based communications, the compliance of overseas companies is increasingly important to the UK’s interception capability. However, in the absence of explicit extra-territoriality, some overseas companies have now started to question their obligations under RIPA. Those companies have made it clear that they will comply with the law only where there is an explicit obligation to do so. Unless we put the matter beyond doubt, we could, very shortly, see a damaging loss of capability.

I now turn to the Government’s response to this situation. The Bill before the House today is a narrow and focused response to these two issues: the ECJ judgment and the potential loss of compliance with RIPA. On both matters, it makes explicit what we have always asserted to be the case. The first part of the Bill deals with the issue of data retention. At present, we can oblige companies to retain data where they are issued with a notice under the data retention regulations passed by Parliament in 2009. This means that the data are available when the police need them for an investigation. In spite of the ECJ judgment ruling, we have been clear that these regulations remain in force. However, in the light of the judgment, it is necessary to put the legal basis for these requirements beyond doubt. If we do not, there is a risk that these companies may begin to delete crucial data. Equally, if there were a successful challenge in the domestic courts, this would lead to an immediate loss of data.

Accordingly, Clauses 1 and 2 of the Bill provide a clear basis for data retention. They will replace the existing data retention regulations of 2009, maintaining the status quo. The data types to be covered by this new law will be identical to those in existing law. Although the European Court of Justice was critical of the data retention directive, it recognised the importance of data retention in preventing and detecting crime. Crucially, while the court asserted that the directive itself lacked the necessary safeguards, it did not take into account the robust regimes that exist in member states governing the access to the data. We believe that our retention and access regimes already address many of the ECJ’s criticisms. Among other safeguards, they include an authorisation process that was scrutinised in detail and endorsed by the Joint Committee on the Draft Communications Data Bill, ably chaired by my noble friend Lord Blencathra, and they are subject to robust, independent oversight by the Interception of Communications Commissioner.

The Government have, however, considered the judgment at length and are bringing forward changes that will extend the safeguards in place in order to respond to elements of the judgment and to ensure that the Bill is compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights. These include: the imposition of a requirement on the Secretary of State to consider the necessity and proportionality of a data retention notice before issuing it; specifying that the length of time for which data must be retained should be a maximum, rather than an absolute, period of 12 months; and the creation of a code of practice for data retention, which will place on a statutory footing well-established best practice.

A number of further safeguards will be introduced through the regulations made under the Bill. These regulations were published in draft last week.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury (LD)]

I apologise for interrupting the flow of my noble friend’s speech. However, he started by saying that the Bill introduced no new powers and did not amend existing powers, but he appeared just now to indicate that there were new powers in the Bill. Have I got it wrong?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My noble friend has got it wrong: it is about safeguards. I am talking about safeguards, not powers. I am talking about the Bill imposing limits on the discretion of the Secretary of State through the regulations and the Bill itself. If my noble friend will allow me to continue he will see that I am placing that in the context of seeking to provide a basis for continuing the provisions of the Bill without extending the powers that are available to the Secretary of State or the Government under the Bill.

[Lord Knight of Weymouth (Lab)]

I apologise for intervening in the Minister’s speech, but given that he has just been interrupted anyway, on the same point, can he clarify that Clause 4, “Extra-territoriality in Part 1 of RIPA”, is not an extension of the legal powers that the state has in respect of these matters?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I can indeed do so. Extraterritoriality was assumed by the Government to be part of RIPA, and rightly so, as part and parcel of their legislation. We are making it explicit so that there can be no question of doubt about it. On extraterritoriality, as I said in my opening remarks, RIPA was based on the correct assumption that any firm that provided services here within the UK was governed by the law that we had in connection with these matters. In my view, there is no argument about that. Perhaps I may go on and finish my speech. The noble Lord is gracious enough to acknowledge that this is all of a piece, and I would like to be able to present it to the House as a piece.

I mentioned the number of safeguards to be introduced through regulations made under the Bill. These regulations were published in draft last week to enable parliamentary scrutiny and are available from the Printed Paper Office. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has considered those regulations and made a report, which I am sure many noble Lords will have considered. I thank the committee’s members for their work. They have, as always, provided a useful and thorough review of the issues. In the case of this Bill, they have done so in a necessarily short period of time.

The committee is of course correct that it would be best to avoid a gap between the passage of this legislation and the passage of regulations. That is why the Home Secretary has been clear that our intention is to ensure that this secondary legislation can be approved by both Houses before the Summer Recess. This should reassure members of the committee, and other noble Lords, that the powers in question will not be exercised in lieu of those regulations being approved. It will not, therefore, be necessary to use the “made affirmative” procedure in this case. However, I thank my noble friend Lady Thomas of Winchester and her committee: their suggestion was a positive one. I am pleased that we have been able, through the usual channels, to ensure a more direct way of achieving the same objective —bringing the regulations into play before the Summer Recess.

The committee has also invited me to address the potential scope of the delegated power at Clause 1(3). I am pleased to do so. The Government have already published a provisional draft of the regulations to be made under the Bill, and these go no further than the existing data retention regulations 2009. They are, I can confirm, limited to matters relating to the powers conferred by Clause 1(1) and (2). I hope that this will satisfy the House of the Government’s intention.

The second part of the Bill deals with interception. In relation to interception, Clauses 4 and 5 make it clear that the obligation under RIPA to comply with interception warrants applies to all those companies that provide communications services to people in the United Kingdom, regardless of where those companies happen to be based. These provisions do not extend existing powers. They simply seek to make explicit what has always been asserted to be the case.

I know that many noble Lords will be interested in Clause 5, which clarifies the definition of a telecommunications service. When RIPA was considered by Parliament in 2000, it was intended to be technologically neutral. Much of it relates to fixed line or mobile telephony, so it also covers web-based e-mail and social media communications. We are simply seeking to clarify that definition in order to put this matter beyond doubt.

These provisions will make clear the legal obligation on companies that provide communications services to people in the UK to comply with warrants issued by the Secretary of State. In the absence of such clarity, vital capabilities may be lost in the near future. It is of course never ideal for these matters to be considered in haste, but I trust that noble Lords will agree that it is imperative that we urgently address these issues.

I know that some noble Lords have asked about the delay between the court judgment on 8 April and this legislation being introduced. Following that judgment we needed to balance the necessity to respond quickly with the need to ensure that care was taken to get our response right. We could not have acted prior to that judgment because the precise response needed to be framed in relation to the detail of the judgment. While we are clear that the existing regulations remain in force, we must act now to put this matter beyond doubt, providing a basis in primary legislation and responding to some of the points made by the court.

In relation to interception, as I have told the House, we have reached a dangerous tipping point. It has become clear that without immediate legal clarity we could soon see a loss of vital co-operation. This is not a matter that we are able to leave until after the Summer Recess.

I express my thanks to both sides of the House for the support that they have given to the Bill. It has been constructive, I think, to have spent Monday talking to various Peers about it. I particularly pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, for the constructive approach that the Opposition have taken. I look forward to an equally constructive debate in the House as we consider the Bill on Second Reading and at later stages.

I recognise that this is a tight timetable, but I hope that I have made clear the reasons for that. They were accepted in the House of Commons, which overwhelmingly backed the Bill yesterday. I am sure that noble Lords agree that we must ensure that the police and the security and intelligence agencies have the capabilities they need to protect the public and keep us safe. That is what the Bill will do. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, this debate has been an exceptional debate, not only because we are dealing with something of great importance but also because we have heard some extremely able and interesting speeches. Some have been more supportive than others of the Bill I have presented to the House, but I found them all interesting. The debate reflects the ability of this House to recognise the importance and significance of legislation and the scrutiny it can offer. We know that these are extraordinary circumstances: we are being asked to consider fast-track legislation. However, I think that everyone understands why the Government need a sense of urgency about this legislation.

I hope that where noble Lords have expressed reservations about that, I will be able to reassure them. I appreciate the concerns of some noble Lords about the constrained timetable, given the time that has elapsed between the ECJ judgment and this Bill being introduced. I hope that the House will understand and accept that we have had to make sure that our response both addressed the needs of law enforcement and intelligence agencies and provided the appropriate safeguards and public reassurance. This inevitably required careful consideration, in order to create a package to which all parties could agree.

We feel that it is important that the Bill has been widely supported across the parties, and indeed passed through the House of Commons with a very large majority. Building that consensus was important in a matter that was clearly as important as this.

In the absence of a clear legal basis for retaining communications data, the police stand to lose access to vital information, which—as has been pointed out—contributes to 95% of serious crime prosecutions. Unless we make clear the obligations that RIPA imposes on companies based overseas but providing services here in the UK, the security and intelligence agencies stand to lose their ability to monitor terrorists and organised crime groups in this country. Indeed, as a number of noble Lords have said, and have agreed with the Government, the Bill does not provide new powers. It does not alter or extend existing powers. It simply provides a clear legal basis for powers that the police and intelligence agencies have always relied on to keep people safe, which for different reasons—and there are different reasons within the two parts of the Bill—are now in question.

We have been clear that the Bill is not a permanent solution to the challenges we face in the future. We had a brilliant speech from my noble friend Lord Blencathra, who talked about the scrutiny he had given to previous attempts to find a solution to these problems. It is quite clear that in this Bill we are not attempting to address the future proofing of which he talked. It does not address the growing gap in relation to communications data that the draft communications data Bill sought to resolve. Nor does it address the wider question of the powers that law enforcement, and the security and intelligence agencies, will require in the future.

Those issues will have to be addressed. That is why the provisions in the Bill fall away at the end of 2016. A number of noble Lords have said that we need an earlier sunset. However, if we are to have a proper successor to RIPA, if we are to have a proper evaluation of this matter and if we are to have the public debate about these issues that noble Lords have called for, we need time to do so. Although there have been suggestions that we are being governed by the political timetable—the electoral timetable—I think it is important that we recognise that legislation is dependent on Governments, and Governments have to be elected. Governments have to develop programmes that they are able to communicate.

It is to the credit of this Parliament that we have been able to agree on this issue. I do not know who will form the Government after the election. I do, however, know that it is important that, whichever Government are elected, they have the responsibility of finding a successor to this law and future proofing this sort of issue in the ways outlined so ably by my noble friend. That is why the provisions will fall away. There will be a public debate. I want a public debate. It will have to take account of not only the threats we face but the safeguards required to strike the necessary balance between privacy and security.

[Lord Soley]

This is a very important point. I am sympathetic to the longer sunset, but I do not understand what sort of structures the Government want to put into place to enable that public debate to inform the changes.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

For a start, not only will there be a review of this piece of legislation on a six-monthly basis, something that has been agreed and now forms part of the Bill, but David Anderson, the independent reviewer—that is the very paragraph I was turning to, the noble Lord, Lord Soley, will be delighted to know—will lead a review into these issues. The Bill now provides a clear basis in law for that review. The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, suggested that Mr Anderson look at his report as a starting point for addressing this sort of issue. That will be available before the election, and will help inform public debate during the election. The wider safeguards and assurances that sit around the Bill are also important. I am glad that noble Lords have taken account of those safeguards, which build on the extensive safeguards that already exist.

However, there are wider issues, and I will do my best to go through some of them at this stage. I am going to demand a lot of my officials, in the sense that I will ask them, to the extent that they are able, before Committee tomorrow morning, to draft a letter which can be circulated to all noble Lords who have participated —if I do not get time, because I am conscious of time.

In a very interesting speech, the noble Lord, Lord Knight, asked whether there was compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights. The Home Secretary and I have signed on the Bill a declaration that it is so. We have also made available the memorandum to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which explains how our Bill satisfies the ECHR. I hope that that reassures the noble Lord.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked: what are our plans for the timing of regulations? I understand the interest in that. The draft regulations have been published and we have informed the House that the Government’s intention is to lay the regulations following Royal Assent, so that they can be approved by both Houses of Parliament prior to recess. They have, of course, already been published, as I said, and we are liaising with both the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments and the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, ably chaired by my noble friend Lord Goodlad, to ensure that they can consider these matters as soon as possible. The JCSI will meet on Monday to consider the regulations, so that the Commons can debate them prior to recess.

The noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, asked why the measures were not part of the Queen’s Speech. When the gracious Speech was written, our response had not been finalised. The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, asked why it did not form part of the Serious Crime Bill, which she and I are seeing through this House and has finished in Committee. As she knows, we will not return to Report until October. The difficulty of the timetable for that Bill means that it will not be through all its stages before the new year, if we are lucky.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

My Lords, the Minister has given answers to a lot of the questions that have been raised, but I said, when I talked about introducing the provisions at the same time as the Serious Crime Bill, that although these provisions may have had to be taken more quickly than the rest of the Bill, it is still the view of most Members of your Lordships’ House that these provisions could have been brought in sooner.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, I do not think that the Government consider that that was a satisfactory way to deal with the problem.

The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, asked why the Intelligence and Security Committee did not have time to report on the Bill. I note the noble Lord’s concern on that, but I draw his attention to remarks in the Commons yesterday by the chairman of the committee, Sir Malcolm Rifkind. He said:

“The Intelligence and Security Committee has considered the Bill, and we have taken evidence from the intelligence agencies on its content. If we were concerned in any way that the Bill simply added to the powers available to the Government and that they were using a fast-track procedure to implement it, we would not be able to recommend its endorsement, but we are satisfied that that is not the case”.—[Official Report, Commons, 15/7/14; col. 725.]

Noble Lords should bear that in mind.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

My Lords—

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

Perhaps the noble Lord will allow me to answer other people’s questions.

The noble Lord, Lord Soley, asked about Royal Assent; I think that I have dealt with that. The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, was particularly concerned about the nature of the matters that we are trying to deal with. There are already a number of reviews in the system, including that to be headed by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, David Anderson. He needs to be given time to conduct that work. I see no point in requiring Parliament to return to those issues almost as soon as we return from the Summer Recess without the benefit of the work that we have set in train. Any such legislation would require an accelerated timetable, and we do not want to be doing that again if we can avoid it. I think all noble Lords will agree on that.

The noble Lord, Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, asked whether David Anderson’s review would cover all use of communications data. Clause 7 makes clear that the review covers the operation and regulation of investigatory powers. That extends to communications data for all purposes under RIPA for which it can be obtained. I hope that that reassures the noble Lord.

The noble Lord, Lord Knight, also asked: would the review consider all legislation relating to communications and lawful interception? It does indeed; I have just explained that to the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong.

In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, who is about to resume her place, as I said in my Second Reading speech, we intend to create a privacy and civil liberties board. The terms of reference can be found on the Home Office website and in the Printed Paper Office. Legislation would be required to establish the board, and we will have plenty of opportunity to discuss the detail of the board’s functions then.

I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Carlile for the work that he has done in this area; he has been a very important figure in these matters. David Anderson, his successor, has been consulted on the proposals before the announcement was made to Parliament and as they have developed. Parliament will have the opportunity to debate these matters fully when the legislation to create the board is presented.

The noble Lord, Lord Judd, asked about US data sharing. He will be aware that the Government have announced the appointment of a senior diplomat to look at the issue of data sharing. That is another feature of the non-legislative part of the announcements made by the Home Secretary in the Statement which I repeated here.

My noble friend Lord Paddick asked: what is the annual transparency report and how does it relate to the internet section of the commissioner’s report? There will be an annual transparency report relating to the exercise of powers under RIPA. It will take advantage of as much detail as possible. There will, of course, be a six-monthly report on the operation of the Bill.

My noble friend Lord King of Bridgwater asked: will we reform the ISC so that the chairman is drawn from the Opposition? In view of the reforms that we have made in the Justice and Security Act 2013, the Government have no immediate plans to make further changes, but it is a matter that is live and to which Parliament may well wish to return.

I turn to some of the detailed items under data retention types. The regulations made under the Bill will directly replace the data retention regulations of 2009; they will not extend the list of data types being regulated.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, asked about the ECJ judgment on the EU data retention directive. It did not take account of any of the domestic safeguards that we had in place. Many of the ECJ’s concerns were addressed in the UK’s domestic legislation. The difficulty in responding to the judgment was that we had to consider how we implemented some of the safeguards so that it was clear that they were in primary legislation, not the secondary legislation in which we had translated the European directive in the first place.

I have always enjoyed listening to the legal mind of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, working in its Rolls-Royce fashion. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, also asked: how do the regulations respond to the issue of the ECJ judgment? They will replace the 2009 data retention regulations. In particular, regulations will set out what must be specified in a data retention notice; place requirements on the Secretary of State to keep such notices under review; set out the security requirements that apply; provide that service providers can be reimbursed for any expenses incurred in complying with the requirements; and revoke the 2009 regulations, as they will be redundant.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, asked why Clause 1(1) does not use the wording of the ECJ judgment. The test in the Bill requires the Secretary of State to consider whether it is necessary to require a provider to retain data, but also whether it is proportionate for that legitimate aim. This is in accordance with the judgment, which also makes it clear that it is necessary to verify the proportionality of any interference with a person’s rights when requiring the retention of data. That is why that particular wording referring to proportionality is used.

My noble friend Lord Blencathra raised a plethora of issues, if I may refer to them as such. It is vital that future consideration bears in mind the parliamentary inquiry and accordingly, as I have said, it is explicitly referred to in the terms of reference. Local councils will no longer be able to access communications data under these proposals. From the lists that I have seen, the Egg Marketing Inspectorate does not, nor has it ever had, access to communications data under RIPA. Indeed, Defra will also be losing its entitlement to such access in future. We recognise that the list has grown and that it needs to be cut down. The 13 bodies which will have their powers removed are the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, the Port of Liverpool Police, the Port of Dover Police, the Royal Mail, BIS, Defra, the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development in Northern Ireland, the Environment Agency, the Scottish Environment Protection Agency, the Department of the Environment in Northern Ireland, the Food Standards Agency, the Pensions Regulator and the Charity Commissioners. I should think that noble Lords are amazed that those bodies had access in the first place. This just shows the necessity for reviewing this sort of legislation and working it out on the basis of who actually needs it.

There was some concern over territoriality—a difficult word to say, particularly if one has been sitting here for a few hours. The noble Lord, Lord Knight of Weymouth, raised this, as did my noble friends Lord Paddick and Lord Hodgson and the noble Lord, Lord Judd. The Bill clarifies the territorial extent of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act: in the absence of explicit extraterritorial jurisdiction, some companies have started to question whether the legislation applies to them. This is nothing new. Jack Straw—who as Home Secretary was responsible for RIPA in the first place—made this clear yesterday in the House of Commons. He stated that the “clear intention” of that Act was to extend extraterritoriality. My noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne quoted Jack Straw to great effect; his was a very effective speech. I am pleased that many noble and noble and learned Lords, including the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, recognise that this is not an extension of powers.

I have done my best, within the relatively short time that I have had to wind up what has been an extremely useful debate, to reassure noble Lords about this issue. The wider safeguards that sit around the Bill are important and we will have a chance to discuss them at length. However, I am glad that noble Lords have taken account of them in discussing the Bill before us today. We will no doubt be back tomorrow to consider it in Committee. There are wider issues and it is good that they have been raised by my noble friend Lord Blencathra.

I welcome this debate, and I would like briefly to reflect on the importance of the issues that we will return to tomorrow. Communications data and interception powers are intrusive. They are rightly subject to very strict safeguards, but they are also of vital importance to the work of law enforcement and the security and intelligence agencies. Without the legislation that we are considering today, those powers would be undermined. Those who mean us harm would be able to evade detection. Put simply, lives would be at risk. These are important issues. That is why this debate has been an important one. On that basis, I commend the Bill to the House and ask that it receive its Second Reading.

Bill read a second time and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

Serious Crime Bill [HL]

Lord Taylor of Holbeach Excerpts

Tuesday 15th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall be brief. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has rightly set out in some detail a strong case for Amendment 40BZB, with which we are associated. I will not attempt to repeat the points that have already been so effectively and powerfully made. The need to recognise in the Bill that harm can be caused by emotional ill treatment and emotional neglect as well as physical ill treatment and neglect is important, as is the substitution of “serious harm”, which is consistent with other areas of criminal law, for “unnecessary suffering”, including the inference that there can be necessary suffering.

The amendment also defines “harm” and “wilfully”, with the latter definition stating that the person has to have the capacity to foresee that an act or omission would be likely to result in harm but none the less unnecessarily took that risk.

We also support the amendment moved in the name of my noble friend Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede that it should be specific that the age of children to whom a child cruelty offence applies is “under 18”.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend Lady Walmsley for moving her amendment, to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss—we are delighted to see her in her place, taking part in our debate—and to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for outlining their respective amendments. They have all brought extensive knowledge to this debate. We have missed my noble friend Lady Hamwee, who cannot be in her place this afternoon. I am sure the whole House wishes her well.

The amendments all relate to the scope of the offence of child cruelty in Section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933. Before I address the amendments, it may assist the Committee if I explain our approach in Clause 62. I am grateful for the general welcome which the clause has received. I am grateful, too, for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. Many of those welcoming the Bill spoke in support of the amendments. That I understand, and I will try to address their concerns.

The offence in Section 1 of the 1933 Act is committed when a person over the age of 16 who has responsibility for a child under that age wilfully assaults, ill treats, neglects, abandons or exposes that child in a manner likely to cause unnecessary suffering or injury to health, including any mental derangement. That is the law as it stands. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has been among those who have argued for some time—as she has pointed out, in her discussions with my right honourable friend Damian Green in his ministerial capacity and with me— that the offence of child cruelty in the 1933 Act lacks the necessary clarity when it comes to tackling psychological suffering or injury to children.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Brinton for bringing this important matter before the Committee. We all recognise that every child should be protected from sexual and other forms of abuse and neglect, and this Government are absolutely committed to doing everything that we can to ensure that they have the full protection they deserve. In recent years—I scarcely need to say this to noble Lords—we have seen appalling cases of organised and persistent child sex abuse. This includes abuse by celebrities as well as the systematic abuse of vulnerable girls in Rochdale, Oxford and other towns and cities. Some of these cases have exposed failures by public bodies to take their duty of care seriously, and some have shown that the organisations responsible for protecting children from abuse, including the police, social services and schools, have failed to work together properly.

That is why, in April 2013, the coalition Government established the national group on sexual violence against children and vulnerable people, which is led by the Minister for Crime Prevention, my right honourable friend Norman Baker. This cross-government group was established to learn the lessons from some of the cases that I have mentioned and the resulting reviews and inquiries. As a result of its work, we now have better guidance for the police and prosecutors and better identification of children at risk of exploitation through the use of local multiagency safeguarding hubs.

I assure my noble friend Lady Brinton and other Members of the Committee that we are aware that there is more to be done. Significantly, as I informed the House on Monday last week, the Government are establishing an independent inquiry panel of experts in the law and child protection to consider whether public bodies and other non-state institutions have taken seriously their duty of care to protect children from sexual abuse. It will begin its work as soon as possible after the appointment of all the members of the panel. I hope to be able to report back to the House with details of those members and the terms of reference for the inquiry panel very soon.

Meanwhile, the work of the national group continues apace. As part of this work, the group has considered the issue of mandatory reporting and whether there is a need for some form of more targeted statutory reporting regime to deliver better protection for children and vulnerable adults. However, the picture here is, by definition, a very complex one. Some evidence suggests that, in the USA, Australia and Canada, mandatory reporting legislation has been accompanied by significant increases in the number of referrals of suspected child abuse and neglect made to the authorities, a large percentage of which in the end were not substantiated. As the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth of Breckland, pointed out, there is a risk that child protection services can be diverted from the task of increasing the safety of our most vulnerable children to evidence gathering and investigation of cases that are eventually unsubstantiated and which often lead to significant disruption of family life. Those words from the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth, are important to bear in mind.

Having said that, there is an emerging consensus that action must be taken to address the clear failures in public protection in the past. Indeed, noble Lords may have seen remarks just last week by Peter Wanless, chief executive of the NSPCC—an organisation which has the protection of children at its heart—which supported the introduction of a criminal offence making covering up and hiding child abuse within institutions illegal. Those and other views are an important contribution to the debate, and I would like to assure the Committee that this issue is being actively and carefully considered. The primary concern from all involved is the uncertainty about the number of reports that would result and, if there were large numbers, how those reports would be triaged to ensure that the most serious cases were identified. It is hugely important that, if we are to propose changes of this kind, we make absolutely sure that we get it right.

It is against this background that I now turn to the detail of Amendments 40BZD and 40BZE. Those would place a requirement on police, when investigating a child cruelty offence under Section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, to inform the local safeguarding children and adults board of the investigation. Subsequently, the local authority would be placed under a duty to liaise with relevant officials, such as those at the child’s school, social services or the police. My noble friend seems to be addressing concerns that relevant children’s services are not sufficiently joined up in their response to child safeguarding. That concern has of course been borne out by several recent serious case reviews. I concur absolutely with the intention behind these amendments. As I have indicated, the Government are already committed to considering these issues. However, as I have also said, there is no easy solution. While we accept that this is a pressing issue, such consideration will necessarily take some time. In advocating a change in the law, Peter Wanless has acknowledged the need for further discussions as to the form of any new reporting duty and to whom it should apply.

It is right that the Government take the time to consider this important issue fully, in the light of all the evidence and having considered the views of the many experts and stakeholders, who rightly hold strong views. My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe and the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth of Breckland, pointed out that there are other factors that have to be borne in mind. The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, pointed out that the issue is far from simple and there are also funding questions to be considered. I say to noble Lords that their views will be very welcome in this context. I know that a number of Members of this House have already been involved in this important debate. I encourage others to be involved in providing us with views and information on which we can base a decision that achieves the objective of safeguarding children.

The Government recognise concerns about our current safeguarding system and understand the public’s anxiety about the reporting of child abuse. They are taking this issue very seriously and want to make sure that any action they take achieves the desired outcome of improving safeguarding for all our children and vulnerable adults. Given the complexities involved, it is right that we look carefully at this matter. The new independent inquiry panel is also relevant here. For these reasons, I cannot offer my noble friend an assurance that the Government will legislate in line with her specific proposals. I can, however, give an assurance that the Government take this issue very seriously and, should there be a need for further legislative change and action, we will bring forward measures to deliver this as soon as possible.

My noble friend highlighted the need for all involved in child protection to work together more effectively. I cannot agree more. All the evidence suggests that the best protection and results happen when agencies work together and when not just a single agency considers the protective needs of the child. That is why the Government have undertaken significant work to improve our understanding of the different multiagency models in place to support information sharing around safeguarding responses for vulnerable people.

I hope that my noble friend will be reassured by this. There is already guidance requiring social workers to convene a strategy discussion—the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth, will know all about this—with all relevant professionals who are known to the child and the family if they suspect a child may be suffering significant harm. Our guidance is also clear that support should be given to a child as soon as need is identified. Early help services can be delivered by teachers, youth workers and health workers to support children. It is important to bear in mind that that work can be invaluable in dealing with these matters promptly. In the light of what I have said about what the Government are doing and the invitation to noble Lords to be involved in that process, I ask my noble friend to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Brinton]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I absolutely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth, that time pressure, particularly on social workers, is a key and fundamental problem. It is one of those adages that Governments always produce legislation for statutory work but often, certainly in the current climate, do not fund the support required to deliver that effectively. I am sure that training is vital. However, I am mindful of the NSPCC survey of social work professionals. If only 7% believe that timely action is being taken in cases of emotional abuse, partly because of training and partly because of identification, there is an issue. Guidance may well be available, but there are still concerns.

I am very grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, for raising the issue of child and adolescent mental health services. I hope that it may be possible for the Minister and those of us who are interested in this issue to meet Norman Lamb to talk about the pressure on child and adolescent mental health services, particularly for this group of children who may not automatically be referred to those services. We are told that in some areas there is an 18-month waiting list for a child to be referred. For a child who is being emotionally abused, that is far too long.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I will do my utmost to try to arrange for noble Lords who have spoken—and, indeed, others who may be interested in this subject—to meet Norman Lamb and, indeed, Norman Baker, who, as noble Lords know, also has responsibilities in this area.

[Baroness Brinton]

I am very grateful to my noble friend the Minister for saying that.

I thank my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for her contribution, with which I agreed. I was a county councillor for some years and I have concerns about the Minister’s comment regarding the priorities of triage when big issues are involved. In Cambridgeshire, we had a case where a family had two adopted children and anyone would have thought they were absolutely the apple of their parents’ eye. They were doted on completely. If they had been triaged, people would have said there was no reason at all to look any further. Yet these children were being quite severely emotionally abused. They had to be removed from their family and placed with foster parents. The foster parents’ reports about their next year with the children, as they unscrambled what had gone on, shows we have to understand that sometimes triage, which can be obvious in an accident and emergency sense, may be much more complex when looking at issues of emotional needs.

Regardless of that, I am grateful to the Minister and look forward to hearing more about the report back on the members of the inquiry panel and its remit. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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[Lord Rosser]

I will raise one question, to which I hope the Minister will be able to respond. The right reverend Prelate has referred to the indication given in the Commons last week by the Prime Minister that the Government were looking at whether we should change the law so that there will be a requirement to report abuse and it will be a criminal offence not to report it. Can the Minister be more specific than he appeared to be on the last group of amendments about the timescale within which the Government expect these deliberations to be concluded?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, this has been a very high-value debate whose contributions inform the Government. I will try to make sure that all colleagues in government with an interest in this matter are sent a copy of our debate.

I cannot give the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, any details of the timescale. If, in the course of time, I have more information, I will try to tell him in good time, but at the moment I cannot. In a way, this debate needs to be taken in conjunction with the one we had on my noble friend Lady Brinton’s debate; it covers very similar territory but it goes just that little bit further. I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Walmsley for tabling this amendment to enable us to look at this particular aspect.

There is a significant difference between the amendments. Amendment 40BZEA would place a duty on those working in regulated sectors who are in a position of trust in relation to children or vulnerable people to report suspicions of abuse to the appropriate local authority within 10 days. Breach of that duty would be a criminal offence punishable by up to three years in prison. This would mean essentially that anyone who works with children or vulnerable adults would commit a criminal offence if they did not report suspected abuse of any kind.

I hope that I can provide some reassurance to my noble friend Lady Walmsley and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham about the current process of referrals to social services. The noble Baroness, Lady Howarth, referred to this. It is important to recognise that existing statutory guidance is already crystal clear that professionals should refer immediately to social care when they are concerned about a child or vulnerable adult. Many thousands of referrals are made to children’s social care each year. In the year ending March 2013, there were 593,500 referrals—that is nearly 600,000. I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Walmsley for offering to provide me with figures that she has available, but I think that we need to bear that figure in mind and appreciate the scale of the situation that we are seeking to engage in.

The most important thing is that people understand how to spot abuse and neglect and the impact that it has on children and vulnerable adults. While we are continuing to review the evidence for the specific case of reporting in regulated settings, we are also continuing to take action to improve the knowledge and skills of professionals working with children and other vulnerable people.

As I indicated in my response to the previous group of amendments, the Government fully understand the public’s anxiety about the potential underreporting of abuse, particularly sexual abuse. I can wholeheartedly support my noble friend’s objective with this amendment; we all want to see improved safeguarding for all children and vulnerable adults. As I have said, we are actively considering the case for a mandatory reporting duty, but the issues are complex, as the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth of Breckland, pointed out. As the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said, we need to consider what form such a duty might take, to whom it would apply and in what circumstances, and what the sanction for failure to comply should be. This amendment offers one approach, but we have just debated an alternative, more focused proposal, and the NSPCC has suggested a third model. Other organisations working to safeguard children and vulnerable adults will have ideas of their own as to how a mandatory reporting regime should be structured, as will other noble Lords. I have sought to encourage noble Lords to make sure that those conducting such investigations are aware of their views.

I can only again seek to reassure my noble friend and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham that we are actively examining the options and treating the matter with the urgency that it deserves. While I cannot undertake to bring forward government amendments on this issue on Report, I certainly expect that, by then, I will have more to say on where we have reached in our consideration of this important matter. Having put the issue firmly on the table as my noble friend has done, I hope that she will now be content to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Walmsley]

My Lords, I thank all those who have taken part in this debate. I thank the Minister for his reply and the right reverend Prelate for his support.

There has been some discussion about terminology. Noble Lords might have detected that I did not use the phrase “mandatory reporting” in my introduction because I know that it causes some people some difficulty. I have also avoided using the word “professionals” in my amendment. We may not want to call a school secretary or a dinner lady a professional, yet they would need to have a CRB check to work in a school and they are specified in Schedule 4 to the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, which is in my amendment. When my noble friend asks to whom the duty should apply, my reply is that it is those people. So it is already in law.

I agree that the issues are complex and that we should approach the whole thing with a great deal of caution. I agree that there are different systems across the world and we need to find out which system suits this country best. I also agree that we need a culture change; I am pretty sure that I said so. We need training not just for the professionals but for the children so that they understand how to protect themselves. We probably need more resources as well because, as I said, there is an awful lot of undetected child abuse out there which has never been treated, and it never goes away. There is no such thing as historic child abuse; it is always current in the lives of the victims, who never lose it.

With that, I have done my very best to persuade all noble Lords. I will have to leave it at that for the moment, but I suspect that I may come back to it at the next stage of the Bill. We shall see. I shall watch with great interest what happens with the terms of reference of the new inquiry committee, the personnel and how they go about their job. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, we are associated with these amendments and support them. I do not intend to go through the points already so eloquently made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, except simply to repeat that the current system of non-statutory notices does not encourage confidence in the system from victims and their families in the ability of the police to protect them when the provisions are breached. The notice leads to no action being taken unless the thresholds of an abduction threat have been met, which is not always the case. As has been said, the threshold means that the adult must have taken or detained the child.

Creating an offence of breach of a proposed child abduction warning order is likely to strengthen victims’ confidence in seeking help and protection, since it will lead to action being taken against the perpetrator if they breach the order. Once again, I hope that the Minister will be able to give a positive response.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

Again, this has been an interesting debate, and I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in it. Child exploitation is an abhorrent crime and we are determined to tackle it in whatever form it takes. The findings of a recent parliamentary inquiry, of which noble Lords will be aware, chaired by Sarah Champion MP and supported by Barnardo’s, have been very helpful in contributing to the ongoing work being done by the Government to tackle child sexual exploitation. The recommendations of that inquiry will be crucial in helping to inform our policy and improve our understanding of this form of offending and, indeed, what more we should be doing about it. Specifically, the inquiry received significant evidence relating to child abduction warning notices and, as a result, this issue featured prominently in their report and is now the subject of these two amendments.

It might help if I updated noble Lords on government thinking in this area as at present. This Government have already taken clear action to tackle child sexual exploitation. As the Committee will recall, as part of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, we are introducing a number of new police powers. First, we are providing for more effective civil prevention orders, namely the new sexual harm prevention order and the sexual risk order. Secondly, new powers will allow the police to require hotels and similar establishments to provide information about guests whom they believe may be involved in sexual exploitation. Thirdly, we are bringing in strengthened powers for police to close premises associated with child sexual exploitation, a provision championed by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, who cannot be in her place today but for whose support on this matter I am very grateful.

With regard to child abduction warning notices, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for articulating the case for putting these notices on a statutory footing. The Government note that proposals to strengthen the impact of these orders have the support of the police, legal experts, representatives of local agencies, young people who have been affected by sexual exploitation, children’s charities and others. As part of the work of the National Group on Sexual Violence against Children and Vulnerable People, my ministerial colleagues have given assurances that the Home Office would look at the effectiveness of the existing child abduction warning notices and, in liaison with police colleagues, examine how best this tool can be used in future. In doing so, we will consider carefully the operational benefits of putting these notices on a statutory footing and how such a statutory scheme might operate. We are currently consulting carefully with policing colleagues to seek their views on the potential use of a statutory notice and whether, in their view, further changes are required to better protect children.

Amendment 40CC is an important contribution to this debate. The existing non-statutory child abduction warning notices are issued by the police. That is entirely appropriate where breach of a notice is not, of itself, a criminal offence. But it would be an unusual step for the police themselves to impose what amounts to a restraint order or injunction, breach of which is a criminal offence. If we made it statutory, we would have to consider that. Compare, for example, restraint orders under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 which are granted by the courts. Other civil preventive orders, such as serious crime prevention orders and gang injunctions which are dealt with elsewhere in this Bill, are also subject to judicial oversight. We would need to see how that played in with the current arrangements of non-statutory warning notices.

Other issues that we need to consider are the test for the grant of an order, the prohibitions or restrictions that may be attached to an order and the penalty for breach. I note, too, that the amendment requires a child to have been found two or more times in the company of the person to be made the subject of an order. Elsewhere, the inquiry proposed amending the grooming offence in Section 15 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to remove the requirement for a second contact with the child. The Government have now tabled an amendment to the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill to that end, as my noble friend Lady Walmsley said. We need to consider whether the approach taken in child abduction warning notices should mirror that in the amended grooming offence.

Amendment 40CB seeks to raise the age threshold from 16 to 18 years for the child abduction offence in Section 2 of the Child Abduction Act 1984, bringing it into line with the summary offence in Section 49 of the Children Act 1989 of abducting a child in care. Children in care are particularly vulnerable and that is why the Children Act 1989 makes it an offence to take any child who is in care, including a 16 or 17 year-old, away from the person responsible for them without lawful authority or reasonable excuse. However, while we recognise the arguments made for consistency, there are contrary arguments and difficult issues raised. Young people aged 16 and 17 can live independently of their parents and, in many respects, are able to make their own decisions about how they live their life, including their sexual relationships. It is in recognition of this that the Child Abduction Act 1984 applies only where the child is under 16 and the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction ceases to operate when the child reaches the age of 16 years.

However, we are committed to examining the case for placing child abduction warning notices on a statutory footing. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has made a reasoned case for doing so and it deserves serious consideration. All speakers tended to favour the idea that statutory footing for the child abduction warning notices should be considered. While Report stage is some three months off, I cannot say to noble Lords that we will have completed our review by that point. I can undertake to update the House on progress and, of course, noble Lords are free to bring back the amendment, or a variation of it, at the next stage. I hope that I will be able to update noble Lords on how the Government have progressed arguments. Clearly, the debate we have had today will be helpful.

I cannot say the same in connection with Amendment 40CB. That amendment would have significant wider implications and for the reasons I have given I am not persuaded of the case for that particular change. However, given what I have said, I hope that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, in proposing the amendment at the beginning of this debate, will feel free to withdraw the amendments tabled in her name and that I will have the opportunity when we return to this subject of updating noble Lords accordingly.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

My Lords, first, I thank everyone who has spoken in this short debate. It has been extremely helpful. Perhaps I might ask the Minister whether he thinks my contribution on warning notices was as helpful as that of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser—because it was actually my amendment. Not to worry, but I could not resist saying that.

Secondly, on the warning notice, I am well aware that it would be extremely unlikely that the police would have the power to issue a criminal notice of that sort—although in other circumstances, of course, they issue cautions, which have a very significant effect without ever going through a court. However, if an offender does not accept a police notice and continues to groom, I could see the advantages of a very speedy application to the magistrates’ court. That seems to me to be the answer to that particular problem. The magistrates could then issue the appropriate order, which the offender would have to comply with. That might be the right way round—I did not go in to all that.

As for the age of 18, having spent many years on the Hague Convention, I am well aware that on international abductions the age of 16 applies right across the world. Nearly 200 countries have signed up to that, including of course ourselves. However, this is abduction of a rather different sort, within the United Kingdom. It is just as dangerous and just as worrying as international abduction. We only have to look at the press reports of the cases in Rotherham and Rochdale, without going into Luton or Oxford or other places where there was grooming of girls, to know that a considerable number of those girls were not in care. Some of the girls and some of the parents were seeking help; and some of the girls probably were over 16. Therefore the vulnerability of the young is not limited to those within the care system.

I can see very well that it would be quite wrong to change the 1984 Act to include international abduction. However, I ask the Minister to reflect on whether that would not meet some of the really shocking issues that have occurred across not only the north of England but the Midlands and, relatively, the south of England. The vulnerable children there may need help beyond the age of 16. It is not beyond the wit of parliamentary draftsmen to put in an amendment to the 1984 Act dealing with grooming in England and Wales that may lead to abduction and not going across the international child abduction arrangements, which of course we follow in exactly the same way as every other country. Having made those points, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, Section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006 makes it an offence to engage in any conduct in preparation for giving effect to an intention to commit or assist another to commit one or more acts of terrorism. It also makes it an offence under Section 6 to provide or receive training for terrorism. The Act also provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction so that an offence may be tried in this country in respect of acts committed abroad. However, this is limited or non-existent in respect of the Section 5 and Section 6 offences to which I have referred.

Clause 65 would provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction for the Section 5 offence and extend the existing extraterritorial jurisdiction for the Section 6 offence. Such extraterritorial jurisdiction is considered appropriate for Section 5 and Section 6 offences because the places where training or preparation for terrorism are taking place are increasingly likely to be located abroad and will enable prosecutions in this country of people preparing or training more generally for terrorism who have, in the current circumstances, travelled from the UK to fight in Syria, where various groups are involved in the conflict.

We do not oppose this clause being in the Bill but have some points to raise about what the impact of the provision is expected to be—hence this debate on whether the clause should stand part of the Bill. I appreciate that the Minister may not be in a position to be too specific in his response, but can he give some examples of the kind of prosecutions which it will be possible to pursue under Clause 65 which it has not been possible until now to pursue under the existing legislation, and which would have been pursued had Clause 65 been effective? If prosecutions have already taken place for the offence of preparing for terrorist activities, what does Clause 65 add in reality to the legislative armoury? Has there been consultation with the Director of Public Prosecutions on the need for Clause 65? If a loophole in the current legislation has been identified which constitutes a potential threat to our security, does the Director of Public Prosecutions believe that the provisions of Clause 65 constitute the best way of addressing that loophole?

As I understand it, prosecutions under Clause 65 would need to be in open court and any evidence brought would have to be evidence acceptable in open court and disclosable in open court. If I am right in saying that, presumably intercept evidence and the evidence of informers, for example, will not be usable. In respect of people coming back from Syria, how is it envisaged that it will in practical terms be possible to gather evidence for a prosecution which relates to what the individual has done in Syria that can be pursued in open court? If the evidence to pursue a prosecution under Clause 65 cannot be used in open court, will a terrorism prevention and investigation measures order be sought, which would enable, for example, intercept evidence and the evidence of informers to be used, albeit it would be to obtain the appropriate order rather than to seek a conviction? Or are the Government claiming that Clause 65 will remove the need for TPIMs in a situation where no one on a TPIM has ever been prosecuted and when, in his last report, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation said that TPIMs continued to be needed?

I hope that the Minister will be able to address these points in his reply. Bearing in mind that Clause 65 relates to an extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction to enable offences to be tried in this country in respect of acts committed abroad under Sections 5 and 6 of the Terrorism Act 2006, it is not clear what the actual impact of Clause 65 will be as much of the evidence that becomes available is, if I have understood the situation correctly, unlikely to be able to be presented in open court and could be used only in seeking a TPIM order.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for affording the Committee an opportunity to debate this issue. I am sure that the noble Lord and, for that matter, the Committee as a whole will be in no doubt about the significant threat posed by foreign fighters, particularly in relation to Syria, and the importance the Government place on protecting the public from those who may seek to harm the UK or UK interests.

The nature of the threat from terrorism has evolved since the passing of the Terrorism Act 2006. Many of the threats we face today have significant overseas connections and the places where UK-linked individuals, and those seeking to harm UK interests, may now be training, or otherwise preparing for terrorism, are increasingly likely to be located abroad. Syria, in particular, has become the number one destination for jihadists in the world today, posing a threat to the region and beyond. However, the issue of individuals from the UK seeking to engage in combat and conflicts abroad is not new, nor is it specific to Syria. As my noble friend Lady Warsi, who is sitting next to me preparing to respond to the debate following this Committee stage, will be aware, the recent events in Iraq further demonstrate the fluidity of movement of foreign fighters and we are concerned that groups such as the al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant—or ISIL, as it is known—are now able to operate in the large areas of ungoverned space that have been created by the conflict. ISIL’s advances in Iraq in particular demonstrate the serious threat that that group poses to both countries, so it is right that we respond to this threat.

In support of wider government efforts to ensure that the full range of operational responses under the Contest strategy are being applied to counter this threat, Clause 65 amends Section 17 of the Terrorism Act 2006. This extends fully the jurisdiction of the UK courts over the offence of preparation of terrorist acts under Section 5 and the offence of training for terrorism under Section 6 of that Act so that preparation and training that take place abroad can be prosecuted. This measure will enable prosecution, on their return to the UK, of individuals who have travelled overseas to prepare or train for terrorism as though their actions had taken place in this country. Any prosecution under this measure will require the express consent of the Attorney-General, in addition to satisfying the Crown Prosecution Service that there is sufficient evidence and that prosecution is in the public interest. Our priority is to dissuade people from travelling to participate in conflicts abroad in the first place, but it is vital that our legislation is as robust as it can be against those who may seek to harm the UK in particular, and leaves no doubt in the minds of individuals engaging in preparatory acts of terrorism, or training for terrorism overseas, of the action we are prepared to take to protect the public.

The noble Lord asked whether it would enable us to prosecute cases which were not prosecutable at present. Recent cases show that these offences can be operationally useful. Mashudur Choudhury was recently convicted under Section 5 of preparing for terrorism in the UK. If, for example, he had undertaken these preparations outside the UK, he could not have been prosecuted. This measure seeks to address this anomaly.

How will this measure have an impact on foreign fighters? We assess that by extending UK territorial jurisdiction for this offence and bringing evidence of activities overseas within its scope, we will potentially strengthen the evidential case that can be made and enhance the prospects of a successful prosecution in some cases. In cases where there is only evidence of activity abroad, it will enable a prosecution to be brought where it is not currently possible.

The noble Lord asked whether we had consulted the Director of Public Prosecutions. We have worked closely with law enforcement partners, including the Crown Prosecution Service, in developing this measure. They fully support it and have suggested that this will be operationally useful. As for the question about gathering evidence and how law enforcement agencies will obtain the evidence required for a prosecution, particularly as it involves evidence gathering abroad, law enforcement agencies are accustomed to working with the relevant authorities in other countries for the purpose of gathering evidence for prosecutions. We fully expect that this established arrangement will continue to be employed for future prosecutions.

We recognise that any evidence gathering which involves other countries is inherently more challenging than if it were confined to the UK, but this does not mean that prosecution is impossible. That is the purpose of introducing these measures in Clause 65. These changes will ensure that UK linked individuals and those who seek to harm UK interests and travel overseas to prepare or train for terrorism can be prosecuted as if their actions had taken place in the UK and that they are not beyond the reach of the law. It is essential that our law enforcement partners are equipped with the right powers to counter the threat posed by foreign fighters who travel overseas to undertake terrorist activities and may go on to carry out terrorist attacks.

I hope that with those explanations the noble Lord will be prepared to accept that Clause 65 should form part of the Bill.

Clause 65 agreed.

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Moved by

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

41: Schedule 4, page 74, line 41, at end insert—
“25A In section 99 of that Act (postponement), after paragraph (c) of subsection (11) insert—
“(d) made a restitution order;(e) ordered the accused under section 253F(2) of the Procedure Act to pay a victim surcharge.”25B (1) Section 100 of that Act (effect of postponement) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (3)—
(a) at the end of paragraph (b) omit “or”;(b) after paragraph (c) insert—“(d) make a restitution order, or(e) order the accused under section 253F(2) of the Procedure Act to pay a victim surcharge.”(3) In subsection (4)—
(a) at the end of paragraph (b) omit “or”;(b) after paragraph (c) insert—“(d) making a restitution order, or(e) ordering the accused under section 253F(2) of the Procedure Act to pay a victim surcharge.”25C (1) Section 104 of that Act (no order made: reconsideration of case) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (7), after paragraph (d) insert—
“(e) any restitution order which has been made against the accused in respect of the offence (or any of the offences) concerned;“(f) any order under section 253F(2) of the Procedure Act requiring the accused to pay a victim surcharge in respect of the offence (or any of the offences) concerned.”(3) After subsection (8) insert—
“(8A) If a restitution order or an order under section 253F(2) of the Procedure Act has been made against the accused in respect of the offence or offences concerned, section 97A(2) and (4) does not apply.”
25D (1) Section 105 of that Act (no order made: reconsideration of benefit) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (10), after paragraph (d) insert—
“(e) any restitution order which has been made against the accused in respect of the offence (or any of the offences) concerned;“(f) any order under section 253F(2) of the Procedure Act requiring the accused to pay a victim surcharge in respect of the offence (or any of the offences) concerned.”(3) After subsection (11) insert—
“(11A) If a restitution order or an order under section 253F(2) of the Procedure Act has been made against the accused in respect of the offence or offences concerned, section 97A(2) and (4) does not apply.”
25E (1) Section 106 of that Act (order made: reconsideration of benefit) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (8), after paragraph (c) insert—
“(d) any restitution order which has been made against the accused in respect of the offence (or any of the offences) concerned;“(e) any order under section 253F(2) of the Procedure Act requiring the accused to pay a victim surcharge in respect of the offence (or any of the offences) concerned.” (3) In subsection (9)—
(a) for “the court must not” substitute “the court—(a) must not”;(b) at the end insert—“(b) must not have regard to an order falling within subsection (8)(d) or (e) if a court has made a direction under section 97A(2) or (4).”25F In section 118 of that Act (application of provisions about fine enforcement), in subsection (2) omit paragraph (k).
25G In section 131 of that Act (sums received by clerk of court)—
(a) in subsection (6), after “97(6)” insert “or 97A(4)”;(b) after that subsection insert—“(6A) If a direction was made under section 97A(2) or (4) for an amount payable under a restitution order or a victim surcharge under section 253F(2) of the Procedure Act to be paid out of sums recovered under the confiscation order, the clerk of court must next apply the sums in payment of that amount.”25H In section 153 of that Act (satisfaction of confiscation orders), in subsection (1) omit paragraph (b).”

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Moved by

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

42: Clause 69, page 51, line 14, leave out “15 and 16” and insert “(Restitution order and victim surcharge) to (Conditions for exercise of search and seizure powers)”

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Moved by

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

42A: Clause 70, page 51, line 26, at end insert “made by statutory instrument”

Communications Data and Interception

Lord Taylor of Holbeach Excerpts

Thursday 10th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)]

My Lords, with the leave of the House I will now repeat a Statement made this morning by my right honourable friend Theresa May, the Home Secretary. The Statement is as follows.

“With permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a Statement about the use of communications data and interception; the difficulties faced by the police, law enforcement agencies and the security and intelligence agencies in utilising those capabilities; and the steps the Government plan to take to address those difficulties.

Before I do so, I would like to make something very clear. What I want to propose in my Statement today is a narrow and limited response to a set of specific challenges we face. I am not proposing the introduction of the communications data Bill that was considered in draft by a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament last year. I still believe that the measures contained within that Bill are necessary—and so does the Prime Minister—but there is no coalition consensus for those proposals and we will have to return to them at the general election.

The House will know that communications data—the ‘who, where, when and how’ of a communication but not its content—and interception, which provides the legal power to acquire the content of a communication, are vital for combating crime and fighting terrorism. Without them, we would be unable to bring criminals and terrorists to justice, and we would not be able to keep the public safe.

For example, the majority of the Security Service’s top priority counterterror investigations use interception capabilities in some form to identify, understand and disrupt the plots of terrorists. Communications data has played a significant role in every Security Service counterterrorism operation over the past decade. It has been used as evidence in 95% of all serious organised crime cases handled by the Crown Prosecution Service. It has played a significant role in the investigation of many of the most serious crimes in recent times, including the Oxford and Rochdale child grooming cases, the murder of Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman and the murder of Rhys Jones. It can prove or disprove alibis; it can identify associations between potential criminals; and it can tie suspects and victims to a crime scene.

I have talked before about the decline in our ability to obtain the communications data we need, which is caused by changes in the way people communicate and the technology behind those forms of communication. That is why I continue to support the measures in the draft communications data Bill. In addition to that decline, we now face two significant and urgent problems relating to both communications data and interception. The first is the recent judgment by the European Court of Justice that calls into question the legal basis upon which we require communication service providers in the UK to retain communications data. The second is the increasingly pressing need to put beyond doubt the application of our laws on interception so that communication service providers have to comply with their legal obligations, irrespective of where they are based.

I can tell the House today that the Government are introducing fast-track legislation—through the data retention and investigatory powers Bill—to deal with those two problems. I deal first with communications data, because we must respond to the ruling by the European Court of Justice that the data retention directive is invalid. The directive was the legal basis upon which the Governments of EU member states were required to compel communication service providers to retain certain communications data where they do not otherwise require it for their own business purposes. Indeed, the ruling provides us with such a problem precisely because very strong data protection laws mean that, in the absence of a legal duty to retain data, companies must delete data that is not required beyond their strict business use. This means that, if we do not clarify the legal position, we risk losing access to all such communications data and, with it, the ability to protect the public and keep our country safe.

The ECJ ruling said that the data retention directive does not contain the necessary safeguards in relation to access to the data, but it did not take into account the stringent controls and safeguards provided by domestic laws—in particular, the UK’s communications data access regime, which is governed primarily by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. RIPA was, and remains, designed to comply with the European Convention on Human Rights. It ensures that access to communications data can take place only where it is necessary and proportionate for a specific investigation. It therefore provides many of the safeguards that the European Court of Justice said were missing from the data retention directive.

This ECJ judgment clearly has implications not just for the United Kingdom but also for other EU member states and we are in close contact with other European Governments. Other Governments, such as Ireland and Denmark, implemented the data retention directive through primary legislation, which means that they have retained a clear legal basis for their data retention policies, unless a separate, successful legal challenge to their legislation is made. The UK does not have that luxury, because here the data retention directive was implemented through secondary legislation. While we are confident that our regulations remain in force, the Government must act now to remove any doubt about their legal basis and to give effect to the ECJ judgment. The legislation I am publishing today—and the draft regulations that accompany it—will not only do this, they will enhance the UK’s existing legal safeguards and in so doing it will address the criticism of the European Court.

I want to be clear, though, that this legislation will merely maintain the status quo. It will not tackle the wider problem of declining communications data capability, to which we must return in the next Parliament. But it will ensure, for now at least, that the police and other law enforcement agencies can investigate some of the criminality that is planned and takes place online. Without this legislation, we face the very prospect of losing access to this data overnight, with the consequence that police investigations will suddenly go dark and criminals will escape justice. We cannot allow this to happen.

I want to turn now to interception because there is growing uncertainty among communication service providers about our interception powers. With technology developing rapidly and the way in which we communicate changing all the time, the communication service providers that serve the UK but are based overseas need legal clarity about what we can access. The House will understand that I cannot comment in detail on our operational capabilities when it comes to intercept, but I have briefed the Opposition on Privy Council terms and members of the Intelligence and Security Committee have heard first hand from the security and intelligence agencies and it is clear that we have reached a dangerous tipping point. We need to make sure that major communication service providers co-operate with the UK’s security and intelligence and law enforcement agencies when they need access to suspects’ communications. This would result immediately in a major loss of the powers and capabilities that are used every day to counter the threats we face from terrorists and organised criminals.

The Bill I am publishing today will therefore put beyond doubt the fact that the existing legal framework, which requires companies to co-operate with UK law enforcement and intelligence agencies, also extends to companies that are based overseas but provide services to people here in the UK. I will make copies of the draft Bill available to the Vote Office and the House Library. I will also make available in the Library the regulatory impact assessments and the draft regulations to be made under the Bill, in order to allow the opportunity for the House to scrutinise these proposals in full.

The parliamentary timetable for this legislation is inevitably very tight. My right honourable friend the Leader of the House has just provided details of the prospective timetable for the Bill’s consideration but it is crucial that we must have Royal Assent by Summer Recess. The Government have therefore sought to keep this Bill as short as possible. It is also subject to a sunset clause that means the legislation ceases to have effect from the end of 2016. This means that the Bill solves the immediate problems at hand and gives us enough time to review not just the full powers and capabilities we need, but also the way in which those powers and capabilities are regulated, before Parliament can consider new and more wide-ranging legislation after the general election.

It is right that we must balance the need to prevent criminal exploitation of communications networks with safeguards to protect ordinary citizens from intrusions upon their privacy. That is why, alongside the legislation I am publishing today, the Government will also introduce a package of measures to reassure the public that their rights to security and privacy are equally protected.

We will reduce the number of public authorities able to access communications data. We will publish an annual transparency report giving as much detail as possible—within obvious parameters—about the use of these sensitive powers. We will appoint a senior diplomat to lead discussions with other Governments to consider how we share data for law enforcement and intelligence purposes. We will establish a privacy and civil liberties board, based on the US model. This will build on the role of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, and the board will consider the balance between security and privacy and liberty in the full context of the threat we face from terrorism. And we will review the interception and communications data powers we need, as well as the way in which those powers and capabilities are regulated, in the full context of the threats we face. The Government are discussing in the usual channels the precise form this review might take, but I hope that an initial report will be published before the election.

I have said many times before that it is not possible to debate the correct balance between security and privacy—and, more specifically, the rights and wrongs of powers and capabilities such as access to communications data and interception—without understanding the threats we face as a country. Those threats remain considerable. They include the threat from terrorism—from overseas and from here in the UK—but also the threat from industrial, military and state espionage practised by other states and foreign businesses; the threat from organised criminal gangs; and the threat from all sorts of criminals whose work is made easier by cyber technology.

In the face of such a diverse range of threats, the Government would be negligent if they did not make sure that the people and the organisations that keep us safe—the police, other law enforcement agencies and the security and intelligence agencies—have the legal powers to utilise the capabilities they need. They are clear that we need to act immediately. If we do not, criminals and terrorists will go about their work unimpeded, and innocent lives will be lost. That is why I commend this Statement, and this Bill, to the House”.

My Lords, that concludes the Statement.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, once again I thank the noble Baroness for her support for the legislation. I am very happy to reassure her on the various aspects that she quite legitimately raised. It has of course not been possible to talk about this matter in public until today. Noble Lords will understand why that is the case, but the House will have the opportunity to consider the legislation. I expect that will be next week, but that will be for the usual channels to decide and announcements will be made.

The noble Baroness asked why we are having fast-track legislation—after all, the judgment was on 8 April. I can understand her concern. It is not easy to deal with things in fast-track legislation. On the other hand, I think she will understand that this is a difficult and sensitive area of policy. We did not want to get mired down in the communications data Bill, as the Joint Committee originally considered. We wanted to ensure that the measures that we were presenting, and which we are presenting in the Bill today, were sufficient to deal with the immediate problem and no more. We were not looking to extend any powers; we were just seeking to restore the situation ex ante the judgment. We wanted to ensure that there was proper consideration, to work with the law enforcement agencies and the data providers on how we dealt with this problem in legislation, and to give proper effect to the judgment that had been made by the European Court of Justice.

I am pleased that the noble Baroness has welcomed the sunset clause. We accept that this is, if I might use the expression, a puncture repair job; it is not equipping data protection with a new tyre so that it can corner more suitably for the road conditions of the future. Future-proofing has to await new legislation. Meanwhile, we are dealing with the problem that would face us if we did not act now. While I understand that the House will want to scrutinise in detail what we are doing, I hope that we will have its support in taking the Bill through.

The noble Baroness asked what contact there had been with the chairmen of the Constitution Committee and the Delegated Powers Committee. Some of the constitutional issues are addressed in the Explanatory Memorandum that is being published today, but I have tried to ring the chairman of the Constitution Committee; unfortunately, though, he was not available. I also tried to ring the chairman of the Delegated Powers Committee but unfortunately she was not available either. However, both are Members of this House and I have left messages. I shall try to talk to them over the weekend, as indeed I am intending to do with other noble Lords who are interested. Various Select Committee chairmen in the House of Commons have been briefed by the Prime Minister.

The data retention provisions of the Bill relate to comms data. However, I must make clear that companies must provide the content of the communication when served with a warrant issued by the Secretary of State. The powers laid out in the Bill do not change anything in that regard.

There were indications in the Statement that RIPA and its whole relationship with future legislation is a matter for review. If we are to inform a new Bill after the election, we will need to study where we are at present. The role of the independent terrorism legislation reviewer in this matter is clear, and David Anderson is likely to be involved in a number of discussions specifically aimed at ensuring not only that this legislation is achieving its objective but that any future legislation or arrangements regarding privacy are going to be effective.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for contacting me earlier this morning. Obviously, bringing this stop-gap legislation in such a hurry to both Houses has been a difficult process, and the opportunities for consultation have therefore been limited. There are very strong and divided views on these issues, including among human rights and civil liberties groups. I wonder whether the Minister can reassure the House that there will be consultation with those groups on regulations and guidance, if there is to be any, as well as their involvement in the review of RIPA.

I welcome what was described as a package of pro-civil liberties measures mentioned in the Statement. Will the Minister tell the House whether they will be introduced to the same swift timetable? Also—I do not mean the question to be frivolous—we are proposing to talk to the Americans, but have they agreed to talk to us?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

We have good discussions with all our allies and I can assure the noble Baroness that I have no fear in that regard. I understand what she is saying about civil liberties and much of the discussions about this have centred on ways in which we can enhance privacy protection. The noble Baroness is quite right; we have not had time to consult. Letters will be going to a large number of people and I know that the list includes a number of the best-known civil liberties groups. As far as future business is concerned, and the implementation of the powers in the Bill, they will be parties to the discussion in the usual way. I will do my best to ensure that the noble Baroness is also kept informed.

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, I am very supportive of what the Government are doing. I think it is absolutely appropriate, subject to the various caveats that my noble friend Lady Smith of Basildon raised. There is no doubt whatever, as the Minister said, that this has ensured in the past our security, our ability to tackle organised crime and our ability to get murderers, paedophiles and the like. There is no doubt whatever about that, and it was something that was going to be lost. But is it not a disgrace that we find ourselves in this position? The communications data Bill was looked at by a Joint Committee of the House. It made a mass of suggestions as to how it should be amended to protect privacy and civil liberties. All of those measures were taken in and agreed, and the Bill redrafted. I think that the Liberal Democrats should be ashamed of the fact that they did not agree then to go forward with the Bill. If it had gone forward, we would not now be rushing through this legislation. Does the Minister agree?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

Of course I do not agree. To be frank, I am a great believer in the partnership that the coalition represents. I have given an indication today in repeating the Statement that it is important to see this as a partnership between protecting individual liberty and at the same time making sure that we have the capability. I am so grateful to the noble Lord for his support in that regard. I am sure he would not expect me to go into detail as to why we have not progressed. We said in the Statement that we recognised that there was not enough unity of purpose across the coalition to continue with the communications data Bill. I make no apology for that. This will obviously be discussed at the time of the general election and hopefully afterwards we will be able to address the issue.

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick (CB)]

My Lords, I hope that the noble Lord will recall that a committee of privy counsellors was set up some years ago to consider the admission of the intercept as evidence in terrorist and criminal cases. Does he agree that the intercept, the actual words spoken, provides by far the strongest basis on which to convict terrorists and other serious criminals—far better than just the fact that a communication took place? When does he think that the Chilcot committee, which is still considering this matter, is going to report?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, I am not in a position to answer that particular question. It may be beyond the gift of anyone to answer it at this stage. The noble and learned Lord makes a very interesting point which I am sure will be considered, but it is not part and parcel of this legislation, which is very narrow in what it is seeking to achieve. We are not looking to extend the powers that we currently have available.

[Lord King of Bridgwater (Con)]

My Lords, to save the Minister embarrassment I do not expect him to reply to this point; I fully agree with the previous comment of the noble Lord, Lord West, about the failure to move forward with the previous Bill. Having said that, my noble friend will be aware that both Houses of Parliament are very leery indeed about emergency legislation, and are rightly suspicious of it. It is not just the cynics who say that they are not totally reassured when all parties are in agreement on emergency legislation, which has not always had a happy history.

Having said that, nobody could underestimate the importance of the matters that the Minister has discussed and of what the data have meant to the defence of this country. If ever there was a time not to reduce our defences, this must be it. Can the Minister confirm again that this represents no change in the present situation—that there is no advance in the intrusions on the citizen; it is a matter of data, not the content of messages? It is the “who, when and where” that are so vital in the pursuit of this.

The most important thing is that the provisions also contain the surprisingly short sunset clause, as I understand it, of May 2015—

[Lord King of Bridgwater]

That is still, for the matters which must be discussed, a short sunset clause. It is absolutely right that that is there, and I welcome it.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I am most grateful to my noble friend. As a former chairman of the Intelligence and Security Select Committee, I know that he—like the noble Lord, Lord West, from his ministerial role—can see inside this problem. I expect and want the House to scrutinise this legislation, because it is right and proper that we do so.

My noble friend is right also to point to the fact that the sunset clause allows an incoming Government only 18 months to put a new communications data Bill on the table if they choose to do so. If I were part of any such Government I would be exhorting prompt action in that area. Clearly, without the legislation that we are now hoping to bring forward, we place ourselves in an extraordinarily difficult position.

[Lord Davies of Stamford (Lab)]

My Lords, in all the unfortunate circumstances, the Government were quite right to respond to the ECJ decision as they have. However, on the first part of the Statement on the powers that we thought existed to compel private sector organisations to retain communications data, is not the unfortunate position in which the Government now find themselves a result of their tendency—perhaps more than a tendency; sometimes it looks like a default option—always to implement European directives whenever they can by means of secondary rather than primary legislation? It may the tendency of every bureaucracy, and perhaps every Minister, to try to minimise the degree of democratic transparency and parliamentary scrutiny through which they have to go to get legislation on the statute book. However, in the light of experience, do the Government not agree that they have been getting the balance wrong compared to other countries—the Minister cited the Irish and Danish examples—and that that balance needs to be looked at again?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

Well, we are now coming forward with primary legislation; I hope that it meets with the noble Lord’s approval. I understand his point exactly, but we are dealing with that problem now. It has been the practice of successive Governments to deal with European directives in this fashion. Perhaps in some areas it may pay us to make exceptions to that, particularly if we think that there are matters that really ought to be brought to the attention of the House through primary legislation.

[Lord Armstrong of Ilminster (CB)]

My Lords, I was a member of the Joint Committee which scrutinised the draft communications data Bill. I am sure that all members of that committee would attach great importance to restoring the position that we thought we were in before this. For that reason, I, and I think many colleagues on the Cross Benches, will support the Bill. The sunset clause which has been described will make it necessary to review communications data legislation very early in the new Parliament. I hope that the scrutiny given to it will then bear fruit because I think the result was a good Bill which balanced the essential needs of civil liberty and privacy against the Government’s first duty to protect the security and safety of the citizen.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong, speaks from a great deal of experience in this area. I welcome his support. I agree that this is a matter which will have to be addressed very quickly by an incoming Government. This is a live issue, as is properly demonstrated by the debate we are having now.

[Lord Pearson of Rannoch (UKIP)]

My Lords, would we be in this predicament if we were not members of the European Union and therefore subservient to the judgments of the Luxembourg court? Surely these matters should be for our Government and Parliament and for international collaboration under their control.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

No, my Lords, I do not see the sequitur in that at all. It is right and proper that we should make sure that the legal framework under which we operate is established in Parliament. That is what we are doing. The way in which we adapt to changed circumstances is a healthy arrangement. Regardless of the European Court of Justice’s decision, we would need to address some of the issues that this Bill deals with. We are right to be dealing with it as soon as we possibly can.

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

My Lords, when I was in another place I conducted an inquiry into organised crime in Northern Ireland and I became aware of how crucial cross-border collaboration was in that context. Will there be full discussions with the Government of the Republic of Ireland to ensure that our fight against crime in that part of the United Kingdom can continue unabated?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

Yes. One of the factors which the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and I welcome is that, in the Serious Crime Bill, there is a whole series of measures attaching to Northern Ireland which have support. We hope that these will enable the two law enforcement agencies on that island to work closely together in the interests of protecting the people of that island.

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

My Lords, I associate myself with the comments of the noble Lord, Lord West, and the noble Lord, Lord King, whom I succeeded as chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee. Those of us who have had direct experience of the benefits of this kind of information will very much support what the Government are doing. Perhaps I may ask the Minister a practical question about data retention. By acknowledging that new legislation is required, can we assume that there is nothing that threatens the use of existing data that are held? Will the Minister continue to use examples in the way that he did today in repeating the Statement so that people outside who have concerns about the use of data recognise the productive way in which they can be used in important criminal cases?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

Yes. I think that sometimes the arguments become focused on particular issues. I agree with the noble Baroness. I know that she speaks from experience and I am grateful for her support. There is an important communications exercise in making sure that people realise why we are involved in the fight against crime and the fight against sexual exploitation. These are all factors in our need to have this capability. I am grateful for the noble Baroness’s support.

[Lord Butler of Brockwell (CB)]

My Lords, I know that the Intelligence and Security Committee, of which I am a member, will now look at this legislation very urgently, as is necessary. However, that committee has to deal all the time with highly classified matters. Does the Minister agree that it would have made the task of the committee easier, and its task of advising the two Houses easier, if the Government had consulted the committee at an earlier stage?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

Had that been possible, it might have been done. Clearly, the Bill is a complicated piece of legislation and getting it right has not been easy. I think the noble Lord will understand the background against which the Bill will be presented to the House of Commons and to your Lordships’ House. In such circumstances, it was important that the Government got their own position right first. Having done that, we are very grateful for the scrutiny and advice that we will receive from the Intelligence and Security Committee.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan (CB)]

My Lords, I wholeheartedly support what has been said concerning the inhibition which now exists on the use of vital evidence by way of intercept, which makes it impossible for what would have otherwise been crucially important prosecutions to succeed. I well appreciate that there are two sides to the argument and I appreciate that final advice to Parliament on this matter is still awaited, but will the noble Lord accept that in many common-law countries the rule is different? It is left to the good sense of the prosecution whether to rely on such evidence, bearing very much in mind the sensitivity of the situation in the public interest. It does not seem beyond the bounds of possibility that the United Kingdom is coming under very severe pressure from very powerful allies in this particular matter, to her own detriment.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I do not want to go into detail today on the noble Lord’s points. However, I will examine what he said, because he is talking about procedures rather than the matter that the Bill deals with—how we handle this in legal process. If the noble Lord will allow me, I will write to him in response to his question. I am grateful to him for raising it.

[Lord Marlesford (Con)]

Given the point that the noble Lord, Lord Butler, has just made, and of course given the total paramountcy of the defence of the realm, will the Minister assure us that if the scrutiny of the Bill were to reveal defects in the legislation—which, after all, is what scrutiny is about—the Bill would be amendable, notwithstanding the parliamentary timetable for the Recess?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, the passage of the Bill contains all the normal phases of discussion so it would be for Parliament to decide whether it needed to change the Bill. I hope that it will not be a political football, with people trying to make further points about what might have been and what could be, and all the rest. I do not think that the House is in the mood for that. All the comments that have been made have made it clear to me that, in general, the Bill correctly addresses the issue and we will look at the wording and make sure that we have got it right. That is what scrutiny is for and that is what we are here for. I hope that we will take advantage of that opportunity. I also hope to brief noble Lords on Monday by party group—arrangements are in place for those briefings—because I thought it would be helpful if we had an opportunity to talk about these things before we consider the Bill and before it goes to the House of Commons, which will consider it early next week.

Terrorism Act 2000 (Code of Practice for Examining Officers and Review Officers) Order 2014

Lord Taylor of Holbeach Excerpts

Wednesday 9th July 2014 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

That the draft order laid before the House on 12 June be approved.

Relevant document: 4th Report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments. Considered in Grand Committee on 7 July.

Motion agreed.

Serious Crime Bill [HL]

Lord Taylor of Holbeach Excerpts

Tuesday 8th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend. This amendment relates to an interpretation provision. In Clause 35, new subsection (6B) provides for what:

“References to property or a pecuniary advantage”,

mean in the context of the proceeds of crime. It seems to me that in that legislation and in the legislation that we are amending, some references to property or advantage would be to the whole of it—for instance, if the property is to be subject to confiscation—while some would be to the extent of what has been obtained by a criminal act, for instance the amount confiscated. My amendment really amounts to a question to the Minister as to whether to take it that we should read what is appropriate in the context. In other words, is what I have said implicit and am I worrying about something quite unnecessarily? The second of these examples—in other words, a limited extent—seems not to be provided for in the clause. I beg to move.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)]

Perhaps I may help my noble friend and reassure her because Clause 35 deals with a technical amendment to the Proceeds of Crime Act, which will expand the types of cases that UK authorities can deal with on behalf of their international counterparts. The Proceeds of Crime Act currently enables, among other things, requests and orders made by courts in other jurisdictions to be given effect in the United Kingdom. One such order is that allowing for the recovery of specified property or money where that property or money is believed to have been obtained as a result of, or in connection with, criminal conduct. The scope of the order is therefore restricted solely to the recovery of specific property or money.

Domestic law, by contrast, recognises that the proceeds of crime can include not just specific money or property but a so-called pecuniary advantage, such as not paying a tax that is lawfully due. The reason that pecuniary advantage was not originally included within the assistance that could be provided to other jurisdictions was due to the scope of international agreements at the time when the Proceeds of Crime Act was enacted. In recent years, however, the international approach has broadened but the law has not kept pace. As a result, law enforcement agencies are unable to assist those in other jurisdictions in recovering from a defendant convicted of crimes such as tax evasion amounts held in the United Kingdom.

I am sure that my noble friend agrees that it is right that we should be able to co-operate as widely as possible in such matters; this clause will help us achieve that. The clause does not affect the position with regard to domestic cases. However, it extends our ability to assist foreign jurisdictions with the recovery of any pecuniary advantage obtained as a result of criminal conduct. I hope that, with that explanation, I have satisfied my noble friend and she will be able to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, this is one of those occasions when one wants to hold back and read the answer, which is not at all to suggest that I doubt my noble friend. Of course, I share the intention and I am grateful to him for that. I will read the answer but, for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, has created a new parliamentary device. I had long heard of the paving amendment, but today she has moved a door-stop amendment. It has enabled us to discuss an important aspect of the Bill, and I am pleased that we have the chance at least to consider the clauses that are designed to deal with cybercrime.

The Government’s approach and the scale of the investment that we have made across law enforcement agencies to develop and strengthen the operational response are designed to combat that emerging and complex threat. In 2010, the national security strategy named hostile attacks on UK cyberspace by other states and large-scale cybercrime as a tier-one threat to national security. To put these provisions on computer misuse into context, they are principally aimed at that level. That means that for the Government cyber is regarded as on a par with international terrorism as regards the risks to our national security. The Government have responded to that threat by committing £860 million over five years to the national cybersecurity programme. So far, we have invested over £70 million of that funding to strengthen law enforcement’s ability to tackle cybercrime.

We know that a co-ordinated approach is needed to tackle serious and organised crime, including cybercrime. We set out how we plan to achieve that in the Serious and Organised Crime Strategy, and I think that the noble Baroness will find some of the thoughts of the Home Office in that document, which we launched in October last year. At the same time we launched the National Crime Agency, which leads the UK response to serious and organised crime. The National Cyber Crime Unit in the NCA was established to provide the national crime-fighting response to the most technologically sophisticated cybercrime.

The National Cyber Crime Unit therefore provides the focus for our national response to combating cybercriminals. It is using its increased operational resources to arrest those responsible and to prevent and otherwise disrupt their activities. The National Cyber Crime Unit is also investing in state-of-the-art equipment and specialist expertise, keeping pace with the criminals who threaten the public. It also uses the NCA’s enhanced intelligence picture to proactively pursue criminals, targeting them where they are most vulnerable and signposting the public towards advice on how to protect themselves. Approximately half the NCA’s officers are being trained in digital investigation skills. That shows that we recognise the significance of cybercrime in fighting serious crime in this country.

The National Cyber Crime Unit has already had an impact in pursuing those criminals and disrupting their activity. Examples include the recent operation with its international partners to disrupt the communications used by criminals to connect with computers that are infected with malicious software, or “malware”, such as GameOver Zeus and CryptoLocker.

However, the NCA and the National Cyber Crime Unit cannot tackle that threat alone. The policing response to national threats is set out in The Strategic Policing Requirement, which chief constables and police and crime commissioners must have regard to, and which recognises both cybercrime—as a form of organised crime—and a large-scale cyber incident as national threats that require a policing response. While police forces can draw on the support of the National Cyber Crime Unit, it is also vital to build force capability to tackle the cyberthreat locally. We have therefore also provided funding to support the creation of cybercrime units within eight of the regional organised crime units.

The cyberunits will support the National Cyber Crime Unit and also help local forces prosecute and disrupt cybercriminals. They are also building links with institutions such as this to understand better the threat we face and the best tools to use in response. This year we have offered £25 million to support regional organised crime units. With funding from the national cyber security programme, the College of Policing is investing in new courses to build cybercapabilities in local forces. The training will increase knowledge and understanding of cybercrime and how to investigate it. It includes four e-learning packages and classroom courses to train 5,000 officers by 2015.

Lastly, we are also funding Action Fraud and the “Be Cyber Streetwise” campaign so that the public have a clear single point of reporting if they are victims of cybercrime, in particular financially motivated cybercrime, and know how to protect themselves and so reduce the risk of becoming a victim of cybercrime—the identity theft that the noble Baroness mentioned. Turning to Action Fraud first, we have rationalised the reporting arrangement so that Action Fraud is now the national reporting service for fraud and financially motivated cybercrime. The public and businesses can use it to report online or by phone. All reports go through Action Fraud, which then passes the reports to the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau. Both are now run by the City of London Police, the country’s national lead force for fraud. In January the Government launched a “Be Cyber Streetwise” campaign, delivered in partnership with the private sector, to encourage individuals and small businesses to adopt safer online behaviours to help them better protect themselves.

Although we have included Clause 37 in the Bill, I shall say a little about the new offence therein to capture cyberattacks which cause, or create a significant risk of, serious damage. This was referred to by my noble friend Lady Hamwee. Improvements in technology have brought many benefits and the use of IT systems has increased exponentially since the Computer Misuse Act was passed in 1990. It is surprising that we are building on that Act of 1990—it was a far-seeing piece of legislation. However, as we rely more and more on computer systems, and as they become increasingly interlinked to deliver maximum benefits, the potential for a cyberattack to cause serious damage also increases.

It is now possible that a major cyberattack on essential systems—for example, those controlling power supply, communications or food distribution—could result in loss of life, serious illness or injury, serious damage to the economy, the environment or national security or severe social disruption. However, the existing offence of impairing a computer, currently the most serious of the Computer Misuse Act offences, carries a maximum sentence of only 10 years’ imprisonment. This does not adequately reflect the level of serious economic or personal harm that a serious cyberattack could now cause.

The new offence will apply where an unauthorised act in relation to a computer—that is “hacking”, in common parlance—results, directly or indirectly, in serious damage to human welfare, the environment, the economy or national security, or creates a significant risk of such damage. The offence will carry a maximum life sentence where the attack results in loss of life, serious illness or injury or serious attacks to national security. Where the attack results in serious economic or environmental damage or social disruption, the maximum sentence will be 14 years’ imprisonment. This offence will ensure that, in the event of serious cyberattack, a suitably serious offence will be available to the prosecution and a suitable sentence available to judges.

A number of other issues have been raised, and it may be helpful to noble Lords if I write a summary covering different aspects. Identity theft was raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and the drugs issue was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth. We recognise concerns about the whole business of legal highs and their availability on the internet. The Minister for Crime Prevention, Norman Baker, is currently reviewing law in this area, and the House will have an opportunity to consider the review’s findings later this year. It would be helpful to use the opportunity of this debate about the particular aspect of cyber misuse that is of serious consequence for me to write to noble Lords, including my noble friends Lord Phillips of Sudbury and Lady Hamwee. I would like to be able to reassure them on that point. Indeed, I think that my noble friend Lord Swinfen also raised a point that I would like to address in that way.

I hope that, given the reply that I have been able to make, and including those points in a more general discussion about this area, the noble Baroness will be in a position to withdraw her amendment. We have clauses in the Bill that address cybercrime and we have taken a significant step in recognising the importance of this to our national well-being.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

I thank the Minister for what he said about drugs-related cybercrime. Will he also seek to offer the House some reassurance on a very major issue that he touched on? He emphasised the Government’s very proper concern to protect our critical national infrastructure against cybercrime. I believe that it is the case that a good deal of cybercrime emanates from China. The Government have just completed a negotiation with the Chinese whereby it is agreed that they will build our nuclear power stations. What reassurance can he give to us that we are going to be protected in the event of cybercrime coming from a Chinese source, conceivably in unfortunate diplomatic circumstances authorised by the Government in China? I appreciate that this goes beyond a routinely or merely criminal issue, but it seems exceedingly important to me—and something that the Government must have been thinking about. As he has been advising us on the Government’s measures and strategies to deal with cybercrime, perhaps he could also say something about that.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I think that I said in my general speech in response to the noble Baroness’s amendment in addressing this area that we recognise that serious damage to national interests and human well-being can be caused by individuals and also by organisations and states. I do not want to give an answer to the noble Lord’s particular suggestions. All I can say is that, obviously, we are anxious to work with China. It is an important nation in the world’s affairs and its assistance is important economically to the prosperity of the world.

If I can add any more to what I have just briefly said, I will write to the noble Lord, but in any case I will be writing to all those who participated in the particular debate on this issue, because I think that could be useful.

[Lord Swinfen]

What is the definition of cybercrime? I think it is a very wide one. I ask the question deliberately, because some time ago my charity—which, as I said before, works in 74 different countries—had its website hacked. It was repaired and the following day it was completely destroyed. We suspected that it was destroyed possibly by officials of another nation who did not approve of us giving medical advice to doctors working in that country. I suspect they thought that there might have been some nefarious purpose in it, although in fact it was purely charitable. I would be grateful if my noble friend would give me a definition of cybercrime.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

Cybercrime is the use of computers—indeed, I may have it here. I have the Serious and Organised Crime Strategy, which uses the term. Cybercrime is the use of computers and electronic systems to commit a crime. Clearly, what happened to the noble Lord’s charity is a crime, committed extraterritorially. One of the aspects of cybercrime is that it is not globally isolated to particular territories or countries—hence the debates that we have been having on this particular issue. That is why we need to tackle it globally and why we need to be globally active in order to deal with it.

I believe that the clauses in this area are designed specifically to bring the Computer Misuse Act, which is what lies at the bottom of it, up to date, to recognise the threat that can exist from computer crime and particularly nowadays, when electronic use is so much greater than it was in 1990, when the Act was first brought in.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his explanations and response to the debate and, indeed, grateful to those noble Lords who supported and spoke to my amendment. I am also grateful to the noble Lord for allowing a more wide-ranging discussion, although it may not have been technically correct. I quite like the idea that on the fourth anniversary of my introduction to your Lordships’ House I have created a new form of amendment, as the noble Lord put it.

As the noble Lord said, the question on the definition of cybercrime from the noble Lord, Lord Swinfen, was particularly appropriate. In this debate we have hit the nail on the head of how wide and vast this issue is. At one level we have the very big issues of national security and the resilience of our national infrastructure, which could be attacked by cybercrime. Then there are the issues around business security, with charities and organisations that can be affected by cybercrime. Then we come to the personal, which goes from merely inconvenient to causing misery and tragedy. All those things are encompassed in the term cybercrime.

The noble Lord’s explanation of what the Government are doing was very helpful. I do not see that any of that detracts from my amendment or makes it any less relevant. I remind the noble Lord of the point I made at the beginning: only three police forces—Derbyshire, Lincolnshire and West Midlands—have developed comprehensive cybercrime strategies. Only 15 forces considered cybercrime threats in their strategic threat and risk assessment. I do not doubt that at a national level a lot of work is going on and that it is well funded. However, it seems to me that if the annual report of the police and the police and crime commissioners focused on this issue and identified the work that was being done on it, that would let the public know what is going on and create awareness of this matter. The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, is absolutely right: this would be a way of monitoring implementation and enforcement. I do not see that anything the Minister said detracts from the usefulness of Amendment 31K.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

If I felt that it could be useful, I would take a slightly different approach towards it. I hope that the noble Baroness will read what I said about the efforts being made to ensure that police forces take proper account of this issue. The HMIC report was a wake-up call: it made us realise that, for all the progress we have made in the National Crime Agency and the National Cyber Crime Unit, we also need a local presence on the ground and the involvement of local police forces.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords—

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I would like to finish what I am saying. I should just say that the HMIC report drew on evidence gained last summer and in the early autumn. A lot has happened since that time, so I ask the noble Baroness to read what I said in response to her amendment. I think she will be impressed by the amount of progress that has been made.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

The noble Lord has referred a second time to the new reporting initiative for police forces and mentioned specifically the City of London police. As it happens, I was with them this very morning, when the initiative to which he referred was discussed. However, resources are a matter of acute concern for every police force in this country. We must go beyond simply saying that the Government have initiated a new plan or a new regime because, as I tried to indicate earlier—the noble Baroness agreed with me—it is absolutely fundamental that we give police forces sufficient resources to enable them to undertake the duties that we lay on them. I hope that my noble friend will take that very much into account.

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I appreciate that I have raised a number of issues with the Minister, and I hope that he will commit to giving further consideration to these issues: not to the principle—I am not asking him to concede the principle at all—but in order to make sure that this works. If there is some merit to the concerns that have been raised, can he address them and perhaps bring something back at the next stage of the Bill?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, said, Clause 41 creates a new offence of participating in the activities of an organised crime group. I am pleased that she and my noble friend Lady Hamwee welcomed the general principles that underline this measure.

I think that we would all accept that, for far too long, many of those who take part in organised crime have been able to remain out of the reach of law enforcement. As we set out in the Serious and Organised Crime Strategy in October 2013, we are committed to doing everything we can to pursue them. The new participation offence complements the existing offence of conspiracy, which is central to the majority of law enforcement investigations into organised crime and will remain so. As noble Lords will be aware, conspiracy is used to prosecute two or more individuals who have agreed to commit an offence where the agreement can be evidenced and where the individuals intended the offence to be committed or knew that it would be.

In practice, there are a range of players in many criminal enterprises. “Conspiracy” is used to target the major players who commit the offence or who are fully aware of it and their contribution to it. The participation offence will ensure that there is an appropriate and proportionate sanction for those others who “oil the wheels” of organised crime, who deliberately ask no questions and who then rely on the defence that they were not part of the overarching conspiracy.

The participation offence is therefore complementary to “conspiracy” and can form the second tier of such an investigation. It will be triable only on indictment, with a maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment. It will ensure that we can prosecute effectively the full spectrum of those engaged in organised crime.

Perhaps I may turn to the anxieties which noble Lords expressed about the way in which we have constructed the clause. Both the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and my noble friend Lady Hamwee pointed to a number of concerns about the offence that have been raised by both the Law Society and the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. As was pointed out, I had said that I hoped to meet those organisations and, since Second Reading, I have been able to meet representatives of both. We had positive and useful discussions about a number of issues. I am pleased to say that those discussions are continuing with officials at the Home Office; we see this as a continuing dialogue.

One of the concerns raised was that the participation offence risks extending the reach of the criminal law too far, and as a result capturing the naive or unwitting; or catching individuals where the “facts” seem more firmly grounded with hindsight than they might have done at the time; or creating anxiety among people that they might inadvertently be captured by the offence. There is a tension between defining an offence that addresses the broad range of activity that sustains organised crime and avoiding inadvertently capturing activities innocently carried out. Noble Lords have pointed to that in their contributions. I believe that Clause 41 gets this balance broadly right.

First, the offence requires a person to have actively participated in or facilitated the criminal activity in some way. To which end, I understand why my noble friend proposed Amendment 31M, which would insert text to emphasise this point. However, it may exclude the possibility that an omission or failure to act would be captured by the offence if it were both deliberate and arose for the purposes of furthering the criminal activities of an organised crime group.

Secondly, an organised crime group must consist of at least three persons. Amendment 31S would seek to remove this stipulation, but I put it to my noble friend that this definition reflects the definition set out in the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime. Thirdly, the group must be committing offences carrying a sentence of seven years’ imprisonment or more. This threshold was adopted to catch typical organised crime group activities—for example, blackmail, trafficking in class A or class B drugs, people trafficking, assisting unlawful immigration fraud and theft.

Finally, the effect of subsection (2) of Clause 41 is to define the circumstances in which a person could be considered to be participating in an organised crime group in support of the offence outlined in subsection (1) of the clause. The definition has been drawn so as to capture those persons who know, or have reasonable cause to suspect, that their activities are criminal activities of an organised crime group or will help an organised crime group to carry on such activities. A “reasonable cause to suspect” must be firmly targeted on specific facts, and it will of course have to be proved by the prosecution beyond all reasonable doubt.

My noble friend Lady Hamwee highlighted the concern that local authorities could be unwittingly caught by the same offence. However, it is possible to envisage a number of scenarios where this offence could be of significant benefit to local authorities—or, indeed, banks or other businesses, since it goes beyond the professions. It would provide an appropriate and robust sanction against corrupt insiders: for example, where a bank employee steals customer data and supplies it to organised criminals; or where a local council employee receives corrupt payments to facilitate organised crime.

It is also worth repeating that for the participation offence to be committed, a person must have had reasonable cause to suspect, firmly grounded and targeted on facts, as I have said. If those facts are present, the granting of licences, for example, should not happen. Licences should not be granted if there is reasonable cause to suspect, or knowledge. Any prosecution would also need to prove that the person actively participated in or facilitated the criminal activity in some way. That test may not be met in the letting of contracts for the provision of services to a local authority. As a further safeguard, the Crown Prosecution Service must be satisfied that any prosecution would be in the public interest. I want to take this up further with the Local Government Association because I think that some of its anxieties are unfounded, but I want to be certain that we are reading this correctly in this respect.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. That is very helpful. I have just two questions. First, may I give him the list that the LGA provided to me and ask him to comment on it in writing to noble Lords? That would be helpful. Secondly, in the case that he mentioned of offences where somebody within an organisation is passing information or money out to an organised crime gang, would they not be offences already; or does this create a new offence, or just greater penalties? I would have thought that those kinds of activities would be offences already, perhaps under conspiracy.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

Yes, they could be if they were seen as integral to the conspiracy. However, the whole concept of a participatory offence is the arm’s-length connection that there sometimes has been, which has made conspiracy an aspect of the law that is not particularly easy to use. By creating a participatory offence, we would make those connections with criminality that much easier to establish and, indeed, would cut off the support that organised crime groups have frequently had from insiders who have provided them with assistance. As I said, I hope to talk to the Local Government Association about its anxieties. I would be grateful if the noble Baroness let me have a copy of the particular things that she was concerned about and I will do my best to answer them in correspondence. I will make sure that other noble Lords and the Library are made aware of that, too.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

Before the Minister sits down, I should say that I did not speak earlier in the debate because my noble friend Lady Smith said everything I wanted to. Could the Minister develop his response a little to one very important point that she made? It was on the question of due diligence. There is a serious anxiety among professional people that it will be very difficult for them to demonstrate that they performed the due diligence that would clear them from any charge that they knew or had reasonable cause to suspect that their clients were engaged in organised crime. It would be helpful if the Minister gave us some illustration of the kind of due diligence that would be satisfactory and pass that test. Obviously, if people do not have cause to suspect, then proceed to provide the professional service to their client and so participate, how can they be confident that they will not be caught under Clause 41 in this regard?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I do not want to prolong this. In fact, I still have quite a lot to say on these amendments. I was not about to sit down at all. Indeed, I really ought to carry on or noble Lords will grumble that the Minister is taking too long to reply. However, I think I can address these issues.

The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, asked me if I could elaborate a little on things I already said in correspondence to her, for the benefit of noble Lords, so I will just give some description. A person commits a participation offence if they take part in activities where they know or have reasonable cause to suspect that they are criminal activities of an organised crime group or where it would help an organised crime group. That must be firmly grounded. Although it would be for the jury to decide whether the threshold had been met in the circumstances of a particular case, the prosecution would need to prove that, for example, a landlord’s activity—the noble Baroness asked about this—participated in or facilitated criminality in some way. As a further safeguard, the Crown Prosecution Service must be satisfied that it is in the public interest.

Amendments 31L and 31Q seek to make other modifications to the scope of the offence. I understand my noble friend’s intention with these amendments and hope she will agree with me that these amendments would not materially change the effect of the provision. The main issue lies in the threshold—the mens rea, as lawyers would say—for the offence.

I listened carefully to my noble friend’s arguments and those set out by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, that further consideration should be given to ensure that the participation offence does not capture the unwitting or naive. I also acknowledge that many situations look different with hindsight. What to a jury considering a case after the event will be a whole series of red warning signs clearly indicating organised criminal activity might have not appeared to be anything of the kind to the defendant at the time the events actually took place.

I understand the problem of definition of mens rea. However, the threshold or mens rea of belief provided for in Amendment 31P may be said to be the state of mind of a person who says to himself, “I cannot say I know for certain that the circumstances exist but there can be no other reasonable conclusion in the light of all that I have heard and seen”. Quite honestly, this is a very high threshold, which would remove much of the utility of the offence, which we are not in a position to accept.

There are some 36,600 members of organised crime groups involved in drug trafficking, human trafficking, organised illegal immigration, firearms offences, fraud, child sexual exploitation and cybercrime, and then there are the professional and non- professional enablers who help organised crime. A threshold of “believe” will set the bar too high and will not change the way these people operate or deter them from helping an organised crime group. However, a balance must be struck and, in the light of this debate, I am persuaded that we should give further consideration to ensuring that the mens rea is such that it does not capture the naive or unwitting.

I also acknowledge the points made in questioning the need for a general defence to the participation offence as well as the desire of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, to have defences specific to the regulated sector, which is the nub of Amendment 31R. It is important that there is no anxiety among people, including in the regulated sector, that they might be inadvertently captured by the participation offence. It is therefore right to consider, alongside the level of the mens rea, the need for a defence, but bearing in mind that if one is needed it needs to take into account that the participation offence will apply to professionals and non-professionals alike. We need to have this captured within the mens rea and the defence which should be all-embracing for the regulated and non-regulated sectors.

Amendment 31U seeks to remove the defence in Clause 41(8). This defence is required to protect, for example, undercover police officers who are participating in the activities of an organised crime group for the purposes of frustrating those activities or collecting sufficient evidence to bring the perpetrators to justice. The use of undercover officers will still need senior level authorisation and the police and others will have to demonstrate that the use of the officer is necessary and proportionate. There are a number of precedents for such defences in other statutes, including in respect of the offences in the Bribery Act 2010 and the offences in respect of indecent images of children in the Protection of Children Act 1978.

I will make some points on the particular concern, in Amendment 31T, that someone who has received consent in the submission of a suspicious activity report should not be prosecuted for the participation offence. As it stands, the clause would leave the decision to prosecute the participation offence under these circumstances to the discretion of the Crown Prosecution Service. It would be disproportionate to import the suspicious activity reporting regime for the participation offence when it is most unlikely that it would be in the public interest to prosecute someone in these circumstances; such a prosecution might even constitute an abuse of process. There is also the practical reason that the defence under Section 328 of the Proceeds of Crime Act is only in respect of entering into an arrangement which facilitates money-laundering; if there is evidence of actions constituting part of a wider programme of criminality, this should still be investigated and, if appropriate, prosecuted.

The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, also asked to what extent people must satisfy themselves that there is no wrongdoing. This is part of the question of due diligence raised by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth. The offence will address those who have reasonable cause to suspect or know they are assisting organised crime. It does not require people to carry out additional due diligence. It is for this reason that we do not consider that there will be additional costs for business. There is a much closer relationship between people’s actions in a professional, business or commercial occupation carrying out their trade than in some of the more sophisticated checks that have to be undertaken by professionals concerned with other legislation.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

On the other hand, the regime that the Government are creating through this legislation must not be too easygoing because we face extensive problems of money laundering and participation in other offences. It must be the case that across the country there are professional people who are facilitating organised criminals to launder their money and transfer the proceeds of their crime out of the illegal economy into the legal economy. The Minister is walking a tightrope. I asked him earlier not to lay unreasonable burdens on professional people to demonstrate their innocence. On the other hand, the system has to be tough enough to make an impact on the problem that we suffer from as things are.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

Right at the beginning of my speech, I talked about balance. I said that I thought we have got the balance in Clause 41 just about right. We do not want to upset the balance. We want to reassure people, particularly the professional groups that have been to see us and the Local Government Association, that that balance can be made to work for them. If it means that we come back on Report with some ideas on that, I am sure the House will welcome them because generally the House understands exactly where the Government are on this issue. Even though probing questions have been asked by my noble friend and the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, I understand that underlying them is their support for this participation offence and that they want to make it work.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

I want to raise a point on Amendment 31T. The Minister rejected the idea of a defence if a potential offence is suspected and reported. For example, under the Proceeds of Crime Act, a potential offence can be reported to the financial investigation unit. That is a defence, but not a guarantee, against prosecution. My concern is that one of the reasons that that defence is in the legislation is so that those who uncover what they believe may be illegal activity are not deterred from reporting it to the relevant authority. It is very useful information. Has the Minister considered whether it will have a deterrent effect if somebody working for somebody discovers some way down the line that there may be criminal activity? Does he consider that they may fear reporting it if there is no defence for them to be gained by reporting it? When the Minister meets the professional associations concerned, will he discuss the processes by which they will establish due diligence to see whether there are any additional costs involved that they can outline to him?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

Our discussions went into that area. We discussed how these matters would be considered by them. The noble Baroness will appreciate that as we want to encourage people to report suspicions as soon as they have grounds to suspect, even more so if they know, they should have every incentive to report the matter. However, one would not want to create a general defence that would enable somebody to have, in effect, a “get out of jail free” card so that when things got a bit hot, they were automatically able to create immunity for themselves against prosecution. I am not convinced by the argument that where we are is wrong. We want to talk to professional organisations because we see how important it is to have them on side in the fight against crime. I know from what they have said to us that they are approaching this issue in exactly that way. They want to make sure that their professions are supportive in the fight against crime, and that any within their professions who are not pursuing that objective but are assisting crime are punished.

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Moved by

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

31W: Schedule 1, page 58, line 12, at end insert “; or
(b) in addition to an order discharging the person absolutely.”

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Moved by

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

31AA: Schedule 1, page 60, leave out lines 32 to 34 and insert—
“(1) Proceedings before the High Court of Justiciary (the “High Court”) or the sheriff arising by virtue of section 22A, 22B, 22C or 22E are civil proceedings.
(2) One consequence of this is that the standard of proof to be applied by the High Court or (as the case may be) the sheriff in such proceedings is the civil standard of proof.
(3) Two other consequences of this are that the High Court or (as the case may be) the sheriff—
(a) is not restricted to considering evidence that would have been admissible in the criminal proceedings in which the person concerned was convicted; and(b) may adjourn any proceedings in relation to a serious crime prevention order even after sentencing the person concerned.(4) Despite subsection (1), an Act of Adjournal under section 305 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (Acts of Adjournal) may be made in relation to proceedings before the High Court or the sheriff arising by virtue of section 22A, 22B, 22C or 22E.
(5) A serious crime prevention order may be made as mentioned in section 22A(6)(b) in spite of anything in sections 246 and 247 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (which relate to orders discharging a person absolutely and their effect).
(6) A variation of a serious crime prevention order may be made as mentioned in section 22B(4)(b), or (as the case may be) a variation of or a new serious crime prevention order may be made as mentioned in section 22C(4)(b), in spite of anything in sections 246 and 247 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.”

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Moved by

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

31AD: Clause 45, page 35, line 36, after “22A” insert “or 22C”

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I come back to the point made by my noble friend Lord Howarth. The Government no longer know how much money is being spent on drug treatment: the figure is not available. The amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Howarth and the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, recognise the wider social implications and the involvement of the criminal justice system. At the first point at which someone comes into contact with the criminal justice system, they look to bring in other agencies and work with a more holistic approach. When we talk about drug victims it is not just those whose lives are controlled or ruined by the personal use of drugs, but those who have suffered as a result of drug crime, whether acquisitive crime or anti-social behaviour. Therefore, the proposal of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, is worthy of detailed consideration and I hope that the Minister will take the opportunity to look at it. It would not detract from the injunctions in the Bill, and it is right that they should be available. However, if we could have a process working alongside injunctions to enable us to deal not just with the criminal process but to develop treatment to deter drug abuse and those who fall victim to it, whether they be the individuals taking drugs or the victims of drug-related crime, that seems to me a result worth paying for.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, for explaining her thinking behind these amendments, and to noble Lords for taking part in this interesting debate. I am also grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, for coming to see me yesterday, when we had a good discussion, so that I could understand what she wanted to achieve through her amendments on tackling drug dependency. I know that she takes a strong interest in this issue. We have often discussed drugs policy in this Chamber while wearing other hats. I recognise that her intention is to place a stronger focus on addressing drug dependency and on meeting the needs of vulnerable individuals who may become involved in gang-related violence and drug dealing. Therefore, I welcome this opportunity to discuss these issues.

However, as my noble friend Lord Elton indicated, gang injunctions are a much wider issue than that of just drug abuse. Drug abuse can be an element of gang activity but gang injunctions go much further than drug abuse alone. I hope that I can help noble Lords by talking about what the Government are doing to tackle drug-related offending and reoffending. The Government strongly support local investment in integrated offender management approaches, including identifying drug-using offenders and directing them to treatment. This is going on now. The Government are also: piloting drug recovery wings, focused on abstinence and connecting offenders with community drug recovery services on release; increasing the number of drug-free environments and piloting payment by results for drug and alcohol recovery services; testing a new “through the gate” model for substance misuse services to complement the introduction of transforming rehabilitation proposals; and developing and testing liaison and diversion services in police custody suites and at courts. I mention these initiatives because I do not want it to be assumed that no effort is being made at a local level to try to make drug users’ lives better. A great deal of effort is being expended in this area.

The expansion of activities covered by gang injunctions is not a substitute for seeking the prosecution of someone for a serious crime such as drug dealing. However, there are instances where a gang injunction may help prevent respondents engaging in gang-related drug activity or protect people being further drawn into such activity, which is particularly important for children, girls and young women.

Amendment 32 introduces the concept of dissuasion panels with the purpose of assessing the personal circumstances that could have led a person to engage in gang-related violence or gang-related drug-dealing activity. The panels would be composed of persons from a medical, legal or social work background. The amendment also confers powers on these new panels to impose requirements on an individual to prevent them engaging in the gang-related violence or gang-related drug-dealing activity, to protect the individual from such violence or activity, and to address drug dependency.

Although referrals to a dissuasion panel appear to be discretionary, the tenor of the proposed new clause seems to be to prevent an application for a gang injunction being considered by a court until the case has been referred to the dissuasion panel—I think I heard the noble Baroness aright in that regard—and the person concerned declines to abide by any requirements imposed by the panel. The result of the proposed new clause would be the introduction of a two-stage process. While I have considerable sympathy for the outcome the noble Baroness is seeking to achieve, I believe that interjecting a dissuasion panel into the process applying to a gang injunction is unnecessary.

[Baroness Meacher]

I should make it clear that the amendment proposes that only if a police officer identifies drugs as a problem for the individual concerned will they be referred to the dissuasion panel. If they have engaged in violence and there is no indication of drugs being involved, then, of course, they will go straight through to the court.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for that explanation but I do not think that it totally weakens the argument I am trying to make for adopting a holistic approach to gang activity, which is contained in the gang injunctions. An individual’s personal circumstances leading to his or her involvement in gangs are already part and parcel of the matters taken into account as part of the gang injunction process. The Policing and Crime Act 2009 includes a consultation requirement. This requires the applicant to consult any local authority, chief police officer and other body or individual that the applicant thinks it is appropriate to consult. The Government’s statutory guidance on gang injunctions—we are considering gang injunctions in the Bill—published in 2010, stresses this point and suggests that the consultation process may include voluntary or support services working with the respondent and/or their family as well as the respondent’s school or housing provider, among others.

I agree that it is essential to take into account mental health or substance misuse issues, as these can be very relevant to someone’s involvement in gangs, together with any other personal circumstances, and this is already the case as part of the application process for a gang injunction. I also agree that it is important to stress this point further. However, I believe that the best place would be in guidance rather than introducing an additional statutory layer to the process. The guidance on gang injunctions is currently being revised and will be reissued in the autumn, as I explained to the noble Baroness yesterday. The revised version will make clear that the consultation process should include medical practitioners where appropriate and any other relevant professional who may assist in determining the individual circumstances of the case, and in particular whether substance misuse or mental health issues are factors that need to be taken into account.

New subsection (7) of the proposed new clause stresses further the point that requirements to prevent or protect a person from gang-related violence or drug dealing may include treatment for drug dependency, counselling, education or training. Gang injunctions are intended to help respondents leave the gang and may already include positive requirements such as the ones highlighted in Amendment 32 that work towards this end. The statutory guidance encourages applicants to be creative about helping respondents to leave the gang and specifically suggests that anger management sessions, coaching, counselling or other behavioural sessions may be appropriate. The revised guidance will stress further the positive requirement element of the gang injunction as a way of helping break away from gang-related violence, which is one of the elements we are seeking to address, and/or drug dealing.

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[Lord Elton]

Before my noble friend concludes, could I ask him two questions? First, we had some impressive figures indicating the change in the percentage of treatments that were completed following the introduction of the system in Portugal. How do those rates compare with existing rates in the United Kingdom?

Secondly, he mentioned anger management as one means of diminishing gang violence and therefore, presumably, gang membership. I hope that he will not overlook the exceedingly powerful inducement of fear maintaining the membership of gangs—not merely internal intimidation but the feeling that nowhere is safe unless you are inside the gang, which is a very common phenomenon among young people certainly in London and I do not doubt in other major cities as well. I went to a conference some time ago in London where children were reported as having said that they felt safer in the gang than they did not only in school but at home. That is a much bigger issue than we are tackling now, but it cannot be ignored. If we are going to get the architecture right, it has to be taken into account.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I am not in the position to provide the figures that my noble friend asked for, but certainly when we study the Portuguese system and documentation I will make sure that I write to the noble Lord—and indeed to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. It will be useful to share that information.

My noble friend is absolutely right. There are all sorts of reasons why people belong to gangs. Fear is one of them. I have made two visits now to Brixton to see how territory, people and circumstance combine to encourage the existence of gangs. We need to be proactive in the way in which we deal with this problem. It causes abject misery through drug dependency; it causes crime through theft; it causes violence; and it causes unnecessary loss of life, as much of the violence can result in fatalities. All of that needs to be addressed in any policy that deals with gangs.

That is why we need a process. In my view, gang injunction lies at the heart of that process. I would be reluctant to dilute that but it can be informed by processes that can be imported from elsewhere. I hope that I have given some idea of my thinking about the issue and I hope that the noble Baroness, as I have said already, will withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Meacher]

I thank the Minister for his very considered reply, and also give a special thank you to the noble Lord, Lord Elton, for his thoughtful intervention. I assure him that one of the key points in the Portuguese system is indeed the monitoring of the observance of the contract by the individual.

--- Later in debate ---

I do not think the noble Lord should ask the House to legislate to this effect until he can show us that his new provisions for gang injunctions are part of a decent, coherent and convincing policy.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I am very happy to assure the noble Lord that our policy is indeed decent and coherent. I did not find his arguments so coherent, because I felt in some ways that he was trying to say that he felt the new provisions within the Bill were going too far, and were affecting civil liberties, and at the same time suggesting that they were not effective at all about dealing with young people who found themselves in gangs. In our last debate I showed there is coherence here. Gang violence is a serious problem. It does need addressing. It needs a legal framework against which you can address it. A great advantage of the injunction is that it provides an opportunity for that to happen.

Gang and youth violence is damaging too many young people in our country and can have a devastating effect not only on those who get caught up in it but also on their families and communities. Gang injunctions are a valuable civil tool that allows the police or a local authority to apply to the county court or the High Court for an injunction against an individual who has been involved in gang-related violence. Gang injunctions are available to help the police and local authorities prevent acts of gang violence, but importantly, the injunctions are also there to protect younger gang members’ behaviour from escalating, including by requiring them to participate in activities which help them leave gangs behind.

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[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

I had intended to speak in this debate. The noble Lord was uncharacteristically quick off his feet to respond to my noble friend. This clause requires some clarification and I am sorry that he seems quite upset about the probing questions that have been asked. I will listen to what he has to say. If the issues I intended to ask him about are not addressed, I will come back to him at the end of his comments, but there are some points of clarification that would be helpful in this debate.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I am sorry, I just felt that the closing remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, when he said that government policy lacked coherence in this area, were belied by the contribution that I had made in the previous debate on the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

I did not say that the policy lacked coherence; I said that I thought it was wrong to ask the House to legislate before the Government had demonstrated that these new legislative provisions were part of a coherent and decent policy.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

In which case, I am in the process of doing just that. Perhaps we can draw a line under our little spat. Indeed, I was going on to talk about the ways in which the people who are responsible for seeking gang injunctions do bring professional expertise to these matters.

As I was saying when the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, intervened, gang injunctions for adults have been available since January 2011, and gang injunctions for 14 to 17 year-olds have been available since January 2012. I hope it reassures the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, that when applying for injunctions against minors, the applicant must consider their duties towards young people in general, including the general duty to safeguard and promote the welfare of children, together with any child protection issues that arise in a particular case. In doing so, the applicant would be expected to seek the views of any social services or children’s services department that is engaged with the child.

The findings of a review of the operation of gang injunctions, published in January 2014, indicated that the definition of a gang used in the Policing and Crime Act 2009 has some limitations for addressing local gang issues. I am sure that noble Lords would expect the Government, having found those limitations, to come forward with amendments to address them.

Section 34(5) of the 2009 Act specifies the circumstances in which gang injunctions may be made. The court must be satisfied that,

“the respondent has engaged in, or has encouraged or assisted, gang-related violence”—

that is the fundamental requirement. “Gang-related violence” is defined as,

“violence or a threat of violence which occurs in the course of, or is otherwise related to, the activities of a group that … consists of at least 3 people … uses a name, emblem or colour or has any other characteristic that enables its members to be identified by others as a group, and … is associated with a particular area”.

We are not talking about stop and search here; we are talking about collective activity. Following consultation with practitioners, we have concluded that this definition is too restrictive and, more importantly, does not reflect the true nature of how gangs operate in England and Wales.

Gangs do not always have a name, emblem or colour or other characteristic which enables their members to be identified as a group. Instead, individuals may operate as a group and engage in criminality with some degree of organisation without these features. Although gangs are traditionally associated with particular territories, they are now increasingly involved in criminality beyond their own areas and can be less associated with a particular area. Gang structures are now seen to change over time—they are morphing—such that it is possible for gangs to disappear from certain locations and reappear in other locations relatively quickly. Gangs may move to other locations as a result of black market forces or being pushed out by rival gangs.

In order to reflect the changes in the way gangs operate, Clause 47 amends the 2009 Act to revise the definition of gang-related violence. Under the new definition, violence will be gang-related,

“if it occurs in the course of, or is otherwise related to, the activities of a group that … consists of at least three people”—

that remains—

“and has one or more characteristics that enable its members to be identified by others as a group”.

It has been suggested that this definition is too wide and that any group of three or more people identified by others as such could be affected by this legislation. I assure the Committee that this is not the case. Being part of a gang as defined by this clause is the first stage of the process but courts will also need to be satisfied that the defendant has been involved in violence and that any such violence is related to the gang. Of course, only courts can impose a gang injunction, after they are satisfied that it is necessary to do so.

In addition, evidence from police and local authorities shows that urban street gangs often engage in street drug-dealing on behalf of organised criminals, and some gangs aspire to and may become organised crime groups in their own right. That is why we are expanding the activity in relation to which gang injunctions can be imposed to involvement in the drugs market. This will allow gang injunctions to be used to prevent individuals from engaging in drug-dealing and to protect people from being further drawn into illegal drug-dealing, which is particularly important for vulnerable people, in particular teenage children, of whom we spoke earlier.

The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, has raised some wider points about the Government’s overall drugs strategy. The noble Lord’s view is that the strategy is not sufficiently focused on tackling the root causes of demand for illegal drugs which drive this market. I agree with the noble Lord that reducing the demand for drugs is essential to successfully tackling this issue. Indeed, it is one of the three strands of the Government’s strategy, which balances action to reduce demand alongside support for individuals to recover from drug dependency and ensuring that law enforcement effectively protects society by restricting the supply of drugs.

We are confident that this approach is working. Drug usage has fallen to its lowest level since records began in 1996. Figures on the level of overall drug use among young people in 2012 show that 17% of pupils aged 11 to 15 reported ever taking a drug, compared with 29% in 2001. There is a marked fall in the use of drugs among young people.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

The Home Office is fond of quoting certain statistics that are, I am sure, correct, and demonstrate declining use of certain drugs. Can the noble Lord, however, tell us whether the use of class A drugs has fallen? What is his view on the consumption of new psychoactive substances, which are also drugs, even if not proscribed under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971? Surely the overall picture is far less comforting than he seeks to persuade us it is.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I accept that. I am not at all complacent about the role of drugs in society and I think the noble Lord knows that. However, I am saying that we have, through our strategy, at least reduced consumption over the past few years. It is an important element—we know that 45% of acquisitive crime, for example, is estimated to be carried out by opiate or crack users. It remains a matter of concern. Nobody is complacent about this—I did not want to create that impression. However, I also wanted to reassure the noble Lord and the noble Baroness that we are driving this policy hard because we recognise the damage that drugs do in society. We continue to do all we can to prevent people using drugs in the first place, and to intervene early with those who start to develop problems, for example by developing an online alcohol and drug education and prevention information service. This work to reduce demand for illegal drugs is crucial, but I am equally clear that we need to provide the police and local authorities with the tools they require to intervene to prevent the harm caused to communities by gangs who are involved in drug dealing and to divert young people on the periphery of this world away from gangs before their involvement becomes serious.

The whole point of this clause is to improve our response to gang-related violence and involvement in illegal drug dealing by redefining and extending the scope of these injunctions to ensure they better reflect the reality of gang culture in England and Wales. Of the 109 gang injunctions issued, 45% have been breached. Interim injunctions were granted on the authority of the court. It needs to act proportionately when it considers these matters. We never expected large numbers of gang injunctions to be used. They are aimed at preventing gang-related violence, and they are a useful tool for local partners to use in the right circumstances for the right individuals. The changes in this Bill will enable more effective targeting of those not directly involved in violence but who could influence violent activity. I say to the noble Lord that legal aid is available for gang injunctions, including costs incurred for a lawyer to represent a person in court. Legal aid also covers breach and variation hearings.

I have tried to cover most of the points raised by the noble Lord in his intervention. I apologise to the noble Baroness—I did not mean to cut her off from this debate, and if she wants to say a few words on this issue I am happy to do my best to reply to them too.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Elton]

My Lords, before my noble friend applies the secateurs again to this budding debate, perhaps I may give notice that I also have points to raise, after he has dealt with this one.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I think it would be easier if I dealt with them all. If other noble Lords want to bring something to the party I would be happy to deal with them all in a final wind-up speech. I do apologise for jumping the gun. The two noble Baronesses were obviously far too polite to each other, but if the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and my noble friend Lord Elton would like to speak, I will do my best to respond.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Elton]

My Lords, mine is a much smaller question and reveals my ignorance of POCA. I understand that the applications will be made by the police. How long is it expected that it will take to grant the applications and are the arrangements for the interim in any way influenced by the proposed new section? I imagine that there is a section in the parent Act which applies the standards in the new section to the interim injunction. If not, how do they relate?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I am pleased that we have had this little episode at the end of our discussion. I am grateful for the contribution of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. He is right: I did say that 45% of injunctions had been breached. Making civil injunctions work is always a challenge for authorities. We have discussed that sort of issue when considering previous Bills.

I say to my noble friend Lord Elton that it is not POCA, but PACA—it is the Police and Crime Act 2009 that is being amended by this part of the Bill.

I say to the noble Baroness that this is not about criminalising gang members but finding a civil way of dealing with the trouble in which they find themselves. They are members of a gang; we want to get them out of a gang. The gang is no good for them; it is no good for their fellow gang members. This is an important way of being able to deal with this matter.

I expect the guidelines, about which I spoke to the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, privately yesterday and today in public—I am sorry that I did not address this issue earlier—to be available before we return on Report. I say again to the noble Baroness that the test of “encouraging or assisting” gang-related violence is in the existing legislation; it is not a new illustration. I am not aware that the courts are having any difficulty in interpreting that test.

I hope that I can with confidence propose that Clause 47 stand part of the Bill, having done my best to demonstrate all the things that noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport, demanded of me when he addressed the issue at the beginning of this debate.

Clause 47 agreed.

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[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Marlesford for introducing this amendment. It is not the first time that he has raised the issue of foreign passports held by UK passport holders. My noble friend knows very well that success is not normally achieved at the first outing of an amendment, and I admire his persistence. He certainly does not need to apologise for raising this issue again, even if his speech was as wide-ranging as it was interesting.

I query the need for subsections (2) and (3) of the proposed new clause. I do not know why they are there at all. If Parliament agreed them, we would be telling enforcement officials, rather unhelpfully, “We give you this source of information and you are to be grateful and make use of it”. I suspect that my noble friend is far too skilled and experienced to carelessly insert a redundant provision into his amendment. Perhaps it has rather more to do with my noble friend ingeniously making his amendment relevant to the Bill.

The problem is that if we tidy up his amendment by deleting subsections (2) and (3), the amendment will no longer be relevant to the Bill. However, I have another anxiety. I can understand why my noble friend has not provided for any penalties, other than the implied possibility of the withdrawal of the UK passport under prerogative powers. My fear is that an innocent holder of multiple passports may find themselves in difficulties, while at the same time the serious criminal or terrorist has merely made an admin error. I hope that when my noble friend comes to reply to the debate, he will allay my concerns.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

As noble Lords know, we debated this issue fairly recently when my noble friend moved a similar amendment on Report of last Session’s Immigration Bill on 7 April. Since then, following my recent meeting with my noble friend, I met him again today. We have looked afresh at the issue and I have to advise my noble friend that I have reached the same conclusion as I did before.

As I indicated when we debated this issue in the Immigration Bill, Her Majesty’s Passport Office contributes directly to the Home Secretary’s key aims of securing borders, tackling terrorism and reducing crime. It achieves this through its public protection strategy and by sharing data and intelligence with other parts of the Home Office and other agencies. I thank the senior officials from Her Majesty’s Passport Office for providing me with briefings in this area. They have been extremely busy recently, as noble Lords will know.

My noble friend raised a number of points concerning his amendment. I start by responding directly to the issues he raised. There is an existing requirement for holders of any uncancelled passport to provide that document when applying for a British passport. I will expand on that point later. HMPO issues around 5.5 million passports each year. Data are not held centrally on the number of applicants who hold a second passport under another nationality. Of the passports issued each year, around 1 million applications are from first-time applicants and the remaining 4.5 million are for passport renewals and replacements. About 95% of applications are made in the UK, with the remaining 5% from British citizens resident overseas.

There is no requirement for a British passport holder to notify HMPO of a change of address. This is because the address of the passport holder is not relevant to the ability to travel and cross borders. The HMPO database is for those issued with or refused a British passport. It is not intended to be a record of the individual’s changing personal circumstances unless that impacts on their identity, nationality or entitlement to continue to hold a passport. HMPO has an established process in place whereby the police, courts and prisons notify it of court or police conditions attached to an individual, including persons wanted, arrest warrants, bail conditions and travel restrictions.

I do not have an estimate of the costs involved in setting up a database as suggested in the amendment, but imagine it would be in the hundreds of thousands rather than millions. The issue is one of value for money. To what use would we put the information? If there were a benefit in setting up such a database, we would do so and the costs would be outweighed by security and public protection considerations. However, as I indicated, Her Majesty’s Passport Office already requires a person applying for a first-time passport or renewing or replacing any existing passport to indicate whether they have had any sort of passport—British or otherwise—or been included in any passport before.

Where a passport applicant indicates that they have, they are then required to send to the Passport Office all uncancelled passports. This requirement to submit a passport held in a second nationality is primarily for identification purposes. It can also assist in the determination of British nationality. However, the primary function is to ensure that any British passport issued is compatible with the identity and personal details contained in the existing overseas passport.

Border Force and law enforcement agencies can access data held by Her Majesty’s Passport Office provided it is relevant to their examination of a passenger at a port or is necessary in connection with any investigation or inquiries being undertaken. Accordingly, the information gathered by HM Passport Office is available to assist Border Force and others in helping to prevent and detect crime.

Holding dual national status is perfectly lawful in the UK. It is not a barrier to the issuing of a British passport. We believe that it would therefore be disproportionate to require a person to notify the UK Government of any subsequently acquired overseas passport unless that was relevant to an outstanding application for a British passport. Should such a person fail to disclose at the point of application for a British passport that they hold a passport under another nationality, it would be a criminal offence on the basis that they would have made a false statement on the application form. Apart from considerations of criminal proceedings, it would be open to consider the exercise of the royal prerogative to withdraw or refuse the issue of a British passport. That would be considered on the individual circumstances of the case and the seriousness of the consequences of the attempted deception.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, Section 47 of the Policing and Crime Act 2009—PACA, as my noble friend referred to it a few minutes ago—provides that the Secretary of State must issue guidance relating to gang-related violence injunctions. Under Section 47, the Secretary of State must, before issuing or revising guidance, consult the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales and such other persons as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate. Given the multidisciplinary nature of gang-related violence, it is interesting that the only specific consultee is the Lord Chief Justice—the courts, essentially. My amendment would add consultation of representatives of chief police officers, local authorities, health authorities and persons concerned with the care of young people, the Youth Justice Board and, again, such other persons as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate.

I do not need to persuade the Committee of the interest, in a technical sense, of all those whom I have listed, in the issue of gang-related violence and the formation and operation of gangs. I appreciate that, under PACA, the Secretary of State is able to consult all these people but it would be appropriate to list a wider number of officeholders and interests than is simply caught up in “such other persons”. I beg to move.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Hamwee for outlining her thinking behind this amendment. I entirely agree that the contents of any statutory guidance should be developed and agreed on by all the relevant parties in advance. I assure her that this is already the case. The statutory guidance on gang injunctions is being revised, as we have already discussed, and will be reissued in the autumn. We are already consulting the Youth Justice Board, the Ministry of Justice, HM Courts and Tribunals Service, the Judicial College, the Crown Prosecution Service and the College of Policing. We also plan to consult police forces and local authorities, through the Local Government Association, as well as the Department of Health and the Department for Education. This will ensure that the welfare of young people is integral to the process. I have emphasised, in my contributions, the importance of this guidance in making gang injunctions effective.

In legal terms, the current requirement to consult the Lord Chief Justice and,

“any other such person as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate”,

allows enough flexibility so that relevant parties are involved in the process as judged most appropriate. It is a commonly used form of words to describe this sort of consultation. Although I understand exactly why my noble friend has tabled this amendment, it is not possible to set out in legislation a comprehensive list of all those who should be consulted and I am not persuaded that anything further would be achieved by laying out a list of consultees. For this reason, and in the knowledge that the new guidance involves considerable consultation—though not I hope so much that it would mean it is not available by Report—I hope my noble friend will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, we know the phrase well. When my noble friend started to list those who are currently being consulted, I thought that this was sticking, again, with the court system. However, he widened that, and I was very pleased to hear confirmation that the importance of the welfare of young people, not just a criminal justice response, is being encapsulated in the consultation going on at the moment. I do not intend to pursue this, but I am glad to have that information and to have the recognition articulated in that way. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Terrorism Act 2000 (Code of Practice for Examining Officers and Review Officers) Order 2014

Lord Taylor of Holbeach Excerpts

Monday 7th July 2014 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

That the Grand Committee do consider the Terrorism Act 2000 (Code of Practice for Examining Officers and Review Officers) Order 2014.

Relevant document: 4th Report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)]

My Lords, as noble Lords will know, Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 allows an examining officer to stop and question—and, when necessary, detain and search—individuals travelling through ports, airports, international rail stations or the border area to determine whether that person appears to be someone who is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism. Examining people at ports and the border area contributes on a daily basis to keeping the British public safe. Those engaged in terrorist-related activity travel to plan, finance, train for and commit their attacks. Most major international terrorist plots have involved individuals travelling through international borders to plan and prepare their attacks. Schedule 7 is an important part of the UK’s counterterrorism strategy and integral to the UK’s border security arrangements.

The Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act, which received Royal Assent on 13 March 2014, made changes to Schedule 7—and to Schedule 8, which provides for the treatment of persons detained under Schedule 7 powers. These changes were made following extensive public consultation in 2012 and are intended to reduce the potential scope for Schedule 7 to be operated in ways that may interfere with individuals’ rights unnecessarily or disproportionately, while retaining operational effectiveness.

The changes made to Schedule 7 include: reducing the maximum period of examination from nine to six hours; extending to individuals detained at a port the statutory rights, already available to individuals detained under Schedule 7 at a police station, to have a person informed of their detention and to consult a solicitor privately; clarifying that the right to consult a solicitor includes consultation in person; ensuring that all individuals examined for more than one hour are formally detained and given their statutory rights; introducing statutory review of the need for continued detention; introducing a statutory requirement for training of examining and reviewing officers; establishing a statutory provision that undertaking strip-searches of persons detained under Schedule 7 powers requires reasonable grounds to suspect that the person is concealing something which may be evidence that they are involved in terrorism, and requires a supervising officer’s authority; repealing the unused power to seek intimate samples— for example, blood or semen; and making express provision that an examining officer may make and retain a copy of information obtained or found in the course of an examination.

Noble Lords will appreciate that our discussions are consequential on the full debates that we had when the Bill was before us. The existing code of practice must be revised to reflect the changes made to the powers by the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act and to make specific provision on training and reviews. I am grateful to noble Lords for attending this debate and beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, this is consequential on previous debates. It is amazing how much and how quickly all that agonising goes out of one’s head, and one has to remind oneself of the subject of it. I am glad that we have had the chance to consider the draft code of practice and the covering SI. What concerns me is the delay in the introduction of the review arrangements, which I assume is because it has simply not been possible to get the training in place quickly enough. I am not suggesting that the better provisions of the legislation, as they are after the work done on the then Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill, should be delayed. However, could my noble friend confirm that training is on track for the more senior officers, who will be detailed to undertake the reviews, and how supervision will be carried out in the mean time? I notice that the code says that it will be delayed until the relevant provisions come into force. However, in distinction, the paragraphs about audio recording say that there is no requirement to follow the code until next April. That is the time when the review provisions are to come into force, or so we are told. I do not know whether I am seeing a problem where there is none. Perhaps my noble friend has information, although he may not, about the proportion of officers who will be trained to undertake the more senior role.

I shall raise a point again that I raised during the passage of the Bill. Will training cover how officers should deal with the family or other accompanying passengers of the individual who is being held or detained? I think that I mentioned during the Bill’s passage that I had come across an example, which I hope was a rare one, of an individual being told that, if he insisted on waiting for a legal representative, it would be a problem for his elderly mother, with whom he was travelling. In other words, inappropriate pressure was put on him to forgo a right. I am also not clear what happens if, because of detention, passengers miss their flights. I hope that my noble friend can also confirm that the facilities for this work are satisfactory and appropriate. We have talked about short-term holding facilities a good deal, of course.

The code refers to legal privilege, where the restriction seems to be on copying, not on looking at it. You cannot erase something from your head although, obviously, there would be a restriction on using it—but what happens if a privileged document is copied when it should not be?

Paragraph 41 suggests that consultation with a solicitor is invariably not allowed. This is in the examination part of the code, not the detention part. I had thought that it was always allowed, but not necessarily with a solicitor of the individual’s choice. Is that only when the individual is actually detained?

Paragraph 42 states that an examining officer may grant a request that a named person is informed of the examination at his discretion and that:

“Where reasonably practicable, the request should be granted”.

Is it discretion or reasonable practicality?

Paragraph 45, which is where we get on to detention, states that the power may be exercised,

“where the examining officer considers it is appropriate to do so”.

The last bullet point of paragraph 46 states that:

“Detention is an option (during the first hour of examination)”.

Is that bullet point just about the first hour of detention? If I am asking too many questions, I have no doubt that my noble friend will ask to write to me.

However, I will raise a couple of matters which I hope he can confirm now. First, paragraph 7.2 of the Explanatory Memorandum reads:

“Examining people at ports and the border area contributes daily to plan, finance, train for, and commit their attacks”.

I shall not reread that, but when the Minister looks at it, he will realise that some words must be missing. I do not think you detain people in order to help them plan their attacks. I have had a word with the Minister’s officials, and I think they think it is a typo, but quite an important one.

My second question is on similar lines, but I think I am on dodgier ground. It is on annexe A to the code, which explains to the detainee that he is detained to determine essentially either whether he is involved in terrorism or whether he is entering or leaving Northern Ireland. I thought, or perhaps I had assumed without applying much thinking, that it should be “and” rather than “or”. Looking at Schedule 7, Northern Ireland is dealt with in a separate paragraph. Will my noble friend confirm that detention can be solely to establish whether somebody is going into Northern Ireland without any terrorism-related aspect? I am sorry to have slung that at my noble friend. I looked at this rather too close to the time of the debate to give him notice of the rather detailed points which I have just raised.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I will be giving the Minister a somewhat easier time than he has just been given by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.

I thank the Minister for the explanation of the purpose of this order, which brings into operation a code of practice for examining officers and review officers in respect of the exercise of the powers under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 and under Schedule 8 to that Act where the powers are exercised in connection with Schedule 7, as amended by Schedule 9 to the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. The code of practice revises the preceding code of practice to take account of amendments made to Schedules 7, 8 and 14 to the Terrorism Act 2000 by the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014.

The Explanatory Memorandum refers to commencing the remaining provisions of Schedule 9 to the 2014 Act this month to coincide with the issue of the code of practice brought into operation by this instrument, with the exception of the provision to which the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, referred requiring review of the detention of persons detained under Schedule 7, which are being delayed until next April to allow sufficient time to develop, accredit and train all examining and review officers. I shall pursue some of the points she raised. Will the Minister say how many examining and review officers still require to be trained, how long the training of each officer takes and why the required training has not been completed by this month and has had to be delayed? The need for such training must have been known for some time. Could the Minister also spell out the impact of this delay, in practical terms, including any impact on the provisions of this instrument, which comes into force at the end of this month?

The Explanatory Memorandum also refers in paragraph 4.5 to consultation on this issue having taken place with “National Business Leads”. Perhaps the Minister could remind me who or what this organisation is or these people are.

As the Minister said, the Explanatory Memorandum states in paragraph 7.2 that:

“Schedule 7 is an important part of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy and key to the UK’s border security”.

The memorandum goes on:

“The changes to Schedule 7 in the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act are intended to reduce the potential scope for Schedule 7 powers to be operated in an unnecessary or disproportionate way, whilst still retaining their operational effectiveness”.

It then lists the changes made under the 2014 Act. They include ensuring access to legal advice for all individuals examined for more than one hour. In that regard, could the Minister clarify what legal entitlements people have when detained under Schedule 7? Will they have access to free legal advice?

The changes also include reducing the maximum period of examination from nine hours to six hours. The Government and others recently expressed concerns about the numbers going from this country to Syria apparently to be trained and engage in violence in the current conflict, and the possible consequences of that. In the light of concerns about what might happen if and when these people return to this country, with or without others, and what their intentions might then be, is it the Government’s view that all the changes made by the 2014 Act, including reducing the maximum period of examination from nine hours to six hours, actually enhance our ability to minimise the risk of those potential threats? Do the Government believe that the new code of practice provided for in this order—reflecting the amendments made to Schedule 7 to the 2000 Act by the 2014 Act—contribute to rather than potentially diminish our security in the present climate?

I simply conclude by commenting that the Explanatory Memorandum states that,

“the majority of consultation respondents agreed that the revised code clearly reflected the changes made to Schedule 7 powers in the”,

2014 Act. What it is not able to say is that the majority of respondents agreed that in today’s climate all those changes are still appropriate. We will not oppose this order, but I hope that the Minister will respond directly to the points and questions I raised, as well as those of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, I thank both my noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for their contributions to our discussions on these issues. It is important that I try as best I can to answer the questions now. If there are things left unsaid at the end, I am obviously very happy to write. It was fortunate that there was a brief adjournment before we started because it gave my noble friend a chance to have a word with officials and give advance notice of the things that she was particularly concerned about. Perhaps I can deal with the details.

On paragraph 7.2, we can give an undertaking that we will correct the wording so that it reads as it should. It is perhaps not capable of being interpreted at the moment. As my noble friend admitted, she was on slightly weaker grounds when it came to annexe A because the wording is designed to ensure that the code of practice works equally well whether the person is stopped at a GB port or the person is stopped at the Irish border. That is why the wording is as it is. Perhaps my noble friend will tell me if she feels that that is not correct.

She asked whether training was on track. It is on track and is a nationwide programme. We are working out a training package and rolling it out nationally because we want to make sure that we operate to consistently higher standards. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked for quite a few details about the training programme, the time taken and what was involved. If he is happy for me to do so, I should be pleased to write to him with further details of what the training involves.

[Lord Rosser]

I am happy to await a letter from the Minister but can he cover in his reply why the training has been delayed? The word “delay” is used in the Explanatory Memorandum. I mentioned that the need for such training must surely have been known for some time. He could address that point in his letter, as well as the impact on the instrument of the delay referred to in the Explanatory Memorandum.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I am quite prepared to do so. I know off the top of my head that the problem is that standards are not equal across the country, but we are obviously now trying to make sure that officers’ roles under these powers are considerably enhanced and need to operate properly at every point. We are cutting down the hours, which is fine; there is no security risk by doing that as long as the process is properly managed and dealt with. That is part of the reason for the change.

My noble friend said that she thought there was perhaps already an opportunity for consultations. As I say, the interview depended on whether it involved those detained at a port or those detained in a police station. Those detained within a port were not necessarily supported with the same rigour as those detained within a police station. That will change under this new regime.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked which organisations we consulted. I do not have those names but I would again be happy to write to him. If I may, I will write both to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and to my noble friend Lady Hamwee together, so that they will also have the answers to each other’s questions. I know that they share an interest in those answers.

That more or less concludes my response, although I wish to mention a couple of other things. Review provisions will commence on 1 April 2015. Audio recording is delayed to allow facilities at ports to be provided; noble Lords will understand that facilities at ports are not as good as they may be elsewhere, but it is already a requirement to report interviews at police stations.

I hope that I have been able to deal with at least some of the questions. I remind everyone that only 1% of examinations result in detention, and 96% of those examined under Schedule 7 are held for less than an hour. We are dealing with those in detention, who are a relatively small number of individuals, but we must make sure that they are properly safeguarded and that we have processes in place to ensure that the security of the country is maintained.

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, I do not know whether the noble Lord wishes to respond to me now or in a letter, but I referred to the reduction in the period for examination from nine hours to six hours, and to the concerns expressed very recently about what is happening with people going to Syria, then perhaps returning to this country, and what their intentions may be. I asked the Minister whether the Government feel that the provisions covered in the code of practice, and which arise as a result of the 2014 Act, are all still appropriate in the light of the security concerns being expressed by the Government and others in relation to Syria.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I can assure the noble Lord that they are appropriate. Indeed, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation recorded in his report in 2012 that these particular interviews have been instrumental in securing evidence which has assisted in terrorist prosecutions, and that they are very important. The truth of the matter is that the number of people detained for over six hours is very small and usually confined to circumstances where the examination was more protracted than it needed to have been. We are now satisfied that we can do this within six hours, otherwise we would not be bringing this legislation forward.

Motion agreed.

Child Abuse

Lord Taylor of Holbeach Excerpts

Monday 7th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)]

My Lords, with the leave of the House, I will now repeat a Statement made in the House of Commons earlier this afternoon by my right honourable friend Theresa May, the Home Secretary.

“With permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a Statement about the sexual abuse of children, allegations that evidence of the sexual abuse of children was suppressed by people in positions of power, and the Government’s intended response.

In my Statement today I want to address two important public concerns: first, that in the 1980s the Home Office failed to act on allegations of child sex abuse; and, secondly, that public bodies and other important institutions have failed to take seriously their duty of care towards children. As I do so, I want to set three important principles. First, we will do everything we can to allow the full investigation of child abuse and the prosecution of its perpetrators, and we will do nothing to jeopardise those aims. Secondly, where possible, the Government will adopt a presumption of maximum transparency. Thirdly, we will make sure that wherever individuals and institutions have failed to protect children from harm, we will expose these failures and learn the lessons.

Concern that the Home Office failed to act on allegations of child abuse in the 1980s relates mainly to information provided to the department by the late Geoffrey Dickens, a Member of this House between 1979 and 1995. As the House will be aware, in February 2013, in response to a Parliamentary Question from the honourable Member for West Bromwich East, the Permanent Secretary of the Home Office, Mark Sedwill, commissioned an investigation by an independent expert into information the Home Office received in relation to child abuse allegations, including information provided by Mr Dickens. In order to be confident that the investigation would review all relevant information, the investigation reviewed all relevant papers available relating to child abuse between 1979 and 1999.

The investigation reported last year and its executive summary was published on 1 August 2013. It concluded there was no single ‘Dickens Dossier’ but there had been letters from Mr Dickens to several Home Secretaries over several years that contained allegations of sexual offences against children. Copies of the letters had not been kept, but the investigator found evidence that the information Mr Dickens had provided had been considered and matters requiring investigation had been referred to the police.

In total, the investigator found 13 items of information about alleged child abuse. The police already knew about nine of those items, and the remaining four were passed by the Home Office to the police immediately. The investigation found that 114 potentially relevant files were not available. These are presumed—by the Home Office and the investigator—destroyed, missing or not found, although the investigator made clear that he found no evidence to suggest that the files had been removed or destroyed inappropriately. The investigation found no record of specific allegations by Mr Dickens of child sex abuse by prominent public figures.

Upon completion of the investigation, the Home Office passed the full text of its interim report and final report, along with accompanying information and material, to the police for them to consider as part of their ongoing criminal investigations. As Mark Sedwill has said, the investigator recorded that he had unrestricted access to Home Office records and he received full co-operation from Home Office officials. The investigator was satisfied that the Home Office passed all credible information about child abuse in the time period—from Mr Dickens and elsewhere—to the police so they could be investigated properly.

I believe that the Permanent Secretary did the right things in listening to the allegations made by the honourable Member for West Bromwich East and ordering an independent investigation. I am confident that the work he commissioned was carried out in good faith. But I know that, with allegations as serious as these, the public needs to have complete confidence in the integrity of the investigation’s findings.

So I can tell the House that I have today appointed Peter Wanless, the chief executive of the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, to lead a review not just of the investigation commissioned by Mark Sedwill but also of how the police and prosecutors handled any related information that was handed to them. Peter Wanless will be supported in his work by an appropriate senior legal figure, who will be appointed by the Permanent Secretary. Where the findings of the review relate to the Director of Public Prosecutions, it will report to the Attorney-General as well as to me.

I will ask the review team to advise my officials on what redactions to the full investigation report might be needed in order that, in the interests of transparency, it can be published without jeopardising any future criminal investigations or trials. I expect the review to conclude within eight to 10 weeks, and I will place a copy of its terms of reference in the House Library today.

In addition to the allegations made by Geoffrey Dickens, there have also been allegations relating to an organisation called the Paedophile Information Exchange, a paedophile campaign group that was disbanded in 1984. In response to another query from the honourable Member for West Bromwich East, the Permanent Secretary commissioned another independent investigation in January this year into whether the Home Office had ever directly or indirectly funded PIE. That investigation concluded that the Home Office had not done so, and I will place a copy of the investigation’s findings in the House Library today. But, again, in order to ensure complete public confidence in this work, I have also asked Peter Wanless to look at this investigation as part of his review.

I now turn to public concern that a variety of public bodies and other important institutions have failed to take seriously their duty of care towards children. In recent years, we have seen appalling cases of organised and persistent child sex abuse. This includes abuse by celebrities, such as Jimmy Savile and Rolf Harris, as well as the systematic abuse of vulnerable girls in Derby, Rochdale, Oxford, and other towns and cities. Some of these cases have exposed a failure by public bodies to take their duty of care seriously, and some have shown that the organisations responsible for protecting children from abuse, including the police, social services and schools have failed to work together properly.

That is why, in April 2013, the Government established the national group to tackle sexual violence against children and vulnerable people, which is led by my honourable friend the Minister for Crime Prevention. This cross-government group was established to learn the lessons from some of the cases that I have mentioned and the resulting reviews and inquiries. As a result of its work, we now have better guidance for the police and prosecutors, new powers for the police to get information from hotels that are used for child sexual exploitation, and better identification of children at risk of exploitation through the use of local multiagency safeguarding hubs. In the normal course of its work the group will publish further proposals to protect children from abuse.

I know that in recent months many Members of the House, from all parties, have campaigned for an independent, overarching inquiry into historical allegations of child abuse. In my correspondence with the seven Members of Parliament who wrote to me about the campaign—the honourable Members for Birmingham Yardley, Brighton Pavilion, East Worthing and Shoreham, Richmond Park, Rochdale, Wells, and West Bromwich East—I made clear that the Government did not rule out such an inquiry.

I can now tell the House that the Government will establish an independent inquiry panel of experts in the law and child protection to consider whether public bodies and other non-state institutions have taken seriously their duty of care to protect children from sexual abuse. The inquiry panel will be chaired by an appropriately senior and experienced figure. It will begin its work as soon as possible after the appointment of the chairman and other members of the panel. Given the scope of its work, it is not likely to report before the general election, but I will make sure that it provides an update on its progress to Parliament before May next year. I will report back to the House when the inquiry panel chairman has been appointed and the full terms of reference have been agreed.

It will, like the inquiries into Hillsborough and the murder of Daniel Morgan, be a non-statutory panel inquiry. This means that it can begin its work sooner; and because the basis of its early work will be a review of documentary evidence rather than interviews with witnesses who might themselves still be subject to criminal investigations, it will be less likely to prejudice those investigations. But I want to be clear that the inquiry panel will have access to all the government papers, reviews and reports that it needs. Subject to the constraints imposed by any criminal investigations, it will be free to call witnesses from organisations in the public sector, private sector and wider civil society. I want to make it clear that if the inquiry panel chairman deems it necessary, the Government are prepared to convert it into a full public inquiry in line with the Inquiries Act.

I began my Statement by saying that I wanted to address the dual concern that in the past the Home Office failed to act on information it received and, more broadly, that public bodies and other institutions have failed to protect children from sexual abuse. I believe that the measures that I have announced today address those concerns. I also said that I wanted the work we are doing to reflect three principles: that our priority must be the prosecution of the people behind these disgusting crimes; that wherever possible and consistent with the need to prosecute, we will adopt a presumption of maximum transparency; and that where there has been a failure to protect children from abuse, we will expose it and learn from it. I believe that the measures announced today reflect those important principles, and I commend this Statement to the House”.

My Lords, that concludes the Statement.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, for her comments and indeed her support. I suspect that the whole House will be pleased to have heard the Statement made by the Home Secretary today and will recognise that it is a determined attempt to find out what lies at the bottom of the issues that the inquiries and the reviews will be addressing. I hope that noble Lords will be reassured by the comments in the Statement about the review made almost immediately on the Permanent Secretary’s arrival in the Home Office.

I disagree with the noble Baroness. I do not think that the review was inadequate. It was a very important inquiry. It has shown us some truths about where we are within the Home Office on that issue. It has also given us encouragement to set up a further review that goes across all the reviews across government. Perhaps I should concentrate on the questions that the noble Baroness asked me in that regard. She asked whether Peter Wanless—he is a superb choice for the job and I am very pleased that he has agreed to take it on—will have professional support. He will have high-quality legal support in the work that he is given. He will have a team that will enable him to get to the bottom of this. This is not going to be a half-baked job. It is going to be a thorough job delivering within eight to 10 weeks, we hope, a review of the situation.

As I said in the Statement, there will be total access to Home Office papers and staff and to government agencies to enable Peter Wanless to get a thorough view of the situation. It is not the inquiry; it is a review of where we are and what we know already. The inquiry is another thing, which I will perhaps come on to. As I said, we will be able to see all documents. The terms of reference will be placed in the House Library so that noble Lords can see them.

I think that it is important to see the Wanless review in connection with the inquiry, which is a much more far-reaching affair, designed to discover the extent to which government and non-government departments, the police and other authorities have failed in their task of protecting children and why this has happened. I hope that the noble Baroness will understand that that may well be a much longer process, but there is a commitment to come back to this House before the election with a Statement as to where we are on that issue. The noble Baroness will know that I will always co-operate in trying to provide information to the House on any subject of this nature. I have not been able to answer some of the inquiries that the noble Baroness made, but I am very happy to do so and will make sure that a copy of the answers is placed in the Library for other noble Lords to see.

[Lord Fowler (Con)]

My Lords, I am sure that the whole House will welcome the reviews, not least because, I suspect, questions on the destruction of files go much wider than the Home Office. My experience of three government departments is that Ministers are never consulted in or out of office on such destruction. My suspicion is that decisions on destruction are taken at a fairly junior level and that at times the whole system can be fairly chaotic. May I ask my noble friend whether one of the aims will be to ensure that we have a system that is fit for purpose and applies to all departments in Whitehall and where decisions on destruction are taken at an appropriately senior level?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I agree with my noble friend. I know that he speaks from considerable experience of government in this respect. There are in fact guidelines in place. New guidelines were brought in in the late 1990s to deal with the destruction of files. I imagine that one of the outcomes of all this business will be to determine how come 114 files are missing. At this stage we do not know whether the files are significant. Mark Sedwill was of the view that they were not. I think that the House would be entitled to ask what the titles of the files were. We do not know what they were. My noble friend is quite right to draw attention to the fact that we will learn lessons here that could well be important in other aspects of government. Tragic and uncalled-for events teach us lessons about how we deal with things in the future. I hope that we learn from this episode.

[The Lord Bishop of Truro]

My Lords, I welcome the Statement. The church is keen to be involved in any such overarching inquiry. A question was asked in the other place about whether the church is involved in this matter. Is the Minister aware that my friend the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury wrote to the Home Secretary some weeks ago asking for an inquiry such as this? The church is very willing to be involved. In a situation such as this—in which, inevitably and sadly, people involved in various authorities at a high level would be related to other authorities and institutions—it is crucial that such an inquiry is allowed to go wherever it needs to go. The church and other organisations and institutions should explicitly be involved in this matter. Perhaps I may add as chairman of the Children’s Society that we would be keen to stress that the voice of children and young people should be always in the centre of one’s thoughts on any matters such as this. If any matters come to light through this inquiry that need to be directed to the police, that will, one hopes, happen and they will be dealt with swiftly and decisively.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I pay tribute to the role of the church in the care of children. I am sure that the Home Secretary will note the offer of involvement in the review and these inquiries. I am delighted that the right reverend Prelate has raised this issue. The involvement of church activists in the national group to tackle sexual violence against children and vulnerable people is an important start.

[Lord McConnell of Glenscorrodale (Lab)]

My Lords, by far the most harrowing constituency surgery meetings I ever attended were those where representations were received from victims of historic child abuse. People were haunted by that abuse 40 or 50 years later. One of the most difficult days I had as First Minister of Scotland was when I had to issue from the Chamber of the Scottish Parliament a formal apology to those victims on behalf of the Government and people of Scotland. However, there is still no independent inquiry into historic child abuse in Scotland. I warmly welcome what the Government have announced today which, I presume, at this stage covers England and Wales. Victims and perpetrators will have crossed borders over the past decades. What discussions could take place to ensure that any review at this stage or future inquiry will cover those victims and perpetrators across the whole UK?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

We know that these are devolved matters in some areas. As the former leader of the Scottish Parliament, the noble Lord will know that Scotland is affected as much of the United Kingdom has been by these matters. We have inquiries going on in Northern Ireland and north Wales. In so far as it is not a devolved matter, the inquiry will indeed embrace the entire United Kingdom, but it is about England initially. However, I am sure that we can all learn from each other’s experiences. If there is a willingness to accept, across the United Kingdom, that information should be exchanged between the Governments and Assemblies in other parts of the United Kingdom and the inquiry, I am sure that that will be made clear.

I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, that I have received a comment about gagging and whether people will be prevented because they have signed a commitment not to talk about matters. I make it clear that this is to be a wide-ranging review. It will have access to all papers and reports, as I have said, and, subject to the constraints of criminal investigations, it will be free to call witnesses. We have made it clear that if the inquiry panel deems it necessary, the Government are prepared to convert it into a free inquiry. It will have considerable powers.

[Baroness Walmsley (LD)]

My Lords, I welcome the Statement, particularly the independent inquiry. Indeed, I added my voice to those who were calling for such an inquiry during my debate in your Lordships’ House on 26 June.

There is no reason why such an inquiry should in any way interfere with the work of the police as long as the panel has available to it people from the police and the prosecuting authorities who know what is going on and which inquiries are actually under way. I ask my noble friend whether such people with up-to-date knowledge of what is being looked into and may be looked into in the future will be attached to the panel so that it can avoid straying into areas that might prevent perpetrators being prosecuted in the future. That is very important.

I ask my friend whether the inquiry will focus more on learning lessons than pointing fingers. It is the role of the police and the prosecuting authorities to point fingers and to bring perpetrators to justice, but they are not in the position, as the panel will be, to learn overall lessons. I echo what the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, said about victims. They need to be at the heart of this. We need to be sure that they can be heard and will have support in order to be heard.

Finally, what will be the scope of the recommendations that the panel will be able to make? Clearly, it will be making recommendations on changes of practice. Will it also be able to make recommendations on changes in legislation? What will be the procedure for the Government to respond to those recommendations in the fullness of time?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I will start on that final point. There will be no limit on what the inquiry will be able to tell us all about what it finds. That is the whole point of it. My noble friend assumed too much when she said that it would not be pointing fingers. I think it will point fingers, and it should do so if it feels that areas of government have failed, either now or in the past. The panel needs to be able to tell us that, and it is right and proper that it should do so.

Of course it is important that people who have been subjected to child abuse feel that this inquiry is about what has happened to them. However, the principal thing that I would urge them to do is to go and tell the police what has happened to them. It is for the police to bring justice to these incidents. We are trying here to learn the mechanisms whereby we can have that framework and whether that is possible or easy to do.

My noble friend asked about the constitution of the panel. I cannot give information on that. No doubt the panel will be constructed to provide the right sort of expertise. We do not want the panel to be so inhibited by the situation regarding criminal prosecutions that it fails to do its work properly. It will have a proper legal basis for making inquiries so that prosecutions, if necessary, can follow from what it discovers.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, the two inquiries that the Home Secretary has announced are of course welcome. Does the Minister recognise that an eight-week review into an existing review into whether the Home Office handled things properly and a more wide-ranging inquiry into whether public and other bodies have carried out their duty of care will not address the central, corrosive concern that is all over today’s newspapers, which is that it is not just about celebrities who have managed to get away with child abuse over many decades, but about people in power—Members of your Lordships’ House, Members of the other place and former Members of the other place? How will these processes address and restore the confidence that people in power are not being allowed to get away with things?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

The inquiry will be entirely independent and able to make whatever recommendations it makes without fear or favour. I would not be supportive, and I do not think this House would be, of anything that smacked of a cover up. This is about finding the truth and making the truth evident. If people have done wrong in the past, that will be revealed by the inquiry. The review is designed to check that all aspects of the review conducted by Mark Sedwill, in the first instance, and the review into the Paedophile Information Exchange were properly conducted and whether there were any failures in the Home Office. I should say that the inquiry that Mark Sedwill set up found no evidence of wrongdoing by prominent figures. However, that is not to say that it will not be discovered; that is a matter for the inquiry to find out when it comes to it.

[Lord Deben (Con)]

Does my noble friend accept that he has had huge support from every side of the House for what is a really important decision by the Home Secretary? Does he also accept that the whole House would want to thank Mr Wanless for taking on what will be an extremely unpleasant job? That is true of anyone who is going to take part in the inquiry and we ought to appreciate that. I hope he will also accept that anyone with information of any kind is duty bound to give that information in whichever of these arrangements is appropriate. Does he further accept that those without information are also duty bound not to talk to the public in ways which suggest that they seem to have, or pretend to have, or sometimes claim to have information which they do not have? The issue here is too serious for it to be a matter of innuendo. This is a matter of finding the truth. Those who have information should give it; those who do not should shut up.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I agree with that, but I think we are right to have embarked on this difficult exercise. I think nothing less would satisfy public opinion. We need to get to the bottom of what is going on. We need to be satisfied in ourselves that we have done all we can do to make sure that child abuse does not flourish in any institutions with which we are associated. I agree totally with what my noble friend has just said, but I think the Home Secretary has provided us with the opportunity to get to the bottom of it all.

[Lord Warner (Lab)]

My Lords, although I welcome this inquiry, I ask the Minister to take back to the Home Office the issue of children’s homes. I carried out an inquiry for the noble Baroness, Lady Bottomley, when she was Health Secretary. Children’s homes have often been a pivotal point for vulnerable children being exploited by people in authority and power. The inquiry will be a good opportunity to explore this area very seriously as we know from previous inquiries that this has been a source of children who can be abused. We need to make sure that things are improving and are now a lot better than they were in the 1980s and early 1990s.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I am sure that this matter will be considered by the inquiry. I have no doubt that one of the most unpleasant things about child abuse is that it is often the most vulnerable who are subjected to it.

[Lord Steel of Aikwood (LD)]

My Lords, I too welcome this Statement by the Home Secretary and thank the Minister for repeating it here. One of the names mentioned regularly in the press in recent days is that of the late Cyril Smith MP. Can I assure the Minister that no complaint—or even rumour—of misbehaviour on his part when a Member of the House of Commons ever reached the Liberal Party? If, indeed, he was one of those named in the 1980s by Geoffrey Dickens MP, I find it odd that he never relayed that information to the Liberal Party. However, what is important is that the short, sharp Wanless review must reassure the public that, if politicians were guilty of molesting children, they will be revealed just like anybody else and there will be no cover up.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I obviously will not talk about any individual cases and I hope that noble Lords will understand why I will not do so. The whole point of the exercise is that there should be no hiding place.

[Lord Clinton-Davis (Lab)]

If any doubt affecting complete public confidence arises in the future, will Parliament be informed immediately? That is most important.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I think I can take it from the sentiments of the House and from the support that the Home Secretary’s Statement received in this House that if I felt the House needed to be informed I would not hesitate to seek the opportunity to do so.

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I speak as leader of a local authority which has premises which have been the continuing subject of police investigations, with which, obviously, the authority is co-operating and has co-operated. I welcome the Statement and agree with many of the things that have been said in this House. Fundamentally, my noble friend has said that the police investigations will not be prejudiced. At one point he said that they were less likely to be prejudiced. Can we be assured that the investigations in train will not lack for resources at any point and will not be suspended and will be pursued relentlessly in every case where they are currently underway? People want to see perpetrators brought to justice.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I agree with my noble friend in those comments.