Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts
Main Page: Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts's debates with the Home Office
(10 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in moving Amendment 65, I will speak at the same time to Amendments 66 to 75. With this group, we come to Part 12 of the Bill, which is concerned with extradition. As this is the first time I have spoken at this stage of the Bill, I need to remind the Committee of my interest as a trustee of Fair Trials International. I am very grateful to that organisation for many of the real-life examples that underlie the amendments that I shall move to this part of the Bill in the next hour or so. I also acknowledge the help that I have had from Justice and several other interested parties.
I am grateful to my noble friend for that full and very considered response. We are, of course, going around the track for the first time today and I have some difficulty understanding the conflation of prosecution charge and try and the interpretation of Clause 137 in which I think he said—I hope I have quoted him right—that the judge can consider any external factor. Certainly the advice I have received is that that is far from the case, that the judge’s hands remain very carefully circumscribed and tied and that the judge would not have the width and breadth of discretion that my noble friend’s remarks suggested. It would be helpful if one could read in some detail what he had to say, as it is obviously highly complicated and technical, and then see whether expert external advice believes that the extraordinarily plausible answer he gave actually holds up when we come to discuss it further. I beg leave to withdraw.
My Lords, I will speak also to Amendment 78. These amendments expand the issues a judge can consider in testing the proportionality of a European arrest warrant. Amendment 76 deletes the words,
“but the judge must not take any other matters into account”.
Amendment 78 extends judicial discretion as regards proportionality by a list of factors, including the cost of extradition, the consequences of extradition for the suspect and the public interest aspect.
Under the Bill, the judge must have regard to the specified matters relating to proportionality so far as he or she thinks it appropriate to do so, but must not take other matters into account. Thus, the judge is limited to the three specified matters but has discretion to ignore them. As a starting point, I would like the Government to justify why a judge should be able to ignore factors that will always be germane to the issue of proportionality. If an offence is serious, extradition is more likely to be proportionate but that does not mean that the proportionality test has no place in serious crimes. Amendment 76 therefore removes the discretion to ignore relevant factors.
Under the proposed test, the judge can take into account just three factors but it is unclear how they are supposed to relate to each other. In any case, the current list of specified matters does not allow a useful proportionality analysis. As drafted, the judge would be able to take into account the seriousness of the offence and the anticipated sentence, but since regard cannot be had to any other matter, the judge cannot balance these against the relevant considerations. For example, it is difficult to see how the judge can decide whether a less serious offence would make extradition disproportionate if the judge cannot also take into account the implication of extradition in terms of the human impact or, indeed, the costs for the UK taxpayer. The financial costs of extradition are high. The Government estimate that the execution of each EAW costs on average £20,000. In addition, the human impact of extradition can extremely severe. Recent cases under Article 8 of the ECHR have shown that the extradition of single parents can drastically disrupt the development of their children. There was the judgment of Lady Hale in HH v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic in 2012.
Recognising the need for proportionality checks on the operation of the EAW, the European Commission recognised that the issue was with,
“very minor offences which do not justify the measures and cooperation which execution of an EAW involves”,
and that there is a,
“disproportionate effect on the liberty and freedom of requested persons”,
when the EAW is used in such cases.
The point of a proportionality test should be to determine whether, on a case-by-case basis, the human and material costs are justified. Indeed, the Council of the European Union’s handbook on how to issue an EAW is 125 pages long and explains that,
“considering the severe consequences of the execution of an EAW with regard to restrictions on physical freedom and the free movement of the requested person, the competent authorities should, before deciding to issue a warrant consider proportionality by assessing a number of important factors. In particular these will include an assessment of the seriousness of the offence, the possibility of the suspect being detained, and the likely penalty imposed if the person sought is found guilty of the alleged offence”.
The Bill excludes a balancing exercise that takes into account all these relevant factors.
These amendments therefore provide the judge with sufficient discretion to consider these key factors and others, including the passage of time, since prolonged delays in prosecuting an offence and issuing an EAW may provide evidence of its very low level of seriousness, and the public interest in extradition, since this will vary in line with the seriousness of the offence. Other factors might include, for instance, the person’s conduct, in particular, whether they absconded in order to evade prosecution or left the issuing state unaware that they were being pursued.
I recognise that this will call for a case-by-case test and a fact-sensitive assessment. However, this need not affect the length or complexity of EAW proceedings. An issue raised in relation to human impact would in any event have to be considered under Article 8 of the ECHR. Under the operation envisaged by these amendments, the factors considered under Article 8 of the ECHR will be considered as part of the statutory proportionality test but alongside the cost of extradition to the United Kingdom and having greater regard to the seriousness of the extradition offence. Indeed, under the Government’s proposal, it can be argued that there will often have to be two separate proportionality analyses—one under the statutory test, excluding anything to do with family life, and another under Article 8 of the ECHR, potentially resulting in confusion and complication. Unifying the two tests, as would be achieved by these amendments, would, if anything, simplifying proceedings. I beg to move.
My Lords, Clause 138, “Proportionality”, will not be an easy one for a judge to interpret, as my noble friend has outlined. The question of proportionality under the Human Rights Act 1998 is one matter and then there is the statutory proportionality, which apparently is to be restricted to certain specific matters mentioned in subsections (2) and (3) of the new Section 21A that Clause 138 inserts into the Extradition Act 2003. I respectfully ask the Minister to explain why it is so necessary to distinguish between the two types of proportionality. Proportionality is a fundamental principle in EU law and, in particular, under the Human Rights Act. I suggest there is scope for confusion and therefore possible litigation if a judge misdirects himself or herself in applying proportionality in one sense and not in another.
My Lords, as my noble friend Lord Faulks has just said, Clause 138 is dedicated to addressing this issue and bringing the fundamental concept of proportionality into extradition matters. Much of what my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbots proposes has already been included within the Extradition Act 2003, as it will be amended by the Bill.
It is important to recognise that the judge will consider proportionality in addition to the existing bars to extradition, such as the passage of time and human rights considerations, including any impact on family and private life. Consequently, new paragraphs (d) and (e) as provided for in Amendment 78, which seek to merge these existing considerations into the proportionality bar, are unnecessary and would have little practical impact.
Turning to the proposed new paragraphs (f) and (g), which relate to the cost of proceedings in the UK and the duration and cost of proceedings in the issuing state, I do not believe that those considerations are relevant. The proportionality bar is designed to provide additional protection to those whose extradition is sought. It is appropriate that the matters concerned should relate to the alleged crime and the potential impact on the person concerned. Of course, costs are an issue for us all, and that is why the totality of our proposals is designed to improve the workings of the Extradition Act, including reducing unnecessary delays. However, costs to the UK arising from the extradition process should not mean a denial of justice where it is right that a person is extradited. On new paragraph (g), the costs and the duration of proceedings in the issuing state are a matter for the issuing state.
New paragraph (h) would require a consideration of the public interest. That is implicit in any consideration of extradition by the courts, which look at a range of factors alongside the proportionality bar. Taken together, the statutory bars to extradition provide a broad public interest test, so it is not necessary to include a separate test here in the Bill.
Finally, new paragraph (i), which refers to other matters that the judge believes relevant, is too open-ended and leaves too many issues that could be considered. It could lead to duplication and potential delay as a result of proportionality considerations overlapping with other considerations. My noble friend Lord Faulks talked about the complexity of these issues and the opportunity that he believed the provisions give for judicial consideration, deliberation and challenges. I think that the proposals in the amendment would complicate the matter further. I must emphasise that the proportionality bar is one among a number which must be considered already, not least whether extradition would be compatible with the requested person’s human rights.
Let me assure my noble friend that, in addition to the provisions in Clause 138, we will also take a more pragmatic approach to our administrative processes when an EAW is received. This will ensure that the most trivial requests are identified and, where appropriate, dealt with administratively before even getting to the courts. The aim will be to work practically with other member states to identify alternative solutions for trivial requests.
My noble friend Lord Faulks asked: why not merge proportionality and human rights? The proportionality bar deals specifically with the proportionality of extradition as a way to deal with the conduct alleged. Proportionality is indeed a factor when considering interferences with various rights under the ECHR, but it is considered when examining the specific rights one at a time. Our bar adds to that, but deals with the wider issue of human rights within the EAW.
I hope that both my noble friends are happy with the reassurances that I have given them and that my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbots will be content to withdraw his amendment.
I am grateful to my noble friend. He rightly chided me about the list of matters in Amendment 78 and the wide-ranging nature of my proposed new paragraph (i), which would insert the text,
“any other matter which the judge considers relevant”.
Although I entirely accept that, I do not understand why three matters are chosen in subsection (3) and why a judge must not take any other matters into account. That seems to me to be erring on the other side of the argument. I hope that he will forgive me if I say that, when I hear Ministers say, “We should be pragmatic about this”, it does not reassure me, because in this area, where we are dealing with people’s liberty and livelihoods, pragmatism can go awry.
I understand the complexity of the issues that my noble friend is attempting to address in the amendments. If he feels it helpful for me to write a fuller explanation than I am able to give the Committee today, I would be very happy to do so. It may be easier if I do that; I hope that my noble friend will accept that.
Of course I would be delighted to receive a letter from my noble friend. That would also enable me to reflect fully on what has been said, take expert advice on the technical matters which we are discussing this evening and decide whether to take the matter further. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, in moving Amendment 77, I shall also speak to Amendments 79, 80, 81 and 87. This set of amendments keeps us in the area we have just been talking about: one of the three specified matters. The amendments emphasise the importance of less coercive, less disruptive measures than a full European arrest warrant. Where a state issuing an EAW refuses to use them, the judge could take that refusal into account before granting an EAW.
New subsection (3)(c), which sets out the third of the three matters we have just been discussing, currently reads,
“the possibility of the relevant foreign authorities taking measures that would be less coercive”.
Amendment 77 replaces “possibility of”—a pretty low test, in my view—with “availability of”. Amendments 80 and 81 are essentially consequential.
The assumption underlying the provision relating to less coercive measures is that the severely restrictive measure of extradition, involving deprivation of liberty and the physical transport of a person away from home and family, should be used only as a last resort. The issuing state should therefore use that mechanism only when other, less restrictive measures are unavailable. If other such measures are available—for instance, because of the existence of mutual legal assistance mechanisms or, once it is negotiated, the European investigation order—extradition should be refused if they have not been used. The reference to the possibility of using such alternative measures may result in an issuing state avoiding their use due to a lack of resources and/or bureaucratic difficulties in liaison between the competent authorities of the issuing state and the judicial authority that issued the EAW.
I argue that, although the EAW system provides for extradition between judicial authorities, the physical transfer of a person under an EAW is still a process between two EU member states which are, as a whole, bound to observe the principle of proportionality. All their authorities, such as ministries of justice or the interior—where these are responsible for mutual legal assistance requests—should, therefore, be jointly expected to search for alternative solutions before choosing the heavy-handed option of extradition. Accordingly, if an alternative is available, under bilateral or multilateral arrangements between member states, this should be used before the EAW.
Amendment 79 would ensure that, if there are alternative mechanisms available to the issuing state, its failure to use them will always result in the refusal of the EAW, irrespective of the gravity of the offence or any other matter. The inclusion of the less coercive measures test appears to rest on the assumption that the step of issuing an EAW—which involves deprivation of liberty and serious human impact—should be taken as a last resort. The responsibility is on the issuing state to use less coercive measures if these are available. In the handbook on how to issue an EAW, to which I referred, the section on proportionality encourages the authority considering an EAW to use alternatives, including mutual legal assistance, videoconferencing or a summons. The logic that less restrictive alternatives should be used before issuing an EAW applies regardless of the seriousness of the allegation in question. The amendment therefore ensures that extradition is always considered disproportionate if other measures are available.
The case of Andrew Symeou demonstrates the need for it to be made clear that alternatives should be used in preference to the EAW, irrespective of the offence at issue. The Greek police and prosecution authorities could have made use of mutual legal assistance; for instance by asking UK authorities to obtain evidence from the witnesses who had allegedly incriminated Andrew. These witnesses would have been able to explain that they had been subject to police brutality and did not stand by their earlier evidence, which had been taken under pressure and without the assistance of an interpreter. Instead, the Greek authorities opted to have an EAW issued, requiring Andrew’s extradition to Greece to face trial for allegations which might have been found to be without basis much earlier if MLA had been used. The English court should have been able to refuse Andrew’s extradition on the ground that alternative measures were available. I beg to move.
My Lords, as my noble friend explained, his amendments in this group seek to widen yet further the proportionality bar to extradition in Part 1 cases. As I have already indicated, Clause 138 will allow the UK courts to deal with the long-standing issue of proportionality, which, as I have already said, is a fundamental principle of EU law.
Amendments 77, 79, 80 and 81 would require a judge to consider whether the requesting state has less coercive measures available to it. If so, the judge must bar extradition on proportionality grounds. However, even where such measures may exist, they may not be appropriate in each case, depending on the nature of the crime and other factors such as relevant previous criminal history. It would not be right to require a judge to bar extradition wherever less coercive measures are available. I therefore prefer the existing subsection (3)(c) of the new section inserted by Clause 138—to which my noble friend drew attention—which addresses the issue more attractively than the choice of words proposed in the amendment. That said, the existence of alternatives is clearly a relevant factor, and that is why the clause specifies that this is one of the factors that the judge must take into account when considering proportionality.
Amendment 87 to Clause 140 is consequential on the amendments to Clause 138. It would require a judge to conclude that less coercive measures were available if a person had made a request for temporary transfer, as envisaged by Clause 140, but the issuing state had refused that request unreasonably. This would mean that the judge would have to bar extradition on proportionality grounds. This would require our courts to make an assessment of the rationale of a decision made by the authorities in another member state. Given this, we do not think it appropriate automatically to link a decision not to agree to a temporary transfer with the consideration of proportionality. The EAW framework decision is clear that temporary transfer must be agreed by mutual consent, and it is therefore open to the issuing state to refuse a request, including the UK where we are seeking someone’s extradition to the UK.
My Lords, I support my noble friend’s amendment. The point at issue is the extent to which we are determined to make the physical transfer of somebody the last resort. How easy is it for a state that cannot be bothered to take somebody, on an EAW, without taking all the measures necessary to ensure that the person’s life is interrupted as little as possible? I am not convinced that my noble friend has the balance right, but we need to read carefully the detail of his remarks. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw.
My Lords, I now seek to move Amendment 82 and will speak to Amendment 93. The background to these amendments is the existence of two different types of European arrest warrant: a prosecution warrant where a person is to be prosecuted for a crime, and a conviction warrant where a person has been convicted and has fled to another country, knowingly or unknowingly. As drafted, the Bill provides for a proportionality check for prosecution warrants but not for conviction warrants. Amendment 82 seeks to remedy this by inserting the new clause shown. The amendment creates a proportionality check for EAWs to parallel the existing human rights bar in Section 21 which will, under the Bill, be relevant only to prosecution EAWs.
Fair Trials sees many cases where suspended prison sentences imposed in respect of minor offences have been reactivated, several years after the person left the category 1 territory, with an EAW then being issued on that basis. This leads to the drastic measure of extradition being used inappropriately in respect of minor offences. There is the case of Natalia Gorczowska, who was convicted of possession of 4 grams of amphetamines and given a 10-month suspended sentence. She left to begin a new life; several years later, with no apparent reason for the delay, the sentence was reactivated and, still later, an EAW was issued, leading to significant expense and very nearly to a drastic impact upon her young son’s life. The Committee might like to note that, had the same conduct been the subject of a prosecution EAW, it would probably have fallen to be considered as one of minor gravity and unlikely to attract a lengthy prison sentence in application of the specified matters relating to proportionality to be considered before granting a prosecution EAW but not in the case of considering a conviction warrant.
This rather lengthy amendment to Section 21 allows a proportionality analysis, including a broad range of factors tailored to conviction EAWs. Applying the proposed test, the judge would be able to take into account the person’s conduct and other circumstances when addressing proportionality—for instance, whether the person deliberately evaded onerous community obligations by leaving the country, or whether the sentence was reactivated systematically, long after the person left the country and without his or her knowledge.
Amendment 93 provides discretion to refuse a conviction warrant where the subject is a British national and will serve his or her sentence in a UK prison. The proposed amendment would allow the judge at the extradition hearing to refuse to surrender a person under a conviction EAW if that person is a British resident or national, and if it is possible for them to serve their sentence in the UK. It is worded in similar terms to Section 3(1) of the Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984, which also provides for the issue of a warrant to authorise a person’s detention to serve or complete in the UK a sentence imposed by a foreign court.
Currently, UK courts have no discretion to refuse to extradite a British national or resident to serve a sentence in another country on the basis that it is more appropriate that he or she serves that sentence in the UK. This issue has been highlighted in a number of Fair Trials cases. Individuals have been extradited from the UK following conviction in another jurisdiction yet, following surrender, have been transferred back to the United Kingdom after the lengthy and bureaucratic prisoner transfer process. This is a waste of time and money. UK courts should be given the option of refusing extradition and allowing the defendant to stay in the UK to serve the sentence. Other member states including Belgium, Denmark, Italy and Poland have included this ground for refusal in their implementing legislation.
In the announcement that my noble friend referred to earlier, the Home Secretary stated:
“Where a UK national has been convicted and sentenced abroad, for example in their absence, and is now the subject of a European arrest warrant, we will ask”,
the issuing state’s,
“permission, for the warrant to be withdrawn, and will use the prisoner transfer arrangements instead”.—[Official Report, Commons, 9/7/13; col. 179.]
The flaw in this approach is the possibility that the issuing state will simply not grant permission.
This amendment establishes a legal basis for the judge to refuse extradition and order that the person serves the sentence in the UK. This possibility is provided for in the EAW framework decision, in which paragraph 6 of Article 4 provides that the executing judicial authority may refuse to execute the EAW,
“if the European arrest warrant has been issued for the purposes of execution of a custodial sentence or detention order, where the requested person is staying in, or is a national or a resident of the executing Member State and that State undertakes to execute the sentence or detention order in accordance with its domestic law”.
Given this clear legal basis to provide the judge with discretion to refuse extradition and allow the person to serve the sentence in the UK, it is disappointing that the Government have opted for a slightly different policy, which is not placed on a statutory footing.
The reference to UK nationals in the Home Secretary’s announcement suggests that this reluctance may be because the Government wish the policy to benefit only UK nationals and not non-national residents. It follows clearly from the case law of the Court of Justice that, if the UK implemented paragraph 6 of Article 4 of the EAW framework decision, which applies to both nationals and those staying in or resident of the executing member state, it would not be able to reserve the benefit of this provision to UK nationals only. The drafting in the Bill appears to be a way of avoiding that constraint. However, the policy discriminates in favour of UK nationals and could be the subject of legal challenge, irrespective of whether or not it is placed on a statutory footing.
The policy adopted in lieu of implementation of paragraph 6 of Article 4 of the EAW framework decision is also an ineffective protection. If the issuing state refuses to use the prisoner transfer arrangements, there is no recourse and the person has to be extradited in any event. As the Home Secretary said in her announcement, the proposed change,
“could have prevented the extraditions of Michael Binnington and Luke Atkinson”,
UK nationals who,
“were sent to Cyprus only to be returned to the UK six months later”.—[Official Report, Commons, 9/7/13; col. 179.]
to serve the rest of their sentences. However, this would have been dependent on the Cypriot authorities co-operating. Had Cyprus declined to use the prisoner transfer arrangements, the judge would not have had any legal ground on which to refuse extradition.
It would make more sense for the Government to put the policy on a statutory footing, providing proper protection for UK nationals and other residents whose social reintegration would be served by their serving their sentences in the UK, in line with the relevant provisions of the framework decision. These amendments allow the judge to identify residents on a discretionary basis; equally, Parliament could set reasonable statutory criteria. By example, I understand that Dutch law provides a five-year residence criterion, which has been considered lawful by the Court of Justice of the European Union. I beg to move.
My Lords, as my noble friend has said, Amendment 82 seeks to introduce a proportionality bar for post-conviction cases. As my noble friend Lord Taylor has said, Clause 138 will allow the UK courts to deal with the long-standing issue of proportionality, which is of course a fundamental principle of EU law in cases where a person is sought for prosecution. Under the EAW framework decision, an EAW can be issued in a post-conviction case only if a sentence of at least four months has been imposed. We believe that this is a sufficient proportionality safeguard in such cases.
Perhaps I might also reassure my noble friend that the courts will still consider any representations made that the extradition would breach a person’s human rights—I believe that he mentioned this in his comments. As now, a person would be extradited only if it was compatible with their rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. This includes and applies to those people who are wanted to serve a sentence.
I turn to my noble friend’s Amendment 93. I draw your Lordships’ attention to the terms of the Statement made in July by my right honourable friend the Home Secretary—again, my noble friend referred to this—about the reform of the operation of the EAW to enhance the safeguards available for British citizens wanted for extradition. In that Statement, the Home Secretary set out our commitment to make greater use of EU prisoner transfer arrangements. Where a UK national has been convicted and sentenced abroad, for example in their absence, and is now the subject of a European arrest warrant we will ask for permission for the warrant to be withdrawn and will use the prisoner transfer arrangements instead. My noble friend acknowledged that.
Whereas this policy is limited to UK nationals, Amendment 93, put forward by my noble friend, would broaden the scope of this safeguard beyond UK nationals to those who are resident in the UK, with the consequential impacts that would lead to, including those on the public purse. This Government’s policy is that foreign nationals should, wherever possible, serve their sentences in their home country. Therefore the scope in terms of broadening this beyond UK nationals is not something the Government subscribe to, based on the policy I have indicated. I hope, based on the explanations I have given which underlie the Government’s approach, that he will at this time seek to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I have just one question. As I understood my noble friend’s remarks, he said that we now have an effective proportionality test for conviction warrants. My advice is that we do not have that and that there is no chance of a proportionality test for that.
While he is reflecting, my other point is on the question of how we are going to be able to deal with situations where countries do not collaborate. I appreciate the point about non-national residents. I hope, however, the Government will consider following up examples like that of the Dutch. They have established cases where non-nationals would not qualify and therefore the issue which he very properly raises about the impact on public funds could be avoided.
Could he just confirm that there is a proportionality test for conviction warrants, because as I understand it there is not?
For clarification, I repeat that I said that under the EAW framework, an EAW can only be issued in a post-conviction case if a sentence of at least four months has been imposed. We believe that is the sufficient proportionality safeguard in such cases.
I will not try to absorb all that now; I will read about it in Hansard. In the mean time, I seek to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, in moving Amendment 83, I shall speak also to Amendments 84 to 86. With these amendments I am seeking to address some of the weaknesses of the temporary transfer system. Amendments 83 and 84 seek to ensure that temporary transfers remain temporary. Amendment 83 would insert in proposed new Section 21B the words,
“a specific timeframe within which the person must be returned to the United Kingdom”,
and Amendment 84 would insert the words,
“within the period specified in the judge‘s order made under subsection (5)”.
They make a temporary transfer conditional on the issuing state providing assurance that the person will be returned within the time allotted for the transfer. The purpose of the temporary transfer system is to enable the issuing state to complete certain steps in the criminal case which we referred to earlier, such as charging the person, and to allow the person to return home, without seeking their extradition. However, in the Bill as drafted, there is no system for ensuring the return of the person.
The concern is that a person brought before a judge or court in the issuing state in the course of a temporary transfer could rapidly find themselves processed in accordance with the usual course of procedure and detained pending trial. I believe that it is therefore necessary to enable the judge to obtain specific assurances that the person will be returned within a fixed period by the judge. The amendment allows the judge to refuse to grant a temporary transfer in the absence of such assurances.
Amendments 85 and 86 permit the temporary transfer system to be used more than once. The Bill allows for the temporary transfer scheme to be used once only. I entirely accept that there is a need to ensure that the temporary transfer process is not used repeatedly to delay extradition, but I believe the current restriction to one use may be too blunt. If a new point comes to light later in the proceedings suggesting that further progress could be made by the requested person attending again, then, provided it is not an abuse of the system, the procedure should be available again. It must also be unfair to prevent a requested person using a temporary transfer just because they have previously agreed to a request, perhaps by the requesting state. There is an issue here of equality of arms. I beg to move.
My Lords, the provisions in Clause 140 will allow a person to speak with the authorities in the issuing state before any extradition takes place. The clause allows for the person’s temporary transfer to the issuing state and for the authorities in that state to speak with the person while he or she remains in the UK, for example, via videoconferencing. I understand my noble friend’s concerns that there should be safeguards, but I believe that there are sufficient safeguards already in place.
Both parties must consent to a temporary transfer—a temporary transfer is only possible where the person concerned agrees to it—and in doing so the issuing authority would be agreeing that the person would be returned to the UK. If the person was not returned, the issuing state would, of course, be in breach of that agreement and the clear terms of the European arrest warrant framework decision. Neither are we aware of any cases among our EU partners where such agreements have been disregarded.
Amendments 85 and 86 relate to the circumstances in which a person may make a request for temporary transfer or videoconferencing. I am grateful to my noble friend for bringing to the Committee’s attention the suggestion of allowing more than one request to be permitted by a UK judge.
In this particular case the Government are not persuaded that there are sufficiently compelling arguments for making such a change. Allowing more than one request could be used to delay the extradition process to no good end. We would expect the cases to which my noble friend refers to be very rare, and if such a situation did arise, the individual would still be able to approach the requesting authorities via their legal representatives to provide further information to consider in that case.
Noble Lords are aware, as my noble friend Lord Taylor has emphasised, of the importance we place on getting the balance right between ensuring efficient extradition processes and the protection of the requested person. We believe that this potential for unnecessary delay would outweigh any marginal benefits it may bring.
I therefore hope, with the explanation I have given, that my noble friend will be minded to withdraw his amendment.
I certainly will withdraw it. I am convinced about Amendments 83 and 84, but I cannot see how the ability to get a second temporary transfer is going to cost the Government anything. In fact, it would greatly improve the efficacy in the administration of justice. If I were an EAW subject, I would be very disappointed that because the requesting state had used the temporary transfer system up for its own purposes, I was not then able to use it for myself. It is a shame that we do not have even a measure of equality of arms, always providing for the fact that this should not be allowed to detain and block up the process. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment
In moving Amendment 88, I shall speak also to Amendments 88A and Amendments 89, 90, 91 and 92. Clause 141 is about appeals against EAWs. I note that the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, have tabled a stand part debate to remove this clause. I look forward to hearing their remarks in support of that fairly blunt instrument. My amendments, by contrast, offer my noble friend the Minister a focused, surgical approach to this issue.
Amendments 88 and 90 remove the requirement for leave to appeal. We have spoken about how extradition has an enormous impact on suspects’ lives and those of their families. Given the problems that, for example, Fair Trials regularly sees arising at first-instance extradition hearings, there are concerns about any measure that limits access to appeal courts. The vast majority of those subject to extradition procedures—the “little platoons” that I referred to in my first group of amendments —cannot afford a lawyer and are therefore represented by a duty solicitor. Many duty solicitors have little experience of extradition cases and therefore may not be familiar with the complex conditions of the 2003 Act and associated case law. This can be contrasted with the position of the requesting state, which is automatically entitled to representation by a specialist unit of Crown Prosecution Service lawyers. The complexity of extradition cases also means that there is often inadequate time at a first-instance hearing for consideration of all the relevant facts and issues. If suspects lose their automatic right to appeal then, so long as these problems at first instance remain, there may be cases that result in people being wrongly extradited.
These problems are demonstrated by the recent case of Krzysztof Juszczak, who in February 2013 appealed successfully against extradition to Poland on the basis that his removal from the UK would constitute a disproportionate interference with his family life under Article 8 of the ECHR. Although Mr Juszczak is the primary carer for his severely disabled stepdaughter, this was not raised by the duty solicitor before the district judge, an omission that was criticised as a failure of duty by Mr Justice Collins in his appeal judgment. As this evidence was obtained late in the process, there is a clear danger that under the proposed system Mr Juszczak would have been denied leave to appeal.
I recognise the problems raised in the Sir Scott Baker review in relation to the large number of unmeritorious appeals in the extradition process, and understand the need for a process to ensure that appeals with merit are heard and disposed of more quickly. It must be in the interests of both defendants and the state that the appeal process works to correct genuine errors rather than to delay the judicial process. However, it is surely equally true, and vital, that suspects are given a full opportunity to get a case together and identify any valid grounds on which their extradition should be refused, and any appeal process should reflect that.
The Sir Scott Baker review recommended that any leave-to-appeal test should follow the standard required for judicial review—namely, that the defendant must show an arguable case in order to be allowed to appeal. The inclusion of any higher standard of proof would be inappropriate, not least because the requirement to demonstrate an arguable case, as is the case in the judicial review process, would suffice to weed out those cases with no merit. Leave should be sought on paper, with written reasons provided for the outcome. Defendants must then have a right of appeal against refusal to a judge at an oral hearing. Only the judge at first instance or the High Court judge who would hear the appeal should consider applications for leave to appeal. If all these safeguards were guaranteed, a requirement for leave to appeal might be acceptable.
There has been concern that the lack of information about how the Government’s proposed amendments will work in practice makes it far from clear that they satisfy the above recommendations of the Sir Scott Baker review, and people could still have their lives ruined by an unjust extradition. As this concern remains unanswered in the Bill as currently drafted, the argument regarding appeal remains flawed and liable to create unfairness and inequality of arms. It has also been pointed out that the Government’s proposed amendments did not affect the requesting state’s automatic right to appeal if an extradition request is refused, thus introducing a further inequality of arms into proceedings that are already heavily weighted in favour of requesting states, which have far greater resources than individuals and benefit from a strict “no questions asked” regime that gives courts very little power to refuse extradition.
The Government have taken concerns in this regard into account, with the introduction of a requirement of leave to appeal against discharge at extradition hearing in Clause 141(2), but this amendment proposes that that requirement should also be omitted in line with the proposed approach to appeals against extradition orders in Clause 141(1).
Amendment 88A would extend the deadline for bringing appeals against extradition from seven days to 14. I reiterate my welcome for the introduction of flexibility in relation to appeal deadlines, but I remain concerned that the current drafting may be insufficient to address potential injustices, particularly when linked to the proposed removal of the automatic right to appeal. Given the impact of extradition on individuals, a standard period of seven days to appeal or seek leave is pretty short. This is often exacerbated by the need to obtain evidence from other jurisdictions and can raise enormous challenges when a person decides to change their lawyer after the first-instance hearing.
My Lords, as my noble friend has explained, Clause 141 makes the right of appeal against a decision to order extradition subject to the leave of the High Court. Similarly, it makes the requesting state’s right of appeal against a decision to discharge a person from extradition proceedings subject to the leave of the High Court. Clause 141 also allows the requested person to make an application for leave to appeal out of time in certain circumstances. This does not apply to the requesting state.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, using his blunt instrument, gives me the opportunity to broaden the debate beyond the immediate amendments and explain how this process will work and why the Government feel justified in introducing Clause 141. My noble friend Lord Hodgson, in tabling his Amendments 88 and 90, challenges us on why we are making these changes. At present, a person has an automatic right of appeal against a decision to order his or her extradition, and the requesting state also has an automatic right of appeal against a decision not to order extradition—an important factor to bear in mind.
As noble Lords are aware, the Government commissioned a review by Sir Scott Baker of the UK’s extradition arrangements. One of the key findings of his review was that the success rate of appeals was extremely low: less than 13% in 2010. In other words, the court system is burdened by unmeritorious appeals, a fact to which my noble friend Lord Hodgson referred, which then delay hearings for all appellants and means that justice is deferred. Clause 141 addresses this problem by making appeals subject to permission from the High Court. This filter applies to appeals against, for example, a judge’s decision to order extradition to a Part 1 territory, that is, another member state; a judge’s decision to send a case to the Secretary of State to consider extradition in Part 2 cases, that is, where the requesting country is not an EU member state; and to a decision by the Secretary of State to order extradition in Part 2 cases. To provide parity, it also applies to appeals against decisions to discharge a person.
My noble friend Lord Hodgson asked what sort of issues a court would consider in deciding whether to allow an application to be heard. This will be, as one would expect, a matter for the judge concerned. They will, of course, give full consideration to all the relevant factors raised by the appellant before reaching a decision. We do not think that they are appropriate to be set out in legislation, as it is a matter for the court itself to consider. I understand that noble Lords will have questions about what safeguards will be available. Let me reassure noble Lords that this provision does not prevent anyone from applying for permission to appeal. Once an application has been made, the High Court will decide which cases proceed to a hearing, but each application will be considered by a High Court judge. Furthermore, Clause 141 sets out that the High Court must not refuse to entertain an application for leave to appeal by the requested person solely because it has been submitted outside the normal time period, if the person did everything reasonably possible to ensure that the notice was given as soon as it could be.
That point brings me to the matters that my noble friend Lord Hodgson raised in relation to this in his Amendments 88A, 89, 91 and 92. My noble friend proposes to amend Clause 141 to insert a requirement for the courts to allow an appeal to be made out of time if it is in the interests of justice to do so. As I said, Clause 141 allows the High Court to hear an out-of-time appeal where the person has done everything reasonably possible to bring the appeal as soon as possible. Our approach follows that of the Supreme Court, which ruled last year that out-of-time appeals should only be considered exceptionally. We believe that this provision gets the balance right: the timetable for an appeal is clear and there must be an onus on an appellant to meet the statutory requirements, as happens in the vast majority of cases.
My noble friend is also proposing to extend the time limit for appeals in Part 1 cases from seven days to 14 days. As he has explained, this was one of the recommendations that Sir Scott Baker made in his review of our extradition arrangements. We have therefore considered it very carefully in developing the provisions in the Bill. Our view is that extending the time limit in this way would have no practical effect beyond increasing the likelihood for delay. As I said, we have introduced new protections where people are unable to submit their appeals on time through no fault of their own. We believe that this new provision will address the concerns raised by my noble friend, and indeed by Sir Scott Baker, on this issue.
What safeguards will exist under these new provisions? We do not believe that we are removing any existing safeguards. We need to get the balance right between ensuring proper protection for those subject to an extradition request while ensuring that people do not delay their proper surrender by burdening the courts with unmeritorious appeals. We believe that this approach gets these matters right. The court itself will decide the issues and the relevance of any out-of-time considerations.
The changes set out in Clause 141 will allow the courts to focus their attention on the right appeals, removing the burden of unmeritorious appeals while ensuring that proper safeguards are in place for those subject to extradition. I commend the clause to the Committee and I hope that my noble friend will be prepared to withdraw his amendment, and that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, will see the merit in the clause.
I am grateful to my noble friend for that fulsome reply. I am disappointed that the Government have not seen fit to follow up the Scott Baker proposal for 14 days instead of seven days, given the complexity of the appeal process, particularly when linked to the additional steps that the Government are taking to introduce prohibitions on and difficulties in getting an appeal process going in the first place. Obviously, however, this is not the time to take the argument further. I look forward to reading with care in Hansard tomorrow what the Minister has said. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, Amendment 94, which is concerned with mistaken identity, and Amendment 95 would insert two new clauses into the Bill. Amendment 94 would enable the judge at the extradition hearing—whether it is a prosecution or a conviction warrant—to request more information where there is a real doubt as to whether the person sought is actually the person suspected or convicted. This would be particularly valuable in cases where there is a reasonable belief that the person sought has had his or her identity stolen or where there is a clear case of mistaken identity. In these days of cybercrime, the former is an increasingly common occurrence.
There are currently no grounds in domestic law on which to refuse extradition where there are serious doubts about whether the person sought is the person who committed the crime or is suspected to have committed the crime. Such a situation has arisen in several cases where the person subject to the EAW has had their identity stolen by the real perpetrator or where that perpetrator has identified someone else as the person who committed the offence.
This is demonstrated by the case of Edmond Arapi, who was tried and convicted in his absence in Italy and given a sentence of 16 years. He had no idea that he was wanted for a crime or that the trial or subsequent appeal had taken place until he was arrested at Gatwick Airport in 2009 on an EAW on his way back from a family holiday. The British courts ordered that Edmond be sent to serve the sentence in Italy, despite clear proof that he was at work in the UK on the day of the alleged offence. On the day that the High Court was due to hear his appeal against extradition, the Italian authorities decided to withdraw the EAW following a campaign, admitting that they had sought Edmond in error. He narrowly avoided being separated from his wife and children, including a newborn son, and spending months or years in an Italian prison awaiting a retrial. This amendment is needed to give courts greater discretion to request further information where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person sought under an EAW is the victim of mistaken or stolen identity.
Amendment 95 seeks to clarify the approach that a judge should follow in relation to human rights and provide a stronger basis on which to refuse to execute an EAW on human rights grounds. Many have argued that the underlying assumption of the EAW system—that other Part 1 territories can always be trusted to respect the fundamental rights of those extradited—rests on shaky foundations. For instance, it has been reported that in the years 2007 to 2012, Greece violated Article 6(1) of the ECHR 93 times in criminal cases.
Garry Mann, giving evidence to the Home Affairs Committee, described his 2004 trial in Portugal as follows, stating that,
“the police … just told me it was some kind of public order offence … we went into court and there were 12 of us … we had one interpreter … she would try to say something and pass it down the line of 12, but we did not understand what was going on at all … They asked me what I thought in broken English, but again the judge and the lawyer did not speak much English … I never knew the charge that I was facing until 30 minutes before I was convicted at 11.30 that night … They said there was no time to call any witnesses. I said I would like CCTV; no time to call CCTV”.
An English court later called on to issue a football banning order against Garry refused, finding that the trial had not complied with Article 6 of the ECHR.
The courts have, however, given very short shrift to arguments alleging that extradition would lead to a violation of human rights. In accordance with the concept of mutual trust, on which the operation of the EAW is based, the courts assume that the issuing state will protect the extradited person against any unfairness and that past proceedings giving rise to convictions on which EAWs are based were fair. A person must show that they are at risk of a “flagrant” breach of their fair trial rights in order to resist extradition. The approach is difficult to sustain when there are ongoing systematic deficiencies in a justice system, which are liable to impact upon an extradited person. For instance, the European Court of Human Rights recently found Italy in violation of Article 3 of the ECHR and applied its pilot judgment procedure, recognising that widespread overcrowding was leading to systematic infringements of Article 3. The concept of mutual trust is difficult to defend in such circumstances. If an extradited person is going to be detained in the same prison, it is plainly likely that their human rights will be infringed.
The Government have taken the view that the EAW framework decision implicitly allows refusal to execute an EAW on human rights grounds, relying on recital 12 and Article 1(3) of the framework decision, which affirm that the latter shall not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles, as recognised by Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union and reflected in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. However, the precise content of those fundamental rights obligations is not clear. In her opinion on the Radu case, Advocate-General Sharpston suggested that, under the charter, the test was whether there was a “substantially well founded risk” of a violation which would,
“fundamentally destroy the fairness of the trial”,
a slightly different test from the ECHR flagrancy test. However, for the time being, the precise requirements of fundamental rights are not defined in EU legislation. Accordingly the member states enjoy some discretion to apply fundamental rights as they understand them, provided that this does not compromise the unity and effectiveness of EU law. This amendment therefore falls within the permissible bounds of the EAW framework decision. I beg to move.
My Lords, the additional safeguards that my noble friend has proposed through Amendment 94 seek to introduce matters of mistaken identity. It is not something that we believe is necessary. Clearly, we do not want the wrong people to be extradited; the wider issues relating to identity were carefully considered during the review of the UK’s extradition arrangements. Sir Scott Baker did not find any evidence that a person who was subjected to mistaken identity had actually been surrendered to stand trial. He concluded that there was no need to amend the Act to require a judge to request further information concerning the requesting person’s identity. Nor did the Metropolitan Police, the Crown Prosecution Service or the Crown Office raise concerns about the issue.
I agree with expert opinion and I am not persuaded that a change is needed here. My noble friend asked about the case of Mr Arapi—I will try to avoid talking about particular cases—but, as my noble friend will be aware, Mr Arapi was not extradited and the Italian authorities admitted their error in making the request for him rather than another person of the same name. In his review, Sir Scott Baker found that no amendment was needed to the protections already afforded in the Act with regard to identity as there are already sufficient procedures in place to protect people who are sought as a result of mistaken identity.
The amendment raises the particular issue of a judge being clear that the person who has been arrested and appears in court is the person who is alleged to have committed the crime. This goes to the heart of the trial in the issuing stage. It is not a matter for the UK courts. The courts’ consideration of an extradition request is not one of guilt or innocence but of whether any of the statutory bars to extradition apply.
Turning to Amendment 95, my noble friend seeks to make changes to a judge’s consideration of human rights in EAW cases, including expanding the matters to which the judge should have regard when considering whether extradition would breach a person’s human rights.
We believe that there are already sufficient safeguards in the Extradition Act to allow a judge to bar extradition on human rights grounds. The 2003 Act is drafted to allow the courts to give the fullest possible consideration to human rights issues. We discussed this matter in earlier deliberations in Committee. In all cases, the judge must decide whether extradition would be compatible with the convention rights and must discharge the person if he or she decides that it would not be compatible.
In his review of the UK’s extradition procedures, Sir Scott Baker found that the human rights bar to extradition did not need amending. The review found that the bar did not permit injustice or oppression, and the Government agree with that assessment. We do not accept that a judge’s approach to human rights needs to be changed.
In conclusion, I am very grateful to my noble friend for giving the Committee this opportunity to consider various aspects of Part 12 of the Bill.
Of course, I shall not hesitate at all. Again, I am extremely grateful to my noble friend. He is quite right to remind me that Edmond Arapi was not extradited, although, in the words of the Duke of Wellington, it was “a damn close-run thing” in the sense that the appeal was heard on the day that he was about to go.
I acknowledge the points that my noble friend made concerning the Scott Baker issues of identity and human rights, although I think that identity is going to become more and more important because of cybercrime and people assuming other identities. I think that that will come back for discussion. I am disappointed that we have not been able to find a way through that because, in my view, it will rise in importance and relevance.
My noble friend Lord Lamont asked the critical question: do we have sufficient mutual trust? The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, said that we should have. The point, of course, is that unlike Albania, for which there would be a Part 2 warrant, the process of a Part 1 warrant, which the EAW would be, is a great deal swifter. Standing here on my feet at this moment, I do not know whether the court has more powers to make investigations in the case of a Part 2 warrant, as would be provided by my amendments, than it has in the case of a Part 1 warrant. That is something on which I cannot give an answer off the top of my head. However, I am grateful to my noble friend because I think that he has put his finger on it: is there enough mutual trust?
I am grateful to my noble friend and to the Committee for having let me rabbit on at some length about these issues. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.