My Lords, when I repeated the Statement of my right honourable friend the Home Secretary last Thursday, I outlined to the House the urgent need for this legislation. I am sure that noble Lords will agree with me that it is essential for both the Government and this Parliament to ensure that law enforcement, and the security and intelligence agencies, have the powers they need to do their duty. Those powers are now at risk. If we do not take urgent action, lives could be lost. As your Lordships’ House has already heard, the situation is pressing. The timetable for this legislation is, accordingly, inevitably very tight, and I will talk about the reasons for that.
However, it may be helpful to the House if I make clear that Members who wish to table amendments for the Committee stage of the Bill are now able to do so. Amendments for the Marshalled List may be tabled up until the rising of the House, at which point the Legislation Office will produce a Marshalled List in the normal way. Members will also be able to table manuscript amendments for the Committee stage of the Bill tomorrow morning. Arrangements for tabling amendments for subsequent stages of the Bill will be announced in due course.
Perhaps I may turn to the legislation itself. I should like to take a moment to reassure the House. This Bill does not provide any new powers. It does not alter or amend existing powers. It simply provides a clear basis, in respect of both data retention and investigatory powers, for the exercise of existing powers. Crucially, and quite rightly, the legislation is sunsetted. Its provisions will be repealed at the end of 2016. The intention—Clause 7 has been amended in the Commons to provide an explicit legal basis for this—is that we will have time in the interim for a proper debate about what powers are required in the future. There will be a review, led by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, David Anderson QC, into what powers and capabilities might be required in the future, considered in the full context of the threat. That review will consider capabilities but it will also consider safeguards to protect privacy, the challenge of changing technologies, issues of transparency and oversight, and the effectiveness of current legislation.
David Anderson’s work will be far-reaching. It will provide a robust, independent basis for the subsequent work of a Joint Committee of Parliament, to be established following the general election. There will be a public debate and Parliament will have the necessary time to consider legislation on these important and complex issues. I know that some noble Lords have questioned the timing of the sunsetting provision. I hope now that the Government’s intentions behind that timing are clear.
Noble Lords will also be aware of the wider package of measures, announced by the Prime Minister last week, which will strengthen safeguards and reassure the public that their rights to security and privacy are equally protected. We have now published terms of reference for the various measures, including the privacy and civil liberties oversight board. Following ongoing discussions with the Opposition and consideration in the Commons, we have amended Clause 6 to ensure that the independent Interception of Communications Commissioner will now report every six months. I am sure that your Lordships will agree that these measures will help to ensure a better-informed public debate.
I now turn to the purpose of the Bill and the matters before us today. Communications data—the who, where, when and how of a communication, but not its content—can be used to piece together the activities of suspects, victims and vulnerable people. They can prove or disprove alibis, identify links between potential criminals, tie suspects and victims to a crime scene, and help find vulnerable persons at risk of imminent harm. Only this morning, noble Lords will have seen the news that the National Crime Agency has made more than 600 arrests as part of a six-month operation targeting people accessing child abuse images online. Senior officers are clear that, without access to communications data, many of these investigations would hit a dead end.
Those data are held by communications service providers for their business purposes and where they are required to do so by law. They are then accessed by law enforcement, subject to stringent safeguards, where it is necessary and proportionate to do so for a specific investigation. But, as I explained last week, a recent judgment in the European Court of Justice has put into doubt the legal basis on which we require service providers in the UK to retain communications data. As a result, we run the risk of losing access to data that are vital to a wide range of investigations. This could be devastating. It would seriously undermine the ability of the police, the National Crime Agency, the intelligence services and others to prevent and detect crime, catch terrorists, and safeguard and protect children and others at immediate risk of harm.
The Bill also deals with investigatory powers and, specifically, the interception of communications. The content of a communication—the text of an e-mail or a telephone conversation—can play a critical role in the work of law enforcement and the intelligence agencies. The majority of the Security Service’s top priority counterterrorism investigations use interception in some form to identify, understand and disrupt the plots of terrorists. The police and the National Crime Agency rely on interception to prevent and detect serious crimes, including drug trafficking, human trafficking and child sexual abuse.
The House will know that interception can take place only if there is a warrant authorised by a Secretary of State and that can happen only where he or she considers it necessary and proportionate and where the information sought cannot reasonably be obtained by other means. The legislation that provides for interception—the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 or RIPA—obliges telecommunications service providers to give effect to interception warrants. This Government, like our predecessors, have maintained that this obligation applies to companies with customers in the UK, irrespective of where those companies are based. Given the increasing reliance of suspects in the UK on internet-based communications, the compliance of overseas companies is increasingly important to the UK’s interception capability. However, in the absence of explicit extra-territoriality, some overseas companies have now started to question their obligations under RIPA. Those companies have made it clear that they will comply with the law only where there is an explicit obligation to do so. Unless we put the matter beyond doubt, we could, very shortly, see a damaging loss of capability.
I now turn to the Government’s response to this situation. The Bill before the House today is a narrow and focused response to these two issues: the ECJ judgment and the potential loss of compliance with RIPA. On both matters, it makes explicit what we have always asserted to be the case. The first part of the Bill deals with the issue of data retention. At present, we can oblige companies to retain data where they are issued with a notice under the data retention regulations passed by Parliament in 2009. This means that the data are available when the police need them for an investigation. In spite of the ECJ judgment ruling, we have been clear that these regulations remain in force. However, in the light of the judgment, it is necessary to put the legal basis for these requirements beyond doubt. If we do not, there is a risk that these companies may begin to delete crucial data. Equally, if there were a successful challenge in the domestic courts, this would lead to an immediate loss of data.
Accordingly, Clauses 1 and 2 of the Bill provide a clear basis for data retention. They will replace the existing data retention regulations of 2009, maintaining the status quo. The data types to be covered by this new law will be identical to those in existing law. Although the European Court of Justice was critical of the data retention directive, it recognised the importance of data retention in preventing and detecting crime. Crucially, while the court asserted that the directive itself lacked the necessary safeguards, it did not take into account the robust regimes that exist in member states governing the access to the data. We believe that our retention and access regimes already address many of the ECJ’s criticisms. Among other safeguards, they include an authorisation process that was scrutinised in detail and endorsed by the Joint Committee on the Draft Communications Data Bill, ably chaired by my noble friend Lord Blencathra, and they are subject to robust, independent oversight by the Interception of Communications Commissioner.
The Government have, however, considered the judgment at length and are bringing forward changes that will extend the safeguards in place in order to respond to elements of the judgment and to ensure that the Bill is compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights. These include: the imposition of a requirement on the Secretary of State to consider the necessity and proportionality of a data retention notice before issuing it; specifying that the length of time for which data must be retained should be a maximum, rather than an absolute, period of 12 months; and the creation of a code of practice for data retention, which will place on a statutory footing well-established best practice.
A number of further safeguards will be introduced through the regulations made under the Bill. These regulations were published in draft last week.
I apologise for interrupting the flow of my noble friend’s speech. However, he started by saying that the Bill introduced no new powers and did not amend existing powers, but he appeared just now to indicate that there were new powers in the Bill. Have I got it wrong?
My noble friend has got it wrong: it is about safeguards. I am talking about safeguards, not powers. I am talking about the Bill imposing limits on the discretion of the Secretary of State through the regulations and the Bill itself. If my noble friend will allow me to continue he will see that I am placing that in the context of seeking to provide a basis for continuing the provisions of the Bill without extending the powers that are available to the Secretary of State or the Government under the Bill.
I apologise for intervening in the Minister’s speech, but given that he has just been interrupted anyway, on the same point, can he clarify that Clause 4, “Extra-territoriality in Part 1 of RIPA”, is not an extension of the legal powers that the state has in respect of these matters?
I can indeed do so. Extraterritoriality was assumed by the Government to be part of RIPA, and rightly so, as part and parcel of their legislation. We are making it explicit so that there can be no question of doubt about it. On extraterritoriality, as I said in my opening remarks, RIPA was based on the correct assumption that any firm that provided services here within the UK was governed by the law that we had in connection with these matters. In my view, there is no argument about that. Perhaps I may go on and finish my speech. The noble Lord is gracious enough to acknowledge that this is all of a piece, and I would like to be able to present it to the House as a piece.
I mentioned the number of safeguards to be introduced through regulations made under the Bill. These regulations were published in draft last week to enable parliamentary scrutiny and are available from the Printed Paper Office. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has considered those regulations and made a report, which I am sure many noble Lords will have considered. I thank the committee’s members for their work. They have, as always, provided a useful and thorough review of the issues. In the case of this Bill, they have done so in a necessarily short period of time.
The committee is of course correct that it would be best to avoid a gap between the passage of this legislation and the passage of regulations. That is why the Home Secretary has been clear that our intention is to ensure that this secondary legislation can be approved by both Houses before the Summer Recess. This should reassure members of the committee, and other noble Lords, that the powers in question will not be exercised in lieu of those regulations being approved. It will not, therefore, be necessary to use the “made affirmative” procedure in this case. However, I thank my noble friend Lady Thomas of Winchester and her committee: their suggestion was a positive one. I am pleased that we have been able, through the usual channels, to ensure a more direct way of achieving the same objective —bringing the regulations into play before the Summer Recess.
The committee has also invited me to address the potential scope of the delegated power at Clause 1(3). I am pleased to do so. The Government have already published a provisional draft of the regulations to be made under the Bill, and these go no further than the existing data retention regulations 2009. They are, I can confirm, limited to matters relating to the powers conferred by Clause 1(1) and (2). I hope that this will satisfy the House of the Government’s intention.
The second part of the Bill deals with interception. In relation to interception, Clauses 4 and 5 make it clear that the obligation under RIPA to comply with interception warrants applies to all those companies that provide communications services to people in the United Kingdom, regardless of where those companies happen to be based. These provisions do not extend existing powers. They simply seek to make explicit what has always been asserted to be the case.
I know that many noble Lords will be interested in Clause 5, which clarifies the definition of a telecommunications service. When RIPA was considered by Parliament in 2000, it was intended to be technologically neutral. Much of it relates to fixed line or mobile telephony, so it also covers web-based e-mail and social media communications. We are simply seeking to clarify that definition in order to put this matter beyond doubt.
These provisions will make clear the legal obligation on companies that provide communications services to people in the UK to comply with warrants issued by the Secretary of State. In the absence of such clarity, vital capabilities may be lost in the near future. It is of course never ideal for these matters to be considered in haste, but I trust that noble Lords will agree that it is imperative that we urgently address these issues.
I know that some noble Lords have asked about the delay between the court judgment on 8 April and this legislation being introduced. Following that judgment we needed to balance the necessity to respond quickly with the need to ensure that care was taken to get our response right. We could not have acted prior to that judgment because the precise response needed to be framed in relation to the detail of the judgment. While we are clear that the existing regulations remain in force, we must act now to put this matter beyond doubt, providing a basis in primary legislation and responding to some of the points made by the court.
In relation to interception, as I have told the House, we have reached a dangerous tipping point. It has become clear that without immediate legal clarity we could soon see a loss of vital co-operation. This is not a matter that we are able to leave until after the Summer Recess.
I express my thanks to both sides of the House for the support that they have given to the Bill. It has been constructive, I think, to have spent Monday talking to various Peers about it. I particularly pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, for the constructive approach that the Opposition have taken. I look forward to an equally constructive debate in the House as we consider the Bill on Second Reading and at later stages.
I recognise that this is a tight timetable, but I hope that I have made clear the reasons for that. They were accepted in the House of Commons, which overwhelmingly backed the Bill yesterday. I am sure that noble Lords agree that we must ensure that the police and the security and intelligence agencies have the capabilities they need to protect the public and keep us safe. That is what the Bill will do. I beg to move.
My Lords, this debate has been an exceptional debate, not only because we are dealing with something of great importance but also because we have heard some extremely able and interesting speeches. Some have been more supportive than others of the Bill I have presented to the House, but I found them all interesting. The debate reflects the ability of this House to recognise the importance and significance of legislation and the scrutiny it can offer. We know that these are extraordinary circumstances: we are being asked to consider fast-track legislation. However, I think that everyone understands why the Government need a sense of urgency about this legislation.
I hope that where noble Lords have expressed reservations about that, I will be able to reassure them. I appreciate the concerns of some noble Lords about the constrained timetable, given the time that has elapsed between the ECJ judgment and this Bill being introduced. I hope that the House will understand and accept that we have had to make sure that our response both addressed the needs of law enforcement and intelligence agencies and provided the appropriate safeguards and public reassurance. This inevitably required careful consideration, in order to create a package to which all parties could agree.
We feel that it is important that the Bill has been widely supported across the parties, and indeed passed through the House of Commons with a very large majority. Building that consensus was important in a matter that was clearly as important as this.
In the absence of a clear legal basis for retaining communications data, the police stand to lose access to vital information, which—as has been pointed out—contributes to 95% of serious crime prosecutions. Unless we make clear the obligations that RIPA imposes on companies based overseas but providing services here in the UK, the security and intelligence agencies stand to lose their ability to monitor terrorists and organised crime groups in this country. Indeed, as a number of noble Lords have said, and have agreed with the Government, the Bill does not provide new powers. It does not alter or extend existing powers. It simply provides a clear legal basis for powers that the police and intelligence agencies have always relied on to keep people safe, which for different reasons—and there are different reasons within the two parts of the Bill—are now in question.
We have been clear that the Bill is not a permanent solution to the challenges we face in the future. We had a brilliant speech from my noble friend Lord Blencathra, who talked about the scrutiny he had given to previous attempts to find a solution to these problems. It is quite clear that in this Bill we are not attempting to address the future proofing of which he talked. It does not address the growing gap in relation to communications data that the draft communications data Bill sought to resolve. Nor does it address the wider question of the powers that law enforcement, and the security and intelligence agencies, will require in the future.
Those issues will have to be addressed. That is why the provisions in the Bill fall away at the end of 2016. A number of noble Lords have said that we need an earlier sunset. However, if we are to have a proper successor to RIPA, if we are to have a proper evaluation of this matter and if we are to have the public debate about these issues that noble Lords have called for, we need time to do so. Although there have been suggestions that we are being governed by the political timetable—the electoral timetable—I think it is important that we recognise that legislation is dependent on Governments, and Governments have to be elected. Governments have to develop programmes that they are able to communicate.
It is to the credit of this Parliament that we have been able to agree on this issue. I do not know who will form the Government after the election. I do, however, know that it is important that, whichever Government are elected, they have the responsibility of finding a successor to this law and future proofing this sort of issue in the ways outlined so ably by my noble friend. That is why the provisions will fall away. There will be a public debate. I want a public debate. It will have to take account of not only the threats we face but the safeguards required to strike the necessary balance between privacy and security.
This is a very important point. I am sympathetic to the longer sunset, but I do not understand what sort of structures the Government want to put into place to enable that public debate to inform the changes.
For a start, not only will there be a review of this piece of legislation on a six-monthly basis, something that has been agreed and now forms part of the Bill, but David Anderson, the independent reviewer—that is the very paragraph I was turning to, the noble Lord, Lord Soley, will be delighted to know—will lead a review into these issues. The Bill now provides a clear basis in law for that review. The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, suggested that Mr Anderson look at his report as a starting point for addressing this sort of issue. That will be available before the election, and will help inform public debate during the election. The wider safeguards and assurances that sit around the Bill are also important. I am glad that noble Lords have taken account of those safeguards, which build on the extensive safeguards that already exist.
However, there are wider issues, and I will do my best to go through some of them at this stage. I am going to demand a lot of my officials, in the sense that I will ask them, to the extent that they are able, before Committee tomorrow morning, to draft a letter which can be circulated to all noble Lords who have participated —if I do not get time, because I am conscious of time.
In a very interesting speech, the noble Lord, Lord Knight, asked whether there was compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights. The Home Secretary and I have signed on the Bill a declaration that it is so. We have also made available the memorandum to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which explains how our Bill satisfies the ECHR. I hope that that reassures the noble Lord.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked: what are our plans for the timing of regulations? I understand the interest in that. The draft regulations have been published and we have informed the House that the Government’s intention is to lay the regulations following Royal Assent, so that they can be approved by both Houses of Parliament prior to recess. They have, of course, already been published, as I said, and we are liaising with both the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments and the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, ably chaired by my noble friend Lord Goodlad, to ensure that they can consider these matters as soon as possible. The JCSI will meet on Monday to consider the regulations, so that the Commons can debate them prior to recess.
The noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, asked why the measures were not part of the Queen’s Speech. When the gracious Speech was written, our response had not been finalised. The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, asked why it did not form part of the Serious Crime Bill, which she and I are seeing through this House and has finished in Committee. As she knows, we will not return to Report until October. The difficulty of the timetable for that Bill means that it will not be through all its stages before the new year, if we are lucky.
My Lords, the Minister has given answers to a lot of the questions that have been raised, but I said, when I talked about introducing the provisions at the same time as the Serious Crime Bill, that although these provisions may have had to be taken more quickly than the rest of the Bill, it is still the view of most Members of your Lordships’ House that these provisions could have been brought in sooner.
My Lords, I do not think that the Government consider that that was a satisfactory way to deal with the problem.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, asked why the Intelligence and Security Committee did not have time to report on the Bill. I note the noble Lord’s concern on that, but I draw his attention to remarks in the Commons yesterday by the chairman of the committee, Sir Malcolm Rifkind. He said:
“The Intelligence and Security Committee has considered the Bill, and we have taken evidence from the intelligence agencies on its content. If we were concerned in any way that the Bill simply added to the powers available to the Government and that they were using a fast-track procedure to implement it, we would not be able to recommend its endorsement, but we are satisfied that that is not the case”.—[Official Report, Commons, 15/7/14; col. 725.]
Noble Lords should bear that in mind.
Perhaps the noble Lord will allow me to answer other people’s questions.
The noble Lord, Lord Soley, asked about Royal Assent; I think that I have dealt with that. The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, was particularly concerned about the nature of the matters that we are trying to deal with. There are already a number of reviews in the system, including that to be headed by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, David Anderson. He needs to be given time to conduct that work. I see no point in requiring Parliament to return to those issues almost as soon as we return from the Summer Recess without the benefit of the work that we have set in train. Any such legislation would require an accelerated timetable, and we do not want to be doing that again if we can avoid it. I think all noble Lords will agree on that.
The noble Lord, Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, asked whether David Anderson’s review would cover all use of communications data. Clause 7 makes clear that the review covers the operation and regulation of investigatory powers. That extends to communications data for all purposes under RIPA for which it can be obtained. I hope that that reassures the noble Lord.
The noble Lord, Lord Knight, also asked: would the review consider all legislation relating to communications and lawful interception? It does indeed; I have just explained that to the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong.
In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, who is about to resume her place, as I said in my Second Reading speech, we intend to create a privacy and civil liberties board. The terms of reference can be found on the Home Office website and in the Printed Paper Office. Legislation would be required to establish the board, and we will have plenty of opportunity to discuss the detail of the board’s functions then.
I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Carlile for the work that he has done in this area; he has been a very important figure in these matters. David Anderson, his successor, has been consulted on the proposals before the announcement was made to Parliament and as they have developed. Parliament will have the opportunity to debate these matters fully when the legislation to create the board is presented.
The noble Lord, Lord Judd, asked about US data sharing. He will be aware that the Government have announced the appointment of a senior diplomat to look at the issue of data sharing. That is another feature of the non-legislative part of the announcements made by the Home Secretary in the Statement which I repeated here.
My noble friend Lord Paddick asked: what is the annual transparency report and how does it relate to the internet section of the commissioner’s report? There will be an annual transparency report relating to the exercise of powers under RIPA. It will take advantage of as much detail as possible. There will, of course, be a six-monthly report on the operation of the Bill.
My noble friend Lord King of Bridgwater asked: will we reform the ISC so that the chairman is drawn from the Opposition? In view of the reforms that we have made in the Justice and Security Act 2013, the Government have no immediate plans to make further changes, but it is a matter that is live and to which Parliament may well wish to return.
I turn to some of the detailed items under data retention types. The regulations made under the Bill will directly replace the data retention regulations of 2009; they will not extend the list of data types being regulated.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, asked about the ECJ judgment on the EU data retention directive. It did not take account of any of the domestic safeguards that we had in place. Many of the ECJ’s concerns were addressed in the UK’s domestic legislation. The difficulty in responding to the judgment was that we had to consider how we implemented some of the safeguards so that it was clear that they were in primary legislation, not the secondary legislation in which we had translated the European directive in the first place.
I have always enjoyed listening to the legal mind of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, working in its Rolls-Royce fashion. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, also asked: how do the regulations respond to the issue of the ECJ judgment? They will replace the 2009 data retention regulations. In particular, regulations will set out what must be specified in a data retention notice; place requirements on the Secretary of State to keep such notices under review; set out the security requirements that apply; provide that service providers can be reimbursed for any expenses incurred in complying with the requirements; and revoke the 2009 regulations, as they will be redundant.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, asked why Clause 1(1) does not use the wording of the ECJ judgment. The test in the Bill requires the Secretary of State to consider whether it is necessary to require a provider to retain data, but also whether it is proportionate for that legitimate aim. This is in accordance with the judgment, which also makes it clear that it is necessary to verify the proportionality of any interference with a person’s rights when requiring the retention of data. That is why that particular wording referring to proportionality is used.
My noble friend Lord Blencathra raised a plethora of issues, if I may refer to them as such. It is vital that future consideration bears in mind the parliamentary inquiry and accordingly, as I have said, it is explicitly referred to in the terms of reference. Local councils will no longer be able to access communications data under these proposals. From the lists that I have seen, the Egg Marketing Inspectorate does not, nor has it ever had, access to communications data under RIPA. Indeed, Defra will also be losing its entitlement to such access in future. We recognise that the list has grown and that it needs to be cut down. The 13 bodies which will have their powers removed are the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, the Port of Liverpool Police, the Port of Dover Police, the Royal Mail, BIS, Defra, the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development in Northern Ireland, the Environment Agency, the Scottish Environment Protection Agency, the Department of the Environment in Northern Ireland, the Food Standards Agency, the Pensions Regulator and the Charity Commissioners. I should think that noble Lords are amazed that those bodies had access in the first place. This just shows the necessity for reviewing this sort of legislation and working it out on the basis of who actually needs it.
There was some concern over territoriality—a difficult word to say, particularly if one has been sitting here for a few hours. The noble Lord, Lord Knight of Weymouth, raised this, as did my noble friends Lord Paddick and Lord Hodgson and the noble Lord, Lord Judd. The Bill clarifies the territorial extent of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act: in the absence of explicit extraterritorial jurisdiction, some companies have started to question whether the legislation applies to them. This is nothing new. Jack Straw—who as Home Secretary was responsible for RIPA in the first place—made this clear yesterday in the House of Commons. He stated that the “clear intention” of that Act was to extend extraterritoriality. My noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne quoted Jack Straw to great effect; his was a very effective speech. I am pleased that many noble and noble and learned Lords, including the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, recognise that this is not an extension of powers.
I have done my best, within the relatively short time that I have had to wind up what has been an extremely useful debate, to reassure noble Lords about this issue. The wider safeguards that sit around the Bill are important and we will have a chance to discuss them at length. However, I am glad that noble Lords have taken account of them in discussing the Bill before us today. We will no doubt be back tomorrow to consider it in Committee. There are wider issues and it is good that they have been raised by my noble friend Lord Blencathra.
I welcome this debate, and I would like briefly to reflect on the importance of the issues that we will return to tomorrow. Communications data and interception powers are intrusive. They are rightly subject to very strict safeguards, but they are also of vital importance to the work of law enforcement and the security and intelligence agencies. Without the legislation that we are considering today, those powers would be undermined. Those who mean us harm would be able to evade detection. Put simply, lives would be at risk. These are important issues. That is why this debate has been an important one. On that basis, I commend the Bill to the House and ask that it receive its Second Reading.
Bill read a second time and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.