Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Lord Taylor of Holbeach Excerpts(10 years, 3 months ago)
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The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)
My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend Lord Marlesford for tabling this amendment, not least because it provides your Lordships with an opportunity to consider the Foreign Enlistment Act 1870—not something that we do every day, or night. The Act prohibits British nationals from fighting in the armed forces of another state, against friendly states. The new clause would go further by creating a new offence of participation in armed conflict against any foreign state at peace with Her Majesty. My noble friend’s amendment raises an important and topical issue: that of people from the United Kingdom seeking to engage in combat abroad in so-called “theatres of jihad”, such as the civil war in Syria, to which my noble friend referred.
Although the issue of British nationals fighting abroad is not a new one, or one specific only to Syria, it is something that the Government take very seriously. Syria is now the number one destination for jihadists anywhere in the world, and there are currently thousands of foreign fighters in Syria, including a large number of Europeans. We judge that more than 200 UK-linked individuals have travelled to Syria to join the fighting. Of course, not all individuals who travel to Syria are extremists. Many simply want to support humanitarian efforts. However, those who do travel there are putting themselves and innocent Syrians in danger, and we know that a number of Europeans have already been killed in the conflict. Moreover, we know that some individuals travel to Syria—or other places such as Yemen or Somalia—to engage in fighting with terrorist groups.
The Government are working with the police and security services to disrupt travel by individuals of concern. Your Lordships will understand why I am unable to provide specific details of all of the actions that are being taken to this end—but rest assured, we support the use of the full range of available measures. In particular, where there is evidence that individuals are planning, promoting, funding, facilitating or participating in terrorist activities overseas—including terrorist fighting—the police and Crown Prosecution Service will look to prosecute them, before they go or on their return. A very wide range of offences already exists on the statute books to capture such activity, not least in the Terrorism Acts 2000 and 2006, which provide extraterritorial jurisdiction in relation to certain activities. Although my noble friend’s amendment seeks to add a further offence to the disruptive arsenal, I fear that this amendment, as drafted, entails a number of drawbacks that would undermine its effectiveness.
Firstly, the amendment recognises that, while the 1870 Act already deals with fighting for another state’s armed forces, many modern conflicts involve an array of non-state actors and irregular militias. However, like the 1870 Act, this amendment deals only with,
“armed conflict against a foreign state at peace with Her Majesty”.
Hard distinctions of war and peace made sense in 1870; Tolstoy’s masterpiece had been published just the year before. But the bases for modern conflicts are no longer so binary. The UK has not been in a declared condition of war since the defeat of the Axis forces in 1945. Today we are at peace with all states, at least in the classical sense of international law.
Secondly, the defence of notification to the proposed new offence has the potential to severely undermine the disruptive utility. Whether it was my noble friend’s intention I do not know, but the amendment as drafted gives the Secretary of State no additional power to prohibit a person who gives notice of their intention to fight overseas from going. A number of existing powers might be used to prevent such a person from travelling—and, of course, the Bill augments these by providing powers to seize passports cancelled on public interest grounds. But the amendment adds nothing to these powers. Indeed, the proposed offence bites only when a fighter who previously failed to notify returns to the UK. Anyone who does notify the Secretary of State would be completely free from the sanctions which this amendment seeks to put in place.
Thirdly, any offence that hinges on such a notification regime is likely to raise significant difficulties in enforcement. A committed jihadist is unlikely to inform the authorities of his travel plans for fear of disruption, either before or after the fact. Evidence that a person has engaged in fighting abroad would be extremely difficult to obtain, so the evidential difficulties in securing a prosecution may be no less than for the other relevant offences available.
Fourthly, although self-defence has a well understood meaning in relation to ordinary offences against the person, how it would apply in the context of overseas conflicts is unclear. Many jurisdictions have laws to deal with the use of defensive force in situations of immediate danger, and we expect British nationals to comply with local laws wherever they are. But the idea of participating in armed conflict as an act of self-defence is a difficult matter. We must take care not to legitimise the wrong-headed extremist narrative that paints so-called jihadists as fighting a war of self-defence on behalf of Muslims internationally.
Finally, the amendment proposes sentences for the new offence that could include forfeiture of a passport and deprivation of British citizenship. As noble Lords will recall from our discussion in Committee of what is now Clause 138, passports are issued under the royal prerogative. The Home Secretary already has the power to refuse or withdraw passports where she believes that a person’s activities—past, present or proposed—are so undesirable that the grant or continued enjoyment of passport facilities is contrary to the public interest. The British Nationality Act gives the Home Secretary powers to deprive persons of their British citizenship when she is satisfied that deprivation is conducive to the public good, provided that the person is not left stateless as a result. As such, these sentencing options would not be necessary.
I thank my noble friend Lord Marlesford for raising the issue of British nationals fighting overseas. I assure your Lordships that this is something that the Government take extremely seriously. Nevertheless, for the reasons that I have set out, I do not believe that the amendment would be the right way to proceed and I ask my noble friend to withdraw it.
Lord Marlesford
My Lords, I am most grateful to my noble friend for having raised so many points so clearly and in such detail. I hope very much that there will be action under the present provisions of the law to ensure that, wherever possible, British citizens who have engaged in jihadism overseas, will be prosecuted on their return to this country—as he said that they already can be under the existing law. I hope very much that the removal of passports—and, if appropriate, of British citizenship—will take place.
This is a very serious subject. The evidence given by the security chiefs to Parliament was chilling. I had no idea what a serious situation we face, and I am delighted that the Government have stated that they are well aware of it and are dealing with it. I therefore beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I entirely agree with what lies behind these amendments but have one concern about them, with which the noble Lord may be able to help me. We heard in an earlier debate on the Bill that a number of police and crime commissioners are already dealing with anti-social behaviour as one of their objectives. I assume that, as they are doing that, they are able to do so. Therefore, I wonder whether it is necessary to refer specifically to this Act, as it will be, in the second of the noble Lord’s amendments in this group.
Given that we already have a requirement under new subsection (1A) of the relevant Act for each of the responsible authorities to have regard to the police and crime objectives, I am not sure whether the proposed new subsection (1B) is necessary. We often hear that things are not necessary but it is helpful to be clear about them. However, my real concern is whether, by referring specifically to the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act, there might be a suggestion that it should have priority over other legislation which could be listed among the objectives. The relevant police reform Act, the obligations of the police and crime commissioners and the police and crime plans use wide and general terms. The Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act, as it will become, will not be the only legislation to which all responsible authorities need to have regard, so I am concerned about knock-on effects outside what we are considering at the moment.
Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)
I understand the noble Lord’s eagerness to accept this, and it may have something to do with the hour, but, just occasionally, I have a few words to say on the proposals put forward by my noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey. I must admit that when I first looked at these amendments I had a slight concern about the role of the community safety partnerships and their responsibilities. My own CSP has seen a massive cut in its budget and its capacity to deal with some of the issues before it. But when resources are short, planning is most essential. It would be extremely useful to have the kind of co-ordination function that is laid out in the amendments.
I am sorry that the Minister laughed when my noble friend said how helpful he was trying to be. He has been accused of many things during the course of proceedings on the Bill. He was accused of being mischievous when he was trying to be helpful. He put on record that he is trying to be helpful now and there was hilarity from the Benches opposite, which I genuinely think is most unfair. This is the kind of amendment that sets in place how the objectives of the Bill can be achieved by those responsible for implementing it.
There are new powers in this Bill. It is important that all the partners understand their role and the expectations. I give one example. The noble Lord will recall that I proposed amendments in Committee on dispersal orders. One of the issues is that there is no longer a responsibility on the police to consult the local authority when issuing dispersal orders. The new orders that the Government are proposing are wider and can last longer than the ones in place at the moment. There is also no obligation to consult the local authority, but the guidance says—I cannot remember the exact phraseology—that there is the opportunity to discuss or that that is expected or is likely. Before any dispersal orders were issued, would it not be helpful if discussions took place within the community safety partnership about what the expectations would be when it came to the point of issuing one? It is fitting to have that kind of co-ordination, to know what the expectations and responsibilities are, to ensure that the legislation being put forward by the Government has an impact, that it does not disappear into the ether somewhere but can be worked on. I would expect that this is the very least that the Government would expect—to have this way of taking the new legislation into the existing framework.
I certainly accept my noble friend’s comments that he is seeking to be helpful. It is a very helpful amendment. I trust that the Minister will be able to take that on board.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I thank the noble Baroness for that comment. Indeed, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey. I am quite prepared to accept that he has a helpful side to his nature. I am very grateful that he has presented these amendments. I sense the spirit in which he has tabled them. My noble friend Lady Hamwee is always helpful. I am grateful for her contribution to this debate.
I will talk about the issue in general and then talk about how it happens specifically. This is about how police and local councils will use the powers running right through Parts 1 to 5 of the Bill. I will deal with Amendment 90 first and then I will come on to Amendment 91. I have listened to the noble Lord’s comments on the amendment. Although I appreciate the helpful intent behind the amendment, I do not believe that it is necessary. As the noble Lord will be aware, Sections 5 to 7 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 already require local authorities and the police to co-operate with each other and other local agencies in formulating and implementing strategies to reduce crime and disorder. The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, is absolutely right. The Government expect local authorities and the police to co-operate together. The formulation and implementation of those strategies would manifestly include a consideration of anti-social behaviour. I am sure that the noble Lord will be aware of the London Borough of Haringey’s current community safety strategy which identifies six outcomes, one of which is to:
“Prevent and reduce acquisitive crime and anti-social behaviour”.
It is in implementing such strategies that it goes almost without saying that the responsible authorities will take full account of the new powers in Parts 1 to 5 of the Bill, as well as existing less formal interventions, to tackle such behaviour.
As a result of our extensive consultation on the new powers with local authorities—the Bill has been drafted with local authority consultation as its backbone—as well as other agencies, I am confident that they are fully aware of the importance in ensuring that the use of the powers is underpinned by a coherent strategy and good partnership working. Indeed, local authorities have played a major role in shaping the new powers and would no doubt be keen to ensure that they work effectively in their areas. Moreover, along with their individual strategies and the Government’s statutory guidance, local authorities will issue their own guidance to front-line professionals on the use of the new powers and their approach to them. This is what they do with their existing powers and I see no reason why that practice would not continue.
I turn to Amendment 91. I will repeat the point that I made in Committee. The election of police and crime commissioners put the public back at the heart of our drive to cut crime, thereby giving them a greater say in how their local area is policed by these directly elected representatives. I admit that it will be a great day when I can get the noble Lord, Lord Harris, to admit that the policy has achieved that objective—but that task is not beyond us.
Under the provisions of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, PCCs are required to issue and publish a police and crime plan for their local area and must consult with their chief constable in drawing up the plan. Such plans must include objectives for reducing crime and disorder. As I indicated in Committee, 30 of the police and crime commissioners have put tackling, preventing and reducing anti-social behaviour as one of their key priorities in their plans. Another eight have put reducing the impact and keeping people safe from anti-social behaviour as one of their individual priorities; and the remaining three commissioners want to encourage the reporting of anti-social behaviour.
Perhaps I may give the noble Lord an example. London’s Police and Crime Plan 2013-2016 states that,
“tackling anti-social behaviour … or quality of life crime, is critical to addressing perceptions of disorder in a neighbourhood, and although MOPAC”—
the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime—
“is setting no explicit targets for the police in this area, ASB is one of the three priorities for the London Crime Reduction Board, chaired by the Mayor”.
It is obvious that the successful implementation of this and other police and crime plans when it comes to tackling anti-social behaviour will necessarily involve an assessment of how the new powers in the Bill can be put to best use.
This was reflected by Sir Graham Bright, the Cambridgeshire police and crime commissioner, who said about the Bill in October last year:
“Police and Crime Commissioners have been closely following the progress of the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill. We want the police to be given effective powers to tackle anti-social behaviour that provide better protection for victims”.
Sir Graham went on to say:
“It is also important to have a multi-agency approach to tackling anti-social behaviour as the police are only one part of the solution. By working with local authorities, housing associations and other agencies we can effectively combat anti-social behaviour and empower victims and communities”.
In short, the police, local authorities and other agencies recognise the importance of understanding how to use the new powers in the Bill effectively to protect the public from anti-social behaviour. The statutory guidance provided in the Bill will undoubtedly help them in this regard.
In practice, I believe that on this issue there is little between the Government and the noble Lord, Lord Harris. We are at one in recognising the importance of partnership in working to tackle anti-social crime and anti-social behaviour, and of this being reflected in local crime and disorder strategies and police and crime plans. This is what the Government expect local authorities to do.
In implementing such plans, in so far as they relate to tackling anti-social behaviour, we would clearly expect the police, local authorities and other agencies to make effective use of the new powers in the Bill. While we seek the same outcome, I do not believe that these amendments are needed to achieve it. I therefore invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Syria
Lord Taylor of Holbeach Excerpts(10 years, 4 months ago)
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The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)
My Lords, in concluding this debate, I should like to begin my contribution to it by thanking my noble friend Lord Roberts of Llandudno for tabling the Motion, which gives us the opportunity to talk about this very serious issue. He graphically described the catastrophe that has overtaken the people of Syria and the consequential problems for the people not only of that country but of neighbouring countries. The Government share many of the deep concerns expressed by noble Lords today; if there are disagreements between us, they will be about how we best handle the issue.
Conflicts of this magnitude, with such a severe impact on civilian populations, require a commensurate response from the international community. The Government are proud of the fact that the UK is playing its full part in that response. The UK has pledged £500 million for the Syrian relief effort, of which more than £470 million has already been allocated to partners both inside Syria and in neighbouring countries. This represents the United Kingdom’s largest ever response to a humanitarian crisis. It is also the second-largest bilateral contribution by any country behind that of the United States—until very recently, we had given more money than the rest of the European Union put together.
By providing aid in this way, we believe that we can help far more people than we could by resettling what could be only a token number. I think that all noble Lords will agree that the numbers that have been mentioned today are tokens compared with the massive figure of 2.3 million people who have already left that land.
We are proud of the UK’s record of offering protection to those genuinely in need. In the EU, the UK is the third-largest recipient of asylum seekers from Syria, behind Germany and Sweden. As the Deputy Prime Minister said earlier this week, in the year up to September 2013 the UK had received more than 1,500 asylum applications from Syrians. Over the same period, more than 1,100 were granted refugee status. We also operate an immigration concession for Syrian nationals who are already legally present in the UK, designed to make it easier for them to extend their stay or switch immigration category.
In response to the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Roberts, in some cases reiterated by other noble Lords, 30,000-plus Syrians have sought refuge in the EU so far, not the 12,000 he quoted. We recognise that Bulgaria is under considerable pressure. We are supporting efforts by the European Asylum Support Office to build capability in Bulgaria. UK aid is providing immediate practical help to Syrians in the region. Family members of Syrian refugees in the UK are eligible for family reunion under Immigration Rules and 90% of Syrian asylum claims are granted. We recognise the scale of this process and we respect the views and values which want to resettle Syrians, but our own view is that aid in the region will help more. I think I have made that clear in my response so far.
The Government have discussed with EU partners on a number of occasions, both in Brussels and bilaterally, the best way to respond to those fleeing Syria. I emphasise to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, that these are active negotiations. We have also spoken to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other partners in the UK. We are very aware that some, including the UNHCR, would like to see a more proactive programme of resettlement of refugees currently hosted by countries neighbouring Syria. We have considered these options very carefully and respect the views of those countries who favour a resettlement programme, but we maintain that our top priority and that of the EU should continue to be to provide humanitarian assistance to displaced people in the region, in partnership with neighbouring countries, UNHCR and other UN and non-governmental partners.
Beyond immediate humanitarian assistance, our priority must be to help neighbouring countries provide sustainable protection in the region. With more than 2 million people, as we know, now having been displaced from Syria, regional protection is the only realistic means by which the rights of the vast majority of displaced persons can be safeguarded. Accordingly this should be our focus, rather than resettlement or providing “humanitarian admission” to displaced Syrians, initiatives which provide only very limited relief to the neighbouring countries and can have only a token impact on the huge and increasing refugee numbers.
Turning to the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, I recognise his interest in this issue. We are not running scared of public opinion; we have considered all options very carefully and concluded that we can make the biggest difference through our generous humanitarian package, which is second only to that of the USA, as I have said. We considered the Bosnia-style approach, but there is no EU support for such an approach and there is a difference: Bosnia is on the border of the EU and was easier to access and to handle than the Syrian situation.
I say to my noble friend Lady Tonge, whose interest in these issues I respect, that we have considered resettlement arguments carefully and respect the right of other countries to offer resettlement programmes, but we believe we can make a bigger difference through generous aid efforts in the region. We have so far given UNRWA £23.5 million to help Palestinian refugees.
Baroness Tonge
Would we not be able to consider some sort of help even just for the children? Noble Lords may remember the Kindertransport that went on, quite rightly and enthusiastically, during the Second World War. There are so many children involved here and so many are unaccompanied. Could we not have some sort of scheme to help them?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
The noble Baroness makes a very interesting suggestion and I thank her very much for it.
While we recognise that others may wish to participate in these activities, it is important that this does not substitute or deflect our attention from longer-term regional solutions. That is why we firmly support the establishment of an EU Justice and Home Affairs-led regional development and protection programme, the RDPP, for those displaced by the Syrian crisis. Providing durable solutions for those displaced, while at the same time meeting the needs of the countries bearing the brunt of Syrian displacement, is rightly at the heart of this programme. I again reassure the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, that we are very much engaged in this programme.
The Home Secretary announced in July last year that the UK will contribute €500,000 to the project, bringing its overall size to more than €13 million. This type of approach aims to promote refugees not only being protected and supported in the short term, but being well placed to integrate into the local community or return home if the possibility arises. It is also designed to support broader socioeconomic development in host countries, such as Jordan and Lebanon, to help mitigate tensions between refugees and host communities. The noble Lord, Lord Wright of Richmond, is correct to draw attention to the fundamental need for a political solution.
Lord Warner
I am sorry to interrupt the Minister’s flow, but is he well informed on the circumstances in which people are living as refugees in Lebanon in particular? Lebanon has laws that prevent any of those refugees working: they have no means of sustaining themselves. Does that not make a little difference to the Government’s views about how these people can survive over a long period?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
That is exactly why I am going on to say that the noble Lord, Lord Wright of Richmond, is right to say that a political solution to this problem is imperative and is strongly supported by this country. It was supported by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and my noble friend Lady Tonge joined in recognising the importance of it.
The noble Lord, Lord Wright of Richmond, asked me if I could give more details about the Geneva conference on 22 January. I cannot give him any more information than that which he already possesses, but I will write to him and, if I may, place a copy of that letter in the Library and circulate it to all Members of the House who have spoken in the debate.
I have a couple of notes here for the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. Options to help Syrian refugees, including some form of resettlement, have been discussed on a number of occasions. We expect to continue these discussions but there are no plans for an EU-wide evacuation or resettlement programme. Instead, we want to focus on developing a programme for protection in the region and a development programme. I think I have made that clear throughout the remarks I have made.
I understand that this is a highly emotive issue and one that continues to require real action through high levels of international co-operation, both in the region and more widely. The UK has a proud tradition of providing protection to those in need, and this Government are committed to continuing to play their full part in the international response to the humanitarian crisis in Syria. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Roberts, for giving us a chance to explain that.
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Lord Taylor of Holbeach Excerpts(10 years, 4 months ago)
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“Guidance
(1) The Secretary of State may issue guidance to—
(a) chief officers of police, and(b) the councils mentioned in section 28(2),about the exercise of their functions under this Part. (2) The Secretary of State may revise any guidance issued under this section.
(3) The Secretary of State must arrange for any guidance issued or revised under this section to be published.”
“( ) In deciding whether to give such an authorisation an officer must have particular regard to the rights of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly set out in articles 10 and 11 of the Convention.
“Convention” has the meaning given by section 21(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998.”
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, there are two government amendments in this group. It may assist the House if I set out the case for the reform of the existing powers available to the police and, in doing so, also address Amendment 32, which has been tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith.
In Committee, the Opposition questioned whether the new dispersal power is needed—indeed, the noble Baroness mentioned that earlier in the debate—and whether there is any problem with the existing powers. It is true that both of the existing dispersal powers have been used successfully to deal with anti-social behaviour and alcohol-related disorder. However, they also have limitations. Section 30 of the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003 is used to deal with persistent anti-social behaviour in an area and requires the agreement of the local authority in designating a dispersal zone. That approach is not as swift and responsive as it could be. This Bill takes a different approach. Where there is persistent anti-social behaviour in an area, it is the council that is able to put in place the measures to promote long-term, sustainable change in an area. It uses not a dispersal power but the new public spaces protection order.
Section 27 of the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006 is a police-only power, so can be used more quickly; but it can be used only in relation to alcohol-related disorder, and that is too limited. In reforming the anti-social behaviour legislation, we have sought to streamline the powers and make them more flexible. That is the philosophy behind all the anti-social behaviour powers in this Bill. The new dispersal power will allow police to respond quickly so that victims do not have to suffer the anti-social behaviour while a dispersal zone is put in place. I believe that agencies should not have to label an area an ASB hotspot before the police are able to act. These labels are a stigma on communities and can hinder the hard work of local agencies to improve the quality of life in those areas. I agree that the existing dispersal powers are not “broke”—to use a well known expression—but that does not mean that we should not take this opportunity to improve them. Combining the best elements of the existing powers makes the new power a more effective tool to protect victims of anti-social behaviour.
In its written evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee, ACPO stated that the new dispersal power,
“will strengthen police powers to remove people from areas for poor public place behaviour in general and are not overly focussed on alcohol related disorder as at present”.
It said that the two existing powers,
“have proved to be very effective tools and combining these orders will simplify their administration and reduce costs”.
This is echoed by a number of individual police forces and the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime, which also welcome the new dispersal power. The Criminal Justice Alliance stated that the new power,
“could alleviate antisocial behaviour from particular areas quickly with far less administrative bureaucracy than previously”.
All these organisations caveat their statements with the note of caution that it will be important that the new power is used proportionately and sensitively, and we agree. As I have explained, the new power is designed to allow the police to act quickly to prevent anti-social behaviour from escalating. This does not mean that we expect the police to act in isolation from other agencies; indeed, we acknowledge that there will be many situations where it is appropriate to involve the local authority in the response to anti-social behaviour.
However, to require the police to consult the local authority routinely before the dispersal power is used would severely constrain its use. As for providing democratic oversight of the police, which some have suggested is the reason for local authority involvement, that is not the role of the local authority. As with all police activity, police and crime commissioners will provide the democratic accountability for the use of dispersal powers.
I believe that it is right to reform the dispersal powers. That said, we have listened to the concerns expressed in Committee that the new dispersal powers could be used to restrict peaceful protests and freedom of assembly. That brings me to government Amendments 31 and 33, which I hope will be agreed by the House. I remain satisfied that the test for the exercise of those powers precludes them from being used in such a way. However, given the strength of feeling on the matter, we have tabled the amendments. Amendment 31 makes it clear that, before authorising the use of the dispersal powers, the authorising officer must have due regard to the rights to freedom of assembly and expression as enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights. Similarly, Amendment 33 makes clear an officer’s duty to consider those rights before issuing a dispersal direction.
Similar concerns were raised in the context of public spaces and protection orders. Although not in this group, Amendment 54 places a similar duty on the local authority to have particular regard for those two convention rights before making such an order. Again, as public authorities under the Human Rights Act, local authorities are already duty bound to act compatibly with convention rights, but we recognise that, in the context of the Bill, it is helpful to reinforce that point.
I hope that that reassures noble Lords that the new dispersal powers will not be used in a way that conflicts with an individual’s convention rights. I commend the government amendments and the provisions of Clause 32 to the House.
Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)
My Lords, I am sure that we are all grateful to the Minister for Amendments 31 and 33. They are clearly intended to address one of the problems which arises from the clauses on dispersal orders. They address the issue of whether this power could be used in respect of people conducting a demonstration of some sort—at least, I assume that that is what they do. Perhaps when the Minister responds, he could tell us the strength of the words,
“have particular regard to the rights of freedom of expression”,
in relation to a demonstration which may be a bit rowdy, a bit difficult or a bit challenging, as opposed to a straightforward, entirely sedate slow march or, indeed, to someone standing still waving a placard.
For example, could the power be used under circumstances in which, having given regard to the rights of freedom of expression, the inspector concerned decides that he has thought about it but, none the less, he wishes to use the power? If the Minister can reassure us about that, clearly the issue has been adequately addressed by Amendments 31 and 33.
I address my remarks to the wider issues raised by Amendment 32 in the name of my noble friend, which would remove Clause 32. I suspect that that is a rather blunderbuss approach to a matter on which we have been trying throughout the passage of the Bill through your Lordships’ House to get clarity on: in what circumstances the power might be used and how that might happen. We asked many questions in Committee about how this might happen, to which we have had very little in terms of answers. I certainly recall raising the issue of the rank of the police officer who would authorise the use of the power in a specified locality. I accept that the Minister described inspectors as comparatively senior police officers—and indeed they are comparatively senior police officers compared with a constable or a police sergeant—but they are not comparatively senior compared with an assistant chief constable or a superintendent. These are relative terms.
Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for the amendments that he has brought forward. He did respond to the debates in Committee by bringing them and we welcome the provisions on freedom of expression and assembly. However, as my noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey said, he and I both raised more fundamental concerns about the changes being made by the Government. I do not propose to repeat the comments made by my noble friend or comments that I made previously but the fact is that we did not receive satisfactory answers in Committee, particularly on how the dispersal orders will work in practice or on the evidence base for why they are being extended and changed.
In Committee, the Minister said that he would write to me with that information. Again, I take the same view as my noble friend Lord Harris: my apologies if I have missed the Minister’s letter to me in the many letters that we have received or have been copied into. However, I do not appear to have received the letter that he promised with information on the evidence base for changing the orders. I was very interested in the comments that the Minister made this evening when he opened and I wish that I had had them in writing previously, as I thought I would. That would have given me an opportunity to consider them properly but I will read Hansard to see what he said.
In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, tried to extract information about how the orders would work in practice. He made a similar point tonight, but when he made it in more detail in Committee the Minister accused him of being mischievous. It is fair to say, he does have a mischievous streak. That has been evident but it was not evident on that occasion and it is not evident this evening.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I think that was the phrase I used—that the noble Lord had a mischievous streak to his nature.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
No, it was not. The Minister accused him of being mischievous in that regard. He cannot rewrite Hansard. My noble friend was making then, and is making now, a genuine attempt to find out how the orders will work in practice, step by step. The points made about the police officers are ones to which I should like answers.
We are not opposed to dispersal orders. I made that point before and I will make it again. We introduced them in 2004. There was some controversy at that time but we think it was the right thing to do. The issue we have is with the significance of the changes being made in the geographical area and the timescale and the lack of involvement from the local authority. The noble Lord, Lord Harris, made the point that our issue is not with any demographic oversight the PCC can provide after the event. It is with ensuring that, where there is to be a dispersal order, democratically elected community representatives ensure that the power is used to the best effect and that they do not cause any further problems and misunderstandings by not using it appropriately. That consultation and involvement with local authorities is very important.
When the Home Affairs Select Committee recommended as part of its pre-legislative scrutiny in the other place that there should be a duty to consult local authorities over dispersal orders of more than six hours, the Government agreed and said they would amend the legislation. They have not done so and it would be helpful to hear from the Minister why the Government are not now fulfilling their commitment to HASC. There must be a reason why they are no longer choosing to do that.
As far as I understand it, the Minister said that the police have now said that they find the dispersal order powers useful. At the risk of being accused of a blunderbuss approach, I have tabled the same amendment to try to get some answers. What was the evidence base for bringing such significant changes forward? Did the police come along and say to the Government, “There is a lack of flexibility in the current orders. There are delays in implementing them. We do not want to have to liaise with local authorities. We want to go it alone. We need them to be longer. We need a wider area.”? Did they raise those concerns prior to the Government bringing this forward? I am not aware that they did or that there were any such concerns raised by the existing orders, but if there were, can the Minister let us know that? In his comments in Committee regarding the involvement of local authorities he used phrases such as “it is likely” the police will work with the local authority and he referred to draft guidance, which states that the authorising officer “may wish where practical” to consult local council or community representatives. That is very vague and it is not my understanding of the commitment made to the Home Affairs Select Committee.
I am just trying to understand why the changes were brought forward in the first place, who complained about local authority involvement and who thought that was hampering the process or the use of orders? If the Minister is unable to answer these questions at this stage we will have to conclude there is no evidence base but I would very much regret the Government bringing forward such significant changes without an evidence base. I reiterate the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Harris. We need some real understanding of how this will work in practice, given the very significant changes that are being made.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, this gives us an opportunity to come back to a subject where there has not been a great deal of meeting of minds. I am anxious to make sure that we are all reading this situation in the same way. I will address the various points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey—I accept that he is not making them out of mischievousness but out of genuine inquiry as to how the operations are going to work—and the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith.
When we talked about setting this process up, I thought my speaking notes made it clear that information that we provided in the consultation we had on this was about making efficient dispersal arrangements and providing them in connection with the public space protection order. One of those things deals with territory and one deals with situations. I think we all agree that when we are dealing with territory, there is often quite a bit of history—there is certainly a lot of experience—and local government and the police can work very happily in hand together to deal with it. When we are dealing with situations and people, it is very important that we have a clear order of command. In areas which may well have provided trouble in the past or, indeed, in situations which are known to the police and local authorities to be likely to be troublesome, there may well be some prior discussions.
One of the great advantages of using inspector grades to take these decisions is that most inspectors have territorial responsibilities and local knowledge is very important. Indeed, in terms of policing—and it is an operational matter involving the police, not local authority employees, for example—it is the police who have that local knowledge. They have access to that local knowledge and an inspector would have access to it by consultation with sergeants and constables. Indeed, it need not be at inspector level that the decision is ultimately made. If it is a complex issue that requires great sensitivity, the inspector is perfectly entitled to go up to superintendent or even chief constable level before determining that the dispersal order is made. However, this legislation provides the facility for it to occur.
The noble Baroness talked about the evidence. To my mind, the evidence is pretty self-explanatory in that what we need is a clear command structure. The Government feel that this is the right thing. We have presented it to the police. I met Richard Antcliff of Nottinghamshire Police city community protection team before Christmas. He welcomes these new powers. His team is a partnership team of police officers, police staff and council officers. I went to Nottingham in October to see its work. He is very positive about the new dispersal power and sees it as a key intervention in dealing with anti-social behaviour in the city of Nottingham. The work in Nottingham is co-operative, and that is surely the sort of thing we want.
Lord Harris of Haringey
I am not trying to hold up progress through the Bill. I am sure the project that the Minister went to see in Nottingham is excellent, but if it is being interpreted, on the basis of a conversation that he had with somebody there, who was no doubt in deep awe of the Minister, as a statement of police support for this change, it is going a little far. It may be that it is more than that, but the point still remains. The clause we have at the moment simply states,
“a police officer of at least the rank of inspector”.
It does not say, “a police officer of at least the rank of inspector who has, for example, an intimate knowledge of the communities concerned and the likely impact of this action”. If it said something like that, and I appreciate that that is not legislative drafting, that would reassure on that particular point, but it does not. It could simply be an inspector. I think it quite likely that some police forces, given that they are about to receive a large new volume of technical legislation, will decide to have an inspector somewhere—or maybe even a superintendent; it does not really matter which—whose sole purpose will be to ensure that all the boxes have been ticked in terms of following the legislation. That is not the same as someone with an intimate knowledge of what the community consequences are likely to be in that locality.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
Although the noble Lord is not being mischievous, he is being extraordinarily cynical. Effective operation of a police force is that police force’s job; it is not our job here in Parliament, as we construct the law, to tell the police how they should effect the law. The law requires us to ensure that dispersal orders are operated properly and that full consideration is given to the rights of peaceful protest and political expression. We have made it clear what the law is, and it is up to the police to decide what they should do. The view that I have expressed—it is, of course, just an opinion—is that it is right to involve inspectors in this sort of decision-making, because, as I think the noble Lord would agree, when it comes to local knowledge of policing situations, it is frequently the inspector who is in the best position. If he does not know, he can ask a superior officer, and also consult the officers involved in policing that particular area.
I am sorry, but I feel that the noble Lord is making heavy weather of what I considered to be a fairly straightforward matter. He asked what sort of protest would not be approved of. I have already said that if people were carrying hate messages on placards they might well be considered to be out of order, and a dispersal order could be the most effective way of handling that situation. I gave that simply as an example.
As I explained in Committee, the dispersal will be authorised by an officer of the rank of inspector or above. This is in line with all the other responsibilities that police inspectors have. A neighbourhood policing inspector will have a detailed knowledge of the local area and what the consequences of using the dispersal power may be. Ultimately, as I have said, it is an operational matter.
I hope I have answered noble Lords’ questions. Have I answered the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Harris, and the questions asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith? The noble Baroness asked me about our response to the Home Affairs Select Committee. As she said, we did not make any commitment. We made it clear that we would accept the committee’s argument that the dispersal power would benefit from the additional safeguards, to ensure that its use was proportional and appropriate, and that we would change the legislation to state that the use of the dispersal power should be approved in advance by an officer of at least the rank of inspector. This ensures that the wider impact on, for example, communications can be considered properly before use. Those were the commitments that we made to the Select Committee.
Lord Harris of Haringey
I am under strict instructions from my Front Bench not to pursue this point at any length. But before the Minister sits down, may I ask him whether he would accept that if, at Third Reading, there was an amendment that said, “In deciding whether to give such an authorisation, an officer must have particular regard to the likely community impact of such an order”, that would solve the problem? It would place an obligation on those in the police service, however they had chosen to organise themselves, to consider the community impact. At the moment, the officer’s only obligation is to consider whether he or she is,
“satisfied on reasonable grounds that the use of those powers in the locality during that period may be necessary for the purpose of removing or reducing the likelihood of”,
certain events. That is not the same as having regard to the likely community impact.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
No. I am sorry. I cannot commit the Government to accepting such an amendment.
“( ) In deciding whether to give a direction under section 33 a constable must have particular regard to the rights of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly set out in articles 10 and 11 of the Convention.
“Convention” has the meaning given by section 21(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998.”
“Guidance
(1) The Secretary of State may issue guidance to chief officers of police about the exercise, by officers under their direction or control, of those officers’ functions under this Part.
(2) The Secretary of State may revise any guidance issued under this section.
(3) The Secretary of State must arrange for any guidance issued or revised under this section to be published.”
“( ) Where an item ordered to be forfeited under this section is kept by or handed over to a person within subsection (2)(b), the local authority by whom the person is employed or was designated must ensure that arrangements are made for its destruction or disposal, either—
(a) in accordance with the order, or(b) if no arrangements are specified in the order, in whatever way seems appropriate to the local authority.”
“Guidance
(1) The Secretary of State may issue—
(a) guidance to chief officers of police about the exercise, by officers under their direction or control, of those officers’ functions under this Chapter;(b) guidance to local authorities about the exercise of their functions under this Chapter and those of persons designated under section 50(1)(c).(2) The Secretary of State may revise any guidance issued under this section.
(3) The Secretary of State must arrange for any guidance issued or revised under this section to be published.”
Lord Greaves
My Lords, I return again to the relationship between public spaces protection orders and what I call special categories of land. This in an important issue, so I will dwell on it for a few minutes. I raised this at Second Reading and in Committee I suggested that these special types of land, where public access is specified and guaranteed by other legislation, should be excluded from public spaces protection orders. The categories of land are: access land under the Countryside and Rights of Way Act, which is mountain, moor, heath, down and commons and now includes the coastal footpath and coastal access land where that has so far been designated in England; village greens and town greens; and rights of way—mainly footpaths and bridleways—which appear on a definitive map and the statement of rights of way which nowadays comes under the Wildlife and Countryside Act and is held by top-tier local authorities.
The purpose of the designation of these kinds of land is to allow public access. To have public spaces protection orders put on them which deny that access looks like an easy and quick way for local authorities to prevent access, which is otherwise a fairly difficult and convoluted process. Public footpaths can be closed or diverted. There is a process by which, over time, access land can have its designation removed. There is also a process by which exceptions and exclusions can be made to access land, under the CROW Act. However, these take time and are difficult, for very good reasons.
In Committee, the Minister said this was okay but that rights of access were for specific purposes. For village greens it is informal recreation. For footpaths it is, obviously, walking along them. For access land it is for accessing that land on foot, together with a restricted number of ancillary activities, such as stopping and having a picnic or taking photographs, but there are a lot of activities which are not allowed. Anti-social behaviour may well be taking place on some of that land which is affecting the enjoyment of it by the people for whom the designation has been made, such as the people walking on it. That is a fair point, so Amendment 47 does not say that public spaces protection orders should not be made on this land. It says that, if they are made, they cannot remove the right of access which is the whole purpose of the land.
I know the Government do not want to do this. I do not know why, because it is very sensible. Nevertheless, I am pressing the case to give the Minister the opportunity of saying exactly how these access rights will be protected. I have had a letter about this from Norman Baker, who was in charge of the Bill within the department. I will read some of it out, because it has not been widely circulated and it is worth putting on record:
“I note your concerns that the new public spaces protection order is a much wider power than the three orders it replaces, and as such could be used to restrict access to common land, access land and rights of way on the definitive map. However, I believe the test and the safeguards we have built in mitigate such a risk.
As Lord Taylor made clear during the debate in Committee, these types of land are important and certainly worthy of the additional debate they received. In fact, in the draft guidance, we specifically mentioned a number of these categories of land because of their importance to both the local community and visitors to the area”.
One of the points that I raised in Committee was the importance of the national bodies that look after this kind of land—the Ramblers, the British Mountaineering Council and the Open Spaces Society, as well as landowners’ organisations and others—being involved in any change in the system. Mr Baker writes:
“We also made clear that where restrictions were necessary, national bodies could play an important role in the consultation process”—
that is not something that I had picked up—
“to ensure that all those affected have a chance to comment. I know my officials are continuing to work with interested groups with a view to making this even clearer in the final iteration”.
This is the vital importance of the statutory guidance, as it now will be, to prevent what I might call rogue local authorities—there are one or two—taking advantage of this legislation and doing things that are not intended. The letter continues:
“However, in terms of restricting access on certain categories of land, I do not believe that this would pass the test, in part because of the final limb, which states that the anti-social behaviour, ‘justifies the restrictions imposed by the notice’. Given the importance of these areas, whether coastal access land or registered common, I cannot envisage a level of behaviour that would constitute such a draconian response. Where a problem behaviour does exist, the flexibility within the PSPO means that the behaviour itself can be targeted rather than access in its totality. This is a major failing in the current system where unless the anti-social behaviour is related to dogs or alcohol, the local authority is left with limited options, too quickly resorted to ‘gating’ in some situations.
In addition, the behaviour that has to be restricted on this land has to be ‘unreasonable’. Again, given the rights afforded to commoners through other legislation, I fail to see how someone exercising these rights in a responsible manner (for instance, pannage) could be considered to be acting in an unreasonable way. As such, I believe these rights are adequately protected”.
In reading that out, I apologise to the Minister if I have stolen his thunder and he was going to say exactly the same things. However, at the very least, I would like him to guarantee here in the Chamber that what I have said is true and that that is the way in which the Government look at it. In the end, of course, how it comes out in the wash will be how we will judge it. However, the discussions that we have had have been useful in clarifying these issues and in concentrating the minds of people in government as to exactly how these things might work. I hope that the Government will accept my amendment. I have no great optimism about that but, anyway, I beg to move.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Greaves has once again articulated his argument well and, if I may say so, he has also articulated mine. In quoting the letter from Norman Baker he has to some degree stolen my thunder. However, as my noble friend asked that I reiterate the position of the Government on the record, I will do so.
The types of land that he mentioned in his amendment are important and worthy of the additional discussion. Common land, village greens, rights of way and open access land all play an important part both in local communities and in our nation’s heritage. This is exactly why they should be protected from the minority of anti-social individuals who ruin this enjoyment by acting in a way that is unreasonable. I am glad that my noble friend has accepted that the new public spaces protection order could be used positively to protect the categories of land he identifies.
The amendment itself, though, seeks to protect any rights conferred on individuals or groups as a result of other legislation. As I have said before, this amendment is unnecessary. For a new order to be made, the activities have to be “unreasonable”. I do not believe that someone exercising their rights to, for example, collect firewood in a particular woodland could be considered to be acting unreasonably. In addition, while in theory the council could seek to restrict access to that land altogether, I do not believe that that would meet the final limb of the test—namely, that the activities justified the restrictions. Such an absolute ban would likely be disproportionate in legal terms. Indeed, it is the flexibility that we have built into the new power that makes sure that the nuclear option, to use that phrase, is truly a last resort. Where problem behaviour does exist, this flexibility means that the behaviour itself can be targeted rather than access in its totality. This is a major failing in the current system where unless the anti-social behaviour is related to dogs or alcohol, the council is left with limited options, and too quickly resorts to gating in some situations.
However, I do believe that where the anti-social behaviour is unreasonable and so bad as to justify restrictions, the council, in consultation with the police and others, should have the ability to act, and act fast. That said, given the continuing concerns which my noble friend has expressed, I assure him that Home Office officials will continue to work with interested bodies to see how the statutory guidance can address these issues more effectively. We have already emphasised in the draft guidance the importance of these categories of land, but the draft guidance is exactly that—a draft. We want to make sure that by the time we publish the final statutory guidance, it reflects the needs of professionals and the interests of the users of rights of way, access land and village greens.
Many professionals will be aware of the special rights and protections afforded to such land, but where they are not, we can make sure they have the relevant information so that their decisions and actions reflect the needs of the whole community. In the light of these assurances I have given, rather reiterating points made by my friend, colleague and fellow Minister Mr Norman Baker, I ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Greaves
I also dodged the issue of whether Norman Baker was right honourable or honourable.
I am grateful for what the Minister has said and I think that the general tenor of what the Government are saying on these has shifted a little bit in the right direction. I am grateful to the Minister for his help and assistance in these matters.
I still think there is a possibility of conflict—for example, if there is a village green where traditionally the kids play cricket in the middle of summer, and the cottages around the village green are all bought up by townies who go and live there at weekends and complain about the fact that cricket balls are coming into their gardens. That is the kind of conflict which could happen, and where a PSPO might try to stop them playing cricket despite the fact that that was part of the traditional informal recreation there.
However, the national organisations now clearly have an accepted role, which was in doubt at the beginning of this process, so—combined with the tenacity and vigour with which my friends in the Open Spaces Society pursue these matters—I hope that it will never get to the High Court to sort things out, but at least I am happy in the knowledge that that would be possible if it came to it. Having said that, I am grateful to the Minister for all his help, and for that of his colleague, and I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, the government amendments in this group flow from the debates we have had in Committee about the consultation requirements attached to the making of a public spaces protection order and the preparation of the community remedy document. In responding to the points raised in Committee, particularly by my noble friend Lord Greaves, we have sought to strike a balance between the need to ensure that appropriate consultation takes place, while avoiding the imposition of unnecessary bureaucratic burdens on local authorities, the police or police and crime commissioners.
In relation to public spaces protection orders, the key amendment is Amendment 54, which brings together and augments the consultation and notification requirements already provided for in Chapter 2 of Part 4 of the Bill. The key additions are the requirement to consult with the owner or occupier of the relevant land, so far as it is reasonably practical to do so, and to notify any county council, parish council or community council. These requirements are in addition to the existing duties to publish the proposed text of an order before it is made or varied, and to consult the chief officer of police, the local policing body and any community representatives whom the local authority thinks it appropriate to consult.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, may I say a word following on from Amendment 54? It is on a matter that I raised in Committee, which is how parts of this Bill fit in with the existing nuisance legislation.
My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones and those with whom he worked on what is now the Live Music Act 2012 remain concerned about the possibility of local authorities using public space protection order powers when there is existing nuisance legislation that could be used against a particular nuisance—though I think that they do not regard much music as “nuisance”. There have been some awkward examples of some local authorities banning busking and other live music-making during “reasonable hours”; and when I say that, I would probably agree that they are reasonable, but I do not particularly want to bring that into the equation here. During hours when there have been a small number of complaints, the local authorities would argue that such action is reasonable and there is a concern that the powers might be used far more extensively than the Government would have in mind. They have spoken to me about balancing competing rights between freedom of expression and the right to peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions—in this case the items that are being used for busking.
I am making the point now in the hope that the Government may be able to say something about guidance on the fit between the statutory powers under this Bill and statutory nuisance. I raised the issue at the previous stage following discussions with the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health. I know that officials are working on this area of the guidance but I also know that those who have been in touch with me will be grateful if they can have further discussions on and further input into what will now be statutory guidance. Clearly those who are working on these issues day-to-day still feel uncomfortable that their concerns about what I called “workability” have not quite been taken on board.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I thank my noble friends Lord Greaves and Lady Hamwee for their hard work on this section of the Bill. They have proposed a number of amendments, many of which have informed government thinking. Indeed, these government amendments are based on ideas that came from the debates we had in Committee with them. We have yet to dispose of my noble friend’s Amendment 55, but I hope he will at a suitable moment see fit not to move it.
The role that my noble friend Lady Hamwee has emphasised depends on the statutory guidance, which is very important in this area. This is a matter for consultation. We want to get the statutory guidance right and ensure that it allows councils maximum flexibility. We do not want to miss the chance, particularly as the guidance will now be statutory, of making sure that we give background information on the exercise of all the elements of these parts of the Bill for the efficient use of anti-social behaviour powers.
I hope I have reassured my noble friend Lady Hamwee on the importance we attach to the guidance and my noble friend Lord Greaves about our recognition of the need to publicise what is going on in connection with the consultations that will take place.
Lord Greaves
Why does it say “publish” for one and “publicise” for the other?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I am sure someone will know the answer to that; I am not entirely sure. “Publish”, I suspect, implies that it is in a particular form; “publicise” is perhaps multiple publication. However, I am only hazarding a guess, without being particularly good in my command of language.
Baroness Hamwee
I will not speculate about whether “publish” is a technical term, which I think it probably is. “Publicise” is about spreading it around in a practical way.
However, returning to my question, will the guidance —I hope it will—make clear that, where possible, it would be more appropriate to use existing legislation, such as noise abatement notices, than these wider powers?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
It may be that that is one of the things that is considered in the guidance. We will make use of what we have available to us. There is no repealing of the Noise Abatement Act 1960, for example, in the Bill.
“Bodies other than local authorities with statutory functions in relation to land
(1) The Secretary of State may by order—
(a) designate a person or body (other than a local authority) that has power to make byelaws in relation to particular land, and(b) specify land in England to which the power relates.(2) This Chapter has effect as if—
(a) a person or body designated under subsection (1) (a “designated person”) were a local authority, and(b) land specified under that subsection were within its area.But references in the rest of this section to a local authority are to a local authority that is not a designated person.(3) The only prohibitions or requirements that may be imposed in a public spaces protection order made by a designated person are ones that it has power to impose (or would, but for section 66, have power to impose) by making a byelaw in respect of the restricted area.
(4) A public spaces protection order made by a designated person may not include provision regulating, in relation to a particular public space, an activity that is already regulated in relation to that space by a public spaces protection order made by a local authority.
(5) Where a public spaces protection order made by a local authority regulates, in relation to a particular public space, an activity that a public spaces protection order made by a designated person already regulates, the order made by the designated person ceases to have that effect.
(6) If a person or body that may be designated under subsection (1)(a) gives a notice in writing under this subsection, in respect of land in relation to which it has power to make byelaws, to a local authority in whose area the land is situated—
(a) no part of the land may form, or fall within, the restricted area of any public spaces protection order made by the local authority;(b) if any part of the land— (i) forms the restricted area of a public spaces protection order already made by the local authority, or(ii) falls within such an area,
“Convention rights, consultation, publicity and notification
(1) A local authority, in deciding—
(a) whether to make a public spaces protection order (under section 55) and if so what it should include,(b) whether to extend the period for which a public spaces protection order has effect (under section 56) and if so for how long,(c) whether to vary a public spaces protection order (under section 57) and if so how, or(d) whether to discharge a public spaces protection order (under section 57),must have particular regard to the rights of freedom of expression and freedom of assembly set out in articles 10 and 11 of the Convention.(2) In subsection (1) “Convention” has the meaning given by section 21(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998.
(3) A local authority must carry out the necessary consultation and the necessary publicity, and the necessary notification (if any), before—
(a) making a public spaces protection order,(b) extending the period for which a public spaces protection order has effect, or(c) varying or discharging a public spaces protection order.(4) In subsection (3)—
“the necessary consultation” means consulting with—
(a) the chief officer of police, and the local policing body, for the police area that includes the restricted area;(b) whatever community representatives the local authority thinks it appropriate to consult;(c) the owner or occupier of land within the restricted area;“the necessary publicity” means—
(a) in the case of a proposed order or variation, publishing the text of it;(b) in the case of a proposed extension or discharge, publicising the proposal;“the necessary notification” means notifying the following authorities of the proposed order, extension, variation or discharge—
(a) the parish council or community council (if any) for the area that includes the restricted area;(b) in the case of a public spaces protection order made or to be made by a district council in England, the county council (if any) for the area that includes the restricted area.(5) The requirement to consult with the owner or occupier of land within the restricted area—
(a) does not apply to land that is owned and occupied by the local authority;(b) applies only if, or to the extent that, it is reasonably practicable to consult the owner or occupier of the land.(6) In the case of a person or body designated under section (Bodies other than local authorities with statutory functions in relation to land), the necessary consultation also includes consultation with the local authority which (ignoring subsection (2) of that section) is the authority for the area that includes the restricted area.
(7) In relation to a variation of a public spaces protection order that would increase the restricted area, the restricted area for the purposes of this section is the increased area.”
“Guidance
(1) The Secretary of State may issue—
(a) guidance to local authorities about the exercise of their functions under this Chapter and those of persons authorised by local authorities under section 59 or 64;(b) guidance to chief officers of police about the exercise, by officers under their direction or control, of those officers’ functions under this Part.(2) The Secretary of State may revise any guidance issued under this section.
(3) The Secretary of State must arrange for any guidance issued or revised under this section to be published.”
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Lord Taylor of Holbeach Excerpts(10 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)
My Lords, this is one of those debates that are quite special to your Lordships’ House. I spent 13 years in the other place and I have been in your Lordships’ House for three and a half years. I think other noble Lords who served there would agree this is not the kind of debate that we often heard in the other place. This House is made all the more relevant and important because of that. It is also one of those debates that Ministers from any party in Government would perhaps refer to as “interesting” and “helpful”. It certainly has been a very interesting debate. The noble Lord, Lord Dear, the noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu, and the noble and learned Lords, Lord Mackay and Lord Morris, have done this House a great service by bringing forward this amendment.
I want to be clear at the outset that I think everybody who has spoken wants to see effective and swift action to tackle serious anti-social behaviour and to treat the issue with the seriousness it deserves. It is not overdramatic to recognise that, if left unchecked, anti-social behaviour can destroy lives. Ongoing anti-social behaviour can cause alarm and distress and, in some cases, leaves people feeling utterly devastated and unable to cope. It creates total misery.
In previous debates, I have spoken of my experience in supporting victims, both as a Member of Parliament and a county councillor. There is no doubt that when anti-social behaviour orders were brought in they created a significant change in the way such cases were dealt with. There were teething problems but experience has shown that they are an important tool in tackling such serious problems. That is why I just do not understand why the Government are embarking on such a dramatic change in this legislation. Obviously, improvements can always be made to any system and we would support improvements to anti-social behaviour orders. However, this really is a case of throwing the baby out with the bathwater and does not improve the position for those suffering from anti-social behaviour.
I am not a lawyer—I am perhaps in a minority among those who have spoken today—but all my experience and instincts from dealing with this issue tell me that these proposals from the Government are ill thought-out and unworkable. Noble and learned Lords with far greater experience and knowledge than I who have spoken have come to the same conclusion. As we have heard, the concern is that the Government’s new proposed threshold for granting an injunction for engaging or threatening to engage in causing nuisance or annoyance to any person on the balance of probabilities if the court considers it to be just and convenient is too vague and too broad. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, described it as open-ended machinery that would catch people who should not be before the courts. The danger is that in the rush of those being brought before the courts for nuisance and annoyance we could lose focus on the serious cases of harassment, distress and alarm.
The very real concerns about how this power could be used and abused were raised at Second Reading and in Committee. In preparing for this debate, I started to draw up a list of activities that could be brought into the remit of Clause 1. I had to give up after several pages and hours. The noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu, described it as an extraordinary power, and indeed it is. I appreciate and welcome the experienced and knowledgeable legal views but this is not just a legal issue. It is a moral issue of dealing with those people who are suffering the most. The Government are not targeting the behaviour causing the most serious problems but creating a catch-all clause that could affect almost everybody at some point. There is no doubt that some people and some activities inevitably cause some degree of nuisance and annoyance. However, is an injunction, which in most cases will be pretty weak and ineffective—although at the extreme end it could involve custody—the most appropriate way of dealing with these cases, or should we accept that in our everyday lives some level of nuisance or annoyance is a consequence of ensuring the liberty and freedom of the individual? Liberty and freedom are not open ended. There have to be constraints and the test of harassment, alarm and distress spoken about today is the appropriate point to place those constraints.
The ACPO lead for children and young people, Jacqui Cheer, emphasised this point in November when speaking to the APPG on children. She said:
“I think we are too ready as a society, as the police and particularly with some legislation coming up on the books, to label what looks like growing up to me as anti-social behaviour”.
There have also been concerns that one person’s annoyance may be another person’s boisterous behaviour. Indeed, as the noble and learned Lords, Lord Morris and Lord Mackay, and the noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu, said, it need not be boisterous behaviour. Exercising fundamental democratic rights of protest or even just expressing views in a forceful manner can cause nuisance or annoyance.
The Minister’s amendment suggests that behaviour has to be reasonably expected to cause nuisance and annoyance. That is an admission that the Government now recognise the unreasonableness of the clause that they have previously defended to the hilt. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, made clear, while that change on its own may be welcome, it does not address many of the points being raised here today. It still leaves the test as nuisance and annoyance to any person on the balance of probabilities. That is not good enough. I was interested in the points made by the noble and learned Lord on “just and convenient”. I accept his assessment of the value and usefulness of that. If the boisterous behaviour to which I referred is ongoing and causes harassment, alarm or distress, then action obviously has to be taken. But as it stands, even with the government amendment, a one-off event that causes nuisance or annoyance to any person on the balance of probabilities would still lead to injunction.
In Committee the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, relied largely on the definition in the Housing Act 1996. Noble Lords have concerns about paragraph (b) of the amendment. I do not share their concerns because it is appropriate in limited circumstances for the existing law aimed at people in social housing to remain to give housing providers the tools to deal with tenants in such circumstances. No change is being sought to that position and that is what part (b) of the amendment makes clear.
I will now address some of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, in his defence of the Government, which I am sure we will hear in due course from the Front Bench as well. One great benefit of ASBOs is how seriously anti-social behaviour is taken. The issue of alarm, harassment and distress is crucial and there are appropriate sanctions for dealing with it. We could end up with more of these orders being imposed but in most cases they will be a weaker response to dealing with anti-social behaviour. The noble Lord referred to the guidance and he read it out very quickly. I have a copy of that guidance. It is somewhat confusing because it says, as he rightly quoted:
“It should not be used to stop reasonable, trivial or benign behaviours that have not caused, and are not likely to cause, harm to victims or communities”.
Where in the Bill is harm referred to? Guidance is not legislation. The legislation, as it stood, referred to alarm, distress and harassment. The Bill refers to nuisance or annoyance. Guidance suggesting there has to be harm as well does not override what is in the Bill. Noble Lords who were defending the Government’s position, when asked whether they could give examples of activities that would come under the Bill’s definition of nuisance and annoyance but not cause alarm, harassment and distress, were unable to do so. Every example they gave of where action should be taken caused harassment, alarm and distress. It is quite clear that the existing legislation is the best way to define the kind of behaviour that is disrupting lives.
The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, also raised the issue of hearsay evidence. It is currently the case with anti-social behaviour orders that professionals can give advice on behalf of those suffering so that they themselves do not have to go to court to present their case. The noble Lord, Lord Phillips, made a very important point about the courts being clogged up and about the pressures on police officers having to respond to every case of nuisance and annoyance. Has the Minister given any consideration to how the police should respond with their increasingly limited resources to cries for help from people suffering what they consider to be nuisance and annoyance and whether they will then be able to deal with very serious cases of anti-social behaviour?
The existing test of harassment, alarm and distress recognises the seriousness of anti-social behaviour and the need to take action against those who breach an order. The definition proposed by the Government is too broad and the remedies are too weak. Setting the threshold so low undermines fundamental freedoms and tolerance. It is a great shame that, having had warning at Second Reading and in Committee of the great concern in your Lordships’ House, the Government did not come back today with something a bit better than the amendment being put forward. There are serious concerns about this, not just because it would catch too many people but because those who are really causing distress in our communities will not be the focus in tackling problems. I urge the Minister to accept the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Dear. The only compromise that would be acceptable today would be if the Minister were to say that he accepts that there has to be a change of definition and that he can assure us that that would be “harassment, alarm and distress” and not “nuisance and annoyance”.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)
Well, my Lords, this has been an interesting debate. I am not particularly thick-skinned, so I am clearly sensitive to the views that have been expressed by this House. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Dear, and other noble Lords who have spoken, because they have done justice to this debate by the contributions they have made. I owe it to the House to explain the Government’s position, and perhaps I can then take this issue on.
Clause 1 is clearly an important part of the Government’s reforms, and I begin by acknowledging that there has been some common ground on the need to include it in the Bill. We have indeed reached some common ground on the elements that we need to include in Clause 1 to make it effective. First, I am glad that the civil standard of proof for the new injunction has been accepted by so many noble Lords. Secondly, I welcome the tacit acceptance of the “just and convenient” limb of the test for an injunction. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Carswell, said that this is a proper consideration for courts in any case, but it is right that we should make it explicit as one of the limbs of the test.
The terms of Amendment 1, as compared with the amendments put forward in Committee, are a welcome demonstration that this House listens carefully to the evidence put before it both by noble Lords and by front-line professionals, and that it adapts its approach accordingly. The Government have also listened to the concerns expressed by noble Lords in Committee and by the Constitution Committee and the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and that is why I have tabled Amendment 2, which we believe addresses the concerns about the breadth of the “nuisance or annoyance” test. Although Amendment 2 is not part of this group, it addresses exactly the same issue—the appropriate form of the test for the grant of an injunction—and, accordingly, it is important that your Lordships consider Amendments 1 and 2 together.
As I said in the debate in Committee when my noble friend Lord Faulks tabled his amendment, I believe it is inherent in the way that the court will look at any application for an injunction to consider whether it was reasonable to grant an injunction in the circumstances of the case. I am grateful for my noble friend’s contribution, and I look forward to him joining me on this Bill before we conclude our consideration of it.
I thank my noble friend Lady Hamwee for her contribution to this debate. I also thank other noble Lords who wanted to speak but were not able to or who have forgone their right to speak in order to expedite this debate. In that I include my noble friends Lady Newlove and Lady Berridge.
Lord Elton (Con)
Will the Minister take on board the fact that our concern is not with the Government’s purpose but with the effects of the legislation?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I shall be coming on to that, but I felt I had to place what I was going to say in some context—and I am grateful for the discipline of the House in allowing me to do just that. Our aim is to allow decent law-abiding people to go about their daily lives, engage in normal behaviour and enjoy public and private spaces without having their own freedoms constrained by anti-social individuals.
The test for an injunction, when taken as a whole, coupled with the wider legal duty on public authorities, including the courts, to act compatibly with convention rights, would ensure that the injunction cannot be used inappropriately or disproportionately. As I have explained, government Amendment 2 is designed to strengthen the first limb of the test so that the conduct must be such that it could reasonably be expected to cause nuisance or annoyance. This limb on its own is likely to preclude an injunction being sought or granted under this Bill to deal with bell ringers, carol singers or children playing in the street. However, there is a second part to the test.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
I ask my noble friend the same question that the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, was unable to answer. Can he give one example of a problem that would not be resolved by the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Dear? What is the problem that the Government are seeking to deal with? Can he give one example?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
If I might say, it solves the problem of over-complex legislation. Having two tests for the single problem of anti-social behaviour was not the Government’s intention in drawing up this legislation.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
I do not want to detain my noble friend, but I am asking for an example of the kind of behaviour that would not be caught by the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Dear. We understand the Government’s intentions, but it is not clear what the problem is that they seek to remedy. Can he give one example that would not be caught under the amendment?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I do not intend to give any examples to my noble friend. I have given the reason why we have a single test for anti-social behaviour leading to an IPNA. I have given my reasoning, and I hope that my noble friend will accept it; I am not going to go into listing individual activities that the IPNA is intended to address. That is why we have a single test and why noble Lords will understand that I am speaking in justification of that single test.
The second part of the test is not a throwaway test, as some have suggested. It is under this limb of the test that the court will consider whether it is reasonable and proportionate in all the circumstances to grant an injunction. In making such an assessment, the court will consider the impact on the respondent’s convention rights, including the rights to freedom of speech and assembly.
I agree with the noble Lord that we should not leave it to the courts to apply these important safeguards. All these factors will weigh on the minds of front-line professionals in judging whether to apply for an injunction. Our draft guidance makes this clear. This will be backed up by a framework of professional standards and practice operated by the police, local authorities and housing providers.
Having said all that—and I apologise to my noble friend for not giving him an example—I have listened to the strength of feeling around the house on this issue. The Government’s purpose is plain: we wish to protect victims. ASB, or anti-social behaviour, ruins lives and wrecks communities. In our legislation, we need to ensure that authorities seeking to do so have coherent and effective powers to deal with anti-social behaviour. Recognising noble Lords’ concerns, I commit to take the issue away to give myself the opportunity in discussion with the noble Lord and others to provide a solution that clarifies the use of the legislation and safeguards the objective, which I think is shared around this House, of making anti-social behaviour more difficult and protecting those who are victims of it.
On those grounds, and on the understanding that the Government will return to the issue at Third Reading, I will not move for now government Amendment 2, and I hope that on the commitment to discuss the issue the noble Lord, Lord Dear, will not press his amendment.
Lord Dear
My Lords, we have been detained for something over two hours and I shall take no more than a couple of minutes of your Lordships’ time to say what I have to say. First, I sincerely thank all those who have spoken in this debate, particularly the three signatories to my amendment and the Minister, who has had to sit through a varied and interesting debate.
Secondly, I want to pick up on the chilling effect. The experience with the word “insulting” in the Public Order Act is sufficient in itself to indicate what front-line practitioners will do. Governed as they are by very well-oiled complaints machinery, they will undoubtedly be faced with many examples when a set of circumstances are produced for them, and they will be virtually pressurised into taking some sort of action, to pursue the case and push it through to the courts to decide. That is the easy option, and it is what happened all too often with “insulting”. To take an exercise in discretion and turn around to the complainant and say, “Frankly, I think we should let this one go by”, is not an option that they will take willingly. That is undoubtedly why the Association of Chief Police Officers as one group has said that it thinks that “nuisance and annoyance” is wrong and that we should stay with the well tried formula of “harassment, alarm or distress”.
The choice between those two wordings is the pivotal point of the legislation—the absolute foundation on which everything else hangs. We can talk for as long as we like about reasonable, just, convenient, necessary and all those adjectives, and try to make it work but, if the pivot does not work, all the rest falls away. The pivot suggested by the Government is “nuisance and annoyance”. We have no knowledge of what will happen if that comes into play, but we know what will happen with “harassment, alarm or distress”; it is well proven, well tried and respected, and has never been faulted. To move way from that is a step into the dark.
We have had no examples whatever of the sort of conduct that “nuisance and annoyance” seeks, rightly, to address. I pay great tribute to the Minister, for whom I have a huge liking and respect, but unless he can satisfy me—and I suspect that this is the case with others in the Chamber, from what I pick up from the atmosphere—that he is willing to move immediately to “harassment, alarm or distress”, I must seek to divide the House. I invite him to respond to that.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
As far as I am concerned, if I go into discussions between now and Third Reading, all the aspects that the noble Lord has related in his speech, and those expressed by other noble Lords around the House, will be on the table. I do not want to prejudge the outcome of those discussions. All that I can say is that I wish to make sure that when we come back to Third Reading we have a House that can unite behind legislation on this issue. I do not think that that is an unreasonable expectation, and I believe that it represents the sentiment in which this debate has taken place this afternoon.
Baroness Butler-Sloss
I have listened with great care to this debate, and I was undecided when I came into this Chamber as to what I would do. What I have not yet heard from the Minister, to my understanding, is what is wrong with the amendment and why it will not actually meet what needs to be done.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I was asked a parallel question by my noble friend Lord Forsyth. We are trying to simplify the legislation so that we make it easier for practitioners, no matter in what circumstances they are dealing with the application for an IPNA, to have a test that is capable of being applied in all areas.
I have listened to this debate. There may be ways in which the noble Lord’s amendment can be modified to advantage. It is important to recognise that he has made a very valid contribution to this debate, and I would like to have the opportunity to consider further what he is proposing in his amendment.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
My Lords, if I understand the position that the Minister has taken up, he will have an open discussion, the precise outcome of which cannot, of course, be forecast. He will take account of all aspects of what has been put forward in the hope that we can, between us, reach an agreed solution to the problem which has the support of the whole House.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, Amendments, 4, 5, 24 and 25 are all directed at a defence for an application for an IPNA or for a criminal behaviour order. My amendments are different from definitions of the first condition which is the requirement for an injunction or an order.
There must be cases where the conduct can be expected—or maybe we will end up with “reasonably be expected”—to cause the impacts that we have been debating. Nevertheless, there is good reason for that conduct. It is not clear to me if, as drafted, there is any defence other than “I didn’t do it” or that the conduct does not meet the test.
In the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, Section 1(5) includes a provision similar to the one which I have set out in two of these amendments—that:
“For the purpose of determining whether the condition”,
of the test,
“is fulfilled, the court shall disregard any act … which … was reasonable in the circumstances”.
In case that point is not clear enough, I have specifically used the term “defence” in my more homemade Amendments 5 and 25.
There must be an opportunity for the respondent or defendant to explain himself, and I would not be happy to leave whether or not to proceed to the discretion of the applicant or prosecuting authority, whichever we are talking about. At the previous stage, the Minister said that he would take away the first of each pair of these amendments to explore whether it was appropriate to introduce an explicit reference to reasonableness. I appreciate that he went three-quarters of the way to doing so this afternoon. I know that he gave no commitment at that stage, but in any event I do not believe that his amendment, had he pursued it, would have met the point of a defence. Conduct which could reasonably be expected to cause nuisance or annoyance might still be conduct for which, in particular circumstances, there is good reason. The court should actively have to consider this.
The point is made more important by the fact that it is likely in this area that there will be a lot of litigants in person, so the legislation itself needs to be extremely clear.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Hamwee for her explanation of these amendments. She explained that they seek to provide the respondent or offender with a defence as to why an injunction or criminal behaviour order, which are also included in these amendments, should not be granted—namely, that the behaviour was reasonable in the circumstances. My noble friend has pointed out that this issue is distinct from the amendment that we have already debated, which is related to the first condition for the grant of an injunction.
If I may respond at this point to the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, about his queries in the previous debate, I can say that the provisions in Clause 1(5) are not defences; they are factors for the court to take into account when imposing restrictions or requirements. The two issues mentioned should not be confused with defence issues.
The Earl of Lytton
Do I understand from the Minister then that the normal range of civil defences would continue to apply in the normal way, in connection with matters under this Bill as everywhere else?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
As I understand it, that is the case. I was going on to argue the question of defences because that was the issue that my noble friend wanted to sort out. However, I hope that we have saved the price of a stamp by clearing that up in the Chamber.
In effect, my noble friend is seeking to argue that it is not enough to be able to establish, in the case of the injunction, that the conduct in question could reasonably be expected to cause nuisance or annoyance but that it should also be necessary to show that the conduct was unreasonable in the circumstances. My noble friend has pointed to the reasonableness defence in Section 1 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which applies to the ASBO on application, although it is worth noting that no such defence is contained in Section 1C of that Act, which relates to the ASBO on conviction. I am sympathetic to the point that she raised and I hope to persuade her that it is already effectively covered.
I will deal first with the injunction. As my noble friend will be aware, the second condition that must be satisfied is that the court considers that it is “just and convenient” to grant an injunction for the purpose of preventing the respondent from engaging in anti-social behaviour. As I have already indicated, in applying this limb of the test, the court will look at whether it is reasonable and proportionate in the circumstances of the case to grant an injunction. It will be open to the respondent to argue that he or she had a good reason for his or her conduct. The court will weigh that up against the evidence submitted by the applicant and come to a view. If the court is satisfied that the reason put forward by the respondent is a sound one, I fully expect it to conclude that it will not be just and convenient to grant an injunction. Therefore, the defence is, in practice, inherent in the drafting of Clause 1 as it stands.
In the case of the criminal behaviour order, it is again important to look at the wider context in which the court will apply the test in Clause 21. The same public law principles of reasonableness and proportionality will apply. It would therefore be open to the offender to argue that there were reasonable grounds for the conduct in question, which the court would then consider alongside the evidence presented by the Crown Prosecution Service.
I might add that there is no reasonableness defence in Section 1C of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which provides for ASBOs on conviction—the forerunner to the criminal behaviour order. That section does, however, stipulate that the court may consider evidence presented by the prosecution or the defence, which will be the position in relation to the criminal behaviour order, albeit that is not expressly stated in the Bill.
In addition, it is worth pointing out that, in deciding whether to apply for a criminal behaviour order, the Crown Prosecution Service would need to be satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of obtaining an order and that it was in the public interest to apply for an order. The prosecution would therefore consider any evidence which showed that the conduct of the respondent was reasonable in the circumstances.
In short, the point made by my noble friend is well made. I assure her that a respondent or offender will be able to raise such a defence, which will then be properly considered by the court alongside evidence submitted by the applicant for the injunction or order. In the light of this reassurance, I do not believe that these amendments are necessary and, as a result, I hope that my noble friend will be prepared to withdraw Amendment 4.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, my noble friend is having a difficult enough day, so I reassure him immediately that I will seek to withdraw the amendment.
I notice the reference to the public interest test in the case of the criminal behaviour order. As regards the injunction—this is not a matter for this afternoon—I wonder whether my noble friend might consider a reference to the point in the statutory guidance. I reassure my noble and learned friend that I am seeking not guidance to the court—I would not dare—but guidance to potential applicants in order to prevent them going forward if it is not appropriate that they should go forward in the circumstances that I sought to outline. As I said, it is not a matter for this afternoon and I know that the Government are consulting on the guidance but I hope that my comment at this point can be taken as a contribution to that consultation. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, I start by joining in the tributes being paid to Paul Goggins. I know that my colleagues in the Home Office share this view. We were together yesterday evening when his illness was mentioned. His loss this morning is a loss to British public life and I am happy to pay tribute.
I am very grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, for tabling these amendments. It is right and proper that we consider these matters. His amendments raise important issues about whether detention is appropriate for someone aged under 18, and we debated this at some length in Committee. I was pleased that we had the opportunity for a productive meeting yesterday and I hope that I will be able to answer some of the points made by the noble Earl and other noble Lords.
The Government strongly support the use of informal interventions and rehabilitative approaches, particularly when dealing with young people. That is at the heart of our overall approach to anti-social behaviour. However, detention must be available to the court if the new injunction is to act as an effective deterrent and to protect victims and communities in the most serious cases. When we consulted on the new anti-social behaviour powers, 57% of those who responded were in favour of the breach sanctions for the injunction for under-18s. Only 22% disagreed, with only a further 4% against any custody for under-18s.
The injunction is a court order and must be supported by tough sanctions to ensure compliance. However, in contrast to anti-social behaviour orders, under-18s will not be unnecessarily criminalised and saddled with a criminal record for breach. However, it is only in the most serious or persistent cases of breach that a court may detain someone aged under 18. Schedule 2 to the Bill makes clear that a court may not detain a young person for breach of an IPNA,
“unless it is satisfied that, in view of the severity or extent of the breach, no other power available to the court is appropriate”.
Where this is not the case, the court may impose a supervision order on a young person and Part 2 of Schedule 2 to the Bill sets out a number of non-custodial requirements that can be attached to such an order. The relevant requirements are a supervision requirement, an activity requirement or a curfew requirement. These are three of the requirements which may be attached to a youth rehabilitation order, the youth equivalent of a community sentence.
We would expect the youth courts to do all they can to ensure that a young person’s rehabilitation is effective. In making any decision to make a detention order, the court must consult with the youth offending team and inform any other body or individual the applicant thinks appropriate. If the court does decide to make a detention order, it must give its reasons in open court. The availability of custody as a sanction in exceptional cases reflects the current position as regards the anti-social behaviour order on application. Indeed, breach of an ASBO on application attracts a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment as well as a criminal record.
The previous Administration took the view that there needed to be effective sanctions for breach up to and including imprisonment, including in cases involving young people. While it was generous of the noble Earl to congratulate the previous Government on this aspect of their policy, we do not believe that they got the balance quite right between punishment and rehabilitation. That is why we are treating breach of the IPNA as a contempt of court rather than as a criminal offence: we believe that they were right to include the option of custody for both adults and juveniles. To remove that option for juveniles would significantly weaken the effectiveness of the injunction and thereby weaken the protection we are seeking to afford to the victims of anti-social behaviour.
I shall address some of the concerns expressed by the noble Earl and other noble Lords. Of course, a vital part of preparing for the introduction of these new powers will be appropriate training and support for the judiciary, police and other front-line professionals in how these powers are applied to young people, and the Home Office is already discussing these requirements with the Ministry of Justice, the Judicial College and the College of Policing.
I can inform the noble Earl that young offenders under 18 years of age may be placed in a young offender institution run by the National Offender Management Service, NOMS, a privately operated secure training centre or a local authority secure children’s home. Placement is made by the placements team of the youth justice board, which is notified by the court when custody is given. They will use their expertise and will be informed by the relevant youth offending team to place them in an appropriate establishment suitable for their needs. The youngest and most vulnerable young people will be placed in secure children’s homes. There are no longer any places for girls in young offender institutions, so they will be placed in a secure training centre or secure children’s home.
Under the Bill, the court must consider any representations made by the relevant youth offending team in considering whether to make a detention order against an under-18. Moreover, the applicant for a detention order or a supervision order must consult any youth offending team and inform any other body or individual the applicant thinks appropriate. I hope that helps to reassure the noble Earl.
I shall go on to the dispersal order.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
The noble Lord made the point about it being a contempt of court. Can he tell me in how many other cases young people can face detention for a contempt of court?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
Off the top of my head, I cannot, but I hope that the noble Baroness will allow me to write to her on that. I will copy in all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate and put a copy in the Library.
As for breach of a dispersal direction, I can offer the noble Earl some comfort and, in doing so, I should like to correct the impression I gave in Committee on 20 November that custody was an option for breach of a dispersal direction by a person aged under 18. I can, in fact, reassure the noble Earl, the noble Lord and the noble Baroness that this is not the case. Detention and training orders—the juvenile equivalent of imprisonment —must be made for a minimum of four months. That means that where the maximum term of imprisonment that could be imposed is less than four months, as is the case here, a detention and training order is not an option in relation to a juvenile offender. The court will be left with the options of a youth rehabilitation order, a fine, a conditional discharge or an absolute discharge. I hope that is of some reassurance and apologise if my previous comments misled noble Lords. I hope I have been able to reassure the noble Earl as regards the dispersal powers.
In the case of the IPNA, I fear that we have to agree to differ on the appropriateness of having custody as a long-stop option for breach of an injunction by a person under 18. For the sake of victims of anti-social behaviour, we remain strongly of the view that, in exceptional cases, a detention order should be available to the courts. We should not weaken these provisions by removing that option.
Amendment 86, the final amendment in this group, seeks to place a new responsibility on local authorities to provide youth services to prevent young people becoming involved in anti-social behaviour. This obligation is already effectively provided for by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which places a responsibility on local authorities to formulate and implement a strategy for the reduction of crime and disorder in their area, where crime and disorder includes anti-social behaviour and youth anti-social behaviour. That Act includes a responsibility for local authorities to keep the strategy under review, monitor its effectiveness and alter it accordingly. Local authorities must ensure that their strategy focuses on the types of problem in their area, based on an analysis of local levels and patterns of crime and disorder, and the misuse of drugs and alcohol. Therefore, if an area has a particular problem with youth anti-social behaviour, the local authority has a responsibility to put measures in place to reduce the problem. I would expect this to include preventive measures. In addition, the Children Act 1989 places an obligation on local authorities to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in their area who are in need and to promote the upbringing of such children by their families by providing a range and level of services appropriate to those children’s needs. This includes services to prevent young people becoming involved in anti-social behaviour, crime and disorder, as well as services to support those young people and their families who become involved in anti-social behaviour or crime.
I hope I have reassured my noble friend Lady Hamwee, the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, and the noble Earl that the duty he seeks to create through this amendment already exists and that local authorities have these crime and disorder reduction strategies in place. In these circumstances, I hope the noble Earl will be prepared to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Rosser
My Lords, I will be brief. The Minister has been asked a number of relevant questions and I am sure that noble Lords will be waiting to hear the responses. In particular, do the Government anticipate that their proposal, with provision for suspending Section 49 of the 1933 Act, is likely to lead to a significant increase in the number of children being named as a result of that suspension of Section 49? Or do they take the view that it will lead to very little increase at all because they think that courts will regularly make decisions—an active choice—not to name the child in question? The question has already been asked about the Government’s intentions, not in respect of numbers or an exact figure, but whether they are looking for a significant increase in the number of children named. Is that the purpose of this? Or is their view that even though they are making the change, it may not make a great deal of difference because the courts are more likely to look at this matter and make the active choice not to name the child in question?
The answer may be that it is already covered in the draft guidance. I have not looked at the guidance to see if it is. However, if it is not already in the guidance, is it the intention that the guidance which will be issued to professionals will say anything about making applications to courts for children not to be named where professionals are directly involved? If it is not in the guidance is it the intention that it should be put in that guidance, and what in fact would it say?
I will leave it at that; the concerns have been expressed about this. Obviously there are already circumstances where children can be named as far as legislation is concerned, and I do not want to pretend that that is not the case. Clearly the Government were expecting that numbers of IPNAs would be issued and, therefore, that that might have an effect on the numbers of children being named. Whether that would still be the case in light of the amendment that has now been carried will remain to be seen. Nevertheless IPNAs will still be around, and that may lead to an increase in the numbers of children being named. It would be helpful to know the Government’s stance. Is that what they are looking for—or do they not see it making a great deal of difference? Will they be giving advice to anybody? I know that they cannot give advice to the courts, but will they give advice to professionals who might be appearing in court in order to make sure that courts are reminded at the very least that they do have this power to make the decision that children should not be named?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, this again has been a good debate on an important issue. Though it is a small part, it is an important part of these provisions. I thank the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Ripon and Leeds for presenting these amendments for our discussion.
As the House will know, the Government do indeed believe that there is a need for reporting restrictions in respect of under-18s in certain cases, where it is both necessary and proportionate to allow for effective enforcement of an injunction or criminal behaviour order. This will enable communities to play their part in ensuring that the injunction and criminal behaviour order are effective in tackling anti-social behaviour by alerting the police if the respondent or offender breaches their conditions. Publicising the injunction and the order in certain cases will provide reassurance and increase public confidence in agencies’ willingness and in their ability to take action against perpetrators of anti-social behaviour. Potential perpetrators will be deterred from committing anti-social behaviour due to reporting. So while I understand the sentiment behind these amendments, I believe that there is a strong case for maintaining the default position under Clauses 17, 22 and 29. This mirrors the current position for anti-social behaviour orders.
“(1A) Rules of court may provide for a youth court to give permission for an application for an injunction under section 1 against a person aged 18 or over to be made to the youth court if—
(a) an application to the youth court has been made, or is to be made, for an injunction under that section against a person aged under 18, and(b) the youth court thinks that it would be in the interests of justice for the applications to be heard together.”
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Lord Taylor of Holbeach Excerpts(10 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Taylor of Holbeach
That the amendments for the Report stage be marshalled and considered in the following order:
Clauses 1 to 10, Schedule 1, Clause 11, Schedule 2, Clauses 12 to 86, Schedule 3, Clauses 87 to 96, Schedule 4, Clauses 97 to 105, Schedule 5, Clauses 106 to 120, Schedule 6, Clauses 121 to 138, Schedule 7, Clause 139, Schedule 8, Clauses 140 to 142, Schedule 9, Clauses 143 to 166, Schedule 10, Clauses 167 to 171.
Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2013
Lord Taylor of Holbeach Excerpts(10 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Taylor of Holbeach
That the draft order laid before the House on 2 December be approved.
Relevant document: 15th Report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)
My Lords, the Government are determined to do all that they can to minimise the threat from terrorism to the UK and our interests abroad. Proscription is an important part of the Government’s strategy to tackle terrorist activities. We propose to add Imarat Kavkaz, also known as the Caucasus Emirate, to the list of international terrorist organisations, amending Schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000. This is the 13th proscription order under that Act.
Having carefully considered all the evidence, the Home Secretary believes that Imarat Kavkaz meets the statutory test for proscription and that it is appropriate to exercise her discretion to proscribe it. Section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000 provides a power for the Home Secretary to proscribe an organisation if she believes it is currently concerned in terrorism. The Act specifies that an organisation is concerned in terrorism if it: commits or participates in acts of terrorism; prepares for terrorism; promotes or encourages terrorism, including the unlawful glorification of terrorism; or is otherwise concerned in terrorism. If the test is met, the Home Secretary may then exercise her discretion to proscribe the organisation. In considering whether to exercise this discretion, the Home Secretary takes into account a number of factors: the nature and scale of an organisation’s activities; the specific threat that it poses to the United Kingdom; the specific threat that it poses to British nationals overseas; the organisation’s presence in the United Kingdom; and the need to support other members of the international community in tackling terrorism.
Given the wide-ranging impact of proscription, the Home Secretary exercises her power to proscribe only after a thorough review of the available relevant information and evidence on the organisation. This includes open source material, intelligence material and advice that reflects consultation across government, including with the intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The Home Secretary is supported in her decision-making by the cross-Whitehall proscription review group. Decisions to proscribe are taken with great care by the Home Secretary and it is right that the case for proscribing new organisations must be approved by both Houses.
Having carefully considered all the evidence, we firmly believe that Imarat Kavkaz is currently concerned in terrorism. Noble Lords will appreciate that I am unable to comment on specific intelligence that leads to any decision to proscribe, but I can provide a brief summary of its activities. Imarat Kavkaz, or the Caucasus Emirate, is a terrorist organisation which seeks a Sharia-based caliphate across the north Caucasus. It regularly uses terrorist tactics and has carried out attacks against Russian state and civilian targets. The organisation claimed responsibility for the January 2011 suicide attack on Domodedovo Airport in Moscow that killed 35, including one British national, and a suicide attack on the Moscow metro in March 2010 that killed 39. Since then, there has been continued activity by Imarat Kavkaz, including renewed threats of activity in Russia made during the summer of 2013. The organisation is designated by the US and listed by the UN under the al-Qaeda sanctions regime. Subject to the agreement of this House, the order will come into force on Friday, 13 December.
In conclusion, I believe it is right that we add Imarat Kavkaz to the list of proscribed organisations under Schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000.
Lord Rosser (Lab)
The Minister explained the statutory power available to the Home Secretary to proscribe an organisation that she believes is currently concerned in terrorism and the factors that she has to take into account before exercising her discretion. The United States proscribed Imarat Kavkaz in 2011 after it was linked to the two deadly attacks in Moscow to which the Minister referred—namely at the international airport, when 35 people were killed, and in the Moscow metro, in which 39 people were killed. Imarat Kavkaz was formed in late 2007 and is an Islamic militant organisation based in Russia’s north Caucasus. Its stated goal is the liberation from the control of Moscow of what it considers to be Muslim lands. It regularly conducts attacks against Russian security forces and is linked to al-Qaeda.
We support the order, but I have three points to raise. When the order was discussed in the House of Commons on Tuesday, Diana Johnson MP asked the Minister in the other place about the effects of proscription on the social media, given that Imarat Kavkaz has a number of Facebook pages, and a range of fan pages are directed towards its leader. She asked the Minister to,
“clarify whether Facebook will be prohibited from hosting such fan pages and allowing people in the United Kingdom to access them once the group is proscribed”.
The Minister replied:
“The group’s Facebook page has been referred to the Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit, which has responsibility for assessing such issues. If the site is assessed to be illegal, the CTIRU will flag that up with Facebook directly and have it taken down”.—[Official Report, Commons, 10/12/13; cols. 204-05.]
I appreciate that it is only two days since that question was asked but this order, as the noble Lord said, is due to come into effect tomorrow. What, then, is the position in relation to the group’s Facebook page? This is the 13th order of this kind to be laid. Does the Minister know whether previously proscribed organisations had Facebook or any other social media pages and, if so, whether those pages have been taken down?
The consequences for a proscribed organisation are considerable for both the organisation and its adherents. It is a criminal offence for a person to belong to or invite support for a proscribed organisation. It is also a criminal offence to arrange a meeting in support of such an organisation, wear clothing or carry articles in public that arouse reasonable suspicion that an individual is a member or supporter. A proscribed organisation or any person affected by the proscription may apply to the Secretary of State for deproscription. If the Secretary of State refuses, the applicant may appeal to the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission. First, how many separate applications for deproscription have been made to the Home Secretary since the Terrorism Act 2000 came into force? Secondly, how many appeals have been made to, and been determined by, the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission over the same timescale?
Time-limiting proscription was recommended by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, David Anderson QC, who felt that a proscription order should be subject to a review after a fixed period, following which it could be renewed or would lapse. My final question is: what is the Government’s position on David Anderson’s recommendation?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, I hope that I shall be able to answer most of the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. I appreciate his support for the order. I strongly believe that Imarat Kavkaz should be added to the list of proscribed organisations.
The noble Lord asked a number of questions. The first was about the internet and the relationship of this proscription and others to organisations such as YouTube and Facebook. We have been removing illegal terrorist content from the overt space where it is hosted in the UK or overseas and we have good relationships with those in the industry—for example, YouTube and Facebook. To date, the Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit, which the noble Lord referred to in commenting on the reply in the Commons, has removed more than 18,000 pieces of illegal material. This particular group’s Facebook page has been referred to the Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit. If it is assessed as illegal, the CTIRU will flag this directly with Facebook for removal.
The noble Lord also asked about applications for deproscription. There has been none since 2009, and indeed there have been no appeals to the POAC. There was one successful appeal in 2007-08 by the PMOI as a result of a judicial review of the case, as the noble Lord will be aware.
The noble Lord’s last question was about the recommendation made by David Anderson. We obviously take note of that, and indeed matters have been set up. In response to David Anderson, the Home Secretary said that under the current regime any person affected by a proscription can submit a written application to her requesting that she considers the removal of a specified organisation from the list. The Home Secretary is required to determine the application within 90 days. If the Secretary of State agrees to deproscribe an organisation, she will lay an order before Parliament removing it from the list of proscribed organisations. That is subject to the affirmative procedure, as is this order. The Home Secretary’s consideration of these matters following applications from the groups themselves is an effective process. There is a right of appeal and challenge, should the Home Secretary’s decision be negative. Any valid application for deproscription will be considered by the Home Secretary in accordance with the Act. I hope that that helps the noble Lord.
Lord Rosser
Does that response mean that the Government are not looking at going down the road of what I understand to be his recommendation—time-limiting proscription, which would be subject to a review after a fixed period, following which it could renewed or it would lapse? Are the Government not looking to doing that?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I have described the position, and I have a note here which helped me to do so. It presents the Home Secretary’s role and the Home Office’s view on the best way of dealing with deproscription, subject to application and considered within 90 days. In the event of a negative response there is a right of appeal. That is the current procedure and it would apply to any of the current 14 bodies that have been proscribed through the order.
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
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The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, for the way in which she has contributed to the debate. All noble Lords have recognised the seriousness of this issue. I understand that all noble Lords who have spoken have tried to exercise their best judgment in this particularly sensitive area. My noble friends Lady Hamwee and Lord Avebury, the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, and my noble friend Lord Lester—I am sure we all wish him a speedy recovery in his absence—have all raised a number of issues through their amendments.
As has been pointed out, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, David Anderson QC, has recently made some recommendations for further reforms to the powers contained in Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act. These recommendations, as my right honourable friend Damian Green reported, are being considered by Ministers. We are grateful to the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation for his report.
I have to say that, as Mr Anderson has also observed, there is a limit to how far these matters can be considered before the conclusion of the judicial review proceedings in the case of David Miranda. That being the position, while I welcome the opportunity to air these important issues in debate now, I propose only to set out the Government’s preliminary view of the amendments before us today. Subject to the timing of a judgment in the Miranda case, I hope to give a more definitive view before the Bill moves on to Report—I will make sure that noble Lords are aware as soon as we are in that position.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, invited me to do, I begin by touching on Amendments 56YJ and 56YK, which deal with some complex issues. The first of these is around safeguards for legally privileged and related material and the use of admissions in criminal proceedings. It is right that the Government are considering these matters and they are doing so now. There is no need for the Bill to require that consideration in future.
I would like to be clear that the current compulsion under Schedule 7 to the 2000 Act to answer questions means that admissions made in an examination would not normally be considered admissible in criminal proceedings. Both the High Court and the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation have suggested that a statutory bar be introduced to this effect, and this is something that we are examining carefully.
It is right that the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation makes recommendations, but Amendments 56YK and 100A seek to tie the hands of the Secretary of State by, in effect, requiring her to implement the recommendations of the independent reviewer. It is for the Government and Parliament to decide what legislative changes should flow from the independent reviewer’s recommendations. Given the importance of these issues, any such legislative proposals should be subject to full parliamentary scrutiny—as with the provisions in this Bill—rather than implemented through secondary legislation, as my noble friend has suggested in Amendments 56YK and 100A.
Amendments 57 and 58 deal with fundamental principles of the powers. First, Amendment 57 seeks to qualify the definition of the purpose for which these powers can be used. The legislation is already clear: they are for the purpose of determining whether a person appears to be someone who has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, has expressed concern that the powers may be used in a discriminatory way. Accordingly, Amendment 57 also includes requirements on collecting data. Requiring examining officers to collect data on all protected characteristics from all individuals examined under Schedule 7 would be both very intrusive and extremely bureaucratic. It would also prolong the majority of examinations, of which 63% are completed within 15 minutes. There is a question as to how useful such data would be.
Direct comparison with the UK population is not really relevant here. A significant proportion of those who travel through ports are not UK residents. The use of the powers is based on the current terrorist threat to the United Kingdom, meaning that certain routes are given greater focus. Consequently, some ethnic groups may be more likely to be examined, but not because the powers are being used inappropriately. As the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation reported in his recent annual report:
“If the power is being properly exercised ... one would expect”
that those examined, in terms of breakdown, would,
“correlate not to the ethnic breakdown of the travelling population, but rather to the ethnic breakdown of the terrorist population”.
He went on:
“Police are however entitled and indeed required to exercise their Schedule 7 power in a manner aligned to the terrorist threat. As in previous years, I have seen no evidence, either at ports or from the statistics, that Schedule 7 powers are exercised in a racially discriminatory manner”
That said, we are working with the police and the Equality and Human Rights Commission to find a balance between increasing transparency without increasing the bureaucratic burden. I would also like to reassure the noble Baroness that the statutory code of practice for examining officers makes clear that someone cannot be examined based solely on their ethnicity or their religion.
The final element of Amendment 57 would remove the compulsion on individuals examined at ports and airports to provide information. This would fundamentally undermine the whole purpose of the legislation. Schedule 7 examinations have led to individuals being convicted for terrorist-related offences and have produced information which has contributed to long and complex intelligence-based counterterrorist investigations and the disruption of terrorist activity. If someone could simply refuse to answer questions, the utility of the provision would be fundamentally brought into question.
Amendment 58 seeks to introduce a reasonable suspicion test to be met before an examining officer may detain a person under Schedule 7. Again, this would undermine the capability of the police to identify individuals who are involved in terrorism as they passed through our ports and borders. Examinations are not simply about the police talking to people who they know or already suspect are involved in terrorism. They are also about talking to people travelling to and from places where terrorist activity is taking place or emerging to determine whether those individuals appear to be involved in terrorism, whether that is because they are or have been involved, are going to become involved or are at risk of becoming involved either knowingly or unknowingly.
For those reasons, I am not persuaded that it would be right to introduce a test of reasonable suspicion. I am pleased that my noble friend Lord Faulks has been able to explain that the Joint Committee on Human Rights has supported this position. However, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation has recently recommended that detention be permitted and continue on periodic review only when an officer is satisfied that there are grounds for suspecting that the person appears to be a person concerned with terrorism. We are reflecting on this recommendation ahead of Report.
Amendments 59, 60 and 61 would further reduce the maximum period of detention. The police need time to carry out checks and questioning. The person may have a lot to say, detailed or complex questioning may be required, inconsistencies in the person’s account or documentation may need to be understood, or time may be needed to allow the person to consult privately with a legal adviser or to allow for interpretation. We are already reducing the maximum period by a third but there is a balance to be struck, and for that reason I do not believe that it should be reduced further.
Amendments 57A, 61A, 61B and 62 seek to restrict examining officers’ powers in respect of the property of people who are examined. The power to search for and examine property, including on personal electronic devices, is an essential part of the Schedule 7 powers. As the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation has observed,
“it is of vital importance that the copying and retention of data from mobile phones and other devices should be provided for by a law that is clear, accessible and foreseeable”.
New paragraph 11A of Schedule 7 to the 2000 Act, by clarifying the law, meets a requirement of the European Convention on Human Rights that interference with convention rights be in accordance with law that is adequately accessible and foreseeable. Amendment 62 would take away that clarification.
On Amendment 62A, noble Lords will understand that ports, airports and international rail terminals are quite different from police stations, and, as such, recording facilities are not always going to be available. If recording were mandatory, more individuals would be liable to being transported from the port to a police station where facilities are available, extending the duration of the examination. The questioning of any person detained for examination under Schedule 7 at a police station already falls under a code of practice for the video recording of interviews.
Amendments 63, 64 and 64ZA relate to areas where we are already introducing reforms through the Bill. While the Bill ensures that all persons detained under these powers will have a right to consult a lawyer and to have someone informed of their detention, Amendment 63 would extend those rights to everyone examined. As I have explained, some 63% of examinations last less than 15 minutes. More than 96% are concluded within an hour. Extending statutory rights to all those being examined, even briefly, would create an unnecessary burden and could well lead to longer examinations than are necessary. I would also like to remind noble Lords that the Bill already ensures that anyone examined for more than an hour must be formally detained, so there is no question of prolonged examination without these rights applying.
“Powers of community support officers
Schedule (Powers of community support officers) (which amends Part 1 of Schedule 4 to the Police Reform Act 2002) has effect.”
Lord Rosser
We indicated at Second Reading that we intended to propose a new clause on this issue since it was clear that action had to be taken to address how covert policing operations were authorised and managed. Of course, we support undercover policing, since such operations are a vital part of the fight against organised crime and terrorism and are essential in keeping communities safe. We recognise the dedication and bravery of those officers who undertake this work. However, any such operations must be subject to the highest ethical and operational standards. That is essential for both their operational effectiveness and public confidence. Our amendment today, therefore, seeks to deal with the issue of accountability.
There are two cases that highlight how important it is that changes of the kind that we are proposing are made. The first is the case of Mark Kennedy who, as a police officer, infiltrated—I think that is the word—protest groups over a period of years: groups which said that they were involved in lawful demonstrations, rather than crime. The former policeman, it appears, had relationships with women in the protest movement and travelled to eco-protests across Europe. He later told a Channel 4 documentary of his remorse, including his regrets about and feelings for a woman with whom he had had a long affair. HMIC reviewed the activities of Mark Kennedy and other undercover officers and stated that his actions had led to the collapse of a trial of environmental protesters and that he had “defied” management instructions. The report found that Mr Kennedy had helped to unearth “serious criminality”. However, Mr Kennedy said that, while the subject had never been broached directly, it was “impossible” that his superiors had not known he was having a sexual relationship with some protesters. The report suggested that an independent body might be required to authorise such undercover operations. It also said that Mr Kennedy was inadequately supervised and that oversight of undercover officers needed to be strengthened.
The second case is that of the Lawrence family. Twenty years ago, Stephen Lawrence was murdered at the age of 18. He was, of course, the son of Neville and Doreen, who is now my noble friend Lady Lawrence of Clarendon, a Member of your Lordships’ House. Stephen was cruelly murdered by racists and there was evidence of racism in the way the police inquiry was conducted. Serious allegations have now been made that the police spied on the Lawrence family with a view to discrediting them. Peter Francis, a former undercover police officer and a member of the somewhat controversial Special Demonstration Squad, has spoken of his activities as part of an operation to spy on and attempt to smear the Lawrence family.
These two cases and other incidents have led to serious concerns about the accountability of the undercover police operations that were undertaken and raised questions about the accountability of future undercover police operations. Our amendment seeks to ensure that all long-term undercover operations are signed off by a relevant independent body, to ensure that, where needed, covert operations are used proportionately, sensitively, only when necessary and with clear and improved accountability arrangements. Additionally, we do not currently have effective oversight of these operations. There are various options we can explore and we hope that the Government will look at these options carefully. Judicial oversight is just one that could be considered.
There also appears to be an anomaly, because currently, if the police or security services want to enter—perhaps to break in, to bug a room or to intercept a phone call—they need justification that to do so is in the interests of national security in order to get a warrant. Attaining a warrant requires judicial approval. However, those undercover police officers who entered into relationships in an attempt to retrieve certain information needed no warrant.
Of course—and we appreciate this—undercover operations vary. Some will be as short as an hour or so and may involve relatively minor matters; it would be impractical to ask for independent approval for all such operations. However, our proposed new clause is intended to target long-term covert police operations, and these can span from six months to 12 months or even several years. When such operations are undertaken, there needs to be clarity about the goals, the methods and the priorities. Therefore, there should be independent approval prior to any such lengthy operation. It does not necessarily have to come from a judge, but it must be truly independent, and the very process of seeking such approval would help to ensure proportionality, and clarity of objectives and methods. Our proposed new clause would help to ensure that operations such as the hugely inappropriate and totally wrong campaign against the Lawrence family cannot take place again. That campaign and operation against the Lawrence family showed appallingly bad judgment. Surely, we all want to ensure that any operation undertaken is accountable, justifiable and in the wider public interest.
On Report in the other place, the Minister Damian Green stated that it was the Government’s,
“intention to legislate to enhance oversight of undercover law enforcement officer deployments”,
and this could,
“be done through secondary legislation”.
He outlined the Government’s proposals to increase accountability and oversight. However, proper scrutiny is necessary and we need the opportunity to scrutinise those proposals as part of this Bill. Damian Green promised in the House of Commons that he would,
“lay the appropriate order before the House shortly”.—[Official Report, Commons, 15/10/13; col. 634]
As I understand it, we have not yet seen the order, although I may be wrong in saying that. However, we feel that it would be much better to deal with an issue of this importance in what the Government regard as a flagship Bill on crime and policing. I hope the Minister, when he replies, will be able to give a helpful response.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for tabling this amendment because I agree with him that the whole question of undercover policing is very important. I do not think that any noble Lord should be in doubt that covert techniques, including undercover policing, are an important weapon in the fight against terrorism and other serious and organised crime. Undercover police officers play a crucial role in keeping us all safe. It is difficult and dangerous work and I welcome this opportunity to pay tribute to all who undertake it.
The new clause proposed by the noble Lord seeks to introduce a system of independent authorisation for undercover policing operations. I do not believe there is any great difference of view between the noble Lord and me on this point. We both believe that there must be proper safeguards to ensure that these covert techniques are used only where appropriate and that the mechanisms for approving all such deployments are fit for purpose. However, I hope that it will help noble Lords if I set out why I do not believe that this amendment is required, not least because the Government have already instigated changes that are designed to meet the concerns that have arisen in the light of some allegations of past misconduct, which were sympathetically described by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser.
Undercover deployments are authorised under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, commonly known as RIPA, which stipulates that the use of an undercover deployment can be authorised only at a senior level within the police force or other law enforcement agency concerned. In giving an authorisation, the authorising officer must balance the seriousness of the crime being investigated, and the value of the evidence likely to be gathered, against the right to privacy of the person under investigation and of those others who are likely to have their privacy intruded upon, such as family, friends and other associates.
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary conducted a rigorous and independent review of undercover policing last year and made a number of recommendations to improve the way authorisations and deployments are made. Earlier this year, the inspectorate reported on the progress made in implementing its 2012 report and was generally positive about the work already done. The noble Lord referred to the role played by my ministerial colleague, the Minister for Policing, Criminal Justice and Victims, the right honourable Damian Green, who announced to the Home Affairs Select Committee our intention to strengthen this regime to enhance oversight of undercover law enforcement officer deployments. I am pleased to say that the order to give effect to this commitment was laid in October and is due to take effect on 1 January next year.
I will set out the effect of the changes that the Government are bringing forward. First, law enforcement agencies will need to notify the surveillance commissioners —all retired judges—of undercover deployments. In practice, what will happen is that a surveillance commissioner will see the same papers that were presented to the authorising officer and will have the opportunity to raise any concerns. Noble Lords will appreciate that most deployments are short-term in nature and, in many cases, last no more than a few hours. However, some are long-term, and these may give rise to the greatest concern. Initial authorisations last for a maximum of 12 months. Accordingly, the second change we are putting in place is that an authorisation can be renewed beyond 12 months only with the prior approval of a surveillance commissioner—who, I remind your Lordships, is someone who has held a senior judicial office.
In addition, we are increasing the rank of the authorising officer. Deployments of undercover law enforcement officers will henceforth need to be authorised at assistant chief constable level or equivalent. Any deployments lasting longer than 12 months will be authorised by a chief constable or equivalent, as well as by a surveillance commissioner, as I have already explained. The seniority of those who will now be required to authorise these deployments is an indication of how seriously the Government take proper oversight of undercover law enforcement activity. We believe that these changes will promote the highest standards of professionalism and excellence in this most sensitive area of policing. We also believe that they will achieve the aims of this proposed new clause by ensuring judicial scrutiny of long-term deployments while preserving the flexibility of law enforcement agencies to act swiftly where necessary.
Covert activity is a necessary part of the armoury of law enforcement but it is absolutely right, as is the intention behind this amendment, that it must be properly controlled and regulated. That is why the Government are making the changes that I have described. In the light of these changes and the new regime that we are now putting in place, I do not believe that this amendment is required and I hope the noble Lord will withdraw it.
Lord Rosser
I shall of course withdraw the amendment but, before I do, I have one question for the noble Lord. Does the proposal that is to be implemented in relation to the role of the surveillance commissioners also include, for particularly lengthy covert operations lasting many months, any sort of regular oversight of the operation by the surveillance commissioners, or is it a case of getting their approval beforehand and, once that prior approval has been given, that is the end of the independent oversight?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
The prior approval is of course designed to make sure that there is no extension without the surveillance commissioner being a party to the decision. I cannot give the noble Lord a clear answer on this but I would suspect that the surveillance commissioner could make his approval dependent on an update at some point during the extended 12-month period. I will write to the noble Lord and give him some indication of how this would operate. I understand entirely what he is getting at and am quite happy to investigate and provide that to him.
Lord Rosser
I thank the noble Lord for his reply and for his offer to write to me on the issue that I have just raised. I will obviously want to reflect on the reply that we have received but I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Hodgson for giving us a chance to debate these issues. He has tabled a number of amendments—some in this group and some to follow—and it was good that he was able to put the different groups in context of the overall value of the European arrest warrant. The Government attach great value to this facility but are seeking to improve its operation by provisions in the Bill.
As the Committee will be aware, the Home Secretary announced in July that she would introduce legislation to reform the operation of the European arrest warrant in the UK and increase the protections offered to those wanted for extradition, particularly British citizens. My noble friend has drawn attention to circumstances in which the system did not operate as we would have wished. His amendments would revise the resulting provisions in the Bill.
Clause 137 will require the UK courts to bar surrender of the requested person where the issuing state has not taken both a decision to charge and a decision to try the person, except where the sole reason that such decisions have not been taken is that the person’s presence in the country is required in order for those decisions to be taken. This will have the same effect as that intended by my noble friend’s Amendments 65 to 67, 69 and 70 and 73 to 75; that is, a person will not be surrendered before the issuing state is ready to try the person. However, the clause has the added benefit of requiring the issuing state to prove that both a decision to charge and a decision to try the person have been made, if the judge has any doubt that either—or both—of those decisions has been taken. This provides greater protection for the requested person.
I can also reassure noble Lords that when deciding whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the issuing state has not taken these decisions, the judge can consider any factors or external evidence that could inform his or her decision. We do not believe it is necessary to set this out in explicit terms, as Amendment 72 would.
Finally, Amendments 68 and 71 seek to add a further restriction, so that extradition could not occur where the person’s presence was required in the issuing state for the required decisions to be made, if that could have been achieved by temporary transfer or video-conferencing. I understand my noble friend’s concern about the need for safeguards. However, I do not believe that this additional restriction is necessary. As I have explained, Clause 137 already ensures that extradition cannot occur in the early stages of an investigation when the issuing state is nowhere near a decision to try.
In addition, if the judge is satisfied that the sole reason that a decision to charge and a decision to try have not been taken is the fact that the person is absent from the issuing state, there is no reason why the person should not be extradited so that those decisions can be taken and the case proceed to trial. In these circumstances, requiring temporary transfer simply to charge does not seem to us to achieve anything in terms of safeguards and seems unnecessary.
Having heard these explanations and assurances and the explanation of how Clause 137 is designed to meet my noble friend’s concerns, I hope he will be able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, as my noble friend Lord Faulks has just said, Clause 138 is dedicated to addressing this issue and bringing the fundamental concept of proportionality into extradition matters. Much of what my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbots proposes has already been included within the Extradition Act 2003, as it will be amended by the Bill.
It is important to recognise that the judge will consider proportionality in addition to the existing bars to extradition, such as the passage of time and human rights considerations, including any impact on family and private life. Consequently, new paragraphs (d) and (e) as provided for in Amendment 78, which seek to merge these existing considerations into the proportionality bar, are unnecessary and would have little practical impact.
Turning to the proposed new paragraphs (f) and (g), which relate to the cost of proceedings in the UK and the duration and cost of proceedings in the issuing state, I do not believe that those considerations are relevant. The proportionality bar is designed to provide additional protection to those whose extradition is sought. It is appropriate that the matters concerned should relate to the alleged crime and the potential impact on the person concerned. Of course, costs are an issue for us all, and that is why the totality of our proposals is designed to improve the workings of the Extradition Act, including reducing unnecessary delays. However, costs to the UK arising from the extradition process should not mean a denial of justice where it is right that a person is extradited. On new paragraph (g), the costs and the duration of proceedings in the issuing state are a matter for the issuing state.
New paragraph (h) would require a consideration of the public interest. That is implicit in any consideration of extradition by the courts, which look at a range of factors alongside the proportionality bar. Taken together, the statutory bars to extradition provide a broad public interest test, so it is not necessary to include a separate test here in the Bill.
Finally, new paragraph (i), which refers to other matters that the judge believes relevant, is too open-ended and leaves too many issues that could be considered. It could lead to duplication and potential delay as a result of proportionality considerations overlapping with other considerations. My noble friend Lord Faulks talked about the complexity of these issues and the opportunity that he believed the provisions give for judicial consideration, deliberation and challenges. I think that the proposals in the amendment would complicate the matter further. I must emphasise that the proportionality bar is one among a number which must be considered already, not least whether extradition would be compatible with the requested person’s human rights.
Let me assure my noble friend that, in addition to the provisions in Clause 138, we will also take a more pragmatic approach to our administrative processes when an EAW is received. This will ensure that the most trivial requests are identified and, where appropriate, dealt with administratively before even getting to the courts. The aim will be to work practically with other member states to identify alternative solutions for trivial requests.
My noble friend Lord Faulks asked: why not merge proportionality and human rights? The proportionality bar deals specifically with the proportionality of extradition as a way to deal with the conduct alleged. Proportionality is indeed a factor when considering interferences with various rights under the ECHR, but it is considered when examining the specific rights one at a time. Our bar adds to that, but deals with the wider issue of human rights within the EAW.
I hope that both my noble friends are happy with the reassurances that I have given them and that my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbots will be content to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts
I am grateful to my noble friend. He rightly chided me about the list of matters in Amendment 78 and the wide-ranging nature of my proposed new paragraph (i), which would insert the text,
“any other matter which the judge considers relevant”.
Although I entirely accept that, I do not understand why three matters are chosen in subsection (3) and why a judge must not take any other matters into account. That seems to me to be erring on the other side of the argument. I hope that he will forgive me if I say that, when I hear Ministers say, “We should be pragmatic about this”, it does not reassure me, because in this area, where we are dealing with people’s liberty and livelihoods, pragmatism can go awry.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I understand the complexity of the issues that my noble friend is attempting to address in the amendments. If he feels it helpful for me to write a fuller explanation than I am able to give the Committee today, I would be very happy to do so. It may be easier if I do that; I hope that my noble friend will accept that.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts
Of course I would be delighted to receive a letter from my noble friend. That would also enable me to reflect fully on what has been said, take expert advice on the technical matters which we are discussing this evening and decide whether to take the matter further. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts
My Lords, in moving Amendment 77, I shall also speak to Amendments 79, 80, 81 and 87. This set of amendments keeps us in the area we have just been talking about: one of the three specified matters. The amendments emphasise the importance of less coercive, less disruptive measures than a full European arrest warrant. Where a state issuing an EAW refuses to use them, the judge could take that refusal into account before granting an EAW.
New subsection (3)(c), which sets out the third of the three matters we have just been discussing, currently reads,
“the possibility of the relevant foreign authorities taking measures that would be less coercive”.
Amendment 77 replaces “possibility of”—a pretty low test, in my view—with “availability of”. Amendments 80 and 81 are essentially consequential.
The assumption underlying the provision relating to less coercive measures is that the severely restrictive measure of extradition, involving deprivation of liberty and the physical transport of a person away from home and family, should be used only as a last resort. The issuing state should therefore use that mechanism only when other, less restrictive measures are unavailable. If other such measures are available—for instance, because of the existence of mutual legal assistance mechanisms or, once it is negotiated, the European investigation order—extradition should be refused if they have not been used. The reference to the possibility of using such alternative measures may result in an issuing state avoiding their use due to a lack of resources and/or bureaucratic difficulties in liaison between the competent authorities of the issuing state and the judicial authority that issued the EAW.
I argue that, although the EAW system provides for extradition between judicial authorities, the physical transfer of a person under an EAW is still a process between two EU member states which are, as a whole, bound to observe the principle of proportionality. All their authorities, such as ministries of justice or the interior—where these are responsible for mutual legal assistance requests—should, therefore, be jointly expected to search for alternative solutions before choosing the heavy-handed option of extradition. Accordingly, if an alternative is available, under bilateral or multilateral arrangements between member states, this should be used before the EAW.
Amendment 79 would ensure that, if there are alternative mechanisms available to the issuing state, its failure to use them will always result in the refusal of the EAW, irrespective of the gravity of the offence or any other matter. The inclusion of the less coercive measures test appears to rest on the assumption that the step of issuing an EAW—which involves deprivation of liberty and serious human impact—should be taken as a last resort. The responsibility is on the issuing state to use less coercive measures if these are available. In the handbook on how to issue an EAW, to which I referred, the section on proportionality encourages the authority considering an EAW to use alternatives, including mutual legal assistance, videoconferencing or a summons. The logic that less restrictive alternatives should be used before issuing an EAW applies regardless of the seriousness of the allegation in question. The amendment therefore ensures that extradition is always considered disproportionate if other measures are available.
The case of Andrew Symeou demonstrates the need for it to be made clear that alternatives should be used in preference to the EAW, irrespective of the offence at issue. The Greek police and prosecution authorities could have made use of mutual legal assistance; for instance by asking UK authorities to obtain evidence from the witnesses who had allegedly incriminated Andrew. These witnesses would have been able to explain that they had been subject to police brutality and did not stand by their earlier evidence, which had been taken under pressure and without the assistance of an interpreter. Instead, the Greek authorities opted to have an EAW issued, requiring Andrew’s extradition to Greece to face trial for allegations which might have been found to be without basis much earlier if MLA had been used. The English court should have been able to refuse Andrew’s extradition on the ground that alternative measures were available. I beg to move.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, as my noble friend explained, his amendments in this group seek to widen yet further the proportionality bar to extradition in Part 1 cases. As I have already indicated, Clause 138 will allow the UK courts to deal with the long-standing issue of proportionality, which, as I have already said, is a fundamental principle of EU law.
Amendments 77, 79, 80 and 81 would require a judge to consider whether the requesting state has less coercive measures available to it. If so, the judge must bar extradition on proportionality grounds. However, even where such measures may exist, they may not be appropriate in each case, depending on the nature of the crime and other factors such as relevant previous criminal history. It would not be right to require a judge to bar extradition wherever less coercive measures are available. I therefore prefer the existing subsection (3)(c) of the new section inserted by Clause 138—to which my noble friend drew attention—which addresses the issue more attractively than the choice of words proposed in the amendment. That said, the existence of alternatives is clearly a relevant factor, and that is why the clause specifies that this is one of the factors that the judge must take into account when considering proportionality.
Amendment 87 to Clause 140 is consequential on the amendments to Clause 138. It would require a judge to conclude that less coercive measures were available if a person had made a request for temporary transfer, as envisaged by Clause 140, but the issuing state had refused that request unreasonably. This would mean that the judge would have to bar extradition on proportionality grounds. This would require our courts to make an assessment of the rationale of a decision made by the authorities in another member state. Given this, we do not think it appropriate automatically to link a decision not to agree to a temporary transfer with the consideration of proportionality. The EAW framework decision is clear that temporary transfer must be agreed by mutual consent, and it is therefore open to the issuing state to refuse a request, including the UK where we are seeking someone’s extradition to the UK.
“( ) In section 2 of that Act (Part 1 warrant and certificate), after subsection (7) there is inserted—
“(7A) But in the case of a Part 1 warrant containing the statement referred to in subsection (3), the designated authority must not issue a certificate under this section if it is clear to the designated authority that a judge proceeding under section 21A would be required to order the person’s discharge on the basis that extradition would be disproportionate.
In deciding that question, the designated authority must apply any general guidance issued for the purposes of this subsection.(7B) Any guidance under subsection (7A) may be revised, withdrawn or replaced.
(7C) The function of issuing guidance under subsection (7A), or of revising, withdrawing or replacing any such guidance, is exercisable by the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales with the concurrence of—
(a) the Lord Justice General of Scotland, and(b) the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland.””
Lord Rosser
My Lords, I will be brief with what has been described as my blunt instrument on Clause 141. I will not repeat the detailed arguments put by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbots. As he said, Amendments 88 and 90 seek to preserve the automatic right to appeal against an extradition order by deleting provisions in the clause that would make the ability to appeal against an order subject to obtaining the permission of the High Court. Essentially, it appears that the Government are now proposing to remove a key safeguard for individuals at risk of extradition by repealing the automatic right of appeal. We have real concerns about this change, which of course removes safeguards for UK citizens.
The automatic right of appeal is a key safeguard against the wrongful extradition of individuals, which allows them to raise new evidence that was not available at the time of the extradition hearing or to challenge the decision of the original judgment. It was surely this automatic right of appeal that allowed Gary McKinnon and his family to challenge the initial decision to extradite him to the US, leading ultimately to the decision not to extradite him at all. Without the right of appeal, he might have been extradited without any further consideration of the evidence, old or new, showing that extradition posed a serious risk to his right to life. Indeed, in the Statement that the Home Secretary made on 16 October 2012, she specifically referred to this issue when she said:
“After careful consideration of all of the relevant material, I have concluded that Mr McKinnon’s extradition would give rise to such a high risk of him ending his life that a decision to extradite would be incompatible with Mr McKinnon’s human rights”.—[Official Report, Commons, 16/10/12; col. 164.]
Yet, subject to what the Minister may say, the Government appear to be introducing changes to the Act that would mean that if a similar case occurred after this Bill had been passed, the Home Secretary would not be able to make the same decision.
Clause 141 amends Sections 26 and 108 of the 2003 Act to provide that an appeal will lie only with permission from the High Court, and no indication is given in the Bill of what criteria will be used to decide whether permission should be granted. I hope that the Minister will be able to indicate the reason for the Bill being so vague over an issue—namely, the criteria—that could have significant human rights consequences. What in fact do the Government expect the criteria to be, do they expect them to be evidence-based and will they be available for scrutiny? What impact do the Government believe any likely criteria will have on the number of cases able to be appealed?
Once an individual has been extradited, of course, there is virtually nothing that can be done if new evidence arises to show that that was not the appropriate or fair decision and was contrary to the interests of justice or their human rights. Does the Minister not agree that, because of that, it is crucial that people effectively have an automatic right to appeal against a decision to be extradited, or at least some other means of ensuring that justice is done, and that we do not end up in a situation which, frankly, does our own extradition system no credit?
I cannot vouch for this personally, but Liberty says that extradition experts are of the view that a large number of cases that have been successful on appeal probably would not have been granted leave under the Bill. Removing the right of automatic appeal will potentially have considerable human rights and legal implications. If the Minister cannot offer some movement on this issue when he replies tonight, I hope that he will at least be able to explain why the Government appear to be taking such a major backwards step, having previously placed such emphasis on their concern for Gary MacKinnon’s human rights.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, as my noble friend has explained, Clause 141 makes the right of appeal against a decision to order extradition subject to the leave of the High Court. Similarly, it makes the requesting state’s right of appeal against a decision to discharge a person from extradition proceedings subject to the leave of the High Court. Clause 141 also allows the requested person to make an application for leave to appeal out of time in certain circumstances. This does not apply to the requesting state.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, using his blunt instrument, gives me the opportunity to broaden the debate beyond the immediate amendments and explain how this process will work and why the Government feel justified in introducing Clause 141. My noble friend Lord Hodgson, in tabling his Amendments 88 and 90, challenges us on why we are making these changes. At present, a person has an automatic right of appeal against a decision to order his or her extradition, and the requesting state also has an automatic right of appeal against a decision not to order extradition—an important factor to bear in mind.
As noble Lords are aware, the Government commissioned a review by Sir Scott Baker of the UK’s extradition arrangements. One of the key findings of his review was that the success rate of appeals was extremely low: less than 13% in 2010. In other words, the court system is burdened by unmeritorious appeals, a fact to which my noble friend Lord Hodgson referred, which then delay hearings for all appellants and means that justice is deferred. Clause 141 addresses this problem by making appeals subject to permission from the High Court. This filter applies to appeals against, for example, a judge’s decision to order extradition to a Part 1 territory, that is, another member state; a judge’s decision to send a case to the Secretary of State to consider extradition in Part 2 cases, that is, where the requesting country is not an EU member state; and to a decision by the Secretary of State to order extradition in Part 2 cases. To provide parity, it also applies to appeals against decisions to discharge a person.
My noble friend Lord Hodgson asked what sort of issues a court would consider in deciding whether to allow an application to be heard. This will be, as one would expect, a matter for the judge concerned. They will, of course, give full consideration to all the relevant factors raised by the appellant before reaching a decision. We do not think that they are appropriate to be set out in legislation, as it is a matter for the court itself to consider. I understand that noble Lords will have questions about what safeguards will be available. Let me reassure noble Lords that this provision does not prevent anyone from applying for permission to appeal. Once an application has been made, the High Court will decide which cases proceed to a hearing, but each application will be considered by a High Court judge. Furthermore, Clause 141 sets out that the High Court must not refuse to entertain an application for leave to appeal by the requested person solely because it has been submitted outside the normal time period, if the person did everything reasonably possible to ensure that the notice was given as soon as it could be.
That point brings me to the matters that my noble friend Lord Hodgson raised in relation to this in his Amendments 88A, 89, 91 and 92. My noble friend proposes to amend Clause 141 to insert a requirement for the courts to allow an appeal to be made out of time if it is in the interests of justice to do so. As I said, Clause 141 allows the High Court to hear an out-of-time appeal where the person has done everything reasonably possible to bring the appeal as soon as possible. Our approach follows that of the Supreme Court, which ruled last year that out-of-time appeals should only be considered exceptionally. We believe that this provision gets the balance right: the timetable for an appeal is clear and there must be an onus on an appellant to meet the statutory requirements, as happens in the vast majority of cases.
My noble friend is also proposing to extend the time limit for appeals in Part 1 cases from seven days to 14 days. As he has explained, this was one of the recommendations that Sir Scott Baker made in his review of our extradition arrangements. We have therefore considered it very carefully in developing the provisions in the Bill. Our view is that extending the time limit in this way would have no practical effect beyond increasing the likelihood for delay. As I said, we have introduced new protections where people are unable to submit their appeals on time through no fault of their own. We believe that this new provision will address the concerns raised by my noble friend, and indeed by Sir Scott Baker, on this issue.
What safeguards will exist under these new provisions? We do not believe that we are removing any existing safeguards. We need to get the balance right between ensuring proper protection for those subject to an extradition request while ensuring that people do not delay their proper surrender by burdening the courts with unmeritorious appeals. We believe that this approach gets these matters right. The court itself will decide the issues and the relevance of any out-of-time considerations.
The changes set out in Clause 141 will allow the courts to focus their attention on the right appeals, removing the burden of unmeritorious appeals while ensuring that proper safeguards are in place for those subject to extradition. I commend the clause to the Committee and I hope that my noble friend will be prepared to withdraw his amendment, and that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, will see the merit in the clause.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts
I am grateful to my noble friend for that fulsome reply. I am disappointed that the Government have not seen fit to follow up the Scott Baker proposal for 14 days instead of seven days, given the complexity of the appeal process, particularly when linked to the additional steps that the Government are taking to introduce prohibitions on and difficulties in getting an appeal process going in the first place. Obviously, however, this is not the time to take the argument further. I look forward to reading with care in Hansard tomorrow what the Minister has said. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts
My Lords, Amendment 94, which is concerned with mistaken identity, and Amendment 95 would insert two new clauses into the Bill. Amendment 94 would enable the judge at the extradition hearing—whether it is a prosecution or a conviction warrant—to request more information where there is a real doubt as to whether the person sought is actually the person suspected or convicted. This would be particularly valuable in cases where there is a reasonable belief that the person sought has had his or her identity stolen or where there is a clear case of mistaken identity. In these days of cybercrime, the former is an increasingly common occurrence.
There are currently no grounds in domestic law on which to refuse extradition where there are serious doubts about whether the person sought is the person who committed the crime or is suspected to have committed the crime. Such a situation has arisen in several cases where the person subject to the EAW has had their identity stolen by the real perpetrator or where that perpetrator has identified someone else as the person who committed the offence.
This is demonstrated by the case of Edmond Arapi, who was tried and convicted in his absence in Italy and given a sentence of 16 years. He had no idea that he was wanted for a crime or that the trial or subsequent appeal had taken place until he was arrested at Gatwick Airport in 2009 on an EAW on his way back from a family holiday. The British courts ordered that Edmond be sent to serve the sentence in Italy, despite clear proof that he was at work in the UK on the day of the alleged offence. On the day that the High Court was due to hear his appeal against extradition, the Italian authorities decided to withdraw the EAW following a campaign, admitting that they had sought Edmond in error. He narrowly avoided being separated from his wife and children, including a newborn son, and spending months or years in an Italian prison awaiting a retrial. This amendment is needed to give courts greater discretion to request further information where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person sought under an EAW is the victim of mistaken or stolen identity.
Amendment 95 seeks to clarify the approach that a judge should follow in relation to human rights and provide a stronger basis on which to refuse to execute an EAW on human rights grounds. Many have argued that the underlying assumption of the EAW system—that other Part 1 territories can always be trusted to respect the fundamental rights of those extradited—rests on shaky foundations. For instance, it has been reported that in the years 2007 to 2012, Greece violated Article 6(1) of the ECHR 93 times in criminal cases.
Garry Mann, giving evidence to the Home Affairs Committee, described his 2004 trial in Portugal as follows, stating that,
“the police … just told me it was some kind of public order offence … we went into court and there were 12 of us … we had one interpreter … she would try to say something and pass it down the line of 12, but we did not understand what was going on at all … They asked me what I thought in broken English, but again the judge and the lawyer did not speak much English … I never knew the charge that I was facing until 30 minutes before I was convicted at 11.30 that night … They said there was no time to call any witnesses. I said I would like CCTV; no time to call CCTV”.
An English court later called on to issue a football banning order against Garry refused, finding that the trial had not complied with Article 6 of the ECHR.
The courts have, however, given very short shrift to arguments alleging that extradition would lead to a violation of human rights. In accordance with the concept of mutual trust, on which the operation of the EAW is based, the courts assume that the issuing state will protect the extradited person against any unfairness and that past proceedings giving rise to convictions on which EAWs are based were fair. A person must show that they are at risk of a “flagrant” breach of their fair trial rights in order to resist extradition. The approach is difficult to sustain when there are ongoing systematic deficiencies in a justice system, which are liable to impact upon an extradited person. For instance, the European Court of Human Rights recently found Italy in violation of Article 3 of the ECHR and applied its pilot judgment procedure, recognising that widespread overcrowding was leading to systematic infringements of Article 3. The concept of mutual trust is difficult to defend in such circumstances. If an extradited person is going to be detained in the same prison, it is plainly likely that their human rights will be infringed.
The Government have taken the view that the EAW framework decision implicitly allows refusal to execute an EAW on human rights grounds, relying on recital 12 and Article 1(3) of the framework decision, which affirm that the latter shall not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles, as recognised by Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union and reflected in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. However, the precise content of those fundamental rights obligations is not clear. In her opinion on the Radu case, Advocate-General Sharpston suggested that, under the charter, the test was whether there was a “substantially well founded risk” of a violation which would,
“fundamentally destroy the fairness of the trial”,
a slightly different test from the ECHR flagrancy test. However, for the time being, the precise requirements of fundamental rights are not defined in EU legislation. Accordingly the member states enjoy some discretion to apply fundamental rights as they understand them, provided that this does not compromise the unity and effectiveness of EU law. This amendment therefore falls within the permissible bounds of the EAW framework decision. I beg to move.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, the additional safeguards that my noble friend has proposed through Amendment 94 seek to introduce matters of mistaken identity. It is not something that we believe is necessary. Clearly, we do not want the wrong people to be extradited; the wider issues relating to identity were carefully considered during the review of the UK’s extradition arrangements. Sir Scott Baker did not find any evidence that a person who was subjected to mistaken identity had actually been surrendered to stand trial. He concluded that there was no need to amend the Act to require a judge to request further information concerning the requesting person’s identity. Nor did the Metropolitan Police, the Crown Prosecution Service or the Crown Office raise concerns about the issue.
I agree with expert opinion and I am not persuaded that a change is needed here. My noble friend asked about the case of Mr Arapi—I will try to avoid talking about particular cases—but, as my noble friend will be aware, Mr Arapi was not extradited and the Italian authorities admitted their error in making the request for him rather than another person of the same name. In his review, Sir Scott Baker found that no amendment was needed to the protections already afforded in the Act with regard to identity as there are already sufficient procedures in place to protect people who are sought as a result of mistaken identity.
The amendment raises the particular issue of a judge being clear that the person who has been arrested and appears in court is the person who is alleged to have committed the crime. This goes to the heart of the trial in the issuing stage. It is not a matter for the UK courts. The courts’ consideration of an extradition request is not one of guilt or innocence but of whether any of the statutory bars to extradition apply.
Turning to Amendment 95, my noble friend seeks to make changes to a judge’s consideration of human rights in EAW cases, including expanding the matters to which the judge should have regard when considering whether extradition would breach a person’s human rights.
We believe that there are already sufficient safeguards in the Extradition Act to allow a judge to bar extradition on human rights grounds. The 2003 Act is drafted to allow the courts to give the fullest possible consideration to human rights issues. We discussed this matter in earlier deliberations in Committee. In all cases, the judge must decide whether extradition would be compatible with the convention rights and must discharge the person if he or she decides that it would not be compatible.
In his review of the UK’s extradition procedures, Sir Scott Baker found that the human rights bar to extradition did not need amending. The review found that the bar did not permit injustice or oppression, and the Government agree with that assessment. We do not accept that a judge’s approach to human rights needs to be changed.
In conclusion, I am very grateful to my noble friend for giving the Committee this opportunity to consider various aspects of Part 12 of the Bill.
Lord Lamont of Lerwick (Con)
Am I not right in saying that the European Commission has been quite critical of some of the new entrants into the EU’s legal systems and has instanced poor training of judges and problems of corruption? As long as the criticisms continue to be made, does not my noble friend’s amendment have a real point, or is the Minister saying that the human rights considerations that he has been talking about would cover that instance?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
The European arrest warrant provisions are indeed Europe-wide, so they cover a number of different jurisdictions. None the less, proportionality and human rights considerations are written throughout these particular parts of the Bill. As I said, Sir Scott Baker investigated this. He felt that the human rights bar to extradition did not permit injustice, if it was believed to exist, or oppression, and the Government agree with that assessment. I hope that I have satisfied my noble friend and that he will accept that the Government are not operating this mutual extradition facility which the European arrest warrant provides for in a way which is unreasonable to people who are subject to extradition requests.
Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)
Perhaps I may assist the Minister in replying to the question that has been raised. Recently, the Supreme Court had to consider a case where an individual was being sought to be extradited to Albania. The court was told that there was a high degree of corruption among the judges and the extradition was stayed so that the degree of corruption could be investigated further. The matter is now in the hands of the Lord Advocate in Scotland. That is an example of the kind of phenomenon to which the noble Lord referred—where the standards in one of the new countries are not up to the standards that one might expect. However, I suggest that the courts are very astute in ensuring that the human rights protection in relation to a fair trial is preserved. That is a very recent example which I think meets the point that the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, had in mind.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
Not for the first time, I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, for his intervention in this matter. I should say that Albania is not a member of the European Union at this stage. However, the principle applies, as the noble and learned Lord said. Section 21 of the existing Act already requires the judge to be satisfied that extradition is compatible with the human rights convention, and that includes the right to a fair trial. Therefore, that already exists in law.
In conclusion, I am grateful to my noble friend for giving the Committee an opportunity to consider various aspects of Part 12 of the Bill. On a number of the issues he has raised, I think that we share the same policy objectives, and in such cases where we have differences between us, they may well simply be a matter of drafting. Having had this important debate and in the light of my comments, I hope that my noble friend will agree to withdraw his amendment. If, on reading the record, he finds that there are still aspects with which he is concerned, I hope that he will not hesitate to raise them with me.
“Discount on sentence for time spent in custody awaiting extradition: Scotland
(1) Section 210 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (consideration of time spent in custody) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1)—
(a) in paragraph (a), after “United Kingdom” there is inserted “otherwise than from a category 1 territory”;(b) in paragraph (c)(ii), for “for the purposes of this section” there is substituted “who was extradited to the United Kingdom otherwise than from a category 1 territory”.(3) After subsection (1) there is inserted—
“(1A) Subsection (1B) applies where—
(a) a court is passing a sentence of imprisonment or detention on a person for an offence, and(b) the person is an extradited prisoner who was extradited to the United Kingdom from a category 1 territory.(1B) The court shall specify—
(a) the period of time spent in custody awaiting extradition, and(b) the date of commencement of the sentence in accordance with subsection (1C). (1C) The date of commencement of the sentence is to be a date the relevant number of days earlier than the date the sentence would have commenced had the person not spent time in custody awaiting extradition.
(1D) In subsection (1C), “the relevant number of days” means the number of days in the period specified under subsection (1B)(a).”
(4) After subsection (2) there is inserted—
“(2A) In this section, “category 1 territory” means a territory designated under the Extradition Act 2003 for the purposes of Part 1 of that Act.”
(5) Subsection (3) is repealed.”
“(8) But subsection (7) does not apply if the statutory instrument only adjusts a fee to reflect changes in the value of money.”
“Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (c. 60)(1) Schedule 2A to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (fingerprinting and samples: power to require attendance at police station) is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph 1 (fingerprinting: persons arrested and released)—
(a) in sub-paragraph (2), for “section 61(5A)(b)” there is substituted “section 61(5A)(b)(i)”;(b) after sub-paragraph (3) there is inserted—“(4) The power under sub-paragraph (1) above may not be exercised in a case falling within section 61(5A)(b)(ii) (fingerprints destroyed where investigation interrupted) after the end of the period of six months beginning with the day on which the investigation was resumed.” (3) In paragraph 2 (fingerprinting: persons charged etc)—
(a) in sub-paragraph (2)(b), for “section 61(5B)(b)” there is substituted “section 61(5B)(b)(i)”;(b) at the end of sub-paragraph (2) there is inserted “, or(c) in a case falling within section 61(5B)(b)(ii) (fingerprints destroyed where investigation interrupted), the day on which the investigation was resumed.”(4) In paragraph 9 (non-intimate samples: persons arrested and released)—
(a) in sub-paragraph (2), for “within section 63(3ZA)(b)” there is substituted “within section 63(3ZA)(b)(i) or (ii)”;(b) after sub-paragraph (3) there is inserted—“(4) The power under sub-paragraph (1) above may not be exercised in a case falling within section 63(3ZA)(b)(iii) (sample, and any DNA profile, destroyed where investigation interrupted) after the end of the period of six months beginning with the day on which the investigation was resumed.”(5) In paragraph 10 (non-intimate samples: persons charged etc)—
(a) in sub-paragraph (3), for “within section 63(3A)(b)” there is substituted “within section 63(3A)(b)(i) or (ii)”;(b) after sub-paragraph (4) there is inserted—“(5) The power under sub-paragraph (1) above may not be exercised in a case falling within section 63(3A)(b)(iii) (sample, and any DNA profile, destroyed where investigation interrupted) after the end of the period of six months beginning with the day on which the investigation was resumed.””
( ) an order under section 4(5),( ) an order under section 50(4), or( ) an”
“( ) sections (Information about guests at hotels believed to be used for child sexual exploitation) to (Offences);”
Visas: Artists and Entertainers
Lord Taylor of Holbeach Excerpts(10 years, 5 months ago)
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The Earl of Clancarty
To ask Her Majesty’s Government whether they have plans to improve the official information available, including on the United Kingdom Border Agency website, for long- and short-term visitors to the United Kingdom, and in particular artists and entertainers.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)
My Lords, on 21 November Visa4UK, the UK’s online visa application system for overseas customers, was upgraded to make applications easier to complete. The content of the former UKBA’s website will be transferred to gov.uk by the end of March 2014. Those measures will make immediate improvements to the online customer experience for all users, including the artists and entertainers mentioned by the noble Earl in his Question.
The Earl of Clancarty (CB)
I thank the Minister for that helpful reply but does he realise that the official artists and entertainers information is out of date and does not include the permitted paid engagements scheme the Government introduced to improve the system? Can something be done more quickly to ensure that those planning to visit this country have access to the most up-to-date information at all times? They cannot wait on UKBA reorganisation.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, this is well recognised by us and we regret that the publication of the revised leaflet, of which the noble Earl will be well aware, has been delayed. We plan to publish the revised leaflet in the next few weeks on the existing website. It will move in due course to gov.uk as part of the wider web content migration. We are grateful for the contribution made by the noble Earl and representatives of the arts sector in developing the leaflet and for their helpful feedback on immigration systems for artists and entertainers.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, is my noble friend the Minister aware of the case of the singer and composer Pamela Z, who came from San Francisco on a PPE visa on the invitation of Sussex University and City University, London? She was held by UKBA at Gatwick for more than three hours and eventually allowed to enter only on the extraordinary condition that she could teach at Sussex but not perform at City University. Can my noble friend clarify whether non-EU performing artists invited on these visas by higher education institutes can both teach and perform? Indeed, perhaps he can tell us how to distinguish between the two on every occasion.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My noble friend makes a very good point. In fact, I have had some briefing on this incident and I am grateful that it has been drawn to our attention. We suspect that a deficiency in the guidance of the operation of the rules rather than the rules themselves led to this incident. I do not want to go into a lot of detail about a particular circumstance but my noble friend’s comments have not gone unnoticed.
Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)
My Lords, this is a bit of a shambles and it is also becoming highly embarrassing for the UK. Towards the end of last week a London concert by the Pakistani Sachal Jazz Ensemble was cancelled because of visa problems. The residents of New York had enjoyed packed performances at the Lincoln Center just the week before but the musicians had problems getting visas to come to the UK. A Home Office statement today says:
“Britain is open for business and genuine visitors and tourists coming here to enjoy our world class attractions, study or do business are always welcome”.
It does not appear like that to those artists and performers who are having great problems getting to this country to perform, so our citizens are denied the opportunity to see them whereas American citizens have not been. Can the noble Lord give this urgent attention? I am sorry to say that his answers so far sound slightly complacent.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I hope the noble Baroness will never assume that I am complacent about anything. I am well briefed on this subject too and this incident. It is part of our commitment to work with those putting on concerts and international events to ensure that they are aware of the visa application process. However, the responsibility to have the correct visas rests with people coming here and guidance is available on the website to help them before they travel. As with any other visitors to the UK, we expect individuals to meet our entry requirements. I can say no more than that.
The Lord Bishop of Truro
My Lords, I do not wish to argue that all clergy are entertainers as that would not be true in my experience. But can the Minister comment on the frustration felt again and again by Christian people—clergy and others, especially from Africa—who are invited by dioceses in this country with expenses guaranteed? They have to travel long distances and are not always able to access websites to apply for a visa and are then faced with delay or refusal based on the assumption that they will not return home to their families and responsibilities.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I am sure the right reverend Prelate will be aware of the responsibility on all Border Agency staff to deal judiciously with these matters. However, they can act only on the information that they have when people present themselves for entry. I hope that the new website will make it much easier for everybody to come here. If anybody is organising an event which involves people coming from overseas, they have an opportunity, in a spirit of partnership, to make sure that everybody is aware of the documentation they require. There is no difficulty getting that documentation provided the application is made.
Lord Rowe-Beddoe (CB)
My Lords, will the Minister take a look at the Russian situation? Next year—2014—is designated the UK-Russia Year of Culture. At the first meeting of the joint Russian-British committee, we were informed by the Russian ambassador that considerable trouble and expense are involved in getting Russian artists over here to perform. As we are about to embark on a joint year of culture, as I said, perhaps he will be kind enough to look at this.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I am very happy to pass that message on within the Home Office. I recognise the importance of Russian art and culture in many art forms, not least music. We have made enormous strides in our relationship with China, another country with a large number of potential visitors, and we hope that that will set a useful precedent for arrangements we can make with Russia.
Immigration: Detention
Lord Taylor of Holbeach Excerpts(10 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Roberts of Llandudno
To ask Her Majesty’s Government whether, in the light of the case of Mr Isa Muazu, they will clarify their policy in relation to the detention of immigration detainees who are seriously ill and refuse food and fluids.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)
My Lords, a refusal to eat or drink will not automatically mean that a person should be released from immigration detention. This position has been upheld by the courts. On 19 November, Mr Justice Ouseley said that he did not accept the suggestion that the Secretary of State had adopted a hardline policy of saying that there would be no release for this claimant who was refusing food and fluid. He went on to say that the decision to start, maintain and continue the refusal of food and fluids to the end was for the claimant to make, adding that,
“his detention does not become unlawful simply because he is determined on that outcome”.
Lord Roberts of Llandudno (LD)
My Lords, the Minister may be aware that last week I received an assurance from the Home Secretary that landing arrangements had been made in Nigeria. Something went seriously wrong. Why did the Government attempt to remove a dying man at such human and financial cost, and will the Minister give us an assurance today that Mr Muazu will not be deported in his present condition? Will he also instigate an immediate review into immigration detention and end such routine and inhumane treatment, always remembering that asylum seekers—even failed asylum seekers—are human beings just like us and deserve deep respect?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, it may help the House if I update noble Lords on the current situation concerning Mr Muazu. The welfare of detainees is our highest priority. While refusing food and fluids, Mr Muazu was continually offered medical treatment, including patient care at hospital, which, until recently, he continually refused. Mr Muazu is regularly monitored. The latest assessment—I had a report this morning—shows that he is eating and drinking well and is mobile, and that he continues to be fit to fly.
Lord Dubs (Lab)
My Lords, given that Mr Muazu was sent back on a plane and that the Government had failed to alert the Nigerian authorities about the arrival of that plane, what did the Government think was going to happen to Mr Muazu if he landed there? Were any arrangements made to look after him, given that at that point his health was very precarious?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, Mr Muazu’s flight to Nigeria on Friday returned to the UK for operational reasons which were not connected to his health or conduct. I assure noble Lords that a member of the Nigerian high commission was on that flight.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, does the Minister believe that it was a sensible use of resources to charter an aircraft to remove a single individual from this country, as in the case of Mr Muazu?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
The operational practices are not a matter that I want to discuss particularly but this case has great public interest. It is not the first time that an aircraft has been chartered for this purpose. It might help noble Lords to know that the number of enforced removals in 2008 was 17,200-odd and last year it was 14,600-odd. However, voluntary removals went up from 18,000 to 29,663 last year.
Lord Tebbit (Con)
My Lords, are not all so-called detainees free to leave the so-called detention centre at any time, but only through the door marked “home” and not through the door marked “United Kingdom”? Should our noble friend Lord Roberts not make his complaint to the Nigerian authorities, which refused to accept one of their own citizens back home?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I will not comment on the latter point but, obviously, the Government’s policy is that when people are here and they have no permission to remain they should depart voluntarily.
Baroness Williams of Crosby (LD)
Does my noble friend agree that someone being deported should at least be physically able to sustain their health during the flight? Does he further agree that there should be some contact with the Government of the country to which a person is returning to ensure that a man who is seriously ill will be met at the airport and taken to suitable accommodation to enable him to survive?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I think that my noble friend’s allegations about the condition of Mr Muazu at the time he was flying back to Nigeria are inaccurate. As I have said, he is currently fit to fly. He is eating and drinking, and is mobile.
Lord Tomlinson (Lab)
Does the Minister accept that the Government’s policy of trying to reduce the net immigration figure from hundreds of thousands to tens of thousands is in tatters? Does he not share my regret that Mr Cameron had to go to China to slip it out in an answer there?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I am sorry that the noble Lord takes that view. I am normally a consensual politician but I have to say that the record of the current Opposition when they were in Government was that net immigration rose by more than 2 million. That was out of control. The current situation is that this Government are taking steps to ensure that there are proper controls on immigration to this country, which I hope are supported by this House and, indeed, by noble Lords opposite. They can be difficult. The responsibility in a case such as this is not easy. Many noble Lords on both sides of this House have been faced with that responsibility. We should not shirk from that situation.
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Lord Taylor of Holbeach Excerpts(10 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Rosser (Lab)
My Lords, I will be brief. My noble friend Lady Henig indicated that this is a probing amendment which has been tabled as there are doubts about whether undertakings given previously still stand. In view of the obvious importance of this issue, which is clear from the contributions made to this debate, we shall certainly listen with interest to the Minister’s answer.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)
I thank noble Lords for their contributions and for the concise way in which they have addressed this important issue. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, for presenting these amendments—not that I am going to accept them—as the SIA is one of my departmental responsibilities within the Home Office. She mentioned commitments that I made last year at the annual general meeting of the SIA. I made similar commitments by video link; unfortunately, I could not be there as I was dealing with a Bill and could not be in two places at the same time.
I reiterate our commitment to the SIA. No one knows more than the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, how important that body is, given her distinguished service as its chairman. We also appreciate the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington, on the importance of business licensing for the development of the industry. We are at one in that aim and we have not been idle on this issue. There has been a public consultation on the process and we have published the Government’s response to it. As the noble Baroness may know, we do not need primary legislation —we do not need to put anything in the Bill—to introduce business licensing. It would be introduced by secondary legislation and would cover issues such as door supervision, security guarding, cash and valuables in transit, close protection, CCTV and public surveillance, and key holding—the traditional areas. However, noble Lords will be aware that one of the consequences of the Leveson report is that private investigators should also come within the ambit of the regulatory body—the SIA. Therefore, there is a lot to do. I reassure my noble friend Lady Harris of Richmond that we are still very much on target.
I turn to the amendments. Amendment 56QA seeks to link the application of the complaints and misconduct framework overseen by the IPCC to SIA-regulated businesses. As the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, said, the police work with the private sector on many different aspects of their work, many of which are outside the security industry and, as such, it was never the intention that the provisions of the Private Security Industry Act would apply. I shall describe the sorts of thing that I am talking about. These include, for example, call handlers in police control rooms or inquiry office staff. In addition, forensic science work, which is, of course, integral to the police service, is regulated by the forensic science regulator, and would be excluded.
The intention behind Clause 121 is to ensure that the oversight of complaints and conduct matters by the IPCC extends to all private contractors, subcontractors and their employees carrying out functions for the police where those functions have been traditionally carried out by police officers and police staff, so that where there has been a move towards the civilianisation of police functions, these should be covered. Police forces are increasingly entering into contracts with private sector organisations—I come from Lincolnshire, a county which probably pioneered that—many of which fall outside the SIA-regulated regime, but which should, none the less, be subject to investigation by the IPCC for wrongdoing. I think that the public would rightly expect this to be the case.
Amendment 95ZA raises similar issues in the context of the transit through the UK of people being extradited from one country to another. Again, I understand the noble Baroness’s concern to prevent untrained and potentially unsuitable individuals being given delegated authority for facilitating these transits.
Although I agree with the intention behind the amendment, I believe that we can achieve all this through other, more workable means. I say that because the Government plan to amend this clause in recognition of similar concerns raised by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee—namely, that the power to specify descriptions of those who might in future facilitate the transit through the UK of persons being extradited from and to another country is cast in wide terms. The committee felt that this should be seen in the context of the powers of authorised officers, which include the power to detain persons in custody, and therefore that the delegated power should either be circumscribed in the Bill or subject to the affirmative procedure.
We have listened to the views of the committee and, in response, have tabled an amendment which will apply the affirmative resolution procedure to this order-making power. This will mean that the only categories of persons able to undertake escort duties will be those approved by both Houses. An example of the type of persons who might undertake this escort role is Border Force officials. Whoever is empowered to carry out the role will be subject to the extradition codes of practice, which are based on the equivalent PACE provisions. I hope that the noble Baroness will be reassured that there will be proper oversight and scrutiny of those who undertake quasi-police functions and exercise police powers, and that she will be content to withdraw her amendment.
In relation to the SIA, the Private Security Industry Act 2001, which underpins the SIA’s regulatory activities, specifically states that licensing requirements do not apply to activities carried out by a detainee custody officer and a prison custody officer, both as defined by the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. Therefore, the effect of this amendment would be to create conflicting legislation, with a question as to which Act was supposed to apply to these people. The SIA currently has no remit for regulating this type of activity; nor is it the Government’s intention for it to do so in the future.
I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Henig—I keep thinking of her as “my noble friend”, although, according to the traditions of the House, I should not call her that—will accept my commitment on business licensing and on the determination of the Government to continue their policy objective of advancing the interests of the SIA. We see it as developing an increasingly important role in public protection in this country.
Baroness Henig
I thank the Minister for his response. I listened very carefully and particularly took note of the points that he made about escorting for extradition proceedings. However, I am somewhat disappointed with some of the general points that he made. He said that the Government had not been idle. Three years have passed and nothing has happened. I do not know what definition of “idleness” the Minister is using but in my book three years is quite a long time for nothing to happen. He assured the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, that the Government were very much on target. However, they clearly are not on target, because both the Minister and the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, said that this whole process was going to be completed by the end of this year. Therefore, how can he say that the Government are very much on target when they patently are not? I am sorry but that is not very reassuring.
There was mention of secondary legislation. I have to say to the Minister that the problem with secondary legislation is that there cannot be a range of enforcement mechanisms; nor can there be appropriate sanctions. The industry has made it clear that to have business licensing without appropriate enforcement mechanisms is a recipe for disaster. It means that the good companies will go along with things and the bad companies will not face any sanctions. To businesses, that is a worse prospect than no legislation. They are very alarmed about that secondary legislation.
I know that businesses will be very disappointed with the Minister’s response. He has offered nothing. He has offered no assurances and has not said that the Government will bring anything back. We have here very appropriate legislation for something far more substantive. I have some sympathy for the Minister who I think would like to move further. I am quite sure that the problems are not necessarily in the Home Office but in other parts of government. None the less, the industry is disappointed because the opportunity is here to take a big step towards what it wants and what obviously would be of benefit to the public, but it is not being taken. I understand, and I sympathise with the fact, that industry leaders, probably even today, have made it clear that they will withdraw from a lot of co-operation with the Home Office because of the disappointment and frustration that they feel at the Government’s inability to take this forward. For the life of me, I cannot understand the problem with going ahead with business licensing in a proper manner through primary legislation.
At this stage, I am happy to withdraw this probing amendment but some of us may want to look at this issue again to see whether there are amendments that we could table on Report, which perhaps might find a more favourable response. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, these government amendments implement the recommendation of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in relation to Clause 126. They ensure that there is parliamentary scrutiny of any decisions to designate countries, police forces and ranks under that clause. It is entirely appropriate, given its role, that the College of Policing should play a central part in the designation process, so the clause continues to require the Home Secretary to act only after receiving its recommendation. It will remain up to the Home Secretary whether she implements the college’s designations. However, by putting the designations in secondary legislation subject to the negative resolution procedure, we are ensuring that there is an appropriate opportunity for Parliament to consider them. I commend these amendments to the Committee.
For the time being, I will listen to what the noble Lord, Lord Blair, has to say about his amendment, which is in this group, before I respond to the debate that is likely to follow.
Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)
My Lords, I draw the attention of the House to my registered interests in relation to policing. Amendment 105 stands not only in my name but also in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Condon, and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller. The noble Baroness is not able to be in your Lordships’ House today and has asked me to present her apologies for that. However, I am in a position to say that she remains in firm support of this amendment. Amendment 105 is not affected by, nor affects in any specific terms, the other amendments in this group put forward by the Minister. It is not an amendment to Clause 126 but is about Clause 126. It is actually an addition to the Bill’s last clause, Clause 160—the enactment clause—and can be found at the end of today’s Marshalled List. I am grateful to the Minister for his part in arranging to have it debated now as it is related not to the whole Bill, nor even to the enactment of the whole Bill, but only to the enactment of Section 126.
The amendment is triggered by concerns about how the opening of senior UK police posts will affect those few police chief officer posts that are deeply concerned with UK national security and intelligence. It suggests that the Government should seek the advice of the Intelligence and Security Committee about this point before Section 126 is enacted.
After that, the first thing to say is that neither the noble Lord, Lord Condon—who will be speaking later —nor I have any objections in principle to the appointment of senior officers from abroad, notably those from Commonwealth countries, to UK police positions. That would be hypocritical in that senior UK officers have reasonably often and recently commanded police forces in Commonwealth countries, including Australia.
However, it is pertinent to note that no UK officer has ever been considered to command the Australian Federal Police or for appointment to be director of the FBI or the commissioner of the NYPD for a particular reason. Those posts are concerned with the national security of the United States or Australia, and the postholders routinely share secret intelligence with their national security services. Here our amendment comes to the point. There are similar posts in the UK. There are senior police officers intricately involved in the security and intelligence arrangements of the UK. The amendment picks out four of them and seeks to understand how the Government foresee that these posts can be held by non-UK citizens. It is not easy to see how that would be possible.
The first two of the four we have selected are: the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, who is responsible to the Home Secretary for overall national co-ordination of police counterterrorism activity in the whole of the UK, excluding Northern Ireland; and the deputy commissioner, who holds the full powers and duties of the commissioner in the absence of him or her. That is why these two posts alone are royal appointments on the recommendation of the Home Secretary and are not appointed and never have been by a police authority, the police and crime commissioner or even the Mayor of London.
The third post is one of the currently four assistant commissioners of the Met currently described as assistant commissioner specialist operations, appointed by the commissioner to have full-time, day-to-day responsibility for national counterterrorism policing and liaison with the security services. As an assistant commissioner, he or she—it is currently a she—is one of the most senior chief constables in the UK. He or she chairs the ACPO committee on terrorism, ex officio, and has executive jurisdiction throughout the UK except for Northern Ireland. Counterterrorism is not a devolved matter. General policing is, but not counterterrorism, which is what makes these posts so special.
The fourth post is that of the director-general of the new National Crime Agency. We have included this post partially because the NCA has been selected recently by the Government as a potential successor to hold the Met’s current CT responsibilities. But in any event, he or she will already handle secret material in relation to organised crime and child pornography, both of which have significant international dimensions.
All these postholders must be security cleared to the very high level known as developed vetting. The first requirement for DV, as it is known, is that, as far as I and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, can recall, the individual must be a UK citizen and must have lived in the UK for a decade. If that is not true or has been changed, it would be useful to know, so I hope the Minister can tell the Committee.
It is extremely difficult to imagine these postholders being able to carry out their roles without access to the full range of CT intelligence, which a person will not have if they are not DVed. Furthermore, particularly in the case of a US rather than perhaps a Commonwealth citizen, it is possible that a foreign postholder would inevitably have mixed allegiances. Many counterterrorist operations are highly international and fast moving, being briefed upwards to Prime Ministers and Presidents. It is inevitable that, during a near crisis, different Governments will have different security priorities at different times. COBRA, in which the commissioner and the assistant commissioner specialist operations sit, battles with this regularly.
The noble Lord, Lord Condon, will return to this matter. He will also speak about the fact that the Metropolitan Police Commissioner is responsible for the protection of the monarch and her heirs and successors, as well as the Prime Minister, some Ministers and some foreign ambassadors. We understand that appointments like these will not be undertaken lightly and that they will be political—in the best use of the word—decisions involving senior Ministers. The Government have a clear duty to lay out what mechanisms they would use to mitigate the difficulties I have outlined. In the second section of the amendment we make a proposal which provides a parliamentary solution to the problem. This suggests a delay to the enactment of Clause 126—and only that clause—until such time as the Secretary of State has sought and received advice from the Intelligence and Security Committee on the viability of appointing foreign nationals to these four posts and has ensured that the committee’s findings have been laid before both Houses of Parliament.
This is not a frivolous amendment. It is about a very serious national security issue. The fact that all four noble Lords who have held the office of Metropolitan Police Commissioner are sitting here at this time of night is an indication that there may be something we need to consider. There are no vacancies at present in any of these four posts. A referral to the ISC would create no delay. If that is not what the Government wish to do, what does the Minister propose to do to mitigate this situation?
Lord Rosser
My Lords, I will resist the temptation to go beyond the amendment that we are principally discussing, Amendment 105. We acknowledge that the Government appear to have a strong wish to bring personnel into the police from overseas, but there is an obvious concern that has been powerfully expressed tonight over the implications for the security responsibilities of the posts mentioned in Amendment 105 and their access to the highest classification of intelligence. The question has been powerfully raised of whether it is appropriate that the positions indicated in Amendment 105 should be held by a non-UK national on national security grounds. The strength of the amendment, as the noble Lord, Lord Hope, has indicated, is that it does not say no, but it requires that written advice be sought from the Intelligence and Security Committee as to whether there are any considerations of national security and intelligence that would need to be examined in relation to the appointment of a non-UK national to the posts mentioned in the amendment. Obviously, there is also the requirement that Section 126 would not come into force until the views of the Intelligence and Security Committee had been obtained and given to the Secretary of State and,
“a copy of those findings has been laid before both Houses of Parliament”.
I always say, “subject to what the Minister has to say, since he might persuade me otherwise”, but it seems to me that, in view of the concerns that have been raised— which seem legitimate—Amendment 105 is eminently reasonable. It is not giving an answer to the question, but it is saying that surely the issue is of sufficient importance that advice should be sought from the Intelligence and Security Committee. We will await the Minister’s response with interest, particularly on whether they have already assessed the security implications of a non-UK national filling one or more of the positions listed in Amendment 105 and have come to the conclusion that there are no national security considerations.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, this has been an interesting debate. One or two things have been said that I would have to refute. I disagree with the view of the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, on police and crime commissioners, and they are not really the subject of this amendment or this debate. With the greatest respect, I have to say that I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Imbert, on the views of this Government about policing. There is no way in which any member of the Government who I know holds the police in disdain, and there is no sense that the Bill is in any way about getting at the police, as the noble Lord implied. I must put that on the record because I owe it to all my colleagues to do just that.
There is a serious issue in these amendments and I am grateful to noble Lords for addressing them and to the noble Lord, Lord Blair, for bringing them to our attention. I am also grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, for being a non-policing lay person who wishes to contribute to this debate. I hope that I can reassure the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, as well on this issue.
I understand the concerns that the noble Lord, Lord Blair, has raised, and I am grateful for the experience and knowledge of policing that he and his colleagues have brought to bear on this important issue. I agree that it is essential that those who are appointed as police officers undergo vetting appropriate to the role that they undertake. In the case of posts that have responsibility for counterterrorism policing, such as those that are pointed out in the amendment, it is of course vital that very stringent checks can be carried out.
Of the posts mentioned in the amendment, though, only the post of the Metropolitan Police Commissioner would be affected by the proposals in Clause 126. All the others are not mentioned in this clause or indeed relevant to it. Clause 126, as the noble Lord says, removes the requirement for an applicant to have served as a constable in the UK before being appointed as a chief constable or as the commissioner—where they have certain alternative relevant experience, which is important to emphasise as well. I have to say that there is no requirement under law to have served as a constable in the UK before being appointed as a deputy or assistant commissioner. With regard to the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, it will be for the Home Secretary to decide whether to include further restrictions beyond those set out in primary legislation in advertising for the role when a vacancy arises.
That is the same position as now. As things stand, no policing posts are restricted to British nationals by legislation. I recognise that there will be some posts that will require UK nationals only. However, we do not feel it necessary to start specifying this in legislation. We have not done so up to now; why should we start? The Home Secretary has the ability to impose nationality requirements for the commissioner post if necessary, as indeed she did when the post was last advertised. Similarly, the Home Secretary can also impose this requirement when appointing the deputy commissioner and the director-general of the National Crime Agency. It is for the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police to make the decision when it comes to assistant commissioners—they are not a Home Office appointment.
The noble Lord, Lord Blair, has explained why he does not believe that this is a sufficient safeguard, and that the Home Secretary and Parliament must be required to consider the advice of the Intelligence and Security Committee. However, it would be more appropriate for the Home Secretary to take advice from whom she thinks relevant when she is in the position to make these appointments, so that it is current and pertinent to the role being recruited at that time. However, I reassure noble Lords that, whatever nationality restrictions are imposed, no appointment would be made by this or any future Home Secretary that would put national security at risk. We would always expect the successful candidate to undergo the appropriate vetting procedures. If an applicant cannot be vetted, they will not be appointed.
I shall inform the House about current vetting requirements. The UK has reciprocal agreements with Governments of some EU and NATO countries whereby we recognise their vetting as equivalent to ours. Decisions will need to be made on a case-by-case basis. There is currently no bar to foreign citizens undergoing developed vetting, nor is there a requirement to have a British parent, but 10 years’ residency is usually required.
While I accept and acknowledge the expertise in the ISC, I do not believe we need to be obliged by law to refer this matter to it. I am satisfied that there are sufficiently robust vetting arrangements in place for these sensitive posts—they are, indeed, sensitive posts. Any change in the law to exclude foreign nationals being appointed to them would be introducing a requirement that has not hitherto applied. With these assurances, I hope the noble Lord will be content not to move his amendment.
Lord Blair of Boughton
The Minister has puzzled me about the idea that the deputy commissioner and the assistant commissioners of the Metropolitan Police are not chief constables. They are chief constables. You have to be a chief constable to be an assistant commissioner or the deputy commissioner. At least, that is my understanding of the matter, and I am getting various nods from my colleagues. Titles in the Metropolitan Police are different, as the Minister knows. To say that the deputy commissioner and the assistant commissioners are not chief constables when they are the most senior chief constables in the land is an oddity. Would the Minister care to reflect on that?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I shall certainly reflect on it. I am speaking from my notes. While they acknowledge the deputy commissioner role, they make quite clear that there is no requirement to have served as a constable in the UK before being appointed as a deputy commissioner or assistant commissioner. I say that on the information that I have been supplied. If it proves to be wrong, I will certainly write to the noble Lord and inform the House by placing that letter in the Library.
Lord Blair of Boughton
I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I and colleagues will reflect on what the Minister said and what he has and has not agreed. I think it will come as a general surprise to the holders of the deputy commissioner and assistant commissioner posts that they are not chief constables, but we will come to that in due course. I reserve the right to return to the matter on Report and will be grateful for any further information the Minister can provide.
Lord Rosser
Clause 129(4) gives the definition of anti-social behaviour. It is that it,
“causes or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress”,
rather than the nuisance or annoyance definition that relates to Clause 1 for the power to grant injunctions. That is the IPNAs. In Clause 94(6) on out-of-court disposals, anti-social behaviour is also defined as harassment, alarm and distress rather than nuisance or annoyance. I am not particularly expecting the Minister to give me an instant answer. If he is unable to do so, which I think may well be the case, I would be very grateful if he could subsequently let me know why there is a distinction and why it refers to the definition as being “harassment, alarm or distress” in Clause 129, which is different from the definition given in Clause 1 but is the same as the definition given in Clause 94(6).
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, I will not seek to give an off-the-cuff answer to that question. If the noble Lord is happy for me to write to him I will do so, particularly as I am sure we wish to expedite the business. I hope that we can agree that Clause 129 should stand part of the Bill.
“Information about guests at hotels believed to be used for child sexual exploitation
(1) A police officer of at least the rank of inspector may issue a notice under this section to the owner, operator or manager of a hotel that the officer reasonably believes has been or will be used for the purposes of—
(a) child sexual exploitation, or(b) conduct that is preparatory to, or otherwise connected with, child sexual exploitation.(2) A notice under this section must be in writing and must—
(a) specify the hotel to which it relates;(b) specify the date on which it comes into effect and the date on which it expires;(c) explain the effect of subsections (4) and (5) and sections (Appeals against notices under section (Information about guests at hotels believed to be used for child sexual exploitation)) and (Offences).(3) The date on which the notice expires must not be more than 6 months after the date on which it comes into effect.
(4) A constable may require a person issued with a notice under this section to provide the constable with information about guests at the hotel.
(5) The only information that a constable may require under subsection (4) is—
(a) guests’ names and addresses;(b) other information about guests that—(i) is specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State, and(ii) can be readily obtained from one or more of the guests themselves.(6) A requirement under subsection (4)—
(a) must be in writing;(b) must specify the period to which the requirement relates;(c) must specify the date or dates on or by which the required information is to be provided.The period specified under paragraph (b) must begin no earlier than the time when the requirement is imposed and must end no later than the expiry of the notice under this section.(7) In this section—
“child sexual exploitation” means conduct that constitutes an offence listed in subsection (8)(a) or (b), or an offence listed in subsection (8)(c) against a person under 18;
“guest” means a person who, for a charge payable by that person or another, has the use of a guest room at the hotel in question;
“hotel” includes any guest house or other establishment of a similar kind at which accommodation is provided for a charge.
(8) The offences are—
(a) an offence under any of the following sections of the Sexual Offences Act 2003—sections 5 to 8 (rape and other offences against children under 13);
sections 9 to 13 (child sex offences);
sections 16 to 19 (abuse of position of trust);
sections 25 and 26 (familial child sex offences);
sections 47 to 50 (abuse of children through prostitution and pornography);
(b) an offence under section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978 (indecent photographs of children);(c) an offence under any of the following sections of the Sexual Offences Act 2003—sections 1 to 4 (rape, assault and causing sexual activity without consent);
sections 30 to 41 (persons with a mental disorder impeding choice, inducements etc to persons with a mental disorder, and care workers for persons with a mental disorder);
section 59A (trafficking people for sexual exploitation);
section 61 (administering a substance with intent);
sections 66 and 67 (exposure and voyeurism).”
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, this proposed new clause provides an opportunity for me to update noble Lords on the work that has been done since the commencement of the new offences in the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 on 25 November 2012 to tackle stalking.
We agreed that there was a gap in the law and, on that basis, introduced two new offences of stalking and stalking where there is a fear of violence, serious alarm or distress. These sit alongside the existing offences of harassment and putting people in fear of violence in the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. The stalking offences recognise that the fixated and obsessive nature of stalking differs from harassment.
Crown Prosecution Service figures show that in 2012-13 prosecutions were commenced for more than 8,000 harassment offences, and 91 prosecutions were in relation to the new stalking offences. One has to understand that these figures represent the number of prosecutions initiated within a relatively few months of these offences being introduced. I think that all noble Lords will agree that it takes time for prosecutions to progress through the criminal justice system. We will certainly be monitoring official data and we expect to see an increase in the number of prosecutions and convictions. Police and other professionals need to ensure that they are equipped to make the distinction between harassment and stalking in these complex cases. Official data from the Ministry of Justice on convictions and sentencing will be available in May 2014.
I reassure both my noble friend Lady Brinton and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, that there is obviously a difference in the situation in which Scotland finds itself compared with England and Wales, in that the legislation in Scotland has had time to bed down longer than it has here. The overall position in Scotland is positive, which suggests that the legislation is useful and we can learn from its experience.
Legislation, of course, is not sufficient on its own. We acknowledge that there is still more to do and I am pleased to have the opportunity to outline the steps that we are taking to ensure that the legislation is used to maximum effect. We need to ensure that police and prosecutors have the training necessary to tackle this type of crime. All newly qualified police officers, uniformed officers and investigators and public protection officers are expected to complete the training developed by the College of Policing as part of their continuous professional development. Since October 2012, the stalking and harassment training package has been completed 44,844 times, which is a rather nice number for anyone who is interested in beautiful numbers.
In addition, the Crown Prosecution Service developed an e-learning module to further support prosecutors in prosecuting cyberstalking, non-cyber stalking and harassment. This new e-learning module was launched in November 2012 to coincide with the commencement of the new stalking offences and has been mandatory for all prosecutors since June. More than 1,000 Crown Prosecution Service lawyers have completed the training since it became mandatory.
The national policing lead for stalking and harassment and the Director of Public Prosecutions wrote jointly to all chief constables and chief Crown prosecutors as recently as last month, identifying areas where the police and the Crown Prosecution Service will work together to improve the response to stalking. They intend to address these issues in a joint national protocol between the police and the Crown Prosecution Service, which is expected to be published next spring.
My noble friend Lady Brinton asked why certain police forces have trained a low number of officers on stalking offences. There is differential between some police forces and others. Chief constables have responsibility for ensuring their officers are effectively trained. Priorities for forces are informed by the plans of their police and crime commissioner. That is why the Home Office is engaging with police and crime commissioners to raise their awareness of violence against women and girls issues, including stalking. The noble Baroness also asked about sentencing guidelines. The Sentencing Council plans to start work on the new public order guideline in 2014 and consideration will be given to including guidance on the new stalking offences as part of this work. I am grateful to my noble friend for mentioning that issue.
I share the desire of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and my noble friend to ensure the new legislation is effective. We will be happy to update the House on the progress of our work in this area in due course, and the Government of course expect to be held to account through the usual parliamentary channels. I am not inviting Parliamentary Questions but I am sure that they will follow if I do not keep the House properly informed. However, I am not convinced that these provisions should be singled out in a particular way by imposing a duty to review the progress and implementation of the provisions used by the police. As noble Lords will know, all legislation is reviewed on a regular basis in any event. On the basis of my response to this debate, I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
Baroness Brinton
I thank the Minister for that comprehensive answer on training, but one area that was not covered was the judiciary and magistrates. Perhaps the Minister could write to me with that information at a later date.
Lord Rosser
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for her contribution and for the information that she gave. Of course, she drew attention to the significant geographical discrepancies, the question of whether it was harassment or stalking that was being pursued and whether it was the right charge in each case. That is a significant point.
I understand why the Minister asks, “Why pull out this particular offence and treat it differently as far as a review is concerned?”. But when discussions were taking place in 2012, there was a strength of feeling about this which led the Government to make the decision that they did. It is understandable that, having partially achieved what was wanted—namely, it is in legislation—the next part is to see whether anything is being done with that legislation.
We will want to reflect on what the Minister said before deciding whether to pursue this at a later stage of our discussions on the Bill. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.