Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Rosser
Main Page: Lord Rosser (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Rosser's debates with the Home Office
(10 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberI should like to raise one or two questions about this proposal. As the Minister has said, the role that we currently associate with police community support officers is one of public reassurance through visible street patrols and, as again the noble Lord said, through community engagement, including engaging residents more actively in local policing. Indeed, in my own personal experience, on one occasion two police community support officers knocked on my front door—fortunately they were not there to take me away—to ask me what issues, if any, were causing me concern in my own particular locality. Presumably they were doing a survey of residents’ opinions about issues of concern to them. What we now have is a list of additional powers for police community support officers to issue mainly fixed penalty notices. It could therefore be argued that these powers will put police community support officers potentially into a more confrontational position with members of the public than perhaps we normally associate with their role at present.
As I understand it, under the original terms of this Bill it had not been the Government’s intention to make considerable additions to the powers of police community support officers. Indeed, in the letter that the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Holbeach, kindly sent to us setting out the Government’s intentions in this amendment, he referred, as has the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon, to Stephen Barclay’s amendment in the other place that led to the Government tabling a new clause, which I think is Clause 135, conferring powers on police community support officers to issue fixed penalty notices for cycling without lights. As a result of that, something led the Government to say, “Let’s have a further look at what additional powers we can give to police community support officers”. We now have before us a much greater list. The original Stephen Barclay amendment was one additional power, but now we have a long list of additional powers not just affecting cyclists and not just in connection with traffic-related powers; they go further than that. One could make a case for saying that this is beginning to change the role of PCSOs.
We are not standing here opposing this, but my question is this: what led the Government to believe that the extension of powers now being proposed—in Committee stage here, the Bill having been through the other place—is appropriate when they did not believe it to be so at the time it was drawn up and when, bearing in mind the title of the Bill, we can presume that virtually all issues related to policing and the powers of the police were in fact under review and up for consideration? I would be grateful for an explanation of why this has been brought forward at this stage, but was not considered appropriate when the Bill was being drawn up. I understand that these further powers are the Government’s own view of what they want to do and are not, subject to what the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, may say to me in response, due to any particular pressure from someone. I can see why the Stephen Barclay amendment was made. He raised and then pursued it, and obviously Government Ministers said that they would accept it and take action.
Since it appears that these additional powers have been put forward at a pretty late stage, and therefore presumably over a short timescale, who has actually been consulted on this proposed extension? Has there been wide consultation with those who might have an interest in this change of approach? Have the police themselves been pressing for this extension for some time but to no avail, and now they find that, metaphorically speaking, they have hit the jackpot, because what they have been pressing for has now been agreed at a rather late stage in the proceedings?
I am putting these points as questions for the Minister and my final question is this. Since the Government have clearly now had a look at what additional powers it would be appropriate to give police community support officers, powers that begin to change the nature of the job—the operative word is “begin”—without taking away their former functions, are the Government now going to carry out a full review of the role and responsibilities of PCSOs? I ask this because what is now in front of us gives the impression, again subject to what the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, may say in reply, of something that has been drawn up in quite a short time and is being put forward in the Bill now when it had not been the Government’s intention to do so not very many months ago when the Bill originally arrived in the House of Commons and throughout its passage through that place.
My Lords, I should like to say a few words arising from my policing background and experience. I support to some extent the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, in what he said, at least initially. Police community support officers, if they have a useful role, are seen by the police as a bridge between police officers and the community. Part of the reason they are able to perform that role is that they have very limited powers when it comes to enforcement. They can be seen as friends of the community and not necessarily come into conflict with it. As we know from what happened with traffic wardens when they were introduced, they in fact became the enemies of motorists. We certainly would not want to erode the useful role that police community support officers play in terms of being friends of the community and a bridge between the community and what it increasingly sees as enforcement officers; that is, police officers.
The second issue is the need to keep a very clear distinction between police officers and police community support officers. The recruitment standards and the training that police officers receive are far higher than is the case for police community support officers, particularly in the training of police officers in the use of discretion. If we are asking police community support officers to use their discretion as to whether they issue fixed penalty notices to erring motorists or cyclists, considerably more training needs to be given to them on the circumstances in which they should use that discretion. As I say, there is a clear danger that the distinction between the police and police community support officers will be eroded if slowly but surely we give police community support officers more and more powers.
Thirdly, there is already confusion in the minds of the public as to what police community support officers can and cannot do. When police community support officers arrive at the scene of an incident, the public look to them to act as police officers would, and are surprised to find that they do not have the powers or the ability to intervene in a way that the public expect of them. Gradually giving police community support officers more powers will add to that confusion among the public.
My Lords, perhaps I may say first that when those PCSOs arrived at the door of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, I am glad that they did not take him away. We would have been without his expertise and input in this Bill, so we are grateful for that. Equally, he made an important point in mentioning it. I come back to a point I made earlier: PCSOs are distinct from police officers, and I think I made that clear in my comments. What they do in terms of reassurance is something that the police themselves do. Again, speaking from my experience of working with neighbourhood teams when I was a local councillor, the police also did similar reassurance exercises.
I turn now to the specific questions that have been put to me. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked why we are proposing this now. Of course, we are responding in line with the scrutiny of the Bill in the Commons. My honourable friend Stephen Barclay raised the issue, but it did go wider and beyond the specifics of his amendments. This is not something that the Government have only just thought about. I referred in my earlier comments to a Labour police and crime commissioner, Paddy Tipping, who wants us to go further. We have consulted on this and we have looked at the position with relevant experts in the field to understand the implications of the change. We have included discussions with the police at both the operational and the strategic level, the College of Policing, the partnership agencies and, indeed, national police leaders. As I said in my earlier remarks, this is about enhancing the powers of PCSOs and not about taking away from their engagement. We believe it is right that the engagement role performed by PCSOs is vital in making police accessible to all, and we do not want to overburden them with enforcement powers that would detract from that. That is why we have taken a considered position on these new packages.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, also asked whether we will consider more powers. These changes will mean a significant increase in the number of powers available for designation to PCSOs. That is an important distinction: this is not something that is carte blanche; it is right that the chief officers should have the freedom to take account of local circumstances and priorities when determining how their PCSOs are deployed. That will be the case in these additional powers that are being proposed. That is why we have taken the time to consider and, while we will be exploring a wider role for PCSOs, the Government believe that their particular role is being enhanced.
I hope that I have covered the specific questions asked by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser.
There was not a general consultation with all local authorities but, in our consideration, as I have said, we talked to partnership agencies and national police leagues; that, of course, in some respects includes local authorities’ opinions. This is not trying to take away from local authorities: anyone who has worked at local government level knows that local authorities, the police et cetera all work in partnership in ensuring that we get the maximum level of reassurance.
I turn briefly to the points raised by my noble friend, who speaks with great expertise in this area. I would not in any sense seek to challenge that. I believe that the vital distinction remains between police officers and PCSOs. We are merely seeking to enhance the functions of PCSOs to allow them to engage more effectively in the community and to address the very issues he has raised about their effectiveness when they arrive at a particular point. Our proposals are a proportionate response to what is needed. It will help in community engagement and effective enforcement in respect of some of the lower-level issues that are raised. Neighbourhood policing will be in a better place for that. I beg to move.
We indicated at Second Reading that we intended to propose a new clause on this issue since it was clear that action had to be taken to address how covert policing operations were authorised and managed. Of course, we support undercover policing, since such operations are a vital part of the fight against organised crime and terrorism and are essential in keeping communities safe. We recognise the dedication and bravery of those officers who undertake this work. However, any such operations must be subject to the highest ethical and operational standards. That is essential for both their operational effectiveness and public confidence. Our amendment today, therefore, seeks to deal with the issue of accountability.
There are two cases that highlight how important it is that changes of the kind that we are proposing are made. The first is the case of Mark Kennedy who, as a police officer, infiltrated—I think that is the word—protest groups over a period of years: groups which said that they were involved in lawful demonstrations, rather than crime. The former policeman, it appears, had relationships with women in the protest movement and travelled to eco-protests across Europe. He later told a Channel 4 documentary of his remorse, including his regrets about and feelings for a woman with whom he had had a long affair. HMIC reviewed the activities of Mark Kennedy and other undercover officers and stated that his actions had led to the collapse of a trial of environmental protesters and that he had “defied” management instructions. The report found that Mr Kennedy had helped to unearth “serious criminality”. However, Mr Kennedy said that, while the subject had never been broached directly, it was “impossible” that his superiors had not known he was having a sexual relationship with some protesters. The report suggested that an independent body might be required to authorise such undercover operations. It also said that Mr Kennedy was inadequately supervised and that oversight of undercover officers needed to be strengthened.
The second case is that of the Lawrence family. Twenty years ago, Stephen Lawrence was murdered at the age of 18. He was, of course, the son of Neville and Doreen, who is now my noble friend Lady Lawrence of Clarendon, a Member of your Lordships’ House. Stephen was cruelly murdered by racists and there was evidence of racism in the way the police inquiry was conducted. Serious allegations have now been made that the police spied on the Lawrence family with a view to discrediting them. Peter Francis, a former undercover police officer and a member of the somewhat controversial Special Demonstration Squad, has spoken of his activities as part of an operation to spy on and attempt to smear the Lawrence family.
These two cases and other incidents have led to serious concerns about the accountability of the undercover police operations that were undertaken and raised questions about the accountability of future undercover police operations. Our amendment seeks to ensure that all long-term undercover operations are signed off by a relevant independent body, to ensure that, where needed, covert operations are used proportionately, sensitively, only when necessary and with clear and improved accountability arrangements. Additionally, we do not currently have effective oversight of these operations. There are various options we can explore and we hope that the Government will look at these options carefully. Judicial oversight is just one that could be considered.
There also appears to be an anomaly, because currently, if the police or security services want to enter—perhaps to break in, to bug a room or to intercept a phone call—they need justification that to do so is in the interests of national security in order to get a warrant. Attaining a warrant requires judicial approval. However, those undercover police officers who entered into relationships in an attempt to retrieve certain information needed no warrant.
Of course—and we appreciate this—undercover operations vary. Some will be as short as an hour or so and may involve relatively minor matters; it would be impractical to ask for independent approval for all such operations. However, our proposed new clause is intended to target long-term covert police operations, and these can span from six months to 12 months or even several years. When such operations are undertaken, there needs to be clarity about the goals, the methods and the priorities. Therefore, there should be independent approval prior to any such lengthy operation. It does not necessarily have to come from a judge, but it must be truly independent, and the very process of seeking such approval would help to ensure proportionality, and clarity of objectives and methods. Our proposed new clause would help to ensure that operations such as the hugely inappropriate and totally wrong campaign against the Lawrence family cannot take place again. That campaign and operation against the Lawrence family showed appallingly bad judgment. Surely, we all want to ensure that any operation undertaken is accountable, justifiable and in the wider public interest.
On Report in the other place, the Minister Damian Green stated that it was the Government’s,
“intention to legislate to enhance oversight of undercover law enforcement officer deployments”,
and this could,
“be done through secondary legislation”.
He outlined the Government’s proposals to increase accountability and oversight. However, proper scrutiny is necessary and we need the opportunity to scrutinise those proposals as part of this Bill. Damian Green promised in the House of Commons that he would,
“lay the appropriate order before the House shortly”.—[Official Report, Commons, 15/10/13; col. 634]
As I understand it, we have not yet seen the order, although I may be wrong in saying that. However, we feel that it would be much better to deal with an issue of this importance in what the Government regard as a flagship Bill on crime and policing. I hope the Minister, when he replies, will be able to give a helpful response.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for tabling this amendment because I agree with him that the whole question of undercover policing is very important. I do not think that any noble Lord should be in doubt that covert techniques, including undercover policing, are an important weapon in the fight against terrorism and other serious and organised crime. Undercover police officers play a crucial role in keeping us all safe. It is difficult and dangerous work and I welcome this opportunity to pay tribute to all who undertake it.
The new clause proposed by the noble Lord seeks to introduce a system of independent authorisation for undercover policing operations. I do not believe there is any great difference of view between the noble Lord and me on this point. We both believe that there must be proper safeguards to ensure that these covert techniques are used only where appropriate and that the mechanisms for approving all such deployments are fit for purpose. However, I hope that it will help noble Lords if I set out why I do not believe that this amendment is required, not least because the Government have already instigated changes that are designed to meet the concerns that have arisen in the light of some allegations of past misconduct, which were sympathetically described by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser.
Undercover deployments are authorised under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, commonly known as RIPA, which stipulates that the use of an undercover deployment can be authorised only at a senior level within the police force or other law enforcement agency concerned. In giving an authorisation, the authorising officer must balance the seriousness of the crime being investigated, and the value of the evidence likely to be gathered, against the right to privacy of the person under investigation and of those others who are likely to have their privacy intruded upon, such as family, friends and other associates.
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary conducted a rigorous and independent review of undercover policing last year and made a number of recommendations to improve the way authorisations and deployments are made. Earlier this year, the inspectorate reported on the progress made in implementing its 2012 report and was generally positive about the work already done. The noble Lord referred to the role played by my ministerial colleague, the Minister for Policing, Criminal Justice and Victims, the right honourable Damian Green, who announced to the Home Affairs Select Committee our intention to strengthen this regime to enhance oversight of undercover law enforcement officer deployments. I am pleased to say that the order to give effect to this commitment was laid in October and is due to take effect on 1 January next year.
I will set out the effect of the changes that the Government are bringing forward. First, law enforcement agencies will need to notify the surveillance commissioners —all retired judges—of undercover deployments. In practice, what will happen is that a surveillance commissioner will see the same papers that were presented to the authorising officer and will have the opportunity to raise any concerns. Noble Lords will appreciate that most deployments are short-term in nature and, in many cases, last no more than a few hours. However, some are long-term, and these may give rise to the greatest concern. Initial authorisations last for a maximum of 12 months. Accordingly, the second change we are putting in place is that an authorisation can be renewed beyond 12 months only with the prior approval of a surveillance commissioner—who, I remind your Lordships, is someone who has held a senior judicial office.
In addition, we are increasing the rank of the authorising officer. Deployments of undercover law enforcement officers will henceforth need to be authorised at assistant chief constable level or equivalent. Any deployments lasting longer than 12 months will be authorised by a chief constable or equivalent, as well as by a surveillance commissioner, as I have already explained. The seniority of those who will now be required to authorise these deployments is an indication of how seriously the Government take proper oversight of undercover law enforcement activity. We believe that these changes will promote the highest standards of professionalism and excellence in this most sensitive area of policing. We also believe that they will achieve the aims of this proposed new clause by ensuring judicial scrutiny of long-term deployments while preserving the flexibility of law enforcement agencies to act swiftly where necessary.
Covert activity is a necessary part of the armoury of law enforcement but it is absolutely right, as is the intention behind this amendment, that it must be properly controlled and regulated. That is why the Government are making the changes that I have described. In the light of these changes and the new regime that we are now putting in place, I do not believe that this amendment is required and I hope the noble Lord will withdraw it.
I shall of course withdraw the amendment but, before I do, I have one question for the noble Lord. Does the proposal that is to be implemented in relation to the role of the surveillance commissioners also include, for particularly lengthy covert operations lasting many months, any sort of regular oversight of the operation by the surveillance commissioners, or is it a case of getting their approval beforehand and, once that prior approval has been given, that is the end of the independent oversight?
The prior approval is of course designed to make sure that there is no extension without the surveillance commissioner being a party to the decision. I cannot give the noble Lord a clear answer on this but I would suspect that the surveillance commissioner could make his approval dependent on an update at some point during the extended 12-month period. I will write to the noble Lord and give him some indication of how this would operate. I understand entirely what he is getting at and am quite happy to investigate and provide that to him.
I thank the noble Lord for his reply and for his offer to write to me on the issue that I have just raised. I will obviously want to reflect on the reply that we have received but I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I will be brief with what has been described as my blunt instrument on Clause 141. I will not repeat the detailed arguments put by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbots. As he said, Amendments 88 and 90 seek to preserve the automatic right to appeal against an extradition order by deleting provisions in the clause that would make the ability to appeal against an order subject to obtaining the permission of the High Court. Essentially, it appears that the Government are now proposing to remove a key safeguard for individuals at risk of extradition by repealing the automatic right of appeal. We have real concerns about this change, which of course removes safeguards for UK citizens.
The automatic right of appeal is a key safeguard against the wrongful extradition of individuals, which allows them to raise new evidence that was not available at the time of the extradition hearing or to challenge the decision of the original judgment. It was surely this automatic right of appeal that allowed Gary McKinnon and his family to challenge the initial decision to extradite him to the US, leading ultimately to the decision not to extradite him at all. Without the right of appeal, he might have been extradited without any further consideration of the evidence, old or new, showing that extradition posed a serious risk to his right to life. Indeed, in the Statement that the Home Secretary made on 16 October 2012, she specifically referred to this issue when she said:
“After careful consideration of all of the relevant material, I have concluded that Mr McKinnon’s extradition would give rise to such a high risk of him ending his life that a decision to extradite would be incompatible with Mr McKinnon’s human rights”.—[Official Report, Commons, 16/10/12; col. 164.]
Yet, subject to what the Minister may say, the Government appear to be introducing changes to the Act that would mean that if a similar case occurred after this Bill had been passed, the Home Secretary would not be able to make the same decision.
Clause 141 amends Sections 26 and 108 of the 2003 Act to provide that an appeal will lie only with permission from the High Court, and no indication is given in the Bill of what criteria will be used to decide whether permission should be granted. I hope that the Minister will be able to indicate the reason for the Bill being so vague over an issue—namely, the criteria—that could have significant human rights consequences. What in fact do the Government expect the criteria to be, do they expect them to be evidence-based and will they be available for scrutiny? What impact do the Government believe any likely criteria will have on the number of cases able to be appealed?
Once an individual has been extradited, of course, there is virtually nothing that can be done if new evidence arises to show that that was not the appropriate or fair decision and was contrary to the interests of justice or their human rights. Does the Minister not agree that, because of that, it is crucial that people effectively have an automatic right to appeal against a decision to be extradited, or at least some other means of ensuring that justice is done, and that we do not end up in a situation which, frankly, does our own extradition system no credit?
I cannot vouch for this personally, but Liberty says that extradition experts are of the view that a large number of cases that have been successful on appeal probably would not have been granted leave under the Bill. Removing the right of automatic appeal will potentially have considerable human rights and legal implications. If the Minister cannot offer some movement on this issue when he replies tonight, I hope that he will at least be able to explain why the Government appear to be taking such a major backwards step, having previously placed such emphasis on their concern for Gary MacKinnon’s human rights.
My Lords, as my noble friend has explained, Clause 141 makes the right of appeal against a decision to order extradition subject to the leave of the High Court. Similarly, it makes the requesting state’s right of appeal against a decision to discharge a person from extradition proceedings subject to the leave of the High Court. Clause 141 also allows the requested person to make an application for leave to appeal out of time in certain circumstances. This does not apply to the requesting state.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, using his blunt instrument, gives me the opportunity to broaden the debate beyond the immediate amendments and explain how this process will work and why the Government feel justified in introducing Clause 141. My noble friend Lord Hodgson, in tabling his Amendments 88 and 90, challenges us on why we are making these changes. At present, a person has an automatic right of appeal against a decision to order his or her extradition, and the requesting state also has an automatic right of appeal against a decision not to order extradition—an important factor to bear in mind.
As noble Lords are aware, the Government commissioned a review by Sir Scott Baker of the UK’s extradition arrangements. One of the key findings of his review was that the success rate of appeals was extremely low: less than 13% in 2010. In other words, the court system is burdened by unmeritorious appeals, a fact to which my noble friend Lord Hodgson referred, which then delay hearings for all appellants and means that justice is deferred. Clause 141 addresses this problem by making appeals subject to permission from the High Court. This filter applies to appeals against, for example, a judge’s decision to order extradition to a Part 1 territory, that is, another member state; a judge’s decision to send a case to the Secretary of State to consider extradition in Part 2 cases, that is, where the requesting country is not an EU member state; and to a decision by the Secretary of State to order extradition in Part 2 cases. To provide parity, it also applies to appeals against decisions to discharge a person.
My noble friend Lord Hodgson asked what sort of issues a court would consider in deciding whether to allow an application to be heard. This will be, as one would expect, a matter for the judge concerned. They will, of course, give full consideration to all the relevant factors raised by the appellant before reaching a decision. We do not think that they are appropriate to be set out in legislation, as it is a matter for the court itself to consider. I understand that noble Lords will have questions about what safeguards will be available. Let me reassure noble Lords that this provision does not prevent anyone from applying for permission to appeal. Once an application has been made, the High Court will decide which cases proceed to a hearing, but each application will be considered by a High Court judge. Furthermore, Clause 141 sets out that the High Court must not refuse to entertain an application for leave to appeal by the requested person solely because it has been submitted outside the normal time period, if the person did everything reasonably possible to ensure that the notice was given as soon as it could be.
That point brings me to the matters that my noble friend Lord Hodgson raised in relation to this in his Amendments 88A, 89, 91 and 92. My noble friend proposes to amend Clause 141 to insert a requirement for the courts to allow an appeal to be made out of time if it is in the interests of justice to do so. As I said, Clause 141 allows the High Court to hear an out-of-time appeal where the person has done everything reasonably possible to bring the appeal as soon as possible. Our approach follows that of the Supreme Court, which ruled last year that out-of-time appeals should only be considered exceptionally. We believe that this provision gets the balance right: the timetable for an appeal is clear and there must be an onus on an appellant to meet the statutory requirements, as happens in the vast majority of cases.
My noble friend is also proposing to extend the time limit for appeals in Part 1 cases from seven days to 14 days. As he has explained, this was one of the recommendations that Sir Scott Baker made in his review of our extradition arrangements. We have therefore considered it very carefully in developing the provisions in the Bill. Our view is that extending the time limit in this way would have no practical effect beyond increasing the likelihood for delay. As I said, we have introduced new protections where people are unable to submit their appeals on time through no fault of their own. We believe that this new provision will address the concerns raised by my noble friend, and indeed by Sir Scott Baker, on this issue.
What safeguards will exist under these new provisions? We do not believe that we are removing any existing safeguards. We need to get the balance right between ensuring proper protection for those subject to an extradition request while ensuring that people do not delay their proper surrender by burdening the courts with unmeritorious appeals. We believe that this approach gets these matters right. The court itself will decide the issues and the relevance of any out-of-time considerations.
The changes set out in Clause 141 will allow the courts to focus their attention on the right appeals, removing the burden of unmeritorious appeals while ensuring that proper safeguards are in place for those subject to extradition. I commend the clause to the Committee and I hope that my noble friend will be prepared to withdraw his amendment, and that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, will see the merit in the clause.