Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Phillips of Sudbury
Main Page: Lord Phillips of Sudbury (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Phillips of Sudbury's debates with the Home Office
(10 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 1 is an amendment of modest pretensions, but I think it significant and worthy of the attention of the House. What it does is address the use of the word “considers” in Clause 1(1) and proposes that that word be replaced by the word “believes”. To make sense of that, I hope that noble Lords will find it helpful if I say that this is a key clause because it gives the Secretary of State the power to issue retention notices to telecommunications operators. As we know, that class of people includes all great companies in the internet and web world. It allows the Secretary of State to issue a retention notice so that they in turn have to retain what are called “relevant communications data” according to that notice.
However—and this is the important point—the Secretary of State can do that only in certain circumstances: namely, according to the clause, when he or she,
“considers that the requirement is necessary and proportionate”.
My dissatisfaction with that formulation is simply that, in Sections 22, 28 and 29 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, which bestow comparable powers on the officeholders there mentioned, precisely the same formulation contains the word “believes” rather than “considers”. In precisely comparable circumstances, where necessity and proportionality must be present, the officeholder concerned has to believe in that necessity and proportionality.
Some may think, “Well, what’s the difference?”—and, indeed, that is the key question. I think that there is a difference. I think that “believes” is a stronger requirement than “considers”. I looked at the Oxford English Dictionary definition of the two words. “Consider” is defined thus: “think carefully” about something—typically before making a decision. On the other hand, “believe” is defined as “accept the truth … of”—feel sure of the truth of whatever it is. That is what I thought before looking up the words in the dictionary, but I was surprised in discussions with the office of the parliamentary draftsmen to find that there is considerable doubt on their part that there is any difference in this context between “considers” and “believes”. If that be so, to agree my amendment will not change the purport of the Bill one iota—but if on the other hand I am right and there is a significant difference, it would be wise and proper of us to insert “believes” rather than “considers”.
Since Clause 1 refers expressly to Section 22 of RIPA 2000, I am bound to say that I think that a court—we have many noble and learned former judges here and I hope that they will add their opinion—would seek, given a difference of wording, to render a difference of meaning as between Section 22 of RIPA 2000 and what will be Section 1 of the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act. As a long-in-the-tooth lawyer, that is the way that I am working, which seems to me to be right and proper.
Why do I think that the amendment is worth while? I am at one with a huge number of our fellow citizens outside this place who are extremely unhappy about the whole of this Bill and the method and manner in which it has been brought forward. The fact that, this very day, we are going to complete all stages is an indication of the radical nature of the procedures adopted to push this Bill through, as was the case in the Commons the day before yesterday.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for tabling this amendment. He slightly wandered off it into more general objections, which he might have made at Second Reading yesterday.
On his particular amendment, the requirements in Clause 1(1) of the Bill respond to the European Court’s criticisms of the data retention directive—to ensure that no more data than are required are retained. It is worth reiterating that the judgment concerns the EU data retention directive, not the UK data retention regulations. In the UK we have always taken a tailored approach—if I might use that word—to retention notices. We do not and have never required every communications provider to retain all its data. Ministers have always issued retention notices to selected companies based on the nature of the company and the threat, and we have required the retention only of the data types listed in the schedule of regulations.
Following the judgment, we are putting that good practice in the legislation. This Bill will require the Secretary of State to issue data retention notices to communications service providers on a selective basis: only if she considers the obligation to be necessary and proportionate for one of the authorised purposes. We also add a requirement to keep notices under review. I think therefore that we are in close agreement on what is required.
Ministers have not required an operator to retain data without first going through a serious and careful consideration of the value to be gained by law enforcement and intelligence agencies from the data retained. This Bill ensures that these considerations are law. We feel that it is appropriate for Ministers to “consider” these issues. They have never taken this consideration lightly and I can assure noble Lords that they have no intention of doing so in future. I do not believe that a Minister having due consideration to the issue of a notice could decide to proceed if he or she did not believe that to do so was necessary and proportionate.
In other words, I do not believe that changing the word “considers” would have any material effect. I know that my noble friend met with parliamentary counsel this morning and was told that it does not. Accordingly, I invite him to withdraw his amendment.
Before the Minister sits down—I am keen to have his response to this—if, as he now confirms, the Government think that there is no difference in meaning between “considers” and “believes”, why not have consistency between the language of RIPA and that of the Bill so as to avoid confusion and argument in future?
If my noble friend had been listening to yesterday’s Second Reading debate, he would have understood that it was the view of the House in general, and certainly of the Government, that the review that will be undertaken will indeed look at RIPA and decide whether the terms stated in it are appropriate for future-proofing the legislation. Meanwhile, the Bill is presented to the House in ways that we believe are appropriate to deal with the problems that I outlined when I introduced it yesterday.
My Lords, I regret to say that I find that answer completely unsatisfactory. There is every reason in the world, I suggest, why we have commonality of language, particularly in clauses that expressly relate one to another. If it is felt after the review that the language of RIPA 2000 needs changing, a change could be made to this legislation as well. In the mean time, though, there is going to be confusion, and it is a difficult enough Bill without adding unnecessary complexity to it. However, since no one in the House has risen to support the amendment, I beg leave—with good grace, I hope—to withdraw the same.
My Lords, the amendment is also in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws—who unfortunately cannot be here, although those who heard her speak last night will have a good idea of what she might have said—the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts.
We have something of a paradox of timing in relation to the Bill, in that, as we all know only too well, this measure has been rushed, helter-skelter, through both Houses. It is fair to say that the vast majority of Members in both Houses are deeply worried by all that but have none the less accepted the view of the Government as to the need for that expedition. On the other hand, we have a sunset clause in the Bill—designed to be some sort of reassurance—requiring the Act to be repealed in two and a half years’ time, at the end of 2016. The point behind the amendment is self-apparent, namely that if six months is too short—that was the proposal in the other place, that the repeal should take place at the end of this year—to wait two and a half years hence is too long. That is why we have suggested a repeal date of 31 December next year.
It is common ground that this complex measure—I think the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, called it “obscurantist”, and she is a lawyer—which is wedded to RIPA 2000, itself a highly complex piece of legislation, needs review and is being reviewed from various quarters, as we have heard from my noble friend Lord Taylor. I am sure we are all very grateful for that. However, is it not also the case that, because we have not had a chance to consider the Bill properly, we do not know whether there are serious lacunae in it? The proposition of those of us behind the amendment is that to wait two and a half years before anything must be done about those deficiencies is just too long. We have suggested this compromise of a year and a half from now.
I finish by repeating the importance of the Bill for our reputation as a House of Parliament and for Parliament as a whole. Although we may be satisfied that what we are doing is necessary, appropriate and proportionate, I am afraid millions of our fellow countrymen are not of that view. There is therefore a wider issue behind this amendment. It will provide some reassurance that the delay—it will be seen as such—in allowing a thorough review of this legislation, which will find an outlet and remedies by the end of next year, is a reasonable compromise; to leave it for two and a half years is not. I have that phrase of John Pym, in the other place in 1642, ringing in my ears. He said in that tense Parliament that we must not lose the,
“vigour and cheerfulness of allegiance”,
of our fellow Britons. I beg to move.
My Lords, I oppose the amendment. I was unable to speak yesterday. I do not propose to make a Second Reading speech, but I wish to make a case for the Bill to remain as it is. I first draw attention to my declaration of interest in the register as a member of the independent surveillance panel, put together by the Royal United Services Institute for the Deputy Prime Minister’s work, which will go on for the next year and beyond the next election.
Frankly, we need time to do the job: 18 months is not long enough. I am not even going to use the excuse of a potential change of Government after the general election. The fact is that it is important that the sunset clause is there and it is important that it cannot be extended: it will go. However, time is needed to do the job properly. It is not as though nothing is going to happen for two and a half years. It will take two and a half years to pull together the reviews of RIPA and the other reviews that are taking place to bring legislation to Parliament very early in 2016, because this will finish at the end of 2016. The idea that it has been left to the last minute is nonsense. We need that time to do the job, and to explain and consult.
Public trust has to be secured. I am convinced that the fair-minded public, when they are treated as mature adults, will support an accountable system for interceptions and surveillance, rather than take what is said by unaccountable NGOs and newspaper editors. Contrary to what was said earlier on, the public have no idea what exists in the system in terms of these arrangements. We have to look at the use of modern technology.
What the noble Lord is talking about is political leadership. Political leadership, I am sure, will mean that there are opportunities to discuss this matter during a general election.
This has been a good debate, and I am quite happy that we have had to discuss this issue, but I urge the noble Lords who have proposed the amendment to withdraw it.
My Lords, I agree with my noble friend that this has been an excellent and worthwhile debate. On behalf of my co-sponsors, I thank all those who have taken part.
We have a wealth of experience in this place, which has been demonstrated today wonderfully well. I shall be quite frank: my views have been influenced by what has been said. So long as the Minister was serious, as I am sure he was because he is a sincere man, and so long as the tenor of what he said is carried into effect in the time ahead of us—namely, that, as he put it, the Government will make haste but take the public of this country into consideration in defining and putting together the new legislation to come—it is appropriate for this amendment to be withdrawn. The arguments made about the timescales, especially given the forthcoming general election, seem to me to be correct. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.